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ILLUSTRATIVE

OF THE

BURMESE WAR.

WITH AN

INTRODUCTORY SKETCH

OF THE

Events of the War,

AND

AN APPENDIX.

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COMPILED AND EDITED

By HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, Esq.

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FROM THE GOVERNMENT GAZETTE PRESS, BY G. H. HUTTMANN.

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TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

LORD AMHERST,

Earl of Arracan,

GOVERNOR GENERAL OF BRITISH INDIA;

§c.

§c.

§c.

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ARE

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## INTRODUCTION.

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THE work that is now offered to the Public, makes no pretensions to the character of a History of the late War with the Burman State. Its humbler aim is to provide and preserve materials for the Historian.

The little knowledge Europeans possess of the countries which were the theatre of military operations, has given an interest to all information on the subject, that does not attach to the details of hostilities in countries more visited, and amidst nations better known. It is, therefore, the more expedient to preserve those documents, which originated in recent events, and to present them in a collective and convenient form.

The official papers relating to the war, are scattered through the columns of the Calcutta and London Gazettes, the papers printed for the use of the Court of Proprietors, or House of Commons, and various daily or monthly journals. To bring them together in one compilation has, at least, the merit of accommodation, and must save much trouble to all who wish to refer to them, either as the record of the past, or as a guide for the future.

The intelligent industry of many of the military and civil officers employed in the late war, furnished the Government of India with much valuable topographic and statistical information, which, with great liberality was, in many instances, allowed to be imparted to the public. The communications from this source, which appeared, from time to time, in the Calcutta Government Gazette, have been collected in the present compilation, and appended to the official papers.

## INTRODUCTION.

In the Introductory Sketch by which the documents are preceded, no other object has been proposed, than to supply a succinct and connected view of the events narrated, and a key to the documents which form the substance of the compilation. It is hoped that no omission nor mistake of any importance has been made in the narrative, and should such have occurred, it will easily be corrected by reference to the authorities on which the whole depends.

The Editor is obliged to the kindness of Major Jackson, for the map which accompanies the work, and which will, probably, be thought not the least valuable of the contents of the volume. He is indebted to the same officer for the plan of Rangoon, and for the opportunity of consulting various plans and maps calculated to render his narrative distinct. He is also indebted to Captains Grant and Pemberton, for assistance of a similar description, in opportunities of inspecting their surveys of Tenasserim and Manipur.

*Calcutta, 1st November, 1827.*

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## HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF

# THE BURMESE WAR.

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THE occurrence of hostilities with the neighbouring kingdom of Ava, was an event which was not unforeseen by the British Government of India, as the eventual consequence of the victorious career, and the extravagant pretensions of the Burman state.\*

Animated by the re-action which suddenly elevated the Burmans from a subjugated and humiliated people, into conquerors and sovereigns, the era of their ambition may be dated from the recovery of their political independence, and their liberation from the temporary yoke of the Peguers, was the prelude to their conquest of all the surrounding realms. The vigorous despotism of the Government, and the confident courage of the people, crowned every enterprise with success, and for above half a century the Burman arms were invariably victorious, whether wielded for attack or defence. Shortly after their insurrection against Pegu, the Burmans became the masters of that kingdom. They next wrested the valuable districts of the Tenasserim coast from Siam. They repelled, with great gallantry, a formidable invasion from China, and by the final annexation of Aracan, Manipur, and Asam, to the empire, they established themselves through the whole of the narrow, but extensive tract of country, which separates the western provinces of China from the eastern boundaries of Hindustan. Along the greater part of this territory they threatened the open plains of British India, and they only awaited a plausible pretext to assail the barrier, which, in their estimation, as presumptuously as idly, opposed the further prosecution of their triumphs.

The imperious disposition of the Court of Ava, was manifested at a very early period, and even the liberator of his country, Alompra, not satisfied with disdaining the proffered alliance of the Company, authorised a barbarous massacre of their servants on the island of Negrais, which was never disavowed nor excused by his successors, nor resented by the British Government

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\* Documents 1 and 2.

Government of India.\* Shortly after the conquest of Aracan, a Burman army entered the territories in pursuit of robbers, without any previous representation of the cause of their aggression, or intimation of their purpose—whilst a force of twenty thousand men assembled at Aracan to support the invasion. The advance of a British detachment, under Colonel Erskine, and the prudence of the Burman commander, prevented hostilities; but the presumption of the Burman Government was so far encouraged, that the principal individuals who had incurred its displeasure were secured, and delivered to its vengeance.† The communication thus opened, was thought to afford a favourable occasion for a pacific mission, and Colonel Symes was, accordingly, despatched on that object. The reception of the Envoy, however, as detailed by himself, clearly exhibits the interpretation given to it by the Court, and they evidently regarded it as the tribute of fear, rather than as an advance towards liberal conciliation and civilised intercourse.‡

Upon the subjugation of Aracan, great numbers of the native population fled from the cruelty and oppression of their conquerors, and either found an asylum in the district of Chittagong, or secreted themselves amongst the hills and thickets, and alluvial islands, along its southern and eastern boundaries: from these haunts, they occasionally sallied, and inflicted upon the Burmans in Aracan, a feeble retaliation for the injuries they had sustained: retiring to their fastnesses, when their purpose was effected, or when encountered by superior force. In general, their efforts were insignificant, and their incursions were rather predatory than political; but in § 1811, a more formidable invasion took place, and the fugitives having collected under the command of Khyberring, a Mug Chief, attempted an aggression of a serious character. They were joined by many of the Mugs from Chittagong, and being aided by those still resident in Aracan, they soon overran that province, and recovered the whole of it, except the capital, from the Burmans. Their success was transient. Reinforcements arrived from Ava. Khyberring was defeated, and his followers put to the route, and the insurgents were compelled to return to their hiding places on the frontiers of Chittagong. Although every exertion was made by the police of Chittagong, aided by the military, to prevent all assemblages of armed men in the district, and to disperse them as soon as formed, the nature of the country, and the general devotion of the Mug population

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\* On these subjects, Dalrymple's Repertory furnishes some characteristic details.—Vol. I. pages 151 and 394.

† Of this transaction, Dr. Hamilton remarks, "The opinion that prevailed both in Chittagong and at Ava was, that the refugees were given up from fear, and this opinion has, no doubt, continued to operate on the ill-informed Court of Ava, and has occasioned a frequent repetition of violence and insolence, ending in open war. The consequence of this will, no doubt, be fatal to Ava, but may produce subsequent difficulties to the Government of Bengal. These evils might possibly have been avoided by a vigorous repulse of the invasion in 1794, and a positive refusal to hearken to any proposal for giving up the insurgents, after the Court of Ava had adopted hostile measures in place of negotiation, to which alone it was entitled. *Account of the frontier between the southern part of Bengal and Ava.—Edinburgh Journal of Science, for October, 1825.*

‡ Symes's Mission to Ava, 8vo. 1. 275. See also Cox's Burman Empire.

§ Calcutta Annual Register for 1821.



population to the cause of Khynberring, rendered every measure of pacification inefficacy, whilst the issue of the insurgents in such numbers from the Company's territories, and the command of an individual who had resided many years under the protection of the local authorities, did certainly afford reason to the Court of Ava to suspect that the invasion was instigated and supported by the British Government. In order to efface such an impression, letters were addressed to the Raja of Aracan, and Viceroy of Pegu, and Captain Canning was sent on a mission to Ava, to offer every necessary explanation. These advances were unsuccessful, and the Envoy, after experiencing much indignity at Rangoon, and incurring some personal peril, was recalled to Bengal, without communicating with the capital. As long as the chiefs of the insurgents were at large, the Burman Government declined all amicable communication. They insisted upon the seizure of the obnoxious individuals, and their delivery by the British officers, or threatened to overrun the district of Chittagong, with a force more than sufficient for their apprehension. This menace was frustrated by the presence of a body of troops, but due attention was paid to the just claims of the Burman Government, and parties were dispatched against the fugitives, and rewards offered for their capture. Khynberring escaped; but several of his chief followers were secured. Common humanity forbade their being resigned to the barbarity of the Burmese, and the refusal to deliver them was a source of deep and long cherished resentment to the Court of Ava. After a few years of a precarious and fugitive life, during which, deserted by his followers, and straitened by the vigilance with which his movements were watched by both British and Burmese, Khynberring was deprived of the means of doing mischief, that chieftain died, and left the Court of Ava no cause of complaint against the Government of British India.\*

The death of Khynberring, the dispersion of his adherents, and the confinement of the principal leaders, produced a favorable change in the state of the country, and divested such disturbances as subsequently occurred of all national or political importance. The insurgents generally manifested a disposition to return quietly to their homes, but a few, unable to resume at once habits of tranquil industry, continued to lurk in the hills and jungles of Chittagong, under the command of Kyngjang, a chief of Khynberring's party, who continued at large. At first, his band did not consist of more than thirty followers, but it gradually increased to about a hundred, and with these he committed some predatory excesses, but solely upon the subjects of the British Government; being impelled to this conduct by the terror of a prison and the want of food. The depredations of this chief, and his adherents, were speedily checked by the activity of the magistrate, and in May 1816, were finally suppressed by the surrender of the chief. Their existence, however, furnished the Court of

Ava,

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\* Although we have thought it advisable to refer to these occurrences, as explanatory of the feelings which have since influenced the Court of Ava, we do not conceive it essential to enter into them in detail, nor to record the authorities upon which the preceding summary is founded. The events of the period are narrated in the works, which we have cited, or form the bulk of the papers, printed by order of the House of Commons, in May 1825, to which, therefore, we refer our readers for any further illustration, which they may think the subject requires.

Ava, with no additional ground of complaint, as they were restricted to the territories of the Company.

The perfect immunity of the Burman frontiers from aggression for a period of two years, and the repeated assurances of the British Government of India, that, as far as depended upon their officers, this desirable state of things should be perpetuated, might have satisfied the Government of Ava of the sincerity of the pledge, and justified the expectation that amicable relations would be permanently formed.

The second year, however, of the restoration of tranquillity on the confines of the two states had not quite expired, when the demand for the surrender of the Mug refugees was renewed by the son of the Raja of Ramree, who brought a letter from his father to that effect.\* The magistrate of Chittagong was directed to reply to the letter of the Raja of Ramree, but the Governor General, the Marquis of Hastings, thought it advisable to address a letter to the Viceroy of Pegu, in which it was stated, for the purpose of being communicated to the King of Ava, that "the British Government could not, without a violation of the principles of justice, deliver up those who had sought its protection, that the existing tranquillity and the improbable renewal of any disturbances rendered the demand particularly unseasonable, and that whilst the vigilance of the British officers should be directed to prevent and punish any enterprize against the province of Aracan, it could lead to no advantageous result to either state to agitate the question of the delivery of the insurgents any further." No notice was ever taken of this letter, and the silence of the Court of Ava, for some time afterwards, confirmed the Government of Bengal in the belief, that "there was not the least reason to suspect the existence or the future contemplation of any hostile design on the part of the Burmese Government," in consequence of which impression, the Government countermanded "the extraordinary preparations of defence against the Burmese, which had been adopted upon the general tenor of the intelligence obtained after the receipt of the communication from Ramree, the knowledge possessed by Government of the arrogant spirit of the Court of Ava, and the extreme jealousy which it had always entertained of the protection granted, by the British authorities, to the emigrant Mugs."†

The impression thus entertained was, by no means justified by the result, and after the expiration of another twelve month, a second letter was received from the Raja of Ramree, making a demand, on the part of the King of Ava, for the cession of Ramoo, Chittagong, Moorshehabad, and Dacca, on the alleged grounds of their being ancient dependencies of Aracan, now annexed to the Burman dominions, and filled with extravagant and absurd menaces, in the event of a refusal to comply with the requisition. A letter in reply, was written to the Viceroy of Pegu, treating this demand as the unauthorised act of the Raja of Ramree, and stating, that "if the Governor General could suppose it to have been dictated by the King of Ava, the British Government would be justified in considering it as a declaration of war." The

letter

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\* Documents No. 3 and 4.

† Public Letter to the Honorable the Court of Directors, of the 20th December, 1817.

letter from the Raja, it may be observed, was never disavowed, and the demands it conveyed as well as the tone, in which they were expressed, could not have emanated from a subordinate officer, if he had not been previously armed with the full authority of the Court. Nor, in fact, was the demand altogether new, although now, for the first time, directly urged. The claim was repeatedly advanced both in public and in private, as far back as 1797, when Captain Cox was at Amerapura, and it must even then have been familiar to the discussions of the administration.\* It was therefore, not the unauthorised impertinence of a provincial governor, but the expression of sentiments long entertained by the Government of Ava, and presently, as we shall observe, explicitly avowed by other and more important of its functionaries. Had not the attention of the Government of India been directed to more emergent considerations in other quarters, there is no doubt that a satisfactory explanation of so extraordinary a procedure would have been insisted on, or that the alternative would, as intimated by Lord Hastings, have then been war.

The successful termination of hostilities in central India, was, perhaps, one cause of the subsequent silence of the Burmese Government, but other reasons may be found in the death of the King of Ava, who expired in 1819, in the arrangements consequent upon the succession of the reigning prince, the active interference of the Court of Ava in the politics of Asam, and the reduction of that country to its authority.†

The constitution of Asam comprised even to a greater extent than usual with Asiatic Governments, the seeds of civil dissension. Although the Government was hereditary in the same family, the choice of a successor rested with the King, or the great council, or the persons of most authority in the state. These were also, for the greater part, hereditary, not only as to rank, but function, and the son of a minister ordinarily succeeded to his father's post. The chief ministers were three in number, the Barputra Gohain, the Bara Gohain, and the Boora Gohain : next to these was the Bar Barua, or great secretary, and then came the Phokuns and Baruas, who filled the different public offices of the state, and were mostly supposed to be descended from the original companions of the founders of the ruling dynasty, in consequence of which they were entitled to the influence and authority they enjoyed.

#### Amidst

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\* "A desultory conversation then took place, in which the Woonghees, Woondoks, and others indifferently joined. One advanced, that Chittagong, Luckipore, Dacca, and the whole of the Casimbazar island, formerly made part of the ancient dominions of Arracan, that the remains of chokeys and pagodas were still to be seen near Dacca, and that they would further prove it from the Arracan records, and hinted, that his Majesty would claim the restitution of those countries. Cox's Burmhan Empire. p. 300. The Woondok again brought forward his Majesty's claims on the ancient territory of Arracan, and reduced it to the form of a demand of half of the revenues of Dacca. p. 302. The Woondok renewed the subject of the Burmhan claims on Dacca, &c., but lowered the demand to one-tenth of the revenues. He said it was evident, we were dubious of our right, by Captain Symes having so strenuously urged the building of a chokey on the Naaf, to mark that river as the boundary between the two countries. Had the Naaf been the proper boundary, there was no occasion for Captain Symes's agitating the subject : we had betrayed our consciousness of our want of right by his solicitude on that occasion. They have publicly said, that three thousand men would be sufficient to wrest from us the provinces they claim." p. 304. So little change did nearly thirty years effect in the ideas of the Burman Court.

† Document No. 8.



Amidst these individuals, jealousy and intrigue were always busy, and the annals of Asam present a singular picture of intestine discord. It was, however, between the Rajas and the Gohains, that the principal struggle prevailed, in which the Boora Gohain had acquired an irresistible ascendancy, and subsequently to the year 1796, usurped the sovereign authority, the Raja being a mere cypher in his hands.

Upon the death of Raja Kamaleswar in 1810, his brother, Chandra Kant, was raised by Purnanand, the Boora Gohain, to the throne, but the new Raja soon became impatient of the controul of a servant, and encouraged his adherents to enter into a conspiracy against his minister. The plot was, however, discovered : the Raja was obliged to disavow all participation in it, and his adherents were put to death with the most horrible cruelty. The Bara Phokun, who was one of the conspirators, made good his escape to Calcutta, where he applied, on behalf of his master, to the British Government. Meeting with but little encouragement in that quarter, he had recourse to the Burman Envoys then at the presidency, and accompanying them on their return to Ava, immediately procured military succors. Six thousand Burmans, and eight thousand auxiliaries, accompanied him to Asam, where the Boora Gohain had breathed his last, two days before their arrival. The son of that minister, who succeeded to his father's station and ambition, retreated to Gohati on the approach of the Burmans, leaving the Raja at Jorhath to welcome their arrival, and reward the activity of the Bara Phokun, by making him his minister. The Burmans were reimbursed their expences, and dismissed with honour, and a female of the royal family was sent with valuable presents to Amerapura.

The services of the Bara Phokun were unable to protect him against the effects of court intrigue, and the Bara Barua and Bara Gohain influenced Chandra Kant, to put him treacherously to death, on which his friends and kindred fled to Ava. In the mean time, the son of the late Boora Gohain, inheriting his father's resentment against the reigning Raja, invited a Prince of the royal family, Purandar Sinh, who had resided sometime in obscurity, to become a competitor for the throne, and in his cause, defeated and deposed Chandra Kant. Purandar Sinh was satisfied with slitting an ear of his rival, a mutilation which was held to disqualify him for the regal dignity.

The Court of Amerapura, on hearing of the murder of their ally, the Bara Phokun, despatched a large army to Asam to avenge his fate. The force entered the country early in 1818, and were opposed at Najeera, a place three days from Jorhath, with some spirit, but a panic seizing the Asamese commander, he fell back to Jorhath, from whence Purandar Sinh and his party retreated to Gohati. Attributing, apparently, the murder of the Bara Phokun to Chandra Kant's advisers, rather than to himself, the Burmans re-established that Prince in his authority, and on their departure, left a division, under Maha Thilwa, for his defence. The Bara Barua and the Bara Gohain were taken, and put to death at Rangpur. Upon the advance of the Burman force to Gohati, Purandar Sinh and the Boora Gohain took refuge in the territories of the Company. Their surrender was demanded by Chandra Kant.

A very short interval elapsed when Chandra Kant's brother-in-law, and one of his ministers, having incurred the displeasure of the Burman general, was put to death by his order.

This



This act having alarmed the Raja for his own safety, he fled with his sister to Gohati, and although Maha Thilwa endeavoured, by professions of friendship, to dissipate his alarm, he could not be induced to trust himself again in the power of the Burman general. In resentment of his mistrust, a great number of Asamese were put to death. Chandra Kant retaliated on the Burman officers who had been deputed to persuade him to return, and the bitterest enmity separated him from his allies. The Burman commander sent a force against him, which compelled him to evacuate Gohati, and retreat towards the British frontier. There, however, he made head against his enemies, and having purchased supplies of arms and ammunition, and being joined by a number of the Asamese, he became, in his turn, triumphant, and at the end of 1821 had again established his authority over the western part of Asam, as far as to the vicinity of Jorhath. His success, however, was of no long duration, for in the beginning of 1822, the Burmese in Asam, who had set up another pretender to the throne, were joined by considerable reinforcements from Ava, under Menghee Maha Bandoola, an officer of rank and military ability. Chandra Kant was defeated at Mahagar-ghat in an action, in which he displayed great personal bravery, and was compelled to seek safety once more in flight. He refrained from retiring to the Company's territories, but the Burman commander anticipating that he would take that direction, addressed a letter and message to the officer commanding on the frontier, stating, that although it was his wish to remain on friendly terms with the Company, and to respect the British authorities, yet, should protection be given to Chandra Kant, he had received orders to follow him wherever he might go, and to take him by force out of the British dominions.\* Although it was not thought likely that these menaces would be enforced, yet orders were, in consequence, sent to the Magistrate, that should Chandra Kant or any of his party appear within his district, they should be disarmed and sent to a distance, and measures were taken to strengthen the force on the frontier. In the meantime, a general feeling of insecurity prevailed amongst the inhabitants of Rungpore, and on various occasions, parties of Burmese crossing the river, committed serious devastations within the British territory, burning a number of villages, and plundering and murdering the inhabitants, or carrying them off as slaves. These proceedings, when complained of, were disavowed, but no redress was ever obtained.

The pretence of maintaining the lawful Prince in possession of his throne, was soon abandoned by the Burmans, and a chief of their own nation was appointed to the supreme authority in Asam. The vicinity of a powerful and ambitious neighbour was therefore substituted for a feeble and distracted state, and this proximity was the more a subject of reasonable apprehension, as, from the the country being intersected by numerous rivers, and from the Burmese being equally prepared to combat by water as by land, it was at any time in their power to invade and plunder the British provinces, without its being possible to offer effective opposition, or to intercept their retreat, under the existing constitution of our defensive force. It was also to be anticipated, from the known pretensions of the Burmese, and the spirit they had

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\* Document No. 9.

had invariably displayed, that it would not be long before they found some excuse for disturbing the amicable relations which, chiefly through the forbearance of the British Government, in not exacting retribution for the injuries offered to its subjects, were still suffered to subsist on the frontiers of Asam. This anticipation was speedily realised. An island in the Bramahputra, on which the British flag had been erected, was claimed by the Burmese; the flag thrown down, and an armed force collected to maintain the insult.\* It does not appear that this conduct was ever resented, but sickness weakening the Burmese force in Asam, and the rising of some of the native tribes engrossing their attention, they desisted for the time, from their unwarrantable encroachments. They were, however, likely to renew them whenever the opportunity was convenient, and a sense of insecurity could not fail to be entertained by the authorities in Asam, until the actual occurrence of war relieved the apprehension by the certainty of danger.

The threatening attitude of the Burmese, at either extremity of the frontier, now rendered it incumbent on the British Government to advert to the position which they likewise occupied in the more central portion, and to take such measures as were at once practicable for the defence of the eastern provinces. With this view they determined to accede to a requisition that had been some time under their consideration, and to take the principality of Cachar under British protection, by which arrangement they were enabled to occupy the principal passes into the low lands of Sylhet, and thus effectively oppose the advance of the Burmans from the district of Manipur, which they had some short time previously reduced to their authority.†

Bhogi Chandra, Raja of Manipur, who died about 1796, left several sons, of whom the eldest, Hersha Chandra, succeeded. After a few years, he was put to death by the brother of one of his father's wives, but this chief was speedily slain by Madhu Chandra, the second son of the late Raja. He was killed after a reign of four or five years by his brother Chourajit, who then became Raja. Of the remaining brothers, Marjit fled to the Court of Ava, and Gambhir Sinh continued in Manipur. After repeated alternations of reconciliation and animosity, Marjit, having obtained a strong Burmese force, invaded Manipur about 1812, and succeeded in dispossessing his elder brother, and compelling him to fly. Chourajit took refuge first in Cachar, and subsequently in Jyntea. The youngest brother, Gambhir Sinh, after residing with Marjit for a twelve month, found it also expedient to leave the principality, and he entered into the service of Govinda Chandra, the Raja of Cachar, by whom he was invested with the command of his troops. In 1817, the new sovereign of Manipur invaded the neighbouring state of Cachar, on which the Raja fled into Sylhet, and solicited the aid of the British Government, offering to hold his country under an acknowledgement of dependency. As these offers were declined, he had recourse to the brothers of the Raja of Manipur, and invited Chourajit from Jyntea, promising to divide with him and Gambhir Sinh, the territory of Cachar, as the price of their services. The succour of the two brothers, and the exertions of his own adherents, proved effectual, and Marjit

was

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\* Documents Nos. 10, 11, 12. † Document No. 13.

was compelled to withdraw to Manipur. The allies of the Cachar Prince were, eventually, equally detrimental to his interests, and Chourajit and Gambhir Sinh uniting their forces against Govinda Chandra, expelled him in 1820, from Cachar, and divided the country between them. Govinda Chandra again took refuge in the Company's territories. Some time afterwards, probably after the death of the King of Ava, Marjit was summoned to Amerapura, and declining to comply with the summons, a powerful Burman force was sent against him, which drove him from the country, and annexed Manipur to the Burman empire, connecting and concentrating its conquests in this direction. Marjit was received by his brothers in Cachar, with kindness, and a portion of their principality was assigned to him. This harmony did not last long, and Chourajit and Gambhir Sinh disagreeing, the former was defeated, and fled into the Company's territories. On this occasion, Chourajit tendered his interest in Cachar to the Company. The Burmese taking advantage of these dissensions, now prepared to invade Cachar, on which, both Marjit and Gumbhir Sinh hastened to invoke the support of the British Government of India, and for the reasons above referred to, it was determined, that Cachar should be taken under the protection of the Company. The same was extended, upon his request, to the Raja of Jyntea. Notwithstanding the intimation of these determinations to the Burmese, they persisted in their purpose of invading Cachar, and thereby provoked the commencement of actual hostilities in that quarter, as will be hereafter noticed : in the mean time, the discussions on the side of Chittagong had assumed a decided tone, and left the question of peace or war between the two states no longer a subject of speculation.

The insolence of the Burman authorities in Aracan and the adjacent countries, had not been restricted to the extravagant menaces which have been noticed. Repeated instances of actual aggression had still more distinctly marked either their intention of provoking hostilities, or their indifference as to their occurrence. The chief objects of these acts of violence were the elephant hunters in the Company's employ, whom the Burmese seized, and carried off repeatedly, under the pretext, that they were within the territories of the King of Ava : a pretext that had never been urged throughout the long series of years, during which the Company's hunters\* had followed the chase in the jungles and hills of the eastern frontier. In May 1821, the Burmese carried off from the party employed in the Ramoo hills, the Darogah, the Jemadar, and twenty-three of their men, on whom they inflicted personal severities, and then threw them into confinement at Mungdoo, demanding from the prisoners a considerable sum for their ransom.

In the following season, or February 1822, the outrage was reiterated : the party employed at the Keddah, was attacked by an armed force, dispersed, and six of the hunters were carried off to Aracan, where they were thrown into prison, and threatened with death, unless they paid a heavy ransom. The place whence these people were carried off was, undoubtedly, within the Company's territory, being considerably to the west of the Morassi rivulet,

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\* Documents Nos. 14 and 15.



rivulet, which, in 1794, had been acknowledged by the Burmans to separate the two states. Urgent applications were made therefore, to the Raja of Aracan, to release his unfortunate captives, and a representation on the subject was made to the Court of Ava, but no notice was taken of either application. Several of the people, after experiencing much ill usage, were released, but some died in captivity. The object of the Burmans was evidently to establish themselves, by intimidation, upon the hilly and jungly tracts, which were calculated to afford them a ready and unexpected entrance into the level and cultivated portions of Chittagong.

The same system of violence was adopted in another part of the Chittagong district, in order to maintain pretensions to territorial jurisdiction equally unfounded with those made upon the elephant grounds of Ramoo, and in like manner, without communication with the local authorities. A boat laden with rice, having, in January 1823, entered the nullah, which is on the British side of the Naf, was followed by an armed Burmese boat, which demanded duty.\* As the demand was unprecedented, the Mugs, who were British subjects, demurred payment, on which the Burmese fired upon them, killed the manjee, or steersman, and then retired. This outrage was followed by reports of the assemblage of armed men on the Burmese side of the river, for the purpose of destroying the villages on the British territory, and in order to provide against such a contingency, as well as to prevent the repetition of any aggression upon the boats trafficking on the Company's side of the river, the military guard at Tek Naf was strengthened from twenty to fifty men, of whom a few were posted on the adjoining island of Shahpuri.

The determination thus shewn by the British authorities to maintain the integrity of their frontier was immediately resented by the Burmese, and the Mungdoo Ucherung, or police officer, to whom the conduct of these transactions was committed by the Viceroy of Aracan, was urgent with the Magistrate of Chittagong to withdraw the guard, asserting the right of the King of Ava to the island, and intimating his having authority from the Viceroy to declare, that if the detachment was not immediately recalled, the consequence would be a war between the two countries.

The Raja of Aracan was therefore addressed on the subject, who replied by reiterating the demand for the concession of Shahpuri.† In answer to his demand,‡ the right of the Company was asserted, but at the same time a disposition to investigate the claim in a deliberate and friendly manner was expressed, and a proposal was made, that Commissioners on the part of either Government should be deputed in the ensuing cold season, to meet and determine all questions respecting the disputed territory on the borders. Before this reply could have reached the Raja, however, he proceeded to carry his threat of applying force, into execution, under the express orders, as was carefully promulgated, of his sovereign the King of Ava. A body of one thousand Burmese, under the Raja of Ramree, landed on Shahpuri, on the night of the 24th September, attacked the British post, and killed three, and wounded four of the sipahees stationed

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\* Document No. 16.

† Do. No. 17.

‡ Do. No. 18.

stationed there, and drove off the rest off the island. The Burmese then returned to the main land.\*

The act was reported to the Bengal Government, in a menacing letter from the Raja of Aracan himself, stating, that unless the British Government submitted quietly to this treatment, it would be followed by the like forcible seizure of the cities of Dacca and Moorshedabad.†

Notwithstanding the assertions of the Burmese, that the island of Shahpuri had belonged to their Government, the earliest records of the Chittagong jurisdiction, shewed that it had been always included in the British province, that it had been surveyed and measured by British officers, at different periods from 1801 to 1819, and that it had been repeatedly, although not uninterruptedly, held by Mug individuals, under deeds from the Collector's office, ever since 1790.‡ It lay on the British side of the main channel of the Naf, and the stream which separated it from the Chittagong shore was fordable at low water. With these facts in its favour, however, the British Government invariably expressed its readiness to investigate the subject in a friendly manner, which offer being met by the forcible irruption of the Burmese, placed them under the necessity of upholding their character, as well as vindicating their rights.

It was not the value of the island of Shahpuri, which was, in fact, of little worth, being of small extent, and affording only pasturage for cattle, that was in dispute. The reputation of the British Government, and the security of their subjects, enjoined the line of conduct to be adopted, and, in fact, the mere possession of Shahpuri was clearly not the object of the Burman court. The island was avowedly claimed upon the very same pretext, as the provinces of Chittagong, Dacca, and Moorshedabad, and its abandonment would have been an encouragement of other and more serious demands. It was, therefore, no more than prudent to make a stand at once in this quarter, with the view of deterring the Burmese from the further prosecution of those encroachments, which they evidently projected.

In order, however, to avoid till the last possible moment, the necessity of hostilities, the Government of Bengal, although determined to assert their just pretensions, resolved to afford to the Court of Ava an opportunity of avoiding any collision. With this intent, they resolved to consider the forcible occupation of Shahpuri, as the act of the local authorities alone, and addressed a declaration to the Burman Government, recapitulating the past occurrences, and calling upon the Court of Ava to disavow their officers in Aracan. The tone of this dispatch was that of firmness, though of moderation, but when rendered into the Burman language, it may, probably, have failed to convey the resolved and conciliatory spirit, by which it was dictated, as subsequent information of the most authentic character established the fact of its having been misunderstood, as a pusillanimous attempt to deprecate the resentment of the Burmese, and it was triumphantly appealed to at the Court of Ava, as a proof, that the British Government of India was reluctant to enter upon the contest, be-  
cause

\* Document No. 19.

† Do. No. 22.

‡ Do. No. 149.

cause it was conscious of possessing neither courage nor resources to engage in it with any prospect of success. The declaration was forwarded in a ship bound to Rangoon, with a letter addressed to the Viceroy of Pegu.\*

In the mean time, the island in dispute was re-occupied. Two Companies of the 20th Regiment, which had been forwarded from Calcutta, were landed on Shahpuri, on the 21st November,† and stockaded on the island: no opposition was offered, nor did any Burmese appear. A proclamation was distributed at the same time, stating, that the only object of the detachment was the re-occupation of the island, and that the intercourse of the people on the frontier, should suffer no interruption from their presence. The force left on the spot was two Companies of the 20th Battalion 20th Regiment Native Infantry, and two field pieces, six pounders, on the stockade at Shahpuri: one Company at Tek Naf, and the *Planet*, armed vessel, and three gun-boats, each carrying a twelve-pounder carronade, were stationed in the Naf.

Although no resistance was offered to the occupation of the island, yet, a variety of concurrent reports, and the unreserved declaration of the Burmese officers with whom communications were entertained, made it evident, that the result would be a war between the two states. Certain information, also, that the Burmese were collecting troops, both in Asan and Aracan, and menaced an attack upon the different exposed points of the Company's frontier, rendered it necessary, that the Bengal Government should look to the occurrence of hostilities, as an impending contingency.‡ Under this impression, the correspondence that had taken place was referred to the Commander-in-chief, who, during a great part of the time, had been absent on his military tour to the upper provinces. His Excellency was also requested to take the subject into his consideration, and provide, as he might think most advisable, for the defence of the frontier, as well as for the system of offensive operations, that might be expedient, should war between the two states become inevitable.

In reply to this communication, the Commander-in-chief suggested, that for the defence of the eastern frontier, three brigades should be formed, to consist of three thousand men each, to be stationed at Chittagong, Jumulpore, and Goalpara, and a strong corps of reserve, to be posted under a senior commanding officer in Dinagepore, to which all communications should be made; and from whence all orders should be issued. His Excellency also urged the formation of an efficient flotilla on the Burrampootra, towards Asam, and in the vicinity of Dacca. The course of operations on the frontier, he recommended, should be strictly defensive, or, at the utmost, limited to the re-establishment of the states subdued by the Burmese, whilst the offensive system, which was likely to be the only effectual mode of punishing the insolence of the Burmese, was an attack from sea, on such points of their coast, as should offer the best prospect of success.§ In a subsequent dispatch, in reply to a further communication from the Supreme Government, his Excellency declared his conviction, that the conduct of the Burmese had rendered hostilities inevitable; and reported the dispositions

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\* Documents Nos. 20 and 21.

† Do. No. 26.

‡ Do. No. 23.

§ Do. No. 24.



dispositions which had been made for the defence of the eastern frontier ; and the views adopted by the members of Government at the presidency, being thus confirmed by the sentiments of the Commander in Chief, arrangements were adopted for carrying on the war upon the principles in which he had concurred.\*

In the end of October, information was received by the Commissioner of the N. E. frontier, that the Burmese were concentrating their troops in Asam, for a military expedition, which, in the first instance, was intended for Cachar, and, according to general report, eventually against the British territories.† Instructions were sent to the Commissioner, to lose no time in apprising the Burman Government of Asam, that Cachar was placed under British protection, and warning it to abstain from any project of molesting that country, and that any attempt against it would be regarded as an act of hostility, and communications were accordingly made by him repeatedly to that effect, to the authorities in Asam. A force was also advanced from Dacca to Sylhet, consisting part of the 1st Battalion of the 10th (14th) Native Infantry, three companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 23d, (46th) Native Infantry, four companies of the Rungpore local corps, and a few guns : divisions of which, under Captains Johnstone and Bowe, and Major Newton, were posted at Bhabrapur, Jatrapur, and Talain, in advance of the Sylhet frontier, and covering that station against an attack from either of the directions in which it was menaced.

These arrangements were scarcely matured, when events justified their policy. The Burman armies, notwithstanding the representations of the Commissioner in Asam, entered Cachar in different quarters,‡ and it became necessary to resist their progress, before they occupied positions, which would give them the command of the Sylhet frontier, where their irruption into Cachar had already spread a general panic, and inflicted much serious mischief, causing many of the Ryots to abandon their homes, and materially impeding the collection of the public revenue. As it was evident, that there was little hope of attention being paid to any representation, or remonstrance, the British officers were instructed by the Civil authority, to oppose the advance of the Burmans by force, and hostilities shortly ensued.

In the early part of January, a force of about four thousand Burmans and Asamese advanced from Asam into the province of Cachar, to the foot of the *Bherteka* pass, and began to stockade themselves at Bikrampore.§ Intelligence was also received that the troops under Gambhir Sinh, had been defeated by a Burman force from Manipur, and that a third Burman division was crossing into Jyntea, immediately to the north of the station of Sylhet. It was therefore judged advisable by Major Newton, the officer commanding on the Sylhet frontier, to concentrate his detachment at Jatrapur, a Cachar village about five miles beyond the boundaries of Sylhet, and thence advance against the invading party from Asam, before they should have time to compleat their entrenchments. The British division accordingly marched at two A. M. on the 17th January, and at day-break came in sight of the stockade, whence a few shots were fired upon the advanced guard. An attack upon the positions was immediately made in

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\* Document No. 25.

† Do. No. 27.

‡ Do. No. 19.\*

§ Do. No. 20.\*

two divisions, one commanded by Captain Johnstone, upon the south face of the stockade, and the other under Captain Bowe, upon the village adjoining. The Burmans in the village presently gave way, but those in the stockade made a resolute resistance. The Burmans lost about a hundred men, whilst six Sipahis were killed on the part of the British. The Burmans who escaped, fled to the hills.

Shortly after the action of the 17th January, the Commissioner, Mr. Scott, arrived at Sylhet, and thence advanced to Bhadrapur, to maintain a more ready communication with the Burmese authorities. On the 31st of January, a messenger sent by the Magistrate, returned to camp, and from his information, as well as a letter previously received, it appeared, that the Burmese Generals professed to have advanced into Cachar upon an application formerly made by the Ex-Raja, Govind Chandra, for assistance, and that they had orders to follow and apprehend Chorajit, Marjit, and Gambhir Sinh, wherever they might take refuge. In reply, a letter was addressed to the General commanding in Asam, stating, the English Government had no objection to the re-establishment of Govind Chandra under their protection, and that the interference of a Burman army for this purpose could not be permitted: that although the Manipur Chiefs could not be delivered up, they should be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of the province, and finally, the Burmese were required to evacuate the country, or the forces of the British Government would be compelled to advance both into Cachar and Asam.\* It was also intimated, that any attempt upon Jyntea, which it was known was in contemplation, would be resisted.† A letter had, in fact, been addressed by the Commander of the Asam force, to the Raja of Jyntea, calling upon him, and his ministers, whoever they might be, to bow in submission and send offerings, and ordering the Raja to come to the Burmese camp. The Raja had, accordingly, thrown himself upon the British Government for protection.‡

To these communications, no answer was received, the Burman Commander declaring he would give none, until he had received instructions from Ava. The messengers sent by the Commissioner were also detained for a considerable period in the Burmese camp under different pretexts, and it was evidently the object of the Burmese to procrastinate the negotiations, until they had strengthened themselves in the position they occupied, which they might then hope to maintain until the state of the weather rendered it impossible to act against them with advantage.

Subsequently to the action of the 17th January, Major Newton returned, with the force under his command, to Sylhet, withdrawing the whole of the troops from Cachar. The Burmese then advanced to Jatrapur, about five miles east of the frontier, and eight miles from Bhadrapur, where the two divisions from Asam and Manipur effected a junction, and erected stockades on either bank of the Surma, connecting them by a bridge across the river. Their united force amounted to about six thousand, of whom four thousand were Asamese and Cacharees: a detachment of two thousand more was posted at Kila Kandy, in the

S. E.

\* Document No. 21.\*

† Do. No. 22.\*

‡ Do. No. 23.\*



S. E. quarter of Cachar. The main body of the Burmese proceeded to push their stockades on the north bank of the Surma, to within one thousand yards of the British post at Bhadrapur, where Capt. Johnstone commanded, having under him a wing of the 10th (14th) N. I. the third company of the 23d (46th), and a small party of the Rungpore Local Corps. With these, he determined to dislodge the enemy before the entrenchments were completed, and having the concurrence of the Commissioner, he moved against them on the 13th of February.\* Having divided his small force into two parties, one under Captain Bowe crossed the river, whilst the other, under his own command, proceeded higher up. Finding it unlikely to prevail upon the Burmese to discontinue their arrangements, by amicable expostulation, Captain Johnstone ordered the columns to attack. The Burmese fired as they advanced, but the troops pressed on without hesitation, and drove the enemy from their unfinished works at the point of the bayonet. The Asam division of the Burmese, fell back upon the Bherdeka pass and the Jetinghi river, whilst the Manipur force stockaded itself at Doodpatlee.

With the view to expel the former of these detachments altogether from Cachar, Lieutenant-colonel Bowen, who had joined, and taken the command, marched in pursuit of the retreating enemy.† They were found at the foot of the Bherdeka pass, stockading themselves in a strong position on the opposite bank of the Jetinghi river. The stream being deep and rapid, a passage was effected with some difficulty, and after a division of the force had crossed, it was found that a rivulet opening into the stream, rendered an advance along the bank impracticable. It was therefore necessary to make a detour through the thick jungle, which was accomplished only with great exertion; but the passage to the north-east angle of the stockade being at last effected, the troops formed, and carried it with the bayonet. The enemy fled to the hills, and left no further force in the direction of Asam to be encountered.

There still remained, however, the Manipur division to be expelled, and with this object, Lieutenant-colonel Bowen directed his march against their position at Doodpatlee, which proved to be much stronger than any yet assailed. The Burmese were stockaded on the north bank of the Surma river. Their rear rested on steep hills. Each face of the entrenchment was defended by a deep ditch, about fourteen feet wide: a fence of bamboo spikes was constructed along the outer edge, and the approach on the land side was through jungle and high grass. After the post had been reconnoitred, and the three field pieces with the detachment, had been brought to bear upon it with considerable effect, the Commanding Officer directed the assault to be made upon the western front. The Burmese remained passive, till the troops advanced to the spikes, when they poured upon them a destructive and well maintained fire, which checked the advance of the assailants, although they kept their ground. After being exposed to this fire for some time, and, as it appeared, with no hope of advantage, the attempt was abandoned. The force was withdrawn to Jatrapur. Four officers were wounded, two severely: Lieutenant Armstrong, of the 10th, was killed, and  
about

\* Document No. 24.\*

† Do. No. 25.\*

about one hundred and fifty Sipahis were killed and wounded.\* On the 27th February, Colonel Innes joined the force at Jatrapur, with four guns, and the 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment, (38th,) and assumed the command. In the mean time the Burmahs retreated from the position at Doodpatlee, and fell back to Manipur, so that Cachar was freed from the presence of an enemy. As there seemed little reason to apprehend their speedy return in force, and the nature of the country rendered it difficult to procure supplies for any number of troops for a protracted period, it was thought sufficient to leave a detachment of the Rungpore Local Infantry in Cachar, whilst the main body went into cantonments at Sylhet.

While these events were taking place in Cachar, the occurrences in the southern extremity of the frontier partook of the same character, and equally indicated the determination of the Government of Ava to provoke hostilities.† Early in January, the British detachment stationed on the island of Shahpuri was withdrawn, in consequence of the unhealthiness of the post, and, at the same time, intimation was conveyed to the Raja of Aracan, that two British officers, Mr. Robertson, the Civil Commissioner, and Captain Cheap, had arrived at Tek Naf, where they were ready, under the orders of their Government, to meet any persons the Raja might depute, for the purpose of defining and settling the boundary. The Raja sent four persons to meet the British authorities with a letter, demanding the unconditional surrender of the island; and his envoys, in the conferences that ensued, declared they would not enter upon any conversation respecting boundary, until the island was acknowledged to belong to the King of Ava, or at least allowed to be considered as neutral, and to be occupied by neither power. As this demand was not at once submitted to, they returned to Aracan, where it had been ascertained, a considerable force had been assembled under the four Rajas, under whose several jurisdiction the province of Aracan was divided. These were shortly afterwards placed under the supreme command of the Maha Bundoola, or chief military officer of the state, who quitted Ava early in January, to take the supreme command, both civil and military in Aracan, and brought with him considerable reinforcements. Shortly prior to his arrival, however, four individuals, said to have been deputed by the Court of Ava, arrived at Mungdoo, and under their authority, a wanton outrage was perpetrated, which could only tend to precipitate the commencement of the war. When the Sipahis were withdrawn from Shahpuri, the Hon'ble Company's Pilot vessel *Sophia* was ordered to join the gun-boats off that island, to serve in some degree as a substitute for the troops that had been removed. Upon the arrival of the deputies, or Wuzcers, at Mungdoo, on the opposite bank of the Naf, they invited the commanding officer of the *Sophia* on shore, under the pretext of communicating with him amicably on the state of affairs, and on his unguardedly accepting the invitation, they seized him, and an officer and the native seamen who accompanied him, and sent them prisoners to Aracan, where they were threatened with detention until the chief Mug insurgents should be delivered in exchange. Mr. Chew, the commander of the *Sophia*, was kept at Aracan from the 20th January to the 13th February, when he was sent back, with his companions  
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\* Documents Nos. 26\* and 27.\*

† Do. No. 28.

and some natives of Chittagong, to Mungdoo. The motive of this seizure was, the *Sophia's* being anchored off Shahpuri, and the act was no doubt intended as one of intimidation. In a similar light might be considered the circumstance of the Burmese agents, crossing from Mungdoo to Shahpuri, and planting the flag of Ava on the island. This was a bravado little worthy of notice, and was only important as displayed after the arrival of the Maha Bundoola, and, consequently, indicative of the spirit by which he was likely to be actuated, but the forcible arrest of an officer in the British service, was a national insult, that could not be suffered to pass without apology or excuse, neither of which, it was likely, would be tendered. As the two states might now be considered as actually, although not declaredly, at war, the British Government, agreeably to the usage of civilised nations, promulgated the grounds of their recourse to hostile measures, in a declaration,\* addressed to the Court of Ava, and the different powers of India, and a public proclamation,† dated the 5th March. In these documents, the causes of the war were declared to be the acts of encroachment and aggression, so perseveringly committed on the south-east frontier, the attack upon the post of Shahpuri, the arrest of a British officer and crew, the invasion of Cachar, and the menaces addressed to the Jyntea Raja, and the tacit approbation of the conduct of their officers by the Court of Amerapura, which evinced a determination not only to withhold all explanation and atonement for past injuries, but to prosecute projects of the most extravagant and mischievous ambition, pregnant with serious danger to the British Government. The proclamation was speedily followed by a communication from Pegu,‡ in reply to that addressed to the Court of Ava in the preceding November, which might be considered as a counter-manifesto, as it declared, in terms of singular arrogance, that the Governors on the frontier had full power to act, and that until every thing was settled, a communication need not be made to the golden feet.

The war being now formally declared by the British Government, and virtually announced by the Court of Ava, measures were taken at once for its prosecution, upon the principles adopted with the concurrence of the Commander in Chief. The operations on the frontier were to be limited to the protection of the British provinces, and the expulsion of the Burmese from the adjacent territories, which they had recently wrested from the native princes, whilst a powerful force was to be directed against the most vulnerable and important points of the maritime provinces of the enemy. Of the former plan, it appeared, in the first instance, only necessary to dislodge the Burmese from Asam, as Cachar was already cleared of them, and the invasion of Aracan was not immediately proposed. In Sylhet and Chittagong, therefore, a strictly defensive line of conduct was pursued. Colonel Innes, with his brigade, remaining at the sudder station of the former, and Colonel Shapland commanding at the latter. The Chittagong force consisted of the left wing of the 13th (27th) Regiment Native Infantry, five companies of the 2d Battalion 20th (40th) Native Infantry, and the 1st Battalion 23rd (45th), with the Provincial Battalion: a Local Corps, or Mug Levy,

\* Document No. 29.

† Do. No. 30.

‡ Do. No. 31.



Levy, was also raised, and the whole amounted to about three thousand men. Of these, a detachment under Captain Noton, consisting of five companies of the 45th Native Infantry, with two guns, and details from the Provincial Battalion and Mug Levy, was left at Ramoo, to check any demonstration on the side of Aracan. It was in Asam, however, the first hostilities occurred after the war was proclaimed.

The Asam force stationed at Goalpara, under the command of Brigadier McMorine, consisted of seven companies of the 2d Battalion of the 23d (46th) N. I., six companies of the Rungpore Local Corps, the Dinapore Local Corps, and a Wing of the Champarun Local Corps; three brigades of six-pounders, and a small body of Irregular Horse, besides a gun-boat flotilla on the Brahmaputra.

This force moved from Goalpara on the 13th March, 1824. The route lay along both banks of the river, occasionally through thick jungle and long grass, in which the troops were completely buried: a number of small rivulets and ravines also intersected the road, and heavy sands, or marshy swamps, rendered the march one of more than usual toil. Through the greater part of the advance, the signs of cultivation were of rare occurrence, and all the supplies of the divisions were carried with them on elephants, or in boats. On the 28th, the force arrived at Gohati, where the Burmese had erected strong stockades, but evacuated them on the approach of the British. The necessity of retreat had apparently exasperated them against their unfortunate subjects and fellows in arms, the Asamese, the bodies of many of whom, barbarously mutilated, were found upon the road and in the stockade at Gohati. On entering Asam, a proclamation was addressed to the inhabitants, encouraging them with the prospect of being released from the cruelty of their Burman invaders, and assuring them of British protection. Several of the barbarous tribes in the eastern portion of Asam, as the Khantis and Sinlphos, availed themselves of the unsettled state of affairs to harass the Burmese, but their operations were equally directed against the unfortunate natives of Asam, numbers of whom were carried off by them as slaves. The Asamese displayed the most favourable disposition towards the British, but their unwarlike character, scanty numbers, and reduced means, rendered their co-operation of no value, and the uncertainty of support, and doubt of the capability of the country to maintain a large advancing force, as well as inaccurate information of the state of the roads, induced the Commanding Officer to pause at Gohati, and at one time to abandon all thoughts of prosecuting the campaign further in the season, notwithstanding the fairest prospect offered of expelling the Burmans altogether from Asam, even by the partial advance of the British force.

Mr. Scott, the political agent, having crossed from Sylhet through Jyntea,\* arrived at Noagong, in advance of the Brigadier on the 15th April, with a party of some strength. Leaving his escort under Captain Horsburgh to occupy Noagong, a town, or series of villages, extending twelve miles along the Brahmaputra, and which the Burmese had deserted, he traced a retrograde route to Gohati, to communicate with the head-quarters of the invading force. The

Burmese

Burmese had retreated to their chief stockade at Moura Mukh, but finding that no steps were taken in pursuit of them, they, in the end of April, returned to Kaliabur. Colonel Richards was now, therefore, detached from Gohati with five companies of the 23d, and the flotilla, and having joined the Commissioner's escort at Noagong, he advanced to Kaliabur, a place on the left bank of the Brahmaputra, near the junction of the Kullung with that river. The Burmese stockaded at Hautbur, pursued their previous system of not waiting for an attack, but deserted it, and retired to Rangligher, a post at the distance of about eight hours' march. A small party, however, having returned to re-occupy the Hautbur stockade, were surprised by Lieutenant Richardson, with a resala of Horse, and a company of Infantry. The surprise was effectual. The enemy, in attempting to escape, fell upon the Horse, by whom about twenty were killed, besides a Phokun, or officer of rank.

Whilst the main body of the detachment continued at Kaliabur, a small party was left under Captain Horsburgh, in the stockade of Hautbur on the Kullung, at a short distance from its junction with the main stream. The Burmese exhibited, on this occasion, the only proof of enterprise, which they had yet displayed in the campaign in Asam, and advancing from their entrenchment at Rangligher, they attempted to cut off Captain Horsburgh and his division. Their advance was, however, seasonably ascertained, and arrested by the picquet, until the whole detachment could form. Upon Captain Horsburgh's approach with the Infantry, the Burmese fled, but the Irregular Horse, which had been sent into their rear, having intercepted the retreat of about two hundred, a great number of them were sabred on the spot, or drowned in crossing the Kullung. After this repulse, they abandoned the Rangligher stockade, and retrograded to Maura Mookh, where the chief force of the Burmese, now not exceeding one thousand men, was posted under the Governor of Asam. Colonel Richards having succeeded to the command, upon the death of Brigadier McMorine, of cholera, early in May, established his head-quarters at Kaliabur; but upon the setting in of the rains, it was found necessary to retire to Gohati, in order to secure the receipt of supplies. The operations of the first campaign in Asam were closed by a successful attack upon a stockade on the north bank of the Brahmaputra, by Captain Wallace: the enemy had time to escape, but the stockade was destroyed. The general result of the operations was decidedly favourable, and the British authority established over a considerable tract of country between Goalpara and Gohati. It is likely, however, that had an advance like that made by Colonel Richards in April, been authorised a few weeks sooner, the Burmese might have been expelled from a still greater portion of Asam; their force in this country never having been formidable, either in numbers or equipment.\*

In prosecution of the offensive system of operations, a powerful force was fitted out by the presidencies of Bengal and Madras, destined to reduce the islands on the Coast of Ava, and to occupy Rangoon, and the country at the mouth of the Irawadi river. The Bengal armament left the Hooghly in the beginning of April. Their further proceedings we shall, hereafter,

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\* Document No. 32.

hereafter, notice in order to keep the course of them entire, and in the mean time shall terminate the military transactions on the British frontier.

It has been already noticed, that a large Burman force had been assembled in Aracan, under the command of the chief military officer of the state of Ava, Maha Mungee Bundoola, an officer who enjoyed a high reputation, and the entire confidence of the Court, and who had been one of the most strenuous advisers of the war, in the full confidence, that it would add a vast accession of power to his country and glory to himself. His head-quarters were established at Aracan, where, probably, from ten to twelve thousand Burmese assembled. Early in May, a division of this force crossed the Naf, and advanced to Rutnapullung, about fourteen miles south from Ramoo, where they took up their position, and gradually concentrated their force, to the extent of about eight thousand men, under the command of the four Rajas of Aracan, Ramree, Sandaway, and Cheduba, assisted by four of the inferior members of the Royal Council, or Atawoons, and acting under the orders of the Bundoola, who remained at Aracan.

Upon information being received of the Burmese having appeared, advancing upon Rutnapullung, Captain Noton moved from Ramoo with the whole of his disposable force to ascertain the strength and objects of the enemy.\* On arriving near their position, upon some hills on the left of the road, in which the Burmese had stockaded themselves, they opened a smart fire upon the detachment, which, however, cleared the hills, and formed upon a plain beyond them. In consequence, however, of the mismanagement of the elephant drivers, and the want of Artillery details, the guns accompanying the divisions, could not be brought into action, and as, without them, it was not possible to make any impression on the enemy, Captain Noton judged it prudent to return to his station at Ramoo, where he was joined by three companies of the 40th Native Infantry, making his whole force about one thousand strong, of whom less than half were regulars. With these, Captain Noton determined to await at Ramoo, the approach of the Burmese, until the arrival of reinforcements from Chittagong.

On the morning of the 13th of May, the enemy advanced from the south, and occupied, as they arrived, the hills east of Ramoo, being separated from the British force by the Ramoo river. On the evening of the 14th, they made a demonstration of crossing the river, but were prevented by the fire from the two six-pounders with the detachment. On the morning of the 15th, however, they effected their purpose, and crossed the river upon the left of the detachment, when they advanced, and took possession of a tank, surrounded, as well as other tanks in this situation, by a high embankment, which protected them from the fire of their opponents. Captain Noton drew up his force behind a bank about three feet high, completely surrounding the encampment. Upon his right hand, and about sixty paces in front to the eastward, was a tank, at which a strong picquet was posted, and his right flank was also protected by the river. On his left, and somewhat to the rear, was another tank, in which he stationed the Provincials and Mug Levy. The regular Sipahis were posted with

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\* Document No. 33.



with the six-pounders on his front, or along the eastern face of the embankment. From this face a sharp fire was kept upon the Burmese as they crossed the plain to the tank, but they availed themselves with such dexterity of every kind of cover, and so expeditiously entrenched themselves, that it was much less effective than was to have been expected.

Information having been received on the 15th, that the left wing of the Battalion of the 23d, N. I. had left Chittagong on the 13th, and its arrival being therefore looked for on the following day, Captain Noton was confirmed in his intention of remaining at his post, although the Burmese were in very superior numbers, and were evidently gaining ground. Several of the officers were wounded, and the Provincials had manifested strong indications of insubordination and alarm.

On the morning of the 16th, the Burmese, it was found, had considerably advanced their trenches. The firing was maintained on both sides throughout the day, but no important change in the relative position of the two parties was effected. The officer in command of the guns, however, was disabled, and it was with some difficulty, that the Provincials were intimidated from the desertion of their post; a retreat was still practicable, but a reliance upon the arrival of the expected reinforcement, unfortunately prevented the adoption of the only measure which could now afford a chance of preserving the lives of the officers and men.

On the morning of the 17th, the enemy's trenches were advanced within twelve paces of the picquets, and a heavy and destructive fire kept up by them. At about nine A. M. the Provincials and Mug Levy abandoned the tank entrusted to their defence, and it was immediately occupied by the enemy. The position being now untenable, a retreat was ordered, and effected with some regularity for a short distance. The increasing numbers and audacity of the pursuers, and the activity of a small body of Horse attached to their force, by whom the men that fell off from the main body were instantly cut to pieces, filled the troops with an ungovernable panic, which rendered the exertions of their officers to preserve order unavailing. These efforts, however, were persisted in, until the arrival of the party at a rivulet, when the detachment dispersed, and the Sipahis throwing away their arms and accoutrements, plunged promiscuously into the water.\* In the retreat, Captains Noton, Trueman, and Pringle, Lieutenant Grigg, Ensign Bennet, and Assistant Surgeon Maysmore were killed. The other officers engaged, Lieutenants Scott, Campbell, and Codrington, made their escape, but the two former were wounded: the loss in men was not ascertained, as many of them found their way after some interval, and in small numbers, to Chittagong: according to official returns, between six and seven hundred had reached Chittagong by the 23d May, so that the whole loss in killed and taken, did not exceed probably two hundred and fifty; many of those taken prisoners were sent to Ava, where they served to confirm the arrogant belief of the Court, in the irresistible prowess of their troops, and their anticipations of future triumph. The defeat of the detachment at Ramoo, was also the source of some uneasiness at Chittagong and Dacca, and even at Calcutta, although there was, in reality, no reasonable ground

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\* Documents Nos. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.

ground of apprehension, except perhaps at the former station. All anxiety, however, was soon allayed, by the evident want of enterprise in the victors, and by confidence in the measures immediately taken to oppose the remote possibility of their further advance.\* Colonel Shapland was speedily re-inforced to an extent, that placed the frontier out of danger, had the Burmese shewn any inclination to prosecute their success. With exception, however, of an advance to Chekeria, whence they soon retrograded, the capture of the small post at Tek Naf, and an unsuccessful attempt to cut off the *Vestal*, cruizer, and the gun-boats in the river, the Burmese General undertook no other military operations in this quarter, and was shortly after recalled, with the most effective portion of his force, for the defence of the provinces of Ava. By the end of July, the Burmese abandoned all their positions to the north of the Naf.†

The absence of the British troops from Cachar, and the system of active operations, apparently adopted at this period by the Court of Ava, seem to have induced the Burmese to renew their invasion of that province. They advanced from Manipur, and resumed their position upon the heights of Talain, Doodpatlee, and Jatrapur. The force that occupied these positions, was estimated at about eight thousand men, and it was given out, that they formed the advance of an army of fifteen thousand, destined by the Court of Ava, to march upon the frontier in this direction.

In consequence of the apprehensions excited for the safety of Chittagong and Dacca, after the defeat at Ramoo, the force at Sylhet had, in the first instance, moved from the latter station, towards the south. The alarm having subsided, the movement was countermanded, and Colonel Innes returned to Sylhet on the 12th of June,‡ with the troops under his command, amounting to above twelve hundred men, with which he again proceeded to Cachar to expel the invaders, after resting a few days at Sylhet from the fatigues to which the period of the year, and the inundated state of the country, had exposed the troops. On the 20th June, Colonel Innes arrived at Bhadrapur, from whence he proceeded by water, along the Barak river, to Jatrapur, where, with considerable difficulty, he arrived on the 27th. On the route, an opportunity offered to reconnoitre the position of the enemy on the heights of Talain, where they were strongly stockaded, and it was determined to attempt to dislodge them from their post.§ With this view, part of the force was landed, and a battery of two howitzers, and four six-pounders, erected on a rising ground, about six hundred yards on the south-west of the stockade, which opened on the 6th July. As the guns, however, made but little impression at the distance at which they were placed, they were removed on the 7th, to an eminence nearer to the stockade, the occupation of which was spiritedly, though unsuccessfully, opposed by the enemy.¶ On the 8th, however, they assembled in force upon the heights, in rear of and commanding the battery, dislodging the party of Raja Gambhir Sinh's men, who had been posted on the hills for its protection, and frustrating, by their superior numbers, an attempt made to turn their flank. It was therefore found necessary to bring off the

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\* Document No. 40. † Do. Nos. 39 and 41. ‡ Do. No. 42. § Do. Nos. 43 and 44. ¶ Do. No. 45.



the guns, and as the troops were exhausted by the fatiguing service they had undergone, and the season was becoming every day more unfavourable for military operations, it was determined to fall back to Jatrapur, to which the troops accordingly retired.\* The increasing sickness of the men, induced by constant exposure to the rain, in the midst of a country abounding with swamp and jungle, compelled a retreat to a more healthy situation, and the force was disposed along the river near to Bhadrapur, either in boats, or in elevated situations on the banks. The Burmese remained in their entrenchments, being, in fact, confined to them by the rise of the rivers, and no further movements took place on either side, during the continuance of the rains.

We have thus terminated the first period of the system of defensive operations, and shall now proceed to the more important enterprises of an offensive war, to which those we have noticed, were wholly subordinate. The results of the operations described, were of a mixed description; but such as to leave no question of the issue of the contest. In Asam, a considerable advance had been made. In Cachar also, a forward position had been maintained, although the nature of the country, the state of the weather, and the insufficiency of the force, prevented the campaign from closing with the success with which it had begun. The disaster at Ramoo, although it might have been avoided, perhaps, by a more decided conduct on the part of the officer commanding, and would certainly have been prevented by greater promptitude, than was shewn, in the despatch of the expected reinforcements, reflected no imputation upon the courage of the regular troops, and, except in the serious loss of lives, was wholly destitute of any important consequences. In all these situations, the Burmese had displayed neither personal intrepidity, nor military skill. Their whole system of warfare resolved itself into a series of entrenchments, which they threw up with great readiness and ingenuity. Behind these defences, they sometimes displayed considerable steadiness and courage, but as they studiously avoided individual exposure, they were but little formidable in the field as soldiers. Neither was much to be apprehended from the generalship, that suffered the victory at Ramoo to pass away, without making the slightest demonstration of a purpose to improve a crisis of such splendid promise, and which restricted the fruits of a battle gained, to the construction of a stockade.

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The difficulty of collecting a sufficient force for a maritime expedition from Bengal, owing to the repugnance which the Sipahis entertain to embarking on board vessels, where their prejudices expose them to many real privations, had early led to a communication with the Presidency of Fort Saint George, where there existed no domestic call for a large force, and where the native troops were likely to undertake the voyage without reluctance. The views of the Supreme Government were promptly met, and a considerable force was speedily equipped.

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\* Document No. 46.

equipped. The like activity pervaded the measures of the Bengal authorities, and by the beginning of April, the whole was ready for sea.

The period of the year at which this expedition was fitted out, was recommended by various considerations of local or political weight. Agreeably to the information of all nautical men, a more favourable season for navigating the Coast to the eastward could not be selected, and from the account given by those who had visited Ava, it appeared, if the expedition, upon arriving at Rangoon, should be able to proceed into the interior without delay, the rising of the river, and the prevalence of a south-easterly wind, rendered June and July the most eligible months for an enterprise which could only be effected, it was asserted, by water conveyance.\* That no time should be lost in compelling the Burmese to act upon the defensive, was also apparent, as by the extent of their preparations in Aracan, Asam and Cachar, they were evidently manifesting a design to invade the frontier with a force, that would require the concentration of a large body of troops for the protection of the British provinces in situations, where mountains, streams, and forests, could not fail to exercise a destructive influence upon the physical energies of the officers and men, and would prevent the full development of the military resources of the state. To have remained throughout the rains, therefore, wholly on the defensive, would have been attended, probably, with a greater expense, and, under ordinary circumstances, with a greater sacrifice of lives, than an aggressive movement, as well as with some compromise of national reputation. The armament, therefore, was equipped at once, and was not slow in realising some of the chief advantages expected from its operations.

The Bengal force was formed of his Majesty's 38th and 13th Regiments, of the 2d Battalion of the 20th (now 40th) Native Infantry, and two companies of European Artillery, amounting in all to two thousand, one hundred, and seventy-five fighting men. The Madras force, in two divisions, consisting of his Majesty's 41st and 89th Regiment, the Madras European Regiment, seven Battalions of Native Infantry, and four companies of Artillery, besides Golandaz, Gun Lascars, and Pioneers, amounted altogether to nine thousand and three hundred fighting men, making a total of eleven thousand, four hundred, and seventy-five fighting men of all ranks, of whom nearly five thousand were Europeans. In addition to the transports, the Bengal force comprised a flotilla of twenty gun-brigs, and as many row-boats, carrying one eighteen-pounder each. The Bengal fleet was also accompanied by his Majesty's sloops, *Larne*, Capt. Marryatt, and *Sophie*, Captain Ryves, by several of the Company's cruizers, and the *Diana*,  
steam

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\* During the dry months of January, February, March, and April, the waters of the Irawadi subside into a stream that is barely navigable: frequent shoals, and banks of sand retard boats of burthen, and a northerly wind invariably prevails. *Symes*. 1. 24. In the months of June, July, and August, the navigation of the river would be impracticable, were it not counteracted by the strength of the south-west monsoon: assisted by this wind, and cautiously keeping within the eddies of the banks, the Burmans use their sails, and frequently make a more expeditious passage at this, than at any other season of the year. *Ibid.* 1. 128. See also Appendix, p. xliv. where it is said, that the internal trade from Bassein was carried on in boats of large size chiefly, which assembled about the end of April, ready to take advantage of the rise of the river, and the prevailing winds from the south. *Account of Bassein*.

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**PLAN**  
of  
**Rangoon**  
and the locality  
thereof.

- A. New Dagon Pagoda
- B. Shweth Dagon Pagoda
- C. General's House
- D. Magistrate's House
- E. The Bazaar
- F. Commisariat Store
- G. Head Quarters of the Army
- H. Auction House
- I. American Church
- J. Pin Master's Royal Warehouse
- K. Pin Master's House

Ground on which the Troops encamped after the action of the 5th Dec.

White House Picket

Former Residence of Major Cunningham

Madras Artillery

Bengal Artillery

R.C. Chapel

Mission House

Hindoo Temple

Battery

Picket

Picket

Battery

Picket

Picket

Picket

Picket

Picket

Hospital

Battery

Picket

Pin Picket

Old Bazaar

Picket

McCreagh's Pagoda

Picket

Picket

Picket

Entrenchments

Point for Anchorage

Assault Entrenchments

Thickland

Picket

Scotch Tank

Pin Picket

Pin Picket

Pin Picket

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joint force, Colonel Macbean, with the rank of Brigadier General, commanded the Madras force, and Captain Canning accompanied the expedition as Political Agent and Joint Commissioner with the Commander in Chief. The Bengal expedition sailed from Saugar in the middle of April, for Port Cornwallis, in the Great Andamans, which was appointed the place of rendezvous for both divisions. The Bengal ships, after a somewhat tedious, but in all other respects most favourable passage, reached the rendezvous between the 25th and 30th April. They were joined on the 4th May by his Majesty's frigate the *Liffey*, Commodore Grant, and on the 6th by the *Slaney* sloop of war. The first division of the Madras ships sailed on the 16th April, and joined the Bengal fleet either at Port Cornwallis or on the voyage, and on the 5th May, such of the armament as had assembled commenced its progress towards Rangoon. The second division of the Madras force, left Madras on the 23d May, and joined at Rangoon in June and July. Further accessions to the force were received from the Madras Presidency in August and September; and by the end of the year, from Bengal, including a weak regiment of the line, His Majesty's 47th, and the Governor General's Body Guard, making the whole force engaged in the first campaign nearly thirteen thousand men.\* From the rendezvous at Port Cornwallis on the voyage to Rangoon, detachments severally under Brigadier McCreagh and Major Wahab, were sent against Cheduba and Negrais.

The expedition arrived off the mouth of the Rangoon river on the 9th, and stood into the river on the morning of the 10th, when the fleet came to anchor within the bar: on the following morning, the vessels proceeded with the flood to Rangoon, the *Liffey* and the *Larne* leading, and the *Sophie* bringing up the rear: no opposition was made to the advance of the fleet, nor did any force make its appearance, although a few shots were occasionally fired from either bank.

The town of Rangoon is situated on the northern bank of a main branch of the Irawadi, where it makes a short bend from east to west, about twenty-eight miles from the sea. It extends for about nine hundred yards along the river, and is about six or seven hundred yards wide in its broadest part: at either extremity extend unprotected suburbs, but the centre, or the town itself, is defended by an enclosure of Palisades ten or twelve feet high, strengthened internally by embankments of earth, and protected externally on one side by the river, and on the other three sides by a shallow creek or ditch, communicating with the river, and expanding at the western end into a morass crossed by a bridge. The Palisade incloses the whole of the town of Rangoon in the shape of an irregular parallelogram, having one gate in each of three faces, and two in that of the north: at the river gate is a landing place, denominated the King's wharf, in which situation the principal battery was placed, and opposite to which the *Liffey* came to anchor about two P. M. After a short pause, a fire was opened on the fleet, but was very soon silenced by the guns of the frigate. In the mean time, three detachments were landed from the trans-

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\* Documents Nos. 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51.



ports of his Majesty's 38th Regiment, under Major Evans, above the town, and his Majesty's 41st, under Colonel McBean below it, whilst Major Sale, with the Light Infantry of the 13th, was directed to attack the river gate, and carry the main battery. These measures were successful. The Burmans fled from the advance of the troops, and in less than twenty minutes the town was in the undisputed possession of the British. Whilst the divisions were moving to the shore, Mr. Hough, an American Missionary, came on board the *Liffey*, accompanied by a native officer, having been deputed by the Raywoon to demand the object of the attack made upon the town, and intimating that, unless the firing ceased, the lives of the Europeans in confinement would be sacrificed. Any stipulation for terms of surrender was now, necessarily, of little avail, but assurances were given, that persons and property would be respected, and the release of the European prisoners, was insisted on, under menaces of severe retaliation, if they suffered any violence. The chief authorities of the town, however, were too much alarmed to await the return of their messengers, and abandoned the place before they relanded.\*

Upon taking possession of Rangoon, it was found to be entirely deserted. The news of the arrival of the fleet had scarcely reached the town, when the population began to depart, and to secrete themselves in the adjacent thickets. This desertion was, in a great measure, the effect of a universal panic, but it was promoted by the local authorities, in order to deprive their invaders of the resources of the population. The perseverance, however, with which the natives of the country submitted to the privations to which they were exposed in the jungle, during the heavy rains that ensued, clearly proved that the abandonment of their homes was, in a considerable measure, a voluntary act, emanating, not perhaps from any feeling of rancorous hostility, but a firm conviction, that the occupation of Rangoon by the invaders would be but temporary, and that to submit to their rule, would only involve themselves in that destruction to which they were devoted. However this may be, the absence of the population, and the impossibility of deriving any aid from their local experience and activity, were productive of serious inconvenience to the expedition, and more than any thing else disconcerted the expectations which had been formed of its immediate results.

One of the first objects of the British Commander on occupying the town, was the rescue of his countrymen and other christians, who were in confinement, and the party under Major Sale discovered, and released in the custom house two English traders, with an Armenian and a Greek, who had been left there in irons: seven other prisoners of this class had been carried away by the Burmans in their flight, but they were all liberated on the following morning by the detachment sent out from the town to reconnoitre the ground, who found them in different chambers where they had been secured, and forgotten by the Burman chiefs, in the confusion of their retreat.

The days immediately following the capture of Rangoon, were appropriated to the landing and disposition of the troops, who were posted in the town, in the great pagoda of Shwe-

Shwe-da-gon, about two miles and a half from the town, or on the two roads which, leading from each of the northern gates, gradually converge until they unite near the pagoda, leaving a tolerably open space between them. Parties of seamen from his Majesty's vessels, with detachments of the European Regiment were also employed in scouring the river, and to discover and destroy any armed boats or fire rafts, which it was thought likely the enemy would prepare. In one of these excursions, a stockade having been observed in course of construction at the village of Kemendine, about four miles distant from the town, it was attacked by the Grenadier Company of his Majesty's 38th, and the boats of the *Liffey*, and stormed with great intrepidity, although maintained by four hundred of the enemy, who behaved with considerable spirit, and, notwithstanding the strength of its defences, it was carried accordingly not without some loss. Lieutenant Kerr, of the 38th, was killed, and Lieutenant Wilkinson, R. N., who commanded the boats, was dangerously wounded: the enemy suffered still more severely, and left sixty killed in the stockade.\* Detachments were also sent in the interior, to endeavour to find and bring back the population; but without success. On this occasion, parties of the Burmans were sometimes encountered, and skirmishes ensued, with invariably advantageous results to the invading force: measures were also adopted to collect boats and supplies as far as practicable, with the view to the ultimate advance into the interior. Some heavy falls of rain occurred in the latter part of May, and cover was provided for the troops with the least possible delay. They were cantoned chiefly along the two roads before mentioned, in the numerous pagodas and religious buildings, which connected the chief temple with the town. The Staff and different departments were placed in the town, whilst the terrace of the great pagoda was occupied by part of his Majesty's 89th Regiment and the Madras Artillery, and formed the key to the whole position. The Shwe-da-gon Pagoda stands upon a mound, to which the ascent is by eighty or a hundred stone steps, and the summit of which is about eight hundred yards square. Besides the central edifice, or the temple itself, a number of buildings, smaller shrines, or the habitations of the attending priests, chiefly of teak, and curiously carved and gilt, surmount the elevation, and formed not incommodious dwellings. It very soon appeared that there was little chance of quitting this position before the end of the rainy season, as the disappearance of the inhabitants rendered it impossible to provide and equip a flotilla necessary to proceed up the river, or to man it with rowers when equipped. The same circumstance, and the desolate state of the country, from which nothing in the shape of supplies was to be procured, rendered it equally certain, that both for the temporary occupation of Rangoon, and eventual march into the interior, the force was entirely dependant upon the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras, for every description of conveyance and food: a state of things which was little to have been expected, from the known commerce and supposed resources of Rangoon, and for which, accordingly, no previous preparation had been made.

Whilst

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\* Document No. 53

Whilst thus situated, the force at Rangoon was re-joined by the detachments which had been despatched against Cheduba and Negrais. The latter, a small island of about six miles in circumference, was found uninhabited, but the enemy having collected in some force on the opposite main land, and constructed a stockade, Major Wahab detached a part of his force against them. The first division, three companies of the 17th Regt. Madras N. I., having landed within a short distance of the enemy's entrenchment, the officer commanding determined to advance at once against them without waiting for support, and giving them time to prepare for the contest. Having carried a breast-work, which had been thrown up by the enemy, the party came upon a stockade, one angle of which being still open, they were able to direct their fire amongst those within it, supposed to amount to between seven and eight hundred men, who abandoned the defences after sustaining some loss. Having destroyed the stockade, and brought off the guns and ammunition found in it, Major Wahab re-embarked his men and sailed for Rangoon, being short of provisions, and not considering that any further advantage would be derived from the occupation of Negrais, or an advance to Bassein, the success of which was, in some degree, doubtful, from his comparative inferiority to the Burman force.\*

The capture of Cheduba, by the force under Brigadier McCreagh, was attended with more permanent results, and was more vigorously contested. The transports with the *Slaney*, sloop of war, collected off the mouth of the river leading to the chief town, on the night of the 12th of May, and early on the 14th, two hundred of his Majesty's 13th, and one hundred of the 20th Native Infantry, being embarked in such boats as could be assembled, proceeded up the river: about a mile up the river, the enemy were discovered in some force, on the northern bank, and as the headmost boat arrived upon their right flank, they opened a slight fire, on which the troops landed, and after a short contest, compelled them to retreat. They retired with some precipitation upon the village, and passing through it, gained a strong stockade at the further end. The guns were landed from the ships without delay, and a battery opened upon the gate-way by the 18th, the fire of which having much weakened the defences, Major Thornhill, with a company of the 13th, forced an entrance into the stockade, without much difficulty. After a short contest, in which their Commander was slain, the Burmans retreated by the opposite gate, leaving a great number killed. The loss of the assailants was inconsiderable. On the 19th, the Raja of Cheduba was taken by a reconnoitring party, and sent prisoner shortly afterwards to Calcutta: such of the Burman force as had been sent to his succour, and survived the late action, returned to the main land, and the people of Cheduba very readily submitted to the British rule. Brigadier McCreagh, therefore, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Hampton with his detachment of the 20th Native Infantry, and the sloop *Slaney*, for the protection of the island, proceeded with the European division to Rangoon, where he arrived on the 11th of June.†

Between

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\* Document No. 55. (B) (C) (D)

† Do. No. 57 (B)



Between this date and the attack of the Kemendine stockade, on the 10th of May, several engagements had taken place with the Burmans, who having received reinforcements, had been for some days closing upon the British lines, and entrenching themselves in their immediate vicinity, or concealed in the dense jungle that grew close to the posts, maintained a system of harassing attacks, cutting off stragglers, firing upon the piquets, and creating constant alarms by night as well as by day, which subjected the troops to much unnecessary and hurtful exposure and fatigue. In order to deter them from persisting in this mode of warfare, as well as more precisely to estimate their number and position, Sir Archibald Campbell marched out on the morning of the 28th May, with four companies of Europeans from his Majesty's 13th and 38th Regiments, two hundred and fifty Sipahis, one gun, and a howitzer, against the entrenchments in the vicinity of the Camp, which were supported, it was said, by a considerable body of troops under the command of the Governor of Shwedang. After passing and destroying three unfinished and undefended stockades, and exchanging a few shot with such of the enemy as shewed themselves from time to time in the jungle, the Artillery-men being exhausted with fatigue, the guns were sent back under escort of the Native Infantry, and Sir Archibald continued to advance with the Europeans, through rice fields, some inches under water, and in a heavy fall of rain. After a most fatiguing march of eight or ten miles, the enemy was discovered in great numbers at the village of Joazong, and defended in front by two stockades. The attack was immediately ordered, and the stockades were carried at the point of the bayonet, in the most daring and determined manner. A demonstration was then made of advancing against the Burman line, which immediately fell back, as if intending to retreat into the thicket, and, as it seemed doubtful if they could be brought to action, the detachment returned to the lines. The loss they sustained was severe. Lieutenant Howard, of the 13th, was killed, and Lieutenants Mitchell and O'Halloran, severely wounded, each subsequently losing a leg by amputation. The enemy was said to have left three hundred dead in the stockades, in which the conflict was maintained for some time man to man.\* Brigadier General Mac Bean, with two regiments and some howitzers, was sent out on the following morning to the same spot, to see if he could again fall in with the Burman force, but they had disappeared, and the stockades remained deserted. On the following day, a party of the enemy were driven with some loss from a stockade in the jungle, not far from the Shwe-da-gon pagoda, by the Light Company of the 38th, under Major Piper, and on the same day a detachment, under Col. Godwin, was sent against Siriam, which fort was found, on the opposite side of the Pegu river, abandoned.

The strongest position occupied by the Burmans, at this time, was at Kemendine, upon the river, nearly two miles above the post called, also, the Kemendine stockade, from which they were driven on the 10th of May. At this place the Burmans had erected one main stockade of unusual strength and extent, whilst in the vicinity there were several others, more or less elaborately constructed. In order to remove them from the position, two columns

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\* Document No. 55 (A)



of the Madras force, one under Lieutenant-colonel Hodgson, and the other under Lieutenant-colonel Smith, marched on the 3d of June from the Shwe-da-gon pagoda, to attack the post by land, whilst Sir Archibald Campbell proceeded up the river with two cruizers, and three companies of his Majesty's 41st. The vessels advanced abreast of the entrenchment, and the troops landed and burnt the village. The land columns arrived in the vicinity of the stockade after a very harrassing march, but as they moved through the thicket within gun shot, they were mistaken for a body of Burmans, and received a heavy cannonade, which occasioned some loss, and disconcerted the troops, so that they could not be afterwards led to the attack : the force therefore was obliged to return without accomplishing the object for which it had marched.\*

Previous to the attack upon this post, two Burmans, of inferior rank, had come into Rangoon, stating that they were sent to ascertain the objects of the British, by the newly appointed Meywoon, or Viceroy, who was at Kemendine with the Governor of Prome: as they could produce no credentials, it was supposed that they were merely spies; but they were civilly treated, and sent back. On the 5th of June, two other messengers arrived to announce the proposed mission of other officers of high rank, two of whom, whose attendants, and gilt umbrellas, indicated them to be personages of consequence, came down to Rangoon in two war boats; the senior had been the Woon of Bassein, but was now a personal attendant, on the King. They were received by the Commander in Chief and Political Commissioner, and stated that they were deputed by the Thekia Woongyee, recently nominated Viceroy of Pegu, and then at Donabew, to which they invited Sir Archibald Campbell, or Major Canning, to repair, expressing themselves willing to remain as hostages for their return. As such a proposal, however, could not be listened to, and it appeared, that the Thekia Woongyee could do no more than forward the result of the conferences, supposing him sincere in wishing to open them, to the Court, it was stated in reply, that the Commissioner would be content with an opportunity of forwarding despatches to Ava: to this the Deputies engaged to obtain the Viceroy's assent, and promised to return with it on the 15th. As, however, they did not repeat their visit, it seems probable, that their only object was to gain time, and suspend the British operations until the force assembling at Donabew should be ready to act. If such was their object, it was disappointed, and on the 10th of July, a strong force was sent once more against Kemendine and the stockades inland, between it and the great pagoda.

The force destined for this service, consisting of nearly three thousand men, with four eighteen-pounders, and four mortars, moved from the lines on the morning of the 10th of June, under the Commander in Chief, whilst two divisions of vessels proceeded up the river to attack the stockade in that direction. On the march, the land columns came upon a strong stockade, about two miles from the town: in front, the palisades were from twelve to fourteen feet high, strengthened by cross bars and railing of great solidity; on the other three sides, it was protected by

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\* Document No. 56.

by the denseness of the surrounding jungle : it was invested on three sides, and a breach being made in front by the fire of the two eighteen pounders, the Madras European Regiment, supported by his Majesty's 41st, made good their entrance, whilst, at the same time, the advanced companies of the 13th and 38th, clambered over the palisadoes on another side, and co-operated in clearing the entrenchment.\* The enemy fled into the thicket, but they left one hundred and fifty dead, including a chief of some rank, as indicated by his golden chattah. Several of the British officers and soldiers distinguished themselves by their personal prowess on this, and on similar occasions, being engaged repeatedly in single combat with their antagonists in the *melé* that followed the storm of a stockade. Before the Burmans had learned to appreciate the valour of those with whom they had to contend, these conflicts were of necessity sanguinary; for, unaccustomed to civilised warfare, they neither gave nor expected to receive quarter; and whenever, therefore, unable to escape, they rushed desperately upon the bayonets of their assailants, and often provoked their death by treacherously attempting to effect that of the soldiers by whom they had been overcome and spared.

After carrying this post, the force moved forward to the river, where it came upon the chief stockade, which was immediately invested. The left of the line communicated with the flotilla, but the right could not be sufficiently extended to shut in the entrenchment completely between it and the river, in consequence of the enemy having thrown up other works beyond the stockade. By four o'clock, the troops were in position in a thick jungle, and no time was lost in bringing the guns to bear. Notwithstanding a heavy fall of rain, batteries were erected during the night, and opened at day-light on the 11th: after a cannonade of two hours, a party advancing to observe the breach, found that the enemy had evacuated the stockade, carrying with them their dead and wounded. The immediate contiguity and thickness of the jungle, enabled them to effect their retreat unobserved. The stockade of Kemendine, commanding the river between it and the town, and connecting the head of the British line, the Shwe-da-gon pagoda with the river, secured the latter from being turned, or the town of Rangoon from being threatened in that direction, and it was therefore occupied by a small European detail, and a battalion of Native Infantry. The Burmese, after the capture of their post, retired for a while from the immediate vicinity of the British lines, and continued to concentrate their forces at Donabew.

In the short interval of comparative tranquillity that ensued between this date and the renewal of active operations, the British authorities had leisure to consider the position in which they were placed. An advance up the river, whilst either bank was commanded by the enemy in such formidable numbers and by strong entrenchments, was wholly out of the question, as, although conveyance for the troops and ordnance had been provided, the impossibility of deriving supplies from the country was undeniable, and it was equally impracticable to maintain a communication with Rangoon. It was clearly necessary, therefore, to begin by annihilating the force immediately opposed to the invading army, before any advance could be attempted.

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\* Document No. 57.

attempted. But this was not so easy a task as was to have been anticipated from the superior organisation and valour of the British army. In the field, the enemy were as little able as inclined to face the British force, but their dexterity and perseverance in throwing up entrenchments, rendered their expulsion from these an undertaking, that involved a loss of time, and sacrifice of lives, and the country and seasons stood them in the stead of discipline and courage. The vicinity of Rangoon, except about the town or along the main road, was covered with swamp or jungle, through which the men were obliged to wade knee-deep in water, or force their way through harassing and wearisome entanglements. The rains had set in, and the effects of a burning sun were only relieved by the torrents that fell from the accumulated clouds, and which brought disease along with their coolness. Constantly exposed to the vicissitudes of a tropical climate, and exhausted by the necessity of unintermitted exertion, it need not be matter of surprise, that sickness now began to thin the ranks, and impair the energies of the invaders. No rank was exempt from the operation of these causes, and many officers, amongst whom were the senior naval officer, Captain Marryatt, the Political Commissioner, Major Canning, and the Commander in Chief himself, were attacked with fever during the month of June. Amongst the privates, however, the use of spirituous liquor, and the want of a sufficient supply of fresh meat and vegetables, the consequence of the unexpected flight of the inhabitants of the town, which threw the force wholly upon their sea stock for sustenance, augmented the malignant influence of the climate, and crowded the hospitals with the sick: fever and dysentery were the principal maladies, and were no more than the ordinary consequences of local causes; but the scurvy and hospital gangrene, which also made their appearance, were ascribable as much to depraved habits and inadequate nourishment, as to fatigue and exposure. They were also latterly, in some degree, the consequences of extreme exhaustion, forming a peculiar feature of the prevailing fever, which bore an epidemic type, and which had been felt with equal severity in Bengal. The fatal operation of these causes was enhanced by their continuance, and towards the end of the rainy season, scarcely three thousand men were fit for active duty. The arrival of adequate supplies, and more especially the change of the monsoon, restored the force to a more healthy condition.\*

Although, however, the proportion of the sick was a serious deduction from the available force, it was not such as to render it unequal to offensive operations altogether, or inadequate to repel, in the most decisive manner, the collected assault of the Burman force that had been  
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\* A correct notion of the extent of the prevailing sickness, may be formed from the following statement of a competent observer. "During June, July, August, September, and October, the average monthly admissions into hospital from the Artillery, was sixty-five Europeans, and sixty-two Natives, being nearly one-third of the greatest numerical strength of the former, and one-fourth of the latter; and large as was this number, I am assured, that it was considerably less, in proportion, than that which was exhibited by any European Regiment, in either division of the army. The aggregate number in hospital, during the whole fourteen months, to which this account is limited, was six hundred and five Europeans, and six hundred and eighty-seven Natives, a large proportion being made up of re-admissions for dysentery. Of the former, forty-nine died, including twelve, who died in the field hospitals of Rangoon and Mergui, or a fraction less than one in twelve and half. Amongst the latter, thirty-four deaths occurred, or something less than one in twenty. On the setting in of the cold season, the general sickness began to decline, and from January to July, 1825, it was comparatively moderate." On the diseases prevailing amongst the British troops at Rangoon. By G. Waddell, M. D. Transactions of the Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta, vol. 3d.



some time assembling in its vicinity. During the month of June, several affairs of minor importance occurred, and on the first July, the only general action in which the troops had yet been engaged, took place.

On receiving intelligence of the occupation of Rangoon by the British armament, the Court of Ava was far from feeling any apprehension or alarm: on the contrary, the news was welcomed as peculiarly propitious: the destruction of the invaders was regarded as certain, and the only anxiety entertained was, lest they should effect a retreat before they were punished for their presumption. Notwithstanding the unseasonable period of the year, therefore, orders were sent to collect as large a force as possible to surround and capture the British, and one of the chief officers of state, the Thakia Woongyee, was dispatched to assume the command. The result of these arrangements was little calculated to inspire the Court of Ava with confidence in its officers or men.

On the morning of the 1st of July, the Burman force was observed in motion: the main body drew up upon the left of the British lines in front of the Kemendine stockade, and Shwe-da-gon Pagoda, but they were screened from observation by the intervening thicket, and their disposition and strength could not be ascertained. Three columns, each of about 1000 men, moved across to the right of the line, where they came in contact with the piquets of the 7th and 22d Regiments of Madras Native Infantry, which steadily maintained their ground against these superior numbers. The enemy then penetrated between the piquets, and occupied a hill, whence they commenced an ineffective fire on the lines, but were speedily dislodged by three companies of the 7th and 23d Regiments M. N. I., with a gun and howitzer, under Captain Jones, and the personal direction of the Commander-in-Chief: after a short but effective fire, the Sipahis were ordered to charge, which they did with great steadiness, and the enemy immediately broke and fled into the jungle. The body in front of the head of the lines apparently awaited the effect of this attack, and fell back immediately on its failure: part of the force re-crossing the river, a considerable division entered the town of Dalla opposite to Rangoon, where Lieutenant Isaack, of the 8th M. N. I., in command of the post, was shot, as he advanced to drive them out: the town of Dalla was, in consequence, destroyed.\*

The check sustained by the Burmans on the 1st had not altered their plans, and they continued gathering strength in front of the lines and giving constant annoyance. It again, therefore, became necessary to repel them to a greater distance, and on the 8th, a column, about twelve hundred strong, under Brigadier General Macbean, moved out to operate by land, whilst Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, with another division of eight hundred, proceeded by water. The boats with the *Larne* and several of the Company's cruisers advanced to a place where the Lyne river, or branch of the Irawadi, falls into the Rangoon branch, and at the point of their junction, termed Pagoda-point, they found the enemy strongly posted. The main entrenchment was constructed on the projecting tongue of land at the junction of the two rivers, whilst stockades

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\* Document No. 58.



stockades on the opposite bank of either stream commanded the approach, and afforded mutual support. Notwithstanding these formidable dispositions, the post was soon carried. A breach having been effected by the fire of the vessels, a gun-brig, and three cruisers, under the command of Captain Marryat, of the Royal Navy, the troops consisting of the Madras Infantry, supported by part of his Majesty's 41st and the Madras European Regiment, landed and stormed the first stockade: the second was carried by escalade, and the enemy abandoned the third. Brigadier General Macbean, supported by Brigadier McCreagh, was equally successful. He advanced to Kamroot, about six miles from Rangoon, a short way inland from Pagoda-point, and, notwithstanding the fatigue they had undergone, the troops under his command, headed by the 13th and 38th, under Majors Sale and Frith, maintained the character they had already so well earned for desperate valour, and captured, in rapid succession, seven strong stockades. The enemy, driven from the inferior defences, fell back upon the central position, consisting of three strong entrenchments within each other, in the innermost of which Thamba Woongyee, who commanded, had taken his station, and endeavoured to animate his men to resistance, not only by his exhortations, but example. This conduct, so contrary to the usual practice of the Burman Chiefs, who are rarely even present in an engagement which they direct, was equally unavailing, and served only to add his death to that of his followers. Another leader of rank fell also on this occasion, in a personal contest with Major Sale, who, in every attack, had distinguished himself by his personal intrepidity, and who engaged in this encounter to rescue a soldier, who had fallen beneath the sword of the Burman Chief, and was about to become the victim of his revenge. The capture of so many stockades by so inferior a force, and without any assistance from artillery, was an achievement unsurpassed during the war, and first made a profound impression upon the minds of the enemy, who henceforward learnt to think themselves insecure within the strongest defences. The business was accomplished also with a trifling loss on the part of the assailants, whilst eight hundred of the Burmans were left dead in the stockade, and numbers of their wounded were left to perish in the surrounding jungle, or the adjacent villages.\*

The inundated state of the country, now precluded the possibility of undertaking any movements of importance, but the period was not suffered to pass unimproved. Information being received of the assemblage of a force at Kykloo, Sir A. Campbell despatched a column of one thousand and two hundred men against them by land, on the 19th July, whilst he himself, with six hundred more, proceeded up the Puzendown creek in boats to the same point. The land column was unable to make good its advance, and the division by water, deprived of its expected co-operation, returned to head-quarters, having on the way seen only a few flying parties of the enemy, and liberated several families, inhabitants of Rangoon. It was satisfactory also, to find an indication of reviving confidence in the appearance of the population of the villages, who, although they had fled on the advance of the detachment, gathered courage to return to their homes, by the time of its return, and saluted it as it passed.†

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\* Documents Nos. 58 and 59.

† Do. No. 60.

The head man of the district of Sirian, near the junction of the Pegu with the Rangoon river, having collected, in obedience to the orders of his Government, a considerable force, and being actively engaged in constructing works to command the entrance into the river, the Commander-in-Chief undertook to dislodge him, and embarked on the 4th of August, on board a flotilla for that purpose, with about six hundred men, consisting of part of his Majesty's 41st, the Madras European Regiment, and 12th Madras Infantry, under the command of Brigadier Smelt. The Burmans, it was found, had taken post within the walls of the old Portuguese fortified factory at Sirian, having cleared the jungle from its surface, filled up the chasms with palisades, and mounted guns upon the ramparts. As the troops advanced to storm, they were received with a brisk fire, but the enemy had not resolution to await an escalade. They fled towards a Pagoda in the vicinity, and were pursued by a detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Kelly. The Pagoda also was guarded and mounted with guns, but after a hasty fire, its defenders abandoned the post with precipitation, leaving the assailants in possession of the temple.\*

Reports having reached Sir A. Campbell, that much dissatisfaction had been excited in the district of Dalla, by the orders of the Court for a general conscription, a force of four hundred men was embarked under Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, and despatched on the 8th of August, to take advantage of any opportunity that might offer of giving support to the discontented. The party entered a large creek, about two miles from the mouth of which they came upon a couple of stockades, one on either bank, which they landed to storm. In consequence of the difficulty of getting through the mud, they were exposed for some time to the enemy's fire, and suffered some loss. Here, however, as in the preceding instance, the entrenchments were carried as soon as the escalade was attempted, and the Burmans immediately fled into the neighbouring jungle.†

In the beginning of August, Major Canning, the Political Agent, who had been some time ill of fever, went on board the *Nereide*, in order to return to Bengal for the recovery of his health: he died shortly after his arrival in Calcutta.

In the impossibility that existed of engaging in any active operations in the direction of Ava, it was judged advisable to employ part of the force in reducing some of the maritime provinces of the Burman kingdom. The district of Tenasserim, comprising the divisions of Tavai and Mergui, was that selected for attack, as containing a valuable tract of sea coast, as well as being likely to afford supplies of cattle and grain. Accordingly, an expedition was detached against those places, consisting of details of his Majesty's 89th and the 7th Madras Native Infantry, with several cruizers and gun-brigs, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Miles. They sailed from Rangoon on the 20th August, and reached the mouth of the river leading to Tavai, on the 1st September: some difficulty occurred in working up the river, in consequence of which, the vessels arrived off the town only on the eighth. A conspiracy amongst the gar-  
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\* Document No. 62.

† Do. No. 63.

risson facilitated the capture of the place, the second in command making the Maiwoon and his family prisoners, delivered them to the British officer, and the town was occupied without opposition. At Mergui, whither the armament next proceeded, and where it arrived on the 6th October, a more effective resistance was offered: a heavy fire was opened from the batteries of the town, which was returned by the cruizers with such effect, as to silence it in about an hour. The troops then landed, and after wading through miry ground between the river and a strong stockade, which defended the town, and being exposed to a brisk fire from the enemy, they advanced to the stockade, and escalated in the most gallant style. The enemy fled. The town, when first occupied, was deserted, but the people soon returned, and both here and at Tavai, shewed themselves perfectly indifferent to the change of authorities. After leaving a sufficient garrison of the Native troops and part of the flotilla, Colonel Miles returned with the European portion of his division to Rangoon in November, in time to take a part in the more important operations about to occur.

In the end of August, and throughout September, nothing of any importance took place: the Burmese continued in force about Pagoda-point and in the Dalla province, and were evidently only waiting till the country should be more practicable for some important enterprise. In the mean time they were engaged in perpetual night attacks upon the piquets, whose musquets they frequently contrived to carry off, and on two occasions, a considerable body of chosen men, designated as the Invulnerables, made an attack upon the piquet of the Shweda-gon Pagoda, but were repulsed with loss. An attempt was also made in the beginning of September, to cut off three gun-brigs stationed in the Dalla creek, and a number of war-boats attacked them at eleven at night, the crews of which were engaged in boarding, when a re-inforcement of row-boats arrived, and drove off the assailants. Five of the enemy's boats were captured. The men serving as marines on board the gun-brigs, behaved with great steadiness, and received the Burmans, as they attempted to board, at point of the bayonet. Towards the end of September, a detachment was sent under Brigadier General Fraser to Panlang, by which a post of the enemy at that place was taken and destroyed.\*

The beginning of September was marked by a failure, on our part, of some magnitude. This occurred against the post of the enemy at Kykloo, fourteen miles from Rangoon. Colonel Smith was detached against this place, on the 5th of October, with eight hundred Madras Native Infantry, two howitzers, and forty Pioneers. On the first day's march, the division came upon a stockade at Tadaghee, which they carried, although not without some loss. Information was here received, that the strength of the enemy at Kykloo was greater than had been anticipated, and Colonel Smith applied for re-inforcements, and especially for a small body of Europeans: three hundred of the 20th and 30th Madras Infantry, and two other howitzers, were directed to re-inforce him, but no Europeans joined the division. On the 8th of October, the force arrived in the vicinity of the stockades, and carried a succession of breast works,

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\* Documents Nos. 61, 65, 66, 67, and 68.



works, thrown across the road, which delayed their approach to the main position, an entrenchment resting on an eminence on its right, which was crowned by a fortified Pagoda. As the storming party, conducted by Major Wahab, advanced to escalade, a round of cannon was fired from the Pagoda, but the troops in the stockade reserved their fire until the assailants were within fifty or sixty yards: they then poured down volleys of grape and musketry, with an effect and regularity till then unequalled, by which Major Wahab, with the leading officers and men were knocked down, and the rest so panic-struck, that they lay down to evade the fire. As the evening was too far advanced to allow of repairing the evil, Colonel Smith ordered a retreat. Upon the first fire from the Pagoda, a detachment had been directed to attack, but it was found too strongly stockaded, and the discomfiture in this quarter, adding to the alarm already excited by the repulse from before the stockade, completely banished all regard for discipline, and the whole of the troops retreated in a confused and indiscriminate mass to a plain at the foot of the rising ground of Kykloo. The second division of the force, which had been detached into the jungle, hearing the retreat sounded, came back in good order, and in time to cover the retreat of the fugitives. The detachment being again formed, proceeded without molestation to Tadamgee, carrying with them their wounded. The loss, on this occasion, was twenty-one killed, and seventy-four wounded; amongst the former were Captain Allen and Lieutenant Bond, and amongst the latter Major Wahab, Captain Moncrieff, and Lieutenants Campbell, Chalon, and Lindesay.\*

As a counterpoise for this temporary discomfiture, complete success attended an expedition directed at the same time against the post of Thantabain, at the junction of the Lyne river, or branch, to which the Prince of Tharawadi, the favorite brother of the King of Ava, who had been latterly sent with very considerable re-inforcements from the capital, had pushed forward some of his army. Instructions were also circulated by him to the heads of the districts, to assemble every inhabitant capable of bearing arms, and either to join him, or take up such positions as should prevent a single man of the 'wild foreigners,' as he termed the British, from effecting their escape. They were also to block up the passage of the river, so as to render the retreat of the flotilla equally impracticable. The Prince's head quarters were fixed at Donabew, but the advance division of his army, under the first Minister of state, the Kye Woongyee, was posted at Thantabain, against which Major Evans was sent, with three hundred of his Majesty's 38th, and one hundred of the 18th Madras Native Infantry, a detachment of Bengal Artillery, and a division of gun-boats; the flotilla being under Captain Chads, of his Majesty's Ship *Arachne*, who had joined the expedition at Rangoon, relieving the *Larne*, of which the crew was completely disabled by sickness. The force sailed on the 5th of October, proceeding up the Lyne river, and skirmishing as they advanced with the war-boats of the enemy, and flying parties on the bank. One war-boat, carrying a gun, was captured on the 6th, two stockades were taken, and seven war-boats destroyed on

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\* Document No. 69.



on the 7th, and on the same day, the force arrived opposite to the village of Thantabain, which was defended by three breast-works of large beams, and by a flotilla of fourteen war-boats, each carrying a gun. After the exchange of a brisk fire the troops were landed, and the work carried with little resistance. On the following morning, the principal stockade was attacked, and, notwithstanding its unusual strength, carried without a struggle.\* It was two hundred yards long, and one hundred and fifty broad, built of solid timber, fifteen feet high, with an interior platform, five feet broad and eight feet from the ground, upon which a number of wooden guns, and shot, and jinjals were found, whilst below, were seven pieces of iron and brass ordnance; the entrenchment was strengthened by outworks, and altogether was capable of containing two thousand men. In the centre of the stockade was found a magnificent bungalow, the residence of the Kyee Woongyee, who, as well as the Thakia Woongyee, was present at the commencement of the action. The bungalow was found perforated, in many places, by the shot from the vessels. Only seventeen bodies were discovered in the stockade, although the enemy's loss must have been more considerable. For some time past, however, the Burmans had made it their practice to carry off their dead and wounded, wherever an opportunity occurred. The British detachment returned to head quarters without the loss of a man, not having had, in fact, any opposition to encounter beyond the ineffective fire of the ill-constructed and worse-managed artillery of the Burman force. The absence of opposition, notwithstanding the strength of the post, and the encouraging presence of officers of high rank, clearly showed the impression made upon the Burmans by the intrepidity of the British troops. The first lessons they received, were finally confirmed by the daring escalade of the seven stockades at Kamaroot, on the 8th July, by the troops under Brigadier Macbean, and from that moment, although they might be induced to keep up a fire from behind their palisades, and to evince considerable determination against the Sipahis alone, they never offered any effective opposition to British troops in the storm, and rarely, if ever, awaited the consequence of an escalade.

Nor were the Burmans suffered to indulge in the idea of the impregnability of the Kykloo stockades, as, on the same day that Colonel Smith's detachment returned to head quarters, Brigadier M'Creagh was sent, with a combined force of Europeans and Natives, to attack the post. He arrived at the entrenchments on the 11th, but the enemy had deserted them, and fallen back to one said to be of still greater strength. Colonel M'Creagh, accordingly, advanced, and overtook the Burman force in their entrenchments at a considerable village, but they again fled and dispersed in all directions, after setting the village and stockade on fire. After further destroying the works, the detachment returned to Kykloo, and thence to Rangoon. On their advance, they had an opportunity of witnessing the barbarous character of the enemy, many of the bodies of the Sipahis and Pioneers, who fell in the former attack, having been fastened to the trunks of trees, and mangled and mutilated by imbecile and savage exasperation.†

During

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\* Document No. 70. (C) (D)

† Do. No. 70. (A) (B)

During the rest of October and November, the troops enjoyed a state of comparative repose, and this interval, together with the gradual approach of a more healthy season, and improved supplies, contributed materially to diminish the number of sick, and to preserve the health of those who had hitherto escaped. The force was therefore gathering vigour, for the renewal of active operations. On their side, the Burmans were not idle. The successive capture of the strongest stockades, the discomfiture of every attack, and the prolonged occupation of Rangoon, had begun, in the estimation of the Burmese themselves, to change the character of the war, and to inspire the Court of Ava with uneasiness and alarm. Ascribing however the impunity of the invaders to the want of energy in their generals, rather than to any inferiority in arms, the Court still looked with some confidence to the effect of the measure which had been adopted at an early period, of recalling the Bundoola, and his victorious army from Aracan. That chief, as we have already noticed, withdrew his troops from Ramoo in July and sending his army in detached parties across the mountain towards Sembewghew and Prome, with instructions to assemble at Donabaw, repaired to Ava to receive the rewards and commands of his Prince. No pains nor expence were spared to equip this favourite general for the field, and by the approach of the season for active operations, it was estimated that fifty thousand men were collected for the advance upon Rangoon, who were to exterminate the invaders, or carry them captives to the capital, where the chiefs were already calculating on the number of slaves who were, from this source of supply, to swell their train. Reports of the return of the Aracan army soon reached Rangoon, but some period elapsed before any certainty of its movements was obtained. By the end of November, an intercepted despatch from the Bundoola to the governor of Martaban, removed all doubt, and announced the departure of the former from Prome, at the head of a formidable host. His advance was hailed with delight, and preparations were made immediately for his reception.

Before we advert, however, to the results of the conflict, it will be convenient to notice some other occurrences which took place in the interval, connected with the general course of the war in this direction.\* In the course of September, the Company's cruiser *Hastings*, stationed off Cheduba, had made several reconnoissances of the large and neighbouring island of Ramree, and cut off several of the enemy's war-boats. In the beginning of October, Lieut. Colonel Hampton, commanding on Cheduba, detached a party of two hundred men, who, with a part of the crew of the *Hastings*, landed on the island and destroyed some stockades: nothing further was attempted. A more important measure was the capture of Martaban by Colonel Godwin, who was detached on this duty in the end of October, with part of his Majesty's 41st Foot, the 3d Regiment of M. N. Infantry, and Madras Artillery, under convoy of his Majesty's ships *Arackne* and *Sophia*. They reached Martaban on the 29th November: the place was found to be of considerable strength, and was, at first, warmly defended by Maha Udina, the governor, a bold and active chief. After a mutual cannonade, the troops were landed under

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\* Documents Nos. 72 and 73.

under a heavy fire from the enemy, who, as usual, did not await the effects of the storm, but evacuated the entrenchments as soon as the British entered. The town was at first deserted, but the inhabitants, chiefly Taliens or natives of Pegu, gradually returned, and the post was occupied by a British detachment throughout the remainder of the war.\* Towards the end of November also, Lieut.-Colonel Mallett was detached to display the British flag in old Pegu, which was effected without opposition, and the division returned to head quarters in time to take a part in the brilliant operations of the ensuing month.

The concentrated effort to which the energies and expectations of the Government of Ava had been, for some time, directed, was at length made, and the first half of December was the season of a series of operations which shewed, by the perseverance of the Burman generals, how much they had at stake. The grand army, which had been sedulously forming along the course of the Irawadi, and which had been gradually approaching the British lines, now ventured seriously to invest them. The force was now estimated at 60,000 men, of whom more than half were armed with muskets, the rest with swords and spears; a considerable number of jinjals, carrying balls of from six to twelve ounces, and a body of seven hundred Casay Horse, were attached to the force, whilst a numerous flotilla of war-boats and fire-rafts proceeded along the stream. No opposition was made to the advance of the enemy to the immediate proximity of Rangoon, which took place on the 1st December, and encouraged by this seeming timidity, as well as inspired by the confidence that they were now to exterminate their invaders, they formed a regular investment of the British lines, extending in a semicircle from Dalla, opposite to Rangoon, round by Kemendine and the great Pagoda, to the village of Puzendown on the creek communicating with the Pegu branch of the river, their extreme right being thus opposite to the town on one side, and their extreme left approaching it on the other, within a few hundred yards. In many places, their front was covered by thick jungle, but where it was more assailable, the Burmans entrenched themselves with their usual dexterity, throwing up these defences within a couple of hundred yards of the piquets.

The British force, reduced by sickness, and by the casualties of the service, was far from adequate to the defence of the position they occupied: their numerical insufficiency was, however, compensated by their superior skill and valour, whilst the openings in the lines were covered by the judicious disposition of the artillery, in batteries and redoubts along the assailable front. The shipping protected Rangoon, and the position on the river side, whilst the extreme left was defended by the post at Kemendine, supported on the river by his Majesty's sloop *Sophie*, and a strong division of gun-boats.

The operations on the part of the enemy were commenced on the morning of the 1st of December, by a resolute attack on the post of Kemendine, which was met with equal vigour, and repulsed by the garrison and flotilla, the former under Major Yates, of the Madras Service, the latter under the Commander of the *Sophie*, Capt. Ryves. Repeated attacks were  
made



made during the day, but with invariably the same results, and a bold attempt after dark to direct fire-rafts of formidable construction down the stream against the shipping of Rangoon, was frustrated by the skill and intrepidity of the British seamen.

In the afternoon of the 1st, a reconnoissance was made of the enemy's left, by a Detachment of his Majesty's 13th, and the 18th Madras Native Infantry, under Major Sale, which broke through their entrenchments, and after killing a number of the enemy, and destroying their works, returned loaded with military spoil. In the evening of the same day, two companies of the 38th, under Major Piper, drove back a considerable force, which was approaching inconveniently near to the north-east angle of the great Pagoda, and on the following morning a party was dislodged from a commanding situation in front of the north gate of the Pagoda, by Capt. Wilson, with two companies of the 38th, and a Detachment of the 28th Madras Native Infantry. With these exceptions, and the reply to the enemy's fire by the artillery, nothing was attempted for a few days, in order to encourage the Burman Generals to trust themselves completely within the reach of the British army.

Between the first and the fifth of December, the Burmans accordingly advanced their entrenchments with incessant activity close to the principal points of the British lines. On the north of the great Pagoda, they occupied some high ground within musquet shot, separated from the temple by the reservoir, known by the name of the Scotch tank. They thence formed at a right angle, facing the eastern front of the temple, to the vicinity of a morass, beyond which their lines proceeded parallel with those of the British, nearly to the Puzendoun creek, and at their southern extremity, within gun-shot of Rangoon. From these positions, they kept up a constant fire upon the Pagoda and the advanced piquets, and made it dangerous for the men to shew themselves beyond the defences. On the opposite side of the river, they cannonaded the shipping with little intermission, whilst at the post of Kemendine, scarcely any respite was given to the garrison, and frequent fire-rafts were launched against the vessels in the river. Little harm was effected by this shew of activity, but as the Burman force could no longer be permitted to harass the troops with impunity, and it was now impossible for them to escape from the consequences of a defeat, the Commander-in-Chief resolved to become the assailant, and terminate the expectations in which they had hitherto been permitted to indulge.\*

With this view, on the 5th December, a division of the Flotilla and gun-boats, under Captain Chads, was ordered up the Puzendoun creek, which cannonaded the enemy in flank, and drew off their attention in that quarter: at the same time two columns of attack were formed to advance from the Rangoon side, one eight hundred strong, under Major Sale, and the other of five hundred, under Major Walker, of the Madras service. A party of the Governor General's Body Guard, which had arrived on the preceding evening, was attached to Major Sale's column. The columns advanced at seven o'clock: that under Major Walker, first came in contact with the enemy, who, at first, offered some resistance, but the entrenchment being carried at the point of the bayonet,

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\* Documents Nos. 76 and 78.



bayonet, they quickly broke and retreated. The other column equally forcing the point of attack, completed the discomfiture of the Burman army, the whole of whose left was driven in scattered parties from the field, leaving numbers dead on the ground, and their guns, and military and working stores in the hands of the assailants. The loss of the latter was inconsiderable, except in the death of Major Walker, who was shot, gallantly leading his troops into the works, by a jinjal ball. The Bundoola made no attempt to recover this position, but collecting the fugitives upon his right and centre, continued to carry on his approaches to the great Pagoda, until the trenches approached so close that the bravadoes of his men could be distinctly heard in the barracks of the British force. In order to terminate the contest, therefore, now that the chief part of the enemy's force was in his front, Sir Archibald Campbell directed an attack to be made on the 7th, by four columns, under Lieut.-Colonels Mallet, Parlyb, Brodie, and Captain Wilson, and under the general superintendance of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles, Major Sale, with his division, acting upon the enemy's left and rear. The advance of the columns was preceded by a heavy cannonade, during the continuance of which they moved to their respective points of attack. The left column, under Colonel Mallet, advanced against the right of the enemy, and that under Colonel Brodie, upon their left, whilst the other two marched directly from the Pagoda upon their centre. They were saluted, after a momentary pause, by a heavy fire, in spite of which they advanced to the entrenchments, and quickly put their defenders to the route. The Burmans left many dead in their trenches, and their main force was completely dispersed. Their loss, in the different actions, is supposed to have been five thousand men; but they suffered most in arms and ammunition, which they could not easily replace, two hundred and forty pieces of ordnance of every kind, and a great number of musquets, were captured. The right division at Dalla, lingering at that position after the dispersion of the main body, was expelled from their entrenchments on the 8th, by Lieutenant-Colonel Farrier, and were driven from the neighbourhood, on the following day, by a more considerable detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Parlyb.\* The loss of the British, in these different affairs, was less than fifty killed, but above three hundred were wounded. Amongst the former were Lieutenant O'Shea, of H. M. 13th, and Major Walker, as noticed above.

The utter incompetence of their means to oppose the British force should, it might be thought, have pressed itself upon the Burman Commanders, and they might have been cautious how they ventured again upon an encounter with such an enemy. The Maha Bundoola, in spite of the confidence he had always expressed, appears to have received some impression of this nature, as, although with that perseverance which the Burman Chiefs displayed, he speedily re-organised his troops at no great distance from the scene of his late defeat, he seems to have withdrawn himself from the dangerous proximity, and relinquished the command to an officer of rank and celebrity, Maha Thilwa, who had been Governor of Asam, and under whom the Burmans were soon stockaded at Kokein, a place about mid-way between the Lyne and Pegu

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\* Document No. 77.

Pegu rivers, and about four miles to the north of the Shwe-Da-gon Pagoda. Their removal was necessary to confirm the impression made by the late victory, and to open the country to the further advance of the army, as well as to secure the safety of Rangoon, which was endangered by the practices of Burman warfare, that not only launched fire-rafts down the stream, but employed incendiaries to set the town on fire: on the night of the 14th, a great part of Rangoon was in flames in different quarters, and more than half the town was consumed, including the quarters of the Madras Commissariat. Upon the first alarm, the troops were at their posts to repel any attack that might be attempted, whilst parties, from the fleet and land force, were detached to suppress the conflagration. It was subdued by their exertions in the course of two hours, without any serious damage beyond the destruction of the wooden houses of Rangoon.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 15th, Brigadier General Campbell moved out against the enemy in two columns, the right of five hundred and forty men, with sixty of the Body Guard under Brigadier General Cotton, the left eight hundred strong, besides one hundred of the Body Guard, under Major General Campbell himself, the former being directed to make a detour, and take the work in the rear, whilst the latter attacked them in front. They were found to be of great strength, consisting of two large stockades on either flank, connected by a central entrenchment: each wing was about four hundred yards long by two hundred broad, and projected considerably beyond the center: the whole was occupied by a force of twenty thousand men. The right column having gained the rear, attacked the centre, whilst the left, forming into two divisions, commanded by Brigadier Miles and Major Evans, stormed the flank stockades. In fifteen minutes, the whole of the works were in the possession of the assailants. Besides the loss sustained by the enemy in the entrenchment, a number were destroyed in their retreat, by Colonel Miles's column, and many were sabred by the Body Guard. The British loss was also more than usually severe and the 13th suffered heavily, in consequence of having borne the brunt of the rear and principal assault, and having been, for some interval, exposed to the whole of the enemy's fire in a disadvantageous position, before the escalade could be effected: This regiment, which was foremost in every action, and particularly distinguished itself throughout the war, had, on this occasion, three officers, Lieutenants Darby, Petry, and Jones, killed, and seven officers, including Majors Sale and Dennie, wounded. Lieutenant O'Hanlon, also, of the Bengal Artillery, died of his wounds. The total killed amounted to eighteen, and the wounded to one hundred and fourteen, of whom twelve killed and forty-nine wounded, were of the 13th Regiment alone.

During these operations, the boats of the *Flotilla* were equally active, and with the assistance of the *Diana* steam packet, which filled the enemy with equal wonder and terror, succeeded in capturing thirty war-boats and destroying several rafts.\*

These several actions changed the character of the war. The Burmans no longer dared attempt offensive operations, but restricted themselves to the defence of their positions along the river,

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\* Documents Nos. 81 to 86.

river, and the road was now open to the British force, which, agreeably to the policy that had been enjoined by the events of the war, prepared to dictate the terms of peace if necessary, within the walls of the capital. Before prosecuting their course, however, we shall revert to the renewal of active hostilities on the north-eastern and eastern frontier of the British Indian dominions.

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Upon the return of the British forces in Asam to their cantonments in Gohati, Burman parties re-occupied the stations of Kaliabur, Raha Chokey, and Noagong, levying heavy contributions on the people, and pillaging the country. They even carried their incursions into the neighbouring states, and devastated the frontier districts of the British ally and dependant, the Raja of Jyntea. The renewal of operations in this quarter, therefore, commenced with their expulsion once more from these positions. The force under Lieutenant-Colonel Richards, who had been continued in the command, and had been instructed to clear Asam of the Burmans during the ensuing campaign, consisted of the 46th and 57th Regiments of N. I., the Rungpoo and Dinapore local battalions, and the Champaron L. I., with details of Artillery and Flotilla, and a detachment of Irregular Horse, amounting altogether to about three thousand men; a corps more than adequate for the purposes it was directed to effect, being fully equal, if not superior, to the aggregate of the Burman troops in Asam, and infinitely superior in equipment and efficiency.

The numbers of the army, and the necessity of recourse to water-carriage, preventing the forward movement of the whole body at an early period, Colonel Richards detached two divisions about the end of October 1824, to put a stop to the exactions and excesses of the Burmans. Major Waters, with a Flotilla, and part of the Dinapur Battalion, was directed to proceed to Raha Chowkey and Noagong, and the other boats, with one wing of the Chumparun Light Infantry, with four guns, under Major Cooper, advanced to Kaliabur. The latter arrived at Kaliabur on the 29th October, surprising a small party of Burmans on his route, who were dispersed with the loss of one of their chiefs, and the capture of another. Major Waters also, on his way, dislodged a party from the village of Hathgaon, and on his arrival at Raha Chokey, on the 3d of November, took the party stationed there by surprise. They were scattered about in the houses of the village, and in their attempt to escape from one of the columns into which Major Waters had divided his force, fell upon the other, by which many were killed. A small body which had been detached to reconnoitre, returning in ignorance of these transactions, was, on the following day, drawn into an ambuscade, and nearly half destroyed.\* In these affairs, the completeness of the success was not more owing to the steady courage of the troops, than to the accuracy of the information obtained through Lieutenant Neufville, in charge of the Intelligence Department in Asam. On the morning

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\* Document No. 87.

of the 3d, learning that the Boora Raja, the Burmese governor of Asam, was meditating his retreat from Noagong, Major Waters made a forced march in order to anticipate and intercept him. He was unable, however, to reach the village before the following morning, when he found the enemy had the start too far to leave any chance of his being overtaken.\* From information obtained on the spot, it appeared, that the retreating division amounted to about one thousand and three hundred men, of whom five hundred were Burmans, and the precipitate abandonment of their defences by so considerable a body, upon the approach of a force not one-third of their strength, clearly shewed how little they were disposed to offer effective opposition to the entire reduction of the country. The advanced posts being thus secured, Colonel Richards moved the remaining portions of his force up to Kaliabur, but the head-quarters were not transferred thither earlier than the 27th of December; the chief means of transport being water conveyance, and the boats being tracked against the current, the progress of the stores and supplies was necessarily slow, and the advance of the army was proportionately retarded: no difficulty was experienced from any other cause, as the people were friendly, and there was no enemy to encounter. From Kaliabur, the route was resumed to, and the force arrived at Maura Mukh on the 6th January. On their arrival, intelligence was brought that a party of the enemy were about three miles off, on the road to Jorehat. Colonel Richards immediately detached a company from the 46th Regiment, under Lieutenant Jones of that Corps. They proceeded, under the guidance of Lieutenant Neufville, to the spot, but unluckily, the enemy were found on the move, and only a few of their stragglers were seen and pursued without effect.†

Having afterwards received intelligence that two parties were in the hills to the southward, one of which, at Kaleana, was considerably in his rear, Colonel Richards deemed it expedient to endeavour to dislodge them, as, if allowed to remain, they would have it in their power to command the road between his force and Kaliabur, and cut off its supplies; besides deterring the inhabitants from returning to their homes. The enemy being reported also to have parties in stockaded positions at Cutcheree Hath, Deogoroo, and Deogaon, different parties were detached against them, under Captains Macleod, Waldron and Martin, whilst other detachments were sent out to intercept the enemy, after they should be dislodged in their retreat.

The party under Captain Martin, accompanied by Lieutenant Neufville, reached Deogaon, against which it had been sent, a distance of nineteen miles, about one A. M. on the morning of the 10th of January, but found the enemy too much on the alert for a surprize. Several of their scouts had been on the line of route during the day and night, looking out for the advance of the force expected, and, although the Detachment moved in perfect silence, and avoided two of their advanced posts, by a detour of half a mile, its approach was evidently known, as the party were repeatedly challenged, and signals by fire made from the Chokies. They gained, however,

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\* Document No. 87.

† Do. No. 88.



however, the western entrance of the stockade, as the rear of the enemy were quitting the opposite one, when some of the hindmost were killed, and some made prisoners ; but the main body taking to the jungle could not, in the uncertain light, be effectually pursued. Captain Martin accordingly, in obedience to instructions, halted the following day, and after destroying the stockade returned to camp.

Captain Waldron's party proceeded on the 9th to Deogooroo, and on their arrival at the place, were informed that the enemy had gone on to another post, about fifteen or eighteen miles distant, where they had a stockade. They accordingly pushed forward, and succeeded in falling upon them at day-break, when they immediately carried the place by assault, with a loss to the enemy of their Chief and twenty men, the remainder flying towards Cutcheree Hath. Captain Waldron then returned to camp.

The detachment under Captain Macleod, succeeded in cutting up some small parties on their route, but on reaching Cutcheree Hath, found it vacated by the enemy, who, the day preceding had taken the direction of Dodurallee. Captain Macleod was, however, fortunate in encountering the fugitives from Captain Waldron, who fled upon Cutcheree Hath, in ignorance of its being in the possession of a British detachment.\*

The success that attended these arrangements compelled the enemy to concentrate their forces at Jorehat, and left the country open for the British advance. At Jorehat, intestine division contributed to weaken the Burmese still further, and the Chief, known by the name of the Boora Raja, who had been considered as the head of the Burmese party in Asam, was killed by the adherents of Sam Phokun, a rival leader, although equally an officer in the Burman service. Despairing, consequently, of defending the position at Jorehat, the Burman Commanders, after setting fire to the entrenchment, fell back upon the capital, Rungpore, on the banks of the Dikho, about twenty miles from its junction with the Brahmaputra.

The country being thus cleared of the enemy, Colonel Richards advanced to Jorehat on the 17th January ; the movements of the force, on the following days, were much impeded by heavy rain, but by the 25th, the head-quarters were at Gauri Sagar, on the Dikho river, about eight miles from Rungpore. The Flotilla was left near the mouth of the Dikho, which was too shallow to admit of boats of burthen, and the left wing of the 46th Native Infantry remained for its protection. The guns and supplies of ammunition were removed into camp by land conveyance.

On the morning of the 27th, the Burman garrison of Rungpore made an attack upon the advanced post of the encampment, at a bridge over the Namdong nullah, which was defended by the Rungpore Light Infantry, under Captain Macleod : on hearing the firing, Colonel Richards moved out with two companies of the 57th Regiment, and the Dinagepore Local Corps, and found the enemy in considerable force, extending themselves into the jungle, right and left, and threatening to surround the party defending the post. The thickness of the  
jungle

jungle rendering it impossible to attack the enemy with advantage, Colonel Richards withdrew the party from the bridge and suspended his fire, by which the assailants were encouraged to show themselves more boldly, mistaking these arrangements for weakness or apprehension. As soon as they offered a sufficient front, Colonel Richards directed a charge to be made, which the Burmans did not wait to sustain. After giving their fire, they broke and fled, but they were overtaken, and a considerable number put to the sword: the loss of the British was trifling.\*

Having been joined by the requisite reinforcement of guns, Colonel Richards resumed his march towards Rungpore on the morning of the 29th. The approach of the capital had been fortified by the enemy: a stockade had been drawn across the road, the left of which was strengthened by an entrenched tank, a little way in front, and the right was within gun-shot of the fort: the position mounted several guns, and was defended by a strong party. On approaching the defences, the assailants were saluted by a heavy fire, which brought down half the leading division, and caused a momentary check: a couple of shells, and a round or two of grape having been thrown in, the column again advanced, and the stockade was escalated and carried by the right wing of the 57th Regiment, under Captain Martin, supported by the 46th. The tank on the right was also occupied, and two temples, one on the right and the other on the left, were taken possession of, by which the south side of the fort was completely invested, and the enemy were driven in at all points. In this action, Lieutenant-Col. Richards and Lieutenant Brooke were wounded; the former slightly, the latter severely; the number of wounded was considerable, but the loss in killed was of little amount.†

The result of these two engagements not only dispirited the Burmans, but gave renewed inveteracy to the divisions that prevailed amongst them. The two chiefs, the Sam and Bagli Phokuns, were willing to stipulate for terms; but the more numerous party, headed by the subordinate chiefs, were resolutely bent on resistance, and threatened the advocates of pacific measures with extermination. The latter, however, so far prevailed, as to dispatch a messenger to the British Commander, a Bauddha priest, a native of Ceylon, but brought up in Ava, Dhermadhar Brahmachari, to negotiate terms for the surrender of Rungpore, and they were finally agreed upon through his mediation.‡ Such of the garrison as continued hostile, were allowed to retire into the Burman territory, on their engaging to abstain from any act of aggression on their retreat, and those who were pacifically inclined, were suffered to remain unmolested, with their families and property: their final destination to await the decision of the Governor General's Agent; but in the event of peace with Ava, they were not to be given up to that Government. Colonel Richards was induced to accede to these conditions, by his conviction of the impossibility of preventing the escape of the garrison, upon the capture of the fort, or of pursuing them on their flight. It was also to have been apprehended, if the evacuation of the province had been much longer delayed, that it might not have been cleared

\* Document No. 90.

† Do. No. 91.

‡ Do. No. 92.

cleared of the enemy during the campaign, as the want of carriage and supplies would have detained the army some time at Rungpore, and might have delayed its movements till the season was too advanced to admit of its progress far beyond the capital. By the occupation of Rungpore on the terms granted, much time was saved, as well as some loss of lives avoided; and the object of the campaign, the expulsion of the Burmans from Asam, without the fear of their renewing their irruptions with any success, was peaceably and promptly secured. The persons that surrendered themselves, by virtue of these stipulations, were Sam Phokun and about seven hundred of the garrison; the rest, about nine thousand, of both sexes and all ages, including two thousand fighting men, withdrew to the frontiers; but many dropped off on the retreat, and established themselves in Asam.

The surrender of Rungpore, and the dispersion of the Burmans, terminated the regular campaign on the north-eastern frontier; but the state of anarchy into which Asam had fallen, and the lawless conduct of the Sinhpho, and other wild tribes, inhabiting its eastern portion, continued to demand the active interference of British detachments throughout the remainder of the season.\* The Burmans also appeared in some force, in May, at Beesa Gaon, a Sinhpho village, on the right bank of the Nao Dehing, where they erected a stockade; they also advanced to Duffa Gaon, a similar village, a few miles inland from the same river, about ten miles to the north of the former, where they entrenched themselves. The force at these posts consisted of about one thousand men, of whom six hundred were Burmans, the rest Sinhphos, under the command of the Governor of Mogaum. From these stations they were dislodged in the middle of June, by a party of the 57th Native Infantry, under Lieutenants Neufville and Kerr, after a march of great exertion and fatigue. At Beesa Gaon, the stockades were five in number, and were carried at the point of the bayonet: the enemy at first formed in front of the stockades, as if determined to offer a resolute resistance; but they retreated precipitately before the charge of the British detachment, who, following them as quickly as the preservation of order, and the nature of the ground would permit, drove them out of each stockade in rapid succession, without firing a shot: on quitting the last entrenchment, the Burmans fled towards their frontier, but their retreat was pursued by a party under Ensign Bogle, and they were so closely pressed, that they were obliged to abandon several hundred Asamese, whom they were carrying off as slaves.†

The plan of operations on the Sylhet frontier, during the campaign of 1825, comprised the march of a considerable force through Cachar into Manipur, whence an impression might be made on the territory of Ava, or at least the anxious attention of the Court be drawn to its frontier in that direction. With these views, a force of about seven thousand men was collected under Brigadier Shuldham, who was appointed to command the eastern frontier. The army consisted of six Regiments of Infantry, the 7th, 44th, and 45th Native Infantry, forming the 3rd Brigade, and the 14th, 39th and 52d Regiments Native Infantry, Brigaded as the 4th

Brigade,

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\* Documents Nos. 93 and 94.

† Do. No. 95.



Brigade, two Companies of Artillery, four of Pioneers, the Sylhet Local Corps, a Corps of Cavalry, Blair's Irregular Horse, and a body of Cacharis and Manipuris about five hundred strong, under Raja Gambhir Sinh.

At an early period, after the rains had ceased, a reconnoissance was made by Brigadier Innes, of the positions which the Burmans had occupied throughout the season at Talayn, and which they had now abandoned, after sustaining a serious reduction of their force by the climate and want of supplies.\* There was nothing, therefore, to apprehend from the enemy on the advance to Manipur, nor was it probable that they were to be found there in any strength: the defence of Arracan and the Irawadi furnishing ample employment to the resources of Ava. Although, however, hostile opposition was not to be dreaded, the face of the country to be traversed, and its utter unproductiveness, afforded obstacles equally serious, and which proved insurmountable to a numerous and heavily-equipped army. From Bhadrapur to Banskandy, a road was speedily made by the exertions of the Pioneers, on which General Shuldham, with the Artillery and the third Brigade, advanced to Doodpatlee, there to await the further operations of the Pioneers, and the arrival of carriage cattle and supplies. Captain Dudgeon, with the Sylhet Local Corps, Gambhir's Levy, and a wing of Blair's Horse, was sent in advance to cover the Pioneers. The country from Banskandy towards Manipur was a continual series of ascents and descents, the route being intersected, at right angles, by ridges of mountains running nearly due north and south, the base of one springing from the foot of the other, with the intervention only of a mountain rivulet, swollen into a deep and precipitous river after every shower; for the first thirty miles, also, the sides of the mountains were completely covered with a thick forest, the intervals between the trees of which were filled up with a net-work of intertwining reeds and brushwood, except where a narrow and often interrupted foot-path wound through the labyrinth. The soil was a soft alluvial mould, converted by the slightest rain into a plashy mire, and to aggravate all these difficulties, frequent and heavy showers commenced early in February, and continued with slight occasional intermission until the proximity of the rainy season rendered the attempt to reach Manipur hopeless.

During the whole of February, the Pioneers, assisted by a few of the Mountaineers, some Coolies from Sylhet, and working parties from the Local Corps, contrived, with immense labour, to open a pathway through the forest to the banks of the Jiri nullah, about forty miles from Banskandy, but the nature of the soil, and the state of the weather, rendered their success of little avail, as the road continued impassable for guns and loaded cattle. In the attempts to move forward, and in the conveyance of supplies to the Pioneers and the advanced guard, several hundred bullocks perished, a great number of camels were destroyed, and many elephants were lost, both by the fatigue they underwent, and from their dislocating their limbs as they laboured through the mire, or from their becoming so deeply plunged into it, that no efforts could extricate them. After struggling against these physical obstructions in vain, through  
February

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\* Documents Nos. 96 and 97.



February and March, General Shulldham reported the impracticability of the advance to Manipur, in consequence of which the attempt was abandoned, and the force broken up. The head-quarters were removed to Dacca, a force under Brigadier General Donkin was posted at Sylhet, and two Corps of Native Infantry, with the Sylhet Local Corps, and the Manipur Levy, were left in Cachar.\*

That the difficulties which had thus arrested the progress of a heavy body were not insurmountable to a small force differently organised, was very speedily established, and the Burmese were driven out of Manipur by a corps attached to the invading army, on the strength of which it was scarcely enumerated. At his earnest solicitation, Gambhir Sinh was allowed to undertake the recovery of his ancestral possessions with his own Levy, formed of five hundred Manipuris and Cacharis, armed by the British Government, but wholly undisciplined. Lieutenant Pemberton volunteered to accompany the Raja. They left Sylhet on the 17th May, and did not reach Banksandy till the 23rd, the direct road being impassable, in consequence of heavy rain, which compelled them to make a circuitous detour. They started with the Levy on the 25th, and after a march of great difficulty and privation, chiefly owing to repeated falls of rain, which compelled them to halt several days together, they gained the western boundary of the valley of Manipur on the 10th of June. In the town of Manipur, and at two villages in advance, they found the Burmans posted, but the enemy retreated to a village called Undra, about ten miles to the south. The Raja and Lieutenant Pemberton advanced to attack them, but they again fled, and information was shortly afterwards received, that they had evacuated the district. The season of the year, and the want of supplies, rendering the valley of Manipur equally untenable for friend or foe, Gambhir Sinh leaving a division of his Levy, and a body of armed inhabitants, to defend the chief town, returned with Lieutenant Pemberton to Sylhet, where they arrived on the 22d June, having, in this manner, accomplished one of the objects of the campaign, and, with a few hundred undisciplined mountaineers, cleared Manipur of the enemy.

An effort on a still more extensive scale than the armament on the Sylhet frontier formed part of the plan of this campaign, and important results were expected to follow the employment of a powerful force on the side of Arracan. With this intention, an army of about eleven thousand men was assembled at Chittagong in the end of September, † and placed under the command of Brigadier General Morrison, of his Majesty's Service; a Flotilla of Pilot vessels and gun-brigs was attached to it, under the direction of Commodore Hayes, and a numerous equipment of brigs, boats, and other craft, was prepared on the spot by the Political Agent, for the conveyance of the men and stores along the coast, and across the numerous creeks and rivers by which the approach to Aracan was intersected. General Morrison arrived at Chittagong, and assumed the command of the force on the 5th September, 1824.

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\* Documents Nos. 98 to 105.

† Do. No. 106.

The state of affairs at Rangoon had operated sensibly upon the effective strength of the Burmans in Aracan, and they no longer threatened offensive operations. After quitting the stockades at Ramoo, they retreated to Mungdoo and Lowadhong, and finally concentrated such of their forces as remained in the province, at the city of Aracan, which they laboured diligently to fortify agreeably to their usual method. Considerable detachments, however, moved across the mountains to the Irawadi, whither the Bundoola himself followed, leaving about five hundred men under the command of the Atwen Woon, Maungza, an officer of distinguished intelligence and courage.

Although no serious obstruction to the march was to be apprehended from hostile opposition, yet the advance to Aracan was impeded by the same difficulties which had been found the most formidable foes in every stage of the war. The country thinly peopled and overrun with jungle, afforded no resources, and the stores and provisions, as well as cattle and carriage, were necessarily brought from a distance, and collected slowly with much labour and expence. The elements were also unfriendly, and the rainy season of 1824 being protracted to the end of November, rendered it impossible for the troops to quit their cantonments, or the supplies to advance by land, and retarded the preparation of a military road from Chittagong to the Naf, by which the artillery and loaded cattle were to proceed. This was completed without delay, as soon as the season permitted; but a considerable portion of the stores and cattle had not arrived at Chittagong as late as January 1825, in the beginning of which month General Morrison determined to move out. The troops were, accordingly, ordered to march, and, in the course of the month, they were assembled in the vicinity of Cox's Bazar, to which place they were accompanied along the coast by the transports and flotilla.

At this point it became necessary to determine on an election between pursuing the road along the coast to the mouth of the Naf, or, by taking a more easterly direction, cross it at a higher and more practicable portion of its channel, or avoid it altogether. The rivers of Aracan rise in a range of mountains at a short distance from the sea coast, and neither by the length of their course, nor communications with other streams, become of considerable depth or expanse. They are, indeed, in general, fordable, except after heavy rain, but as they approach the coast they suddenly change their character, expanding into vast estuaries, and spacious creeks, communicating with each other and the sea, spreading, at high water, over the soil for a considerable extent, and leaving, at the ebb, broad miry deposits on either bank. The whole coast is to be considered as indented by spacious inlets of the sea, receiving mountain torrents, rather than as broken by the mere passage of rivers of magnitude; and the difficulties immediately on the sea shore were, accordingly, as serious as they were trifling on this account, but a few miles inland.

General Morrison preferred following the direction of the coast, as free from the risk attending a march inland, and recommended by important advantages. The existence of any road

road was, with some, a matter of doubt, and there could be no question that it led through a wild and impracticable country, amidst thickets and over mountains, through which, although the troops might make their way, the artillery and loaded cattle could scarcely be conducted. Whilst proceeding along the coast, the vicinity of the flotilla ensured supplies and conveyance to a certain extent, and it was hoped that, with their aid, the delay in crossing the mouths of the rivers would not be such as to frustrate the objects of the campaign, the expulsion of the Burmans from the province of Aracan, and the possible co-operation of the force with the army on the Irawadi. How little likelihood existed of accomplishing both these purposes appeared from the very first occasion that offered of transporting the army across the debouche of a river on the coast of Aracan.

The army arrived at Tek Naf on the 1st of February, and a detachment was sent across the river on the following day, by which Mungdoo was occupied. No enemy made his appearance, and the population was decidedly friendly.\* A proclamation was addressed to them by General Morrison, calculated to keep alive the amicable feeling they displayed. The troops were gradually crossed over the river, but the delay inseparable from such an operation, exceeded anticipation, and, notwithstanding every exertion, the force was unable to quit Mungdoo before the 12th of the month, at which time a considerable part of the baggage was still on the western bank, and a great portion of the carriage cattle had not even reached the Naf. From Mungdoo, a road led by Lawadong to Aracan, by which the Burmese retreated to the latter, and which presented a much less questionable inland route than that from Ramoo, but acting on the principles first adopted, General Morrison continued his march along the shore to the mouth of another large river, the Meyu, about five marches south from the Naf. To this point his Majesty's 54th, the 10th Madras Native Infantry, and left wing of the 16th Madras Native Infantry, proceeded by sea; whilst the right Field Battery, his Majesty's 44th Foot, 1st Light Infantry Battalion, four Companies of the 42d Native Infantry, five Companies of the 62d Native Infantry, the left wing of the 16th Madras Native Infantry, and two Resalahs of the 2d Local Horse, moved by land. Brigadier Richards, with the remainder of the force, was left at Mungdoo, with directions to follow as soon as carriage cattle capable of conveying three weeks supplies, should have crossed the Naf. This officer had previously been detached to Lowadong, which the Burmans had deserted.

The land column advanced to the Meyu, without much difficulty, by the 22d February,† but the detachment, by water, encountered a squall on the 17th, which compelled the gun-boats, conveying his Majesty's 54th Regiment, to return to Mungdoo, with the loss of much baggage and camp equipage thrown overboard. The boats with the native troops on board were also scattered, and seven were driven on shore, but without any loss of lives. No inconvenience beyond further delay was experienced from this disaster. Provisions were forwarded from Mungdoo to the land force, and the detachment proceeding by water,

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\* Documents Nos. 107 and 108.

† Do. No. 109.



was speedily re-embarked, and reached the river in safety. Upon arriving at the Meyu, the difficulties of the route were experienced in a still greater degree than at the Naf. The mouth of the river was about five miles broad, and was separated by the Island of Akyab, scarcely twelve miles from the mouth of the Oreatung, or Aracan river, which, at its debouche, expanded into an estuary of above ten miles in breadth : at a short distance from the mouth of the Meyu, a creek running north of Akyab, formed a communication between the two streams, opening into the Oreatung at a point marked by the site of a pagoda, and opposite to a similar channel which led to the spot chosen for the encampment, Chang Krein Island, a part of the country, insulated like many others in its vicinity, by the innumerable communicating and intersecting ramifications of the rivers and creeks. The gun-boats, with other boats and rafts, having joined on the 27th February, the force was gradually transported across the Meyu and along the canals above described, to Chang Krein Island, where a sufficient force for forward movements was collected by the 20th of March; nearly a month having elapsed since the arrival of the force at the mouth of the Meyu. From Chang Krein, the main body was advanced on the 20th of March, a short distance to Kay Krang Dong, with the right pushed forward five miles to Natonguay, to cover the working parties employed in rendering the nullahs passable, and the left in position at Chang Krein,\* threatening some stockades at Kheoung Peela, or Chambala, which had been the scene of a temporary check to the marine division of the invading force. Commodore Hayes having entered the great Aracan river on the 22d February, received information which induced him to believe that the principal Mug Chieftains were confined at Chambala, a stockade garrisoned by about one thousand men, half a tide from the capital, and concluding that their liberation would prove of essential service to the advancing army, he determined upon attacking the work. Accordingly, on the 23d, he stood up the Prome Pura Khione, or Branch, leading from the Oreatung river to Aracan, in the *Research*, *Vestal*, and several gun-vessels, having on board one Company of his Majesty's 54th Regiment. At two p. m. they came in sight of the enemy's works at Kheoung Peela, which immediately opened a heavy fire upon the *Gunga Saugor*, and *Vestal*, the headmost vessels. The *Research* getting within half pistol shot, commenced a heavy cannonade and fire of musketry upon the stockade and breast-work, which was returned by the enemy with great regularity and spirit. On ranging to the northern end of the stockade, with intent to anchor and flank it, as well as to allow the other vessels to come into action, the Commodore found his ship raked from forward by another stronger battery and stockade, of which he had no previous information, and the strength of the defendants was more considerable than had been anticipated, amounting, as subsequently ascertained, to three thousand men, commanded by the Son of the Raja of Aracan and other Chiefs of rank. After a severe engagement of two hours duration, the tide beginning to fail, the Commodore was obliged to wear round and drop down

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\* Document No. 110.



the river. The *Research*, *Asseergurh*, *Asia Felix*, and *Isabella*, took the ground, and remained fast for several hours near the batteries; but the enemy made no attempt to fire at or molest them. The loss in this attack was severe. Three privates of his Majesty's 54th were killed, and several of the natives of the Flotilla. Amongst the killed also was Mr. Rogers, the second officer of the *Research*, and Major Schalch, a distinguished officer of the Company's service, commanding an extra Pioneer and Pontoon Corps attached to the army, who was on board the *Research* for the recovery of his health. He was struck whilst standing on the poop by a musket ball in his breast, and died on the morning of the 25th. The fall of this Officer deprived the army of professional talent of the highest description, animated by unwearied zeal, and guided by equal judgment. His remains were consigned to the deep with military honours.\*

The arrangements for moving being completed, the troops advanced on the 24th of March. The line of march lay along the eastern bank of the branch of the main stream, or Aracan river, and was directed against the south-eastern face of the defences of the capital. This road was intersected every few miles by nullahs, communicating at right angles with the main river, and by occasional ridges of low hills parallel to the nullahs, and equally resting on the stream. On these, it was supposed, the enemy would endeavour to make a stand, but little was to be apprehended for the result. In other respects, the march was made under auspicious circumstances. The weather was favourable, the country productive, and the people warm in the cause of those who were likely to liberate them from Burman oppression.

On the 24th of March, the army encamped on the southern bank of the Chabattee nullah. The 25th was occupied in preparing to cross this, and the Wabraing, a similar channel, above a mile in advance, beyond which the road was intersected by the Padho hills, on which it was understood the enemy were posted. The nullahs being crossed on the morning of the 26th, by day break, the force was formed into four columns, the right commanded by Brigadier Grant, the centre by Brigadier Richards, the left by Captain Leslie, and the reserve by Lieut. Colonel Walker. The left column proceeded up the main branch of the river; but the boats soon grounding, the men were landed, and the column was directed to skirt the river, in order to turn the hills on the enemy's right. The right and centre columns moved upon the passes, which had been ascertained to lead through the range.

When the right and centre columns first moved towards the hills, no appearance of an enemy was discernible amidst the forests that crowned their summits, and the presence of armed men was only indicated by the occasional tolling of a Gong, or the report of a single Jinjal, at distant intervals; at last, however, a wild irregular shout, followed by a scattered and desultory fire, announced a hostile force. In order to dislodge them, the Light Companies of the 26th, 28th, 49th, and 63d Regiments, were directed to ascend the summit, which they effected in a most gallant manner, and then moving along the heights, carried several intrenched posts, whilst the column below, proceeding in a parallel direction to the left, cleared an unfinished stockade, and

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\* Document No. 111.

drove the enemy from the heights above where they attempted a stand. The passes were thus gained, and the army crossed the hills to their northern side, which opened upon an extensive plain, intersected by several deep tide nullahs, skirted with jungle, and, consequently, favourable to the escape of the flying Burmans. They made a demonstration of resistance at one point, and menaced the 49th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Smith, which was in advance with an overwhelming force; the Sipahis, however, stood their ground, and before the affair became serious, the approach of the columns obliged the Burmans to resume their retreat. The army bivouacked within a mile and a half of the enemy's principal post at Mahatee. The reserve and the Artillery joined at midnight.

On the morning of the 27th, after the fog which it commenced had dispersed, the advance was resumed. The post of Mahatee was a peninsula, protected in front and on the left by broad rivers, and backed by high conical mountains: deep entrenchments along the front, with epaulments to protect them from an enfilading fire, and with stakes in the banks of the rivers, formed its defences, and the hills in its rear were crowned with stockades and fortified pagodas. In front of these works, and on this side of the nullah, was a small elevation, in which a party was stationed, but who speedily retreated across the river upon the approach of three Companies of the 44th Regiment, under Major Carter, forming the advance. The return of the outpost within their lines, was the signal for the enemy's Artillery to open, but their fire was soon silenced by the guns of the British, and the troops descended to the fords as soon as they were left, by the ebb tide, passable. The enemy did not await their crossing, but fled towards Aracan. A Resalah of Horse that had crossed further to the right, to gain the road by which they were retreating, arrived in time to do some execution on their rear, and to prevent the destruction of the bridges on the road to the capital.

On the 28th, the whole of the troops in the rear, and the Flotilla, with Commodore Hayes, having joined, the enemy's position was reconnoitred, and at day-break on the 29th, the army proceeded to the attack of the defences of Aracan on its eastern front. These proved to be a connected series of stockades, carried along the crest of a range of hills, from three hundred and fifty to four hundred and fifty feet high, running parallel for some distance with the town, immediately to the east and south of it, but extending considerably beyond the town, and strengthened by escarpment, abbatiss, and masonry, where such means could be advantageously employed. One pass alone, at its northern extremity, led through the hills to the capital, and that was defended by the fire of several pieces of artillery, and about three thousand muskets. The whole number of the enemy was estimated at about nine thousand men. The ground in front was a long narrow valley entirely clear of underwood, and in depth not wholly out of the range of the enemy's artillery. Along the foot of the hills ran a belt of jungle, which partly screened the advance, and an interrupted piece of water extended, serving as a natural fosse; but above these the ground, again, was clear and open, not only to the fire of the defenders, but to the large stones which they precipitated upon the assailants, who attempted to scale the summit.

The first attempt to carry the position was by a direct attack upon the pass, and the division

division appointed to the duty was placed under command of Brigadier General MacBean. The assault was led by the Light Infantry Company of his Majesty's 54th, four Companies of the 2d Light Infantry Battalion, and the Light Companies of the 10th and 16th Madras Native Infantry, with the Rifle Company of the Mug Levy, under Major Kemm, and supported by six Companies of the 16th Madras Native Infantry, under Captain French. Notwithstanding the utmost gallantry of the troops, the attempt to escalate failed, in consequence of the steepness of the ascent, and the well-directed fire and incessant rain of stones which knocked down the assailants as fast as they approached the top of the pass. After a fruitless struggle, in which the Sipahis and Europeans vied with each other in the display of cool and determined courage, every officer being disabled, and Captain French, of the 16th Madras Native Infantry killed, the troops were recalled, and the force took up a position for the rest of the day.

Having determined, in consequence of the failure of this attempt, and the nearer observation of the enemy's defences, to attack them on their right, as the key to their position, whilst their attention should be drawn by a continued fire to their front, the 30th of March was spent in the construction of a battery, to play especially upon the works commanding the pass, and on the 31st, at day light the guns opened, and maintained, during the day, a heavy cannonade, which had the effect of checking, though not silencing the enemy's fire. At about eight in the evening, Brigadier Richards moved off with six Companies of his Majesty's 44th, three of the 26th, and three of the 49th Native Infantry, thirty seamen, under Lieutenant Armstrong, of the *Research*, and thirty dismounted troopers of Gardener's Horse.

Though there was moon-light, yet it was evident from the silence of the Burmese, that the movement from the camp had not been detected from the heights. The hill was nearly five hundred feet high, but the road by which the party ascended was winding and precipitous, and an anxious interval elapsed before it could be known that the undertaking had succeeded. At last, a few minutes after eleven, a shot from the hill proclaimed, that the enemy had discovered the advance of the assailants. The whole camp was in a moment on foot: a yell or two from the Burmese, was followed by a sharp fire for a very short period, and then the drums and fifes of the Detachment proclaimed that the point was carried, even before the preconcerted signal, by rockets, had been given.

On the following morning, as soon as a six-pounder, carried up the hill with some difficulty, had been brought to bear upon the enemy, Brigadier Richards advanced to the assault of the entrenchments on the adjacent height, whilst a simultaneous movement of the advance, under Brigadier General McBean, was again directed against the pass from below. The enemy, apparently panic-struck, abandoned the hills after a feeble resistance, and the capital of Aracan was in possession of the British force. The loss in these subsequent operations was inconsiderable.

Aracan stands upon a plain, generally of rocky ground, surrounded by hills and traversed by a narrow tide nulla, towards which there is a prevailing slope. On the northern face, another nulla intervenes between the wall of the fort and the hills, and both these streams unite a little below the Baboo Dong hill, through the rocky fissures of which they rush, at



low water, with the velocity, and noise of a rapid. The space on which the town stands is not an absolute square, nor are the hills arranged with rectilinear regularity ; but allowing for the ruggedness of the natural outline, and supposing the surface to be sprinkled with a few detached and separate little eminences, a tolerably accurate idea of the situation of the place may be formed. The fort stands at the N. W. corner of the space above described. It consists of three concentric walls, with intervening spaces between the third and second, and the second and inner wall, which forms the citadel. These walls are of considerable thickness and extent, constructed with large stones, and with a degree of labour such as a powerful state alone could have commanded. Where the masonry is dilapidated, the interstices have, by the Burmese, been filled up with piles of timber. This interior work is comparatively trifling to that by which, in former days, the defects in the circumvallation of hills appear to have been supplied. At every point, where the continuity of their natural outline is broken, artificial embankments, faced with masonry, some of a very great height, connect them with each other, and the excavations whence the materials were quarried, have now formed into what resemble large natural ponds. The Burmese entrenchments merely followed and took advantage of this ancient line of defensive outworks. The extent of the circumference is nearly nine miles. At the gateways, the stone walls appear to have been of considerable elevation and great solidity, but where the steepness, or altitude of the hill rendered artificial defences of less importance, a low wall of brick or stone has been carried along the summit. These defences are said to have been constructed several centuries ago.

All the hills and hillocks contiguous to the town are surmounted by Pagodas, which, by resembling spires, give the place something of a town-like appearance ; but, with the exception of these edifices, and the walls of the fort, its palaces and its huts were all of the same materials—bamboos, timbers, straw, and mats, with not a single stone or brick-building among them. The number of houses in the town was said to have been eighteen thousand, but half had been destroyed by fire. The greater part of the population had abandoned the place on its first occupation, but speedily returned to their homes, and shewed themselves well satisfied with the change in their Government.

The first days after taking possession of the town were occupied in preparing for further operations : the nature of the country defeated one object of the attack from the eastward, and assisted the Burman force to effect their escape, although in small scattered parties, across the low lands between the capital and the mountains, and across the latter to Chalais by the passes from Talak and Aeng.\* Two of the four provinces of Aracan, or Aracan and Cheduba, were therefore cleared of the enemy, and it only remained to dislodge them from the remaining divisions of Chynda (or Sandoway) and Ramree, for which purpose a part of the force, under Brigadier General MacBean, was dispatched on the 8th of April.

We have already seen that the Burman posts on Ramree were kept on the alert by the troops

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\* Document No. 144.



troops at Cheduba, under Lieutenant Colonel Hampton, and the crews of the *Hastings* frigate and gun-boats, under Captain Hardy, and that several successful descents upon the Island had been made during the preceding year. Encouraged by the result of these attempts, and anticipating the reduction of the enemy's force in order to strengthen Aracan, Lieutenant Colonel Hampton determined, in the beginning of the current season, to undertake the reduction of the Island with a few of his Majesty's 54th and European Artillery-men, and five-hundred and twenty men of the 40th Native Infantry, with the seamen and mariners of the frigate. The party landed on the morning of the 3d February, and proceeded to attack the defences by land, whilst the gun-boats effected a passage up the creek leading to the harbour, across which strong stakes were planted. In consequence of the treachery of the guides, the assailants, after a fatiguing march through a considerable part of the day, found themselves in a thick jungle, at a considerable distance from the stockades, and it was therefore necessary to return to the beach before the day should close, without effecting the object of the attack. As the troops retired, the Burmans kept up a scattered fire from the jungle into which they had been driven, from some intrenched positions that had been stormed and carried at the point of the bayonet. Upon the junction of the reserve with two six-pounder field pieces, this annoyance was checked, and the party re-embarked, without further molestation, by six in the evening. The loss was much less considerable than might have been anticipated.\*

The detachment now sent against Sandoway and Ramree, embarked on board the Flotilla on the morning of the 17th April, and anchored, on the night of the 18th, within three miles of the Cheduba-roads. On proceeding for water to Low Island, to the south of Ramree, information was brought by the Mugs of the evacuation of the latter by the enemy, which proved to be correct, and the town was occupied without opposition on the 22d. Had resistance been attempted, its possession might have been dearly purchased, as its defences were of unusual strength, and judiciously constructed.

After leaving a detachment in Ramree, General Macbean proceeded against Sandoway, on the main land, and arrived at the mouth of the Sandowi river on the 28th. The troops ascended in boats on the 29th, and reached the town on the morning of the 30th. Stakes had been planted across the river in various places, and several stockades were observed, but there was no appearance of the enemy, who had withdrawn from all their positions in Aracan upon hearing of the downfall of the capital.†

The entire occupation of the province of Aracan thus fulfilled one chief object of the expedition, and, in as far as it excited the apprehensions of the Burman Court, of an invasion in that direction, proved a seasonable diversion in favour of the Rangoon force. It was not found practicable, however, to carry into effect the other main purpose of the force, a junction across the mountains with Sir Archibald Campbell. Several reconnoissances were made, with the view of determining the practicability of a route across the mountains, but they failed to afford satisfactory information.

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\* Document No. 115.

† Do. No. 116.

Little was to be apprehended from the enemy until near the Burman boundary. They had retreated over the mountains with great precipitation, losing great numbers by the way from want, fatigue, and contests with the mountaineers. At Chalaín, in the Ava country, they halted, and whilst the chiefs, the Atwen Woon Mounnga and the Viceroy Toroo-wyne, proceeded to the capital, an officer of high military repute, Maha Mengyee Thilwa, assumed the command with considerable re-inforcements. The chief impediments, however, were of a physical character, and consisted in the face of the country and the change of the season. Above eighty miles of a low jungly tract, crossed by numerous rivulets, intervened between the capital and Talak, at the foot of the mountainous ridge which separates Aracan from Ava. It thence passed, for ninety miles more, over lofty and rugged precipices, where no supplies could be expected, and even water was scarce, and which could be rendered practicable for guns and baggage only by great effort and with considerable delay. A force was formed of the Light Companies of his Majesty's 44th and 45th, and 16th Madras Infantry, and three Companies of the 2d Bengal Light Infantry, and placed under the command of Major Bucke, to explore this route in pursuit of the enemy. They proceeded to Talak by water, and thence made four marches over the mountains, in which the men and cattle underwent extreme fatigue. When arrived at Akowyn, within one stage of Tantabain, on the Burman frontier, they learned that the Burmans were there in strength, and the exhausted state of the detachment, and the impracticable nature of the route, induced Major Bucke to retrace his steps, and return to Talak. At a more favourable season the route might have been traversed by the army, but it was now too late, and at any time would have been a work of much difficulty. A much more practicable road across the mountains by Aeng, was not discovered until the end of the war, but it would not have been of much avail for the passage of troops had its existence been known earlier, as none of the carriage cattle of the army had crossed the Meyu river in June, and some were even then to the north of the Naf. Even their presence would not have enabled the army to advance, as the rains set in early in May, and precluded all possibility of military operations. The season also brought with it, its usual pestiferous influence, in the midst of a low country overrun with jungle, and intersected by numerous rivers. Notwithstanding the precautions that had been taken in the timely cantonment of the troops at Aracan, fever and dysentery broke out amongst them to an alarming extent, and with the most disastrous results. That the unavoidable privations of troops on service tended to aggravate the severity of the complaints, was a necessary occurrence; but all ranks were equally affected, and a large proportion of officers fell victims to the climate. Brigadier General Morrison himself, after struggling through the campaign against it, was obliged to quit the country, and died on his way to Europe. The maladies were so universal, and the chance of subduing them so hopeless, that the Government of Bengal was at last impelled to the necessity of recalling the troops altogether, leaving divisions of them on  
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the Islands of Cheduba and Ramree, and the opposite coast of Sandoway, where the climate appeared to be not unfavourable to their health.\*

From these transactions, we return to the operations of the army at Rangoon.

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The capture of the stockades at Kokain on the 15th of December, was followed by the complete dispersion of the Burman army, and the exertions of the chiefs were vainly directed to its re-organization. Two or three small bodies were thus assembled on the Lyne river, at Mophi and Panlang, whilst the Maha Bundoola retreated to Donabew, where he exercised his utmost efforts, and ultimately with some success, to concentrate a respectable force, which he strongly entrenched. The victory produced also a change in the sentiments of the enemy, and a letter was addressed to some of the European residents at Rangoon by the Maha Bundoola, which, although of a vague and indefinite character, evinced a material alteration in the temper of that chieftain, and a disposition, if not to treat for peace, to respect his antagonists. The tenour  
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\* On this subject, we are able to cite the most authentic testimony in the following extracts from the Transactions of the Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta: "The causes of this sickness were too obvious to be overlooked: the locality was sufficient to satisfy every Medical observer, that troops could not inhabit it with impunity, and a reference to the meteorological register, will shew a severity of season to which the men were quite unaccustomed, and which no covering could wholly resist. Exposure to the weather, which no precaution could prevent, and intoxication, which European soldiers are unfortunately too prone to, had their share in producing disease; but a still greater in pre-disposing to or rendering more violent the endemic, with which nearly every one was visited in a greater or less degree." *Sketch of the Medical Topography of Aracan, by R. N. Burnard.* "In a country like Aracan, and in Cantonments, such as have been described, it seems not difficult to trace the causes of disease, and after what has been advanced regarding the influence of a raw, variable, and impure atmosphere, little remains to be said, either of the causes of the sickness, or of the mortality which followed it. But it is the opinion of some, that the sickness of the south-eastern division of the army arose, not from the unwholesomeness of the climate, but owed its origin to the bad quality of the supplies. That the provisions were occasionally bad, and that the army suffered from the want of many little comforts which such a situation required, may be admitted, but that the great mortality in Aracan owed its origin to this source, is a conclusion of which there is no proof." *On the sickness prevailing in Aracan, by J. Stevenson.* In further proof, that the sickness arose from climate, Mr. Stevenson cites the different fate of the two detachments sent against Talak and Ramree: both were supplied from the same stores; but the former, who, on their return, had to travel through jungle and marsh after the rains had set in, almost all fell ill of fever and died. The latter, who spent about six weeks at sea, had only two deaths, one from fever, and the other from dysentery, and it was observed, that the men who composed the detachment resisted the influence of the climate after their return much better than those who remained behind. The detachment of Europeans and Sipahis stationed at Sandoway preserved their health during the rains. From tables included in Mr. Burnard's paper, it appears that the European force, amounting to above one thousand five hundred men, lost, between May and September, two hundred and fifty nine; and at the end of the latter month, had nearly four hundred in hospital. During the same time, ten native corps, the strength of which was nearly eight thousand, lost eight hundred and ninety-two, and had three thousand six hundred and forty-eight in hospital. It appears, also, that during July, August, and September, the Thermometer ranged from 92° 8' to 78°, and the fall of rain was a hundred and twenty-three inches, of which a hundred and three fell in the two first months.



of the letter, and its address to unofficial persons, precluded its being made the basis of negotiation, but a letter was written by Sir A. Campbell to the Burman Commander, to point out to him the propriety of addressing the British General direct, if he had any communication to make, to which he was desirous the latter should pay regard, and assuring him that Sir A. Campbell would ever be accessible to any correspondence of an amicable purport. No notice of this letter was taken by the Bundoola, and even if sincere in his first advance, the re-assembling of his forces probably encouraged him to make another appeal to the chance of war.

Having been joined by his Majesty's 47th Regiment, a detachment of Rocket Artillery, and a division of gun-boats, Sir A. Campbell determined to make a forward movement upon Prome. In order to leave no obstruction in his rear, he dispatched Colonel Elrington against the only remaining post in possession of the enemy, in the vicinity of Rangoon, the old Portuguese fort and the Pagoda of Syrian, which had been re-occupied by part of the grand army in December, and from whence they were once more driven, after a slight resistance, on the 11th February, and the army was at liberty to commence its advance.

The departure of the army from Rangoon was encouraged by the indication of favourable changes in the political situation of the country. The major part of the population in the lower districts of the Burman kingdom, are Taliens or Peguers, who, although depressed by a long course of servitude, retain some memory of their ancient greatness, and hostility to their oppressors. During the presence of the Burman force in the immediate neighbourhood, and the compulsory removal of their families, they had been obliged to avoid all communication with the British, and to desert the town: now, however, that the Burman leaders had retreated, and the army was scattered, they began to recover confidence, and join the invaders, in which they were encouraged by a proclamation issued by Sir A. Campbell, copies of which were conveyed even into the enemy's camp at Panlang, where the greater part of the troops consisted of Peguers.\* The consequence was, the desertion of nearly the entire division in the direction of Dalla, and their retreat being supported by a detachment sent to their succour, they effected, their escape, with their wives and their children, to Rangoon, and the population, thenceforward, daily and rapidly returned to its original enumeration.

During the period of Burman ascendancy, vast numbers of Peguers had sought refuge in the kingdom of Siam, and these also manifested, apparently at the suggestion of the Siamese, some inclination to come forward and join their countrymen in the Rangoon province, in an attempt to recover their political existence.† Some of their chiefs addressed both the British Commander and the head men of the towns and villages in Pegu, offering the assistance of the Siamese forces under their command, against the Burmans. This circumstance, and the actually existing state of hostility between the Courts of Bankok and Ava, were a sufficient guarantee of the disposition of the Siamese, although, with the timid and selfish policy of a semi-barbarous state, they were averse to committing themselves by any decided step in  
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\* Document No. 121.

† Do. No. 119.



favour of a power, whose success they probably knew not whether to hope or fear. In further confirmation, however, of a friendly feeling, the Siamese Commanders addressed a complimentary letter to Sir A. Campbell, upon the success that had attended the British arms.\*

On the other hand, the advance into the heart of the country was not without its unpropitious accompaniments. There was no doubt that a similar policy would be pursued in the interior that had been adopted at Rangoon, and that all the local resources would be removed from the reach of the invaders. It would, therefore, be necessary to maintain an uninterrupted communication with Rangoon, for which purpose a considerable force must be left there, and at different points on the line of march, and, above all, the navigation of the Irawadi was to be commanded by a numerous and well-equipped Flotilla. Whatever carriage was required for the baggage, artillery, and stores, was procurable only by sea from Bengal and Madras, from whence few of the class of bearers or coolies would consent to embark, and the transport of cattle was attended with much delay and loss. The Bengal cattle also were found too small and feeble for effective field service, and the chief dependance was necessarily placed on those sent from Madras, which had been shipped with great promptitude for the use of the army. Still, the whole number of available cattle was far from adequate to the transport of guns, ammunition, and provisions, and General Campbell was, accordingly, obliged to reduce his force materially, leaving a much larger portion than he had contemplated at Rangoon, to join him at a subsequent opportunity. His determination to advance remained unaffected by these embarrassments, and, confiding in his own resources, and the tried courage of his gallant troops, he did not shrink from assailing the concentrated force of the kingdom of Ava, formidable from its positions, its numbers, and the spirit of pertinacious resistance, which repeated defeat seemed unable to shake or to subdue.

Before breaking up his cantonments at Rangoon, General Campbell considered it expedient to dislodge an advanced division of the Burman force stationed at Thantabain, on the Lyne river, and Colonel Godwin was dispatched for this purpose, on the 5th February, with a detachment of his Majesty's 41st, and the 30th and 43d Madras Native Infantry, with the *Satellite* armed vessel, the steam vessel, and gun-boats, under Captain Chads, R. N.† The enemy, about three thousand strong, with thirty-six pieces of artillery, of various calibre, were posted in a strong stockade upon the point of a peninsula, and received the detachment with a brisk fire, which was more effectively returned by the guns of the *Satellite*, and some rockets from a division of the rocket troop, under Captain Graham, on board the steam vessel. As soon as a near approach was secured, the troops were landed, and the stockade carried by storm, with little difficulty or loss. The enemy suffered severely. The two branches of the Panlang river were reconnoitered on the following day, for a considerable distance, and many fire-rafts were destroyed, but no division of the enemy appeared, and the path was, thenceforward, open to the advance of the main army.

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\* Document No. 120.

† Do. No. 122.

Every thing being now ready for the advance, General Campbell formed such force as he possessed the means of moving, into two columns: with one, about two thousand four hundred strong, he purposed moving by land, whilst the other, of the strength of eleven hundred and sixty-nine, under Brigadier General Cotton, was to proceed by water to Tharawa, where the land column it was intended should reach the bank of the Irawadi, carrying on its way the entrenched posts of Panlang and Donabew. The Flotilla consisted of sixty-two boats, carrying each one or two pieces of artillery, and the boats of all the ships of war off Rangoon, the whole under command of Captain Alexander, of his Majesty's navy. It having been reported, that a friendly disposition was manifested by the people of the district of Bassein, a third division, of seven hundred and eighty, was sent thither, under Major Sale, who, it was expected would be able, after occupying Bassein, to penetrate across the country to Henzada, on the Irawadi, and form a junction with the main army. The rest of the force, nearly four thousand effective men, was left in Rangoon, under Brigadier McCreagh, who was to form a reserve column as soon as means of transport could be collected, and to follow the advance of the Commander in Chief. These arrangements being completed, General Campbell began his march on the 13th February: the water column moved on the 16th, and the detachment for Bassein sailed on the 17th of the same month. Two days after the departure of Sir A. Campbell, the Talien chiefs arrived at Rangoon, and represented themselves as desirous of negotiating for the independance of Pegu. It proved, however, that they were officers in the service of Siam, from which state they brought a letter to the British commander. As, however, they possessed no authority to enter upon any definitive discussion, and the movement of the army precluded the possibility of Sir Archibald Campbell's holding any personal communication with them, they were referred to Lieut.-Col. Smith, who had been appointed to the command of Martaban, from whence they had come, and in the vicinity of which place, but within their own frontier, it was ascertained that a Siamese force had assembled.\*

The land column under the Commander in Chief proceeded along a narrow and difficult path, a short distance from the left bank of the Lyne river, and tending obliquely, in a north-westerly direction, towards the main stream on the Irawadi, through the provinces of Lyne and Tharawadi. On the 17th, the force arrived at Mophi, where the Burman General Maha Thilwa had taken up his post, with between two and three thousand men, in an old Peguan fort, where he seemed determined to await an attack; but as the division approached, the Burmans, after firing a few shots, fled, and escaped into the jungle. The column halted at Mophi till the morning of the 19th, when it moved onwards to Lyne, the capital of the province, where it arrived on the morning of the 23rd: on the 24th, the march was resumed, and on the 26th, the division halted at Soomza two days, to allow two Native battalions, which had been left at Lyne, to replenish the carts from the boats, which accompanied the march as high as Thaboon, up the river, to rejoin. On the 1st of March, the column forded the Lyne river at Thaboon, and

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\* Document No. 123.

and moving nearly due west, a march of fourteen miles, came on the 2nd to Tharawa, on the Irawadi. Throughout the whole march from Rangoon, the country had continued to improve, and, although much overrun with jungle, offered ample evidences of fertility. The villages were mostly deserted, but some of the Carian tribes remained, and some supplies were collected; and in various places, after the first panic had subsided, the people, both Carians and Burmans, returned to their homes before the troops had taken their departure. The men composing the column, kept their health, although the weather was beginning to be hot. As the column entered Tharawa, the whole of the population was observed crossing to the opposite bank, who, after halting for a short time, disappeared in the adjacent thickets.\*

The water column reached Teesit on the 17th February, and destroyed three stockades newly erected, but unoccupied: on the 19th, the advance arrived at Panlang, where the Burmans were strongly stockaded.† Two stockades were constructed on the opposite banks of the main stream, at Yuathat and Miaghee, and one still stronger, on a point of land between the Elenchinnaer and Dalla branches: on the 20th, a battery was erected, from which, as well as the *Satellite*, and steam boat, shells and rockets were thrown into the stockades, with admirable effect, so that when the troops landed to take possession, they encountered no resistance. The troops then advanced against the great stockades, and the right column forded a third branch of the river, breast high. The *Satellite*, unfortunately grounded, but the steam vessel and the boats, keeping up with the troops, embarked them across the Yengen-chena branch, against the main stockade, from which, after a feeble fire, the enemy precipitately retreated, and the passage of the river was cleared. The stockades at Yuathat and Miaghee, were destroyed, but a division of the 18th Madras Native Infantry, was left in the Panlang stockade, to maintain the communication with Rangoon. Brigadier General Cotton then advanced to Yangen-chena, where the Panlang, or Rangoon, river branches off from the Irawadi. He arrived at this point on the 23d February; on the 27th, the whole of the Flotilla entered the main stream, and on the 28th, the advance came in sight of Donabew, where the Maha Bundoola was strongly posted with all the troops he could assemble, amounting to about fifteen thousand men. The post consisted of a series of formidable stockades, extending nearly a mile along the bank, commencing at the Pagoda of Donabew, and continuing to increase in strength, until completed by the main work, situated on a commanding height, and surrounded by a deep abbatis, with all the usual defences.

Some delay having occurred in getting the whole of the most heavily-laden vessels, across the sands, at the mouth of the Yangen-chena branch, the whole of the force was not in position until the evening of the 5th March. On the 6th, Brigadier General Cotton advanced to within two miles below Donabew, and sent a summons to surrender; to which a refusal was returned in a tone of unusual courtesy: on the receipt of the reply, a party of the 89th was landed opposite to the main stockade, to effect a reconnoissance, which was successful, notwithstanding

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\* Document No. 124.

† Do. No. 125.



withstanding a heavy fire from the enemy: on the 7th, five hundred men were disembarked a mile below the Pagoda, and formed into two columns, under Lieutenant-Colonel Donoghue, and Major Basden, with two six-pounders and a detachment of Rocket Artillery: after receiving and returning the enemy's fire, the men rushed on to the stockade, and forced an entrance into it, with a determination that overpowered the resistance offered, although more resolute than had for some time been encountered. The first stockade was carried with the loss of about twenty killed and wounded. The enemy fled to the next defence, leaving two hundred and eighty prisoners in the power of the assailants.

The second defence was at the distance of about five hundred yards from the first, and at an equal distance from the main work, by which it was commanded. Previous to assailing it, two other six-pounders, with four mortars, were brought up and placed in position, and a fresh supply of rockets was procured. The enemy remained quiet until the near approach of the storming party, when a destructive fire was opened from all parts of the face of the work, which checked the progress of the column, and inflicted so severe a loss upon them, that it became necessary to order a retreat. Captain Rose, who commanded the detachment, and Captain Cannon, of the 89th, were killed, and the greater number of the men were killed or wounded. In consequence of this failure, Brigadier General Cotton deemed it advisable to abstain from any further attempt against the post, until joined by General Campbell, or at least reinforced, and he therefore re-embarked the men and guns, and dropped down to Yoong-yoon, to await the result of his communication with the Commander of the forces.

On receiving intelligence at Nangurh, about twenty-six miles above Tharawa, of the occurrences at Donabew, Sir Archibald Campbell determined to retrace his steps, and attack the post with all his strength. He accordingly returned to Tharawa, from which place the force had to cross the Irawadi with such scanty means as could be procured. A few small canoes were collected, and rafts were constructed, and in the course of five days, between the 13th and 18th, the passage of the whole division was completed, and the head-quarters established at Henzada. Information having been received, that the Kye Woongyee was posted about fifteen miles from thence, to intercept the detachment expected in that direction from Bassein, a party, under Lieut.-Col. Godwin, was sent off by night to endeavor to surprise him. The alarm, however, was given in time for the Burman force to escape; but it was completely scattered without a contest, their commander setting the example of precipitate flight. After halting two days at Henzada, to prepare carriage for the stores, the army resumed its march along the right bank, and came before Donabew on the 25th: a communication was opened with the Flotilla on the 27th, and both divisions zealously co-operated in the reduction of the place.\* Batteries, armed with heavy artillery, were constructed without delay. Spirited attempts to interrupt their progress, were frequently made by sorties from the work, and on one occasion, the Bundoola ordered out his elephants, seventeen in number, each carrying a complement

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\* Document No. 126.



complement of armed men, and supported by a body of Infantry. They were gallantly charged by the Body Guard, the Horse Artillery and Rocket Troop, and the elephant drivers being killed, the animals made off into the jungle, whilst the troops retreated precipitately within their defences, into which rockets and shells were thrown with a precision that rendered the post no refuge from danger.

The mortar and enfilading batteries opened on the 1st of April, and the breaching batteries commenced their fire at day-break on the second, shortly after which, the enemy were discovered, in full retreat, through the thicket. The entrenchments were immediately taken possession of, and considerable stores, both of grain and ammunition, as well as a great number of guns of various descriptions, were captured. The sudden retreat of the enemy, it was ascertained, was occasioned by the death of their General Maha Bundoola, who was killed, on the preceding day, by the bursting of a shell. With him fell the courage of the garrison, and the surviving chiefs vainly attempted to animate the men to resistance. The death of the Bundoola was a severe blow to the Burman cause. He was the chief instigator of the war, and its strenuous advocate, and, in courage and readiness of resource, displayed great abilities to maintain the contest. He was a low and illiterate man, who had risen to power by his bravery and audacity. When the war broke out he professed himself ready, and no doubt thought himself able, to lead a Burman army to the capital of British India, and wrest from its Government the lower districts of Bengal. Although not present in the action at Ramoo, he commanded in Aracan, and derived additional reputation from the result of that campaign. When called to the defence of the territory of his sovereignty, he anticipated fresh triumphs, and engaged to conduct the invaders captives to Ava. The operations at Rangoon taught him a different lesson, and, although they seem not to have shaken his pertinacity and valour, they inspired him with a new spirit, and engrafted courtesy on his other military merits. Of this the reply, he is reported to have returned to the summons sent him by General Cotton, is a remarkable instance. He is said to have answered, "we are each fighting for his country, and you will find me as steady in defending mine, as you in maintaining the honour of yours. If you wish to see Donabew, come as friends, and I will shew it you. If you come as enemies, LAND!"

Immediately after the capture of Donabew, Sir Archibald Campbell resumed his forward movement, and was again at Tharawa on the 10th of April.\* There he was joined by the column of reserve from Rangoon, consisting of the Battalion Companies of the Royals and 28th N. I., with a supply of elephants, under Brigadier McCreagh. From thence he pushed forward to Prome; the brother of the King of Ava, the prince of Tharawadi, who now commanded the Burman force, and who had recently received a reinforcement of six thousand men from Ava, falling back as the British advanced: consequently, the force reached Prome unopposed on the 25th of April, and occupied the place without the necessity of firing a shot. The weather, though

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\* Document No. 127.

though hot, was not found oppressive, and the troops took up their position in high health and spirits.

Upon the advance towards Prome, at Turríp Miu, thirty miles from the former, an intimation was received from the Burman authorities, of a disposition to enter upon negotiations for peace.\* A letter from them was brought into a camp by a Burmese, accompanied by a soldier of the 38th Regiment, who had fallen into the hands of the Burmans, and who, with two native Khlassis likewise taken, was liberated on this occasion. Two Burman messengers were sent back with an answer, professing the readiness of the British commander to treat with the Burman deputies, but declaring his determination to advance to Prome. To this communication a reply was received,† when within eight miles of Prome, in which the Atwen woons proposed, that the army should halt where it had already arrived; but they abandoned the city without waiting for a reply, and Sir A. Campbell having continued his march, arrived only just in time to save the town and its granaries from fire; an act, which coupled with information, that large reinforcements were on their way from Ava, rendered it probable, that the overtures of the deputies were made without authority, and were rather with a view to gain time than in consequence of instructions received from the Court of Ava. That it was the sincere wish of the Prince of Tharawadi to terminate the war, was proved satisfactorily by subsequent information, and he shortly afterwards quitted the camp for the express purpose of advocating a treaty of peace, in opposition to the infatuated councils of the war party of the Lotoo, at the head of which were the Queen and her brother.‡

Upon the first appearance of the force before Prome, the city, although strongly fortified, was deserted, and part of it consumed: the same was found to be the case for a considerable distance along the course of the river, the villages being everywhere abandoned and laid in ashes; but this state of things, the result partly of the fears of the people, and partly of the policy of the Burman Court, was not of long continuance, and a few days sufficed to bring back the population of Prome to their dwellings. The command of the lower provinces acquired by this position, inspiring the people with confidence, they soon began to resume their usual avocations, and to form markets along the river, and especially at Prome and Rangoon, by which the resources of the country now began to be fully available for carriage and support. This was the more satisfactory, as in the commencement of May, the periodical change of seasons took place, and obliged the force to establish itself in cantonments at Prome. Previous to the setting in of the rains, the Thermometer had risen in the shade to 110°, but the nights remained cool, and the climate was not found unhealthy. The monsoon brought with it, its ordinary effects upon the condition of the troops, but by no means to the same extent as in the previous season at Rangoon, the face of the country being mountainous, and free from swamps, and of some considerable elevation above the sea.

The temporary repose enjoyed in the cantonments at Prome was, in the early part of the season, enlivened by the accounts of the success of Major Sale, in the direction of Bassein, by  
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\* Document No. 128.

† Do. No. 129.

‡ Do. Nos. 130 and 131.

advice of the successful repression of the kidnapping practices of the Siamese, in the districts of Tenasserim, and the further developement of the relations with that power and the Talien Chiefs of Pegu, through the agency of the British authority at Martaban.

Major Sale, with his detachment, arrived off Pagoda-point on the 24th February,\* and on the 26th, the Flotilla stood in for the Bassein river. Parties of the force having been landed, several stockades were encountered and destroyed, but in no place did the enemy offer any opposition. On the 3d March, the detachment arrived at Bassein, which it was found had been set on fire and abandoned; the Governor of the district having retreated to Lamina, a town about six days journey up the river. Having occupied Bassein, the town was soon restored to a comparatively flourishing state, and the population gradually returned. The chief part of the force, with its gallant commander, was speedily recalled to Rangoon, to reinforce the main army, after the line of its operations had passed the point at which a diversion in the direction of Bassein was likely to be useful, but the place continued to be occupied throughout the war. A reconnoissance was also made as far as Lamina, about one hundred and forty miles from Bassein, by two hundred men of his Majesty's 13th, one hundred Native Infantry, and seventy seamen, under Major Sale, who proceeded up the river in boats, bivouacking at night upon the banks. They encountered no opposition, although flying parties of Burmans hovered about them throughout their course, and the river was, in many places, very narrow, and ran between lofty banks, mostly covered with long grass and jungle, from which an enemy might have opposed a resistance that it would have been difficult to overcome. The Woongyee, who had commanded at Bassein, was but a short distance ahead, and the party was repeatedly upon the eve of overtaking him. He contrived, however, to escape. All the villages on the banks of the river were deserted, and in general burned, and the population driven into the interior by the retreating Burman force. Lamina also, although a place of great extent, was found abandoned, and as no resources, therefore, were available for the support, or the further progress of the detachment, Major Sale returned to Bassein, after an absence of fourteen days. A state-boat and two war-canoes were captured. Whilst on the march, the firing at Donabew was distinctly heard.

Although no declared war existed between the powers of Ava and Siam, active hostilities had been only suspended for some years past, by the mutual fears and weakness of the parties, and a system of border-inroads had been maintained, by which the countries on the confines of the two states had been almost depopulated. The Siamese commanding the passes, and the southern points of the Peninsula, had the advantage in this contest, and, availing themselves of their position, annually made incursions, especially into the districts of Ye, Tavai, and Mergui, and carried off the inhabitants, whom they detained in slavery. These practices were, however, now to cease, and the protection thus afforded to the persons of the people of Tenasserim, was no unimportant benefit for which they were indebted to their new rulers. In the course of January 1825, a Siamese Flotilla, of thirty large boats, made  
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\* Document No. 125. (D)



its appearance near Mergui, on which, a party of Sipahis was sent to prevent any aggression. On falling in with the Siamese commander, he professed his ignorance of the country being in the possession of the English, and consented to repair to Mergui, where he restored ninety of the prisoners he had taken.\* Finding, however, that nothing short of the surrender of the whole would satisfy the British authorities, he suddenly made off, and accounts were shortly after received of Old Tenasserim having been attacked and plundered. It was calculated that five hundred persons had been thus carried into captivity. In February, other parties were heard of, but were sought for in vain, and in March, a large party landed and scoured the country about Tenasserim: on this occasion, they were surprised by a detachment sent against them: a chief and a few men were taken, and the rest dispersed. In the end of March, however, Lieutenant Drever, with a detachment, being sent against a marauding party, captured several of their boats, nearly secured the person of their Chief, the Raja of Choomphon, drove them from their cantonments on the island of Yeagudan, and inflicted so severe a loss upon them, that they never again ventured to molest the territories under the British authority. The negotiations also that presently ensued with the Court of Bangkok, not only contributed to prevent the repetition of the predatory incursions, but eventually obtained the liberation of almost all the Burman inhabitants who had thus been carried into bondage.

We have already noticed the arrival at Rangoon, of deputies from the Siamese army that had advanced to the frontiers, and the transfer of the duty of ascertaining the characters and objects of these emissaries to Colonel Smith, in command at Martaban. That officer conducted the deputies with him to his head-quarters, furnished with a letter to the Siamese commander, the Ron na Ron, a Talien, or Pegu Chief, who had, with many of his countrymen, found a refuge from Burman oppression in the territories of Siam.† The communication of the British authorities was duly acknowledged, and the Siamese General having announced his intention of approaching to Martaban, to hold a conference with Colonel Smith, arrangements were made to facilitate his advance, and provide for his accommodation, when information was received of the recall of the army, upon the plea of the rainy season being near at hand, and the troops being required for the cultivation of the country. Further enquiries, however, left little doubt of the unreality of this excuse, and the chief cause appeared to be a suspicion entertained by the Siamese Court of the views of their own General. Possessing, in a great degree, the affection of the Talien people, and being encouraged by the chief men, an apprehension was excited, that he might induce the English to put him in possession of those towns and districts which the Siamese coveted for themselves. It is also highly probable that they were not sorry to avail themselves of any plea for delaying active operations, until they should be better able to judge of the progress of the war. That they were in some degree sensible of the inconsistency of their conduct, was rendered apparent by a subsequent letter from the Chief, apologising for his retreat, upon the plea of sickness. This document was remarkable, also, for an affected apprehension

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\* Documents Nos. 132 to 136.

Dos. Nos. 137 and 138.



hension of the retreat of the English, which was apparently designed to draw from the British functionaries some declaration of the future purposes of their Government. Shortly after the receipt of this dispatch, others arrived from the Siamese Ministers, as well as from the General, to the address of Sir A. Campbell, in which they renewed their professions of esteem for the English, and their promise of affording active co-operation after the rains had ceased, a measure now far from desirable, and one which there was little reason to anticipate. The aid of a Siamese army could be but nominal, and the presence of an undisciplined rabble would only be formidable to the provinces now subjected to the British authority.

Immediately after the occupation of Prome, Sir A. Campbell detached Colonel Godwin with a force of eight-hundred Infantry, a troop of the Body Guard, and two field pieces, to the eastward, on the route to Tongho, the capital of the province of Tharawadi, in order to ascertain the state of the country, and the strength of the enemy in that direction. The force left Prome on the 5th of May, and marched in a north-easterly course till the 11th, when they came upon a mountainous and difficult country, beyond which, apparently interminable forests extended. They then turned to the left, and moved to Meaday, sixty miles above Prome, on the Irawadi, which they found deserted. They thence returned to Prome, where they arrived on the 24th. At setting out, they disturbed a gang of plunderers, who fled, and effected their escape, notwithstanding a party of the Body Guard was sent in pursuit, but no enemy was seen: the villages were all burnt, and the people living in the thickets: the intercourse held with them dissipated their alarms, and great numbers came into Prome. A stock of cattle was collected, but no grain, and the army continued to depend upon Rangoon for its principal supplies.\*

The months of June, July, and August, were necessarily spent in inactivity, from the setting in of the rains, and the prevalence of the inundations. The monsoon, however, proved mild: the men were comfortably hutted: there was no want of provisions, and, although extensive sickness occurred, it was not more than was fairly attributable to the nature of the service and the season of the year, and was by no means so severe as that of the previous rains at Rangoon, nor, indeed, more so than it would have been in any of the lower Gangetic provinces. The casualties were comparatively few.

The same cause that suspended the operations of the British force, arrested the activity of the Court of Ava, and during this interval, it was unable to send any armies into the field. The only military occurrence, was the expulsion of the Thekia Woongyee, who had retreated to Old Pegu, where his force having gradually become thinned by desertion, the people themselves rose upon his detachment, and put it to the rout, taking prisoner a Burman Chief of rank, whom they brought into Rangoon, and delivered to Brigadier Smith.† At their request, they were furnished with a small Sipahi force, for their defence against any attempt of the Thekia Woongee to recover his footing in the city. The presence of this detachment, it was ascertained, gave much uneasiness

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\* Documents Nos. 139 and 140.

† Do. No. 141.

uneasiness to the Ava Government, as supposed to indicate an advance upon Tongho, the garrison of which was, accordingly, reinforced.

The capture of the stockades at Donabew, and the death of the Bundoola, were events that excited the utmost consternation at Ava: no person about the Court ventured to communicate to the King the first reports of these disasters, and when the official intelligence arrived, the first feeling of the Government was that of utter despair. The members of the administration, however, soon resumed their lofty tone, and declared it would be better they should die, than consent to the humiliation of their Monarch, or the dismemberment of his dominions, and the Pagahm Woongyee, especially, undertook to remedy the evil consequences of the Bundoola's failure, and still drive the invaders from the country. The impressions thus, at first, made upon the Court, gradually gave way to reviving hope; but that upon the people was more permanent, and high bounties, as much as a hundred and seventy rupees per man, were necessary to induce them to enlist in the army. The necessary sacrifices were, however, made, and information was received at the end of June, of the assemblage of a numerous force at Ava, preparatory to the season for resuming operations: early in July, a reconnoissance was made in boats up the river, when about three or four thousand men were found cantoned near a village about ten miles above Songhee, or about eighty-four miles from Prome: a few shots were exchanged, and it was ascertained that the equipment of the force was far from formidable.

Although prepared for the renewal of hostilities, the English General being sensible that it was not the wish of the Government of India to urge them to extremities, availed himself of an opportunity that occurred at this period, to afford an opening to a negotiation for peace. Amongst the individuals of all ranks, who had now flocked to Prome, was a confidential servant of the Prince of Tharawadi, who made no secret of his relation to the Prince, nor of the distress which the latter suffered from the occupation of his Government by the English. A private letter was, accordingly, addressed to the Prince, through this channel, by Sir A. Campbell, stating the disposition of the British Government to terminate the war, whenever the Court of Ava should be inclined to offer reparation for the injuries which had provoked it, and to indemnify the British Government for the expense. This attempt, however, was unavailing, and no answer was received. In the mean time, the whole of the lower provinces were becoming habituated to the change of masters, and yielding their new governors cheerful submission. The villagers issued from their hiding places in the thickets, re-constructed their huts, and resumed their occupations, and the Miuthagis, or head men of the districts and chief towns, tendered their allegiance, and were restored to their municipal functions by the British General. A state of desolation and anarchy once more gave way to order and plenty, and from Bassein to Martaban, and Rangoon to Prome, every class of natives, not only contributed their aid to collect such supplies as the country could afford, but readily lent their services to the equipment and march of military detachments.

At the end of July, General Campbell quitted Prome for Rangoon, to expedite arrangements connected with the Commissariat, which his presence materially forwarded. He left  
Prome

Prome in the steam vessel, the *Diana*, and after spending a few days at Rangoon, returned to the former place on the 2d August. The entire security with which his journey was performed, satisfactorily established the settled state of the country under English administration.

In compliance with the repeated injunctions of the Government of Bengal, that no opportunity should be omitted of entering upon pacific negotiations, Sir A. Campbell judged it expedient, upon the approach of the season for active operations, to address a letter to the Court, declaratory of his being authorised and desirous to abstain from further hostilities.\* Various reports were current at this time, which rendered it probable that the overture would be acceptable. Insurrections had taken place, it was asserted, in different parts of the Burman dominions, and a rumour of the deposition of the King seems to have found extensive currency. These reports turned out to be incorrect; but there was no doubt that the war was highly unpopular, and that the Lotoo, or great council of the nation, was much divided. The Queen, however, and her brother, both possessing great influence with the King, were resolutely bent on the continuance of hostilities, and great exertions were made to collect a formidable force, which, as it was formed, was advanced to positions approaching to the British cantonments at Prome, and stationed at Pagahm, Melloon, Patanagoh, and finally at Meaday, where the troops arrived in the beginning of August, to the extent of about twenty thousand men. The whole force in motion was estimated at double that number, under the command of Memia Bo, a half brother of the King, besides twelve thousand at Tongho, under the Prince of Tongho and the Thekia-woon. To oppose them, General Campbell had, at Prome, something less than three thousand effective men, and had ordered about two thousand more to join him in time for the opening of the campaign.

On receiving intelligence of the advance of the Burman army, Brigadier General Cotton was despatched in the steam boat, with fifty men of the Royal Regiment, to reconnoitre.

The enemy were discovered on the morning of the 15th August, at Meaday, on the left bank of the river. A large nullah runs into the Irawadi, immediately below Meaday, from the mouth of which the Burman force was ranged to the extent of a mile and a half up the bank of the main stream. This bank had several Pagodas upon it, for the most part near the nullah, all of which the enemy were stockading, and had entrenched, and they had thrown a ditch and breast-work between them and the river, to protect their boats, which were ranged underneath.

During the progress of the reconnoitring party along their line of defence, the Burmans opened a battery of sixteen guns, of different calibre, from four to six pounders, upon the steam vessel, but, the width of the river being at least one thousand five hundred yards, their shot fell short.

The force displayed by the enemy was estimated, by Brigadier General Cotton, at between sixteen and twenty thousand, who appeared to be all armed with muskets, and  
 twenty



twenty golden chattahs were counted. They had also a small force on the right bank, with jinjals, opposite to the right of their line, as it faced the river. On the return of the party, the gun boats which the steam vessel had in tow, were disengaged to cannonade the enemy's line, and make them developé their whole force; and it was then ascertained, that they had an advanced party across the nullah already mentioned, thrown on the road leading to Prome, and occupying some Pagodas which overlook it, and which they were stockading. This party were working also on a breast-work on the side of the hill, which would likewise command the road. Three golden chattahs were visible with the latter force. About four hundred boats were seen at Meaday, but only one regular war boat.\*

The menacing aspect of the Burman force was, however, suddenly changed to pacific demonstrations, and the letter addressed by Sir A. Campbell to the Ministers promised to produce the happiest effects.† On the 6th September, a war-boat, with a flag of truce, arrived at Prome, and two Burman deputies, on being conducted to the British General, presented him with a letter in reply to his communication of the 6th of August. This letter purported to be from the General of the advanced army, acknowledging the petitions of the English agent, and officers, and directing them, if they wanted peace, to come and solicit it. This style was not very conciliatory, but being the Court language, it was not thought proper to object to it, beyond pointing out its impropriety to the deputies, and explaining to them, that although the English General was willing to meet Burman commanders half-way, he could not condescend to seek them in their entrenchments. They admitted the force of the objection, and proposed that two officers should be deputed to the Burman commanders, which request was readily complied with, and in order that, if necessary, full powers to negociate might be obtained from Ava, the British General proposed to grant a suspension of hostilities for a term of thirty or forty days. This proposal, the deputies expressed their conviction, would be concurred in by the Burman commanders. The deputies returned to their entrenchments on the following day, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, Deputy Adjutant General, and Lieutenant Smith, of his Majesty's ship *Alligator*.

The British Officers were met on their way, by a flotilla of war-boats, having on board several Chiefs of rank, who escorted them to the Burman advanced cantonments, about a mile from Meaday. On their arrival there, they were received with every demonstration of respect, and conducted through a guard of two thousand men, armed with muskets, to a house prepared for their accommodation. On the following day, a deputation visited them from the Kyee-Woongee, the chief in command, to assure them of his anxiety to conclude a pacific treaty; but requesting them not to urge immediate negociation, as it would be necessary to receive instructions from Memia-bo, who was at Melloon. The British deputies having acceded to this proposal, were treated in the interval with the greatest possible attention and kindness: no guard was set over their movements, and all comers had free access to them, which afforded

\* Document No. 143.

† Do. No. 144.



afforded them ample opportunity of learning the sentiments of individuals of every rank, who were unanimous in expressing a hope that hostilities were about to cease. On the 13th of September, the officers waited, by appointment, on the Kyee-Woongee, but the result of the interview was their assent to wait two or three days longer for the arrival of instructions. On the 16th, it was intimated to them, that full powers had arrived, and on the 17th, they again visited the Kyee-Woongee, when it was settled, that the latter should meet General Campbell at Neubenzeik, a place mid-way between the two armies, on the 2d of October, to discuss the conditions of peace, and, in the mean time, the terms of an armistice were agreed upon between them and the Atwen-Woon Menghie Maha Menla Raja, and Wondok Menghi Maha Senkuyah. By this stipulation, hostilities were suspended till the 17th of October: the line of demarcation was drawn from Comma, on the western bank of the Irawadi, through Neubenzeik to Tongo. The armistice included all the troops on the frontiers in other parts of the dominions of Ava, none of whom should make a forward movement before the 18th October. With respect to the meeting of the 2d of the ensuing month, it was also settled, that two officers on either part should meet on the 23d of September, at Neubenzeik, to determine the requisite arrangements, and as it was contrary to etiquette for the Burman Minister to move with a less escort, than one thousand men, half armed with muskets and half with swords, the option was given to General Campbell to be similarly attended. On the conclusion of these preliminary negotiations, Colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith returned to Prome.\*

On the 30th of September, the British General proceeded to Neubenzeik, assisted at his request, as Commissioner, by Sir James Brisbane, Commander of his Majesty's Naval Forces in the Indian Seas, who had arrived at Rangoon, in H. M.'s ship *Tamar*, early in September, and reached Prome on the 22d, where he assumed the direction of the operations by water.† The ground was found prepared for the encampment of the respective chiefs, with their attendants, and a Lotoo, or hall of audience, erected in the intermediate space, equi-distant from the British and the Burmese lines. At a few minutes before two o'clock, on the 2d of October, two Burmese officers of rank arrived in camp to conduct Sir A. Campbell to the Lotoo, Lieutenant Colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith, R. N., were dispatched at the same time to the Burmese cantonment, to pay a similar compliment to the Kyee Woongyee. At two o'clock, Major General Sir A. Campbell and Commodore Sir J. Brisbane, accompanied by their respective suites, proceeded to the Lotoo, and met the Burmese Commissioners, Kyee Woongyee and Lamain Woon, entering the hall, arrayed in splendid state dresses. After the whole party were seated, Sir A. Campbell opened the conference with an appropriate address to the Woongyees, who replied in courteous and suitable terms, and expressed their hope that the first day of their acquaintance might be given up to private friendship, and the consideration of public business deferred until the next meeting. This was assented to, and a desultory conversation then ensued; in the course of which the Woongyees conducted themselves in

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\* Document No. 145.

† Do. No. 146.

in the most polite and conciliatory manner, inquiring after the latest news from England, the state of the King's health, and similar topics, and offering to accompany Sir A. Campbell to Rangoon, England, or wherever he might propose.

On the following day, the appointed meeting took place, for the purpose of discussing formally the terms of peace, at which the following officers were present on the side of the British, Major General Sir A. Campbell, Commodore Sir J. Brisbane, Brigadier General Cotton, Captain Alexander, Brigadier McCreagh, Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, and Captain Snodgrass.

On the part of the Government of Ava, the Chiefs present were Sada Mengyee Maha Mengom-Kyee Woongyee, Munnoo Rut, ha Keogong Lamain Woon, Mengyee Maha Menla Rajah Atwenwoon, Maha Sri Senkuyah Woondok, Mengyee Maha Menla Sear Sey Shuagon Mooagoonoon, Mengyee Attala Maha Sri Soo-Asseewoon.

The principal conditions of peace proposed by the English Commissioners, were the non-interference of the Court of Ava with the territories of Cachar, Manipur, and Asam, the cession of the four provinces of Aracan, the payment of two crores of rupees, as an indemnification for the expences of the war, one to be paid immediately, and the Tenasserim provinces to be retained until the liquidation of the other. The Court of Ava was also expected to receive a British Resident at the capital, and consent to a commercial treaty, upon principles of liberal intercourse and mutual advantages.

In the discussion of these stipulations, it was evident, notwithstanding the moderate tone of the Burman deputies, and their evident desire for the termination of the war, that the Court of Ava was not yet reduced to a full sense of its inferiority, nor prepared to make any sacrifice, either territorial or pecuniary, for the restoration of tranquillity. The protection given to fugitives from the Burman territories, was urged in excuse for the conduct of the Burman Court, although the actual occurrence of the war was attributed to the malignant designs of evil councillors, who had misrepresented the real state of things, and suppressed the remonstrances addressed by the Government of India to that of Ava, thus virtually acknowledging the moderation of the former Government. It was also pleaded, that in the interruption of trade and the loss of revenue, the Court of Ava had already suffered sufficiently by the war, and that it became a great nation like the English, to be content with the vindication of its name and reputation, and that they could not possibly be less generous than the Chinese, who, on a former occasion, having conquered part of the Burman territory, restored it on the return of peace. To this it was replied, the Chinese were the vanquished, not the victors, whilst the British were in possession of half the kingdom, the most valuable portion of which they were still willing to relinquish; but that as the war had been wholly unprovoked on their part, they were fully entitled to expect such concessions, in territory and money, as should reimburse them in the expence they had incurred, and enable them to guard more effectively against any future collision. The manner in which these points were urged, satisfying the Woongyees of the firmness of the British Commissioners, they, at last, waved all further objections, and confined themselves to requesting a prolongation of the armistice till the 2d of November, in order that they might put the Court fully in possession of the views of the

British

British negociators, and be empowered to give them a definitive reply. This request was readily acceded to. On the representation of the British General, the Woongyees also pledged themselves, that all British and American subjects detained at Ava, should immediately be set at liberty, the British Government liberating the Burmans taken on the coast, and confined in Bengal. On the day after this conference, the Burman officers dined with the British General, and this intermixture of friendly hospitality with the prosecution of hostilities, whilst it excited their astonishment, taught them a lesson of civilization, which it is to be hoped may not have proved in vain. The Burman character, although not worthy of implicit trust, is far from suspicious, and no feeling of uneasiness or alarm appeared to impair their enjoyment of British hospitality. The parties separated, well pleased with each other. Captain Alexander and Brigadier McCreagh accompanied the Kyee Woongyee to near Meaday, and three of the Burman Chiefs attended Sir A. Campbell to Prome.

The notion of treating upon a perfect equality, which evidently pervaded the recent negociations on the part of the Burman Commissioners, and which probably originated not only in the haughtiness of the Court of Ava, but in an impression entertained by it, to which the acknowledged anxiety of the British authorities for peace had given rise, that they were unable or disinclined to carry on the war, rendered the ultimate result of the conferences at Newbenzeik little problematical, and arrangements for resuming hostile operations were actively pursued. Their necessity was soon evinced.\* The Court of Ava, indignant at the idea of conceding an inch of territory, or submitting to what, in oriental politics, is held a mark of excessive humiliation, payment of any pecuniary indemnification, breathed nothing but defiance, and determined instantly to prosecute the war. With more regard to the existing treaty, however, than was to have been expected from the Burman commanders, no operations of a decidedly hostile character were attempted by them, and although, in the end of October, several Burman parties passed the line of demarkation, and pillaged and burnt the villages within the British lines, these outrages were attributable to the difficulty of checking so ill organised a force, under the immediate expectation of renewed hostilities, rather than to any design of the Commanders to violate the terms of a solemn stipulation. In the pause that ensued before hostilities were renewed, Sir Archibald Campbell addressed the Kyee Woongyee, relative to the prisoners, whose liberation was refused on the plea of troops having moved by way of Negrais to Rangoon; and in reply to his enquiry, as to the probable termination of the truce, that Chief intimated, that the demand for any cession of money or territory, precluded all possibility of a renewal of friendly intercourse. Nothing remained, therefore, but a further appeal to arms.†

The information of the last few weeks, had fully established the assemblage of a very considerable force along the line of the river, between Meaday and Ava, which was gradually drawing towards the British position at Prome. From a direct attack, there was nothing to apprehend,

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\* Document No. 147.

† Do. Nos. 148 and 149.



apprehend, but any serious movement on either flank, might have been attended with some inconvenience. In order to oppose an advance on the right, Colonel Pepper was stationed in Old Pegu, whilst it was thought the detachment at Bassein, after the division at Donabew had been withdrawn, would be a sufficient check against any annoyance from this quarter. The chief point, however, was to keep the enemy on the alert in the line of his immediate advance, and draw his attention as much as possible to Prome. Upon the close of the armistice, the state of the country, and the yet incomplete concentration of resources, rendered the forward movement of the whole army impracticable; but Sir A. Campbell lost no time in detaching a force to drive the Burmans back from an advanced position which they occupied at Wattigaon, about twenty miles from Prome.\* With this view, Colonel Macdowall marched with two brigades of Madras Native Infantry, to attack the post from the left, and Major Evans, with the 22d Native Infantry, was ordered to move upon the front of the position, and attack in concert with the main body, whilst the 18th Native Infantry was advanced to support the 22d, if required. The 38th Native Infantry also was sent round by Saagee, to make a diversion in favour of the assailants. The state of the road did not admit of artillery being attached to either column.

The result of this attempt was disastrous. The main body marched on the evening of the 15th of November. On the morning of the 16th, they encountered the Burmese in great force, who maintained a spirited contest, and, although forced to fall back, kept up a fierce and destructive fire, as they slowly retreated to the works in their rear, which proved to be too strong for the attacking force to carry by storm, and which their want of artillery prevented them from breaching. In attempting, however, to overcome the fire of the enemy, and approach the works, the officers set their men the example of personal exposure, and, consequently, sustained a severe loss. Colonel Macdowall himself was shot in the head by a musket ball, and four of the junior officers were disabled and carried from the field. Lieutenant Colonel Brooke, who succeeded in the command, finding it impracticable to make any impression on the post, was compelled to order a retreat. This was effected with as much regularity as circumstances would permit, the country being a thick jungle, in which the enemy lurked in great numbers, and kept up a galling fire. After a march of severe fatigue, in which a number of the wounded and exhausted were unavoidably left behind, the detachment came to a nullah about nine miles from Prome, where the enemy desisted from pursuit, their attention having been diverted by the movements of the other detachments.†

Major Evans having moved on the night of the 15th, fell in with the enemy's piquets at day-break on the following morning. After driving them back, he proceeded to an opening in the jungle, when he was checked by a very heavy fire from a strong stockade, by which the Light Company, who had preceded the advance, were almost annihilated, and the men of the other companies struck down in considerable numbers. The firing in the direction of

Colonel

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\* Document No. 150.

† Do. No. 151.



Colonel Macdowall's column had been heard early in the morning, but as no appearance of their co-operation was indicated, and the enemy were in much too great a number for a single Regiment to make an impression on them, Major Evans also retreated. The enemy pursued for about three miles, and harassed the rear, but the corps effected its return after a fatiguing march in good order. In this division, as well as Colonel Macdowall's, many of those who fell on the march, through wounds or fatigue, were left behind: the dooly bearers having, at an early stage, thrown down their loads, and fled into the thicket.

The 38th Regiment, under Colonel Smith, approached Wattygaon, only about twelve o'clock on the 16th, and then fell in with what appeared to be the rear of the enemy, at this time engaged in the pursuit of the main division. On the first appearance of the corps, the Burmese fled, but no traces of the main division being visible, and the firing having ceased, Colonel Smith found it necessary to measure back his course to Prome, which he reached after a fatiguing march, without encountering any opposition. The loss on this occasion was severe; besides Colonel Macdowall killed, thirteen officers were wounded, of whom Lieutenant Ranken, of the 43d Regiment, subsequently died of his wounds: fifty-three Rank and File were killed, and about one-hundred and fifty were reported wounded and missing. The principal cause of this disaster appears to have been misinformation as to the enemy's strength, as, instead of two or three thousand, at which their numbers were originally computed, Major Evans estimated those opposed to him to be not fewer than five thousand, whilst those engaged by the main division were reckoned, by Lieutenant Colonel Brooke, at between ten and twelve thousand men. The position was also one of considerable strength, and, from the density of jungle, of difficult access.

The ultimate consequences of this disaster were not unfavourable, as it encouraged the Burman Generals in the high opinion, they were still rather inclined to entertain, of their own power, and induced them to adopt a system of confident warfare, which brought them within the reach of the British Commander. Relying on the manifestation of their purpose to attack him in his position, General Campbell determined to await their advance, and the enemy soon made their appearance round Prome to the extent, it was estimated, of between fifty and sixty thousand men. As their numbers enabled them to spread over a considerable tract of country, they were enabled to detach parties past both flanks of the British position, by which the communication with Rangoon was threatened, and the districts below Prome, on both banks of the river, exposed to the depredation of irregular and marauding bands.\* The entire command of the river by the British Flotilla gave them an important advantage, and on the western bank, a position at Padown mew, was occupied by a small detachment in concert with the river force, and maintained, with great spirit, against repeated attempts of the enemy to dislodge them: a detachment was also sent out under Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, to Shudaun, which cleared the left bank of the river of the enemy for ten miles below Prome, and a party of Burmans  
having

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\* Document No. 152.

having fired upon a division of the 87th, on their way to join the army, the men landed and dispersed the assailants.

After awaiting for some days the expected approach of the Burman force, General Campbell finding that they were reluctant to quit the cover of the jungle, and that they continued to harass the country, and disturb the line of communication, determined to make a general attack upon every accessible part of the enemy's line, to the east of the Irawadi, which extended from the Napadee hills, a commanding ridge on the bank of the river, to the villages of Simbike and Sembel inland, about eleven miles to the north-east of Prome. The Burman army was divided into three corps : the right was formed on the western bank of the river ; the centre was stationed upon the hills of Theybu, or Napadee, and communicated through a thick forest by a line of posts with the left, which was posted at Simbike, upon the Nawine river. The left was commanded by Maha Niow, the centre by the Kyee Woongyee, and the right by the Sada Woon : the divisions were all strongly stockaded, and occupied positions of difficult approach.

Leaving four regiments of Native Infantry for the defence of Prome, General Campbell marched early on the morning of the 1st December against the enemy's left, whilst the Flotilla, under Sir James Brisbane, and the 26th Madras N. I. acting in co-operation, by a cannonade of the works upon the river, diverted the attention of the centre from the real point of attack.

Upon reaching the Nawine river, at the village of Ze-ouke, the force was divided into two columns. The right, under Brigadier General Cotton, proceeding along the left bank of the river, came in front of the enemy's entrenchments, consisting of a series of stockades, covered on either flank by thick jungle, and by the river in the rear, and defended by a considerable force, of whom eight thousand were Shans, or people of Laos, under their native chiefs. The post was immediately stormed. The attack was led by Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, with the advanced guard of the right column, consisting of his Majesty's 41st, the flank companies of his Majesty's Royal and 89th Regiments, supported by the 18th Madras Native Infantry, and the stockades were carried in less than ten minutes. The enemy left three hundred dead, including their General Maha Niow, and all their stores and ammunition, and a considerable quantity of arms were taken. The left column, under the Commander in Chief, which had crossed the river lower down, came up as the fugitives were crossing, and completed the dispersion of the Burman army.\*

Following up the advantage thus gained, General Campbell determined to attack the Kyee Woongyee in his position without delay. The force accordingly marched back to Ze-ouke, where they bivouacked for the night, and resumed their march on the following morning at day-break. The nature of the country admitted of no approach to the enemy's defences upon the hills, except in front, and that by a narrow path-way, accessible to but a limited number of men in line. Their posts at the foot of the hills were more readily assailable, and from these

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\* Document No. 153.

the se they were speedily driven ; but the attack of the heights was a more formidable task, as the narrow road by which they were approached, was commanded by the enemy's artillery and breast-works numerously manned. After some impression had been apparently made by the artillery and rockets, the first Bengal Brigade, consisting of his Majesty's 13th and 38th, Regiments, advanced to the storm, supported on their right by six companies of his Majesty's 87th. They made good their ascent in spite of the heavy fire they encountered, and to which scarcely a shot was returned ; and when they had gained the summit, they drove the enemy from hill to hill, until they had cleared the whole of the formidable and extensive entrenchments. These brilliant advantages were not gained without loss, and in the affair of the 1st, Lieutenants Sutherland and Gossip, of his Majesty's 41st, and Ensign Campbell, of the Royal Regiment, were killed, and Lieutenant Proctor, of his Majesty's 38th, Lieutenant Baylee, of the 87th, and Captain Dawson, of his Majesty's ship *Arachne*, in that of the 2nd. On the 4th of December, a detachment, under Brigadier General Cotton, proceeded across the river, and drove the left wing of the enemy not only from their post upon the river, but from a strong stockade about half a mile in the interior, completely manned and mounting guns. The enemy were dispersed with severe loss in killed and prisoners, and their defences were set on fire.\*

The beneficial results of this action were immediately apparent in the disappearance of the flanking parties of the enemy, and the re-establishment of a free communication along the river ; but in order to realise all the advantages to which it was calculated to lead, Sir A. Campbell immediately advanced in pursuit of the retreating army. As it was known that the enemy had fortified the positions along the river from Meaday to Paloh, and had strengthened them with great labour against the direct line of attack, General Campbell determined to move upon them circuitously, with one division of his force, so as to turn them as high as Bollay, whilst another division proceeded along the river, communicating and co-operating with the Flotilla. Of the first division he took the command himself : the second was placed under Brigadier General Cotton, and the Flotilla proceeded under Commodore Brisbane, having on board a military force, commanded by Brigadier Armstrong. General Campbell marched on the 9th of December to Wattygaon : on the 11th, the column was detained by a heavy fall of rain, which continued for thirty hours, rendering the roads almost impassable, injuring a considerable quantity of Commissariat stores, and inducing extensive sickness amongst the troops : cholera, in particular, became alarmingly prevalent both in this and General Cotton's division, but luckily was not of long continuance. In consequence of these causes of detention, the column did not reach Bollay till the 16th, when it came into communication with the other divisions. The enemy having abandoned Meaday, General Campbell pushed on to Tabboo with the advance, whence he detached the Body Guard in pursuit, who overtook the Burman rear about five miles beyond Meaday, and made some prisoners. General Campbell fixed his head-quarters at Meaday on the 19th.†

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\* Document No. 154.

† Do. No. 155.



The column under General Cotton moved on the 13th December, and on the 16th, approached Bollay; but just below that place was stopped by a deep nulla, across which it was necessary to throw a bridge. On the 18th, the division crossed, and encamped at Inggown on the 19th. On the road, the column passed the enemy's stockades below Palho, which, had they been defended, could not have been carried without great loss, the stockades extending along rugged and deep ravines, and being screened by a thick bamboo jungle, so as not to be visible till the road led to within a few yards of them. These defences were, however, abandoned, and the villages everywhere deserted.\*

The Flotilla moved on the morning of the 12th December, and worked up against the current with great labour, but failed to encounter that opposition for which the extraordinary strength of the works along the river had been prepared. The channel of the river being also, in many places, so narrow, as to oblige the boats to pass within two hundred yards of either bank, the passage, if opposed, could not have been forced without sustaining considerable loss.† Their defeats, however, early in the month, and the unexpected movement of the main force on the flank of their positions, seem to have disconcerted the Burman commanders, and they precipitately retreated to Melloon on the right bank of the Irawadi. Their losses in the field, and by desertion, had likewise been augmented by the ravages of disease, and the road was strewn with the dying and the dead, or the mangled remains of the Burmese, who had perished in vast numbers on the retreat. At a short distance from Meaday, it became necessary to halt the European part of the force, owing to a failure in the supply of animal food. Sir A. Campbell, however, moved on with the Madras division towards Melloon. The Flotilla also proceeded on its route.

On the 26th of December, General Campbell was met on his march by a flag of truce, with a letter expressing the wish of the Burman commanders to conclude a peace, and proposing that the leaders, on both sides, should meet to determine its conditions. Two British officers, Lieutenant Colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith, R. N., were deputed to ascertain what arrangement was contemplated by the Woongyees, and, in the mean time, the army continued its march to Patanagoh, opposite to the Burman entrenchments of Melloon. It arrived at Mingeoun on the 28th, where a letter was received from the Burman General, postponing the meeting till the 24th of January, a delay that was declared inadmissible, and a definitive reply was demanded before sun-set on the 29th, at Patanagoh, where the army arrived, and encamped without molestation. The Flotilla also ascended the river, and anchored above the Burman lines, without experiencing any demonstration of hostility; an indication of the sincerity of the Burman commanders.‡

In the communications that ensued, Sir A. Campbell was assisted by Mr. Robertson, the Civil Commissioner in Pegu and Ava, who had been appointed to the general superintendance of the civil affairs in the provinces under British authority, and to the conduct, jointly with

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\* Document No. 155. (B)

† Do. Do. (C)

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with the Commander in Chief, of political intercourse with the Court of Ava. Mr. Robertson arrived at Rangoon in October, and joined the army at Prome on the 27th November. Shortly after his arrival, arrangements were made for the civil administration of Rangoon, Bassein, Martaban, and Ye, as well as for the collection of the revenue from such parts of the Country, as had not suffered from the desolating system of Burman warfare.

In the train of the Commissioner, was a Burman priest, designated as the Rajgooroo, the spiritual preceptor of royalty, who, with his followers, had been allowed to return from Bengal. At the breaking out of the war this person had been travelling, ostensibly, for purposes of devotion, in Hindostan, and after leaving Benares was arrested by the British authority at Lucknow. After being detained some time in Calcutta, he was liberated, and sent back to Rangoon, and he reached Prome in the suite of Mr. Robertson. As the period of his arrival was the eve of important military operations, he was not allowed to proceed immediately on his journey; but, after the defeat of the Kyee Woongyee at Napadee, and the advance of the army to Meaday, he was permitted to continue his route, and was furnished with a private note, expressive of the undiminished readiness of the British officers, to grant peace to the Court of Ava upon liberal conditions, which it was expected he could communicate to his master. It seems doubtful if he displayed much anxiety to smooth the way to the restoration of tranquillity, and it is probable that his influence was little felt in any respect. The Burman priests, generally, possess but a slight hold upon the minds of the people, and the personal character of the present king renders it unlikely that he would listen to the councils of the Gooroo.

In the present instance, however, a sufficient interval had not elapsed for his interference to have produced any effect at Ava, although, from the letters of the Burman Generals, it appeared that he had been instrumental in inducing them to make their present overture. Kolein Woongyee, who had lately joined the army, had been furnished with authority to enter upon negotiations, and had been sent from the Court for that purpose. There could be no doubt of the prevailing feeling amongst all ranks of Burmans. The war had long been most unpopular: the best troops of the state had been destroyed or disorganised: the new levies raised to supply their place, were of the worst description, procured at an immense expense, and were thinned by desertion the moment they took the field. Most of the members of the Lotoo, or great council, and the King's own relations, warmly advocated peace, and he was well inclined to listen to their advice. The Queen, and the small party of her kindred and adherents, still, however, counselled opposition, and the pride of a barbaric sovereign could ill stoop to make the sacrifices, by which alone tranquillity could be purchased. The advance of the British army from Napadee seems, however, to have turned the scale in favour of pacific councils, and Kolein Woongyee was, in consequence, sent from Ava to Melloon, to endeavour to set a treaty on foot. In this he was cordially seconded by the Kyee Woongyee, who, although he continued high in command, and discharged his duties with credit, was, throughout, opposed to the war.

After some unimportant preliminary discussions, it was agreed that Sir A. Campbell, Mr. Robertson, and Sir James Brisbane, whom the British Commissioners solicited to cooperate

operate with them in the pending negotiations, should hold a conference with Koleh Menghee and the Kye Woongyee, on the Irawadi, between Patanagoh and Melloon, in a boat fitted up by the Burmese for the purpose. The first conference took place on the afternoon of the 30th December; each party was accompanied by fifty unarmed attendants, and the conference was public. At the first meeting, the terms were stated generally, and their further discussion postponed till the next day. On this occasion, Koleh Menghee declared, that, besides the general orders issued by the Court to make peace, he had lately received particular instructions to that effect, and that his acts were to be considered as those of the King. On the next day, the Burman Commissioners acceded to those terms which were previously proposed as the basis of the treaty, with the addition of the provinces of Ye, Tavai, and Mergui, which were now included amongst the demands for territorial concession. The pecuniary demand was reduced to one crore of rupees.

A third interview, for the purpose of adjusting the payment of the stipulated indemnification, was to have taken place on the 1st of January; but Koleh Menghee being unwell, it was deferred till the 2d. The Burmese Chief requested the aid of an English Doctor, and Assistant Surgeon Knox was selected, for his conversancy with the language, to wait upon him. On the 2d, the meeting took place, when the Burman Commissioners endeavoured strenuously to evade the money payment, which they asserted the country was unable to make, and they solicited its remission as an act of charity. They were also very reluctant to concede the province of Aracan, as compromising the national honour; and, with respect to Manipur, they declared that they had no objection to withdraw from all interference with the affairs of that country, although they hesitated to acknowledge Gambhir Singh as the Raja, as they asserted that the person whom they regarded as the lawful Prince was residing under the protection of the Court at Ava. Finding, however, the British Commissioners could not be induced to deviate from the conditions stipulated, they finally yielded, and Koleh Menghee closed the conference by exclaiming, "Now we shall be excellent friends." The English copy of the treaty was signed on the 2d, the Burmese on the 3d of January, and an armistice was agreed upon till the 18th of January, by which period it was expected the treaty would receive the ratification of the King, and would be returned from Ava, and that all prisoners would be delivered up, and the payment of the first instalment commenced.

During the conferences, the Burman Commissioners repeatedly declared their being furnished with full powers, and their firm persuasion, that whatever they agreed to, the King would ratify; they expressed their entire satisfaction with the spirit in which the negotiations had been conducted by the British Commissioners, and their gratification at the prospect of a speedy renewal of friendly relations: they made no secret of their motives, and frankly and unreservedly admitted, that the King had been ruined by the war; that the resources of the country were exhausted; and that the road to Ava was open to the British army. There appeared every reason to credit their assertions, and all who had an opportunity of exercising personal observation, were impressed with the conviction, that the negotiators were honest.

To the treaty now agreed upon, the Siamese were made a party, as far as regarded the establishment of amicable relations. Although they had taken no part in the war, they had continued their military demonstrations. In December, a letter was received by Captain Fenwick, at Martaban, from the Ron na Ron, announcing that he was on his march towards the Pegu frontier, with a Siamese army, and had moved to Kamboori on his way. It was, accordingly, arranged by the Commissioners, that Captain Williamson should be attached to the Siamese, and a letter was addressed to the ministers of Siam, in encouragement of the disposition thus manifested. In the mean time, however, Captain Burney had been dispatched by the Supreme Government to congratulate the King of Siam upon his accession, the former sovereign having expired on the 22d July, 1824. His remains were burnt on the 5th May, 1825, agreeably to the Siamese custom, which delays this ceremony for about a year from a sovereign's demise. His successor was crowned on the 4th of August, and Captain Burney reached Bangkok on the 4th of December. He found the Siamese Court much alive to what was passing in their vicinity, but rather sceptical as to the extent of the advantages gained by the English over the Burmans, and by no means confident of the ultimate termination of the war. Neither was it any part of their policy to take an active share in it, or their wish to contribute to the re-establishment of Pegu, as an independant kingdom. The Court of Siam would have been well pleased to have recovered the Tenasserim provinces, which had been wrested from them by the Burman arms, but they hesitated to render the services that might have entitled them to some compensation, not only in the uncertainty of the return they might expect, but in mistrust of their own army, composed as that was, in a great degree, of Peguers, and commanded by a General of Pegu extraction. It was very evident, therefore, that they were by no means in earnest in any intention to co-operate in the war, and the objects of the Envoy were limited to frame a treaty of friendly and commercial intercourse, to adjust some disputes of local importance, and procure the release of the individuals carried into captivity, in which he fully succeeded.

The establishment of the independance of Pegu would have been a serious infliction upon the Burman state, and was well deserved by its procrastinating the war. The measure might have been carried into effect with extreme facility, as the bulk of the inhabitants of the lower provinces were of Pegu, or Talien origin, and were well enough disposed to shake off the heavy yoke of their Burman conquerors. At the same time, there were obvious objections to the arrangement. The people were very much mixed with the Burman race, and their characters indicated neither personal intrepidity, nor national spirit, which could have been relied upon as available in undertaking their defence: neither did it appear that any individual of rank or influence existed, round whom the population would have rallied, as the common object of their reverence or attachment. Subsequent events did not invalidate these conclusions, as, in the short-lived insurrection which immediately followed the war, the Taliens displayed neither steadiness nor valour, and the person who came forward as their leader, was an individual who had actively opposed the British, and who derived his importance from his connexion



connexion with the royal family of Ava, not Pegu, his sister having been one of the wives of the present King. The only persons of any importance in Pegu were the head men of the villages, who had been all appointed under the Burman rule, and the Ron na Ron, a General in a foreign service, boasted no higher an origin than that of the head man of Martaban, which situation had been held by his father, under the Burman Government. The burthen of maintaining Pegu in its independence, must, therefore, have fallen entirely upon the British power, and in the difficulty of nominating a ruler, it would, probably, have been compelled to assume the sovereignty, involving an extension of dominion compatible neither with its policy nor advantage. These considerations induced the Commissioners to abstain from urging any stipulation to this effect, and to reserve it as an extremity, to which the obstinate perseverance of the Court of Ava, in a course of hostility, might compel them to resort.

In the interval that elapsed before the close of the armistice, the utmost cordiality prevailed between the two camps, and the officers of either army associated in the most unreserved manner. That the spirit of the Court was also improved, was evinced by its sanctioning, though unavowedly, an intercourse with the English prisoners at the capital. A boat from Ava arrived in eight days at Patanagoh, on the 6th January, with letters from Dr. Sandford, and Lieutenant Bennet, of the Royal Regiment. These officers left Prome for Rangoon on sick certificate, and fell into the enemy's hands a little below Padoun. It was evident, that their letters were written under dictation, as both the writers were made to say, that the religious principles of the ruling dynasty, and the high sense of honour entertained by the Burmese, would never consent to the dismemberment of their empire, or to the violation of an oath, which had not been broken for ages. They also wrote, that "the Emperor had always been well-disposed towards the British, and neither sanctioned nor approved the present rupture," which, at any rate, was an indication of his now entertaining pacific dispositions. They added, that they were not closely confined, and had been treated, both on their way to Ava, and in the capital, with every indulgence that they could reasonably expect.

In fact, the treatment of the prisoners, who experienced much ill usage, rather perhaps through the haughty indifference, than the cruelty of the Court, and especially through the barbarity and extortion of the inferior officers, was much amended after the capture of Prome, although still frequently and wantonly severe. They had been removed to Amerapura, and from thence to a place about ten or twelve miles from Ava, Aong-ben-le, where they were kept closely confined, and subsisted wholly upon the charity of the poorer and middling classes of Burmans, and upon the earnings of their native servants who were not imprisoned, and who behaved with exemplary fidelity: most of the Sipahis taken prisoners died in confinement, either of hunger or disease, brought on by long abstinence and occasional repletion; and one prisoner, an old Greek, died on the way to Aong-ben-le, of extreme fatigue, and the barbarous treatment he experienced. As the British army advanced, the fears of the Burman Court secured better usage for the captives, and their services and mediation soon became of importance in the negotiations that ensued.



The happy prospect of an immediate termination of the war at this period was once more disappointed.

On the 17th of January, the day before the armistice expired, the Atwenwoon, Maun Yee, and three other Chiefs, were sent to the British camp, to apologise for the non-arrival of the ratification of the treaty : at the same time they offered to pay the first instalment of the crore of rupees, or four lacs of ticals, about five lacs of rupees, and to deliver hostages for the safe return of the English prisoners from Ava, who it had been stipulated, should be liberated. These conditions, the Burman Commissioners proposed to fulfil on their own authority, professing not to have received, in consequence of some accidental delay for which they could not account, any answer from Ava, and they solicited, in return, the retreat of the British force to Promé, or at least a further suspension of hostilities. In reply, a conference with the principals was proposed, which being declined on the plea of indisposition by Kolein Menghee, Mr. Mangles, Secretary to the Commissioners, Major Jackson, Lieutenant Smith, Royal Navy, and Mr. Assistant Surgeon Knox, were deputed to Melloon, to confer with that officer. On landing at Melloon, they were conducted to the house of Kolein Menghee, in the principal stockade ; but a short interval elapsed before the principal Chiefs made their appearance. When the Kyee Woongyee, and Kolein Menghee entered the hall, and were informed of the ultimatum of the British Commissioners, Kolein Menghee stated, that it would be necessary to refer the matter to Memia Bo, the King's brother, who was now in the immediate neighbourhood, and went to him accordingly to receive his instructions. He returned in about a quarter of an hour, and declining to sign a compliance with the terms required, a further appeal to arms became unavoidable.\*

On the 18th, the Burman Commissioners proposed a further suspension of hostilities for six or seven days, which was at once refused ; as it was well known that their excuse of not having received any communication from Ava, was untrue, boats passing daily between the capital and the camp. They were told, that if they evacuated their position at Melloon by sun-rise on the 20th, and withdrew towards Ava, hostilities would not be re-commenced, and the British force would halt wherever the ratified treaty should be received. As they declined compliance with this alternative, they were apprised, that hostilities would commence after midnight on the 18th. Batteries were accordingly erected with such expedition, that by ten the next morning, eight and twenty pieces of ordnance were in position on points presenting more than a mile on the eastern bank of the Irawadi, which corresponded with the enemy's line of defence on the opposite shore : nor had the Burmans been idle, having, in the course of the night, thrown up additional defences of considerable strength and extent, and well adapted to the purposes for which they were constructed.

At eleven o'clock on the 19th, the cannonade began, and having produced the desired impression by one, the troops, previously embarked under cover of the fire, moved off to the opposite

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\* Document No. 157. (A)

site bank. Lieut.-Col. Sale, with his Majesty's 13th and 38th Regiments was ordered to drop down the river, and assault the main face of the enemy's position near its south-eastern angle, whilst Brigadier General Cotton, with the greater part of the remaining strength, crossed above Melloon to attack its northern front. The boats pushed off together, but the current carried Lieutenant Colonel Sale's party against their point of attack, before that under Brigadier General Cotton had passed the river. Colonel Sale was wounded whilst in his boat, but the Brigade having landed and formed under Major Frith, rushed on to the assault, and bore everything before them with their usual intrepidity. The place was in their possession before Brigadier General Cotton's division could attack the entrenchments, and he therefore directed one of his Brigades, under Lieutenant Colonel Blair, to cut in upon the enemy's line of retreat, by which they suffered considerable loss. The loss of the assailants was inconsiderable, in comparison with the importance of the object achieved, and the resolute manner in which all the divisions, both military and naval, exposed themselves to the enemy's fire. No officer was killed, and but two were wounded besides Lieutenant-Colonel Sale, Major Frith, of his Majesty's 38th, and Lieutenant Dickson, of the Bengal Engineers. In addition to the ordnance and military stores captured, a large magazine of grain was taken, and specie to the value of ten thousand rupees. The efforts of all concerned in the attack were of the most meritorious description, but to none was the success due in a greater degree, than to the Artillery and Rocket Corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson and Lieutenant Blake. The precision and rapidity of the practice in both branches, spread destruction and panic through the Burman entrenchments, and paralysing the energies of the defenders, enabled the assailants to reap the fruits of their daring with so comparatively trifling a sacrifice of life.\*

The original treaty was found in the lines of Melloon, and from this, and from letters ascribed to the Raj Guru taken at the same time, it seemed probable, that the Burman Commissioners had been playing a treacherous part, and had sought only to protract the war by their negociations for peace, to which they had never intended to obtain the sanction of the King. As far, however, as the Burman Commissioners are concerned, subsequent information exonerates them from the imputation of insincerity. A copy of the treaty was sent to Ava. The treaty which they signed was not submitted, for, in the formal execution of it they rather exceeded their powers, and presumed to anticipate the intentions of their Royal master. Their offer to pay a portion of the instalment, and the discovery of a sum of money in their possession, were further evidences of their integrity, as were their offer to deliver hostages for the release of the European prisoners at Ava, and their actual liberation of Lieutenant Flood, of his Majesty's 12th. There is no reason, therefore, to suspect them of any want of candour, nor is it doubtful, that the Court was anxious for peace. The terms of the treaty were however unquestionably very unpalatable, and the cession of Aracan, and the payment of money, most galling to the feelings of the King and those about him. That he

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\* Document No. 157. (B)

he should hesitate to give them his acquiescence was not surprising, and those who advocated desperate resistance, taking advantage of this mood, urged him to withhold his final concurrence. Whilst he thus fluctuated, a Chief, whose incapacity was only equalled by his presumption, volunteered his services to lead another army against the English, and promised to retrieve the sinking glory of the empire. As a last hope, his offers were accepted, and it was resolved to try once more the fortune of war. The opportunity was not long wanting.

In the mean time, advices of the capture of Melloon reached the capital, and created the utmost consternation. In the uncertainty of the ultimate result of negotiations for peace, the military operations were suffered to proceed, but the Court determined to renew communications of a pacific tendency with the British General. It was, however, no easy matter to find negociators in whom the British and Burman authorities could now confide, and the high officers of the latter state were very reluctant to be sent upon what they considered a hopeless, if not a dangerous errand. In this dilemma, the Court applied to Mr. Price, a member of the American mission to Ava, who was liberated from confinement on the occasion, and obtained his consent to be employed as an envoy to the British camp. In order also to amend the chance of success, Mr. Sandford, the Surgeon of the Royals, a prisoner at Ava, was associated in the negotiation, upon his giving his parole to return, and in order to conciliate the British authorities, four prisoners of war, three soldiers and the master of a gun-vessel which put into Martaban by mistake, at the beginning of the war, were restored to their liberty, and sent down with the deputies. Mr. Price and Mr. Sandford reached head-quarters on the 31st of January, and after conferring with the Commissioners, returned to Ava on the following day. They were made acquainted, that the terms proposed at Melloon were still open for the acceptance of the Court of Ava, and that with respect to the pecuniary indemnification, the army would retire to Rangoon upon the payment of twenty-five lacs of rupees, and would evacuate the Burman territory upon the discharge of an instalment of similar amount. The advance of the army was not retarded by the stipulations, but was continued towards Pagahm, where it was understood, the enemy's force was collecting. On the route, a small but brilliant affair took place between a reconnoitring party of the Body Guard, under Lieutenant Trant, in which a party of between four or five hundred Burmans was charged, and their Chief killed. The army left Patanagoh on the 25th of January, and reached the Petroleum Wells, at Yenau Gheoun, on the 31st, over a most bleak and sterile country. From thence it moved to Pakang Ye, where it was halted from the 4th to the 6th of February. Above Yenau Gheoun, the country improved at every step, and began from thence to assume the appearance of verdure and cultivation.\*

Having marched from Pakang Ye on the 6th of February, the army under General Campbell reached the village of Yapang on the 8th, and a reconnoissance, on the evening of that day, discovered the enemy about five miles in advance, on the road to the ancient city of Pagahm.

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\* Document No. 159.



Pagahm. On the morning of the 9th, the army proceeded to the encounter, and for the first time found the Burmans had abandoned their system of combating behind barriers, and prepared to dispute the day in the open field, in front of their position at Loganunda Pagoda. Their numbers were estimated at sixteen thousand men, under Zay-yah-thoo-yan, the new General, who had received, on his departing to take the command of the army, the title of Na-wing Phuring, or Prince of Sun-set. His dispositions for the action, whilst they displayed unwonted audacity, exhibited considerable judgment, and he had formed his men in the prickly jungle, on either side of the main road, by which he had calculated the British army must necessarily advance. The object of this manœuvre was easily detected, and frustrated by a corresponding change of position, by which the army advanced in two columns against his flanks. The right, under the Commander in Chief, was formed of his Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, four guns of the Bengal Horse Artillery, and a small detachment of the Body Guard, supported by his Majesty's 89th. The left, under General Cotton, consisted of his Majesty's 38th, supported by his Majesty's 41st, and two guns of the Madras Artillery, whilst the extreme left was further protected by the 43d Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Parlbly.\*

On moving to the attack, the advanced guard of the right column, consisting of thirty-eight troopers of the Body Guard, and fifty men of his Majesty's 13th, followed closely by General Campbell and his staff, with a couple of guns, and a howitzer, had pushed on considerably a head of the main body, when they came upon a strong piquet of the enemy, who observing their detached position, made a well-concerted movement on both their flanks to enclose and cut them off: a party even succeeded in forming in their rear, but were presently attacked and dispersed by the rest of the 13th continuing their advance and proceeding in open order. After clearing the road of the enemy, the advance proceeded, and left the Commander in Chief behind, with his personal escort and the guns, when the few men immediately in his front were driven in by a mass of Manipur horse, and forced back precipitately upon the guns. Their situation, and that of the whole party, was one of imminent peril, from which they were extricated by the gallantry and steadiness of the small division of the Body Guard, attached, as his personal escort, to the Commander in Chief. Dashing past the retreating skirmishers to right and left, they deployed in their rear, and with a cool determined courage, that would have done honour to any cavalry, kept the superior number of the enemy at bay: falling back gradually till within range of the guns, they then filed off to the right and left, to allow the latter to open, which effectually checked the assailants, and gave time for additional troops to come up, and drive them from the field.†

The attack upon the main divisions of the enemy was eminently successful, and they soon broke and fled before the fire of the advancing columns; part retreated to a well-constructed field work, from which they were immediately dislodged by the bayonet, with great slaughter.

\* Document No. 160.

† Do. No. 161.



slaughter. They then made an attempt to rally within the walls, and about the Pagodas of Pagahm, but were followed with unremitting activity, and in the course of five hours, this last hope of the kingdom of Ava was utterly annihilated. Their vaunting General made his escape into the neighbouring jungle, and shortly afterwards returned to Ava, where he earnestly solicited another opportunity to redeem his credit. The presumption of the request was held less venial than the defeat; and for that, he was ordered from the presence on the night of his arrival, to the place of execution, cruelly tortured on the way thither, and finally beheaded. One gratifying result of this action was, the liberation of the population of the country from the restraint under which they had been kept by the Burman army, and the compulsory separation from their homes. Immediately after the action, they began to come into the camp for protection, and several thousand boats, crowded with people, passed Pagahm downwards, on their way to their native villages and towns. The contest was now evidently about to close, and it remained to be seen, whether the Burman Court would offer timely submission, or whether the British army was to add the capital to its other conquests. To prepare for either alternative, and refresh his troops after their late fatigues, Sir A. Campbell halted the army for a few days at Pagahm.

Whilst these transactions were taking place on the upper line of the Irawadi, the province of Pegu had been the scene of some military operations, which we may here pause to notice. The force stationed at Pegu, under Colonel Pepper, had been originally intended to act only on the defensive, and to cover the province from the Burman detachments that might be sent out from the main body or the garrison of Tongo, which, with some other fortified posts on the Sitang river, still remained in the possession of the enemy. Encouraged by the absence of molestation, and obtaining in the person of Ujina, the former Governor of Martaban, an active and enterprising leader, the Burmans in the end of 1825, became daring and troublesome, and by the acts of pillage and devastation which they committed, occasioned some mischief, and still more alarm. In order to check their incursions, therefore, Colonel Pepper moved from Pegu on the 23d December, and marched to Shoe-gein, on the left bank of the Sitang, which he occupied without resistance. Parties of the enemy shewed themselves occasionally in the jungle, but attempted no collective opposition. A party of one hundred and fifty men was posted at Mikow, and Lieutenant Colonel Conry, with the 3d Light Infantry, was detached to reduce Sitang, the Burman post between Tongo and Martaban.

Lieutenant Colonel Conry reached Sitang on the forenoon of the 7th January, and immediately made his dispositions for the attack, which, from the strength of the place and the inadequate number of the attacking force, entirely failed, with the loss of Lieutenant Colonel Conry and Lieutenant Adams killed, Lieutenants Harvey and Power wounded: one native officer and nine privates were killed, and eighteen rank and file wounded.

On receiving news of the repulse, Colonel Pepper moved with a re-inforcement of the 12th and 54th Regiments Madras Native Infantry, the flank companies of the 1st European Regiment, and a small detachment of Artillery, and at nine in the morning of the 11th of January, reached Sitang. The stockade was found of great extent, built entirely of teak timber: its height

was from twelve to fourteen feet, and it was constructed on an eminence, which commanded every approach: the north face was protected by a creek fordable only at low water. After placing the guns in position, the force advanced to the attack in three columns, the right commanded by Major Home, 12th Native Infantry, the left by Captain Cursham, 1st European Regiment, and the centre by Captain Stedham, 34th Local Infantry. A simultaneous advance was ordered; on which the creek was forded, and the stockade was attacked and carried in about twenty minutes: the advance was made under a heavy fire from the enemy, and the loss was proportionately severe. Captains Cursham and Stedman were killed. Major Home, Lieutenant Fullerton and Lieutenant Gower, were wounded, and the loss in rank and file was fourteen killed and fifty-three wounded.\*

The number of the enemy was computed at three or four thousand. Three hundred dead bodies were found in the stockade, and their loss was estimated at double that number, many being thrown into the river, or into wells, or carried off. The whole of the defences were destroyed on the morning of the 13th.

Shortly after the reduction of the stockade of Sitang, Colonel Pepper was joined by strong re-inforcements from Rangoon, consisting of four companies of his Majesty's 45th, seven companies of the 1st Madras Native Infantry, besides details of the 3d and 34th Madras Native Infantry, altogether eight hundred strong, by which all apprehensions for the security of the country were dissipated, and the population once more resorted with confidence to their homes and ordinary avocations. The efforts of the enemy were not however relaxed, and in the month of February, they made a vigorous attack upon the British post at Mikow, which maintained the communication between Pegu and Shewgein, and covered the country between the former and the Sitang river. The attempt was gallantly repulsed by the young officer who commanded the position, Ensign Clark, with a small detachment of the 3d Madras Native Infantry. Immediately after the news of the action reached Colonel Pepper, a re-inforcement of a hundred rank and file of the 13th Regiment, with twenty Pioneers, under Captain Leggett, was sent to Mikow, as well as a hundred from Pegu, by which the post was secured against the repetition of a similar attempt. The establishment of peace suspended further operations in Pegu.

No occasion had offered for the further prosecution of hostilities against the Burmans in Aracan or Asam, and those provinces continued in the undisturbed possession of the British authorities. Cachar had been likewise unmolested by any foreign force, but it was not till about this time that Manipur was finally cleared of the enemy. It has been already mentioned, that Gambhir Sinh and Lieutenant Pemberton, after reaching Manipur in the beginning of the year, were obliged to return to Sylhet for want of supplies. Being furnished with adequate provisions and arms, the Raja, with Captain Grant and Lieutenant Pemberton, again set off for Manipur with the Levy. They quitted Banskandi on the 4th December, and arrived

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\* Documents Nos. 162 and 163.

arrived at the town of Manipur on the 18th.\* There was no Burman force in the vicinity of the city, but a considerable body of them were stockaded at Tummoo, in the south-east corner of the valley, against which a detachment was sent. Finding, however, that the enemy was too strong for the force sent against them, the Commander of the detachment applied for re-inforcements, on which the Raja and Captain Grant immediately marched to his assistance, with the rest of the Levy, across the Mirang hills, into the Burman territory, in which route they passed several stockades that had been commenced in the defiles, but abandoned on their unexpected advance: they joined the detachment on the 18th of January. On reconnoitring the stockade, it was found to be of considerable strength and extent: the party were unprovided with artillery, and an attempt to carry it by escalade must have been attended with serious loss. It was ascertained, however, that the water of the stockade was procured from a Nullah sixty paces distant, and advantage was promptly taken of this circumstance to cut off the Burmans from their supply.†

On the 19th, the Manipur troops effected their advance through a thick jungle, and were not discovered till they had obtained command of the spots whence access to the stream from the stockade was practicable. The enemy on perceiving them, opened a heavy fire, but the men being sheltered by the thicket, suffered little. The Burmese made several spirited sorties to drive them from their positions, as well during the rest of that day, as on the two days succeeding, but they were received with great spirit in a desperate, and, as it appeared, final sortie on the night of the 21st, being repulsed with severe loss, they commenced their retreat. They retired in small parties, three or four at a time, and had completely cleared the stockade by the night of the 22d, when it was taken possession of by the Raja. Four small guns and several jinjals were captured in the stockade, with a quantity of rice, sufficient for two months' supply of the Levy. Lieutenant Pemberton joined the force on the morning of the 20th.

Immediately after this success, a detachment of three hundred men was sent forward, who succeeded in capturing a stockade on the right bank of the Ningti river. More than two hundred of the people of Manipur were liberated on this occasion, and many others were rescued from captivity, by flying parties of the Levy, the whole of which was advanced to the banks of the Ningti, by the 2d of February, whence a ready road lay before them to the capital of Ava. The restoration of tranquillity, however, arrested their advance, and saved the frontier districts from that retaliation, which a long series of cruelty and oppression exercised by the Burmans in Manipur, would, no doubt, have provoked, and would almost have justified.‡

After halting two or three days at Pagahm, General Campbell resumed his march, which now seemed likely to conduct him to the capital of Ava. There, one feeling alone prevailed, and although various reports were thrown out, at one time, of the intention of the King to defend the city to the last extremity, and at another, to protract the war by flying to the mountains, these

purposes,

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\* Documents Nos. 164 and 165.

† Do. No. 166.

‡ Do. No. 167.



purposes, if ever conceived, originated in the anxiety of the moment, and were never seriously entertained. The King and his Ministers felt, that they were in the power of the British, and their only anxiety was, that the personal dignity and security of the sovereign should not be violated. It was with as much satisfaction as astonishment, therefore, that they learned from Mr. Price, on his return from Ava, that the British Commissioners sought to impose no severer terms than those which had been stipulated in the treaty of Melloon. To these there was now no hesitation to accede, although a lurking suspicion was still entertained, that the invaders would not rest satisfied with the conditions they professed to impose. With a mixture of fear and trust, Mr. Price was again despatched to the British Camp to signify the consent of the Burman Court to the terms of peace, and Mr. Sanford was now set wholly at liberty, and allowed to accompany the negociator to rejoin his countrymen. These gentlemen returned to Camp on the 13th of February\*, but as the Envoy had brought no official ratification of the treaty, Sir A. Campbell declined suspending his march until it should be received. Mr. Price having returned to Ava to obtain this ratification, the army advanced to Yandabo, within four days' march of Ava, when the negociator, accompanied by the Burman Commissioners, again made his appearance with the ratified treaty, and the amount of the first instalment, or twenty-five lacs in gold and silver bullion. By this treaty, the Burman Government engaged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Asam, Cachar and Jyntea, to recognise Gambhir Sinh as Raja of Manipur, to receive a British Resident at Ava, and depute a Burman Resident to Calcutta, to concur in a commercial treaty, and to cede, in perpetuity, the four provinces of Aracan as divided from Ava by the Anupectumien mountains, and the provinces Yeh, Tavai, Mergui, and Tenasserim, to the south of the Sanluen or Martaban river. The treaty was concluded on the 24th February 1827.†

On the 5th of March, the troops commenced their return, the greater part proceeding by water to Rangoon: one detachment marched by Sembewghewn to Aeng, over the mountains, and another by the Tongho pass to Ramree, and both reached the places mentioned, within a moderate period. At Rangoon, no time was lost in embarking such portion of the force as was no longer required. Mr. Robertson, the Civil Commissioner, returned to Calcutta early in April, and Sir A. Campbell also visited the Presidency by the same opportunity; but shortly afterwards returned to Rangoon, which continued to be occupied, agreeably to the terms of the treaty, by a British force, for some months after the termination of the war.

It is foreign to the object of the present Sketch to notice the subsequent intercourse with the Court of Ava, and it is sufficient to remark, that the terms of the treaty have, up to the present period, been fulfilled with as much punctuality as could reasonably be expected. That the Government of Ava feels humiliated by the result of the late contest, cannot be questioned, and any great cordiality between the two powers is not to be looked for, until that impression shall have yielded to the influence of time, the interchange of friendly communication, and

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\* Document, No. 172. † Do. No. 170.



and the realization of those advantages, which improved commercial intercourse must eventually afford. In the mean time, the just appreciation of British valour, and of the power and moderation of the Government of India, which the Burmans have derived from the late events, will, it is to be hoped, prevent the possibility of any unfriendly collision, or endanger the harmony that is now happily restored.

It has been already shown that the occurrence of hostilities was unavoidable on the part of the Government of India. Their conduct will best be judged from the details already given, or may be learned from the explanation afforded by the Supreme Government of the principles which influenced their measures.\* Whatever disappointments were felt in the outset, were chiefly the result of physical difficulties, aggravated on the Rangoon side by the judicious but barbarous policy of the Burman Court, and in other quarters by the employment of armies unnecessarily numerous, and consequent embarrassment in providing adequate equipment. These impediments, in some degree inseparable from the prosecution of hostilities amidst local peculiarities, which could not be fully estimated until they had been actually experienced, were, however, no sooner overcome, than a career of rapid and brilliant success ensued; such as was to be expected from the resources of British India. To the intrepid exertion of every branch of the force, native and European, military and marine,† and to the spirit and skill with which they were led, the Government of Bengal paid appropriate acknowledgements in a public Order, and also yielded the tribute of its regret to those who had fallen in the course of the war, by the sword of the enemy, or the still more destructive influence of the climate. The public thanks of the Court of Directors were also given to the Governor General, and Governor of Madras, to Sir Archibald Campbell and Sir James Brisbane,‡ and the Officers and men engaged

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\* Document No. 175.

† Do. No. 171.

‡ During the progress of these pages through the press, the Quarterly Review for April 1827, has reached us, in which we find it asserted, that the command of the Naval Expedition to Rangoon was entrusted to the Quarter Master General. How far this is from being correct, the subjoined Documents, to which we have been permitted to have access, will shew.

*Extract from a Letter from the Secretary to Government in the Political Department, to Commodore Grant, c. B. ; dated the 12th March, 1824.*

I am directed by the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 25th ultimo, and to convey to you the cordial acknowledgements of the Government, for the prompt and valuable aid, which it is your intention to afford his Lordship in Council, in the prosecution of offensive operations against the Burman nation.

In the event of your being able, without injury to the service in which you are now engaged, to proceed to Rangoon in the months of May or June, either touching at Madras, for the purpose of accompanying the second division of troops from that presidency, or repairing at once to the scene of action, his Lordship in Council would anticipate the most essential benefit to the expedition from the presence of his Majesty's ship, and your personal superintendance of the measures which it may be found expedient to undertake against Rangoon, and the other maritime possessions of the enemy.

engaged in the war,\* His Majesty's Government signified their approbation of the conduct of the Governor General, in his elevation to superior honours,† and the thanks of both Houses of Parliament were voted to the officers and men of the Army and Navy, in His Majesty's or the East India Company's Service, for their exertions in the operations against Ava.‡

That the results of the war cannot fail to be widely beneficial, will be evident from a consideration of the state of those countries which are now annexed to the British empire. Distracted hitherto by incessant feuds, and overrun by hostile armies, or predatory bands, regions once animated by a happy and numerous population, had been converted into wide and unwholesome thickets, and ceased not only to be the haunts of man, but had become hostile to human life. Under their new masters, Asam, Cachar, Aracan, and the Tenasserim provinces, will experience a tranquillity and security they have not known for ages, and must once more assume that character of plenty and prosperity, which the latter wore when the Europeans first visited their coasts, and which tradition, and the remains of roads and towns still found in them, indicate were equally the enjoyment of all.

The contracted territory of the Burman kingdom will be productive of little real diminution of its resources, from the circumstance already referred to, of the desolate condition of the provinces which it has consented to relinquish. Its most valuable districts, those along the Irawadi, and at the mouths of that river, are still untouched, and if the lesson the late war has inculcated, induce the Court of Ava to forego schemes of military conquest, and in their room to cultivate the ample means of domestic wealth, which the forests, the fields, and the mines of Ava, and an active and intelligent population supply, it will derive from the contest more solid benefits, than if it had come out of the struggle with undiminished honor or augmented rule.

The advantage to the British empire of India is dependant upon that which its new acquisitions will realise, and will be proportioned to their increased prosperity, A variety of valuable raw produce is procurable, or may be raised from the new territories, to be replaced by the manufactures of India or of Britain. Indigo, Cotton, Salt, Spices, Lac, Dying woods, Timber,

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*Extract from a Letter from the Secretary to Government in the Political Department, to the Officers Commanding His Majesty's Sloops Larne and Sophia; dated 2d April, 1824.*

The Expedition under the command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, being about to proceed against Rangoon, in the dominions of the King of Ava, after touching at the place of rendezvous, Port Cornwallis, on the north-east of the Great Andamans; I have been directed to intimate to you the request of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, that the senior officer of his Majesty's sloops of war, detached by Commodore Grant to accompany the armament, should assume the naval command of it, subject to the general direction of the Brigadier, commanding the forces.

Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell will apprise you in detail of the objects of the Expedition, in which the services of the naval force will be of the most essential use; and his Lordship in Council relies with confidence on your affording that cordial and zealous co-operation, which ever distinguishes his Majesty's navy, when employed with land forces in the service of their country.

\* Document, No. 176.

† Document, No. 177.

‡ Document, No. 178.

Timber, Antimony and Tin, are amongst the products of Aracan and the Tenasserim coast, which are likely to invite enterprise, and reward industry. Before, however, the capabilities of these regions can be turned to full account, the people by whom they are tenanted, must be raised both in number and character, so as to become productive labourers in their own country, and liberal consumers of the produce of others. That this must be the result of the present order of things cannot be doubted, although any attempts to precipitate so desirable a consummation, would only lead to disappointment.

The acquisition of the southern provinces, as well as the war itself, have brought British commerce more immediately in contact with the Burman kingdom, and are likely to enhance those advantages which have hitherto been reaped from it. It will, indeed, be no unimportant benefit to the merchant to be relieved from the vexatious arrogance which he heretofore experienced from the officers of the Burman ports, and which it is not likely they will feel disposed or be permitted to reassume. The same will be the case at Siam, the trade with which state, under the treaty formed with its Government, and the sentiments of fear and respect which the late events, and the proximity of the British power must inspire, will be conducted hereafter on principles more consonant with the practice of polished nations.

To commerce, the provinces of Cachar and Asam hold out less promising prospects; but they are politically of value as forming a well-defined and naturally strong frontier; and in the approximation they afford to Tibet and China, it is not impossible that trade may be extended in those directions. Even from the intercourse with the barbarous mountain tribes on the frontiers, some advantages may be obtained, which will gradually augment, as the people are brought within the nearer reach of refinement.

In all these countries, valuable accessions to science are already made, and must gradually accumulate. In Geography, alone, the dark mist that overhung so extensive and interesting a tract, is rapidly clearing away, and the natural features of river and mountain, which are here developed on a magnificent scale, are becoming visible and distinct. Geographical knowledge may seem, indeed, an inadequate compensation for the cost and peril of war; but its consequences are of the utmost importance to humanity, as well as to science, as a country that has been once rendered accessible to European energy, is no longer excluded from the chance of being visited by the blessings of CIVILIZATION.

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# Documents,

## ILLUSTRATIVE

OF THE

# BURMESE WAR.

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No. 1.—*Extract from a Despatch from the Governor General in Council, to the Court of Directors of the East India Company; dated 4th March, 1812.*

Chittagong  
1812.

75. The foregoing detail of our measures, orders, and instructions will sufficiently explain to your honorable court the course of our deliberations, and the system of proceeding, which it is our intention to pursue with respect to the late occurrences in the quarter of Chittagong, as far as it is practicable in the present stage of these transactions to form our resolutions. Your honorable court will observe, that while guided on the one hand, by the unavoidable necessity of resisting menace, insult and aggression, we are on the other, resolved to practise every practicable degree of moderation and forbearance in pursuance of our solicitude to maintain the long established relations of peace and amity with the state of Ava. It may possibly even appear to your honorable court, that we have allowed this disposition to operate in a greater extent than is compatible with the rights and the dignity of the relative power of the company's government; but an additional motive of caution and forbearance is suggested by the situation of our envoy, whose personal liberty, and even safety, might be endangered by the vindictive resentment of a barbarous and haughty court in the event of actual hostility between the two states. It might indeed contribute to the future tranquillity of our eastern territory, which has repeatedly been disturbed by the aggressions of the people of Arracan, and to the permanent relief of our government and our subjects from the effects of that arrogance and insolence to which both have so frequently been exposed, and which may, in a great degree, be ascribed to anterior forbearance and concession on our part, if by example and experience that government were led to form a just estimate of the greatness of our power, and the weakness of its own. We state this observation, however, rather as tending in the present instance to alleviate the regret with which we must ever contemplate the necessity of war, than as constituting on our part a principle of action.

No. 2.—*Extract from a Despatch from the Governor General in Council, to the Court of Directors of the East India Company; dated 25th May, 1812.*

70. It has been indispensable to protect the province of Chittagong against the inroads of a barbarous race of men, whose incursions, openly and distinctly menaced, would have subjected the country to the extreme evils of devastation and outrage, and our government to affront and indignity. It was a branch also



Chittagong,  
1817.

of general duty, never to be omitted, to repel insult and maintain inviolate the honour and credit of the British name. For the first of these purposes, the advance of a small body of troops, and the employment of an armed vessel or two became necessary; and the second object has required occasional remonstrance against insolence, and a firm but always temperate assertion of national dignity, both in language and measures: but every part of our conduct which could bear the character of controversy or contest with the Burmahs, has been limited to those views; and we trust your honourable court will see with satisfaction, the moderate, forbearing, and amicable character of the measures which have been pursued, both on the frontier of Chittagong and at Rangoon. They have been perseveringly directed, under many provocations from a very contemptible adversary, to the ends of present conciliation, and the maintenance of a good understanding with the government of Ava. We shall continue to act, as long as circumstances admit, on the same principles; and we entertain a reasonable hope that the late occasion of mistrust and jealousy will pass over without having induced a rupture.

71. We cannot however refuse to entertain the sentiments, that it may become absolutely necessary at some future time, if not at an early period, to check the arrogance and presumption of that weak and contemptible state.

*No. 3.—Extract from a Despatch from the Governor General in Council at Fort William, in Bengal, to the Court of Directors of the East India Company; dated 20th December, 1817.*

22. In the month of May last a despatch was received from the magistrate of Chittagong, reporting the arrival at that station of the son of the Rajah of Ramree, as the bearer of a letter from the Rajah purporting to be written under the immediate orders of the King of Ava, and containing a demand for the surrender of the Mug insurgents.

23. The magistrate very properly replied on his own part, at a conference which took place between the young Rajah and himself, that the demand for the surrender of the Mug refugees had been repeatedly made by the governor of Arracan, and a compliance with it declined, on the grounds of its being inconsistent with the principles of the British government to deliver up a race of people who had sought protection in its territory, and had resided in it upwards of thirty years; but that he had no authority to discuss the question, which must be referred to the Governor-General in Council.

24. Mr. Pechell was desired to address an answer to the Rajah of Ramree, to the effect of his own reply to the Rajah's son; observing a conciliatory and firm tone, and stating his answer to be written under the orders of the Governor-General in Council.

25. The Governor-General at the same time addressed a letter to the Viceroy of Pegu, referring to the mission of the Rajah of Ramree's son to Chittagong, and explaining to the Viceroy, for the information of the King of Ava, the impracticability of our delivering up the emigrants, and the inutilty of renewing the subject.

26. The draft of the Governor-General's letter to the Viceroy is recorded on the proceedings of the annexed date.

27. The magistrate had been directed to use his endeavours to discover the motives and objects of the court of Ava in reviving the question of the surrender of the Mugs; and, if possible, to ascertain from the agent whether any preparations or arrangements were in progress in Arracan indicative of a design to attempt the seizure of the Mugs by violence, or of any other hostile purpose; and his subsequent communications with the Rajah of Ramree's son satisfied his mind that projects of this nature were in contemplation.

28. The intelligence obtained by the magistrate was of a description which appeared to require secrecy, and the despatches which contained it were accordingly recorded in the secret department, and will be found on the consultation noted in the margin.

29. The general tenor of that intelligence, combined with the knowledge possessed by government of the arrogant spirit of the court of Ava, and the extreme jealousy which it has always entertained of our protection of the emigrant Mugs, induced the Governor-General in Council to deem it by no means improbable that, on receiving intimation of the refusal of the British government to comply with the demand conveyed in the Rajah of Ramree's letter, an attempt might be made on the district of Chittagong, or the neighbouring British possessions, by the Burmese. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, judged it expedient to adopt precautionary measures for the security of the honourable company's territory against a sudden irruption; and orders were accordingly issued for reinforcing the post of Chittagong without delay. A cruiser and two gun-boats were accordingly ordered to be stationed on the coast, so as to provide against a sudden descent by sea.

30. The magistrate was also furnished with suitable instructions on the occasion, and in consequence, however, of subsequent despatches from the magistrate of Chittagong, intimating his opinion that the probability of a hostile attack on our territories by the Burmese government, was considerably diminished, the vice-president

dent in council was led to believe that the reports of projected invasion of the eastern provinces arose more from the presumption and ambition of interested individuals, than from any real manifestation on the part of the higher authorities of Ava, of intentions inimical to the existing tranquillity of the company's territories.

31. Impressed with these sentiments, the vice-president in council resolved to suspend the departure of the naval force which had been prepared for the protection of the coast of Chittagong, retaining, however, at disposal the means of having recourse to the projected system of defensive arrangements, if events should subsequently require the resumption of it; it was not however considered by the local government to be advisable to make any alteration in the military arrangements which had been resolved upon for the better security of the eastern provinces.

32. By a reference to the despatch from the magistrate of Chittagong, recorded as per margin, your honourable court will observe that the intelligence contained in it was such as to warrant the conclusion, that the information which had suggested extraordinary measures of defensive arrangement was devoid of any solid foundation, and that there was not the least reason to suspect the existence or the future contemplation of any hostile designs on the part of the Burmese government; under those circumstances the vice-president in council submitted to the Governor-General, whether it might not be expedient immediately to countermand some of those augmentations and dispositions of military force which were founded on a contrary supposition.

33. In suggesting this course of proceeding, the vice-president in council was guided not merely by a solicitude to avoid unnecessary expense, and to obviate inconvenience to the public service, but also by the alarm on the part of the Burmese government, which the measures of defence already in progress appeared, from the last despatch of the magistrate of Chittagong, to have excited respecting the designs of the British government.

34. The Governor-General having signified his entire acquiescence in the suggestion of the vice-president in council, that the extraordinary preparations of defence against the Burmese should be abandoned, the necessary orders were immediately issued for carrying it into execution.

*No. 4.—Translation of a Letter from the Governor of Ramree to the Magistrate of Chittagong, without date, delivered by his Son on the 24th April, 1817.*

After extolling the King of Ava the letter proceeds: " His Majesty has appointed me Governor of Ramree. In the disputes with Kingberring, I beat that chieftain; he fled, and the dominions of the King of Ava remained unbroken. On hearing this, the King conferred on me a dress of honor, many boats, and troops, and appointed me Governor of Cheduba, Chlynda, and Arracan, and ordered me to take the command of the four provinces whenever any war was being carried on. The king conferred on me the title of My-nemo-soora. Understand what kind of personage I am. You are the magistrate of Chittagong. The four provinces of Arracan, Chynda, Cheduba, and Ramree are under my orders. The Mugs belonging to your territory have injured and despoiled my country, and have returned and received protection in your territory. The King of Ava has ordered me, in his Majesty's name, to demand those Mugs. I therefore send my son, Mung-pyng-ge-keo-deng-akhoon, to you. The King's family has been on the throne for three generations. To the south of the King's territories are the countries of Byk, Tenassery, Dawye, Martaban, Pegue and Rangoon. In those countries, Englishmen and other Europeans are permitted to reside. The greatest friendship subsists between the British Government and my sovereign, and mercantile intercourse exists between the subjects of both countries. Since the conquest of the four provinces of Arracan, the King has been always cultivating a good understanding with the English nation, and the magistrate of Chittagong is the *Sirposh* of our friendship. It is proper that the greatest friendship should subsist between you and me. I have seen and heard that the Mugs, the slaves of my territory, having despoiled this country, have gone and remained in your country. It is not well to detain those ungrateful people with their ears bored. It is the custom to restore them with their women, children, and grand children. It is not advisable to retain them. To the east of the King's territories are five other great countries. It is not the custom among the Kings of those countries to detain each others' subjects. To the north of the Burmese territories are Munnypore, China and Wyzalee. The Kings of those countries are in amity with the King of Ava. If the ungrateful Mugs go into their territories, they are restored on being demanded. This is friendship. There are also ninety-nine other countries to the eastward, called Siam, &c.; these have been conquered by the arms of the King of Ava. The sovereigns of many countries have, through fear of the King, delivered up their territories to him, which His Majesty governs like gold and silver. The friendship which subsists between the King and the British Government is like gold and silver. It is like the affection of relations to each other. If a quarrel takes place between two people, a third comes and settles it. It is the custom to settle quarrels in this manner. It is not right to preserve enmity between you and me. It is better to be friends.—Let our friendship cause us as much satisfaction as a person feels

tagong.  
17.

in the shade, or by the light of the moon. It is not proper to be at enmity; but the English Government does not try to preserve friendship. You seek for a state of affairs like fire and gunpowder. The Mugs of Arracan are slaves of the King of Ava. The English Government has assisted the Mugs of our four provinces, and given them a residence. There will be a quarrel between us and you like fire. You act according to the order of your King, and I according to the order of mine. Consider what I have written. I was formerly a chief in the army. The King witnessing my bravery, made me governor of Ramree. There is no use in being of high rank. It is useful to have great abilities.—The King gave me many boats, troops, and the government of Ramree; not that I should sit looking at the ground of Ramree, but he ordered me to demand the Mugs from the magistrate of Chittagong. You are, on account of your qualifications, appointed magistrate of Chittagong, and not to sit looking at the country.—Formerly the governor of Arracan demanded the Mugs from the British Government, which promised to restore them, but at length did not do so. Again, the Mugs having escaped from your hands, came and despoiled the four provinces, and went and received protection in your country. If this time you do not restore them according to my demand, and make delays in doing so, the friendship now subsisting between us will be broken. If our countries are once well, they will continue so, but if they are once bad, it will not be surprising if they are ten times as bad. You are the chief of Chittagong, and I am governor of Ramree. I write to you in order to preserve the friendship of myself and the sirdars of Ramree, with you and the British Government. It is proper that we should conduct business as we formerly did. Therefore I write to you to restore the Mugs, then our friendship will continue. Understand this.

*No. 5.—Letter from the Governor General of India to the Viceroy of Pegu.  
Written May 1st, 1817.*

The friendship subsisting between His Burmese Majesty, your illustrious sovereign, and the British Government of India, and the amicable intercourse which I have always maintained with you personally, induce me to address you on the present occasion, and to request your good offices, in conveying to the King, your master, a faithful representation of what I am about to state.

About three weeks ago a letter was received by the magistrate of Chittagong, from the Rajah of Ramree, who is at present charged with the Government of the four provinces of Arracan, Cheduba, Chynda, and Ramree, purporting to be written under the immediate direction of the King, and requiring the surrender of the Mug emigrants settled in the district of Chittagong. The letter was brought to the magistrate by the son of the Rajah of Ramree, who has expressed his anxiety for merely an answer, declaring, at the same time, that he was not authorized to enter with the magistrate on any discussion of the subject.

The Magistrate having reported to me the arrival of this letter, and transmitted a copy of it, and the contents of it having been understood, the magistrate has been directed to state to the Rajah of Ramree, in reply, that with every desire to gratify the wishes of His Burmese Majesty, the British Government cannot, without a violation of the principles of justice, on which it invariably acts, deliver up a body of people who have sought its protection, some of whom have resided within its territory thirty years; but that no restraint is imposed on the voluntary return of those people to their native country, although no authority would be exercised for the purpose of effecting their removal from the British territories. The Rajah of Ramree will, of course, communicate the magistrate's answer to His Burmese Majesty, but my reliance on your friendship, and your desire to promote the harmony so happily existing between the two states, have suggested the advantage of addressing you on the present occasion.

Exclusive of the reasons already stated in this and our former letters for not expelling these unfortunate persons from the British territories, there appears to be less cause than ever for such a measure at the present moment, when, owing to the persevering exertions of the British Government, and its officers, the troubles which formerly existed on the frontier, have been allayed, and the death or captivity of Kingberring and his principal associates, and the return of the Mugs, in general, to industrious pursuits, have rendered their renewal a matter of great improbability.

His Majesty may rely on the continued vigilance of the British officers to prevent any disturbance being given by those persons to the tranquillity of his frontier, and on any persons who may engage in such criminal enterprises being punished with the utmost severity; but after the full explanations that have been made of the principles, views, and resolutions of the British Government, relative to the surrender of the emigrants, I feel satisfied, that the enlightened mind of His Burmese Majesty will perceive the inutility of agitating a question, the further discussion of which can lead to no result advantageous to either state.

I request you to receive the assurances of my profound respect for your illustrious sovereign, and of my high personal consideration for yourself, &c.



No. 6.—*Translation of a Letter from the Rajah of Ramree, to the Governor General.*  
*Received 8th June, 1818.*

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I, Nameo Sara, Governor of (Yamawoody) Ramree, placing my head under the royal feet, resembling the golden lily, and bowing to the commands of the most illustrious sovereign of the universe, king of great and exalted virtue, lord of white elephants, called Saddan, strict observer of the divine laws, who fulfils the ten precepts, and performs all the good works commanded by former virtuous kings, who assists and protects all living beings, whether near or remote, and possesses miraculous and invincible arms, &c. &c. address and inform the Governor General of Bengal, that our mighty monarch is distinguished throughout the vast world, for his unexampled piety and justice. He has a hundred sons, a thousand grand-sons, and one great grand son, whom he nourishes in his own arms, and who is inexpressibly esteemed and beloved, as a rarity of as great a magnitude as the white elephant is superior to ten other various species of rare elephants; the acquisition of this royal infant, is considered as an offering made to the king, by the angel of heaven himself. The power, good luck, and inestimable reputation of our great sovereign, is universally known, and he is duly recognised by all foreign kings. Those who come to him for the purpose of paying due homage and respect, are invariably taught the principles of religion, and the system of good government. Our master, in fact, protects all living beings.

From Keopugan Lengen Peyagee, and the nine cities of Shyan, situated to the eastward, king Woody, sent three of his esteemed daughters, as offerings to the golden soles of the royal feet of our gracious sovereign, and thereby established a happy friendship between the two kingdoms, which intercourse has been attended with incalculable advantages.

Megema-daysa, King of Assam, (Wezaley) presented His Majesty with his beloved daughter, and signified subjection to the authority of our sovereign.

The Maharajah of Naga-sheindatain, in Munneepoora, promised to resign his throne to his brother Soorbayrajah, after a lapse of three years. The Maharajah not fulfilling his engagement, and otherwise having illused his brother, he proceeded to the capital, and represented this breach of promise, and remonstrated against the injustice by placing his head under the golden soles of the royal feet of our sovereign, who issued orders to the superior authorities of the neighbouring city, situated to the westward of Naga-shein-datain, to send an army, under skilful generals, for the express purpose of placing Soorbayrajah on the throne, he having undergone the Royal Ceremonies, and being vested with the title of Maha-shein-rajah. In consideration of the great distinction and favor thus conferred on him, he likewise presented His Majesty with his esteemed daughter, and also signified himself a subject of the authority of our monarch.

Amatpooya Kounhay, minister of Cheeka-daya, King of (Megema-daysa.) Assam, having disturbed the peace of the country, and acted insubordinately, by not recognizing the authority of the King, his brother, or his son, the two latter proceeded to Ume apoor, and placed their heads under the royal feet, and represented the circumstance to our sovereign, who was graciously pleased to order that Bamo Meewoon, Mo-goun Meewoon, and Moing Meewoon, be dispatched with forces, elephants, and horses to secure the throne to the real sovereign. In pursuance of the royal commands, they proceeded to the spot, and, having ascertained the merits of the claim, settled the difference in a satisfactory and peaceable manner.

In Kameo, the laws of good government not being strictly observed, discontent and mutiny incessantly prevailed. This being also represented to our sovereign, an army was sent to storm the city, which was captured, but no property was suffered to be plundered. Upon investigation, Chandu-ganda-shein proved to be the real sovereign, and entitled by blood to the inheritance. He was accordingly placed on the throne, with all the dignities consistent with his high rank.

Those who do not minutely and scrupulously observe the laws of good government, and exercise oppression and injustice, incur the marked displeasure of our sovereign; who, in similar cases, invariably sends armies, under generals, to capture their provinces, but not to plunder them, and subsequently restore them to the monarch entitled to his inheritance.

Our sovereign is an admirer of justice, and a strict observer of the laws and usages, as they existed in ancient times, and strongly disapproves every thing unjust and unreasonable. Ramoo, Chitagong, Moorshebad, and Dacca, are countries which do not belong to the English, they are provinces, distant from the Arracanes capital, but were originally subject to the government of Arracan, and now belong to our sovereign. Neither the English Company nor their nation observe the ancient laws strictly, they ought not to have levied revenues, tributes, &c. from these provinces, nor have disposed of such funds at their discretion. The Governor-General, representing the English Company, should surrender these dominions, and pay the collections realized therefrom to our sovereign. If this is refused, I shall represent it to His Majesty. Generals with powerful forces will be dispatched, both by sea and land, and I shall myself come for the purpose



of storming, capturing, and destroying the whole of the English possessions, which I shall afterwards offer to my sovereign; but I send this letter, in the first place, to make the demand from the Governor-General.

*No. 7.—Letter from the Governor General of India to His Excellency the Viceroy of Pegu, &c. &c. &c.; dated 22d June, 1818.*

A letter having been addressed to me by the Rajah of Ramree, containing a demand for the cession of certain provinces belonging to the British Government, I deem it incumbent on me, in consideration of the friendship subsisting between His Burmese Majesty and the British Government, to transmit to you a copy of that extraordinary document.

If that letter be written by order of the King of Ava, I must lament that persons utterly incompetent to form a just notion of the state of the British power in India, have ventured to practise on the judgment of so dignified a sovereign. Any hopes those individuals may have held out to His Majesty, that the British Government would be embarrassed by contests in other quarters, are altogether vain, and this Government must be indifferent to attack, further than as it would regard with concern the waste of lives in an unmeaning quarrel.

My respect for His Majesty, however, induces me rather to adopt the belief, that the Rajah of Ramree has, for some unworthy purpose of his own, assumed the tone of insolence and menace exhibited in his letter, without authority from the King, and that a procedure so calculated to produce dissension between two friendly states, will experience His Majesty's just displeasure.

If I could suppose that letter to have been dictated by the King of Ava, the British Government would be justified in considering war as already declared, and in, consequently, destroying the trade of His Majesty's empire. Even in this supposition, however, the British Government would have no disposition to take up the matter captiously, but, trusting that the wisdom of the King of Ava would enable him to see the folly of the counsellors who would plunge him into a calamitous war, and that His Majesty would thence refrain from entailing ruin on the commerce of his dominions, the British Government would forbear (unless forced by actual hostilities,) from any procedure which can interrupt those existing relations so beneficial to both countries.

*No. 8.—Extract from a Despatch from the Governor-General in Council at Fort William, in Bengal, to the Court of Directors of the East India Company; dated the 12th of September, 1823.*

#### JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES.

90. The most important part of the correspondence under this head relates to the occupation of Assam by the Burmese, and the discussions which arose between the local authorities of the two states, in consequence of the partial violation of our boundary by the troops of the latter. To place the subject in a distinct point of view before your honourable court, it will be necessary to advert briefly to the state of parties and the course of events in Assam prior to 1822, as indicated by correspondence which has not yet been regularly brought to your notice.

91. On the 26th June 1819, Mr. Scott, commissioner in Cooch Behar, reported to the government, that the party in Assam acting under the influence of the principal hereditary officer of state, called the Booda or Bura Goheyn, and the nominal authority of Rajah Poorunder Singh, had been driven from Gohatee or Gowahatee, by the opposite faction headed by Chunder Kaunt, a competitor for the Raj, who was supported by the Burmese power, and an army composed of the subjects of the Man Raja, with other rude tribes bordering on Assam.

92. In September following, the Ex-rajah Poorunder Singh, addressed a letter to the Governor-General, stating that he had been driven from his territories by a hill tribe called Maun, and had taken refuge at Chilma-ree in the district of Rungpore; he solicited the protection and assistance of the honourable company, and offered to become tributary, and to pay the expence of the detachment that would be necessary to effect his restoration to the Musnud of his ancestors; this application was repeated in the following month.

93. About the same period the Bura Goheyn, or prime minister of the Assam Raj, came to Calcutta and presented several successive memorials, soliciting the interference of the British government for the restoration of himself and Poorunder Singh, the rightful Rajah (or Surgdeo) to authority, and stating that the King of Ava had been induced to support Chunder Kaunt, through false representations made to him of his title to the Musnud: we should remark that there is some confusion and obscurity in the petitions presented by the Bura Goheyn; he sometimes represented himself as the adherent and supporter of Poorunder Singh, and at other times seemed to state the supreme authority as vesting in his own person, owing to the default of legal heirs to the Raj.

94. In reply to these several applications, we informed, the Ex-rajah and the Bura Goheyn, that the British government does not interfere in the internal affairs of foreign states, nor pronounce on disputed titles to the musnud; but maintains with the reigning prince the relations of friendship and concord. Under these circumstances we declined taking cognizance of the disputes between themselves and Rajah Chunder Kaunt, who had obtained the Musnud of Assam; but assured them, that whilst they should conduct themselves in a quiet and peaceable manner, and conform to the orders of government, they would find an asylum within the honorable company's territories.

95. In the meantime repeated applications were made to us by Chunder Kaunt, the successful competitor, for the seizure of the Ex-rajah, and the Bura Goheyn and his followers, with their property and effects, which he claimed as the property of the state: we replied to the Rajah's letter by stating, that as it is contrary to the principles of the British government to interfere in the affairs of foreign states, we did not pretend to a right of pronouncing on the disputed title to the Musnud of Assam, but should be ever disposed to maintain the most friendly intercourse with the reigning prince of the country, and under this exposition of our sentiments should be happy to cultivate with him the relations of amity, and to pay every attention to his wishes, so long as a compliance with them was not at variance with our established usage and policy. We met his request for the surrender of the heads of the defeated party, by informing him that as it is not the practice of this government to deny an asylum to political refugees, so long as they conduct themselves in a quiet and peaceable manner, the Governor-General felt precluded from complying with his wishes for their apprehension and punishment.

96. The Governor-General was addressed likewise by one of the ministers of the King of Ava on the subject of the intervention of that state to support Chunder Kaunt, and to re-establish tranquillity in Assam; and requesting that certain refugees, who continued to disturb the frontier, might be apprehended and delivered over to the military officers of His Burmese Majesty, for the purpose of being conducted to Arracan. His Lordship's reply was couched in generally amicable and complimentary terms, and professed every disposition to promote the friend-ship and harmony so happily subsisting between the two governments. With respect to the persons expelled from Assam, who had sought refuge within the British territories, it was stated that a letter had been written on the subject to Rajah Chunder Kaunt, and the minister was referred to him for particulars.

97. In the despatch recorded on our consultations as per margin, Mr. Scott reported, that the Ex-swerg deo, or Rajah Poorunder Singh, was employed in collecting troops in the Bhootan territory, for the purpose of invading Assam; and that it was reported his force was to be headed by Mr. Bruce, a native of India, who had long resided at Ingipoga. He added, that Chunder Kaunt, the reigning Rajah, was supposed to be very desirous of getting rid of his allies, the Burmahs, and was understood to be treating with the Bura Goheyn and other refugees of consequence for their return, with a view to a combination of the whole means and strength of the country against the Burmese.

98. On the 30th of April, Mr. Scott made known to us that the Bar Barwah, or Assamese minister, who was an adherent of the interests of the Burmese party, had been murdered, as was supposed, with the connivance of Rajah Chunder Kaunt; that the latter had in consequence retired from Jorahawt to Gowahati; and that it was generally believed an army from Ava would soon invade the country to avenge the death of the Bar Barwah, and to depose the reigning prince. The above communication was followed almost immediately by information that the Burmahs had set up another Rajah in Assam, and that it was supposed Chunder Kaunt would shortly be compelled to fly the country.

99. Applications having been received by us from the Bura Gohayn and the Ex-rajah Poorunder Singh for the restoration of certain arms left by them in deposit at Chilmaree in 1819, and also for permission to purchase arms at the arsenal at Fort William, we declined compliance with the latter request; and to enable us to decide on the former, we called upon the joint magistrate at Rungpore for more particular information regarding the existing state of affairs in Assam. In replying to the above call, Mr. Scott took occasion to remark that with reference to the arrogant character of the Burman government, and the spirit of conquest by which it is actuated, it seemed to him probable that, in the event of its authority being established in Assam, it would become necessary to station a considerable force on that unhealthy frontier; and he submitted, therefore, whether the interests of the British Government would not be best consulted by permitting the Assam refugees to obtain the necessary means for the expulsion of the invaders. He added, that the cruelties practised by the Burmese, and the devastation of property that had taken place since they first entered Assam, had rendered all classes of people desirous of being relieved from them; and that all that seemed necessary to enable either Poorunder Singh or the Bura Gohayn to establish their authority, was a supply of fire-arms. Though there might be objections to furnishing them with muskets from the arsenal of Fort William, there could be none, he conceived, to permitting them to transport such arms as they might be able to obtain by private purchase into the Bootan territories, with the consent of the local authorities. We stated, in reply, that we were aware of no objection to the several parties struggling for ascendancy in Assam procuring muskets and stores by private means,

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means, in order to carry them across the frontier and arm their adherents. For other less important points comprised in the above correspondence, we must beg leave to refer your honourable court to the record of our proceedings as per margin.

100. Towards the end of May, the Ex-rajah Poorunder Singh, having entered Assam from the Bhootan territory, or the northern part of Bijnee, was attacked by a party detached by Chunder Kaunt, and his force entirely defeated and dispersed. His commander also, Mr. Bruce, was made prisoner, and sent to Gowahati.

101. On the 30th of September, the joint magistrate of Rungpore reported, that Chunder Kaunt had been expelled from Assam by the Burmese party, and had fled to the Chokey opposite to Gowalpareh. The above communication was succeeded by reports of various outrages committed on the British frontier villages by parties of the Mauu or Burmese troops, and by suggestions from the joint magistrate that a small force should be detached from Titalaya to protect our territory from further insult.

102. With reference to the measures which Mr. Scott stated himself to have adopted for obtaining reparation on account of the above aggressions, we, in reply, informed him, that we entirely approved his having called on the commander of the Burmese troops, and the Assam minister who accompanied them, to deliver up the perpetrators of the outrages alluded to, whose acts appeared to have been disavowed by their chiefs. In the event of the requisition not being complied with, the Governor General in Council authorized him to accept the offer which there was reason to believe the Burmese commander might make to punish the offenders himself. We expressed ourselves satisfied of the necessity for strengthening the military force in the north-east quarter of Rungpore, and apprised Mr. Scott that the officer commanding at Titalaya would be directed to detach a party of sufficient strength to repel by force any further violation of our boundary, but not to follow the aggressors into the Assamese territory. We instructed the joint magistrate likewise to warn the principal authorities in Assam of the necessity of restraining their followers from the commission of any similar outrages in future.

103. In the meantime a letter had been received by the joint magistrate from the commander of the Burmese troops, stating that his soldiers had by mistake plundered the villages of Habbraghat within the British boundary, thinking that they belonged to Assam; that he had no intention of molesting the inhabitants of Bengal, and that he would afford satisfaction for whatever had occurred, on the receipt of orders to that effect from the Swergdeo or Rajah at Gowahati.

104. In a letter, recorded on our consultations of the annexed date, the joint magistrate of Rungpore reported that he had signified his compliance with a request preferred by Rajah Chunder Kaunt, through Mr. Bruce, for permission to transport gunpowder and military stores into Assam, and suggested that orders should be issued to the proper authority at the presidency for the grant of passes.

105. We informed Mr. Scott, in reply, that we had directed the sanction of government to be conveyed to Mr. Bruce for the transport of three hundred muskets and ninety maunds of gunpowder, intended as a supply to Rajah Chunder Kaunt.

106. We pointed out to him, that the government licence only protected the arms as far as Rungpore, beyond which place they were not to be carried without his permission. This condition the Governor General in Council thought it necessary to introduce under existing circumstances; and Mr. Scott was directed to use his discretion in allowing supplies of arms to be furnished under passes from the officers of government to any of the parties who contested the sovereignty of Assam.

107. The necessary orders, we informed him, would be issued through the Territorial Department to give effect to any pass that he might himself hereafter grant; and in case of application being made at the presidency, the sanction of government would be given, as in the present instance, subject to the condition of his deeming the transport across the frontier unobjectionable at the time and in the manner proposed. It is perhaps unfortunate, we added, that arms should, under the existing regulations, require a government pass for their protection during transport through the country, as such a document is open to be misconstrued into a support or countenance of the particular party to whom the arms may be supplied; whereas while government itself is a neutral party, and no way involved in the contests and disturbances which make a supply of arms desirable to the inhabitants of a country, there is no reason, as far as it is concerned, for any difference between these and other articles of traffic, which any party having the means may purchase without obstruction.

108. At the end of 1821, the cause of Chunder Kaunt became again temporarily triumphant: he defeated the Burmese in several skirmishes, and advanced into the interior nearly as far as Gowahati. These successes, and the continued attempts of Poorunder Singh and the Bura Gobeyn from the side of Bootan and Bijnee, to recover their lost dominion, drew forth a letter from the Burmese general Mengee Maha Silwa (who had arrived some months before to take the command of the troops in Assam) to the address of the Governor General, which your honourable court will find recorded as No. 23 of our consultations referred to in the margin. The document may be consulted as a curious specimen of the Burmese style of official correspondence, and of the arrogance and lofty pretensions of the court of Ava. Its object was apparently to request that assistance might not be  
afforded



afforded to Rajah Chunder Kaunt (or Shundraganda) by any persons residing within the British dominions; and to suggest the expediency of his being surrendered, with all other refugees, who might seek refuge or had already taken shelter there. A letter was also addressed to Mr. Scott on the same occasion, to which he very properly returned for answer, that it is not the custom of the British Government to deliver up persons who may take refuge in its territories on account of political disturbances.

109. We do not think it necessary to enter here into any particular account of the Bura Goheyn's misconduct, who, whilst hanging on the frontier, had contrived to intercept and for a time to detain the above letters from the Burmese party. The relation of that circumstance, and of the orders which we issued in consequence to detain him for some time in confinement, will be found in the papers already cited.

110. A letter having been addressed to the Governor-General by the pretender to the sovereignty of Assam, last set up by the Burmese, named Phunzader, we referred him to the joint magistrate at Rungpore for a knowledge of our sentiments, and directed Mr. Scott to keep us apprised of the countenance which the new claimant of the Musnud might receive from the people of the country.

111. Mr. Scott informed us in reply, that Phunzadur had no better title to be considered ruler of Assam, than his adversary Chunder Kaunt, and that the interests of the latter for the moment predominated, as he was in possession of nearly all the country between Gowahati and the Company's frontier. Such being the case, Mr. Scott suggested the expediency of the refugees being prohibited from returning to Assam with any body of armed followers, whether natives of the country or others, except under the sanction of the latter. We concurred in the propriety of the measure, and desired him to instruct the officer on the frontier to carry it into effect accordingly, but not to molest individuals proceeding in the direction of Assam, whether armed or otherwise.

112. We instructed the joint magistrate likewise to call on rajah Chunder Kaunt to indemnify the inhabitants of the British pergunah Hubragat for the plunder of their villages and property between 1819 and 1821, by the Burmese troops attached to his party; and authorized him in the meantime, to disburse on that account from his own treasury a sum not exceeding sicca rupees 5,800.

113. In a despatch recorded on our consultations of the annexed date, the joint magistrate of Rungpore brought to our notice the distressed situation of many of the Assam emigrants, who to the number of several thousands took refuge in the British territory in 1819, and had been deterred from returning to their own country by which the continuance of disturbances there, and the dread excited by the excesses committed by the Burmese. He suggested that permission should be granted him to farm the small estate of Singeemaree, which lies rather remote from the frontier, and to settle the emigrants upon it, under the protection of government. We approved the scheme, and authorized him to obtain a lease of the estate, at a rent of about rupees 523 per annum.

114. The Burmese party in Assam received a considerable reinforcement in the month of April or May, commanded by an officer of high rank from the court of Ummerapoora, named Mengee Maha Bandoola. Chunder Kaunt soon gave way before the new force, and in June was reported to have sustained a decisive defeat, and to have disappeared altogether from the field. This event was followed by a representation of rather a threatening character on the part of the Burmese officers, to Lieutenant Davidson, the officer commanding the small post of Goalpareh, stating, that their army consisted of 18,000 fighting men, commanded by forty Rajahs; that they had every wish to remain in friendship with the Company, and to respect cautiously the British territories; but that should protection be given to Rajah Chunder Kaunt, they had received positive orders to follow him wherever he might go, and to take him by force out of the Company's dominions. A letter was, at the same time, written by Mengee Maha Silwa to the chief British local authorities, setting forth that Chunder Kaunt had rebelled against the sovereign of Ava; that it behoved them not to permit him to enter their territories, and that if he did so, it was the wish of the Burmese authorities to follow and apprehend him. The dispatches detailing the above particulars, and describing the insecure and disturbed state of the British frontier, in consequence of the anarchy and civil war which raged in Assam, and the augmentation of the Burmese force in that quarter, will be found on our proceedings of the annexed date.

115. On a consideration of the above circumstances, we signified to the joint magistrate, that should Chunder Kaunt or any of his party appear within our territories after their late defeat, they must be disarmed and sent to a distance from the frontier. We stated that we did not consider it probable that the Burmese would attempt to follow up the Ex-rajah into the British dominions; but that should the attempt be made, it must instantly be repelled by force. Instructions were accordingly issued to the officer commanding at Dacca to detach such reinforcement as Mr. Scott might require to the extent of his means. Rajah Pooneadur, or Phunzadar, being now the nominal ruler of Assam, we directed the joint magistrate to acquaint him with our demand upon his government, for restitution of the property plundered at Hubragat by his allies the Burmese, and to renew the hitherto unsuccessful application for the punishment of the individuals by whom certain murders and outrages had been committed at the time of the plunder of the villages.

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116. In July, Mr. Scott reported that a Vakeel, said to be a person of rank, had been deputed by the Burmese authority in Assam to the presidency, with a letter addressed to the Governour-General. He recommended strongly that he should be allowed to proceed on, to which we signified our assent. This person stated to Mr. Scott that nearly two months before, the Wuzeer Mungee Maha Bandoola was sent with an army of 20,000 men, for the purpose of supporting Mungee Maha Helorah (or Silwa), the commander previously employed in Assam, and who had been contending unsuccessfully against Chunder Kaunt for more than a year, and that his orders were to seize the refugees wherever they were to be found. The above accounts of the Burmese force we believe to have been greatly exaggerated.

117. The Burmese vakeel Yazoung Zabo Noratha reached the presidency at the end of the same month, and was received with civility and attention. He delivered letters from the two chiefs, requesting the surrender of Chunder Kaunt and other Assamese refugees, and complaining of the conduct of the British authorities on the frontier in sheltering them; but containing nothing offensive or objectionable, either in style or matter. They will be found recorded as per margin, with a note by the acting Persian secretary on the subject of the Vakeel's reception and behaviour.

*No. 9.—Letter from the Officer Commanding at Gowalpara to the Magistrate of Rungpore, June 20th, 1822.*

I beg leave to state for your information, that the Burmese Sirdars sent their Hurkarrahs to me yesterday evening, with a letter, which I have the honor to send with this letter, it is written in a language and character not understood here, and I suppose it is in Burmese.

With the Hurkarrah, came a Native of Assam, who understood a little of the Burmese language, for the purpose of interpreting the messages sent to me by their chief, the substance is as follows:

That there at present is friendship between the Company and the King of Burmah—that when the Burmese army last came to this country, they by mistake, plundered some of the Company's villages, that at present, they will be more careful, and have received orders to that effect. That they wish to remain in friendship with the Company, but that, if we give protection to the Rajah of Assam, Chunderkaunt, they have received positive orders to follow him, wherever he may go, and take him by force of arms (if the Company decline to give him up to them) out of the Company's territory, that their army consists of 18,000 fighting men, and is commanded by forty Rajahs.

They also informed me, that the letters sent from your Thannah of Gowalparrah were received, but that they could not read them, and had, in consequence, sent for a person who understood the Bengal language up to Gowahatty, and that upon his arrival at their post, they would send an answer. They particularly requested, that a respectable native should be sent, on our part, to explain the wishes of our Government, and prevent misunderstanding.

I have sent the Hurkarrahs back this morning, under a guard of one Naick and four Sepoys, with orders to see them safe to their first post, which is at Hider Chowky, and then to return without having intercourse with the Burmese.

*No. 10.—Letter from the Magistrate of Rungpore to the Secretary to Government, 2nd September, 1822.*

I have the honor to forward for the information of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, a copy of a letter received from Lieutenant Davidson, respecting a certain island near Gowalpara, upon which, as it was considered as appertaining to the British territory, a flag had been erected at the time of the arrival of the Burmese at the Chowky, in order to distinguish it from the Assam dominions, and of which the Burmese now threaten to take forcible possession, upon the ground of its belonging to them.

2. I understand, by a private letter from Gowalpara, that the Burmese have actually proceeded to throw down the bamboo which, under the above circumstances, had been erected, and to take possession of the island, but I have not learnt what steps Lieutenant Davidson may have taken in consequence.

3. The object of dispute in this case is a mere sand-bank, and of very little present value, but as I have reason to believe that it will, on enquiry, be found to appertain to the British Government, and it must at all events be considered, under the circumstances above stated, as a part of that territory, until a fair enquiry into the case may shew that it properly belongs to Assam, I conceive that it would be highly impolitic to submit to the summary mode of settlement which, if my private information be correct, would appear to have been adopted by the Burmese, and that it will be advisable on the arrival of the gun-boats at Gowalpara to re-establish the

land

land mark that has been thrown down, and to acquaint the Burmese, that any attempt to take possession of the island would be resisted, but that an enquiry can be made into the nature of their claims by persons mutually appointed for the purpose.

4. The occurrence of this dispute so immediately after the acquisition of the country by the Burmese, and the haughty demeanour which they have assumed, will serve to shew what is to be expected in future from such neighbours, and seems to point out the expediency of entering into some regular agreement for the settlement of all existing boundary disputes, as well as for the disposal of all churs or islands that may hereafter be thrown up in that part of the Burmahpooter where it forms the boundary between the two states; questions of this kind have frequently occurred in past times, but under the late peaceable government, they generally admitted of adjustment, when of minor importance, without even the necessity of referring the matter for the orders of the Governor General in Council.

*No. 11.—Letter from the Officer Commanding at Gowalpara to the Magistrate of Rungpore,  
25th August, 1822.*

I beg leave to state, that I have received a visit from a Burmese officer who came from Menghee Maha Bundulah, some time since to escort the Burroh Goseah up to Gowahatty.

The Burmese officer states that he was sent in consequence of a humble supplication on the part of the Burroh Goseah to be allowed to return to Assam, that if he does not think proper to go, that it is not a matter of importance to them.

From a long conference with them on the subject I am of opinion, that they only want the Assam chiefs to make prisoners of them, and that they have no serious intention to give the government of the Assam country to any Assam chief.

I have made enquiries about the reinforcement of 500 men I heard had lately arrived at the Assam Chowky, they admit the fact, and state that 500 more are expected, and from the conversation I have had with the chiefs to-day, it appears their intention to dispute the boundary in some places, particularly a small island beyond the two large islands, close to my post, rather above it, and directly between this and Ruttan Sing's Chowky, and which is stated by the Jemadar's servants as being in the Company's territory; they have, however, requested that I will send a man who knows the boundary, over to them to settle this business, but from the warmth with which the argument was carried on their part, I have some doubts whether they will allow the decision of the person who may be sent to be final; I will comply with their request, and report the issue of this business to you without delay.

I have stated to the Burmah chiefs that if, in consequence of their having a large force at the Chowky, any irregularities are committed in the Company's territory by their troops, it will lead to the most serious consequences, as no excuse can now be taken for any act of violence being committed either upon the Company's subjects or territory.

*No. 12.—Extract from a Despatch from the Governor-General in Council at Fort William, in  
Bengal, to the Court of Directors of the East India Company; dated 10th September, 1824.*

27. On our consultations of the annexed date, your honourable court will find recorded a despatch from the commissioner in Rungpore, reporting on the actual strength of the Burmese force in Assam, which was then reduced very low; and they were supposed to be placed in a situation of some difficulty from a rising of the Mohammeries and other native tribes, who, unable any longer to endure their tyranny, had united together, and successfully attacked their oppressors on several occasions.

28. The commissioner considered it proper, however, to state for our information, that such is the nature of the country, and the facility of bringing down the largest army by means of the river with the utmost celerity, that should the Burmese at any time determine upon invading the British territory by way of the Barhampooter, previous intelligence of their designs, supposing them to act with common prudence, could not be obtained in his quarter in sufficient time to be of any avail, for, on the supposition of an army being sent into Assam for the above purpose, they might reach Dacca in fifteen days from the time of their arrival on the banks of the upper part of the river, and in five from that of their appearance on our frontier at Gowalpara.

29. No previous extraordinary collection of boats, Mr. Scott stated, would be required, nor any extensive preparations near our frontier that might excite suspicion, as the Burmese soldiers carry nothing with them but their arms, subsisting upon what they can find in the country they pass through, and proceeding, after they reach the streams flowing into the Barhampooter, upon rafts made of bamboos, until they may be able to seize a sufficient



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sufficient number of boats for their accommodation; which is very easily effected in a country where, for four months in the year, the communication from house to house is by water, and where a canoe is as necessary a part of the husbandman's establishment as a plough or a pair of oxen.

30. Mr. Scott further took the opportunity of bringing to the notice of government, that no redress had yet been afforded for the plunder of the villages in the pergunnah of Hubraghat, reported in his former letters. We had again addressed Menjee Maha Thelooa on the subject, but had no expectation of his reimbursing the Ryots for the loss sustained, unless government should be prepared to compel him thereto, either by a show of taking possession of the chokey, or by laying an embargo on the trade; which latter measure might be adopted after giving due notice to our merchants, without any permanent loss to them, and might indeed be rendered highly advantageous to their future interests, by binding the Burmese authorities, amongst other conditions for the re-establishment of the trade, to reduce the duties on imports to the rates fixed by the treaty of 1793, or at least to what was usually paid under the late government, double and treble the amount having lately been levied, to the great detriment in particular of those concerned in the commerce in salt.

33. We stated, that we had not before been apprised of the serious depredations committed by the Burmese troops within the British frontier at Doopgoory, and elsewhere, when property was destroyed to the value of 21,998 rupees, and called for a more detailed and circumstantial report on the subject.

*No. 13.—Extract from a Despatch from the Governor-General in Council at Fort William, in Bengal, to the Court of Directors of the East India Company; dated 9th January, 1824.*

8. From the year 1817 downwards, constant applications had been received from the ancient and legitimate Rajah of the country, Govind Chunder Narayn, praying for the aid and intervention of the British Government to settle his affairs, and to protect him against the subjugation with which he was menaced from the side of Munnipore. In 1820, the above chief was entirely dispossessed by three brothers, adventurers from Munnipore, named Chorjeet, Marjeet, and Gumbheer Singh, who had themselves been expelled from their hereditary possessions by the Burmese, and had originally obtained a footing in Cachar, by engaging in the Rajah's service. Shortly after the expulsion of the legitimate ruler, a struggle for superiority ensued between the brothers, which involved the country in much suffering, disturbed the peace of our own frontier, and occasioned renewed appeals for the interference of the British power.

9. The receipt of an application from Chorjeet Singh, in May last, offering to cede the sovereignty of Cachar to the British Government, and stating his apprehension, that designs were entertained against the country by the Burmese, induced us to take the subject of his proposition into our serious consideration in the Judicial Department, and to review such of the recorded correspondence as was calculated to throw light on the past and present condition of that petty state. The resolution detailing our views will be found recorded in an extract from the Judicial Department, entered as No. 19 of our consultations in this department, dated 14th November last.

10. We observed, that it does not appear that Cachar has ever been subject or tributary to the government of Ava. It is true, that Marjeet, when in possession of the Raj of Munnipore, which he attained by the aid of the Burmese, and held as their feudatory, did invade, and for a time possess himself of Cachar, but he was speedily repulsed, and no trace appears in the correspondence of the Burmese having at that time, or before, or since, laid claim to that country, or to any right of interference in its affairs.

11. Our measures with regard to Cachar might, therefore, we felt satisfied, be taken without any fear of infringing the rights or claims of the Burmese, and the only question for consideration, as far as they are concerned, was one of policy; viz. whether by extending our authority or influence over Cachar, a country bordering, and having relations with their dependency, Munnipore, we should run the risk of embroiling ourselves with them. If the measure, we stated, be expedient on other grounds, we ought not to deprive ourselves of its advantages from an apprehension of giving umbrage where it cannot, with any colour of justice, be taken, and where, therefore, no opposition is likely to be offered, however unacceptable the extension of our influence, in that direction, might prove.

12. There appeared to us several inducements for the British Government to establish its direct authority, or at least a preponderating influence in the territory of Cachar. These considerations were not deemed of sufficient strength, on former occasions, to lead government to avail itself of the opportunities that presented themselves of effecting this object, nor did they indeed possess the weight that subsequent occurrences, and further experience have given them. It is understood, that one of the easiest passes from Ava, into the Company's possessions, is through Munnipore and Cachar, and that the occupation of the latter is essential to the defence of that pass, which it also effectually secures. The recent progress of the Burmese arms, and their permanent occupation of Assam, the force stationed in which country it would also contribute to keep in check,

gives the possession of Cachar, we observed, an importance, under present circumstances, which did not before belong to it. A perusal of the correspondence shows, moreover, that Cachar has long been a prey to internal dissensions; that its weakness has more than once been the means of disturbing or menacing the tranquillity of our neighbouring district of Sylhet, and that the contentions of the parties struggling for superiority, and their appeals to our assistance and support, have been a frequent source of trouble and embarrassment, both to the local authorities and to government. There seemed no other probable mode of appeasing these dissensions than the employment of our influence for the purpose, and that can only be rendered effectual, we observed, by taking the country openly and decidedly under our protection. Cachar is described to be for the most part, an open country of no great extent, (forty or fifty miles square,) and partly hilly, and similar in climate to the neighbouring parts of Sylhet. The occupation of it would, probably, be attended with little additional charge, even if it were formally annexed to our dominions, and with still less if it were to continue to be governed by its own chiefs, under our general protection.

13. Our information of the actual condition of the government was not, we added, very accurate in detail. The open country was then understood to be still held by the three Munnipooreean brothers, Marjeet, Chourjeet, and Gumber Singh, but we were not aware, what extent of country or degree of power was possessed by each. Tolaram, a Cachar chief, was understood to possess the hilly portion of the country. The power of the hereditary chief, Govind Chunder, seemed to be extinct.

14. The offer of the country to the British government was made, we observed, by Chourjeet, but his right to transfer it was questionable. It appeared to us probable, however, that all the chiefs would be brought without difficulty to place themselves under the protection of the British government, and that such a settlement of the country and the government might be effected, as would rescue the people from the state of anarchy and discord to which they have so long been exposed. Until more distinct information should have been obtained, however, we found it impossible to form any decided opinion, as to the measures which ought to be pursued for that purpose.

15. It may be gathered, we remarked, from Chourjeet's letter, that the Burmese authorities in Munnipoore were turning their attention to Cachar. Whatever measures, therefore, were adopted, should be taken early, so as to anticipate their design.

16. The Governor General in Council accordingly resolved, on the 19th June last, that the magistrate of Sylhet should be instructed to avail himself of Chourjeet's letter to open a communication with him, and eventually with the other chiefs of Cachar, in order to ascertain their sentiments, and to enable him to furnish a full report of their relative power and influence, and the actual state of the country and its inhabitants.

17. On the receipt from the magistrate of the information required, it was proposed to determine, how far it would be expedient to extend to Cachar the protection of the British government, either on the usual conditions of political dependence, or by an arrangement for the transfer and annexation of the country, to the dominion of the Company, suitable provision being made for the chiefs and their families.

*No. 14.—Letter from the Sub-Assistant Commissary General to the Magistrate of Chittagong; dated the 1st May, 1821.*

I consider it my duty to report to you, that the Burmahs have made a most unprovoked and unwarrantable attack upon the people employed at the Keddah in the Ramoo Hills, having made prisoners and forcibly carried away the Darogah, the Jemidar and twenty-three of their men, under the pretext, that they had trespassed upon the Burmah boundary.

This circumstance occurred last month, but I forbore to bring it to your notice, until I had previously ascertained whether the allegation of the Burmahs, with regard to our people having entered their territory, was correct or not.

From the best information I have been able to collect, I find that the allegation of the Burmahs is not correct, as from the situation of the spot where our people were seized, there can be no doubt of its being within the Honorable Company's boundary, it being to the north of the Mooressee Nullah, where we repeatedly caught elephants heretofore, without the least molestation from the Burmahs, who now, for the first time, have set up a claim to the jungles. Our people could easily have resisted this unprovoked attack from the number of fire arms they had, but having been strictly enjoined to engage in no quarrel with the Burmahs, they submitted without resistance. That this wanton attack upon our people by the Burmah Tannadar on the Naaf, has been made solely with the view of extorting money from us, is self-evident from his offer of releasing his prisoners, provided three thousand rupees and three of the seven elephants captured were given to him; but to such a proposal I could not listen. I have therefore to beg, that you will be pleased to adopt such measures as you may think best to obtain the release of the men thus improperly seized, while upon public duty, and who, I am told, have been very cruelly treated since they were taken.

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No. 15.—*Letter from the Sub-Assistant Commissary at Chittagong to the Commissary General; dated the 22d April, 1822.*

I am sorry to have to report to you, that the Burmahs have again this season attacked our Keddah people at Ramoo, six of whom they have seized and carried off as prisoners to Arracan. The enclosed is the copy of a letter I have addressed to the magistrate upon the subject, but as his endeavours, last year, to obtain the release of the men then taken away were of so little avail, we cannot expect that he will be more successful on the present occasion, and the interference of government becomes therefore necessary to procure the liberty of these men.

On account of what Rammohun and his men suffered during their captivity last year, it was with much difficulty that our hunters could be prevailed upon to enter the jungles in that direction this season, from the dread of the Burmahs: the seizure of Acbur Alee and the other five men may, therefore, be considered as at once putting an end to our Keddah business at Ramoo, unless some arrangements be made to prevent similar aggression in future.

It is for the wisdom of government to determine what these arrangements shall be, but as a humble observer of passing events, I cannot but remark, that the Burmah government of Arracan has manifested an uniform spirit of encroachment upon our territory in this district, since 1794, advancing progressively from the banks of the Mooressee river, which they themselves then declared to be the boundary of Arracan, until they now claim the jungles of Gurgeneea, where our Keddah was formed this season, at a distance of nearly forty miles from the Mooressee river—the intermediate tract of jungle is of little moment to either state, further than that, as being our best hunting ground for elephants, and where our villagers cut their annual supply of rattans, renders it of some value to us, while to the Burmahs it is of no apparent benefit whatever: their laying claim to it therefore appears to proceed from a mere spirit of arrogance—unless, indeed, that they look forward to the event of future hostilities with our government, when the possession of these jungles would enable them to come, unperceived, into the rear of such troops as might be stationed at Ramoo.

Our hunters had a herd of elephants surrounded near Gurgeneeah, of which they had secured five, with another herd close in view, when the Burmahs came upon them, and put them all to the route.

No. 16.—*Deposition of a Mug, named Doongree, before the Thannadar of Tek Naf, on the 21st February, 1823.*

In the month of Maugh last, I and Kunchuk, the deceased, and Merkerce, Fatoe, and Nyea, were going to Cox's Bazar, on a boat with seven hundred arces of rice, when we reached the mouth of the Koor Nullah, twelve Burmese in a boat came up with us in the Nullah, and called out to us to pay them permit, (custom dues,) we replied, we are the Company's Ryots, why should we pay you permit, we are taking rice for sale to Cox's Bazar: on this a Burmese, whose name I know not, and whom I did not recognise, fired a ball from a gun at Kunchuk, who was the Manjee of our boat, which entered his back, under the left shoulder, and came out near his right breast. My brother fell lifeless in the boat: we went to the Thannah and related the particulars: the Darogha and others came to the place, and made an enquiry into the affair. On seeing my brother fall in the boat, the Burmese made off. This is my statement.

Q. Did ever any one demand (Muhsool,) of you before?

A. No.

Q. How far was your boat from the shore?

A. Very near to the shore.

Q. How far was it from the Thannah?

A. About do ghuree.

Q. Besides the person who fired, had any one else a gun in his hand?

A. No one else had a gun in his hand, but there were six guns laying in the boat.

Q. Did they say any thing besides demanding Muhsool?

A. Nothing else.

Q. How long have you been in the habit of going along the Naf river?

A. For ten years I have gone in boats, and never had a demand made upon us for Muhsool.

Q. When the ball was fired, what distance were the boats from each other?

A. The Burmese laid hold of the rudder of my boat.

Q. Did the person who fired, do it of himself or by the orders of another?

A. All said fire, and one rose and fired.

Q. Did you recognise the man who fired?

A. No;



A. No; but he is a Burmese.

Q. How far is Shapuree from the place where the act was committed?

A. About half an hour.

Q. Which way did the Burmese go, after firing?

A. They made off quickly to the southward.

Q. Did you ascertain whether they were Uchurung's men, or not?

A. I think them certainly to be Uchurung's men.

Q. Did you ever go to Shapuree?

A. I have gone.

Q. When you first saw the Burmese boat, how far were you distant?

A. At the distance of an *avou*: on seeing us, they pulled as quick as possible towards us.

Q. Were any other boats near you?

A. Some five or six boats had gone before.

Q. Was there ever any quarrel between you, or your brother and the Burmese?

A. Never.

Q. Did the Burmese ever demand Muhsool before from you or your brother?

A. This time only they demanded it—had we been in the habit of paying it, we should have done so now.

Q. How far is the mouth of the Koor Nullah from Shapuree?

A. About two doon.

Q. From whence did you bring the rice which was on board your boat?

A. We are Ryots of Myoon Choudry—it is the produce of our own lands.

Q. Did you ever go to Tup Mungdoo?

A. Never.

Q. Have you ever had any trade or business with them?

A. Never.

Q. Have you or Kunchuk, deceased, and the Burmese ever had any dispute?

A. Never.

Q. Have the Burmese ever come to the village where you live?

A. Never.

Q. What sort of a boat was the Burmese?

A. I think it was made of the Telsur or Gurjun wood, and about twenty *hâths* in length, and three and a half *hâths* broad, having twelve paddles.

Q. When you first saw the Burmese, from what quarter were they coming?

A. From the south.

Q. On seeing you did they immediately come after you, or as usual go along quietly?

A. They came as quick as they could after us, and demanded permit, and not in the manner other boats do.

Q. How broad is the Koor Nullah at the place where the Burmese came up with you?

A. About twenty *hâths* broad, and to the north is the island of Shapuree, distant about one and a half doons of land.

Q. How far distant from the Naf river?

A. Two or three *ghuree*.

Q. Are there any villages or houses on the banks of the Koor Nullah?

A. None on the banks of the Koor Nullah, but on the Rungdoo Nullah and Nona Churree Nullah, there are houses.

Q. How far distant from your boat at the time of the Burmese firing the gun?

A. Two or two and a half doons distant from the village of Rungdoo, and from Nona Churree four or five doons.

Q. How long did you see the Burmese boat after it left you?

A. For about a *ghuree*'s distance.

Q. How far was that from Tup Mungdoo?

A. About half way.

Q. Did you see them go to Tup Mungdoo?

A. No—towards it.

Q. How far was the boat from the Burmese shore when you last saw it?

A. Four or five doons.

Q. How long a time elapsed after the murder, before you gave information at the Thannah?

A. About four *ghurees*.

Q. Within that time, did you meet with any one else?

A. No

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- A. No one—there was no other boat at that place.  
 Q. Did you go alone, or others go with you to the Thannah?  
 A. I went alone, leaving the others in charge of the body and the boat.  
 Q. In what part of the boat was the Burmese standing who fired the gun?  
 A. In the after part of the boat, near the Manjee.  
 Q. How far distant from Kunchuk?  
 A. About fifteen or twenty hâth.  
 Q. How old was Kunchuk?  
 A. Forty years old.  
 Q. Has he left any children?  
 A. Two daughters and one son.  
 Q. How old are they?  
 A. The boy is ten years of age, and the eldest daughter five years, and the other an infant at the breast.

No. 17.—*Letter delivered by Dayen-ya-geo, Vakeel from the Rajah of Arracan, on the 8th August, 1823.*

Maha Mengee Keojoa, Governor General of Arracan, and the Western Frontier of the Burmese Empire, &c. &c. &c., to the Governor General of Calcutta, in Bengal.

Our sovereign is extremely fortunate, he reigns over the great kingdom, by inheritance from his grandfather, since his ascension to paradise. He is replete with religious principles, a strict observer of the ten commandments, and of the twenty-eight acts of virtue; to him has descended the throne of his grandfather, which he now feels.

There is a certain island known by the name of Shein-mabu, where a stockade has been erected, and a guard of native seapoys stationed: in order to their being removed, I forwarded a letter on the subject to the Governor of Chittagong by the hands of General Moundoh, who brought an answer written on a sheet of paper in the English, Arracanese, Persian, and Hindoo characters, declaring the said island of Shein-mabu to belong to the English. I ask, therefore, if this communication is to be considered as an authorized one on the part of the Governor General, if it be so, I assert, that the island of Shein-mabu does not appertain to the Bengal government: from the time Arracan was subject to the original Arracanese ruler, and since it came to the golden possession, the island was always annexed to the Denhawoody (Arracanese,) territories, and still belongs to our sovereign. The guard now stationed at that place, may be the occasion of disputes among the lower order of the people, and of obstruction to the poor merchants and traders now carrying on commerce in the two great countries, and eventually cause a rupture of the friendship and harmony subsisting between the two mighty states. To prevent such occurrences, it is requested, that the guard now stationed at Shein-mabu, may be removed.

No. 18.—*Letter from the Governor General to the Raja of Arracan, &c. &c. &c. written 15th August, 1823.*

I have received your letter brought by Dayen Yageo, regarding the island of Shapuree, which you term Shein-mabu.

The communication addressed to you by the magistrate of Chittagong, on the subject of that island, was entirely in conformity with the views and sentiments of the supreme government.

The island of Shapuree has always appertained to the British territory of Chittagong, and is the undoubted right of the Honorable Company. It lies on the British side of the main channel of the Naf river, which is the admitted boundary between the two states in that quarter, and is, in fact, obviously a continuation of the *Tek*, or point of the main land of the district of Chittagong, from which it is separated only by a narrow and shallow channel. The occupation of Shapuree by the British government for a length of years, is also proved by the records of the Chittagong collectorship, which shew that it has invariably been comprehended in the revenue settlements.

Under these circumstances, with every disposition to receive your communication in the most friendly spirit, and after giving to the claim which you have advanced on this occasion, all proper consideration, I must declare my conviction, that the Burmese government has not a shadow of right to possession of the island of Shapuree.

With respect to what you have written of your apprehensions, lest the guard now stationed at Shapuree, may be the occasion of disputes among the lower order of people, and of obstruction to the poor merchants and traders, rest assured, that they are wholly without foundation. The proximity of British troops is a cause  
of

of protection, and not of injury to all who are peaceably and well disposed, and in the present instance, I feel persuaded, that the maintenance of the post will inspire confidence and encourage the resort of traders.

As to the possibility of a rupture eventually occurring between the two great states, from the British government maintaining a small party of troops on an island undoubtedly its own, you must have written this passage incautiously and without one reflection.

It does not appear from the contents of your letter, that your present communication has been made with the knowledge or authority of your royal master, the King of Ava. The respect which I entertain for His Majesty's wisdom and discernment impresses me with a full conviction that, on learning particulars, he will not fail to recognize the justice of the title by which the British government holds, and will continue to hold, the island of Shapuree.

I regret that the first communication which has passed between us, since my arrival in India, should bear any appearance of a difference of sentiment between the principal authorities of two friendly states; but I trust, that the arguments and explanation contained in this letter, will have the effect of terminating the pending discussion. Should they fail to produce conviction on your mind, it will afford me much satisfaction to depute an officer of rank, from Chittagong, in the ensuing cold season, to adjust finally all questions relating to boundary disputes on the S. E. frontier of that district, in concert with a properly qualified and duly empowered agent from Arracan.

I request you to accept the assurance of my high consideration and friendly regard, &c.

*No. 19.—Extract from a Despatch from the Magistrate of Chittagong,  
dated the 28th September, 1823.*

The enclosed report from the Darogha of Tek Naf, will inform you of the Burmese having attacked and taken possession of the island of Shapuree—three sepoys have been killed, and three wounded, the rest have escaped to the Thana of Tek Naf. The action took place on the night of the 24th September. The Burmese were in force, about one thousand. I shall address you to-morrow, and give immediate notice to Lieutenant Colonel Shapland, c. b.

TRANSLATION OF A REPORT FROM THE DAROGHA AT TEK NAF, DATED 24TH SEPTEMBER.

This morning Ram Jeuren, Jemadar of the guard stationed at Shapuree, came to me and the Subedar of the guard at Tek Naf, and stated that at midnight, whilst the sipahes were under arms at their post, the Burmahs, in number about one thousand, surrounded the Shapuree stockade on all sides, and began to fire on the party. The guard finding themselves attacked, returned the fire, and several rounds were discharged on both sides, for the space of nearly an hour, when three of the men, named Koorbanee, Sauchee, and Gholam Khan, having been killed, and the Burmahs having, by the fire of their great guns (probably swivels) set in flames a part of the stockade, the Jemadar was obliged to abandon the spot, and retreat to the banks of the river Khor. At this time Akber, the interpreter of the guard, according to the orders of the Jemadar, called out "Dooahee Company Beladoor," but the Burmahs paid no attention to the remonstrance. The ghat (landing place) of the river was taken possession of by crowds of Burmese boats. The Jemadar finding his ammunition nearly expended, got with his party into two boats, which the boat-men of the place had contrived to get ready for them and retreated, the Burmese all the time firing at them, and they returning the fire. During the passage, four of the party were wounded, as per margin. On arriving near Tek Naf, they were joined by a party sent by the Soobedar to re-inforce them, but finding that they could not pass back to the island in consequence of the Shapuree ghat being in the possession of the Burmese, they returned to Tek Naf. The Jemadar further states, that many of the Burmahs were killed in the action. - Also a Manjhee and a boat-man are missing, and one fisherman was killed and another wounded by the fire of the Burmahs.

Jye Singh.  
Bukshoo.  
Lal Mahomed.  
Akber.

*No. 20.—Letter from the Governor General to the Viceroy of Pegu, dated 17th October, 1823.*

I have the honor to forward to your Excellency's care a declaration, prepared on my part, to the address of the Burmese government, which, as it relates to matters of the highest importance, I request the favor of your transmitting to the court of Amerapora, by the surest and most expeditious channel.

Adverting to the friendly connection which has so long subsisted between the two states, and the desire uniformly evinced by the minister holding the office of Viceroy of Pegue, to improve and cement the relations of amity, and to augment the commercial intercourse between the British and Burmese dominions, I feel persuaded, that your Excellency will learn, with regret, the rashness and folly of which the local officers of the



Chittagong.  
1823.

Burmese government in Arracan, have recently been guilty on the Chittagong frontier, and to which the paper now forwarded relates.

The most probable view of the case appears to be either, that the Rajahs of Arracan, Ramree, &c. have acted entirely on their own responsibility; or that, if their proceedings have been in any degree authorized, the judgment of His Majesty the King of Ava must have been practised upon, and misled by gross misrepresentations, and designed perversion of the truth, on the part of the local officers of the distant province of Arracan, who, for some unworthy purpose of their own, and utterly regardless of consequences, have dared to represent the island of Shapuree as belonging to Arracan, and perhaps even to exaggerate a simple police arrangement of the British government into an invasion of the Burmese territories. The object therefore of the accompanying declaration is, to place the real facts of the case fully and distinctly before His Majesty, and to state the demand and expectation of the British government, that the court of Ava will take such notice of the insolent and unwarrantable proceedings of its officers, as the circumstances of the case imperatively demand.

Cordially solicitous to maintain the relations of peace and amity with the state of Ava unimpaired, it will afford me the most lively satisfaction to find, that the sentiments entertained by His Burmese Majesty on this affair are such, as not only to render unnecessary any interruption of the intercourse and connection which have proved so beneficial to both countries, but even to rivet the bonds of friendship more firmly than before, by occasioning the removal and punishment of the authors of this and former acts of outrage and aggression on the Chittagong frontier.

*No. 21.—Declaration on the part of the Right Honourable the Governor General, &c. &c.  
to the Burmese Government, 17th October, 1823.*

The recent disturbance on the southern frontier of Chittagong has induced the Right Honourable the Governor General to direct, that the following declaration respecting the facts of the case, and the sentiments and resolutions to which they have given rise, should be prepared on his part for transmission to the Burmese government.

Early in the present year, the perpetration of a most unprovoked and atrocious murder on the person of a British subject, named Kunchuk, by a party of armed Burmese, belonging to the post of the Achurang of Mungdoo, in the vicinity of Shapuree, suggested to the magistrate of Chittagong, the expediency of stationing a small guard on the island, to quiet the apprehensions, and to protect the lives and properties of the inhabitants of that quarter of the district. Upon the adoption of this necessary and perfectly legitimate measure of police, the local Burmese authorities, regardless of the friendship and good understanding subsisting from of old between the two states, presumed to warn off the British troops in the language of menace, and formally to claim the island of Shapuree, as belonging to Arracan, under the designation of Shein-mabu. The demand, notwithstanding its utter want of foundation, was met by a polite and temperate statement of the incontrovertible grounds, on which the title of the British government to that portion of the Chittagong territory rests; and the argument was repeated, with the adduction of fresh proofs in a letter from the Governor General, to the Governor of Arracan, written only last month, in reply to a requisition on his part for the retirement of the British guard and surrender of the island. For the particulars of the proofs and reasoning, which demonstrate the title of the British government to the island of Shapuree; it can only be necessary to refer to the above document itself, (a copy of which is subjoined.) From this paper also, it will be observed, that the Governor General offered, should his arguments fail to produce conviction on the Rajah's mind, to depute an officer, to discuss and adjust all questions on the south-east boundary of Chittagong, with an agent deputed from Arracan during the present season.

The Governor General has now learnt with equal astonishment and indignation, that before this letter could have reached the Rajah of Arracan, the British party at Shapuree was suddenly, and under cover of the night, attacked by a large force of Burmese, (acting apparently under the orders of the Rajah of Ramree,) who killed and wounded five of the British sepals, and usurped forcible possession of the island.

Ever ready to receive with temper, and to investigate in the spirit of fairness and equity, any claims which foreign states may have to prefer against it, the British government in India entertains too just a sense of its power, dignity, and essential interests, to yield even the most trifling point to menace, still less can it permit success to attend any attempts to enforce an unjust demand on its territories, by acts of positive violence and aggression. The Governor General has accordingly dispatched a reinforcement to the southern quarter of Chittagong, to recover immediate possession of Shapuree, to expel, by force of arms, any Burmese troops who may be found on the island, and to remain in that quarter, for the purpose of preventing fresh aggression, so long as the authorities in Arracan shall continue to maintain their present tone of menace and hostility.

Although

Although the Burmese officers have presumed to use the name of their sovereign as a sanction to their conduct, in attacking the British post at Shapuree, the Governor General is reluctant to believe that His Majesty can have authorized the commission of so serious an outrage against a friendly power, at least with a full knowledge of facts and circumstances. He rather adopts the conclusion, either that the Rajah of Ramre, whose rashness and insolence have before given just offence to this government, has, in the prosecution of some unworthy and chimerical purpose of his own, ventured to act in the affair without any authority; or that if his proceedings have been in any degree authorized, the judgment of His Majesty the King of Ava must have been practiced upon and misled by some gross misrepresentation and perversion of the truth. The Governor General expects and demands therefore now, that as the real facts of the case have been fully explained, His Majesty the King of Ava will hasten to evince his just indignation at so flagrant an attempt to produce dissension between two friendly states, by inflicting an adequate and exemplary punishment on the authors of the disturbance; by removing them for ever from their situations, and by issuing such orders to the local officers of Arracan, for their future guidance, as will effectually prevent the recurrence of disputes and differences on the frontier.

Actuated by the most cordial solicitude to preserve unimpaired the existing relations of peace and amity between the two states, the Governor General has, on this occasion, confined his measures to the indispensable object of recovering possession of the island of Shapuree, and to the above exhibition of the unwarrantable and offensive proceedings of the Burmese local officers in Arracan, in the expectation, as already stated, that the court of Ava will perceive the necessity of adopting without delay, such measures as may atone for the past, and prevent the long established harmony and good understanding between the two governments from being exposed to similar hazard of interruption hereafter. The Governor General deems it, however, incumbent on him, in the actual posture of affairs, to call the attention of the Burmese government, in the most pointed and solemn manner, to the consequences which must necessarily ensue, if the insulting tone and unguarded procedures adopted by the local Burmese officers, at every point, where they have come in contact with the British power, but more especially of late in Arracan, are longer persisted in. The forbearance and moderation of the British government, and its unfeigned disposition to cultivate the relations of peace and concord with the state of Ava, have been constantly manifested during a long course of years, and never more unequivocally so, than under the present provocation. But the Burmese government will be sensible, that patience and forbearance, under a succession of petty insults and encroachments, must have their limits; and it cannot be ignorant either of the means which the British government in India possesses for avenging wrong and outrage, or of the fact, that its strength and resources have never yet been exerted in vain for the vindication of its rights and honor.

The sincere respect which the Governor General entertains for the personal character of His Majesty the King of Ava, and his confidence in the wisdom which pervades the royal councils, persuade him that a consideration of the above grounds of remonstrance will induce His Majesty to afford the reparation due to the British government, and to prescribe such a course to his ministers as may effectually preclude the repetition of insult and aggression on the Chittagong frontier hereafter. Under any result, His Lordship will enjoy the consolation of reflecting, that by the temper and moderation evinced on the present occasion, he has afforded fresh and striking proof of the desire on his part to preserve unaltered the mutually beneficial connection so long established between the Burman empire and the territories of the Honorable Company in India.

*No. 22.—Letter from the Rajah of Arracan, received the 29th October, 1823.*

Men Maha Mengee Krojou, Governor of Denhawoody (Arracan), minister and commander in chief, ruling over Yeoka-poora, and one hundred and ninety-eight conquered provinces, to the westward of the great Golden Empire, to the Governor of Bengal.

A stockade having been erected on the island of Shin-ma-bu, (Shapuree) belonging to Denhawoody, adverting to the friendship and commercial intercourse subsisting between the two great states, I sent Daren-ya-gro and Hossain Ally, linguist, with a letter to the Company's Governor, who pretends that Shein-ma-bu belongs to the English, on the proof of certain papers. The island was never under the authority of the Moors or the English; the stockade thereon has, consequently, been destroyed in pursuance of the commands of the great Lord of the Seas and Earth: If you want tranquillity, be quiet, but if you re-build a stockade at Shein-ma-bu, I will cause to be taken, by the force of arms, the cities of Dacca and Moorshedabad, which originally belonged to the great Arracan Rajah, whose chokies and pagodas were there.

We purchased one hundred muskets; these have been seized by the Company's subjects. The rebels, young Anja, Gūa-jan-sheag, Bay-gounja, and young Gnar-toon-bowa, you are requested to have them restored.

*No. 23.—Extract from a Despatch from the Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 9th January, 1824.*

27. The receipt of this letter from the Rajah, and the opinion generally prevailing among those best conversant with the character of the Burmese government, that some attempt would be made on different parts of our frontier, rendered it necessary that, as a measure of precaution, the small force on our north-east frontier should be re-inforced without delay. The requisite arrangements were accordingly made in the Military Department for five complete companies of the Chumparun Light Infantry, with the guns of the corps, to move to Rungpore, and five companies of the 1st Battalion, 10th N. I., to advance upon Sylhet, also five companies of the 2d Battalion, 23d N. I., to proceed by water from Dinapore to Dacca, to replace the five companies of the 10th. Lieut.-Colonel Penham, the officer commanding on the north-east frontier, was directed to repair, at his earliest convenience, to Jumnalpoore, for the purpose of communicating more effectually with Mr. Scott, the civil commissioner in Rungpore, regarding the defence of that quarter, should the Burmese attempt to carry their threat into execution. The necessary instructions were, at the same time, issued to Mr. Scott, and to the magistrate of Sylhet.

28. The troops thus collected at Chittagong, and those directed to re-inforce the districts of Rungpore and Sylhet, we consider to be adequate for the purpose of defence and protection against any army which the Burmese could immediately assemble on our frontier. In the uncertainty, however, of the turn which affairs might take, when the court of Ava should learn our determination to expel the Burmese from Shapuree, it appeared to us to be necessary, that some further arrangement should be made for eventually strengthening our force generally on the eastern frontier. We accordingly requested his excellency the Commander in Chief to take the subject into his consideration, furnishing him with copies of all the documents which would serve to assist his judgment in determining to what extent further re-inforcement might be required.

29. In making this communication to his excellency, we observed, that with advertence to the peculiar inconvenience of a contest with the state of Ava, to the injury thence resulting to our commercial interests, and to the utterly worthless and insignificant nature of the actual point of contention, we were of course desirous to avoid any extreme measures as long as possible, and would accordingly exercise every degree of forbearance and moderation compatible with the honor and character of the British government. We remarked further, that if the local authorities in Arracan, notwithstanding their present insolent tone, should abstain from further acts of hostility, after our re-occupation of Shapuree, we were willing that the relations between the two states should revert to the former footing. On the other hand, if the menacing and hostile proceedings of the local Burmese authorities should be persisted in, and further aggressions take place on our frontier, no course would be left to us but to adopt the most prompt and decided measures for striking such a blow as would impress the court of Ava with juster notions of the power and resources of the British empire in the East, than it at present entertains.

30. In the event of hostilities becoming inevitable, we conceived that it would be a primary object of attention to expel the Burmese from the countries of which they have at no distant period possessed themselves on our frontier, such as Assam, Munneepore, and even Arracan, by encouraging and supporting the original inhabitants of those countries in any attempt which they might be disposed to make for the restoration of the line of their native princes, thus securing for ourselves a barrier of friendly states between the British and Burmese dominions along the whole of our eastern frontier.

31. The most effectual measure, however, to humble the overweening pride and arrogance of the Burmese monarch; to bring the contest to a speedy termination; and to secure ourselves from petty encroachments and aggressions in future, would unquestionably be the conquest and occupation of the principal islands and sea ports in the Ava dominions, such as Ramre, Cheduba, Rangoon and other places, for which purpose it would become necessary to fit out a combined naval and military expedition at the presidency. We do not indeed contemplate this measure as one of immediate or probable occurrence, but in our communication to the Commander in Chief, we adverted to it generally, in order, that it might come within the scope of his excellency's consideration in deliberating on the nature and extent of the military arrangements which it would become expedient to adopt, if we should be forced, by the hostile acts of the Burmese government, into an open rupture with that state. We trust, that it is unnecessary here to repeat to your honorable committee, the assurance of our determination strictly to conform to the views and principles laid down for our guidance in the 8th, and following paragraphs of your letter of the 10th March last. We should, indeed, deplore in the highest degree, the necessity of engaging in hostilities with the Burmese government, and attacking and conquering any of the possessions of that state; and in the event of our being compelled, by further aggressions, on the part of the Burmese troops, to proceed to the extreme measures alluded to in our communication to his excellency the Commander in Chief, we shall hope to avoid making any permanent acquisition of territory,



and propose to occupy Ramree, Cheduba and Rangoon, temporarily only, as a means of effecting compliance with our demands for reparation, and for the relinquishment of all claims, by the Burmese, of sovereignty over the petty states on our frontier, which it may be deemed expedient to declare independent of their controul.

32. Anxious, however, as we are to avoid a rupture with the state of Ava, as long as forbearance shall be compatible with our interests and reputation, we are impressed with a strong persuasion, founded on the experience of the past, that no permanent security from the aggressions of the Burmese, whether on the Chittagong frontier, or to the northward, can be safely calculated on, until that people shall have been made to feel the consequences of their provoking the British Government to depart from the pacific line of policy it has hitherto pursued, the motives for which, there is too much reason to believe, have always been misconstrued by the arrogant and barbarous Court of Amrapoora.

33. Acting on the principles above adverted to, we have uniformly declined to listen to any overtures from the Assamese, for assistance in their struggle with the Burmese, for the independence of their country, and we will persevere in the same course, unless some fresh act of aggression, on the part of the Burman government itself, shall compel us to resort to arms. Your honorable Committee will have remarked, that we have treated the attack on Shapuree, as the unauthorized act of its subordinate officers, who would have it believed, that in taking possession of that island, they have not violated the British territories, but only resumed what we had usurped. This plea can no longer avail them, as we have distinctly declared, and offered proof of our declaration, that the island is a portion of the British dominions, and have apprised the Court of Ava of our determination to re-occupy and maintain it as such. Any subsequent attack on that island, therefore, or any attempt on the part of the Burmese to execute their threats of invasion elsewhere, must necessarily be considered hereafter, as undertaken by the orders of the King of Ava, and must be treated, accordingly, as a declaration of war.

*No. 24.—Extract from a Letter from the Adjutant General; dated the 24th November, 1823.*

The Commander in Chief can hardly persuade himself that, if we place our frontier in even a tolerable state of defence, any very serious attempt will be made by the Burmese to pass it; but should he be mistaken in this opinion, he is inclined to hope that our military operations on the eastern frontier will be confined to their expulsion from our territories, and to the re-establishment of those states along the line of our frontier which have been over-run and conquered by the Burmese. Any military attempt beyond this, upon the internal dominions of the King of Ava, he is inclined to deprecate, as, instead of armies, fortresses and cities, he is led to believe that we should find nothing but jungle, pestilence, and famine.

It appears to the Commander in Chief, that the only effectual mode of punishing the insolence of this power is by maritime means; and the question then arises, how troops are to be created for the purpose of attacking the vulnerable parts of his coast.

*No. 25.—Extract from a Letter from the Deputy Adjutant General; dated 16th Feby. 1824.*

His Excellency cannot but entertain the most painful solicitude for what may yet be expected, and concurring in opinion with Government, from a careful perusal of the documents received with your despatch, under acknowledgement, that the insolence and encroaching disposition of the Burmese have now assumed such a decided character, as to call for the adoption of the most powerful measures on our part to punish and humble that spirit. His Excellency contemplates the necessity which Government will be under, at no remote period, of employing a considerable part of its forces against that state, when the casualties likely to occur from prosecuting warfare in such a country will doubtless be severely felt.

*No. 26.—Extract from a Letter from the Magistrate of Chittagong; dated the 5th December, 1823.*

I have the honor to submit, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, a letter this day received from Lieutenant Colonel Shapland, c. B.

I had forwarded to him several proclamations to be sent to the Uchurung of Chota Anuk, and to be promulgated through the district, in conformity to the tenor of your general instructions, representing the desire of this Government to remain on amicable terms, and our intention of keeping possession of the island of Shapuree, and confining the operations solely to this measure, and that the usual intercourse between the two states would, as heretofore, subsist.

Cachar.

*Extract, &c.* I have the honor to acquaint you, that the detachment which came from Calcutta anchored off Tek Naf in the forenoon of the 20th instant—Early in the morning of yesterday, two companies of the 20th regiment, were disembarked on the island of Shapuree, from two vessels which dropped down to it during the night. A spot has been selected for the erection of a stockade, and the Mugs with the detachment, are employed in clearing the ground, and preparing materials for the construction of one.

Since our arrival in the Naf river, no Burmese have, I believe, visited Shapuree, nor does any thing on the island indicate that they entertained any notion of defending it—I enclose the copy of a letter which was yesterday brought to me by a Vaqueel from Mungdoo: to the complaint mentioned in it I verbally replied, that I could not think the outrage was committed by any subjects of the British Government, which was always ready to repress and punish such conduct.—And on his expressing himself desirous of knowing, on the part of the Rajah of Arracan, from whom he said he came, the cause of our appearing here in such force, I gave him some copies of the Proclamation, and desired him to distribute them on the other side of the Naf, and I told him we came here to occupy and keep possession of the island of Shapuree. I am not aware that the Burmese are making any preparations with a view to dispute our occupation of this island, nor do I think they will dare to shew themselves offensively against us whilst we remain here with our present force. What their conduct may be hereafter it is difficult to conjecture; should nothing in the interim occur, it is my intention to leave a detachment here, with an armed vessel and two gun boats, and as soon as the stockades here and at Tek Naf are completed, to proceed to the northward, and make arrangements for the security of the other parts of the district.

*No. 27.—Extract from a Private Letter from Mr. Scott to Mr. Swinton; dated Gowalpara, 11th November, 1823.*

“By the last accounts from Assam, it appears that the expedition alluded to by Mr. Bruce, is intended for Cachar, and will march immediately. The force is said to be only nine hundred Burmese, and some Hindostany sepahes, but where they can have got the latter I do not know, and suppose it must be a mistake. I think it is probable, that they will desist from the attempt, on being informed of our alliance with the Rajah, unless the disputes in other quarters should, in the mean time, terminate in war.”

*No. 19.\* (A)—Copy of a Letter from W. J. Turquand, Esq., Officiating Magistrate at Sylhet, to G. Swinton, Esq., Secretary to the Bengal Government; dated 8th January, 1824.*

Yesterday, from a letter received from the Vakeel of Jyntea, on the part of Government, I learnt that the body of Burmese alluded to in my former letters, with a Vakeel on the part of Govind Chunder, were advancing towards Cachar, and would, most probably, pass through Jyntea; that the Rajah of that country had sent for him, and desired him to find out whether our troops might assist him in repelling the invaders in case of necessity. The Vakeel stated the body of men were reckoned at fourteen thousand men, but this I conclude must be a very great exaggeration; however, I thought it best to write him to make further enquiries, and to inform the Rajah, that when he wrote himself on the subject, I would give him an immediate reply. To day I heard, through Gumbheer Singh, that an army of Burmese on the Munnipore side, stated to be in his letter about seven thousand or eight thousand men, with a person called Takang Mopala (who he is I know not), together with Kistnanund, another Vakeel of Rajah Govind Chunder, and Pakeedul, name of a Sirdar at their head, had arrived from Burmah into Munnipore, but he was not certain whether they intended to remain there or come to attack Cachar. Two hours since I received an express from Captain Johnstone, commanding a detachment consisting of three companies of the left wing of the 23d Native Infantry, a copy of which I annex, as also a copy of a letter from Captain Bowe, received at the same time, and adverting to the decided intention of Government to protect Cachar from the ingress of the Burmese. I have addressed a letter to Captain Johnstone, copy of which also I annex, and trust my measures may be approved of. Mr. Scott has written that he will leave Mymensingh on the 12th instant for Sylhet, but under the present pressing circumstances, I have not thought fit to wait for his instructions on this head, as I could not expect a reply earlier than his arrival.

*No. 19.\* (B.)—From Captain Johnstone, to W. J. Turquand, Esq., Acting Judge and Magistrate, Sylhet; dated 8th January, 1824.*

I have just this moment received an express from Captain Bowe, communicating intelligence of a large body of Burmahs approaching towards the British frontier; on my arrival at Budderpoor, should I obtain  
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the sanction of Rajah Ghumbeer Sing of Cachar, to enter his dominions, may I have your permission to advance and give them battle?

Cachar.

No. 19.\* (C).—*From Captain Bowe, to W. J. Turquand, Esq., Acting Judge and Magistrate, Sylhet.*

I have the honor to acquaint you, that a messenger, with letters from the Rajah Gumbheer Sing, has brought me intelligence of the near approach of a body of Burmese, estimated at about four thousand, and that a considerable force was in the way to support them. The Rajah's letters, written last night, state that they are three or four day's march from me, and as Captain Johnstone's detachment left Sylhet on Monday, I trust his arrival may be expected, and that our detachments will have joined previous to any affair with the enemy. I lost no time in writing to acquaint Captain Johnstone with the circumstances that have been reported, and to suggest the necessity of his taking measures for the probable junction of the Dumdunah detachment, in case of urgency, as also to expedite his arrival.

No. 19\* (D).—*To Captain Johnstone, Commanding a Detachment of the Left Wing 23d Native Infantry. On the River.*

I have just this moment received your letter of this day's date, and in reply, beg to apprise you that the determination of Government is decided, that any endeavours of the Burmese to possess themselves of Cachar should not be permitted. I request, therefore, you will immediately require them to withdraw, and forward the enclosed letter\* from me to the Commander of the Burmese troops, in which I have stated, that Cachar is considered under the protection of the British Government, and will, therefore be defended from all foreign interference. After this being done, should he not think fit to comply with the requisition therein contained, and still persist in withdrawing a foreign force into Cachar, you will, of course, on the requisition of Gumbheer Sing, in conjunction with Captain Bowe's detachment, and that at Dumdunah, use your best endeavours to restrain the invasion, by taking such measures as you may deem most advisable. I have sent a copy of your letter to me and your express to his address, to Major Newton, and requested his return forthwith, he being at present at Pundwuta, examining that pass.

No. 20.\*—*Copy of a Report from Major Thomas Newton, to W. J. Turquand, Esq., Acting Magistrate, Sylhet; dated Camp Budderpore, January 18, 1824.*

In consequence of intelligence which I received on the evening of the 16th instant, that a body of about four thousand Burmese and Assamese had crossed into the plains at the foot of the Beriteaker pass, and were stockading themselves at the village of Bekrampore; also, that a force to the eastward had defeated Rajah Gumbheer Sing's troops, and that a third division were crossing the Mootagool pass into Jyntea, to the north-west—I resolved, under circumstances so threatening to my force, to concentrate my detachment at Jattrapore, and move from thence with the whole due northward, and attack the enemy before they could have time to strengthen their position. I accordingly ordered Captain Johnstone to join me from Tilayen, leaving his camp standing, and at two A. M. of the 17th, we moved off. At six A. M. just beyond an almost impervious grass and reed jungle, which we, with considerable difficulty, marched through, we came into a comparatively plain country, where the situation of the enemy was discovered, by the discharge of two shots at the advanced guard. Their position extended along the villages at the foot of the hills: they were covered by the huts, bushes, &c. in a close and difficult country, and on their right they had a stockade on the banks of a steep nullah, occupied by about two hundred men: the attack was made in two divisions; the southern face of the stockade being assaulted by Captain Johnstone, with part of the 23d Regiment and Rungpore Light Infantry, and the enemy's line, in the villages, being attacked by Captain Bowe, with part of the 10th Regiment: the whole under my command. This last was immediately successful; the greater part of the enemy, supposed to be Assamese, flying to the hills at the first fire. Captain Bowe then wheeled his force to the attack of the stockade, which was making a brave resistance against Captain Johnstone, and in a short time it was carried by assault, by the united exertions of both parties.

No. 21.\* (A)—*Extract*

\* The Letter not transmitted.



Cachar. No. 21.\* (A).—*Extract from a letter from D. Scott, Esq., Agent to the Governor General on the North-East Frontier, to G. Swinton, Esq., Secretary to the Bengal Government; dated Camp Budderpore, 31st January 1824.*

I have now the honor to submit a report of occurrences on this frontier since the date of my last dispatch from the station of Sylhet, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council.

Subsequently to the action which took place on the 17th instant, Major Newton returned with the force under his command to this place, withdrawing the whole of the troops from Cachar. The Burmese then advanced to Juttrapore, about five miles east of the frontier and eight from hence, and the two armies from Assam and Munnipore formed a junction near that place, and threw a bridge over the Soormah river, on both sides of which they erected stockades.

This day the Vakeel, formerly deputed by the Magistrate of Sylhet to meet the army from Assam, and several messengers who had been dispatched with letters, and detained in the Burmese camp, returned with a letter to my address, written in Bengal character, but in a dialect which no person in camp understands, so that I have not yet been able to ascertain the contents.

From the information brought by the Vakeel and Messenger, it appears that the Burmese force at Juttrapore is about six thousand strong, of whom four thousand are Assamese and Cacharees; they have also a force of about two thousand men in Kila Kandy, of whom one-half are supposed to be Burmahs, so that the number of the latter, who arrived by the way of Munnipore, must have been more considerable than might have been supposed from the effect of the opposition made to them by Gumbheer Sing, who himself computed them at one thousand or one thousand and five hundred men carrying muskets.

In a letter from the Burmese Commander, to the address of Govind Chunder and the British authorities jointly, received some days ago, as well as from the information now brought by the Vakeel, who was confined in the Assamese camp for eighteen days, it appears that the Burmese have entered Cachar upon an invitation formerly given by Govind Chunder; they profess to have no desire of retaining the country themselves, but said they mean to return to Assam via Jynteah, after re-visiting Govind Chunder, and securing the persons of their enemies Gumbheer Sing, Margeet, and Chourjeet, whom they declare they have orders to follow and seize wherever they may have retired. In the Commander's letter he also complains of the attack made upon him at Bikrampore.

In reply to this letter, and in a communication previously made, I have acquainted the Commander in Chief, that I had already, in three different letters, informed him by the way of Assam, that the country of Cachar was under the protection of the British Government, and that the occupation of it would therefore be resisted, and that, while I regretted the occurrence at Bikrampore, he could not but be sensible that it was entirely attributable to his own conduct in persevering in this unwarrantable encroachment after repeated intimations that it would not be permitted.

I further called upon him, now that he was convinced that we were in earnest, to evacuate the country without delay, and prevent worse consequences; and I acquainted him that in case of refusal, I should be compelled, however unwillingly, to order the advance of our troops, not only into Cachar itself, but also into Assam, whence the chief part of the invading army had proceeded. In respect to Govind Chunder, I stated that we had no objection to his re-establishment, under the protection and as the act of the British Government, and that, although we could not with honor deliver up the Muneepoorian Chiefs, much less suffer them to be arrested in our territory, we would willingly concur so far in his master's views, as to engage that they should not again be permitted to disturb the peace of Cachar.

The reply to this communication will be submitted to his Lordship in Council when received; but with reference to the considerable time that has elapsed since my arrival here, and which has hitherto been spent in vain attempts to establish a correspondence with the Burmese, interrupted, until yesterday, by their invariably detaining my messengers, I have considered it proper to make his Lordship in Council acquainted with our past proceedings, and to state, that although I am satisfied that the Burmese Commander has no intention of committing hostilities in our territories at present, yet I have little expectation of his being induced to retire from Cachar without recourse being had to coercive measures, the necessity for which appears now more urgent than ever, with reference to the tenor of Mr. Robertson's dispatches, copies of which were conveyed to me in your letter of the 24th instant, and the consequent probability that the Court of Ava will avail itself of the presence of the army now in Cachar, to annoy us in this quarter, which, from the want of cavalry on our part, and the number of their forces, there is no doubt they could do to a very great extent, by merely plundering the country in small parties, without ever risking an engagement.

I have

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 17th and 24th instant, with their inclosure, to which I shall hereafter reply. In the mean time I beg to state, that I shall consider myself authorized to prevent the entrance of a Burmese force into the territories of the Jynteah Rajah, by which route they threaten to return to Assam.

Having just received a translation of a document in the Burmese character, that accompanied the Bengalee letter alluded to in the fifth paragraph of this address, I find that it differs very considerably from the latter, of which it was supposed to be a counterpart. I have the honor to enclose a translation, and to save time, I have sent the rough copy, which I request may be returned. I also enclose the original Burmese letter, the Persian version being obviously defective in several places, and in particular where it is stated that Gopee (Govind) Chund went to Ava, and is now with the Governor of Assam, that person being still in our territories, and whatever he may formerly have done, at present disclaiming the connexion. I am informed, that after the action on the 17th, messengers were dispatched for instructions to Ava, so that unless previous orders to that effect may, in the interim, be received, I do not anticipate any hostile movement on the part of the Burmese until the receipt of an answer.

*No. 21.\* (B.)—Translation of a Letter written by the Governor of Assam, one of the Nobles of the King of Ava, an Emperor of the Burmah Country.*

Mahanund Kegoodeen, Governor of Assam, intimates to the Magistrate of Sylhet the following circumstances: Gopee Govind Chund, the Rajah of Cachar, being driven from his country by the chiefs of Munnipore, threw himself at the foot of the throne of the Burmese emperor, and preferred an earnest request for assistance, pleading, that Chourjeet and Marjeet, chiefs of Munnipore, had attacked and conquered his country; that on the occurrence of the misfortune, he had retired into the Company's Province of Sylhet, and that from that place he had proceeded to Arrakan. The Governor of that district having inquired into the complaint of the said Gopee Chund, he related the particulars of his hard case, and stated, that for redress he sought the protection of his Burmese Majesty. The Governor of Arrakan having detained the said Gopee Chund there, sent a petition reporting the application made by him. In reply, an imperial mandate was issued regarding the presence of Gopee Chund at Court, and in obedience thereto the Governor of Arrakan sent him to the presence. On the arrival of the Gopee Chund at the foot of the throne of the King of Kings, he represented the hardships he had endured, and his Majesty, pitying his misfortunes, comforted him, and said, "We will re-establish you in your kingdom of Cachar." At length the Emperor ordered the advance of two armies, one from Munnipore and one from Assam; and accordingly Munghee Maha Keyoong Jowa, General of the forces, with eighteen thousand men, has arrived from the former country; and I, the writer, Maha Nund Kegoodeen, with fifteen thousand from Assam. The distressed Rajah Gopee Chund is also with us.

On the 13th of the month of Pendula, or in the month of Poss 1230, Bengal style, the Magistrate of Sylhet sent a letter to meet us, and the army of the King of Ava and that of the Company, meeting on the banks of the Jatinga since, an alarm ensued. The letter from Sylhet having arrived, was read, and the contents thereof are: That besides friendship, there was no enmity between the Rajah Gopee Chund and the King of Ava, and that on hearing that I was coming to re-establish the said Rajah, great pleasure was experienced by the functionaries of the Company; also that the Rajah Gopee Chund, in retaining the protection of his Imperial Majesty, was highly fortunate.

An imperial mandate directed to me has been received, couched in the following terms:—Whereas Chourjeet and Marjeet, by deceit and insolence, have obtained possession of the country of Cachar, the patrimony of Rajah Gopee Chund, you are hereby commanded to conquer the said Raj, and to restore it to the rightful owner.

In obedience to this order I, Maha Nund Kegoodeen, have arrived with an army, and intending to fight with and to conquer Chourjeet and Marjeet, I have met the English Company's troops, and fought with them. It will not be unknown to you, that before this, King Bering, a son of one of the nobles of Arrakan, having disobeyed the orders of the Emperor, was expelled from that country, and took refuge in the English Company's territories. On that occasion the chiefs of his Imperial Majesty and the functionaries of the Company had disputes, and quarrels ensued. Now, also an account of the Munnipore Rajah's receiving protection from the English Company, the like occurrence has taken place, and a battle has ensued. Besides that, Boosyn and Eyassyn, and the Boora Gohayn and Chunder Kant, former Rajahs of Assam, one after another, having misbehaved and rebelled in the dominions of the King of Ava, took refuge in the territories of the Company on that account; also disputes occurred between the functionaries of the Company and those of the King of Ava, and rebels have thus been suffered to occasion discord between the two states, until at length a battle has actually taken place. In reality, the above-mentioned chiefs justly apprehended our vengeance, being fit objects for punishment, but they have escaped, and without reason a battle has taken place between

Cachar.

the forces of the Company and those of the King of Ava. Now the armies of his Majesty have arrived from Munnipore, and also from Assam, and I, Maha Kund Kegooden, will re-establish Rajah Chund in his lawful station. I have come with the most positive orders to effect this, and besides, by chance, there was a battle on the way. Never will I depart from the orders of his Majesty, but I will certainly restore Gopee Chund to his former dignity.

It will not be unknown to you, that between the functionaries of the Company and those of his Majesty there was peace; and that notwithstanding frequent disputes, never had an open breach of friendship taken place, but the merchants of the two countries continued all along to carry on trade, as usual, between the ports of the two states. Now that state of things is at end, I shall not fail to do my best, and with the English Company War will ensue. The former Kings of Ava were always at peace with the Company, but that is now over, and the bands of friendship are severed asunder. Formerly you wrote a letter from which it appeared there was friendship between Rajah Gopee Chund and the English Company; it is therefore likely that their functionaries will not be disinclined to promote his benefit; and it is therefore proper, that having confined the Munniporean chiefs, you deliver them up to me. If you will not do this, I have the King's order to seize them in whatever country they may be found. According to that order I will act. The above is the truth: I have written it.

No. 21.\* (C).—*Translation of a Letter from the Burmese Chief Commanding in Assam.*

Mengee Mahu Handa Krodra, Commander in Chief at Assam, acquaints the Sahab of Sylhet, that Govind Chunder, the Rajah of Cozalee, on being deprived of his throne and conquered by Jorajeet, Marajeet, and the younger Kumbera Sing, natives of Cassay, in order to save his own life, made his escape to Sylhet; and to gain the protection of our most fortunate Sovereign, he immediately forwarded a statement of his grievances to his Burman Majesty, through the English territories, and by the route of Arracan, and afterwards secreted himself upon the hills of Kumaree. He owned submission to his Majesty, and entreated him to take his country, and replace him on the musnud. In consequence of this representation, his Majesty commanded that Jorajeet, Marajeet, the younger Kumber Sing, and all the Cassayers may be taken prisoners, and Govind Chunder, the rightful owner of Cozalee, restored to his throne. A very large military force, with the several elephants and horses, was accordingly ordered to proceed via Munneepoora, under the command of Mengee Maha Krodra; and a similar force was ordered to march from Assam. In 1185, on the 13th of the moon, in the month of Tenzo, (January) Jahat sent a letter, written in Bengalee, in charge of Medana Sing and Govind, who fell in with our army at Jatting. From that letter it was understood that Govind Chunder was an ally of the English, as well as of the Burmans, and that the officers of the Company would feel most happy if Govind Chunder were raised to the musnud. It is also stated, that the Rajah was under considerable obligations to his Burman Majesty, for the innumerable favors conferred on him by that monarch.

In order to apprehend Jorajeet, Marajeet, the younger Kumbera Sing, and the Cassayers, who are vassals of our Sovereign, and to place Govind Chunder, the lawful Rajah of Cozalee, on the musnud without loss of time, in compliance with the repeated solicitations made on behalf of the Rajah by his minister, mudoory Sajakoop, in obedience to the Royal mandate to the army, proceeded by land, and on the 17th of the moon of Foze, 1185, (January) arrived at Beckrampore, where it had not to contend against the Cassayers, but against numberless seapoys, who opposed them with arms, as on the occasion of Kingberring's escape from Arracan, when he took refuge in the English territories after exciting a rebellion. We had not him to fight with, but English seapoys. This happened also, when Poorunder Sing, Boora Gossain, and Chunder Kant Sing, violating their oaths of allegiance, caused an insurrection at Assam, and fled to the English dominions. On this instance, the English seapoys occasioned much destruction in the country; and we had not the Rajah of Cozalee to fight, but English seapoys.

In order to acquaint the Rajah of Cozalee, that his Burman Majesty had ordered troops to proceed by two different routes for the express purpose of placing him on the musnud, the Rajah's slave, Dummazee, was sent to him in 1185, in the month of Fozelan (August) He has not yet returned; but the two men who were with Dummazee, Viza Sela Yan, and Charvelea, have come back, and reported that the Rajah of Cozalee is not now on the Kumaree hills, but is said to be in the village of Dewayalee, belonging to the English. The Arracanese and Wegaleese, meeting with protection in the English territories, frequently attacked us with numberless English seapoys; but no notice of it was taken, in consideration of the commercial intercourse which subsisted between the two states; as from the time of our former kings, no disturbance or difference ever occurred. Our troops were withdrawn to prevent any injury to the English countries; and all mischievous men who fell in our hands, were destroyed, with the view of preventing similar occurrences. Chahap's letter states, that the English are really allied to the Rajah of Cozalee. We have come to make prisoners of Cassayers for the sake of Govind Chunder. The Cassay rebels who have escaped, must, without loss of time,



time, without reference to any country where they may be, and without any exception, be taken, in obedience to the Royal mandate. Should Jorajeet, Marajeet, Kambeera Sing, and the Cassayers enter the English territories, apprehend and deliver them, to save any breach of friendship; so doing, no rupture will take place, and the commercial intercourse now in existence, will continue. If the Cassayers enter the English territories, and their surrender is refused, and if they receive protection, know that the orders of the most fortunate Sovereign are, that without reference to any country, they must be pursued and apprehended.

*No. 22.\* (A).—Extract from a Letter from D. Scott, Esq., Agent of the Governor General on the North East Frontier, to G. Swinton, Esq., Secretary to the Bengal Government; dated Munnipore, 3d February, 1824.*

In continuation of the subject of my letter to your address of the 31st ultimo, I beg to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, that my interpreter returned this day from the Burmese camp at Jattrapore, and states that the Commander of the forces there, in reply to his demand, for an answer to the various letters addressed to him, declared that he would give none, until he received instructions from Ava, to which place he had despatched messengers.

The interpreter says, that the Commander behaved to him in a very outrageous manner, sometimes threatening in a violent passion to cut off his head, and sometimes declaring that he would satisfy his resentment by marching to England. He further states, that they said, that the Governor of Assam was not with the army; but on consideration of the tenor of the Burmese letter, of which a translation was submitted with my postscript of yesterday's date, I think it is not improbable that they have been induced to make this declaration, with reference to the contents of my letters of date the 23d ultimo and 1st instant, of which translations are annexed, in hopes of preventing the advance of our troops into Assam.

The Jynteah Rajah has, with the usual procrastinating policy of the native princes, declined entering into a treaty of alliance, until, as he says, the necessity may prove more urgent. I have pointed out the folly of this line of conduct, in the strongest terms; and, with a view to prevent his being intimidated into submission by the approach of the Burmese army, I have, in the mean time, promised him the assistance of our troops, provided he himself makes all the opposition he can; and declared, that if he admit the Burmese into his territories without doing so, we shall treat him as an enemy.

He has collected a considerable force, said to amount to several thousand archers; and has undoubtedly the means of defending his own territory, at least until assistance could be afforded him; should he, from his conduct, appear to deserve it, I would propose presenting him with a part of the muskets that are expected from Calcutta.

I have the honour of forwarding a translation of a letter respecting the Jynteah country, which I am just about to despatch to the Burmese Commander.

In respect to the exercise of the power with which his Lordship has been pleased to vest me, of eventually directing the advance of the troops into Assam, I shall observe the utmost caution. Of the inconvenience that might result from such a movement, I am fully aware; and it is only in case it should appear to be indispensable towards compelling the evacuation of Cachar before the commencement of the unhealthy season, that I should venture to have recourse to it. In that case, also, I shall at the same time address you by express; and there will still be time to countermand the order, via Rungpore, should it then appear inexpedient to Government.

*No. 22.\* (B).—Translation of a Letter addressed by the Agent to the Governor General to the Commander of the Burmese forces in Cachar; dated the 23d January, 1824.*

After the usual compliments.—Previously to this, from Gowalpara, I wrote three letters to the Governor of Assam, acquainting him that the country of Cachar was under the protection of the British Government, and that we could not permit the forces of the King of Ava to occupy it without resistance. Notwithstanding this, forgetting the obligations imposed by the subsisting friendship between your Sovereign and the Honorable Company, you have come into Cachar with an army from Assam, and another from Munnipore, and are devastating the country. Before I wrote you, and I now repeat, that the country of Cachar is under our protection, and upon receipt of this letter it is incumbent upon you to retire with your army to the places whence you came. If unfortunately you should refuse, notwithstanding the subsisting friendship, I must direct the British troops to advance into Assam, whence you came, and also into Cachar, to repel you by force. For the consequence of such a measure, followed as it may be, by a war between the King of Ava and the Honorable Company, you will have to answer.

Besides

Cachar.

Besides this, I have heard that you have detained our Vakeel Biddeanund Sein, contrary to the custom of all countries. This is a very improper and illegal act, sanctioned by the customs of no country; I therefore request that the Vakeel may be immediately released. If you keep him confined, or maltreat him, or any other person in a similar situation, you will be held personally responsible for the same.

No. 22.\* (C).—*Translation of a Letter addressed by the Agent to the Governor General to the Commander of the Burmese forces in Cachar; dated the 1st February, 1824.*

After the usual compliments. Your letter of the month of Maugh, 1745, has been received, and the contents understood. You write, that by the orders of the Burnah King, you have come with an army to reinstate Rajah Govind Chunder in the Government of Cachar. My friend, the country of Cachar is under the protection of the Honorable English Company, and we cannot permit a foreign power to establish a Rajah there. To the reinstatement of Rajah Govind Chunder we have no objection, but it must be done on the part of the Government. I am therefore hopeful, that having withdrawn from further interference with the affairs of Cachar, you will retire to your own country. You have written respecting the affair at Bikrampore. I regret that such an occurrence should have taken place, but as I wrote three letters to the Commander of the Burmese forces in Assam, from Gowalpara, declaring that the country of Cachar was under our protection, and that we should forcibly resist any attempt to occupy it; and, notwithstanding this formal warning, you persisted in invading the country, you must be sensible, this unpleasant affair, which happened previously to my arrival here, was entirely attributable to your own conduct. Now I hope you will retire with your army from Cachar, and prevent the further progress of hostilities. You state, that you will attempt to seize Chourjeet, and Marjeet, and Gumbheer Sing, in a foreign territory, should they be found therein; my friend, this declaration is inconsistent with the rules of friendship and good manners, as the abovementioned persons are in our dominions. You, of course, have the power of apprehending delinquents in your own territory, but not beyond the boundary, which we could never permit. If you come into our territory to seize the abovementioned, we must resist, and war may ensue. It is the desire of your Sovereign that Chourjeet, Marjeet, and Gumbheer Sing should not be allowed to return to Cachar; and we, also, are willing to prevent them from ever again creating disturbances in that country. Before this I wrote, and I now repeat, that I am desirous of having a personal interview with you. I therefore hope that you will meet me half-way between our respective encampments, when we may discuss the above and other matters, by which means the peace that has so long subsisted between your Sovereign and the Honorable Company may be maintained.

P. S. What else I had to say, I wrote in a letter dated the 23rd of January. You will consider the contents, and act with propriety.

No. 22.\* (D).—*Translation of a Letter addressed by the Agent to the Governor General, to Maha Nund Kegoodeen, Commander of the Burmese forces in Cachar; dated the 2nd February, 1824.*

After the usual compliments. I received your letter in the Bengal language. That in the Burmese character also arrived, but for want of an able interpreter it was sent elsewhere for translation. This has now arrived; and it appears that you write, that the old friendship subsisting between us and your Rajah is at an end, and that war will ensue. Of the result of hostilities, we have no apprehension; but we shall regret to find the long established friendship between the two countries interrupted by your proceedings. Hitherto you have experienced the advantages of being at peace with us: now if you insist upon war, you will also taste its bitter fruits. On all other matters I addressed you on the 23rd of January, and 1st of February. From my letters of those dates, you will have learned my mind.

Now, I hear that you design to enter the Jynteah country, and that you have sent people to the Rajah. Therefore I acquaint you, that we will not permit the execution of this fresh act of aggression. First, because the Rajah's ancestor received that country as a gift, after conquest, from the Honorable Company, and he himself has sought our protection.

Secondly. Because, as you openly threaten war, we cannot permit you to occupy that or any other favourable position for commencing hostilities.

Having understood this, you will do well to return speedily by the road by which you came, otherwise you may lose possession of the country of Assam, whence you proceeded.

No. 23.\* (A).—*Copy of a Letter from D. Scott, Esq., Agent of the Governor General on the North-East Frontier, to G. Swinton, Esq., Secretary to the Bengal Government; dated Camp Budderpore, 4th February, 1824.*

I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the right honorable the Governor General in Council, that nothing material has occurred in this quarter, since the date of my despatch of the 2nd.

This day I received from the Acting Magistrate of Sylhet, a letter in the Burmese character, addressed, by the Commander of their forces, to the Rajah of Jynteah, and forwarded by the Rajah to Mr. Turquand.

An interpreter whom I expect soon, not having arrived, I have as yet been unable to ascertain the contents of this letter, which are also unknown to the Rajah himself; and, as it is not improbable that it may be of an important nature, I enclose a copy of it without a translation, for the information of Government.

My letter of the 2nd, to the Burmese Commander, was this morning returned after being opened, upon pretence of its being directed to one, instead of the two Commanders. I have since despatched it with the necessary explanation; and it is my intention, should the Burmese proceed towards Jynteah, to send a detachment from this post to assist the Rajah's troops in the defence of the stockades he has erected on the frontier of this country.

Although no treaty has yet been executed, for the reason stated in my last despatch, I hope this measure will be approved of by Government, as the abandonment of the Rajah's cause, at this critical juncture, would be productive of the most injurious consequences, by placing at the disposal of the Burmese, the whole means he has collected to oppose them, and still more so by the panic that their progress in that direction could not fail to create at the station of Sylhet, which has once already been almost entirely deserted by the inhabitants on a false and absurd alarm.

P. S. As the letter to the Rajah of Jynteah could not be copied in time for transmission by this day's dawn, it will be sent to-morrow.

No. 23.\* (B).—*Copy of a Letter from D. Scott, Esq., Agent of the Governor General on the North East Frontier, to G. Swinton, Esq., Secretary to the Bengal Government; dated Camp Budderpore, 5th February, 1824.*

I have now the honour to forward the copy of the Burmese letter to the Rajah of Jynteah, promised in my despatch of yesterday's date.

No. 23.\* (C).—*Translation of a Letter from the Burmese Commander in Chief of Assam, to the Rajah of Jynteah.*

Menga Maha Nanda Kroden, Commander in Chief of Assam, acquaints the Rajah of Jynteah and ministers, that presents and offerings from the country of Jynteah were invariably sent to the Rulers of Assam, until Rajah Goorenath became engaged in war with Matounka; and the country and several villages were depredated; from this time the usual offerings were discontinued.

Assam and its Sovereign having been conquered by his Burman Majesty, a Governor has been appointed to rule its four cities and eight provinces, including Jynteah, and to preserve peace. Loja Koop, the Chief of Chajooky, and Nattee, and Cho-hu-ru, other Chiefs, recognize our authority. The General is, accordingly, commanded to acquaint the Rajah of Jynteah and ministers, wherever they may be, that they must bow submission and send offerings. He is also commanded to proceed by land, for the purpose of placing the Chief of Cozalee on the musnud. By the good fortune of our Sovereign, the King of White Elephants, &c., on our arrival at Cozalee, we attacked and assaulted the Cassayers, took prisoners, and quieted the disturbances which prevailed there. The Rajah of Jynteah and ministers always obeyed the commands of the Assamese Rulers, and sent presents and offerings.

Doolwyun, now in the Royal service, the son of the Rajah of Cozalee, and his officers like Kooran, Lijah Koop, Dooraik Woorah, are charged with this letter, and ordered to request the Rajah of Jynteah to come to the place where our forces are assembled for the purpose of affording explanation.

No. 24.\*—*Copy of Letter from Captain Johnstone, Commanding a detachment of the 23rd Regiment Native Infantry, to the Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, dated Budderpore, 14th February, 1824.*

The command of this post having devolved upon me, in the absence of Major Newton, I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that the Burmese advanced yesterday morning in very great force to within one thousand yards of this post, on the north bank of the Soormah river, and commenced upon the construction of five separate stockades on most advantageous ground.



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Having obtained the sanction of Mr. Scott, the Governor-General's agent, for dislodging them from positions which, if permitted to be finished, would form a serious hindrance to our future plans, and inevitably cause the sacrifice of many lives in their reduction, I was determined, if possible, to drive the enemy from them in their unfinished state, and with this view directed Captain Bowe, with part of the 2d Battalion 23d Regiment Native Infantry, and a party of the Rungpore Light Infantry, to cross the Soomah, whilst I proceeded, accompanied by Mr. Scott's interpreter, up the river, in order to induce them to desist from throwing up these fortifications; but seeing no probability of their acquiescence, and that they were rather waiting for further reinforcements, I thought proper to direct the advance of the column.

On reaching the first stockade, the enemy fired upon the leading sections, who ascended the height and instantly drove the enemy with the bayonet from the stockade, and rapidly followed them up without giving them time to rally, till every stockade was carried in the same gallant manner, and left in our possession; my instructions from Mr. Scott being not to commence firing, unless much resistance was made, prevented the enemy's loss from being so great as they otherwise must have sustained: with the stockades the enemy abandoned a number of gingals and muskets, and the whole of their ammunition.

I am sorry to add, that this success, on our part, was not obtained without the loss of a Jemadar of the 1st battalion, 10th regiment, and a number of men wounded, principally by spikes and bows set in the ground to impede the advance of the detachment.

I cannot close this dispatch without bringing to his Excellency's notice the gallant conduct of Captain Bowe, who commanded the column of attack, and that of Lieutenant Ellis, who commanded the detachment 2d battalion 23d Native Infantry, and of whom Captain Bowe makes particular mention; indeed, the whole of the detachment behaved with the utmost steadiness and bravery throughout.

*No. 25.\*—Copy of a Report from Lieutenant Colonel H. Bowen, Commanding in Sylhet, to Captain Bayldon, Major of Brigade, Dacca; dated Camp near Tilayn, 19th February, 1824.*

I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of Lieutenant-Colonel McMorine, commanding the eastern frontier, that at the requisition of Mr. Scott, Governor General's Agent, the whole of the detachment at Budderpore, embarked on board the boats, in which the right wing, 1st battalion, 10th regiment Native Infantry arrived, under my command, from Dacca, and proceeded up the Surmah river, towards Jattrapore, on the 16th instant. The same morning I detached Major Newton to the latter place by land, with two hundred men, for the purpose of occupying the stockades at that place, should it be found that the enemy had quitted them, as was supposed to be the case. About half-way towards Jattrapore, four stockades which had been deserted by the enemy, were destroyed, and I had the satisfaction of learning here, that Major Newton had taken possession of Jattrapore, where we arrived on the 17th. It appears, that the enemy had abandoned these very strong and extensive stockades on the evening of the 13th, after having been driven from those opposite Budderpore by the detachment at that place, and that a considerable number of them had retired to the foot of the Bhurteeka pass, in the range of hills to the north-east of Jattrapore.

Having left Major Newton, with a detachment of about two hundred men at Jattrapore, to protect the stockades, and to prevent the enemy from returning in that direction and occupying them, and it being ascertained that several of the Burmese chiefs had concentrated their forces and taken up their position under the Bhurteeka pass, the detachment continued its route in the boats to the mouth of the Jettinghy river, where it disembarked at nine o'clock on the morning of the 18th, and moved in the best order towards the enemy's position, where we arrived about eleven A. M. and found them strongly posted in two stockades, on the left bank of the river, the passage of which, at the only place where it was supposed to be fordable, was completely commanded by one of them. Their position was naturally very strong, and had been made by the enemy, and the late heavy falls of rain so difficult, as to appear almost impracticable to human means.

Having reconnoitred the river, both above and below, and all my endeavours to discover a more eligible passage having failed, in consequence of the depth and rapidity of the stream, and no boats being procurable, the only expedient left was to endeavour to get the men across on the backs of the elephants which accompanied me, under the cover of the fire of Light Company 1st battalion, 10th regiment, and a party of the Rungpore Light Infantry.

Having in this manner succeeded, after some little delay, and much difficulty, in crossing nearly the whole of the 1st battalion, 10th regiment, detachment 2nd, battalion 23rd, I directed an attack upon the stockades along the bank of the river, but having ascertained that there was a rivulet in that direction that was impassable, I was compelled to order the attack through the jungle higher up the bank. In this attempt, the difficulties opposed to us by the jungle and muddy rivulet were almost of an insufferable nature, but the detachment having at length arrived at the north-east corner of the stockade, immediately formed and carried it with the bayonet, the enemy dispersing and flying in all directions pursued by our detachment towards another strong and extensive stockade under the hills, where it was imagined they were prepared to offer a  
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determined resistance. They, however, merely passed through it in their way to the hills, and the detachment advanced, and took possession of and passed the night in it.

From all the accounts which have reached me, and from the number and extent of the stockades they had constructed, I cannot estimate the number of the enemy in this affair at less than five thousand, of whom at least two thousand are supposed to be Burmahs; and the remainder Assamese, their dispersion and flight in the greatest disorder and confusion towards the passes into Asam, the capture of all their standards, jingals, and eight gilt chatahs, are the fruits of this affair.

It is impossible for me to close this report without endeavouring to do justice to the good conduct of Captains Johnstone and Bowe, who led the attack at the head of the Grenadiers of the 1st Battalion, 10th regiment, Lieutenant McLaren, detachment staff, and Lieutenant Ellis, 23rd regiment. This young officer set a most noble example in dashing into the nullah, and fording it, followed by such of the troops as had not passed on elephants, which mainly contributed to our success.

I am happy to say that this service has been performed with little or no loss.

*No. 26.\*—Copy of a Report from Lieutenant Colonel H. Bowen, Commanding in Sylhet, to Captain Bayldon, Major of Brigade, Dacca; dated Jattrapore, 22d February, 1824.*

I have the honor to report to you for the information of Lieutenant-Colonel McMorine, commanding the frontier, that agreeably to the requisition of D. Scott, Esq. Political Agent, the detachment under my command again disembarked yesterday morning at eight o'clock, and after a march of two hours, fell in with the enemy's stockades at Doodputlee.

Several spirited attacks were made upon their position, under cover of a heavy fire from three six-pounders, all of which, I am sorry to say, failed, and after a most severe action, which lasted from ten o'clock until evening, I was compelled to draw off the detachment, and return to the strong stockades, which have been evacuated by the enemy at Jattrapore on the 16th instant, leaving two European officers and one hundred and fifty men (between the enemy and our present position) at the strong post of Tilayn, as a measure of observation and safety.

I regret to say, that our loss has been severe; one European officer killed, one Lieutenant-Colonel wounded slightly, one Captain and one Ensign wounded dangerously, and about one hundred and fifty-five men killed and wounded.

I have not as yet been able to ascertain the exact extent of our loss, but as soon as I collect the returns, I shall have the honor to forward them.

The enemy's force may be fairly computed at two thousand Burmahs, including cavalry, and they fought with a bravery and obstinacy which I have never witnessed in any troops. It is impossible to estimate their loss, but it must be very severe.

Our troops behaved with their usual steadiness and gallantry, and retired with the heavy guns in the best order.

P. S.—The returns having been received, they are herewith enclosed.\*

*No. 27.\*—Copy of a Report from Lieutenant Colonel H. Bowen, Commanding the Detachment at Cachar, to Lieutenant Colonel Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army, Head Quarters; dated Camp near Jattrapore, 25th February, 1824.*

I regret to have to report to you, that Lieutenant A. B. Armstrong, of the 1st Battalion, 10th regiment N. I. was killed in action with the Burmese on the 21st instant at Doodputlee. This valuable officer was shot at the head of the Grenadiers, among the stakes and spring guns which were planted all round the enemy's stockades outside, for a distance of from twenty to thirty yards, concealed for the most part in long grass.

It is my painful duty to mention, by this opportunity, that Captain Johnstone, of the 23rd regiment N. I. and Ensign Barberie, of the 10th regiment N. I. are in a very dangerous state; the former was shot through the thigh bone, and the latter had his leg shattered to pieces, and has since been amputated. I trust it will not be considered presumption in me to express my hope, that something may be done for these two officers  
in the

\* Return of Killed and Wounded of the 1st Battalion 10th Regiment, in action with the Burmese, on the 21st February, 1824. Killed—1 Lieutenant, and 14 Sepoys.—Wounded—1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 1 Ensign, 1 Subadar, 4 Jemadars, 6 Havildars 6 Naicks, 84 Sepoys, and 1 Lascar.—Lieutenant Armstrong, killed.—Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen, wounded slightly.—Ensign Barberie, wounded severely.

List of Killed and Wounded of a Detachment of the 2d Battalion 23d Regiment, in an action with the Burmese, on the 21st Febry. 1824. Killed—2 Sepoys.—Wounded—1 Captain, 1 Havildar, 1 Naick, and 21 Sepoys.—Captain Johnstone, wounded severely.

List of Killed and Wounded of a Detachment of the Rungpore Light Infantry, in an action with the Burmese, 21st February, 1824. Killed—1 Naick, and 3 Sepoys.—Wounded—2 Naicks, and 4 Sepoys.

in the event of their recovery, and in consideration of their brave and gallant conduct in the actions of the 13th, 18th, and 21st instant.

Captain John-tone has been twenty years in the army, has seen much actual service, has never been absent from his corps during all that time (except on sick certificate for four months) and has rendered me the greatest assistance throughout.

I cannot close this letter without deeply lamenting our failure at Doodpatlee, and the loss we have sustained, and I sincerely hope his Excellency, the Commander-in-chief, will concur in opinion with Mr. Scott, the Governor General's Agent, and myself, that we were justified in following up our former rapid successes in our attack at Doodpatlee, in order to prevent the junction of the Assamese and Burmese armies, and the invasion of our own territories, which they had repeatedly threatened by letter, since (notwithstanding our failure) it has caused the enemy to evacuate their strong stockades at and around Doodpatlee, and to proceed in disorder in the direction of Munnypore and Assam, of which authentic accounts reached me yesterday.

It has now been ascertained by people sent to examine the evacuated stockades at Doodpatlee, that the enemy had between four and five hundred men killed and wounded. They were wholly composed of Burmese, and they fought desperately, reserving their fire to the last moment, and seldom missing their object.

I beg leave to supply an omission in my report of this affair, under date the 22nd instant, and to state that Major Newton, with an hundred and fifty men of the detachment left to protect the stockades at Jatrapore, joined me by order, on the evening of the 20th, near Doodpatlee.

*No. 28.—Extract from a Despatch from the Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors; dated the 23d February, 1824.*

2. It is proper to state, in the outset, that up to this date, no notice whatever has been taken by the government of Ava, of the declaration transmitted to that court in November last, on the subject of the outrage committed by the Rajas of Arracan in the attack of the British post, and the slaughter of our guard at Shapuree on the 9th of September last; and the sequel will abundantly show, that far from entertaining any disposition to disavow or redress that injury, the Burman monarch himself obstinately perseveres in a system of injury and insult to the British power, and disdains to enter into negotiation or explanation.

3. Mr. Robertson, the gentleman whom we had appointed to act as Magistrate of Chittagong, and to conduct political affairs on the south-east frontier, arrived at Tek Naf on the 8th ultimo. On the 11th ditto, he reported to us that the detachment on the island of Shapuree had been attacked with a peculiarly malignant fever, and that the climate of that spot had proved so peculiarly unhealthy, that its further occupation for a long period would be impracticable. Such being the case, and as there existed at the moment, no appearance of hostile preparation, he judged it expedient, after consulting with Lieutenant-Colonel Shapland, to direct the removal of the detachment, considering the moment to be favorable for the adoption of the measure which, 'ere long, the increased sickness would render inevitable under any circumstances; and being farther of opinion, that the step would afford the fairest prospect of an amicable adjustment with the Arracanese authorities. Mr. Robertson had previously addressed the Chief, called the Raja of Arracan, requesting him to depute a competent and proper officer to meet Captain Cheape and himself, for investigating and defining the boundary between the two states. On removing the detachment from its position on the island of Shapuree, Mr. Robertson conceived it proper to address a fresh letter to the Raja, stating, that as two months had elapsed since the British troops were stationed on Shapuree, and no indication having, during that period, appeared of any further attempt on his part to dispute the right of the British Government to the island; considering also, that since the first outrage an amicable intercourse had continued uninterrupted between the subjects of both states, it was deemed superfluous to maintain the detachment there any longer, which had been, in consequence, removed. The Raja was farther informed, that the immediate object of the letter was to apprise him of the above circumstance, that he might warn any of his subjects and followers against venturing to encroach on the island, an act which would be resented and instantly punished.

4. We had not been previously apprised of the sickly state of the officers and men on the island of Shapuree, and adverting to this consideration, and to the real unimportance of maintaining a guard at the place itself, with the view either to the assertion or the defence of our right, whilst so respectable a force, both naval and military, was in the immediate neighbourhood, we regarded the measure adopted by Mr. Robertson to be entirely proper and judicious, and we still think it so, notwithstanding that many untoward events and circumstances have since arisen in rapid succession, which it was impossible at the moment to foresee.

5. Only three days after the abandonment of the post, Mr. Robertson learnt that the four Rajas had again assembled their forces at Lowadhng, with the declared intention of attacking and expelling our detachment, under fresh orders received from the Court of Ava, to dislodge the English at all hazard, and a letter was brought to him from the Raja of Arracan, announcing that circumstance, and stating that he had deputed four messengers to wait on him.

6. Those



6. Those agents, in the conferences which took place, insisted on the right of their sovereign to Shapuree, argued the folly of going to war about such a trifle, and professed that they would be satisfied by a declaration, that the island should be considered neutral ground, and remain unoccupied by either party. The tenor of the whole conversation left a strong impression on Mr. Robertson's mind, that the re-establishment of a post on the island would invite an attack on the part of the Burmese, and infallibly lead to a rupture, which he very naturally and justly deemed it a great object to avoid at so advanced a period of the season, though sensible that it might be eventually necessary, under any turn which the Shapuree discussions might take, to adopt measures for compelling the Burman nation to pay more respect than they had hitherto been disposed to show to the British power.

7. In our instructions, in reply, we expressed our conviction of the justice of the grounds on which the measure of withdrawing the detachment had been adopted, though immediately followed by a combination of circumstances, which naturally excited our regret. Could it have been foreseen, we observed, that the pretensions of the Burmese to Shapuree were to be so soon renewed, accompanied by the threat, that an army had assembled at Lawudhung, and was approaching, under orders from the court of Ava, to expel our post by force of arms, it would have been necessary to continue the British troops on the island for a time at least, since our retirement would doubtless be imputed to the apprehensions of an attack. As the troops had been removed, however, we did not see, in these circumstances, any paramount or adequate motive for directing their return, but left it at the discretion of the magistrate and the commanding officer, either to adopt that measure, according to circumstances, or simply to hold such a force in readiness at Tek Naf, as, with the aid of the armed vessels in the river, would suffice for repelling and adequately chastising on the spot any attempt which the Burmese might make to re-occupy the island.

8. Relatively to the proposition of the Arracanese vakeels for declaring the disputed island to be neutral ground, we observed, that worthless and insignificant as the place must be to either party, and willing as the Governor General in Council might have felt to listen to any such proposal, had it been brought forward by the government of Ava itself, at an earlier stage of the discussion, and previous to the assault on our post, and the slaughter of our sipahees, the just indignation excited by that act of outrage, and the declarations and resolutions it had necessarily induced, must utterly preclude any compromise of the above nature, even if not proffered in the tone of insolent menace which the Raja of Arracan had invariably assumed. We therefore pointed out distinctly to Mr. Robertson, that no overtures involving the relinquishment of our absolute and unqualified right to Shapuree, must for a moment be entertained, and we desired, that if the Burmese deputies should again urge the peremptory orders of their government, to prevent the British authorities from keeping a guard on the island, he would at once meet the argument by stating the no less positive orders of the British government to maintain the fullest right of possession, and to inflict instant and signal chastisement on those who might attempt to cross the Naf for the purpose of disturbing that possession.

9. In conclusion, we informed Mr. Robertson, that considering the altered tone of the Burmese since the arrival of the late orders, which they professed to have received from the King of Ava, and more especially adverting to an affair between our troops and the Burman force on the Sylhet frontier, of which we had just then received accounts, we were of opinion that any attempt to define the south-east boundary could no longer be carried on with a hope of success, or even with safety to himself and Captain Cheape, and we desired him therefore to desist from the prosecution of that part of his original instructions.

10. On the 22d January, the acting magistrate of Chittagong reported to us, that he had just learnt the arrival, in Arracan, of four ministers of rank from the court of Ava, who had been deputed to the province to enquire into the real state of the dispute with the English, and, as it afterwards appeared, to supersede the functions of the local authorities. This intelligence was speedily followed by the report of a fresh act of outrage and treacherous violence, committed by the directions and under the immediate orders of these confidential agents of the court, the particulars of which, as exhibited by the log-book of the Honorable Company's armed vessels *Sophia*, and the reports of the Darogha of Tek Naf, are as follows:

11. It appears that the Burmese commissioners, immediately on their arrival at Mungdoo, the post opposite to the British Thana of Tek Naf, finding that the island of Shapuree had been evacuated, crossed the river in four large boats full of armed men, with some pomp and display, and landed at Shapuree, notwithstanding the solemn warning which had been given against any such encroachment. On their retiring it was found that they had set fire to a hut, the only tangible object on the island, as the redoubt had been razed when our detachment was removed.

12. About the same time an interpreter waited on the Darogha at Tek Naf, to announce the arrival of the abovementioned Wuzers, or ministers, from the court of Ammerpoora, and to invite the officers of the troops and those of the vessels, to wait on them at Mungdoo. With the former, this insidious invitation

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had no effect, but some of the latter unhappily fell into the snare, and by their deplorable imprudence, afforded to the Burmese an opportunity of perpetrating an act of insult and treacherous violence which it is impossible for this government to overlook or tolerate with impunity.

13. It should be observed, that on the removal of the detachment from Shapuree, the Honorable Company's vessel *Sophia*, one of the pilot schooners, armed for the occasion, was ordered to take up a position with the gun boats more immediately off the north-east point of the island, to serve, in some degree, as a substitute for the presence of the troops.

14. On the 20th January, a boat full of armed Burmese pulled along side of the *Sophia*, and asked a number of suspicious questions regarding the force and equipment of the vessel, and the object of her remaining in the Naf. The same afternoon, a second boat came off from Mungdoo, with an invitation to Mr. Chew, the commander, to call on the following morning at that post. Mr. Chew was absent at the time, but on returning to the vessel he determined on accepting the invitation, with what motive cannot be conjectured, as the season for amicable communication and intercourse had obviously passed away, in consequence of the altered tone and language of the Burmese, occasioned by the arrival of the commissioners with fresh orders and powers from the court. So fully sensible indeed was Mr. Chew of the hazard attending the step, that on proceeding to the Burmese shore the next morning, he left particular instructions that, in the event of his not returning by a certain hour, a gun boat should be sent to demand his person and those of his companions. The commander of the *Sophia* was accompanied, in this ill-timed and inconsiderate visit, by Mr. Royce, a young man who commanded the row boats, and the boat's crew of eight lascars. The particulars of what passed after their reaching Mungdoo are not known, but at 8 o'clock, on the morning of the 21st January, Alee Chand, ferryman, saw these unfortunate persons surrounded by a large party of Burmese, and carried off to Lowadhung, in the interior. The witness was himself seized and confined for a time at Mungdoo, and saw the Wuzeeers go off with their prisoners to the interior. Subsequent accounts have fully established the fact, that this treacherous seizure and imprisonment of two officers and a part of the crew of the Honorable Company's vessels in the Naf, was accomplished by the order and under the immediate directions of the commissioners deputed express from the court of Ava to settle affairs on the frontier, and who it must, of course, be presumed, are well acquainted with the temper and designs of their sovereign.

A humane consideration for the safety of the gentlemen who had thus fallen into the hands of the most barbarous and sanguinary of all eastern nations, very properly induced Mr. Robertson to try, at first, the effects of persuasive and conciliatory language, in accomplishing their release, and a letter was accordingly addressed by him to the Raja of Arracan on the subject, which your honorable committee will find recorded in No. 2 of our secret consultations, dated 6th February.

On the 23d January, Mr. Robertson communicated a report from the Darogha of Tek Naf, that the occurrence described in the preceding paragraph, had created the greatest terror and alarm in the southern part of the Chittagong district, and that the inhabitants were preparing to fly with their cattle and property.

In reply to the despatches of the acting magistrate of Chittagong, as above, we expressed the strong sentiments of concern and mortification with which we had learnt the act of treachery and outrage therein reported on the part of the Burmese. We observed, that the deputation of commissioners by the King of Ava (who it should be observed must have been dispatched after the arrival of our declaration at the capital) might have afforded a hope, that after inspecting the mere position of the disputed island, they would have become satisfied of the justice of the British title, and the unfounded nature of the pretensions set up by the Rajah of Arracan, and that thus the result of their mission would have been conducive to the preservation of friendly relations between the two states. Unhappily, however, their very first act had destroyed all hope of such a result, and could be regarded only as affording irresistible evidence of the hostile spirit pervading the councils of the government of Ava, and the absence of any disposition on the part of the Burman monarch to afford us reparation for the former outrage.

Whilst unwilling to relinquish, altogether, the hope that the representation addressed by the acting magistrate to the Rajah of Arracan, would produce the release of Mr. Chew and his companions, and entertaining a sincere disposition to make every reasonable degree of allowance for the barbarous character and notions of the Burmese, and their singular ignorance of the strength of the power, whose vengeance they had thus dared, a second time, to provoke, we stated that we considered it indispensibly necessary to declare our sentiments and determination as to the line of conduct which must be adopted, under the supposition of our officers, detained as prisoners by the Burman government, not being speedily released.

We instructed the acting magistrate therefore, that in the event supposed, he would, on the receipt of our instructions, address one more letter to the Raja of Arracan, in the strongest language of remonstrance, peremptorily calling upon that chief and the Wuzeeers from Ava, in the name of the Governor General in Council, to deliver up the officers and men whom they had detained, within a certain period, (to be fixed by



by himself,) under pain of the severest vengeance of the British power. We directed it to be distinctly avowed, that as the act of treachery and violence complained of, had been committed under the orders of the commissioners deputed from the court itself, it must be considered as emanating from the King of Ava's authority, and, unless instantly remedied, the relations of peace between the two governments, already so seriously disturbed by past proceedings, would be held to be dissolved, and war to have actually commenced. The magistrate was, of course, instructed to make known to us his proceedings, and the results of them under the above orders, by express.

20. For the particulars of our views as to the offensive operations, which might safely and expediently be adopted on the southern bank of the Naf, in the event of the Burmese failing to restore Mr Chew and his companions, and for other particulars comprised in our instructions, we must beg leave to refer your honourable committee to our secretary's letter, recorded as No. 4, of our consultations, of the 6th of February.

21. On the 27th ultimo, the political agent on the Chittagong frontier reported to us, that the Burmese were certainly assembling their forces in unusual numbers at Mungdoo, Lawudhung, and Arracan, and that it was currently believed, that a large reserve, rumoured at 12,000 men, had been collected at a place inland, called Dulak. Mr. Robertson observed on this occasion, that there could exist no longer any doubt that the Burmese, whatever their ultimate intentions might be, were making preparations for warlike operations, and that he was disposed to think the designs of the court of Ava to be a hostile nature, though it seemed probable, that the Rajahs and subordinate authorities in the Arracan province, were well disposed to promote an amicable and pacific adjustment.

22. On the 31st ultimo, Mr. Robertson forwarded translations of two letters to his address from the Rajah of Arracan, distinctly avowing that Messrs. Chew and Royce were seized by the orders of the generals of the sultan of Ava, *because their vessel was anchored off the island of Shapuree*, and promising, at the same time, to treat them well. Mr. Robertson stated, however, that a perusal of those documents had considerably diminished his hopes of the eventual release of those gentlemen and their companions.

23. In communicating our instructions to Mr. Robertson, founded on a consideration of the above dispatches, we signified to that gentleman our resolution, that even should the demand for the release of Mr. Chew and his companions be complied with within the specified time, there would still remain two conditions to be required of the Burmese, compliance with which could alone induce the British government to abstain from the just measures of retaliation, which we had provisionally authorized him to adopt. The first was ample apology and reparation for the insult offered to this government, by the treacherous seizure and temporary detention of the Honourable Company's officers—and the second, a declaration in writing, that the Burmese abandon all pretension to the island of Shapuree, and engage to withdraw the troops they have assembled at Lawudhung and Mungdoo, and to reduce the detachments at those posts to their usual strength. We observed on this occasion, that the hostile and insulting conduct of the Burmese officers, in attacking and slaughtering our guard at Shapuree, which the government of Ava had failed to disavow, and had thereby acknowledged as its own act, after ample space had been allowed for explanation, might justly be considered to have already placed the two countries in a state of war, and to warrant the adoption, on our part, of instant measures of retaliation without farther notice.

24. On the 1st instant, we received a farther report from the acting magistrate of Chittagong. In this letter Mr. Robertson observed, with reference to some remarks contained in our former instructions, that had it not been for the unexpected arrival of the general and his two colleagues from the capital, and their subsequent conduct, he should still have had hopes of averting hostilities, and that his endeavours had been frustrated by circumstances such as no one could possibly at the moment foresee. It must be evident to us, he observed, that the approach of the personage styled the general, and the ascertained fact of a force having been collected with the avowed purpose of commencing hostilities, if their terms (*viz.* the surrender of Shapuree,) are not complied with, renders the dispute on the Chittagong frontier no longer a mere provincial discussion. Whether or not they will attempt what they threaten depends, he added, upon the degree of resolution which the Burmese may be supposed to possess; for of the inclinations of their present leaders there could no longer be a doubt. Mr. Robertson then took occasion to express his own opinion of the peculiarly exposed state of the Chittagong frontier to predatory irruptions, and the strong probability that the Burmese, when once become our avowed enemies, would direct their operations to harassing us in this manner by repeated incursions, and at the same time gratifying their revenge against the Mug refugees who occupy the most easily assailable part of the district. He further remarked, that considering the state of affairs in Cachar, and the conduct of the Burmese on the Naf, the British government must be regarded as virtually at war with the empire of Ava, and that every allowable measure of hostility might therefore justly be resorted to. A defensive system involves, he observed, so many difficulties, and would hereafter prove so endless, as literally to afford the prospect of no point, however remote, at which it might be expected to terminate, while the climate



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climate renders delay the worst evil we can encounter. On these grounds, Mr. Robertson avowed his sentiments as decidedly in favour of offensive operations. For the successful conduct of any such operations against the province of Arracan, no less than for the protection of the Chittagong district itself, the acting magistrate stated his opinion, that it would be indispensable to raise Mug levies, and to supply them with arms and ammunition.

25. On the 8th and 9th instant, Mr. Robertson reported to us the steps which he had taken in pursuance of our instructions of the 31st ultimo, for procuring the release of Mr. Chew and his companions, and apprized us that he had peremptorily called upon the Rajah of Arracan and the Wuzers to set them at liberty within ten days, under pain of the consequences.—Accounts had, in the interval, been received from Mr. Chew himself, evincing a spirit unbroken by the calamitous situation in which he had placed himself and his companions, and stating, that he had latterly been treated with humanity and even kindness. Mr. Robertson however remarks, “It is with deeper regret than I can express that I resign the hopes I have hitherto entertained of Mr. Chew’s release. The high spirit evinced in his letters, and the elasticity of mind with which, under circumstances so depressing, he still keeps his attention directed to his professional pursuits will, I am sure, excite the admiration of His Lordship in Council for the character of the individual, whilst it must deepen his regret at the calamity that has befallen him. Did it rest with the Rajah (of Arracan) to release or detain the two gentlemen, I should still hope for their return, but it is now evident that the local authority of that officer is for a time superseded by that of the person styled the general, whose unexpected approach towards the frontier has so materially altered the aspect of affairs in this quarter.”

*No. 29.—Declaration on the part of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council,  
24th February, 1824.*

During a long course of years, the relations of peace and friendship have been established between the Honorable East India Company and the state of Ava, by public engagements, and by the mutually beneficial intercourse of trade and commerce. The supreme government of India, scrupulously adhering to the obligation of public faith, and cordially solicitous to cultivate a good understanding with all surrounding states, has never ceased to manifest, in a special degree, its desire to cement and improve the relations of amity, subsisting with the court of Ava. It is notorious, however, that, notwithstanding the uniformly pacific and conciliatory demeanour of the British government, the sovereign of Ava has, in repeated instances, committed or sanctioned acts of provocation and aggression which have more than once placed the two countries on the brink of hostilities, and the natural consequences of which have been averted only by the moderation and forbearance of the British power, conscious of its superior strength and resources, and naturally disposed to make the largest allowances for the peculiar character of the people and the government.

Of late, the Burman monarch, emboldened by a career of successful encroachment against the petty states intervening between the two empires, and more especially elated by the conquest of Assam, has dared to offer injury to the British power, under circumstances of studied insult, menace, and defiance, such as no government, alive to a sense of honour, and duly mindful of its safety and best interest, can suffer to pass unavenged.

In the prosecution of a singularly wanton and unfounded claim to the island of Shapuree, situated at the southern extremity of the Chittagong district, the Burman chief, styled the Rajah of Arracan, addressed a letter to the Governor General in August last, demanding, under the implied alternative of a rupture with the state of Ava, the removal of a small guard which had been stationed on that island, as an arrangement purely of police. No time was lost in replying to this letter, by a temperate exposition of the undeniable title of the British government to the place, as established no less by its position on the British side of the main channel of the Naf, than by the indisputable evidence of the public records. The Governor General on the same occasion expressed his persuasion, that the tone assumed in the Rajah’s letter had been adopted without due reflection, and that neither that, nor the abrupt and unwarrantable demand for the evacuation of Shapuree, could have been authorized by the government of Ava. An offer was farther made, should the arguments contained in the letter fail to satisfy the Rajah’s mind, as to the justice of our title, to depute an officer during the approaching cold season to afford additional explanation on the spot, and to adjust all disputed boundary questions appertaining to the Chittagong frontier, in concert with commissioners from Arracan.

Some of the subordinate Arracanese authorities having previously declared, in writing to the local officers of the Chittagong district, that the British guard, if not speedily withdrawn from the island of Shapuree, would be attacked and forcibly expelled; they were, in reply, distinctly warned, under orders from the Governor General in Council, that any such procedure must be resented by the British government as an act of positive hostility, and be punished accordingly.

The language of the Burmahs, in their official communications with the British officers, had been ever of a singularly boastful, assuming, and even insolent strain, and adverting to this habitual extravagance of tone, and to the fact, that the government of Ava itself had never raised a claim, nor addressed any representation to the supreme government on the subject of this paltry object of contention, it was not imagined that the Arracanese rulers seriously meditated the execution of their threat.

It was therefore, with equal astonishment and indignation, that the Governor General in Council learnt early in October last, that the Burmese chiefs of Arracan, called the four Rajahs, after suddenly assembling an unusual force at their frontier posts on the Naf, had, under cover of the night, deliberately attacked our guard on the island, consisting of a Jemadar and twelve privates of the Chittagong Provincial Battalion, whom they forced to retire after killing or wounding six of our men. The Rajahs at the same time sedulously promulgated, both verbally and in writing, that they had acted under the authority of a mandate from the sultan of Ava, and that any attempt of the British government to recover possession of what that government had solemnly declared to be its unquestionable right, would be followed by an invasion of the eastern districts of Bengal, for which purpose the forces of the Burman empire were advancing to the frontier. In a letter also addressed shortly afterwards by the Raja of Arracan to the Governor General, that chief had the unparalleled audacity to declare, that the party on the island of Shapuree had been destroyed in pursuance of the commands of the great Lord of the Seas and Earth; that if the British government wanted tranquillity, it would allow the matter to pass; but if it should rebuild a stockade on the island, the city of Dacca and Moorshedabad, which originally belonged to the great Arracan Rajah, would be taken from it by force of arms.

No comments can be needed to illustrate the character of proceedings thus pushed to the extreme of insult and defiance, by a people who, notwithstanding their barbarous character, and extravagance of national pride, are by no means ignorant of the principles and observances which ordinarily regulate the intercourse between independent states, and who, as their whole conduct and language have shown, can feel keenly enough, in their own case, any supposed infraction of national rights or honour. If any additional circumstance were wanting to demonstrate to the conviction of the whole world, the utterly wanton, as well as gross nature of the injury thus offered to a friendly power, in a time of profound peace, and when no question or discussion had arisen between the two governments, it will be found in the fact, that recently these very officers have professed their perfect willingness that Shapuree should be considered neutral ground—thus acknowledging the dubious nature of the Burman title, and insidiously tendering a proposition at this late period of the season, which, if advanced in proper language by their government on the first commencement of the discussion, would probably have been assented to by the British authorities, as an admissible compromise, where the object in dispute was so utterly worthless and unimportant.

The first impulse of the British government, on learning the outrage at Shapuree, was naturally to take into its own hands the instant chastisement of its authors, by fitting out an expedition to attack any assailable points in Arracan. But various considerations induced the Governor General, subsequently, to pause in the adoption of this course. On farther reflection, it appeared possible that the King of Ava might have been misled by false and interested reports, or that the name of their sovereign might have been used without authority by the Rajahs of Arracan and Ramre, whose intemperate and even insolent language had, on former occasions, excited the serious displeasure of the British government. It was deemed, at all events, a step worthy the magnanimity of a powerful nation, and consistent with our uniform policy towards the state of Ava, to afford to the Burman monarch an opportunity of disavowing and making atonement for what we were willing to consider, in the first instance, as the unauthorized act of a subordinate authority. Under this view, a letter was addressed to the ministers of the King of Ava, in the form of a declaration on the part of the Governor General, explaining in decided, but moderate language, the sentiments to which the occurrence at Shapuree had given rise on our part: demanding reparation for that outrage, by the disgrace and punishment of its immediate authors; and solemnly warning the Burman government of the consequences which must inevitably attend a refusal to comply with this just demand, and to repress, in future, the insolence and hostility of tone which its local officers had invariably assumed at every point where they had come in contact with the British power, whether in Chittagong or Assam. Copies of this letter were forwarded to the capital of Ammerapooora, by two separate channels about the middle of November last.

Conformably with the intention avowed in the letter to the court of Ava, the Governor General in Council, at the same time dispatched re-inforcements to Chittagong, in order to ensure the safety and restore the tranquillity of that district which had been so seriously disturbed by the conduct of the Burmese, and likewise to overpower any opposition that might be made to the re-occupation of the island of Shapuree. On the arrival of the force in the Naf river, the limited objects with which it had been deputed, and the pacific intentions of the British government pending the reference to the court of Ava, were distinctly explained to the Arracanese authorities, both by the magistrate of the district, and the officer commanding the troops, and so



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perfectly disposed were the Burmese to credit our assurances, that an intercourse was speedily re-established between the officers and functionaries of both states, on the most friendly and confident footing.

For a time hopes were entertained, that the differences with the Burmese might be amicably adjusted on terms consistent with the national honor, and that the Burman government would consent to the definition of such a boundary between the two countries, as would obviate the future occurrence of disputes and misunderstanding on the south-east frontier.

About the middle of January, this pacific aspect of affairs was suddenly changed, and all friendly intercourse suspended, by the arrival of a military officer of the highest rank, at the head of large re-inforcements, accompanied by two commissioners from the capital, vested with extensive powers, and bringing positive orders to dislodge the English, at whatever hazard, from the island of Shapuree. The purport of these orders was ostentatiously proclaimed with a distinct intimation, that any attempt on our part to interrupt their execution, would be considered tantamount to a declaration of war between the two states. The first act of the commissioners was to cross over, in state, to the disputed island, obviously for the purpose of recovering a nominal possession; the British detachment having been previously withdrawn, in consequence of the unhealthiness of the spot. The following day, they succeeded in decoying to the shore two of the officers of the Honorable Company's armed vessels in the Naf, whom, with their boat's crew, they treacherously seized, in defiance of the laws of good faith and hospitality, and imprisoned and detained them for nearly a month, expressly on the ground of their having anchored their ship off the island of Shapuree. Shortly afterwards, the standard of the Burman empire was hoisted by stealth, during the night, on the disputed ground, an act which, however contemptible in itself, must necessarily be regarded as a farther pledge of the obstinate determination of the Burman government to carry its point, even at the known hazard of involving the two nations in war.

During all this period the King of Ava has maintained a haughty and contemptuous silence on the subject of the remonstrance addressed to the Burmese court more than three months back. The above document must have reached the capital some time previous to the deputation of the commissioners, and the Governor General in Council is hence compelled to interpret the acts and declaration of those ministers, as the only answer which the government of Ava deigns to return.

Whilst the British territories on the southern frontier have been thus actually violated under circumstances of peculiar and aggravated insult, the language and proceedings of the Burmese, on the north-east frontier of Bengal, have evinced more extensive and mischievous designs of aggression, and leave no rational ground to doubt that the King of Ava has deliberately resolved to pursue the schemes avowed by his officers, in contempt of the rights and dignity, and in open defiance of the British government.

For many years past, the parties dividing authority, and struggling for ascendancy in the Raj of Cachar, had incessantly applied to the British government, soliciting it to interfere, as the paramount state, to settle the affairs of that country. Its internal dissensions had frequently disturbed the tranquillity of the adjoining district of Sylhet, and the Governor General in Council having satisfied himself, that Cachar was altogether independent of the Burmese, and that the measure could afford no just ground of umbrage to that government, adopted a resolution on the 19th June last, to take the country avowedly under protection, on the usual conditions of political dependence. Whilst arrangements and negotiations were in train for defining the terms of our connection with the chief, whom it was determined to re-instate in possession, and who was residing under British protection within the Honourable Company's territory, intelligence arrived from Assam, that the Burmese were preparing an army to invade and conquer Cachar. The Governor General's agent on the north-east frontier, lost no time in addressing letters to the Burmese governor of Assam, briefly apprising him of the nature of our views and measures in regard to the Raj of Cachar, and calling upon him to desist from any project of molesting that country. The outrage at Shapuree having in the interval occurred, the agent subsequently warned the Burman authorities, under the express instructions of government, that their occupation of Cachar would not be permitted, as, independently of the resolution recently taken by the British government to protect that territory, it could not, without a culpable dereliction of duty, and a disregard of the plainest maxims of prudence, allow the Burmese to advance unopposed to a position, the command of which would so greatly facilitate the execution of the threat of invasion, repeatedly pronounced by their countrymen in other quarters. The only answer returned to these communications was, that orders had arrived from the King of Ava, to follow up and apprehend certain Munniporian chiefs, (peaceably residing within the British territory,) wherever they might be found; that these orders would be executed without any respect to territory or jurisdiction; and that the Burmahs were not to be hindered from carrying into effect the mandates of their sovereign, by any opposition which the British authorities might offer.

It soon appeared, that an army had been assembled in the Burman dependency of Munnipore, as well as in Assam, for the execution of the fresh purpose of aggression now distinctly threatened.

On the advance of the invading force from the eastward, the acting magistrate of Sylhet addressed  
letters



letters of remonstrance, under the orders of government, to the military chiefs in command, of a purport and tendency similar to those which had been previously transmitted to the commander of the forces in Assam.

Totally disregarding, however, the intimation thus explicitly given by the British government, of its determination to resist their occupation of Cachar, on grounds the justice of which cannot be questioned, and anxious only to effect their object of concentrating a large army on the immediate frontier of the Company's possessions, the parties from the northward and eastward hurried on, by forced marches, in avowed defiance of our remonstrances, and effected a junction at Jattrapore, only five miles from the frontier of Sylhet, where they entrenched themselves in extensive and formidable stockades. Happily, a party of observation had been advanced to the frontier on the first intelligence of the near approach of the forces of the King of Ava, of sufficient strength to keep them in check, and prevent any actual violation of the British territory in that quarter. But the injury already sustained by their advance has been serious, no less to the suffering country of Cachar, than to the district of Sylhet, throughout which a general alarm has been spread, causing many of our Ryots to abandon their homes, and materially impeding the collection of the public revenues.

The conduct and declarations of the Burman commander, on the Sylhet frontier, have unequivocally disclosed, if indeed any farther proofs were wanting, the ambitious designs, and insufferable arrogance of the court of Ava.

After long detaining and grossly insulting the vakeel, and successive messengers deputed to their camp by the Governor General's agent, they notified in a letter to Mr. Scott, that they had entered the country of Cachar to restore the Raja, and to follow up and seize the Munnipoorian chiefs wherever they might be found, knowing well at the time, that the whole of those chiefs had obtained an asylum within the British provinces. "Should (they observed) Chorjeet, Marjeet, and Gumbheer Sing, and the Cossayers enter the English territories, apprehend and deliver them, to save any breach of friendship. So doing, no rupture will take place, and the commercial intercourse now in existence, will continue. If the Cassayers enter the English territories, and their surrender is refused, and if they receive protection, be it known, that the orders of the most fortunate sovereign are, that, without reference to any country, they must be pursued and apprehended."

Whilst occupying their threatening position in Cachar, the generals of the King of Ava had, moreover, planned the conquest of Jyntia, another petty chiefship, situated similarly with Cachar, in regard to the British frontier; but which having formerly been restored as a gift to the Rajah's family, by the British government, after a temporary convulsion, was more distinctly recognized as a dependency of Bengal. The Rajah of Jyntia, in a letter addressed to him by the Burmese commanders, was called upon to acknowledge submission and allegiance to the King of Ava, and to repair forthwith to the Burman camp. A demonstration was further actually made against Jyntia, to enforce the above requisition, when the British troops frustrated the execution of this hostile and menacing encroachment.

Two successive checks sustained by the armies of his Burmese majesty on the Sylhet frontier, at length induced their partial retreat from the threatening position which they had taken up in that quarter. One party, however, still maintains its position in Cachar, and the retirement of the Assamese force, which had taken post more immediately on the British frontier, has been made under circumstances, indicating no retraction of the hostile designs of the government. The officers and men also of the Honourable Company's armed vessel *Sophia* have been released, but no kind of apology or explanation of their detention has been offered by the chiefs who committed that outrage.

From the foregoing detail it will be evident, that in a season of profound peace, and wholly without provocation, the court of Ammerapura has grossly and wantonly violated the relations of friendship so long established between the two states, and by the hostile conduct and language of its officers, and the actual advance of its forces to several and widely distant points of our frontier, has compelled the British government to take up arms not less in self-defence, than for the assertion of its rights, and the vindication of its insulted dignity and honour.

The scornful silence maintained by the sovereign of Ava, after the lapse of so many months, and the commission of renewed outrages and insults in that interval, obviously by his sanction and command, evince, that all prospect of an honourable and satisfactory adjustment of our differences, by correspondence or negotiation, is at an end. At the same time, the season for military operations is rapidly passing away, and it hence becomes indispensable, whilst an effort may yet be made, to adopt measures, without delay, for repelling the dangers which menace the eastern districts, and for placing the safety of our frontier beyond the reach of the caprice and violence of the Burman monarch.

The Governor General in Council has therefore ordered the advance of the force assembled at Gowalpareh, into the territory of Assam, to dislodge the enemy from the commanding position which they occupy at the head of the Burhampooter, and is prepared to pursue such other measures of offensive warfare

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as the honor, the interests, and the safety of the British government demand recourse to at the present crisis.

Anxious, however, to avert the calamities of war, and retaining an unfeigned desire to avail itself of any proper opening, which may arise for an accommodation of differences with the King of Ava, before hostilities shall have been pushed to an extreme length, the British government will be prepared even yet, to listen to pacific overtures on the part of his Burmese majesty, provided, that they are accompanied with the tender of adequate apology, and involve the concession of such terms as are indispensable to the future security and tranquillity of the eastern frontier of Bengal.

By command of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council,  
GEORGE SWINTON, *Secretary*.

*No. 30.—Proclamation by the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, 5th March, 1824.*

The conduct of the Burmese having compelled the British government to have recourse to arms in support of its rights and honour, the Governor General in Council hereby notifies, that the government of Ava is placed in the condition of a public enemy, and that all British subjects, whether European or Native, are prohibited from holding any communication with the people of that state, until the differences now unhappily existing, shall be terminated.

The Governor General in Council deems it proper to take this opportunity of publicly declaring the causes that have led to hostilities with a state, between which and the Honorable East India Company, a friendly intercourse has long subsisted, to the great advantage of both parties, and with which the British government has invariably sought to cultivate and maintain the relations of amity.

During many years past, the Burmese officers governing the country contiguous to our south-east frontier, have, from time to time, been guilty of acts of encroachment and aggression, which the British government would have been fully justified in repelling by force.

Solicitous, however, to preserve with all nations, the relations of peace, the British government has considered it to be, in an especial manner, its duty to make large allowances for the peculiar circumstances and character of the Burmese government and people. The consciousness of its power to repel and punish aggression has strengthened the motives of forbearance towards a nation removed, by their geographical situation, from the immediate circle of our political relations, and with whom (as we have no opposing interests) the supreme government sought only to maintain a commercial intercourse on terms of equality and freedom, conducive to the welfare and prosperity of both countries.

So long, therefore, as the aggressions of which the British government had to complain, could be treated as the unauthorized acts of the subordinate officers of the Burman government, and could be tolerated consistently with the national honor and the security of the British territories, the supreme government sedulously endeavored to preserve unimpaired the existing relations of peace and friendship, notwithstanding provocations which would have fully justified, and from a state more formidable in position and resources, would have imperiously demanded a resort to arms.

Trusting that the motives of its conciliatory demeanor could not have been misunderstood, the British government persuaded itself that the government of Ava, however extravagant in its pretensions, must have been no less desirous than ourselves to maintain a friendly intercourse so profitable to that country, and could not but be sensible, that as our moderation was founded on a consciousness of our strength, and on a general desire to preserve the blessings of peace, so our forbearance would not be carried beyond the limits where it ceased to be compatible with the safety of our subjects, the integrity of our dominions, and the honor of our country.

Unhappily, these expectations have been disappointed. The Burmese government, actuated by an extravagant spirit of pride and ambition, and elated by its conquests over the petty tribes by which it is surrounded, has ventured to violate the British territories, to attack and slay a party of British sepoys, to seize and imprison British subjects, to avow extensive schemes of mischievous aggression, and to make hostile preparations on our frontier, that leave no doubt of its intention to execute its insolent and unjustifiable threats.

In prosecution of a groundless claim to the island of Shapuree, the Burmese chiefs of Arracan, in a time of profound peace, and without any previous attempt at negotiation on the part of their government, attacked, under cover of night, a small guard of British troops stationed on that island for purposes of police, and drove them from their post with the loss of several lives. No answer has been returned by the court of Ameerpoora to the demand of explanation and atonement which it was of course the duty of the British government instantly to prefer, but which was made in the same spirit of conciliation which had always characterized our communications with the court of Ava. On the contrary, the Burmese local authorities have distinctly



distinctly declared the determination of their sovereign to invade the British dominions unless their groundless claim to Shapuree is unequivocally admitted.

Subsequently to the attack on the island of Shapuree, the commanding officer and several of the crew of the Honorable Company's schooner *Sophia* were insidiously enticed on shore, and carried into the interior, by the order of commissioners specially deputed to Arracan by the Burmese court, and although subsequently released, they have been sent back without any explanation or apology for the insulting outrage.

The Burmese generals on the north-east have, at the same moment, advanced their troops into the country of Cachar, and occupied a post within only five miles of the frontier of Sylhet, notwithstanding that they were distinctly warned by the British authorities, in that quarter, that the petty state of Cachar was under the protection of the British government, and that the movement of their troops must be regarded as an act of hostility to be repelled by force. In both quarters, the Burmese chiefs have publicly declared their determination to enter the British territories in pursuit of alleged offenders against the government of Ava, and have avowed intentions of open hostility as the alternative of our refusing to comply with their unjust and utterly inadmissible pretensions.

Whilst occupying their threatening position on the British frontier, the Burmese government planned, moreover, the conquest of Jyntee, another chiefship situated similarly with Cachar, in regard to the district of Sylhet, and which having formerly been restored by the British authorities to the family of the reigning Rajah, after a temporary convulsion, had been more distinctly recognized as a dependency of Bengal. They called on the Rajah to acknowledge submission and allegiance to the King of Ava, and a demonstration was actually made to enter his territory, when the advance of the British troops frustrated the execution of their hostile design.

The deliberate silence of the court of Amrapoora, as well as the combination and extent of the operations undertaken by its officers, leave it no longer doubtful that the acts and declarations of the subordinate authorities are fully sanctioned by their sovereign, and that that haughty and barbarous court is not only determined to withhold all explanation and atonement for past injuries, but meditates projects of the most extravagant and unjustifiable aggression against the British government.

The Governor General in Council therefore, for the safety of our subjects, and the security of our districts, already seriously alarmed and injured by the approach of the Burmese armies, has felt himself imperatively called on to anticipate the threatened invasion. The national honor no less obviously requires that atonement should be had for wrongs so wantonly inflicted and so insolently maintained, and the national interests equally demand that we should seek, by an appeal to arms, that security against future insult and aggression which the arrogance and grasping spirit of the Burmese government have denied to friendly expostulation and remonstrance.

With these views and purposes, the Governor General in Council has deemed it an act of indispensable duty to adopt such measures as are necessary to vindicate the honor of the British government, to bring the Burmese to a just sense of its character and rights, to obtain an advantageous adjustment of our eastern boundary, and to preclude the recurrence of similar insult and aggression in future.

Still animated by a sincere desire for peace, and utterly averse from all purposes of aggrandizement, the Governor General in Council will rejoice if the objects above-mentioned can be accomplished without carrying the war to extremities. But to whatever length the conduct of the Burmese government may render it necessary to prosecute hostilities, His Lordship in Council relies with confidence on the justice of our cause, on the resources of the government, and on the approved valor of our troops, for the early and successful termination of the contest.

By Command of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council,

GEORGE SWINTON, *Secy. to Govt.*

No. 31.—From *Menla Maha Mengoung*, the Viceroy of Pegu, and of the 32 Provinces of Hanzawoody, to the Bengal Government, representing the Company, received the 17th March, 1824.

The letters brought by Webster's ship were delivered, and on the petition being submitted to the ministers of the most fortunate King of White Elephants, Lord of the Seas and Earth, &c. &c. they observed, that the English protect the Arracanese rebels, who have violated their oaths of allegiance, as well as Jora-jeit, Mora-jeit, the Cassayers, and natives of Eckaba, also Boora Counhay, Chundee Gunda Sing, and the Assamee people; and that Chittagong, Ramoo, and Bengal, form part of the four great cities of Arracan, but that as they were worldly matters, they are not worth notice, on account of the commercial intercourse carried on by seafaring men.



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Shein-mahn is annexed to the four great cities, and because seapoys were stationed there, the governor of Arracan requested, in the first instance, that they might be withdrawn, and afterwards caused them to be expelled by royal authority.

The governor of Arracan has represented, that three ships and three boats are stationed on the opposite side of the Naf, and that a stockade has been erected on the island; also that his messenger, on arriving at Chittagong, was confined there. If this be true, know that the governors on the Burman frontiers have full authority to act, and that until every thing is settled, a communication need not be made to the golden feet.

The Rajahs and generals of Arracan, Ramre, Cheduba, Mecawoody, Bassein, and the western sea-coast would, on hearing these occurrences, rise like giants; for this and for many other considerations, Mengee Maha Bandoola has been appointed to regulate all the state affairs. He is vested with full military powers, and on all important occasions, he must be referred to via Arracan. This appointment has been communicated to all the authorities.

The letter sent by the Governor General states, that he has been newly appointed; he can, therefore, know nothing of the guilt of the Arracanese rebels, and he believes what they represent. Much rests upon those in charge of chokies and such places. Let him ascertain the truth, consider duly every thing, investigate and judge properly, and by petition represent his case to the general, via Arracan.

*No. 32.—Extracts from the Government Gazette.*

April 12.—*Capture of Gowahatty.*—Official intelligence has, we understand, been received from Brigadier MacMorine, dated Camp Pundoonauth, on the left bank of the Berhampooter, 23th March, reporting the occupation by our troops of Gowahatty, the capital of Assam.

Brigadier MacMorine was joined by the howitzers on the 26th of March, when he advanced with the whole force, consisting of the Rungpore Light Infantry, Chumparun Light Infantry, and Dinagopore Local Battalion, and on the morning of the 28th, proceeded to the vicinity of Gowahatty with the view of taking up a position for investing the place.

On his arrival, with the flotilla gun-boats, at Pundoonauth, a reconnoissance was made, by which it was discovered that the Dewan Gorraeh fort had been deserted, the enemy having, during the preceding night, evacuated the whole of their stockades and chokeys, in and adjoining Gowahatty, and retired, it is reported, to Roosah, to join a considerable body of Burmese at that place.

A few loaded iron guns were found in the fort, and a sepoy of the Chumparun Light Infantry possessed himself of a pair of colors, which the enemy had left behind.

Some small parties of sepoys were detached to the town and neighbourhood to take care that the inhabitants were not plundered of what little the Burmese had not carried off with them.

From private accounts, we have gathered the following further particulars. On the 27th, the troops arrived at Plosbang, and the advance guard, under Captain Sneyd, saw about twenty Burmese close to the place where they were to encamp. The Burmese took to flight, and were followed by Captain Sneyd's party until they disappeared in a deep nullah, when a loud shout was set up by about two hundred others from the opposite bank, beating tom-toms, &c. Re-inforcements from the Dinagopore Battalion, and Rungpore Light Infantry having come up, the Burmese retreated, and the party under Captain Sneyd dashed at them, but could not come up with them. They were so closely pursued, however, that some of them hid themselves in the huts of the village that surrounded their post, one of whom was discovered during the day by the villagers, who brought him into camp fastened like a wild beast.

In the stockade abandoned by the Burmese, a dead body was found with the head cut off, and otherwise dreadfully mutilated, and on the preceding night fourteen shots, supposed to be cannon, were distinctly heard in the camp, which the villagers afterwards informed our party, were large jinghals, from which the Burmese had blown fourteen Assamese chiefs suspected of an intention to come over.

It is supposed that no further resistance will be made by the enemy. Several of the Assamese tribes had assembled to cut them up, and prevent their passage through their country to Ava. The Rajah of Dring had accepted our protection, together with a number of petty chiefs. The Rajah of Lucky Dewah and some others, had been carried away by the Burmese.

Five companies of the 23d Native Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Richards, were proceeding up by water, and expected to reach Gowahatty on the evening of the 28th, the day on which Gowahatty was taken. The intelligence of the success of Brigadier MacMorine had reached Mr. Scott, the agent to the Governor General, then at Sylhet, and he had marched to Gowahatty with three companies of the 23d Native Infantry on the 3d instant, across Jyuteepore.

We have been favoured with a copy of the proclamation issued by the British authorities on entering the Assam territory, which in substance is as follows :

"Inhabitants of Assam ! It is well known to you that some years ago the Burmese invaded your territory, and that they have since dethroned the Rajah, plundered the country, slaughtered Brahmins, and women, and cows, defiled your temples, and committed the most barbarous outrages of every kind, so that vast numbers of your countrymen have been forced to seek refuge in our dominions, where they have never ceased to implore our assistance. Notwithstanding our regret at witnessing the miseries to which you were subjected, as we were on friendly terms with the King of Ava, we could not interfere. But now the officers of his Burmese majesty have invaded our dependent territory of Cachar, and there and elsewhere have committed such outrages, and held a language so arrogant and hostile, that we are at length at war. The wished-for opportunity of relieving yourselves from the hands of your oppressors has now arrived. Our victorious army has crossed the boundary, and ere long we will drive the barbarians beyond the Burmahkoond, nor cease until we restore peace and security to your distracted country. Come forward, therefore, without fear for the present or the future. Supply our troops with provisions, for which ready money will be paid, and fail not, where you have an opportunity, to wreak your vengeance on the remnant of those who have caused you so many calamities. We are not led into your country by the thirst of conquest; but are forced, in our own defence, to deprive our enemy of the means of annoying us. You may, therefore, rest assured, that we will never consent to depart until we exclude our foe from Assam, and re-establish in that country a government adapted to your wants, and calculated to promote the happiness of all classes.

May 6.—*Assam*.—Advices have been received from Mr. Scott, the agent to the Governor General, reporting his arrival at Noagaong on the 15th ultimo. This place is described as one of the largest towns in Assam, extending, in a straggling manner, for about twelve miles along both sides of the Kullung river, and containing, it is said, four thousand families. Mr. Scott proposed advancing on the 17th, with the detachment of the 23d Native Infantry, under Captain Horsburgh, to Kulliar, one day's march north-east of Noagaong. The enemy's force stockaded at Maura Mook'h, was understood to consist of 500, natives of the Ava country, and about the same number of Assamese, worse armed than usual, in consequence of almost the whole of their muskets having been thrown away by that portion of their army which fled from Birkola on the 18th of February last. The forward movement on Kalliar is calculated to establish our authority without further delay in the western part of Assam, to secure provisions for the future supplies for the troops, and to dispel the well grounded fears of the inhabitants, that if the country be left much longer unoccupied, the Burmese will recover their courage, and at least deprive us of its resources, if not create a subsequent famine by sending out small parties to devastate and burn the villages. Noagaong is represented to be a place well calculated for a cantonment, and as likely to prove much more healthy than any part of our own frontier, and more abundant in grain.

The Burmese are said to be in great alarm, and sensible of their inability to make any effectual opposition without reinforcements, which they had repeatedly called for from Ava. The inhabitants of the country, through which Mr. Scott had passed, and which seemed to be very populous and well cultivated, had evinced the utmost satisfaction at the arrival of our troops. Such of them as had displayed any backwardness in assisting us were either dependants of the Burmese, or afraid of their return, which latter feeling could only be completely dispelled by the advance of a large force.

Private letters mention, that a messenger, sent with letters to the governor of Assam, had been barbarously murdered by his order. They also describe the country round Noagaong as highly cultivated and very populous, although evidently much less so than it had recently been. Noagaong itself is said to be an immense grove of Beetal and other trees, principally those upon which the Moogul silk worm is fed.

*Further particulars*.—Letters from Russa Chokey, of the 15th of April, state, that the Burmese had left that part of the country, and retired seventy miles higher up, where they had an advanced post at Maura Mook'h. They were said to have been attacked by the Assamese chief Chunder Kaunt, assisted by some of the neighbouring hill tribes, and driven down to Jorbant. Kalliar, the place upon which the detachment, with the Governor General's agent, was advancing, is about a week's march above Goahuttee.

June 7.—*Assam*.—By official reports received from Goahattee, of the 22d May, it appears, that the Burmese who had taken up a stockaded position at Hautbur, on the south bank of the Kullung river, evacuated it on the advance of Lieutenant Colonel Richards, and retired to Runglyghur, where they have a strong stockade, about eight hours march from Kulliar.

On Lieutenant Colonel Richards proceeding with a small guard to examine and give orders for the destruction of the stockade at Hautbur, he was informed on his arrival there, by a villager, that about sixty of the enemy had returned to it. He, in consequence, immediately returned to Captain Horsburgh's camp, and ordered Lieutenant Richardson to repair with the russala of cavalry, and a company of infantry, to endeavour to surprise them. In this he succeeded. The enemy had only time to fire a few shots from the stockade, which

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did not take effect, and ran off to the rear, right upon the cavalry, who had been previously detached to intercept them, and who killed twenty of them, and a Phokun (commander,) all real Burmese. The name of the Phokun killed is supposed to be Tamce, and he is reported to have been the second in command to Boogly Phokun, and to have had the chief management of the enemy's camp.

June 17.—*Assam*.—We are now enabled to give the particulars of the gallant affair with the Burmese, who had advanced to attack Captain Horsburgh's position at Hautbur on the 24th of May.

Lieutenant Colonel Richards had posted Captain Horsburgh with four companies, and the russala, in the stockade at Hautbur, from which the enemy were driven by Lieutenant Richardson on the 17th of May.

It is conjectured, that the enemy advanced upon Captain Horsburgh's position to try their fortune with him before their retreat was finally cut off by Colonel Richards, who was only about four miles in their rear, anxiously waiting the arrival of the elephants, for the conveyance of the guns, and which alone prevented him attacking them eight days before.

At about 3 P. M., on the 24th of May, there was an alarm given, that the enemy was cutting up our grass-cutters; the picket, in consequence, marched out, and Captain Horsburgh got the rest of the men quickly under arms, both cavalry and infantry. When he came up to the picket, he found them carrying on a brisk fire (Lieutenant Jones at their head) with the enemy, who were in the jungle to the right of the road, where they had planted a number of jinjals. He sent Lieutenant Jones to the right with the cavalry, with directions to endeavour, if possible, to get into their rear, and intercept their retreat to their stockade at Runglyghur.

Captain Horsburgh then ordered the picket to proceed along the banks of the river, and went himself with two companies into the jungle on the right of the road, advancing down in as good a line as the thick jungle would admit. The enemy only fired their jinjals once, and fled through the jungle, leaving the jinjals behind. In the mean time, Lieutenant Jones, dashing across with the horsemen to the river, succeeded in cutting off the retreat of about two hundred. Some escaped by swimming, about forty were killed by the Suwars, a number were drowned, and several sabred or shot in the water. The picket which had marched along the banks of the river Kullung, got up in time to kill several in the water. Many of the enemy on horseback attempted to escape by swimming their horses, but they were thrown from their saddles in the middle of the stream; the horses, or rather tattoos, swimming back, fell into our hands, together with a number of old muskets, brass drums, and about eighteen jinjals.

The enemy are said to have retired to a place called Oopah Ruttra, two long marches from Runglyghur, where they were making another stockade.

The particulars of the attack made on Gowahatty by Captain Wallace, detached by Colonel Richards, with one hundred men, against a party of one hundred and twenty, are as follows:

At 2 A. M., Captain Wallace proceeded with his detachment and flotilla, on the 4th ultimo, to the north bank of the Burrumpooter, and advancing about three miles up the Bishenath river, disembarked, and marched to the enemy's position, distant about six miles, where he arrived at half-past seven in the morning. The enemy were on the alert, and had taken precautionary measures to ascertain our approach by placing men in trees within the vicinity of the place, who observed the advance of the detachment at the distance of four or five hundred yards, so that they had merely sufficient time to make their escape, as the rear of the enemy were just leaving their position when the detachment entered it. There is every reason to believe that the enemy had but little baggage, and that from the few bundles of clothes, &c. which have been captured in the pursuit, it appears that such as they did possess had been previously packed up to be removed at a moment's notice.

Captain Wallace had calculated upon arriving at the enemy's position at dawn of day, but unforeseen circumstances on the Burrumpooter at night, without the advantage of moonlight, in a river from six to eight miles in breadth, unfortunately frustrated his intentions. A few arms were captured, seven prisoners, and three women.

It is satisfactory to observe, that the information obtained by the guide and intelligence department, under the immediate authority and control of Lieutenant Neufville, deputy assistant quarter-master general, who accompanied the detachment, was perfectly correct in every point of view.

Captain Wallace destroyed the position by fire before his return to the boats.

June 28.—*Assam*.—From the information we have received of the strength and disposition of the enemy in Assam, it appears that the force at Maura Mook'h consists of one thousand, under the personal command of the Boorah Rajah (Governor of Assam), who is looking for reinforcements from above. At Dee Soab, or Joorhath, between Maura Mook'h and Rungpoor, one hundred—At Rungpoor, one thousand. These comprise the entire force of the enemy in Assam at present, with the exception of the small party near Bishenath, and it is believed that there are not five hundred real Burmese at this time in the whole country of Assam.

By all accounts that have been received, the situation of Maura Mook'h differs much from the stockades we have hitherto met with, which are all indebted, more or less, for strength to nature. But Maura Mook'h appears



appears to be upon a perfectly open plain on the bank of the river, and defended with all the art and strength in their power. It is of great extent, and constructed, as usual, of beetal trees and bamboos, forming strong palisades, and surrounded by ditches, every where closely staked and spiked.

The party repulsed and dispersed by Captain Horsburgh, are supposed to have fled towards Maura Mook'h, which is considered as their grand point of resistance to the attack of any force.

*No. 33.—Copy of a Report from Captain Noton to the Major of Brigade at Chittagong, dated Camp, Ramoo, 11th May, 1824.*

On the 11th instant, a naik, from the Rutnapulling stockade, came in with a Bengalee villager, stating that the latter had seen the enemy advancing upon Rutnapulling, with four chiefs and about one hundred and fifty men, wishing to negotiate, which the naik also stated to be the case.

Conceiving this to be some design of the enemy to put the jemadar off his guard, and thereby more easily gain possession of the stockade, I determined upon moving with the whole of my disposable force to ascertain what their intentions were, leaving the convalescents of the 23d, the whole of the provincials, and one hundred Mugs, to protect the cantonment and sick, in case the enemy might detach a party to outflank me.

I moved off about five P. M., the detachment 23d Native Infantry leading. On our arriving near to the stockade (about half a mile), a heavy fire was opened upon us from the hills on the left of the road, which the enemy had taken possession of in numbers and fortified; their larger guns were fired from the further hill, and the smaller ones from the lower, thereby completely commanding the road. The naik of the provincial battalion, who had come to give the report with the Bengalee in the first instance, told me that we were very near the plain where the stockade was; I consequently pushed on with the detachment of the 23d, and reached the plain. I then returned with a few men to bring on the guns, directing Ensign Campbell to follow, should I not join him in a short time. It was then to my disappointment that I found that two of the elephants had thrown their loads and blocked up the road. This, Captain Pringle reported to me, was the fault of the mahouts.

To extricate the gun, which, together with the gear, was hanging to the elephant, we were obliged to cut the ropes, but from the inexperience of Lieutenant Scott (having never seen guns carried on elephants before,) and none of the golundauze being present, after many trials, and failing in all, I was obliged to leave it, and take steps for carrying away the ammunition, which the other elephant had thrown off, and also that which had been left on the road by some coolies, who had run off. Previous to this, I had been joined by Ensign Campbell. We with difficulty succeeded in getting it away, chiefly by the exertions of the sepoy, the Mugs having hid themselves in the jungles, with the exception of a very few, who assisted the sepoy. After this was effected, I proceeded quietly with a small party of sepoy and an elephant, and brought in the gun, with as many things as I could find, though several articles are missing.

To give the men some rest, and an opportunity of procuring water, I took up a position on the plain, and there remained on the alert during the night. One of the Mugs fancied he saw some Burmahs creeping towards us, and commenced a running fire, which was with difficulty stopped, otherwise we remained quiet. The enemy were firing and shouting during the whole time. From the circumstance of the ammunition-coolies having deserted, and the guns being rendered perfectly useless, by the great deficiency in the detail of artillery, and not placing any confidence in the Mugs for support, should we again have experienced a fire from the hills, even by taking a circuitous route, and there being no possibility of procuring supplies for the men, I deemed it most prudent to return again to Ramoo, there to await the arrival of Captain Trueman's detachment, as well as to obtain further information as to the strength of the enemy's force.

On my return to Ramoo, I was surprised to hear that the jemadar, with his party from Rutnapulling, had arrived about two hours before.

I regret to say our loss has been severe; in all seven missing and eleven wounded. I am sorry to say that Ensign Bennett is among the latter, being severely wounded in the left arm, though I trust not of any very serious consequence. Ensign Campbell likewise received a hurt in the right ankle, from a spent ball, and also some shots in his legs. The whole of the wounded are doing well.

I beg leave to state, that there were a few of the Mug levy, that were under the immediate eye of Captain Pringle (to whom every credit is due for his exertions) who behaved with great coolness and much to my satisfaction, as well in firing upon the enemy, as in assisting our sepoy in carrying off the ammunition. The men of the detachment of the 23d Native Infantry advanced with great steadiness, notwithstanding the suddenness of the attack upon them, and the very heavy fire that was kept up for upwards of three hours from a hidden foe; and I deem it but justice to Ensigns Campbell and Bennett, on the occasion to report, that they both deserved the greatest credit for their coolness and exertions throughout.

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I beg to add, that Lieutenant Scott shewed every anxiety to bring the guns forward, but was prevented by the circumstances above-mentioned.

*No. 34.—Extract from a Dispatch from Lieutenant Colonel Shapland, c. B. Commanding Chittagong Frontier; dated 18th May, 1824.*

It is with the utmost concern that I have to report for the information of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, that as I was making preparations for advancing from this place towards the frontier, I received the melancholy intelligence of Captain Noton's detachment having been completely destroyed by the Burmese force on the 16th instant.

I received this information from Captain Brandon, commanding left wing 23d regiment, who is of course retiring to join me: under the present circumstances, I intend to re-cross the Sunker river, which is immediately behind me, and retire to Chittagong, to provide for the defence of that station.

*No. 35.—Extract from a Dispatch from Lieutenant Colonel Shapland, c. B. Commanding Chittagong Frontier; dated 20th May, 1824.*

I have the honor to report for His Excellency the Commander in Chief, that being joined by the detachment of the 1st battalion 23d Native Infantry regiment, I returned to Chittagong this morning with the detachment, which was advancing towards Ramoo: when the disastrous event occurred at that place.

I enclose a report of the officers who have escaped after the action.

*Report of the Action at Ramoo, received from Lieutenant Scott, Lieutenant Codrington, and Ensign Campbell.*

Information having been required, relative to the retreat of Captain Noton's detachment from Ramoo on the 17th instant, we being the only surviving officers beg leave to forward a condensed statement of the circumstances which have fallen under our observation, for the information of Brigadier Shapland, c. B., commanding the district.

The Burmese, amounting it is supposed to ten thousand men, advanced on Ramoo from the Rutnapulung road, and encamped on the south side of the river on the 13th instant. On the following evening, being within gun shot, and advancing apparently with the intention of fording the river, a party, with two six-pounders, under the command of Captain Trueman, was detached for the purpose of annoying the enemy, and frustrating any attempt to cross; this our troops effected.

On the 15th, however, the enemy at 8 A. M. advanced, and commenced entrenching themselves about three hundred yards in front of our position, the right flank of which was protected by the river and by a tank, about sixty paces in advance. This being surrounded by a high embankment, serving as a breast-work, was occupied by the picquet, who opened and kept up, without intermission, a fire on the enemy during the whole day and following night. Our position was strengthened in the rear by a similar tank to that in front, for the defence of which a strong detachment from the provincial battalion and Mug levy was allotted.

On the morning of the 16th, it was discovered that the enemy had, during the night, opened trenches on our left flank, and had considerably advanced those in front, a desultory fire was continued during the next twenty-four hours from each tank, but with little effect on either side.—By day break on the 17th, the enemy had carried on their trenches to within twelve paces of the picquet, and had also approached to within a short distance of the tank in our rear.—They gained possession of the latter about 10 A. M., the troops defending it, having quitted their post and fled with precipitation; the consternation caused by this quickly spread, and they were almost immediately followed by the remainder of the Mug levy. The elephants (on one of which Lieutenant Scott, who had been severely wounded, was tied) were alarmed at the tumult and fled.

Shortly after this (our rear being now undefended) Captain Noton ordered a retreat, which was effected in good order for about half a mile.

The two six-pounders being from necessity abandoned. The enemy's cavalry, however, pressing hard upon the men of the column, a square was ordered to be formed, but, in consequence of the excessive fatigue and privation which the troops had previously undergone, rendering them absolutely incapable of offering any effectual resistance to the overwhelming masses of the enemy, pouring in on them on every side, the utmost exertions of the officers to preserve discipline were unavailing, and on our arrival at the river, the sepoy's dispersed in every direction, and individual safety became the primary object of each. Under these lamentable circumstances, Ensigns Codrington and Campbell having seen the other officers cut to pieces by the enemy, together with the greater part of the detachment, and deeming all further chance of resistance hopeless,



less, escaped, the former closely pursued to Cox's Bazar, and thence by water to Chittagong, and the latter, who was slightly wounded, by a circuitous route through the hills, to the same place.

No. 36.—*Extracts from the Government Gazette.*

July 8.—*Ramoo*.—As the details hitherto published of the affair at Ramoo, convey but an imperfect notion of the whole circumstances which occurred on that disastrous occasion, we avail ourselves of a plan, which we have received, descriptive of Captain Noton's position at Ramoo between the 13th and 17th of May, and a narrative in explanation, drawn up by one of the surviving officers. We were commencing upon a lithographic sketch of the scene of action, but further consideration induced us to think that the following particulars would be sufficiently explanatory.

The narrative is nearly as follows :

On the morning of the 13th, the enemy appeared advancing from Ramcote and the Rutnapulling road, and occupied, as they arrived, the hills east of Ramoo. The picquet under the officer on duty was detached to reconnoitre, and oppose any attempt of the enemy to ford the river, with orders also to fire on them if they approached within musquet shot on the opposite bank. The enemy remained stationary till about three p. m. when a large body (probably half their force,) took up a position under the hills to the southward, which led us to expect that they would attack us in the course of the night, and the troops accordingly remained under arms. The enemy, however, engaged themselves in strengthening their position with breast-works, and about noon, on the following day, abandoned it, and rejoined the other body.—On their way they halted, and Captain Noton communicated with two horsemen, who approached the opposite bank of the river, who disavowed any hostile intention of the Burmese towards us, but desired only, that some rebellious subjects, under our protection, should be delivered up to them—offering at the same time, to explain further the views of the Burmese, provided Captain Noton would allow them to cross the river with a guard of one hundred horsemen, and guarantee the safety of that party. Captain N., however, placing little confidence in these assertions, rejected their proposal, and the enemy again moved off. The horsemen appeared to be Musselmen of Hindoostan, and one of them mentioned his having been formerly in Skinner's horse, and repeated, as a proof of it, the names of several officers in the H. C. service. We had no means of ascertaining correctly the numbers of the enemy's force, but from their occupying, when encamped, an extent of ground upwards of a mile in length, it was generally considered that they could not have amounted to less than ten thousand fighting men, (including about two hundred Cavalry,) besides, at least, an equal number of coolies and camp-followers. (Captain Noton's force consisted of the right wing 1st battation 23d Native Infantry, which had been reduced by sickness to about two hundred and fifty men fit for duty, three companies 2d battalion 20th Native Infantry, not exceeding one hundred men, about two hundred and fifty of the Provincial Battalion, and four hundred of the Mug Levy, amounting altogether to one thousand men. Although Captain Noton placed little confidence on the Provincials, from their conduct on a former occasion, or on the Mug Levy, from the little military instruction they had received, and the short period they had been in the service, yet so confidently did he depend on being joined in a day or two, by reinforcements from Chittagong, that he determined, with the concurrent opinion of every officer present, to defend, against such superior numbers, the post which he commanded.

On the evening of the 14th, (the enemy's whole force being concentrated on the opposite bank of the river, apparently with an intention of crossing at a favourable opportunity,) the two six-pounders, with Captain Trueman's detachment and the picquet, were detached for the purpose of annoying the enemy in their encampment, and preventing their fording the river, should they attempt it. Several rounds of grape and shrapnell were fired from the six-pounders with effect, and appeared to create much confusion. On our return to camp, a party of the enemy came round to the river, and the picquet was engaged in a sharp skirmish with them, the two six-pounders returning the fire of their jinjals, which were quickly silenced. The enemy had, in the mean time, set fire to most of the surrounding villages and huts, and our troops remained on the alert the whole night in expectation of an attack.

On the following morning, (15th,) the enemy crossed the river unobserved, and advanced in great numbers, but without any regularity, towards a tank, of which they took possession. Captain Noton directing the picquet to occupy the second tank, (which as well as all the other tanks was surrounded by a high embankment, serving as a breast-work,) took up his position behind an embankment about three feet high, which completely surrounded our camp, of which the 20th and 23d Native Infantry, with the two six-pounders, occupied the front or eastern face, the right flank being protected by the river and the tank, and the Provincials and Mug Levy (with the exception of a strong party of the former, and two hundred and fifty of the latter, allotted for the defence of a third tank, were posted on the north face. The two six-pounders opened a destructive fire



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on the enemy, at a distance of about two hundred and thirty yards, as they ran across the plain to reach the tank, and the picquet also commenced a fire on them, when within musquet shot, but they so cautiously concealed themselves in the neighbouring huts and behind trees, and so expeditiously entrenched themselves, that our fire could not have been very effectual. About ten a. m., the enemy appearing to meditate an attack on the picquet, it was reinforced by the detachment 2-20th under Captain Trueman, who shortly afterwards was slightly wounded—A party of the Mug Levy had been in the mean time detached to a small spot of rising ground on our left, within musquet shot of the tank occupied by the enemy, on whom they kept up a constant fire the greater part of the day. Captain Trueman's detachment, after remaining with the picquet till sunset, and keeping up a desultory fire on the enemy, who exposed themselves as little as possible, was withdrawn, leaving the usual picquet of eighty men for the defence of the tank.

Information was this day received from Chittagong, that the left wing of 1-23d Native Infantry, under Captain Brandon, would leave that place on the 13th, and join us with all practicable expedition, and Captain Noton having now every reason to expect with certainty the arrival of this reinforcement on the evening of the 16th, persevered in his former determination to defend his post till that time.

Captain Pringle, Commanding Mug Levy, and Ensign Bennett, 23d Native Infantry, were slightly wounded in the course of the day—the former, whilst endeavouring to restore order amongst a party of Provincials, who were quitting their post in confusion, and the latter, in reinforcing with his company, the tank defended by the Provincials, who also betrayed symptoms of alarm. The picquet continued the fire on the enemy throughout the night, and on the morning of the 16th, it was found that they had considerably advanced their trenches, but were still at such a distance from our main body, that the picquet only was engaged with them—we were not, however, out of the reach of the enemy's musquet balls, which appeared to range much further than ours, and Lieutenant Scott, in directing the guns to another position, was severely wounded, and was obliged to quit the field instantly. The enemy took an opportunity, about noon, of setting fire to the Mug barracks in our rear, but no advantage of any importance was gained on either side. About nine p. m., Captain Noton received information, that the Provincials had betrayed an intention of deserting us and going over to the enemy, and on repairing to the spot, the elephants were found loaded with their baggage, and appeared on the very point of starting. Captain Noton instantly secured the ring-leaders, and took measures to prevent the remainder from carrying their intention into effect.

Under such unlooked-for and unfortunate circumstances, Captain Noton at first determined instantly to commence a retreat, which, from the darkness of the night, would have been undertaken at the most favourable opportunity, and with that intention directed Lieutenant Scott, (severely wounded,) to be fastened on an elephant, to enable him to accompany the detachment. Reluctant, however, to quit the post, which he had so long and so successfully defended, without allowing the enemy to gain a single advantage over him, and anxiously, but confidently expecting to be joined in a few hours by Captain Brandon's detachment, he at length, (depending solely on the courage and good discipline of the regular troops in the event of an attack,) once more resolved, with the concurrence of the officers, to hold out till the arrival of the wished-for reinforcement, which it was considered could not be delayed beyond the following morning.

The enemy were very active during the night in carrying on their trenches, keeping up, at the same time, a constant fire, which was returned by the picquet. On the morning of the 17th, Lieutenant Campbell, on being relieved from picquet duty, was slightly wounded, in passing between the tank to our position, where the enemy's fire was so severe and dangerous, that Captain Noton had directed the picquet to be relieved before day-break. The enemy's nearest trench appeared, at day-break, to be within thirty yards of the picquet, and shortly afterwards a single man advanced, and being protected from our musquetry, in a recumbent posture, by the raised site of a Bengallee hut, which had been burnt on the preceding day, commenced entrenching himself within twelve paces of the picquet, and was quickly joined by numbers from the enemy's main force. The tank in our possession was also similarly invested, and the fire on both sides was now incessant, and at so short a distance, proportionably formidable and effectual. At about nine a. m., the Provincials became so alarmed at the near approach of the enemy, that they quitted their post and fled with precipitation; the two hundred and fifty of the Mug Levy followed their example, and the tank was instantly taken possession of by the enemy, the remaining body of the Mug Levy almost immediately followed, and the elephants (on one of which Lieutenant Scott was fastened,) took fright also, and ran off with the fugitives at full speed.

It will be clearly seen that our position became untenable (or at least comparatively so) the instant that either of the two tanks which we defended, fell into the hands of the enemy, and very nearly surrounded, as we now were, by an enemy whose numbers were from the first overwhelming, and had been daily increasing since the 15th, and left to oppose them with a body of men not exceeding four hundred, fatigued and exhausted from having constantly remained under arms, day and night, since the morning of the 13th, without any interval of rest, or any other sustenance but that which a handful of rice occasionally afforded them, we had

no other alternative, but to attempt a retreat instantly. The bugle was sounded repeatedly for the recall of the picquet, but from the heavy fire which was kept up at the time, it was not heard, and as there was no time to lose, the detachment commenced its retreat. The officer on picquet, in the mean time, totally ignorant of Captain Noton's intention, and anxiously looking out for Captain Brandon's detachment, which was erroneously reported to be in sight, perceived by chance the retrograde movement of the detachment after it had proceeded a considerable distance. The picquet was then instantly withdrawn, and joined the main body, which (having from necessity abandoned the two six-pounders,) proceeded in tolerable order for about half a mile, keeping up a desultory fire on the enemy, who poured in on us on every side in immense numbers. On the arrival of the enemy's cavalry, who fell upon our rear and cut to pieces numbers of sepoy, the detachment quickened its paces, and the utmost combined exertions of the officers to preserve the ranks, and effect the formation of a square, were unavailing, and each corps and company presently became so intermingled with each other, that all order and discipline became at an end. The exertions of the officers, both European and native, to restore order, were nevertheless persevered in till our arrival at the river, when the detachment dispersed and each sepoy hastily divesting himself of his arms, accoutrements, and clothes, plunged into the river and endeavoured to gain the opposite bank. Captain Noton, who was on foot, having been left in the rear by the rapid pace of the detachment, was overtaken by the enemy, who having brought him to the ground by a musquet ball, barbarously cut him to pieces. Captain Trueman was overtaken under similar circumstances by the enemy's horse, who dismounted and cut him down in cold blood. Captain Pringle and Ensign Bennett were killed in attempting to cross the river, (which was not fordable,) but Lieutenant Campbell succeeded in reaching the opposite bank in safety, and escaped to the hills, whence he afterwards proceeded towards Chittagong, and reached that place with much difficulty on the 20th. Lieutenant Codrington made repeated attempts to cross the river on horseback, but at length finding himself followed by some of the enemy's horse, escaped (closely pursued by them a great part of the way,) to Cox's Bazar, and thence by water to Chittagong. Lieutenant Scott also escaped on the elephant before alluded to, but the concurrent account of the sepoys who have escaped leave no room to hope that either of the remaining officers (Lieutenant Grigg and Dr. Maysmor,) could have been equally fortunate.

It is but justice to the regular troops engaged to state, that they behaved with the greatest coolness and bravery throughout, and it was not until the enemy's horse had cut to pieces numbers in our rear that any confusion or alarm was betrayed. The Mug Levy also conducted themselves equally well till the Provincials set them a disgraceful example, which, considering all circumstances, it is not perhaps surprising that they followed.

*No. 37.—Extract from a Dispatch from Colonel Shapland, Commanding Chittagong Frontier; dated 21st May, 1824.*

I have the honor to report for the information of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the account received by Mr. Robertson to-day from Chuckereeah mentions, that the enemy had arrived at that place. I am making every preparation for them in my power, by strengthening the hills which I have selected as a position for the troops. I have as yet received no report of the actual march of the wing of the 15th Native Infantry, though I trust it must be now on its way, as I repeated the urgency of my receiving every reinforcement which could be spared from Dacca.

I forgot to mention in my letter of yesterday, that Ensign Campbell, of the 23d, had arrived here slightly wounded, having escaped with a few of the men of his company. The enemy, by every account, in the affair at Ramoo, gave no quarter whatever.

It has not yet been ascertained how many of the Ramoo detachment escaped, as some men belonging to it daily arrive; as soon as I can collect an accurate statement of them, I shall have the honor of forwarding it.

*No. 38.—Extracts from the Government Gazette.*

May 31.—*Chittagong.*—Accounts received from Chittagong, between the 22d and 25th instant, represent that tranquillity is greatly restored, and that large bodies of the Mugs had arrived in the neighbourhood, whom the magistrate was endeavoring to settle in some convenient situation, their services being considered of the greatest use in the event of offensive operations, as little reliance could be placed on any other class of the inhabitants.

The following particulars respecting the fate of the officers engaged in the affair at Ramoo, had been collected from various accounts given by the sepoys and others, who had been present in the action, and found their way back to Chittagong. Captain Noton, it is said, was cut down by the enemy after the complete dispersion of his detachment. A Soobadar of the Provincials declares, that he saw him spike the two six-pounders

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with his own hand immediately before he fell. Captain Trueman appears to have been destroyed by some of the enemy's horse, when unarmed and defenceless, after the close of the action. Lieutenant Grigg is supposed to have fallen by a musket shot during the engagement. Captain Pringle is said to have been attacked and killed by two of the enemy's cavalry, when endeavouring to make his escape on horseback. Ensign Bennett is believed to have been killed, while attempting to swim across the Ramoo river. Of Mr. Maysmor's fall, no particular information had transpired, but there was not the slightest reason to hope, that he had escaped.

On the 22d instant, a sepoy of the 23d Regiment, who had been taken prisoner at Ramoo, arrived in company with a Bengalee Zemiindar, bringing a letter from the Burmese commanders, a translation of which will be found below.

*Translation of a Letter from the Rajah of Arracan and other Burmese Authorities*

Our master, the lord of the white elephant, the great chief, the protector of the poor and oppressed, wishes that the people of both countries should remain in peace and quiet.

The Bengalees of Chittagong excited a dispute about the deep of Shapoorce which belongs to Arracan. To prevent all dissention, by orders of Ezumaba Sunadwuddee, the general, a letter was sent by Hussain Ullee, Doobashee, to the judge of Chittagong, who wisely relinquished the deep of Shapoorce, as belonging to Arracan. After this, some mischievous persons misled the English gentlemen, and caused a dispute and an encounter between the English soldiers and our people, whereon the general advanced from Pegu, with a large force into Arracan, and with a view to the tranquillity of the two great countries, came to Rutnapulling, and sent a message calculated to benefit both parties, through Hussain Ullee, Doobashee, to the Bengalee captain and commandant of the stockade.

While this conference was going on, a number of Bengalee and Mug sepoys arrived from Ramoo, and began to fire with musket and cannon at the Burmese, among whom Hussain Ullee was wounded.

On this the Burmese also commenced the combat, and putting the Bengalee and Mug troops to flight, shewed forbearance, and refrained from killing them. The surdars forbade them killing any one. Still no letter came from the judge of Chittagong, and therefore we remained at Ramoo.

Our soldiers injured none of the poor inhabitants, and committed no oppressions, and destroyed no inhabitants, yet the English gentlemen, with the Bengalee sepoys, began firing upon us from muskets and cannon. At last the Burmese surdars advanced with a Doobashee, to say what would have contributed to pacify both states. On this the Bengalee sepoys began a fire, which the Burmese were obliged to return, a battle ensued, many were killed, many wounded, and many put to flight. The people of Ramoo set fire to their own village and burned it. The judge and colonel of Chittagong, the generals and chieftains of Calcutta, are all men of wisdom and intelligence: from their keeping and protecting the traitor Hynja, all of these calamities arise. We send this letter by a Bengalee whom we took at Ramoo, 8th Jeth 1186, *Mug Era*.

*No. 39.—Extract from a Despatch from Lieutenant Colonel Shapland ; dated 2d June, 1824.*

In continuation of my reports for the information of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, I have to inform you, that by the accounts received to-day, the Burmese are represented not to have made any further advance from Ramoo and Eadgong.

*No. 40.—Extract from a Despatch from Lieutenant Colonel Shapland ; dated 5th June, 1824.*

I have the honor to acknowledge my receipt of your letter dated the 23d instant, communicating the intended embarkation of a detachment of Artillery, and of His Majesty's 44th Regiment, on two pilot schooners for Chittagong.

By every account, the Burmahs still remain as reported in my former letters, but no information which can be relied on, as to their future designs, has been received.

The rainy season has set in here with much violence during the last three days.

*No. 41.—Extracts from the Government Gazette.*

July 1.—*Ramoo*.—Some Arracan Mugs having effected their escape to Chittagong from Ramoo, the information they have given respecting the enemy at that place is contained in the following abstract of their dispositions, taken before Colonel Shapland on the 21st of June.

Napoo



Napoo states, that the four Ava chiefs named Uttawion Mung Khan, Uttawion Mung Jut, Challee Waion, and Keoo Lumboo, with the four Rajahs of Arracan, Raynberry, Chaindoo, and Chedooba, were detached by the Maha Bundoola, with fifteen thousand men from Arracan, to attack the English force at Ramoo, where a battle took place, in which five hundred Burmese were slain. About the 10th of June a despatch reached Ramoo from the Bundoola, and he heard the Burmese say that it communicated "the intelligence of the fall of Rangoon, Bassein, and Chedooba, and that the English were on their way to Ava. That the Rajahs and sirdars were immediately to detach reinforcements." The sirdars and Rajahs forthwith consulted together, and without loss of time detached five thousand musketeers to the Bundoola at Arracan. Ten thousand men remained at Ramoo, from which parties have been detached to Rutnapulling and Tek Naf, but he cannot specify their strength. They have no force elsewhere in that quarter, but send parties during the day to Cox's Bazar, Eadgong, and Burwah Kullee, to look out, and they always return at nightfall to Ramoo. Before the despatch of the five thousand from Ramoo to the Bundoola, he had with him at Arracan eight hundred men. The deponent also heard that the English had taken Assam fort, and killed a general of the sultan of Ava, named Mung Kirraroo. Napoo was a servant of the Burmese sirdar Challee Waion. He had to cut grass in the day time, and pound rice at night, and not being able to stand this hard work, he ran away in the hopes of better fortune at Chittagong, a week before the date of his deposition.

Nabookee corroborates Napoo's statement respecting the Burmese force sent against Ramoo, but includes three hundred horse. He says that the Burmese captured one elephant, two guns, and three hundred muskets, and three officers' horses. He also corroborates the particulars of the despatch received from the Bundoola with regard to the capture of Rangoon. Three English ships had arrived at Chedooba, and captured the island, upon which the Rajah escaped to Arracan. In the conflict at Ramoo, three hundred Burmese were killed, which he saw with his own eyes. Hussain Ullee, the Burmese Dobashee, was disabled by a shot through his arm, and one in the hip. The deponent knows not how many of the English were killed and wounded, but many of the sepoy were made prisoners, and sent to the Bundoola at Arracan. He understood from the Burmese that the English were proceeding from Rangoon and Bassein, to capture Seemana, and that the force which took Chedooba was attacking Chaindoo. He also heard, that from the ten thousand men at Ramoo, two thousand five hundred were detached to secure Rutnapulling, and a number to Tek Naf. He saw no English officers at Ramoo. He was told by the Burmese that there were under a sirdar, whose name he does not remember, one thousand men in the Mungdoo stockade, and he heard it whispered, that a general of the sultan of Ava, named Mung Kirraroo, had been killed at Assam, the fort of which had been taken by the English. Both Napoo and Nabookee were servants of the sirdar Challee Waion, and ran away on the same plea.

The accounts received since the departure of these men from Ramoo, state the Burmese force to be remaining quiet there.

June 10.—*Chittagong*.—Accounts from the southward mention that the enemy had not advanced beyond Eadgong, where they have a small post, the bulk of their force continuing at Ramoo. There was a rumour that the Burmese were constructing a road through the jungles and mountains towards Runguneeah!

The force concentrating at Chittagong is considerable. Besides the detachment of H. M. 44th Regiment, which left Calcutta on the 24th ultimo, two battalions of Madras Infantry are almost daily expected there.

The Cavalry which the enemy had at Ramoo are called Munnipore Horse, but it is believed that there were among them some individuals who had served in our irregular corps. They appear to have been very active in the dispersion of Captain Noton's detachment at Ramoo, but to have shewn a much greater disposition to give quarter than the Burmese, from whose hands they are said to have saved the lives of many of our men.

June 12.—*Extract from a Letter, dated Naf River, June 4th, 1824, H. C. C. Vestal*.—Yesterday, at 7 A. M., the Subadar in charge of the stockade at Tek Naf came on board, after enduring much hardship and peril, to inform us that the provincial troops under his command, had mutinied, and given themselves up to the Burmese, after refusing to obey his orders *under fire* upon the enemy the preceding evening, under which circumstances he immediately spiked the gun and destroyed the ammunition belonging to it, and would have done the same with the magazine, but the sepoy threatened to take his life if he did so. He escaped to us in disguise with his orderly, having seen the Burmese, whose force consists of one hundred and twenty horse and a large body of foot.

Supplies being now cut off, and our stay of no further utility, at three P. M. weighed and stood down the river. At Mundoo creek, we fell in with a fleet of Burmese war boats, most of them carrying swivels and one hundred men each, drawn out in order of battle, one came off with an order for us immediately to surrender the vessel, or every hand on board would be massacred. The gun boats, under Mr. Boyce's command, returned for answer a shower of grape and cannister, and bore down upon them, firing as fast as they could load.

Chittagong.  
1824.

An immense number of men were killed, and some of the largest boats totally disabled. Nothing could exceed the high spirited conduct of Mr. Boyce, the artillery-men, and Mug sepoy in the boat, under his command.

After silencing the boats and men on shore, who had kept up a close fire during the attack, the vessel made for Shapuree island, where a great number of boats and men lay, who, upon our pouring in a brisk fire, drew up their boats and ran into the jungle, but not before a vast number were killed, in fact, they were literally mown down by our great guns. By this time the gun boats came up, which were left to complete the confusion by clearing the shore and jungle, which they did most effectually. While the brig bore down on the stockade, situated on the opposite shore, on nearing it they gave us three cheers, or more properly speaking three war whoops, but our first broadside soon silenced them, the boats likewise gave their assistance in this grand object. Night coming on, we anchored a little to the southward of the stockade. All the men under arms and at their quarters during the whole of the night, expecting an attack in the dark, but the great loss they sustained during the day I fancy deterred them.

This morning we weighed and are now on our way to Chittagong, not a boat to be seen in the river, I conceive there were yesterday at least two thousand men afloat, and twice that number on shore. To give you an idea of the havock made among them would be impossible, and had not the night prevented, it would have been much greater. During our stay at anchor, we saw the place we left in the morning on fire, but as the villages were deserted some time ago, no great damage could have been done. Our decks exhibit a most motley group of men, women, and children, with 32 Mug sepoy, together with the Subadar, Daroga and Mug Jemidars, who have put themselves under our protection.

July 12.—*Chittagong*.—The reply of the Rajah of Arracan to the acting magistrate's application for the release of the two officers, supposed to be prisoners in the Ramoo stockade, has been received. He distinctly denies that any English gentlemen were taken prisoners, either by him or his sirdars. The magistrate had informed him of Rangoon and Cheduba being in the possession of the English, to which he replied that, in consequence, the Sultan had sent his generals, colonels, and other chieftains to Rangoon, as well as to Munnipore and Assam, and that they had arrived at those places. "Now," he concludes, "have the evil minded men of Munnipore, Assam, and Arracan, caused a quarrel between the two states, and therefore war exists!"

The messenger employed to convey the magistrate's letter, has added some particulars regarding his mission. When the contents of the letter were read, the Rajah said, that no English gentlemen were taken prisoners; if that had been the case, he would have been happy to release them. "If the English," he observed, "have taken any of our people at Rangoon, and will release them, it will be an act of kindness!" Every person present corroborated the assertion that no Englishmen had been taken prisoners at Ramoo, and that none were in confinement in the stockade. The messenger was three days in attendance, and was told that there were about eight thousand men at Ramoo, Rutnapulling, and Cox's Bazar, that the Bundoola was expected to arrive with nine thousand men on the new moon, and that the Burmese consider it certain, if he comes, the whole force will advance to Chittagong! Moreover, the Bundoola is represented as a man of a fierce and violent disposition! Their cavalry, in number two hundred and thirty, is still at Ramoo. The messenger saw two blacksmiths' forges constantly at work, repairing arms of every description! The walls of the stockade are *nine cubits thick*, which the Burmese are confident will be sufficient to resist the English artillery.

There is said to be increased vigilance among the Burmese at Ramoo. Their piquets and outposts are frequently relieved, and instead of the Bundoola being expected with nine thousand men, and marching to Chittagong, they seem to show strong indications of expecting an attack from our troops.

August 21.—*Ramoo*.—Yesterday accounts were received from Chittagong of the evacuation of Ramoo by the Burmese. This information is founded on the deposition and letter of two natives from that quarter.

One of them, with seventeen others in company, on reaching the Bukhalee river, on the 27th of July, met with a Mug woman, who, on being asked why there were no Burmese about the place, replied that they had all fled from Ramoo. The party crossed in a boat, and went into the fort, where they found the fires burning, the food ready dressed, but not a single man. They entered several houses, which were all deserted. Two of the party went to the southward, towards Rutnapulling, to look after some of their Mussulman Ryots, but they saw no one. They went to the eastward, and on returning, reported that the Burmese must have retired by the road over the Sonacharry or Muglating hill.—There were many broken d'bows and digging tools scattered about the fort, but no other weapons. These particulars are corroborated by others, who had also visited the stockade at Ramoo.

The most probable cause of the evacuation of Ramoo by the Burmese, is the alarm excited at the court of Ava, by the failure of the grand attempt to drive our army into the sea at Rangoon, on the 1st of July, and the tremendous overthrow which the Burmese troops received on the 8th. On the receipt of those accounts, nothing is more likely than that an immediate order for the recall of the Burmese force from Ramoo and Arracan would be issued, for the purpose of their proceeding to the assistance of the armies opposed to us at Rangoon.

Rangoon. We know that the Burmese at Rangoon were badly armed, and that the Ramoo force was most efficient in that respect.

*No. 42.—Extract from the Government Gazette.*

June 20.—*Sylhet*.—Letters of the 12th, from Sylhet, mention the return of Colonel Innes to that station, with the troops under his command. The force, we understand, exceeds twelve hundred men. The report of the advance of a considerable body of Burmese into Cachar had been confirmed.

*No. 43.—Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Innes, c. B., Commanding the Sylhet Frontier; dated 27th June, 1824.*

His Excellency is already in possession of what has transpired on this frontier up to the 22d instant, and I now beg to state, that owing to the rapidity of the current of the Barak river, the banks of which are so overgrown with an impenetrable grass jungle, and, in many parts, under water, as to render tracking impossible, I have been obliged to warp up, and did not reach the mouth of the Gogra nullah till the evening of the 25th instant.

Having heard, that from this nullah a passage across the jheels to the hill of Telayn might, possibly, be effected, a movement which would have enabled me to turn the enemy's advanced position at that place, I resolved on making the attempt, but had not proceeded far before I discovered the channel to be too narrow to admit the passage of the large boats, on which the ordnance is embarked, and I therefore returned into the Barak river this morning, and am now in progress to Jatrapore.

My operations after reaching that place will be guided entirely by circumstances, and of which no time shall be lost in making His Excellency fully acquainted.

I deemed it advisable to take advantage of my proximity to the enemy, whilst on the Gogra nullah, to reconnoitre their position, and accordingly detached Lieutenant Fisher, of the Quarter Master General's department, and Lieutenant Craigie, staff of my detachment, for that purpose. From the report of these officers, as well as from my own observations, I learnt that the hill of Telayn is strongly stockaded, and that the enemy are there in considerable number.

P. S. It has rained with little intermission since we left Sylhet, and the country is consequently much inundated.

*No. 44.—Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, c. B., Commanding the Sylhet Frontier; dated 6th July, 1824.*

I have the honour to report, that a battery was opened on the stockaded position of Telayn this morning at six o'clock.

The shells from both howitzers and six-pounders were thrown with the greatest precision; but the round shot from the latter, I regret to say, had scarcely any effect on the strong palisade surrounding the works, the palisades in question being heavy trunks of trees. I regret also to add, that the carcasses when thrown from the howitzers went wide of the mark, and consequently the fringing of the huts on the sides and summit of the hill, which I expected, has not been accomplished: the guns are now posted on a rising ground, about six hundred yards to the south-west of the stockade, but I purpose to-morrow carrying the six-pounders to a small hill directly south of the enemy's position.

*No. 45.—Extract Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, c. B., to the Adjutant General; dated before Telayn, 7th July, 1824.*

In continuation of my last dispatch, I have the honour, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to report, that on the afternoon of yesterday, about five o'clock, the enemy made an attempt to turn the right of my position, by occupying a high hill in the rear of a rising ground, where a working party was employed in clearing the jungle, for the purpose of enabling me to place my guns in battery on it this morning. I directed the Rajah, Gumbheer Sing, whose local knowledge is excellent, with a body of his infantry, to take the enemy in rear, and at the same time threw forward a strong detachment to support the working party: after a short skirmish, the enemy were driven from their position, and I succeeded in retaining the spot I had fixed on for the guns: during the night a breast-work was thrown up, and this morning, at day-break, the guns opened from it at the distance of four hundred yards.



Cachar.  
1824.

Three natives of Cachar who, this morning, made their escape from the enemy, state their loss, from the effects of yesterday's shells, to be very considerable, though they screen themselves in a measure from the severity of the fire by burrowing in the ground.

The only casualties consequent to the skirmish of yesterday, were one man killed and three wounded, of the Rajah Gumbheer Sing's infantry, and one recruit of the 16th, or Sylhet local battalion, wounded.

Although the artillery has been playing on the enemy's works with the greatest steadiness during the day, the fire has not had the desired effect, and the enemy still continue in possession of the place; many of them have been killed, and many more wounded; but till further reinforcements join me, to enable me to extend my operations, I am not sanguine in my hopes of carrying the position.

*No. 46.—Extract Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, c. b., to the Adjutant General; dated on the Barak river, off Juttrapore, 9th July, 1824.*

I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that on the morning of yesterday, a little after day-light, the enemy, in great numbers, made a sudden and unexpected attack on the height immediately in the rear of the battery, which had been occupied by Glumber Singh's followers, and succeeded in driving them from it; I immediately sent off a party to endeavour to get on the hills on their flank, but, I regret to say, this attempt failed, as it was discovered, on approaching, that the enemy had occupied the whole line of the hills in immense numbers, and that there was no prospect of attacking them with any chance of success; the party was therefore recalled, and the battery being no longer tenable, it being so entirely commanded by the heights now in the occupation of the enemy, I was under the necessity of drawing off the guns. I have, however, to observe, that this measure was determined on before, in consequence of the exhausted state both of the artillery and infantry of my detachment, the former having been in the batteries from the morning of the 6th, and till the 8th inst. I think it my duty to bring to the notice of his Excellency the very zealous exertions of this arm of the service; the practice was beyond praise, and the shot and shells were thrown with a precision which could not be surpassed, but the six-pounder shots were found to have no effect on the enemy's works, although the shells must have done considerable execution.

I feel myself much indebted to Captain Smith, for his great exertions during the three days the battery was open, and to Lieutenant Huthwaite, who, though labouring under a severe fever, rendered me the most essential service.

I regret to say, that, from the commanding position of the heights, the guns were not withdrawn from the battery without some slight loss on our part, and which, from the advantages possessed by the enemy, might have been much greater, had they not been kept in check by the steadiness of the troops in the battery, under the command of Captain Cowslade, of the 39th Regiment, whose conduct was particularly conspicuous.

I deemed it advisable to re-embark my detachment yesterday afternoon, and to fall back upon Juttrapore, where I have taken up an eligible position on both sides of the Barak river, and within two miles of the enemy's works, where I shall remain till re-inforced, and then act as circumstances may require.

Enclosed I have the honour to forward a return of the killed and wounded\* of the detachment under my command, on the affair of yesterday.

*No. 47.—Abstract Return of the Bengal Force, embarked for Foreign Service, in April, 1824.*

*Transports.*—Hashmy, Argyle, Eliza (1st), Eliza (2d), Mermaid, Robarts, Earl Kellie, Reliance, Hydery, Zenobia, Ernaad, Anna Robertson, General Wood, Janet Hutton, Penang Merchant, McCauley, Frances Warden,—Total Tonnage, 7339 + 410 = 7749 Tons.

*Corps.*—His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and 38th Regiment Foot—Detachment—2d Battalion 20th (now 40th,) N. L., proceeded to Cheduba—Detail of General and Regimental Staff, Engineers, Artillery, Quarter-master General's Department, Adjutant General's Department, Pay-master's Department, Medical Department, Commissariat and Camp followers. Total 3231. Fighting men, Europeans, of all ranks 2039, Natives 86. Total 2175.

*Artillery.*—18-pounders 4—Light 5½ inch Howitzers 4—8-inch Mortars 4—6-pounders 4.

Honourable

\* Killed—2 Sepoys.—Wounded—1 Sabadar, 1 Havildar, 1 Naick, 14 Sepoys.

Honourable Company's armed Gun Brigs, Schooners, &c. Robert Spankie, Goldfinch, Eliza, Emma, Phoenix, Sophia, Kitty, Phaeton, Narcissa, Hebe, Mary, Sulkea Packet, Active, Tyger, Swift, Saugor, Tom Tough, Powerful: 20 Row Boats, each carrying an 18-pounder Carronade in the bow, Diana Steam Vessel.

Average number of men to each Brig, &c. Europeans 1, Natives 12.

Ditto ditto to each Row Boat, Natives 18, and one European in charge of the whole.

H. M.'s Ships, Liffy, Slaney, (Chéduba,) Larne, and Sophie,—H. C. Cruizers, Mercury, Teignmouth, Thetis, Prince of Wales, and Jessy.

H. M.'s Ship Arachne, joined in October 1824, when the Larne went to Penang and Calcutta.

*No. 48.—Abstract Return of the 1st Division of the Madras Force, embarked for Foreign Service; dated 13th April, 1824.*

*Transports.*—Moira, Glenelg, Hercules, Bannerman, David Clark, George 4th, East Indian, Helen, Virginia, Heroine, Carron, Jehangir, David Malcolm, Bombay, John Shore, Resolution, Nurbudda, Ann, James Colvin, Susan, Fergusson, Abgarris, Bombay Merchant,—Total Tonnage, 10,793.

*Corps.*—His Majesty's 41st—Madras European Regiment—1st Battalion 3d, or P. L. I.—2d Battalion 17th, or C. L. I.—2d Battalion 8th N. I.—1st Battalion 9th N. I.—2d Battalion 10th N. I.—Detail of General and Regimental Staff, Engineers, Artillery, Pioneers, Commissariat and Camp followers. Total 8778. Fighting men, Europeans of all ranks 1983, Natives 4538, Total 6526.

*Artillery.*—Howitzers, 2 8-inch, 2 5½-inch, 2 4½-inch,—Mortars 2 8-inch, 2 5½-inch.—Four Iron 18-pounders, Six Iron 12-pounders, Six 6-pounders, Two 3 ditto.

*No. 49.—Abstract Return of the 2d Division of the Madras Force, embarked for Foreign Service; dated 22d May, 1824.*

*Transports.*—Cornwallis, Windsor Castle, Asia Felix, Indian Oak, Dunvegan Castle, Mary Ann, Fort William, Satellite, Edward Strettell,—total Tonnage 4809.

*Corps.*—His Majesty's 89th, 1st Battalion 7th Regiment N. I.—1st Battalion 22d Regiment N. I.—Pioneers and Camp followers,—total 3672.—Fighting men, Europeans of all ranks 906, Natives 1935.

*No. 50.—General Staff, &c. of the Forces in Ava, 1824-5.*

Major General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B., H. M. 38th Foot... .. Commanding the Forces.  
 Captain J. J. Snodgrass, H. M. 38th Foot, Military Secretary & A. D. C. & Deputy Post Master.  
 Lieutenant J. Campbell, H. M. 38th Foot... .. Aide-de-Camp.

BENGAL DIVISION.

Brigadier General M. McCreagh, C. B., ... .. Commanding Bengal Division.  
 Brigadier M. Shawe, C. B., 87th Foot... .. 2d in Command.  
 Lieutenant-Colonel G. Pollock... .. Commanding Artillery.  
 Colonel F. S. Tidy, C. B., H. M. 14th Foot... .. Deputy Adjutant General.  
 Captain H. Piper, 38th Foot... .. Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.  
 Major Evans, 38th Foot... .. Commanding 1st Brigade.  
 Captain G. Aitkin, H. M. 13th Light Infantry... .. Brigade Major 1st Brigade.  
 Lieutenant Colonel R. G. Elrington, 47th Foot... .. Commanding 2d Brigade.  
 Captain Sadlier, 47th Foot... .. Brigade Major 2d Brigade.  
 Major J. N. Jackson, 45th Native Infantry... .. Deputy Quarter Master General.  
 Captain R. Becher... .. Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.  
 Lieutenant T. A. Trant, 38th Foot... .. Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.  
 Lieutenant G. R. O'Brien 38th Foot... .. Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.  
 Captain T. Fiddes, 42d Native Infantry... .. Deputy Commissary General.  
 Captain W. Burlton, 4th Light Cavalry... .. Assistant Commissary General.  
 Captain W. J. Gairdner, 14th Native Infantry... .. } Sub Assistant Commissary  
 Lieutenant G. H. Rawlinson, Bengal Artillery, officiating... .. } General.  
 Pay Master C. Grimes, H. M. 13th Light Infantry... .. Deputy J. A. General.  
 Major H. Nichelson, 17th Native Infantry... .. Deputy Pay Master.

Captain

Rangoon.  
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Captain J. J. Snodgrass, 38th Foot... .. Deputy Post Master.  
 Lieutenant Dickson... .. Field Engineer.  
 Lieutenant R. Ware, H. M. 38th Foot... .. Fort Adjutant of Rangoon.  
 R. Limond, Esq... .. Officiating Superintending Surgeon.  
 W. Jackson, Esq... .. Medical Store-keeper.

## MADRAS DIVISION.

Brigadier General McBean, left in August, 1824.  
 Brigadier General Fraser, left in October, 1824.  
 Brigadier General W. Cotton, from January, 1825. ... .. Commanding.  
 Lieutenant Colonel W. Mallett... .. Commanding 4th Brigade.  
 Lieutenant Colonel W. Smelt, H. M. 41st Foot... .. 1st Ditto.  
 Lieutenant Colonel J. Brodie... .. 2d Ditto.  
 Lieutenant Colonel H. F. Smith, c. B., Madras Native Infantry... .. 3d Ditto.  
 Lieutenant Colonel Godwin... .. 6th Ditto.  
 Lieutenant Colonel C. Hopkinson... .. Commanding Artillery.  
 Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Snow... .. Deputy Adjutant General.  
 Lieutenant J. Ker... .. Deputy Assistant Ditto  
 Captain S. W. Steel... .. Assistant Quarter Master General.  
 Captain A. E. Spicer... .. Deputy ditto.  
 Captain A. Tullock... .. Deputy Commissary General.  
 Lieutenant T. R. Manners... .. Deputy Assistant Commissary General.  
 Captain W. Williamson... .. Deputy Judge Advocate General.  
 Lieutenant W. F. Lewis... .. Commissary of Stores.  
 Captain A. Stock... .. Pay Master.  
 Captain J. Todd... .. Deputy ditto.  
 Captain P. Montgomery... .. Brigade Major to Artillery.  
 Captain P. Young... .. Ditto 4th Brigade.  
 Captain A. Wilson... .. Ditto 1st Ditto.  
 Captain E. Briscoe... .. Ditto 2d Ditto.  
 Captain H. Kyd... .. Ditto 3d Ditto.  
 Lieutenant N. Johnston... .. Ditto 6th Ditto.  
 Surgeon S. Heward... .. Superintending Surgeon.  
 Assistant Surgeon R. Davidson... .. Deputy Medical Store Keeper.

No. 51.—Statement of Troops Composing the Expedition landed at Rangoon, in May 1824, and such as joined the Head Quarters of the Army up to the 1st January, 1825.

Regiments.	Date of arrival at Rangoon.	No. including Officers.	Remarks.
BENGAL TROOPS.			
Detachment European Foot Artillery, .....	.. .. .	360	The Corps left at Cheduba.
His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, .....	11th May 1824. ..	727	
Ditto 38th Regiment Foot, .....		1035	
Detachment 2d Battalion 20th (now 40th Native Infantry),	.. .. .	24	
Rocket Artillery, .....	28th December 1824. ..	86	
Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard, ....	{ 4th, 24th, } and 26th } Dec. 1824. ..	353	
	Carried forward ..	2585	

Statement, &c.—Continued.



Statement, &c.—Continued.

MADRAS TROOPS.

	Brought over	2585		
Detachment Foot Artillery, . . . . .	.. .. .	556		
His Majesty's 41st Regiment Foot . . . . .	.. .. .	762		
Madras European Regiment, . . . . .	.. .. .	433		
1st Battalion Pioneers, . . . . .	.. .. .	552		
3d Regiment Native Infantry, . . . . .	.. .. .	676		
7th Ditto . . . ditto, . . . . .	.. .. .	695	} 11th May, 1824. . . . .	
12th (8th) Ditto . . . ditto, . . . . .	.. .. .	652		
9th Ditto . . . ditto, . . . . .	.. .. .	658		
18th (10th) Ditto . . . ditto, . . . . .	.. .. .	609		
34th (17th) Ditto . . . ditto, . . . . .	.. .. .	617		
43d (22d) Ditto . . . ditto, . . . . .	.. .. .	711		
His Majesty's 89th Regiment Foot, . . . . .	6th June & 22d Nov. 1824.	1012		} The rest joined in 1825.
Ditto .. 47th. . . ditto, . . . . .	26th December, 1824.	177		
26th Regiment Native Infantry, . . . . .	1st October, ditto.	636		
28th Ditto . . . ditto, . . . . .	1st & 3d September, ditto.	832		
30th Ditto . . . ditto, . . . . .	27th September, ditto. . . . .	613		
◆				
BOMBAY TROOPS.				
Detachment Foot Artillery, . . . . .	12th June, ditto. . . . .	69		
Total ...		12,845		

No. 52.—Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., Commanding the British Forces at Rangoon, to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to the Government, Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c. ; dated 12th May, 1824.

You are already apprized of the different periods of sailing of the transports with the troops from Bengal and Madras, composing the expedition, which the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council did me the honor of placing under my command. Owing to calms and very light winds, the Bengal division did not reach the place of rendezvous, at Port Cornwallis, before the end of last month, and the Madras division not until the 2d instant, at which period several ships from both presidencies were still absent. I had, however, determined to sail with the force assembled, and would have done so that very day, had I not been prevented by a general report of the scarcity of fresh water on board the Madras transports, some of them not having more than four days consumption. This difficulty was very speedily removed by Captain Marryatt, of His Majesty's Ship *Larne*, whose indefatigable exertions in collecting and appropriating the scanty supply which the land springs afforded, and distributing a proportion from such vessels as were well supplied, to those most in need, enabled him, on the following day, to report the fleet ready to proceed to sea. As we were accordingly getting under weigh, His Majesty's ship *Liffey*, Commodore Grant, C. B., appeared in the offing, as also several of the absent transports: judging that some of them might also be in want of water, and being desirous of making the necessary arrangements with the Commodore relative to our future operations, I determined upon remaining in harbour one day longer. On the following morning (the 5th) we finally put to sea, detaching a part of my force, under Brigadier McCreagh, against the island of Cheduba, and sending another detachment under Major Wahab, of the Madras establishment, against the island of Nagrais, (each of the force in ships and troops stated in the margin,) proceeding myself with the main body for the Rangoon river, which we reached on the 10th, and anchored within the bar.—On the following morning, every arrangement having been previously made, the fleet, led by the *Liffey*, sailed up the river, followed by the transports, in the order I wished to employ the troops on the attack upon Rangoon, and in the course of a few hours arrived off the town, receiving on our passage up, some insignificant discharges of artillery from one or two of the Chokies on the banks of the river.

Commodore Grant anchored the *Liffey* immediately opposite the King's wharf, where we had observed a battery, of apparently from 12 to 16 guns, manned and ready to open its fire. Still, from motives of humanity,

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the Commodore and myself were unwilling to commence so unequal a contest, thinking the immense superiority on our side, within full view of the shore, would have induced the authorities in the town to make an offer of negotiating: their presumption and folly, however, led them to pursue a different course: a feeble, ill-supported, and worse directed fire was opened upon us, which the first few guns from the *Liffey* effectually silenced, and cleared the battery: the Commodore, consequently, directed his fire to cease. I had previously ordered the plan of attack, and now gave directions for two brigades to be in readiness in their boats for landing: His Majesty's 38th Regiment, commanded by Major Evans, above the town; Major Sale, with His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, at the centre, to make a lodgement in the main battery, should he be unable to force the gate of the stockade, and a brigade of the Madras division below the town, under the direction of Brigadier-General McBean. The 38th and this brigade being ordered to push round by the rear and enter the town, should they find an opportunity of so doing.

These measures in progress, the Burmese again returned to their battery and commenced firing, which was again silenced by a broadside from the *Liffey*, and the signal being made for the troops to land in the order already stated, which they did in the most regular and soldier-like style, and in less than twenty minutes, I had the satisfaction of seeing the British flag flying in the town, without the troops having had occasion to discharge a single musket, and without my having occasion to regret the loss of one individual, killed or wounded, on our side; nor do I believe that of the enemy, from their rapid flight, could have been great, of the latter, killed, only eight or ten were left behind.

The news of our arrival in the river having reached Rangoon the preceding night, and our rapid progress up in the morning being marked by an occasional shot, in answer to the fire from the Chokies, together with the preparations of the Burmese authorities for defence, threw the inhabitants into such a state of consternation as to cause a general flight in every direction towards the jungles, so much so, that out of a large population, I do not think one hundred men were found in the town on our taking possession of it.

The members of government fled at the first shot, carrying with them seven out of eleven Europeans, whom they had ordered to be imprisoned and put in irons. On our arrival, in their hurry, three were left in the King's godown, whose irons were filed off by the troops on entering the town.

When we were actually in possession of the town, Mr. Hough, an American missionary, released from irons for the purpose, accompanied by a Burmese, came on board the *Liffey*, delegated by the Raywoon and other members of government (then some miles off in the jungle) to entreat that the firing might cease, and to ask what terms would be given to them, hinting that they had seven Englishmen out with them in irons, whose fate would probably depend upon the answers they received. The Commodore and myself told them, that it was too late to ask for terms, as the place was then in our possession: protection to persons and property was all they had to expect, and even that promise would not be confirmed to them until the prisoners were released and given up to us, warning them, that if they dared to injure them, or put one of them to death, fire and sword should revenge the atrocious deed over the whole face of their country. The messengers left us, promising to return as soon as possible; but neither the Raywoon or his adherents could again be found, fear having driven them still farther into the country.

We remained in great anxiety for the fate of our countrymen during the night, but early next morning, in pushing forward some reconnoitring parties, the whole seven were found safe in different places of confinement, strongly fettered, their guards having fled at our approach; a nominal list of these gentlemen I beg herewith to transmit.\*

I am sure it will afford the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council much satisfaction to know, (and I believe my information to be correct) that there is not another Englishman, with the exception of a Mr. Gouger, now at Ava, in the power of the Burmese government.

Although I am not yet enabled officially to communicate to you the subjection to the British arms of the islands

\* List of persons imprisoned and placed in irons by the Burmese Government at Rangoon, on the approach of the British arms, for the purpose of being put to death.

Mr. J. Snowball, .....	British.	Mr. R. J. Trill, .....	British.
— J. Turner, .....	British.	— R. Wyatt, .....	British.
— Wm. Roy, .....	British.	— G. H. Roys, .....	Country born.
— Alex. Teneh, .....	British.	— Arraton, .....	Armenian.
— H. W. Thompson, .....	British.	— P. Aide, .....	Greek.
Rev. J. Wade, American Missionary.			

Rev. Mr. Hough, ditto, taken out of irons and sent by the Burmese on board the *Liffey*, to beg the firing, &c. might cease.

islands of Cheduba and Negrais, together with Bassein, yet I have not the least doubt, from the calculation of time and the fineness of the weather, that the attack in these quarters has been so simultaneously made as to render their fall, about the same time with that of Rangoon, almost certain.

The captured ordnance far exceeds in number any thing we supposed the country to possess, although, generally speaking, of a bad description; the guns are now collecting from the different batteries, and as soon as a correct statement can be made out, I will have the honor of forwarding it.

It would be presumption in me to speak in terms of an officer so well known as Commodore Grant; but it is my duty to inform you, that the cordial co-operation I have received, and continue to receive from him, calls for my warmest acknowledgement.

P. S. I am happy to say I have been able to put the troops under cover, one brigade in the town of Rangoon, and the other three in the houses in the vicinity of the great Pagoda.

No. 53. (A)—*Extract of a Dispatch from Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B.; dated 19th May, 1824.*

Information having been received that fire rafts were constructing and war boats collecting at no great distance up the river, Commodore Grant, some days ago, sent the boats of his ship, under Lieutenant Wilkinson, of the *Liffey*, for the purpose of reconnoitring. They fell in with and destroyed one boat (the crew escaping,) having seen several others, which effected their escape. Our boats had two seamen wounded by musquetry from the shore. On the evening of the 14th, it was thought farther advisable that the river should be explored considerably higher up, and for this purpose Lieutenant Wilkinson, with the boats of the *Liffey*, accompanied by forty rank and file of His Majesty's 41st Regiment, under Lieutenant McLean, went about eighteen miles up, receiving a smart fire of musquetry from the villages on either bank, both in going and returning. At one place, in particular, the enemy assembled in considerable force, but were speedily dispersed by the fire from the boats; on which occasion Lieutenant Wilkinson expressed himself in terms of high admiration of the determined gallantry and coolness of the party of His Majesty's 41st Regiment. They had three rank and file wounded.

A work having been observed in preparation at the village of Kemmendine, only four miles distant from the shipping, which if allowed to be completed, might prove a very serious annoyance, the Commodore and I determined upon destroying it, for which purpose a sufficient number of boats were ordered from the fleet, under the command of Lieutenant Wilkinson, and I ordered the Grenadier Company of His Majesty's 38th Regiment, under Captain Birch, to be embarked on board of them. The whole were in readiness and sailed a little before day-light on the morning of the 16th.

Herewith I beg leave to enclose Captain Birch's report of the result, which leaves me to regret the loss of a valuable officer, Lieutenant Kerr, of the 38th Regiment, who, with one rank and file, was killed, and nine rank and file wounded. On the part of the navy, that enterprising and active officer Lieutenant Wilkinson, and five seamen wounded.

The spirited decision of Captain Birch and Lieutenant Wilkinson, and the gallant manner in which their orders were carried into effect by both officers and men, merit every praise, and must have left a strong impression upon the enemy of what they have to expect should an opportunity offer of bringing them fairly into contact with the British arms.

No. 53. (B)—*Letter from Captain Birch, H. M. 38th Regiment, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., Commanding the Forces, &c. &c. &c.; dated 16th May, 1824.*

I have the honor to inform you, that in obedience to your orders, I this morning embarked with the Grenadier Company of His Majesty's 38th Regiment, under my command, on board the boats of His Majesty's Ship *Liffey*, commanded by Lieutenant Wilkinson of the Royal Navy, having four row boats for the conveyance of the soldiers, for the purpose of dislodging the enemy from the village of Killyumdine, and adjacent villages.

Agreeable to my instructions, I landed the troops at a small village about a mile from Killyumdine, where I observed a party of the enemy had stockaded themselves, and immediately attacked their position, which I carried, after exchanging a few rounds and killing ten or twelve of the enemy.

I then endeavoured to penetrate the jungle towards the village of Killyumdine, for the purpose of assailing it by the rear, while the boats attacked it in front, but I regret to say, that I found the jungles so impervious as to prevent me from executing this part of my instructions.

I therefore re-embarked my detachment and proceeded in the boats.

On



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On approaching a point higher up, intending to land, we found ourselves suddenly exposed to a heavy fire from a stockade, till then unobserved, and as any attempt to retire would have exposed the detachment to certain destruction, and would have given encouragement to the enemy, which I felt convinced you would have highly disapproved of, Lieutenant Wilkinson, R. N., and myself, resolved upon immediately landing and storming the stockade.

We had many unforeseen difficulties to overcome, the enemy having placed bamboos and pikes so as to make landing both difficult and dangerous.

Nothing, however, could withstand the gallantry and determination of both soldiers and sailors, who shortly established themselves within the stockade, defended by about 400 men, who were quickly driven out at the point of the bayonet, leaving sixty dead.

The enemy were well armed, a great proportion having muskets, and a small field piece was taken in the stockade; and I must do them the justice to say, that they fought with very great spirit, many of them receiving our charge with their spears.

I again re-embarked my party and proceeded to the opposite side of the river, where we drove the enemy from a third stockade, which we destroyed in the same manner as we had done the two former.

In concluding, I regret to state, that Lieutenant Thomas Kerr, of H. M.'s 38th Regiment, and one private, was killed, and nine privates wounded in taking the second stockade; and I have farther to regret, that Lieutenant Wilkinson, of the Royal Navy, was severely wounded through the thigh, with eight or nine of his crew, one of which has had his arm subsequently amputated. I have much satisfaction in reporting the conduct of the officers and men under my command, to have been steady and soldier-like. I hope I may be allowed to express the highest admiration of the cool and intrepid conduct of Lieutenant Wilkinson, R. N., who, although severely wounded, continued to render me the greatest assistance, in giving directions from his boat—also of the officers and men under his command.

*No. 54.—Extract of Despatch received from Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, &c.; dated 1st June, 1824.*

Herewith I have the honor of transmitting you a return\* of the ordnance captured at this place on the 11th ultimo, including ten small pieces brought from Negrais.—The strength of the enemy in this arm, so far exceeding any thing reported, is now, I conceive, very much crippled, as in the different encounters we have since had, nothing larger than jinjals, or small pieces, have been found with them.

*No. 55. (A)—Extract*

*\* Return of Ordnance Captured at and near Rangoon, May, 1824.*

Iron long guns, serviceable, mounted:—One 24-pounder, one 20-ditto, one 18-ditto, two 10-ditto, three 9-ditto, one 8-ditto, seven 6-ditto, five 5-ditto, one 4½-ditto, one 4-ditto, one 2½-ditto, and three 2-ditto—Total 27. Dismounted: two 6-pounders, three 5½-ditto, four 4½-ditto, one 3½-ditto, one 2½-ditto, and one 1-ditto—Total 12.

Iron long guns, unserviceable, mounted:—two 12-pounders, one 6-ditto, five 5½-ditto, one 4½-ditto, and one 2½-ditto—Total 10. Dismounted: one 10-pounder, eight 9-ditto, two 6-ditto, one 5½-ditto, four 3-ditto, one 1½-ditto, one ¾-ditto, and eight ½-ditto—Total 26.

Carronades, serviceable, mounted:—three 18-pounders, and one 12-ditto—Total 4. Dismounted:—three 24-pounders, four 18-ditto, and six 12-ditto—Total 13.

Carronades, unserviceable, dismantled:—one.

Iron Swivel, serviceable, mounted:—one.

Brass Swivel, serviceable, dismantled:—two.

Guns, brass, serviceable, dismantled:—three 1-pounders and two ¾-ditto—Total 5.

Iron jinjals, unserviceable:—nine.

Of the above guns, 5 brass and 5 iron, were captured at Negrais.

Shot, 12-pounder, .....	133
Ditto, 9-ditto, .....	30
Ditto, 6-ditto, .....	276
Ditto, 3-ditto, .....	475
Ditto, 3-ditto, .....	box 44
Ditto, Irregular and Foreign .....	299

Total... 1257

Gun-powder, computed at lbs. 2,400.

No. 55. (A)—*Extract of Despatch from Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, &c. &c.; dated 1st June, 1824.*

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1824

Since I last had the honor of addressing you, the detachment sent against Negrais has returned to headquarters. The reports of the officers commanding, relative to the operations against that part of the enemy's coast, I beg, herewith, to enclose, and under all the circumstances therein stated, I hope Major Wahab's evacuation of a place so little calculated for a military post may be approved of. Indeed, I am fully of opinion that the object, which the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council had in view, has been accomplished, by reports of the simultaneous attacks upon Rangoon, Negrais, and (I make no doubt) Cheduba, reaching the Court of Ava at the same time, and it will appear by Lieutenant Stedman's report, that the enemy again experienced the valor of the British arms.

Here little change has taken place in our situation. Every act of the enemy evinces a most marked determination of carrying hostility to the very last extremity; approaching our posts day and night under cover of an impervious and uncombustible jungle; constructing stockades and redoubts on every road and path-way, even within musquet shot of our sentries, and from these hidden fastnesses, carrying on a most barbarous and harassing warfare, firing upon our sentries at all hours of the night, and lurking on the outskirts of the jungle for the purpose of carrying off any unlucky wretch whom chance may throw in their way.

At one post in particular, they had been unusually bold and troublesome, often appearing in large bodies in front of the picket, and had been constantly heard during the night felling timber and making other preparations for defence. On the 27th ultimo, my Aide-de-Camp, Captain Snodgrass, having observed a body of the enemy a short distance in front of this post, apparently making their observations on our line, he advanced with a small patrol for the purpose of feeling them, and ascertaining their strength and intentions. They found sentries and posts regularly established, which having driven before them, to where the path-way on which they were advancing joins a main road, they were suddenly fired upon from a stockade only forty yards distant, and an entrance being observed in an angle of the work, which the enemy in his hurry had neglected to shut, an immediate charge was ordered, and this small party, consisting of eighteen men of His Majesty's 38th Regiment, drove from a strong and well constructed stockade, at least two hundred men, with the trifling loss of three men wounded.

From the precautions which the enemy, on the preceding evening appeared to have adopted for the defence of the road above alluded to, I felt convinced it must lead to grounds which it was intended we should not approach; I therefore, on the morning of the 28th, left camp with four companies of Europeans, from His Majesty's 13th and 38th Regiments, too hundred and fifty sepoy, and one gun and a howitzer from the Bengal Artillery. On approaching the stockade taken on the preceding evening, we found it re-occupied, but only a few shots were fired from it, wounding one man of the 13th Regiment. About a mile further on, we came upon two more stockades, admirably constructed upon well-chosen ground, not quite finished, and abandoned by the enemy, all of which were destroyed. Continuing to advance through a thickly wooded country, we observed, at every opening in the road, parties of the retreating enemy beyond the reach of musquetry, but some excellent practice was made with round shot and shrapnels by the Artillery. After marching in this manner seven miles from camp, I found the Artillery soldiers quite exhausted with fatigue, and was under the necessity of sending back the guns escorted by the Native Infantry. Having determined to advance with the four companies of Europeans as far as a large plain, which my guide informed me was then only a mile distant, at length the road did debouche from the jungle into an extensive valley of paddy-fields, (already some inches under water) at the end of which, two miles distant, stands the village of Juayhyvaug, where immediately I observed quantities of smoke, as if arising from a concourse of people cooking, and concluded that the long desired object of releasing the wretched inhabitants from the hands of their cruel tyrants was now within my reach. The rain fell in torrents, but I pushed on with my small party, confident of victory, should the enemy meet us in the field, which I flattered myself was intended, from seeing their generals drawing out a long line in rear of the village flanked by impenetrable jungles. Our advance was by Echellon of companies, left flank leading direct for the village Juayhyvaug, close to which a heavy fire was suddenly opened upon us from two stockades, so well masked as not to be distinguished from a garden fence, even at the short distance of sixty yards. Not a moment was to be lost—I ordered Brigadier General Macbean to keep the plain with the Light Company outflanking the stockades and village, and keeping the enemy's line in check, while the other three companies, led by that gallant soldier Major Evans, of the 38th Regiment, at the head of the two flank companies of his regiment, and Major Dennie, of the 13th Light Infantry, in like manner at the head of a company of his regiment, destined for the attack; on the order being given, the troops rushed forward to the assault, with an intrepidity and gallantry I have never seen surpassed, and in less than ten minutes the first stockade was carried and cleared of the enemy at the point of the bayonet, many escaping into the thick jungle in the rear. The troops then moving

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out, formed up for the attack of the second work, with a coolness and regularity which only an eye witness could sufficiently appreciate. The second stockade, resolutely and obstinately defended, was carried in the same gallant style, the garrison within, fighting man to man, was put to the bayonet, many escaped to the jungle in their rear, but those who fled to the plain, met a similar fate with their comrades within from the company under Brigadier-General Macbean, who allowed few to get away; he took no prisoners.

The disadvantages under which the attack was made, considering the heavy fall of rain, and the strength of the three companies, commanded by Captains Piper and Birch, of the 38th, and Captain MacPherson of the 13th Regiment, not exceeding in number two hundred men, carrying by assault two formidable stockades, defended by six or seven times their force, and that in the face of what I have seen, ascertained to be the main body of the enemy in this part of the country, amounting to about 7,000 men, I need not, I trust, endeavour to speak in praise of the gallant band I had that day the honor to command. Indeed, I feel that nothing I might say could, in adequate terms, do them justice. Every man appeared to feel and act as if the honor of his country, and the success of the enterprise depended upon his own personal conduct and exertions. The enemy left three hundred dead in the stockades and adjacent fields, and I hope the nature of the contest will not admit of our loss being considered great although some valuable officers and men have been lost to the service, among whom I have to regret, Lieutenant Alexander Howard, of the 13th Light Infantry, killed, and Lieutenants Michel and O'Halloran, of His Majesty's 38th Regiment, very severely wounded, each having since lost a leg by amputation. After carrying the stockades, I drew up my small force and remained an hour in front of the Burmese army, which even then, although late in the day, and ten miles from home, I would have immediately attacked, had I seen any prospect of bringing them to action, but a forward movement, on our part, at once satisfied me of their intention to retreat into the jungle had we approached them.

During the whole of this day, as on every other occasion since we landed, I received the most able assistance from Brigadier-General Macbean. To him, my Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, and the officers of my personal staff, my best thanks are due.

At day-light next morning, I detached Brigadier-General Macbean, with two regiments and some camel howitzers, to endeavour to fall in with the enemy on the same ground he had occupied on the preceding day, but on arriving there, not a man was to be seen, even some strong stockades were found evacuated and abandoned, and from the observations of the Brigadier-General and others, I have reason to believe the slaughter of the enemy on the day preceding, must have been even greater than that already stated.

During the night of the 29th, a piquet, posted in front of the great Dagon Pagoda, was repeatedly fired upon from the jungle in their post, and from the noise of voices heard, it was concluded that the enemy was there in some force. The Light Company of His Majesty's 38th Regiment was, in consequence, ordered to the front at day-light, to reconnoitre, and at no great distance came upon a strong masked stockade. With Captain Piper at their head, they charged and carried in their usual gallant style, the enemy leaving twenty-one men dead on the field; on our part only five men were wounded.

On the 29th, I detached Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, of the 41st Regiment, with a small force against Lynain. He found the place totally deserted, and too insignificant and unimportant to merit farther notice. He returned here next day.

P. S.—Herewith I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded\* in the different affairs with the enemy since the 21st, up to the 31st ultimo, inclusive.

No. 55. (B)—Report from Major Wahab, 12th Madras Native Light Infantry, to General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B., Commanding Expedition, &c.; dated 25th May, 1824.

In conformity to the instructions I had the honour of receiving from you, the three ships thereby ordered, separated

\* General Report of killed and wounded and missing of the troops composing the expedition, under the command of Brigadier-General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B., serving against the dominions of the King of Ava.

H. M. 13th Light Infantry.—Killed—1 Lieutenant.

Wounded—1 Bugler, and 9 Rank and File—1 Bugler and 1 Private since died of their wounds.

H. M. 38th Foot.—Killed—2 Rank and File.

Wounded—2 Lieutenants, 2 Sergeants and 15 Rank and File—2 Privates since died of their wounds.

1st Battalion 9th Native Infantry.—Killed—1 Sergeant or Havildar, and 2 Rank and File—1 Private since died of his wounds.

2d Battalion 10th Native Infantry.—Wounded—1 Rank and File.

H. M. 13th Light Infantry.—Name of the Officer Killed: Lieutenant Alexander Howard.

H. M. 38th Foot.—Names of Officers Wounded: Lieutenants George Michel and Edward O'Halloran; the former suffered amputation of the right leg and severely wounded in the left—the latter suffered amputation of the left leg. One Seaman of the H. C. Cruiser *Teignmouth*, killed whilst sounding.



separated from the fleet on the 5th instant, and on the evening of the 11th, anchored off Pagoda-point near Negrais.

On the morning of the 12th, we again got under weigh, and with some difficulty got in the river, and at noon anchored off the middle of the island. Towards four p. m., boats were seen making from the northern part of the island towards the main land. I desired Captain Goodridge to get the ships under weigh immediately, and I got the troops on board the *Heroine* ready for landing, having previously got the flat-bottomed boat launched for that purpose. Accordingly, about sun-set, I landed with a party of troops, and having gone over the northern extremity without seeing any one, I returned towards the point, where I landed. Two companies having landed by this time, I directed guards and sentries to be posted in various directions for its security, and returned to my ship.

On the following morning at day light, two parties (previously warned for this duty) one under the command of Captain Ogilvie, composed of the troops on board the *Carron*, was directed to explore and search the island, from the southward; the other under Captain Tod, of four companies, from the *Heroine*, to proceed along the foot of the hill, until he met with Captain Ogilvie.

The latter party, after six hours of indescribable labour, through an almost impenetrable jungle, and up to their middle in water, returned without being able to see or discover any thing. The former, after searching the southern side of the island, came up by its eastern side, and joined at sun-set; the rest of the troops landed at its northern extremity with the same success, and without discovering a single spring of fresh water or habitation of any kind.

From the above survey, it is evident that the island at Negrais is perfectly barren and covered with an almost impenetrable jungle and deep inlets of salt water, not producing any article of subsistence for troops. The only spot is in the northern extremity of it, where the jungle has been cleared away sufficiently to build a few fishermen's huts, without any signs of cultivation.

Under these circumstances, it became necessary to search for some place where supplies of provisions might be procured for the subsistence of the troops destined to keep possession of the island. With this view, I crossed over to the main land with a party of troops, and, accompanied by two or three officers, I proceeded in search of some village. After sailing up nearly ten miles, we came to a village, whence, on seeing us, the inhabitants began to fly, but as it was my desire to conciliate them as much as possible, I made them understand by signs (not having any one to interpret) that we would not molest them, and directing the sepoys to keep at a like distance, I proceeded to the village with the other officers. The inhabitants, after a little, seemed pleased at our visit, and those that had fled began to return with their families and goods, and we made them understand by signs, that we wished to have provision, for which we would pay in money, they appeared satisfied, and, as well as we could understand, said they would bring us provisions of all kinds.

Under an idea that these people would be induced to bring supplies of provisions to the troops destined to keep possession of the island, without which they could not possibly remain long there, as there was only a few week's supply on board, I directed five companies to be disembarked with their baggage, and directed the two ships that were to return with me, to complete their water as quick as possible.

The next evening, a number of people were seen collected at a point on the main land, opposite to the island, about five miles distant; but thinking that they came out of curiosity, I took no farther notice of them, than ordering a strict look out to be kept towards them.

The following days were occupied in completing the water of the two ships, but on the morning of the 17th, observing that the numbers collected on the opposite side to be very considerable, and continually increasing, and that they were accompanied by boats of a large description, I considered that their intentions could be no longer deemed peaceable, and as I discovered that a stockade had been thrown up, I ordered immediately three companies, under Lieutenant Stedman, to embark in boats and cross over to the main land, and three other companies, under Captain Ogilvie, for their support, to embark on the return of the boats, there being only five capable of conveying troops, and that not above two hundred and fifty men at a time. Accordingly, they were embarked about noon, but the wind and current was so much against them, it being flood tide, they were carried away four miles beyond the point I intended them to land at, and were brought close to where the stockade had been constructed, fortunately the boats reached the same place nearly at the same time, Lieutenant Stedman having collected and formed them in order, he found there was no time to be lost in waiting for the party under Captain Ogilvie, and he determined to attack them immediately with the party that had already landed, and on his advance the enemy opened their guns upon him. Lieutenant Stedman's letter, which I have the honour to enclose, will explain the result and success of his attack.

The steady conduct of the troops employed on this occasion, the celerity of their advance, and steadiness of their fire, seem to have shaken the courage of the enemy, and on the troops penetrating the stockade by an opening which, fortunately, had not been completed, the enemy fled in the  
utmost

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1624.

utmost disorder, leaving every thing behind them; the route was most complete, they fled in the utmost consternation in every direction; they must have suffered severely, as they were collected in vast numbers, to the amount of about eight hundred men within so small an enclosure.

There were six found dead the following morning at a little distance from the stockade; our loss, considering the exposed situation of the men, was small, being one killed and five wounded—the Jemadar died during the night.

The troops took possession of ten or twelve guns, brass and iron, of various calibres, muskets, spears and d'howes, without number, from forty to fifty boats, some of a very large description, with a quantity of gun-powder and balls, &c.

The guns have been taken on board the Cruiser *Mercury*, and all other articles were completely destroyed.

The island of Negrais is a barren desert, covered with an impenetrable jungle, and the low part, towards the southward, seems to be covered with salt water; at the northern extremity is a hill, with an old pagoda upon it, and at the foot of it, to the westward, is a small flat covered with jungle, where it has been sufficiently cleared only to erect a few fishermen's huts, and has no signs of cultivation. It is evident, from the desolate appearance of the island, that it has never been considered by the Burman government as a place of any importance, nor can it be made dispensible by them, nor is there a village within ten miles of it on the main land.

*No. 55. (C)—Report from Lieutenant J. O. Stedman, Commanding Detachment 2d Battalion 17th Regiment, or C. L. I., to the Officer Commanding 2d Battalion 17th Regiment, or C. L. I.; dated 18th May, 1824.*

I have the honor to report, that agreeably to orders of yesterday's date, I crossed the river, and landed with the three companies detailed to accompany me, at about three o'clock, and within three quarters of a mile of the enemy, whose appearance, before reaching the shore, left me little doubt as to their intentions of opposing our approach beyond the spot on which it was evident they had strongly stockaded themselves.—As the day was too far advanced to expect any re-inforcement under Captain Ogilvie, and as our situation, from not knowing the strength of the Birmans, did not ensure success against them, I determined to detain the boats that brought us, in case it might be necessary to retreat to the ships, at the same time ordering the companies (all of whom landed nearly at the same moment) to follow the advanced guard at the distance of fifty paces.—We had proceeded but a short space, when I observed the guard in advance to halt, and I received intimation that they were already close under a breast-work of the enemy, surmounted with guns, and which the thick jungle along the beach had prevented my observing, or indeed any of the party in advance, till very close to it. Delay, however, under any circumstances, was to be avoided, and as I had made up my mind to return their fire the instant they commenced it, I pushed on, desiring the advance to join their companies, and having loaded, returned their first shot from cannon and small arms, with a volley which was followed up by a charge and an incessant fire on them from the rear companies for the space of ten minutes, when the breast-work, with guns complete, was ours, and all our attention was directed to the stockade itself, in which, at this period, at least seven hundred armed men were observable.—Providentially for us, an opening to the right of the stockade from the breast-work had not been completed, into which we continued to pour our fire with such success, that the enemy were observed to decamp with the greatest precipitation, leaving us their cannon and, indeed, every thing they were possessed of. A list of which, with a return of killed and wounded, will be found in the margin\*—I cannot conclude this report, without expressing my entire approbation of the conduct of all concerned on this occasion, for to all I feel my best acknowledgements are due, though were I to particularise, the services of Lieutenants Lindsay, Haig and Hutchings, were such as to entitle them to praise more valuable than mine. Our loss is so trifling, when I consider the means the enemy had of annoying us, that it can only be attributed to their fire being directed too high.

*No. 55. (D)—Report*

\* List of killed and wounded with a detachment of the 2d Battalion 17th Regiment, or C. L. I., under the command of Lieutenant Stedman—Killed, 1 Jemidar and 1 Sepoy—Wounded, 2 Naigues and 2 Sepoys.

\* List of stores taken and destroyed by a detachment of the 2d Battalion 17th Regiment, or C. L. I., under the command of Lieutenant Stedman,—10 pieces of ordnance of different calibre, between fifty and sixty boats containing rice and military stores.

No. 55. (D)—*Report from Captain R. Goodridge, H. C. C. Mercury, to Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B., Commanding at Rangoon, &c. &c.; dated 27th May, 1824.*

Rangoon  
1824

I have the honor to report the arrival at this anchorage, of the Honorable Company's cruizer *Mercury*, under my command, to wait your further orders, and to acquaint you, in compliance with the instructions received from Commodore Grant, of His Majesty's Royal Navy, I effected the purpose on the 12th May, P. M., for which I was directed to accompany Major Wahab, of the 17th Madras Native Infantry, to the island of Negrais, on which a party was landed by Major Wahab, and the British flag hoisted without opposition.

On the 16th, our attention was called to a collection of men and boats on the opposite side of the river—a party was sent, accompanied by the *Mercury*, which produced a letter from the governor of Basine.

On the 17th, a stockade was perceived of some extent and strength. We weighed anchor in company with a party of troops. At 4h. 39m. anchored off the stockade, the party having previously landed from all the boats procurable. At 5. P. M., the Birmahs opened an indifferent fire on the troops, when I commenced at a long range shot, and after firing a few rounds from our long guns, the troops marched into the stockade without further opposition, on which occasion I have to report the capture of twenty-eight boats, (all of which were destroyed) and fourteen pieces of small cannon.

The island of Negrais is confined to about six miles in circumference, extending north-east and south-west. On the south-west end, there is a plain of some extent, covered with grass, on which I saw a number of cattle, and enclosures for a very small quantity of rice; the hills and other parts are quite woody, no run of water was discovered, but confined to wells; they are capable of producing a great deal with a little attention.

The entrance into Negrais harbour I consider difficult, and only to be effected with great precaution, the channel being extremely narrow; it is quite secure from all winds: the river beyond that to Bassine is, from my own observations, and what I have since collected, clear, and safe from the island to Bassine.

No. 56. (A)—*Extract from a Dispatch from Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B.; dated 4th June, 1824.*

On the 2d instant, I received information that the enemy had assembled in great force, and were stockading themselves at Kemmendine, intending to attack our lines, and that the messengers who had been sent in, were, as I suspected, spies. I therefore ordered two strong columns of reconnoissance, from the Madras division, to move on the following morning upon two roads leading from the great Dagon Pagoda to the village of Kemmendine, the right column under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hodgson, the other under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, proceeding myself up the Rangoon river, with two of the Hon'ble Company's cruizers and three companies of the 41st Regiment, for the purpose of observing the enemy's force, and making a diversion in favour of any attack which might be made by land. In the course of two hours we were abreast of the enemy's encampment. The troops landed, and burnt every hut to the ground: brought away one war boat, and destroyed another: carried off an 18-pound carronade, all without the least annoyance from the enemy, who either fled into the jungle, or retired into a very large stockade which I observed close by, and from which some guns were fired, killing and wounding a few men.

In the course of the morning, the two columns coming down from the great Dagon Pagoda, met close to the stockade of Kemmendine just alluded to, and an effort was made to enter it, which I have no doubt would have succeeded but for the occurrence of some mistakes, and as the attack was never in any way persevered in, I do not much regret the results, as it will tend to lull our crafty foe into a security that may soon prove fatal to him.—I am anxiously employed in preparing transport for the future progress of the expedition. We have already captured from fifty or sixty large cargo boats, which are getting cut down and made more manageable, and are calculated, on an average, to carry a complement of sixty men each.

The second embarkation from Madras, consisting of His Majesty's 89th Regiment, and two battalions of Native Infantry, has arrived in the river.

No. 56. (B)—*Report from Captain Ryves, Commanding H. M. Sloop Sophie; dated 3d June, 1824.*

I beg leave to state to you for the information of Commodore Charles Grant, that during your absence of yesterday. I received directions from Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., and Commander in Chief of Military forces employed against the Burmese, to order the flotilla and row boats to convey troops up the river.



Rangoon,  
1824.

At 5 A. M. the troops embarked, accompanied by the Hon'ble Company's cruizers *Mercury* and *Thetis*, three flotilla gun boats and pinnaces of His Majesty's ships *Larne* and *Sophie*.

In consequence of the draught of water of His Majesty's sloop under my command, being too great for the upper part of this river, I did not consider it prudent to remove her. The boats of the said sloop and *Larne* were, consequently, employed, and made their rendezvous on board the Hon'ble Company's cruizer *Thetis*. At 7 A. M. the cruizers and flotilla anchored and commenced a heavy fire on a very strong stockade (Kemandyne) when the troops were landed.

The pinnaces of His Majesty's ships *Larne* and *Sophie*, in proceeding in advance, carried a small stockade, from which was brought an eighteen pounder carronade, they were afterwards engaged under a most harassing fire of carronades and musquetry from another stockade, and I am sorry to say suffered severely, although infinitely less than could have been expected on such service.

The commander of the Hon'ble Company's cruizer *Thetis*, being severely wounded when I was on board, I took command of her, but Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., having embarked on board the Hon'ble Company's cruizer *Mercury*, all orders to the cruizers and flotilla proceeded from him.

Where every man did his duty, it is difficult to bring into notice the conduct of individuals, yet I cannot avoid particularizing the pre-eminent and gallant conduct of Mr. George Goldfinch, and I much regret the severe wound which he has received, as it will deprive me for a time of his valuable services. He has since our arrival here always been employed in the command of the boats belonging to His Majesty's sloop *Sophie*, and has always met my warmest approbation; indeed, I cannot speak too highly of this meritorious officer. He has passed his examination for a Lieutenant nine years and three months. I hope you will take the conduct of this deserving officer into your consideration, and recommend him to the favorable notice of Commodore Grant, and I trust it may be the means of procuring for him that promotion he so richly merits.

I have every reason to be much satisfied with the co-operation of Lieutenant Fraser, who commanded the *Larne's* pinnace, and whose exemplary zeal and gallant conduct were conspicuous.

The zealous conduct of Mr. Charles Scott, who has passed his examination for Lieutenant four years, reflected on him great credit.

At about 3 P. M. the enemy being in great force, the troops were re-embarked, the cruizers and flotilla then weighed and returned to their former anchorage.

No. 57. (A)—*Extract of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, to George Swinton, Esq. Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated 16th June, 1824.*

Since I last did myself the honor of addressing you, Brigadier McCreagh, and the European part of the detachment sent against Cheduba, have returned to head-quarters, having fully executed the orders given by me, agreeable to the instructions I had received from the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council. The able and satisfactory manner in which Brigadier McCreagh carried on the operations entrusted to him, will appear by the enclosed report, and the result has been such as might have been expected from the judicious arrangements of that experienced officer.

Having completed my arrangements for striking a blow upon the enemy's force assembled here, on the morning of the 10th instant, although the weather continued most unfavourable, I moved upon the enemy's fortified camp and stockades at Kemmendine, with about three thousand men, four eighteen pounders, four mortars and some field pieces, sending two divisions of vessels up the river to prevent the enemy from escaping on that side. It was my intention not to lose a man if it could be avoided. The enemy had already frequently experienced the irresistible influence of the British bayonet, and it was now my wish they should also know that we had still other and perhaps more dreadful means of exterminating them in every stockade they might be found in. The country, season and roads rendered the undertaking extremely arduous, but not beyond the inexhaustible spirit of such soldiers as I command. About two miles from town, the head of the column was stopped by a stockade, apparently very strong and full of men: I ordered two heavy guns and some field pieces to open upon it, while the troops surrounded it on three sides, but the jungle was so very thick and close as to prevent the possibility of altogether cutting off the garrison. In less than half an hour, a considerable gap was made in the outward defences of the work, and the defendants, not daring any where to shew themselves, I ordered a part of the Madras European Regiment, supported by part of the 41st Regiment, to charge, and the work was immediately carried, with a trifling loss on our part, the enemy leaving one hundred and fifty men dead on the ground, Major Chalmers leading the support of the 41st Regiment, and one of the first men in the breach received a wound in the face from a spear, which I am happy to say is not dangerous. While this was going on, under my own eye, a very spirited and successful attack

attack was made on the other side of the stockade, by the advanced companies of the 13th and 38th Regiments, who, by assisting each other up the face of the stockade, (at least ten feet high) entered about the same time as the party by the breach, putting every man to death who opposed their entrance; and it affords me pleasure to state, that the first man who appeared on the top of the work, was, I believe, Major Sale, of His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.

This point gained, the column again moved forward nearly a mile, where our left was posted, communicating with the flotilla on the river about half a mile under the great stockade and fortified camp: the head of the column moving up to the right, with great toil and labour, through the thick and tenacious jungle, for the purpose of again reaching the river above the stockade, and thus completely investing the enemy's great strong hold. In this I was partly disappointed, the enemy having thrown up other works above the stockade which would have exposed my right to certain loss, and not being able to invest the whole of the enemy's extensive fortifications, I was under the necessity of leaving about a hundred yards, between our right and the river, unoccupied; but as the principal work appeared full of men, animating each other with loud and boisterous cheering, I still hoped they would remain till the impression I intended had been made. At 4 P. M., my troops were in position in many places within a hundred yards of the place; but in all parts with a very thick jungle in front, extending to the very bottom of the stockade. The night passed in erecting batteries and making preparations for opening the guns at day-light next morning; the enemy continuing loud and incessant cheering till after daylight in the morning. The moment we had sufficient light on the following day, a heavy and well-directed fire was opened from our breaching and mortar batteries, which was kept up for nearly two hours, a party advancing to observe the breach, found the enemy, during the cannonade, had evacuated the place, carrying off their dead and wounded. The chain of posts occupied by the enemy, rendered flight at all times easy, and the thickness of the jungle necessarily prevented our observing when it took place.

The stockade, you will observe by the accompanying plan, is one of great strength, and capable of being obstinately defended. It was garrisoned by the most desperate crews of the enemy's war boats, and it cannot be doubted that the dreadful example of the day before, and awful effects of our opening fire, alone could have induced men possessed (as the Burmese unquestionably are) of great personal courage, to give it up.

The object I had in view has thus been fully accomplished; a general pause and terror for our arms at present prevail among the troops lately opposed to us, and from one or two reconnoitring parties, which have since been out, I find that every stockade in our neighbourhood has been evacuated, and I have reason to think the enemy has retired to some distance from our front.

I continue to receive every assistance and co-operation from Captain Marryat, R. N. and the ships employed under his command.\*

No. 57. (B)—Extract

\* General Return of killed, wounded, and missing of the troops comprising the expedition, under the command of Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., serving against the dominions of the King of Ava, from the 1st to the 16th June, 1824.

Commissioned Officers.—Madras European Regiment.—Wounded—1 Captain and 1 Lieutenant.

H. M. 13th Light Infantry.—Wounded—1 Lieutenant.

H. M. 38th Foot.—Wounded—1 Lieutenant.

H. M. 41st Foot.—Wounded—1 Major.

Madras European Regiment.—Wounded—1 Lieutenant.

Non-Commissioned Rank and File.—H. M. 38th Regiment.—Wounded—1 Rank and File.

H. M. 41st Regiment.—Wounded—9 Rank and File.

Artillery.—Wounded—1 Sergeant or Havildar, and 1 Rank and File.

Madras European Regiment.—Killed—2 Sergeants or Havildars, and 7 Rank and File—Wounded—2 Sergeants or Havildars, and 30 Rank and File.

1st Battalion 3d Regiment N. I.—Wounded—2 Rank and File.

2d Do. 8th Do.—Wounded—2 Rank and File.

1st Batt. 9th Regiment N. I.—Wounded—2 Sergeants or Havildars.

2d Batt. 10th Regiment N. I.—Killed—1 Rank and File—Wounded—3 Rank and File.

Pioneers.—Killed—1 Rank and File—Wounded—2 Rank and File.

H. M. 13th Light Infantry.—Killed—1 Rank and File—Wounded—10 Rank and File.

H. M. 38th Foot.—Killed—1 Rank and File—Wounded—8 Rank and File.

H. M. 41st Foot.—Wounded—27 Rank and File.

Madras European Regiment.—Killed—1 Sergeant—Wounded—2 Sergeants or Havildars, and 6 Rank and File.

1st Batt. 2d N. I.—Wounded—2 Rank and File.

Natives Attached.—Bheesties—Killed—1—Wounded—Mistrees—1—Bearers—6—Gun Lascars—4—Tindals—1.

Total—Commissioned Officers—Wounded—6—Non-commissioned Rank and File—Killed—14—Wounded—105—Natives attached—Killed—2—Wounded—11.

Remarks.—His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—Name of Officer wounded—Lieutenant James Petry, slightly.

His Majesty's 38th Foot—Name of Officer wounded—Lieutenant Henry Grimes, slightly.

His Majesty's 41st Foot—Name of Officer wounded—Major P. L. Chambers, severely not dangerously.

Rangoon.  
1824.

No. 57. (B).—*Report from Brigadier McCreaqh, Commanding the expedition to Cheduba, to Major General Sir A. Campbell, &c. &c. &c. ; dated 11th June, 1824.*

I have the honour to report, that in execution of the service you assigned me, I anchored on the eastern side of the island of Cheduba, with the transport *Anna Robertson* in company, on the night of the 12th of last month, and found the other transport and His Majesty's ship the *Slaney* already there. I immediately conferred with Captain Mitchell, and on the 13th, Lieutenant Mathews, of that ship, made a bold and very intelligent reconnoissance up the small river, on which the enemy's town is situated, and in our entire ignorance of the localities, his report was of essential use to me in arranging the disembarkation.

The ships lay three miles from the shore outside of a mud flat, which stretches parallel with the land, and is nearly dry at low water, and the coast on this side is covered with jungle to the edge—indeed the mouth of the river is not distinguishable at a very little distance. We moved towards it on the morning of the 14th, with as many men as the boats would hold—two hundred of His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry Regiment, and one hundred of the 20th Native Infantry.

On the southern bank, a short distance up, was an out-post, which was immediately taken possession of by a small party from the leading boat, the Burmese retiring from it without resistance. The river varies in breadth from about forty to one hundred yards, the jungle on both sides extending far into the water. About half a mile farther up, the ground is cleared and cultivated, and the enemy became visible, lining a trench of three hundred yards extent, on the edge of the northern bank, with their right flanked by a bridge over the rivers. They permitted our boats to range along until the headmost arrived opposite their right, and then opened a fire of musketry and swivels, accompanied by flights of arrows. The bank was steep and somewhat difficult, but two or three parties of the 13th were soon on its summit, in spite of the enemy's efforts, who opposed them with considerable boldness: a few minutes firing followed while the remaining boats landed their men, and they fled, leaving upwards of twenty killed and many wounded. Their village or town commences near the spot at which we had landed, and I immediately moved up the street in pursuit; on arriving at the end of it (about a quarter of a mile) we found a stockade, into which they had retired, and from which they opened a fire as soon as we appeared. It was a square of about two hundred yards each face; the outward piles, from sixteen to twenty feet high, and embankment and a parapet within them, salient gateways in each face, and a triple row of railing round the entire exterior, appeared to be in good order, and the fire was from several six-pounders, as well as swivels of various calibre, and musketry.

I immediately lodged parties at such points close to the work as afforded tolerable cover, ordered the howitzer two or three ship guns ashore, together with the remainder of the sepoy's, and meantime marked off a battery within a hundred yards of their front gateway. The weather now became exceedingly unfavorable, but as all gave their most hearty and zealous endeavours to the execution of what was pointed out to them, our want of proper materials, implements and workmen was surmounted. Repeated feints upon the enemy's left, sufficed to turn his attention from our working parties on his right, and during the night of the 16th, two nine-pounders and a canonade, on ship carriages, were placed in the battery, the hut that marked it pulled down, and it opened in the morning. Its fire was soon decisive on the gateway, which having been their last thoroughfare, was not so strongly embanked as the others. Having prepared some seamen with axes and ropes to accompany the column, I ordered it forward; it moved rapidly to its point, headed by Major Thornhill's company of His Majesty's 13th, a few moments sufficed to compleat the destruction of the wounded spars, and we were speedily in the stockade, followed by the reserve, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hampton, of the 20th Native Infantry. The Burmese chief in command was killed near the point of attack, they abandoned their interior defences, (a trench and breastwork) and fled through their rear gate, leaving a great number killed.

Considering that, throughout these little operations, our investment was very close, and the enemy's fire kept up without any intermission, I am happy to say that our loss has been singularly small.

Where all evinced not only ready obedience, but the utmost zeal, it would be difficult to remark upon individual claims to notice; but my thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel Hampton, commanding the detachment of the 20th Native Infantry, and to Brevet Major Thornhill, of His Majesty's 13th, for the manner in which

Madras European Regiment,—Names of Officers wounded—Captain KyJ.,—Lieutenants Stenton and Robertson, *severely not dangerously.*

Two men of the Madras European Regiment were missing soon after the arrival of the army at Rangoon, and have not been inserted in any of the returns, having been taken whilst straying from their line, and not whilst engaged with the enemy.

N. B. The quantity of slugs made use of by the enemy will account for the great disparity in the proportions of killed and wounded.



which they and their officers and men fulfilled their duties; the latter officer was wounded by a spear while leading his men into the stockade. I am also much indebted to Lieutenant Malins, of the 13th, (Brigade Major,) for the active and valuable assistance he afforded me throughout.

I must do myself the pleasure to acknowledge the cordial co-operation that I received from Captain Mitchell, of His Majesty's ship *Slaney*, who accompanied me at the disembarkation, and to whose readiness in affording me every assistance his ship could supply, the service was importantly indebted, and the exertions of his seamen, under the immediate command of Lieutenant Matthews, in getting the guns landed, and assisting in the battery, contributed essentially to accelerate the result.

On the 19th, one of our reconnoitering parties, under Captain Aiken, of His Majesty's 13th, succeeded in capturing the Rajah, who was concealed, with some of his followers, in the jungle, a few miles in the interior. It appears, that of six hundred Burmese who, about a month previous to an attack, were sent over to assist in the defence of the island, little more than three hundred survived the contest unhurt, and the Chedubans, whom they had mustered to assist in the defence of the stockade, have also suffered considerably. The surviving Burmese passed over to the main land.

Having made such arrangements regarding the island as circumstances admitted, I re-embarked the European part of my force, in conformity with your orders, and sailed with the ships *Ernaad* and *Anna Robertson* on the 3d of the present month, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Hampton, with his detachment of the 20th Native Infantry, and His Majesty's ship *Slaney*, in possession, and on the most friendly understanding with the inhabitants. On the 6th, we lost sight of the islands, on the 9th, we made Negrais, with the intention of visiting and reporting to you the situation of the detachment I had ordered there, but the weather becoming so threatening as to render it unadvisable to risque in ships, in such a situation, I stood on for this place, and anchored off the bar of the river this day.

I enclose returns of our killed and wounded,\* and am happy to add, that most of the latter are doing well.

No. 58.—*The following Copy of a Dispatch received from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. Commanding the British Forces at Rangoon; to George Swinton, Esq. Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated July 11, 1824.*

Since I had the honor of addressing you on the 16th ultimo, we have had several partial affairs with the enemy, except in one solitary instance, invariably sought for on our part, and all ending in the same brilliant manner, that has hitherto marked the gallant and intrepid conduct of the troops under my command. About the end of last month, it was stated to me by a few Rangoon people, who had escaped from the jungle, that the  
Burmese

\* *List of Officers, Seamen and Marines, belonging to His Majesty's Ship Slaney, Charles Mitchell, Esq., Commander, who were Killed or Wounded at the reduction of the Island of Cheduba.*

John Parr, Corp. Mar., killed.—John Thompson, Quarter-Master, wounded dangerously.—Louis Paget, able, wounded dangerously, (since dead).—Bathurst Mathews, 1st-Lieut. slightly.—James Mayning, Boatswain, slightly.—Edward Chamberlain, Captain's Steward, slightly.

Killed 1 Marine.—Wounded 1 Lieutenant and 4 Seamen.

*Cheduba, 18th May, 1824.—Return of Killed and Wounded of the Force, under the Command of Brigadier McCreagh, C. B., from the 14th to the 17th of May, 1824, both days inclusive.*

*Honorable Company's Artillery.*—Wounded 1 Gunner.—1 Gun Lascar.—Total 2.

*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.*—Killed 1 Rank and File.—Wounded 1 Brevet Major,—1 Ensign,—1 Serjeant,—1 Bugler,—16 Rank and File.—Total killed 1.—Wounded 20.

*2d Battalion 20th Regiment Native Infantry.*—Killed 1 Rank and File.—Wounded 1 Lieutenant,—1 Havildar,—6 Rank and File.—Total Killed 1.—Wounded 8.

*Followers.*—Wounded 6 Lascars.—Total 6.

Grand Total.—Killed 2.—Wounded 36.

*Names of Officers Wounded.*—His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Brevet Major Thornhill, (slightly).—Ensign Kershaw, (slightly).

*2d Battalion 20th Regiment Native Infantry.*—Lieutenant and Acting Adjutant Margrave, (severely.)

*Return of Arms and Ordnance taken in the Enemy's Works at Cheduba, 17th May, 1824.*

5 European six-pounder Guns.

30 Smaller Guns, and Swivels of various Calibre.

40 European Musquets, and a few matchlocks.

12,525 Leaden Balls of various sizes.

200 Six-pound Shot.

A few hand Granades.

1,080 European Flint.

Rangoon.  
1824.

Burmese chief had received positive orders from court to make a general attack upon our line, and drive us at once out of the country. Every movement of the enemy plainly indicated that something was intended; large bodies of troops were, for two successive days, seen crossing the river above Kemendine, from the Dallah to the Rangoon side, and I felt the more inclined to give credit to the report from being well aware, that had any such order been received by the Burmah general, certain disgrace or even decapitation would be the inevitable consequence of his disobeying it.—On the morning of the 1st instant, every doubt on the subject was removed. Three columns of the enemy, estimated at one thousand men each, were seen crossing the front of our position, moving towards our right: and the jungle in front of the great Dagon Pagoda, and along the whole extent of our line to the left, was occupied by a large force, but on this side, from the nature of the ground, it was impossible to ascertain either the disposition or strength of the enemy. The columns moving on our right soon came in contact with the pickets of the 7th and 22d Regiments of Madras Native Infantry, which received the attack with the greatest steadiness, none of them yielding one inch of ground. The enemy then penetrated in considerable force between two of our pickets, and took post on a hill about four hundred yards from our position, occupying an old Pagoda and some houses in front, from which they commenced a feeble and harmless fire from some jinjals and swivels. I instantly repaired to the point of attack with a gun and howitzer from the Bengal Artillery, and three companies of Native Infantry, viz. one company of the 7th and two of the 22d Regiment, the whole under the command of Captain Jones, of the latter corps. After a short but well directed fire from the artillery, I ordered Captain Jones to advance with his three companies, and drive the enemy from his post at the point of the bayonet, and I had the satisfaction of seeing my order carried into effect in the most cool and gallant style; the enemy flying in every direction towards their favorite haunt, and only place of safety, the jungle. During the firing on our right, parties of the enemy felt the pickets along our line to the left, but never appeared in any force, and retired on the first fire from our advanced post. Thus ended the mighty attack that was to have driven us into the sea: defeated with the greatest ease by the three weak companies of sepoy, and two pieces of artillery; although such an enemy might be well appalled at the appearance of the whole British line under arms.

From some prisoners who were taken, I am informed that twelve thousand men were marched to the attack: the left columns were ordered to engage with vigour, and as soon as they had succeeded in penetrating our line, the attack was then to have become general. Such were the orders issued, but nothing more contemptible than the conduct of the enemy on that day was ever witnessed! They paid for their folly, leaving at least one hundred men dead on the field. We had not one man either killed or wounded.

Before daylight on the following morning, some hundred men of the Dallah force, entered the town of Dallah, firing in the direction of our post. Captain Isaack, of the 8th Madras Native Infantry, commanding, pushed forward with a few men, and was, I regret to say, unfortunately shot. The Burmese mutilating his body with the most savage brutality during the few minutes it remained in their power.

While the enemy abstained from converting their town to the purpose of annoying us, I also respected and afforded it every protection, although uninhabited by one individual; but when they thought proper to make it a mighty scene of savage warfare, I rased it to the ground.

Numerous re-inforcements daily joined the enemy's army in our front, a thing much to be desired, as tending to encrease the distress and discontent already prevailing in their lines, and having observed a disposition to re-cross part of their force to the Dallah side of the river, I determined, on the 8th instant, to make as general an attack as the very woody and inundated state of the country would possibly admit of. For that purpose, I formed the force to be employed into two columns of attack; one proceeding by land, under the command of that excellent and indefatigable officer Brigadier General McBean, for the purpose of surrounding the enemy on the land side, while I, with the other, proceeded by water to attack their stockaded position, along the banks of the river in front. To this post the enemy appeared to attach the greatest importance, and the stockades were so constructed as to afford mutual support, presenting difficulties apparently not to be overcome without a great sacrifice of lives. I therefore resolved to try the effect of shelling, and consulted with Captain Marryat upon the employment of such armed vessels as he might select to breach, in the event of our mortar practise not succeeding. The shells were thrown at too great distance to produce the desired effect, and the swampy state of the country would not admit of any advance. The armed vessels, viz. the *Satellite*, transport, (lately in His Majesty's service) the Honorable Company's cruizers *Teignmouth* and *Thetis*, commanded by Captain Harly and Lieutenant Greer, and the Penang Government yacht, the *Jessie*, Captain Poynton, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Frazer, of His Majesty's ship *Larne*, now took their stations according to a disposition made by Captain Marryat, and opened a fire, which soon silenced that of fourteen pieces of artillery, swivels, and musketry from the stockades, and in one hour the preconcerted signal of breach, practicable, was displayed at the main-mast head. The troops, as previously arranged, entered their boats on the signal being made, consisting of a detail of the 3d, 10th and 17th Native Infantry, com-  
manded

manded by Major Wahab, of the latter corps, ordered to lead the attack, and supported by Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, with two hundred and sixty men of His Majesty's 41st Regiment and one company from the Honourable Company's Madras European Regiment. The assault was made in the best order and handsomest style: Major Wahab, with the Native Infantry, landed, and immediately attacked the breach, while Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, almost at the same instant, pushed ashore a little higher up, and entered the work by escalade; the enemy kept up a sharp, but ill-directed fire while the troops were landing, but, as usual, fled on our making a lodgment in the place. I now ordered Colonel Godwin to re-embark with the detachment of the 41st Regiment, and attack the second stockade, which was immediately carried in the same style. The third stockade was evacuated by the enemy.

The cool and gallant conduct of both European and native troops on this occasion was, to me, a most gratifying sight. To the officers and men of the breaching vessels every praise is due; and I much regret that severe indisposition prevented Captain Marryatt from being present to witness the result of his arrangements.

The inundated state of the country did not admit of any communication with Brigadier General MacBean from the shipping, nor did I know the result of the operations of his column, until I returned to Rangoon in the evening. Nothing could be more brilliant and successful! He took, by assault, seven strong stockades in the most rapid succession, throwing the enemy into the utmost consternation; and he had also the good fortune to fall in with a large body flying from a stockade attacked by the shipping, of whom a great number were killed. The Brigadier General assures me the ardor of his column was irresistible, and speaks highly of the able aid he received from Brigadier MacCreagh. He also reports most favorably upon the judicious and gallant style in which Majors Sale and Frith, of His Majesty's 13th and 33th Regiments, led the troops under their respective command.

Ten stockades were thus taken from the enemy in one day, and upwards of eight hundred of his best troops were left dead on the ground:—thirty-eight pieces of artillery, forty swivels and three hundred muskets were also captured, a loss of no small importance, where fire arms are so scarce. Three of the enemy's chiefs, whose names are not yet known, were found among the dead. The chief destruction of the enemy was by the land column.

Our loss has been comparatively small—four rank and file killed; one Captain, and thirty-five rank and file wounded.\*

To Brigadier General MacBean, my particular thanks are due upon this and on all occasions. To Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy and Major Jackson, Deputy Adjutant and Quarter-Master Generals, and to my personal Staff, I feel very much indebted for their indefatigable exertions in carrying on the duties of the service, occasionally under every disadvantage, and I also beg leave to bring to the notice of the supreme government the name

\* *General Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops, composing the Expedition under the Command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., serving against the Dominions of the King of Ava, from the 16th of June to the 12th of July, 1824.*  
Head-Quarters, Rangoon, July 12, 1824.

21st June—*Madras European Regiment*—Wounded: 2 Rank and File.

24th June—*2d Battalion 10th Native Infantry*—Killed: 1 Subadar.

1st July—*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry*—Wounded: 2 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*His Majesty's 38th Foot*—Wounded: 1 Serjeant, and 2 Rank and File—1 Rank and File missing.

*Ditto*—*1st Battalion 22d Native Infantry*—Wounded: 1 Rank and File.

3d July—*His Majesty's 41st Foot*—Wounded:—1 Serjeant, and 3 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*2d Battalion 8th Native Infantry*—Killed: 1 Captain. Wounded: 1 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*1st Battalion 9th Native Infantry*—Wounded: 3 Rank and File.

5th July—*Engineer's Department*—Killed: 1 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry*—Wounded: 1 Captain, 1 Serjeant, and 15 Rank and File. Killed: 1 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*His Majesty's 89th Regiment*—Killed: 1 Rank and File. Wounded: 2 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*Madras European Regiment*—Killed: 1 Rank and File. Wounded: 2 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*1st Battalion Pioneers*—Wounded: 4 Rank and File.

8th July—*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry*—Wounded: 1 Captain, 2 Corporals, 5 Rank and File, and 1 Lascar. Killed: 2 [Serjeants.

*Ditto*—*His Majesty's 38th Foot*—Killed: 2 Rank and File. Wounded: 1 Serjeant, 1 Corporal, and 13 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*His Majesty's 41st Foot*—Wounded: 5 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*His Majesty's 89th Regiment*—Wounded: 3 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*1st Battalion 7th Native Infantry*—Wounded: 1 Rank and File.

*Ditto*—*1st Battalion Pioneers*—Wounded: 2 Rank and File.

Total—Killed: 1 Captain, 1 Subadar, 1 Serjeant, and 6 Rank and File. Wounded: 2 Captains, 4 Serjeants, 3 Corporals, 66

Rank and File, and 1 Lascar. Missing: 1 Rank and File.

*2d Battalion 8th Native Infantry*—Name of Officer Killed: Captain G. H. Isaac.

*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry*—Names of Officers Wounded: Brevet Captain Knox Barrett, severely, arm amputated; and Captain Johnson, severely and dangerously.



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name of Lieutenant-Colonel Snow, Deputy Adjutant General to the Madras Division, whose ability, zeal and activity I have often had occasion to remark.

I cannot conclude without again adverting to the high feeling which animates every corps and every soldier under my command. Their patience in frequently undergoing the greatest fatigue, marching over a country almost wholly under water, merits every praise, and their intrepidity and valor, whenever the enemy can be found, cannot be sufficiently extolled.

No. 59.—*Extract from the Government Gazette.*

In consequence of a very successful reconnoitre made about a week ago by two companies of His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, under the command of Major Dennis, Sir Archibald Campbell determined to give the three Golden Chattabs who had come down from Ava, with 30,000 men, a regular stirring up, by land and by water. Accordingly, on the 8th July, Sir Archibald, with 300 of his Majesty's 41st Regiment, the 17th Madras Native Light Infantry, Artillery in proportion, together with those of the Hon'ble Company's cruisers, the *Satellite*, the guns of the *Larne*, having been put on board her, besides gun-boats, proceeded up the river to attack some stockades on the banks. Generals McBean and McCreagh commanded the expedition about to proceed by land, consisting of 250 of H. M. 13th Light Infantry, 250 H. M. 38th, 250 H. M. 89th, 250 H. C. European Regiment, 250 H. C. 7th Madras Native Infantry, with a due proportion of Madras Artillery. Of this latter force I am about to speak as I was an eye witness. At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, the whole force had assembled at the great Pagoda; every thing being ready, the column moved on, H. M. 13th Light Infantry leading, the Artillery followed, then the 38th, 89th European Regiments, and Sepoys. We had not proceeded above a mile into the jungle, before the road narrowed so much that it became impossible for the Artillery to proceed, they were accordingly sent back again; after marching about five miles further into the jungle, the advance guard sounded on the bugle "Enemy discovered," and then fired a few shots, upon which the Burmese fled to alarm their main force. A bridge which the enemy had destroyed here, stoop us a few minutes, but the Madras Pioneers soon made another.

The advance guard indeed passed over without a bridge, but the water was so deep that the ammunition in men's pouches got wet;—the whole of H. M. 13th Light Infantry having now crossed over, we moved on into a small plain; a very thick jungle being upon our right and left. We had not advanced above three hundred yards from the bridge, when two stockades were seen on our right; the halt was immediately sounded, to wait till the Pioneers, with scaling ladders, and the remainder of the force, who were a little in rear, came up. At this moment the enemy were seen advancing in column with an intention of attacking us; H. M. 13th formed line across the plain, flanked on both sides by a jungle, the front rank kneeling ready to give them a volley, but our appearance was too formidable for them, they prudently retired into their stockades before arriving within range of a musket ball. Our whole force being now arrived on the ground, which was perfectly hid from the enemy, (I must here tell you, that General McBean had entrusted to Brigadier McCreagh the whole charge of taking the stockades on that day with the three King's Corps, 13th, 38th and 89th.) Brigadier McCreagh ordered an Engineer Officer to go and reconnoitre; in about a quarter of an hour he returned, reporting that he saw two stockades on our right, one of them very large, and one on our left—upon this a signal rocket was fired (as agreed upon before,) to let Sir Archibald and his party know when we were about to attack our stockades, that he might at the same time commence upon his the other side of the river,—this being done, (having no artillery,) the scaling ladders were ordered to the front, being covered in their advance by a company of His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, the ladders being fixed, the 13th and 38th stormed in the most gallant manner; nothing could resist the impetuosity of the attack; the Burmese fled with precipitation, numbers were bayoneted inside; all this did not occupy more than ten minutes of time. The 13th and 38th being again formed outside, were reinforced by the Grenadier Company of H. M. 89th Regiment, and then proceeded to storm the second large stockade; the Madras Pioneers advanced most gallantly to place the ladders, without even waiting for a covering party: at this stockade very great resistance was made, but our men were very soon masters of it; having scaled this, we found that there was an inner stockade where the enemy kept up a heavy fire; not having scaling ladders within, the men assisted one another over on their shoulders. Here the slaughter was tremendous, being obliged to fight hand to hand. Major Sale, of H. M. 13th Light Infantry, engaged the Burmese Commander in Chief, and cut him in two after a short resistance, he then took from him his gold chain which hung round his neck, and his gold hilted sword and scabbard. Being now masters of the outer and inner stockade, we next proceeded to attack two others, one on our right, the other on our left, which were taken in the same gallant style, two others were taken, but the enemy did not stop to defend them.—Seven stockades had now fallen into our hands, and not a single gun was fired, all being taken by escalade in the space

of half an hour. The enemy lost one thousand men killed,—their Commander in Chief, and four men of distinction, seven golden chattahs, seven ponies, twelve barrels of gunpowder, besides muskets, spears, &c.; four of Parker's double barrelled guns, a quantity of silver dishes, plates, the Commander in Chief's bed, which is very beautiful; flowered silver, gold rings, brass three-pounders, and numerous other articles. So sudden was our attack, and unexpected, that the Commander in Chief's dinner was on the table, of which some of our officers partook; not being very particularly nice myself, I should certainly prefer dining with our own Commander in Chief. General McBean, with the European Regiment, and 7th N. I., remained in the rear as a reserve, so that seven hundred and fifty were engaged, two hundred and fifty from each corps of 13th, 33th and 89th. Our loss was trifling,—an officer of H. M. 13th, was shot through the shoulder in mounting the ladder. He was the only officer hit. In men, our loss was altogether not more than thirty men killed and wounded, owing entirely to the suddenness of the attack. Had we stopt to batter the stockades with the artillery, our loss would have been treble, and the enemy's hardly any, for they would have escaped to the jungle. Col. McCreagh said, he never saw troops behave better in all his life, perfectly cool, and obedient to the different words of command and sounds on the bugle. It certainly has been the most brilliant day our troops have had yet, and with less loss.

The Burmese will never stand again, they must lose all confidence in bamboo ramparts. The party by water took two stockades, after battering all day long with nine, twelve, thirty-two pounders, and innumerable shells—they only knocked out these bamboos, and when they got in, the enemy had taken away every thing; five men were found dead, but some say they found in a well upwards of a hundred dead bodies; a greater proof of the inefficacy of battering for a breach before you storm, could not be given than by the result of the two affairs on the 8th.

No. 60.—*Dispatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated 22d July, 1824.*

I am now enabled to inform you, from information received from deserters, and through other sources which can be relied on, that the loss of the enemy in the action of the 8th instant was much more severe, and its consequences much more fatal and disastrous than I could at the time have found any idea of. The number of killed very much exceeds that stated in my dispatch of the 11th instant, and great numbers have since died of their wounds in the jungle. All accounts agree, and I have no longer a doubt of the fact, that Soomba Woonghee, (3d minister of the empire) a Woodcock, and two other chiefs of the first class, were among the slain, and the troops, deprived of their leaders, have either dispersed, or fled in confusion to the rear, there to await the arrival of the Prince of Sarrawaddy, said to be advancing with seventy thousand men.

The only body of the enemy I could hear of in this neighbourhood, was a small force of three thousand men assembled at a place called Keykloe, about twelve or fifteen miles from Rangoon, and measures were adopted for immediately attacking them. On the morning of the 19th instant, I ordered twelve hundred men to proceed by land direct to the spot, proceeding myself with six hundred more up the Puzendown creek, running in its whole course nearly parallel to, and at no great distance from the road upon which the land column was directed to advance.

The inundated state of the country precluded all possibility of proceeding to any great distance with the troops by land, and having advanced rapidly up the creek in the *Diana* steam boat, I did not hear of the impassable state of the country, and consequent return of the land column to their quarters, till the following day, when I had reached the point where I intended to co-operate, or act in concert, as circumstances might require. In our progress up, some small parties of the enemy were seen flying towards the jungles in evident dread and consternation, without firing a shot at us, or we at them; we also passed several villages visited for the first time by our troops, from each of which I had the pleasure of restoring to their homes, some Rangoon families, found in the extreme of wretchedness and misery; we could distinctly observe there were some armed men in the villages, who apparently connived at their escape, and who it may be presumed will remain in arms only until an opportunity offers of providing for the safety of their wives and families. It was not to be expected that a people unacquainted with the customs and manners of the civilized nations of Europe, should, on our first approach, have placed unlimited confidence in us. At all the villages, the greater part of the inhabitants fled from their houses to the fields, where they remained as spectators, but at each we found a few men left to converse with us, who received every assurance I could give them of safety and protection, if they remained quietly at their homes. On our return yesterday to quarters, I had the satisfaction of seeing some of these villages thickly inhabited, the people quite at their ease, and saluting us as we passed.

Although this expedition, upon which I was out for three days, has terminated differently from what I intended, I feel confident much good will result from it. The favorable impression made shall be cultivated

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to the very utmost of my power, and happy indeed will I be to sheath the sword, as often as the object in view can be attained by kindness and mercy.

No. 61.—*Dispatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated 5th August, 1824.*

Being informed that the Governor of Syriam had assembled a force on the banks of the Pegue or Syriam river, and had ordered the whole conscription of the district to repair without delay to the place of rendezvous, for the purpose of finishing and defending a large field work, which was to command the river, and protect the surrounding country; although aware that few had obeyed the summons, I determined upon dislodging the enemy, and for that purpose, I yesterday morning proceeded up the Syriam river, with three hundred European and an equal number of Native Infantry, the whole under the command of acting Brigadier Smelt. Upon approaching the landing place, leading to the town Pagoda of Syriam, I observed the old Portuguese fort, long concealed from view by trees and overgrown brush-wood, cleared and scraped, where the old wall had fallen down, and from fifteen to twenty feet high: upon this the enemy had raised a parapet, and suspended huge logs of wood on the outside, intended to be cut away during the assault, and to carry the assailants before them in the descent.

The troops landed under the fire of the Penang Government brig *Jessie*, and the *Powerful*, sloop, employed as a mortar vessel, and the advanced party moved on until stopped by a deep, impassable nulla, the bridge over which had been destroyed, and threatened to check our progress; but the difficulty was speedily removed, and a very tolerable bridge constructed, by Captain Marryat and part of the officers and crew of His Majesty's ship *Larne*. The enemy's fire from musquetry and artillery was even unusually feeble and contemptible, and they abandoned the place with the utmost precipitation when the troops moved forward to the attack, leaving behind them eight pieces of good artillery.

I next directed Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, of the Madras European Regiment, to proceed with part of the force to the Syriam Pagoda, which I was informed was also occupied by about three hundred men. The Lieutenant-Colonel, on arriving at the Pagoda, found the enemy inclined to dispute the possession of their almost impregnable post, but they lost confidence while the troops were ascending the long flight of steps leading up to the Pagoda, and fled in the utmost confusion, leaving four pieces of artillery, and a great quantity of powder.\*

Although in these affairs, the enemy afforded little opportunity for displaying the discipline and gallantry of the troops, their usual feeling and ardor were by no means less conspicuous, and I had every reason to be satisfied with the arrangements of Brigadier Smelt, and Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, in conducting the different attacks.

From Captain Marryat and the officers of His Majesty's navy I ever received the most prompt and cordial co-operation.

No. 62. (A)—*Dispatch from Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated 11th August, 1824.*

I was informed some days since, that the province of Dalla was in a very distracted and unsettled state, owing to orders having been received for a general levy of every man capable of bearing arms: the order had

\* Ordnance and Ammunition taken and destroyed at Syriam, on the 4th of August, 1824.

Brass.—4 Pounder, Dutch, one.

Ditto, 3 Pounder, Spanish or Portuguese, two.

Iron.—18-Pounder, Carronade, one.

Ditto, one lost in a deep Nulla.

Ditto, 6-pounder, one.

Ditto, ditto, four destroyed for want of means to bring them on.

Wall Pieces, two.

A considerable quantity of Gun-powder destroyed, and about one hundred weight of Grape.

*Return of Killed and Wounded from the 14th of July, to the 5th of August.*

His Majesty's 41st Foot, 3 Privates wounded.

Madras European, ..... 1 ditto ditto.

Bombay Artillery, ..... 1 ditto ditto.

Seamen of the *Larne*, ... 3 ditto ditto.



had been most strenuously opposed, and even blood had been shed on the arrival of a person of rank to enforce obedience to the measures of government. I thought the opportunity favourable for a little interference, to assist the opposition and escape of the discontented, and ordered a detachment of four hundred men, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, of the Madras European Regiment, to embark in boats on the morning of the 8th instant, and proceed up the Dalla river, with directions to act in furtherance of the object alluded to, and to attack any part of the enemy's cordon he might fall in with. The Lieutenant-Colonel's report of his operations, in obedience to these orders, I have herewith the honour to transmit, by which it will appear, how well he and the troops under his command supported (under difficulties which he has modestly omitted to state,) the reputation of the British arms.

I am informed that finer or more characteristic traits of British soldiers' were never witnessed than on this occasion, the officers, less encumbered than their men, forming line breast-deep in mud and water, and passing the scaling ladders from one to another to be planted against the walls of the stockade.

I regret, with Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, the severe wound received by Mr. Maw, Midshipman of His Majesty's ship *Liffey*, left with me in the capacity of Naval Aide-de-Camp, by His Excellency Commodore Grant. Of this young man's gallantry of conduct and merit I cannot speak too highly: he has repeatedly distinguished himself by the most conspicuous and forward bravery.

No. 62. (B)—To Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.;  
dated 8th August, 1824.

I have the honour to report to you, that I proceeded with the detachment you were pleased to place under my command, as per margin,\* at 11 A. M. this morning; and after entering a large creek on the east side of Dalla, and proceeding about two miles, I observed two stockades, one on the right, and one on the left bank, immediately opposite to each other—both in commanding situations, particularly that on the left bank, which I instantly decided on attacking. The boats were hove to for a short time to make the necessary preparations for the attack, and as soon as these were completed, the whole moved on under a heavy fire from the guns and musketry of the enemy in both stockades.—The landing was effected under an incessant fire from the enemy, and after great labour and exertion in getting through the mud, which was remarkably stiff, and thigh deep, the scaling ladders were placed, and the stockade stormed and immediately carried. Some of the troops were again embarked, crossed the river, and took possession of the opposite stockade.

Our loss (a return of which I do myself the honour to enclose), although severe, is not so great as might have been expected from the nature of the ground we had to go over, and the sharp and severe fire kept up by the enemy until the scaling ladders were placed. The loss on the side of the enemy was but small, (between twenty and thirty,) in consequence of the vicinity of the jungle, into which they escaped the moment our men entered their works.

Of the conduct of the troops, I cannot speak in too high praise, although it will be impossible for me to particularize the officers who so gallantly led their men to the assault, as they are too numerous, many of them having assisted in carrying the ladders to the walls.

I felt myself highly indebted to Lieutenant Fraser, and a party of seamen and marines of H. M. ship *Larne*, whose unremitting exertions throughout the affair, greatly contributed towards the success of the day.

It is with regret I have to report that Mr. Maw, (Royal Navy, H. M. ship *Liffey*), your acting Aid-de-Camp, was severely wounded at the early part of the day, whilst he and Captain John Campbell, H. M. 38th Regiment, your Aid-de-Camp, who was a volunteer on the occasion, were cheering on some of the seamen who accompanied us.

I have further to report, that the enemy, previous to their flight, threw some of their guns into a wet ditch that surrounded the fortifications. We found but two small ones, which were brought away. All the houses in both stockades were destroyed by fire, and a part of the pallisade pulled down by the Pioneers, before the return of the detachment to Camp.

No. 63. (A)—Copy

\* Four hundred men, composed of details from H. M. ship *Larne*, the Bombay Artillery, 1st European Regiment, 18th and 34th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, and 1st Battalion Pioneers.

† Return of Killed and Wounded at the attack of the Stockades in the Dalla Creek, on the 8th of August.

Killed—Natives.....	6
Wounded } Officers.....	3
} Privates.....	36

Names of Officers Wounded.—Lieutenant J. Grubb, 1st European Regiment, (severely.)

Captain A. Wilson, 18th Regiment Native Infantry, (slightly.)

Mr. Maw, H. M. ship *Liffey*, acting Aid-de-Camp to Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, (severely.)

No. 63. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated 23d October, 1824.*

Herewith I have the honor to transmit you Lieutenant-Colonel Miles's, C. B. report to me of the subjection to the British arms, of the enemy's seaport towns of Tavoy and Mergui, and as the Mayhoons (governors) and a few more of the head men of each of those provinces are prisoners of war, I trust the poor inhabitants will be left in the enjoyment of tranquillity and, consequently, our protection.

No. 63. (B)—*Copy of a Despatch from Lieut.-Col. E. Milcs, C. B., to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated Tavoy, September 27th, 1824.*

I do myself the honor of reporting to you, that the force placed under my order for the reduction of the enemy's possessions on the coast of Tennasserim, sailed from the Rangoon river on the 26th ultimo, and arrived at the mouth of that leading to Tavoy on the evening of the 1st instant, with the exceptions named in the margin, and which vessel quitted the squadron the day after we sailed. Having advanced with the large ships as far as the depth of the water would allow, I found it necessary to distribute the troops embarked on the Honorable Company's cruiser *Teignmouth*, and transports *Argyle*, *Indian Oak*, and *Marianne*, among the smaller vessels and boats of the fleet, myself and staff proceeding in the Honorable Company's Penang cruiser *Jessey*, which, drawing the least water, was appointed to lead. These arrangements having been effected, on the 4th instant we advanced, but from the difficulty of the navigation of the river, full of shoals, and in many parts only to be passed at the top of high water, together with the obstacles by which the enemy attempted to impede our progress by sinking their largest boats in shallow places, and stockading it across one of the narrow channels, it was not till the 8th, about noon, that we anchored within three miles of the fort: I had, prior to this, dispatched a summons for its unconditional surrender, and no reply having, at that time, been received, I proceeded with Captain Hardy and my Staff to make a reconnoissance within a short distance of the works. This object had just been accomplished when it was perceived that three war boats, full of men, were pulling along shore apparently for the purpose of cutting us off; in this they, however, failed, and on our regaining the *Jessey*, I directed two guns to be fired, and they instantly retired with great precipitation. The tide serving in the evening, the whole fleet arrived within gun-shot of the place about ten o'clock at night, when two or three shots were fired from the fort at our headmost ship, the Honorable Company's cruiser *Prince of Wales*, but without effect. At an early hour in the morning of the 9th, two Burmese came on board, and brought me a communication from the second in command, stating his readiness to seize or destroy the Mayhoon, or governor of the province, or to obey such orders as I might dictate. Immediately on receipt of this, an answer was returned to say, I was on the eve of advancing, and that he was to be taken and confined until my arrival, which was in about two hours after. All was directed; and at one o'clock, P. M., we were in possession of the fort, pettah, and all the defences of the place, without opposition. The population is very great, and from the strength and extent of the works (all built of brick and very high) our loss must have been very great, had any defence been attempted. The annexed copy of my orders, issued on the 10th instant, the sketch of the fort and pettah, herewith sent, together with the return of ordnance, ammunition, and military stores, will, I trust, give you some idea of the importance of our acquisition. The capture of the Mayhoon, his brother and family, with his principal adherents, completely weakens the enemy, and places us in a commanding situation to cripple any exertions in this quarter.

When every thing has been so happily accomplished, I have but to add my sincere and heartfelt thanks to Captain Hardy, of the Honorable Company's Marine, who commands the naval branch of the expedition, for his cordial co-operation, and the unceasing labour and fatigue he experienced in sounding the river, and directing the movements of the ships; whose officers and crews exerted themselves to the utmost.

The patient endurance of a heavy and incessant rain, for five days, of the troops who were on board the boats, deserves my warmest commendations; and the cheerfulness and alacrity of every grade was peculiarly grateful to me. I cannot finally conclude without bringing to your notice the able assistance afforded me by my Brigade-Major, Captain P. Young, of His Majesty's 89th Regiment, and the Deputy-Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, Captain Spicer, of the 12th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, in carrying my wishes and orders into effect, and whose incessant labour and fatigue after landing, and in making the necessary arrangements for the future objects of the expedition, called forth my warmest acknowledgements; and I beg most earnestly to recommend these officers to your protection.

No. 68. (C)—Copy of a Despatch from Lieut.-Col. G. Miles, c. B., to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated Mergui, 9th October, 1824.

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My despatch of the 27th ultimo will have placed you in possession of the movements of the force under my command, up to that period. Having left the detail named in the margin\* for the temporary protection of Tavoy, the remainder proceeded for the accomplishment of the ulterior object of the expedition on this coast; and I have now the honour to announce to you, the fall of this place, by storm, on the 6th instant, the day we arrived before it. My first care was to send a summons to the town for its unconditional surrender; but, instead of a reply, at half-past eleven o'clock, their guns opened a heavy fire upon the H. C.'s cruisers, who had previously taken their position in front of the enemy's batteries, mounting thirty-three pieces of heavy ordnance. The practice on our part was so good, that in about one hour the whole were silenced: during this period, as many troops had been assembled in the boats of the fleet as they could contain, and I directed a landing to be effected to the right of the town. This movement was immediately followed up by the advance of a party of H. M.'s 89th Regiment, to the gate of the stockade, under a heavy and well-directed fire from the enemy; and it was at this spot the greater loss was sustained. The ground, for some distance between the river and the stockade, was deep mud and water; and from the moment the disembarkation commenced, the rain poured down in torrents. Under these disadvantages, the troops maintained their ground with the greatest steadiness; and as soon as it was possible to bring up the ladders, an escalade was ordered, and carried promptly and most gallantly into effect by H. M. 89th Regiment. From this instant the enemy gave way; their loss is said to be about five hundred men. The Raja remained till we were actually in the town, and then withdrew with about three hundred of his followers on the opposite site. More than common attention had been paid in arranging the defence of the place, and the natural strength of the ground gave the greatest advantage to them. Their batteries were placed on the brows of the different hills, commanding the shipping. From the best information I have been able to collect, the enemy had three thousand five hundred men in arms. On our first gaining possession, the whole population fled; but in the course of that night and the following morning, great numbers came in, and are now following their several avocations. About one hundred men belonging to Tenasserim, I have detained in confinement; and as that place has lost all its former consequence, and is at present nothing beyond a fishing village, this body forms half its force.

A copy of my orders issued on this occasion, and the return of killed, wounded, and missing, as also of the ordnance, ammunition, and stores, are herewith transmitted.†

The whole of this affair has proved so decisive, and the gallant and exemplary conduct of every individual so prominent, that I feel at a loss how to bring individual instances of merit forward. I, however, have much pleasure in recording the names of Lieut.-Col. Commandant McDowall, of the 7th Regiment Madras N. I., Major Basden, commanding H. M. 89th Regiment, Captain Russel, commanding detachment Bombay Artillery, serving on board the Honorable Company's cruiser *Thetis*, and Lieutenant Cotton, of the Engineers, to the whole of whom I feel most obliged. The attention of Mr. Staff-Surgeon Smart was unremitting in his department.

To my own Staff, Captain Young, of H. M.'s 89th Regiment, Brigade-Major, and Captain Spicer, of the 12th Regiment Madras N. I., Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master-General, I am much indebted for their assistance; and the promptitude with which they performed and executed every wish of mine, not on this occasion alone, but in all situations in which they have been employed under my command; and I beg leave to recommend them, in the strongest manner, to your favourable notice and protection.

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\* Ship, H. C. cruiser, *Mercury*; troops, rank and file, 370; 1 row gun-boat.

*Abstract of Ordnance, &c. &c. captured at Mergui, October 12, 1824.*

Calculation, total of round shot, iron, of different sizes, 800; ditto, brass, 21; iron bars, welded two shot, 200; grape shot, fixed, 27; musquet balls, leaden or tin, 300; musquets, 668; blunderbusses, 6; country-swords, 48; spears, 110; powder, 1,200lbs.; standards, 33.

Grand total—Ordnance, iron, of sorts, 37; swivels, iron and brass, 106—total, 143.

† *General Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Force under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles, c. B., in the Assault of Mergui, on the 6th October, 1824.*

*His Majesty's 89th Regiment—Killed—6 Privates.*

Wounded—2 Lieutenants, 7 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, and 13 Privates.

Missing—1 Bheestie.

*Names of Officers wounded—Lieutenant William Kennedy, severely.*

Lieutenant P. McKie, slightly.



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There being many points which it is necessary to communicate to you, I have felt the necessity of sending my Brigade-Major, Captain Young, with this despatch, who, possessing my full confidence, will develop to you personally every transaction that has occurred, and the view I have taken of the state of these conquests.

No. 64.—*Despatch from Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated 4th September, 1824.*

The enemy in the Dalla district having, of late, become very troublesome by their predatory excursions, rushing from the creeks and nullahs, with which the country abounds, upon unarmed boats and even fishermen from the garrison, and having again established the head-quarters of these marauding bands in the stockades, taken by Lieutenant Colonel Kelly's detachment on the 8th ultimo, much strengthened by additional works, I once more determined to drive them not only from the stockades, but permanently to a greater distance.

For that purpose I directed Major R. L. Evans, of the Madras Army, with a detachment of Infantry, accompanied by two mortars from the Brigade, commanded by Captain Timbril, and some howitzers from the Madras Artillery, under Captain Kennan, to proceed up the Dalla creek on the 2d instant, and shell the enemy from their position. Such was the excellent practice of the artillery and gun boats, under the immediate orders of Captain Marryat, manned by the officers and crews of His Majesty's ship *Larne*, and Honorable Company's transport *Maira*, that the enemy were soon forced to abandon their defences, with some considerable loss, and I am happy to say with only one man slightly wounded on our part.

On taking possession of the stockades, Captain Marryat and Major Evans pushed up the creek, and succeeded in taking twenty-five boats and canoes from the enemy; who, on seeing themselves closed with, jumped overboard, and escaped into the jungle.

Major Evans's arrangements, for cutting off the retreat of the enemy, were excellent, but the swampy state of the country and thickness of the jungle prevented their meeting with the success they so well merited. To him and every officer and soldier employed, my best thanks are due.

I cannot do adequate justice to the sense I entertain of the ability and readiness with I find myself at all times supported by Captain Marryat and the officers and crew of the ship under his command: nor ought I to omit mentioning, that the officers and crew of the transport ship *Maira* are volunteers on every occasion when the enemy is likely to be met with.

No. 65.—*Extract from the Government Gazette, dated 30th September, 1824.*

*Rangoon.*—Private letters from Rangoon, in the beginning of this month, mention, that the enemy's main force still remains at Denobew, under the command of the Prince of Sarawuddy.

It is said, that in the Burmese army there is a corps of about 3,000 men, specially denominated warriors: of these again, some hundreds assume the title of *Invulnerables*; both one and the other enjoying immunities unknown to other subjects, particularly the latter class, who, in general, remain about the person of the King. Lately, a large body from this redoubted legion made a vow, that if His Majesty would send or allow them to go to Rangoon, they would retrieve the national honor by the immediate expulsion of the British army.—Leave was granted, and the *Invulnerables*, headed by the Attawoon of the Prince of Sarawuddy, proposed, in the first instance, to carry by assault the great Pagoda.

Accordingly, one of their party was sent to reconnoitre and fix upon the best point of attack. The sight of our guns and troops upon the works, to use his own words, "so struck him with awe and terror, that he was at once satisfied he would be much better inside than outside of our lines." He, accordingly, came in as a deserter, and communicated their plans, adding, that any one of four nights of the moon's age, which he specified, was declared by their astrologers to be favorable for the attempt. On the evening of the 29th ultimo, a small force in the jungles was looking out for them, but they could not see a man. Invisible, as well as invulnerable, they succeeded after dark, in creeping unobserved to the edge of the jungle, and, during the darkest part of the night, rushed with great celerity along the road leading to the north gate of the Pagoda, firing and shouting in their usual style. An officer's piquet, of His Majesty's 35th Regiment, was instantly under arms, and received them at the bottom of the stairs leading up to the place, with a couple of volleys. A 12-pounder of the Madras Artillery, mounted only a few hours before, opening upon them with grape at the same moment, they found it prudent to retrace their steps with all possible expedition. It has been learnt from a wounded man, who has since fallen into our hands in an attack upon a piquet, that twenty of the first class warriors were killed in this attempt.

The brutal system of warfare practised by the enemy is alluded to in the same letter, in which it is stated, that the gig of His Majesty's ship *Larne* found floating the remains of an European sailor, supposed to be the gunner of the *General Wood*. It appeared that the unfortunate man had been first tortured by pulling off bits of flesh, and piercing him with spears in parts not mortal, and then sawed in half.

No. 66. (A)—*Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated 9th September, 1824.*

I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, the enclosed report from Captain Marryat, His Majesty's ship *Larne*, of an attack upon a small post, established a short distance up the Dalla creek.

The gallant and good conduct of all engaged in this first rencontre with the enemy's war boats, affords me much satisfaction; and Captain Marryat has particularly mentioned to me the steadiness with which Lieutenant Wight, and a piquet of the 18th Madras Native Infantry received the enemy, both by land and water.

All accounts concur in bearing testimony to the resolute gallantry of Mr. Crawford, in defending his vessel, "the *Kitty*," against very superior numbers, although wounded early in the attack; and I beg leave to bring his name to the favourable notice of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council.

No. 66. (B)—*Report from Captain Marryat, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated 8th September, 1824.*

In compliance with your request for a detail of the circumstances which occurred in the attack on the Dalla stockade, made by the Burmese on the morning of the 6th instant, I have the honor to inform you, that at midnight of the 5th, a straggling fire was heard in that direction, and shortly afterwards a rocket was thrown up, the signal previously arranged with the detachment, in case of immediate assistance being required.

With the advantage of a strong flood tide, the boats of His Majesty's sloop *Larne*, proceeded rapidly to the scene of contention, where a heavy fire was exchanged. As our approach could not be perceived from the smoke, we cheered, to announce that support was at hand, and had the satisfaction to hear it warmly returned both by the detachment in the stockade, and the crews of the gun vessels.

It appeared that the attack of the enemy had been simultaneous; the gun brigs laying in the creek, having been assailed by a number of war boats, while the detachment on shore had been opposed to a force estimated at 1500 to 2,000 men.

Upon our arrival we found the enemy on shore had not retreated, but still kept up a galling fire. The war boats which had endeavoured to board the *Kitty* gun brig, had been beat off by the exertions and gallantry of Mr. Crawford, commanding that vessel, and were apparently rallying at a short distance up the creek, with a determination to renew the attack, but on perceiving our boats advancing a-head of the gun brigs, they made a precipitate retreat.

Although, from their superior speed, there was little probability of success, chase was immediately given, and five of the war boats which had been most severely handled, and could not keep up with the main body, were successively boarded and captured. Many others appeared to be only half-manned, but we could not overtake them, and the pursuit was abandoned about four miles above the stockade.

The spears remaining in the sides of the gun brig, the ladders attached to her rigging, and the boarding netting cut through in many places, proved the severe conflict which had been sustained, and I trust you will be pleased to recommend the very meritorious conduct of Mr. Crawford to the consideration of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council.

Great praise is due to Mr. J. King, of the *Narcissa*, and Mr. Frames, of the *Tiger*, for the well-directed and destructive fire which they poured into the war boats, and I trust, as an eye witness, I may be allowed to express my admiration of the intrepid conduct of the officer commanding the detachment on shore.

The loss of the enemy in this attack, cannot be correctly ascertained, but from the number of dead in the boats captured, and the crippled state of many others, it cannot be estimated at less than 2 or 300 men.

I have the honor to enclose a return of our killed and wounded.

No. 67.—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; to George Swinton, Esq. Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated 30th September, 1824.*

The enemy's main body still remains, as far as I can ascertain, in the neighbourhood of Donobew quite disheartened,

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disheartened, and their commander unable to form any plan for our further annoyance, leaving us in undisputed possession of the surrounding country. Even the trifling repulse of their corps of warriors from the great Pagoda, on the night of the 30th of July, has had its full effect upon the minds of men, already damped by fear and constant disappointment, and who in the employment of these invulnerables, aided by the confident predictions of their best astrologers, appeared to anticipate the intervention of supernatural power in overcoming difficulties they had so often found insurmountable.—The heroes themselves, instead of returning to join the Prince of Sarawuddy after their defeat, have fled to conceal themselves in the hills to the eastward, and all accounts agree, in representing the country to be in a most agitated and distracted state.

Last week we were joined by the native regiment from Madras. Five hundred Mug boatmen from Chittagong, have also arrived under the charge of Captain Wiggins, who the magistrate of Chittagong requested might remain in charge, till the pleasure of the Right Honorable the Governor General was known, but who is now so ill, as to require his return to Bengal in the transport he arrived in. I have therefore appointed Major Jackson, Deputy Quarter Master General, to the charge of the Mug Levy, who, with the Chinese and Malays, formerly under him, amount to about eight hundred men.

The monsoon is evidently at a close, and although the country still remains completely under water, I am very generally assured that most parts of the district are dry and passable before the end of October, when I trust I shall be able to undertake some movements I have long anxiously contemplated, and if I succeed in obtaining such a supply of cattle, as the accounts of the country lead me to expect, I shall consider the chief barrier to our progress as removed.

No. 68. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; to George Swinton, Esq. Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated 1st October, 1824.*

Since I last did myself the honor of addressing you, a movement has been made upon Paulang, where I had been informed the enemy had established a post, and was busily employed in constructing combustible rafts and boats for the destruction of our shipping.

In consequence of this information, I, on the 21st ultimo, directed Brigadier General Fraser, with a strong detachment, to proceed to Paulang, for the purpose of putting a stop to any preparations for our annoyance, and dislodging the enemy from his post.

The detachment fell in with several stockades and breast-works, which the enemy instantly evacuated on the spirited approach of the seamen and troops, without, in any one instance, shewing a disposition to come to close quarters, as will appear by the Brigadier General's report to me of the operations of his expedition, which I herewith beg to enclose.

No fire-rafts were seen.

No. 68. (B)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General H. Fraser, to Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated 27th September, 1824.*

I have the honor to report, that in conformity to your orders of the 19th instant, the party detailed in the margin\* embarked on the morning of the 21st, and anchored off Kummundine the same evening.

It proceeded on the 22d, and about two miles from Pagoda-point, fell in with five stockades, three on the right side and two on the left.

The *Satellite*, towed by the steam vessel, led, and on approaching these stockades, a heavy fire was opened, from both sides, from musketry and cannon, which was returned by the ships and by the troops on the decks and tops of the *Satellite*. Arrangements were immediately made to disembark a proportion of the troops. On their approach to the stockades, the enemy, after a slight resistance, quitted their position, and fled to the jungle, leaving several men killed in the right stockade, as reported by Major Sale, H. M. 13th Light Infantry, who led this party.

One large gun was found burst, and four others were brought off, with several jinjals and other arms.

On the 23d, the flotilla continued to advance without meeting with any obstacle—distance estimated between twelve and fifteen miles.

On the 24th, continued our route up the river about five miles, and in the afternoon fell in with three stockades,

\* 1st Division.—1 Captain, 1 Subaltern, 2 Serjeants, and 65 Rank and File, from each of the European Regiments in the Force, under a Field Officer.

2d Division.—1 Captain, 4 Subalterns, and 220 Rank and File, from Native corps.



stockades, which were bombarded for a short time previous to the landing of the troops, who found the different stockades evacuated.

On the 23th, several boats filled with troops, went in pursuit of some war boats stated to be near, but did not succeed in overtaking them.

During this time the Pioneers were employed in destroying the different stockades, which being completed, the flotilla commenced its return to Rangoon, at the recommendation of the naval commander.

The destruction of the different stockades taken on the 22d was completed during our passage down the river.

I am happy to add, that no casualties occurred amongst the troops during these operations, but I understand two or three sailors were wounded.

The ordnance was taken possession of by the naval commander, with the exception of one gun burst, and another sunk in the river.

No regular return of the ordnance was taken in consequence of the hurried nature of the operations, and the necessity of taking advantage of the tide to reach the anchoring ground, but the number of all calibres is estimated, by the naval commander, at fifteen pieces.

The country on both sides of the river was generally woody, and the few open spots, which evidently had been cleared for the purpose of cultivation, are now overgrown with high grass, and covered with a considerable depth of water. Few villages were seen, and the population appeared inconsiderable. Some herds of buffaloes were discovered, but no other cattle.

My best thanks are due to Captain Chads, of H. M. ship *Arachne*, for the cordial co-operation and assistance I received from him during the whole operations, and I cannot omit to notice the zeal and alacrity with which Lieutenant Keele and Mr. Litt, master's mate H. M. ship *Arachne*, Lieutenant Bayeley and Mr. Wendson, of H. M. ship *Sophie*, performed the different duties assigned to them by Captain Chads.

Major Sale and all the Officers and men, both Europeans and natives, evinced the utmost zeal and spirit in the performance of every duty required from them, and endured their fatigues with the utmost cheerfulness.

The native troops I beg particularly to notice, who, for the space of four days, had few opportunities of dressing any food.

I have much pleasure in stating, that I received every assistance I could possibly wish from the different Staff Officers who accompanied me; videlicet, Captain Ritson, Brigade Major, Captain Steele, Assistant Quarter Master General, and Lieutenant Lake, Superintending Engineer, who performed their respective duties in a manner highly creditable to themselves.

No. 69. (A)—Despatches from Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq. Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated 11th October, 1824.

Being informed that a part of the enemy's force I formerly stated as having concentrated in the vicinity of Pegue, had advanced in this direction, and taken up a position, fourteen miles from hence, in the neighbourhood of Aunauben, and the Pagoda of Keykloo, I ordered out a reconnoitring party on the morning of the 5th instant, consisting of eight hundred rank and file from the Madras Brigade of Native Light Infantry, under its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant Smith, C. B., accompanied by two camel howitzers, and a competent number of Pioneers, with scaling ladders, &c., with orders to advance upon the enemy's position, and to attack him as often as he might consider his force and means adequate to do so with effect.

I afterwards reinforced the above detail with three hundred rank and file, from the 28th and 30th Regiments of Madras Native Infantry, and two more camel howitzers; and with this combined force Colonel Smith arrived at the enemy's stockaded position at Aunauben and Keykloo, on the evening of the 7th instant.

For a detail of the operations of this force, during the period of its absence from quarters, I beg leave to refer you to the accompanying report.

That their close was very different in result from the promising commencement made at Toddoghee, is to me a most painful task to notice, but it forms a pleasant part of my duty to observe, that Lieutenant-Colonel Smith's orders for the attack at Aunauben were judicious, and the coolness and bravery of conduct of himself and every British officer present, in endeavouring to support discipline during the attack, and afterwards to re-establish order and regularity among the troops, were highly conspicuous.

Unpleasant as the circumstances detailed in Lieutenant-Colonel Smith's report must be, the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council may rest assured, that the enemy shall not long be left to exult in his present triumph.

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No. 69. (B)—*Despatch from Lieut. Col. Smith; dated 10th October, 1824.*

Conformably to the instructions conveyed to me by the Deputy Quarter-Master General, I marched on the morning of the 5th instant, with a detachment of the Madras Native Light Brigade, consisting of eight hundred rank and file, two four and half inch howitzers and forty pioneers, by the route pointed out by the guides, the first part of which was low and marshy, and in many places one or two feet under water; but on clearing an extensive swamp, over which is thrown a wooden bridge, requiring some repairs, the road became good, and lay through a large stockade in ruins. At ten o'clock, I arrived at Todagabe, and finding the troops much exhausted from the extreme heat, I halted a few hours to refresh. During our halt the rain fell plentifully.

At two o'clock the detachment moved on, and in twenty minutes the head of the column was obstructed by a deep nulla affected by the tides, but by the assistance of a temporary bridge, which I had caused to be put together prior to my leaving the lices, I pushed over the advanced guard, which had no sooner crossed, than it received a line of fire from the enemy.

The leading company of the 3d Light Infantry, under Lieutenant Shennan, was quickly pushed on, and proceeded fifty or sixty yards under cover of trees and brush-wood, till he reached an open spot, where a party of the enemy had taken post to annoy us in crossing the nulla—these he quickly dispersed, and in pursuing the fugitives, a stockade was discovered directly facing the main road, a plain bounding it on the right, its left face being enveloped in jungle.

After reconnoitring the position, I directed Lieutenant Shennan to make a rapid movement to a certain point, and then wait until the howitzers and other divisions could be brought up. Captain Williamson, commanding the leading division, soon joined with two scaling ladders brought up by Lieutenant Campbell;—this promising young officer, I lament to say, received a serious wound shortly after, and fell together with some men of the 3d Light Infantry. Firing and shouting were at this time distinctly heard in the jungle on our left, and Captain Williamson was directed to detach a party to out-flank, and keep in check any body of the enemy that might appear in that quarter, as well as to ascertain whether any other works had been thrown up to flank the one in front of us.

In the mean time the howitzers came up, were placed in position, and opened a fire upon the stockade, while Lieutenant Dallas, of the 3d, who commanded the detached party, gave them a flanking fire and turned to the concealed stockade I had conceived, from the cross fire, existed in that direction. Captain Williamson, upon this signal, moved forward in double quick to escalate the enemy's works, which was executed in a smart and gallant style by that officer, seconded by Lieutenant Shennan, and the other officers and men of the 3d Light Infantry. Lieutenant Dallas also advanced and entered, at the same time, from his position. Major Wahab, with the 34th, coming up at the same time, made a spirited charge round by the right face of the works, but the enemy, I regret to say, succeeded in effecting his escape with a trifling loss.

The rear guard, in coming up, was attacked by the enemy, when Lieutenant and Quarter Master Challon's horse was shot dead. Partial firing was also continued upon our troops from the front and left flank for some time after.

A prisoner was taken armed with an English musket. From this man I obtained information which led me to suppose that the enemy was in considerable force in the neighbourhood, with guns and a party of horse, very strongly stockaded. These were spoken of as a different description of soldiery to those we had hitherto encountered. I was induced, in consequence, to request that I might be furnished with a strong reinforcement. The correspondence that passed subsequently on that subject, I need not dwell upon, the commander of the forces being aware of its nature.

On the reinforcement of 300 native rank and file of the 28th and 30th Regiments, with two more 4½-inch howitzers joining the detachment, I issued an order, of which No. 1 is a copy. I have thought it necessary to forward this document to satisfy the commander of the forces, that every means was used in my power to establish systematic order and regularity, and a proper understanding between all the parties employed in the operations against the enemy.

At two o'clock the detachment marched, Major Wahab leading the 1st division, from which was detached an advanced guard of a Subaltern's party under Lieutenant McCallen.

Prior to moving, I directed Major Wahab, in the event of a shot being fired from the enemy, to return it, and push on without retarding the progress of the force.—The same instructions regarded breast-works and other obstacles of that nature.

In a short time a few shots were fired from a distance, and on the advance party emerging into the plain, a small body of horse and foot were seen about 600 yards in front—Lieutenant McCallen continued his course steadily, and on nearing the enemy, the horse shewed a disposition to threaten our flank. Our advance formed line, and supported by Major Wahab, actually drove at them, and the horse, on seeing this movement, pulled  
up

up and retreated precipitately. Immediately after this a breast-work was discovered, from which several shots were fired, Major Wahab pushed on without a moment's delay and carried it in great style, with a trifling loss on our side.

A succession of breast-works on our route were stormed and carried in the same rapid and gallant way, by the bravery evinced by Major Wahab and the officers of that corps; in short, the spirit that animated both officers and men was such as to ensure success in any undertaking; but I regret to say, that the taking of these breast-works retarded our progress, and the detachment, consequently, did not arrive in the vicinity of Kikaloo till five o'clock. It was about this time the guides affected to be ignorant of the direct route to the stockade, although they pointed in the direction it was erected. As the road we were in appeared to be good, and leading direct upon a Pagoda which was represented to lay on the left of the stockade, we pursued it.

Shortly after Captain Williamson, with the 2d division, was directed to diverge from the column of march to the right, and push through the jungle, and attack the enemy's works in that quarter, while Major Wahab should assail it on the left, intending that the 3d, or Major Ogilvie's division, should be available for any other service it might have been required for.

The necessary reconnoissance having been made, which the enemy allowed us to complete unmolested, and the extreme silence that had hitherto prevailed, induced me to believe that the post had been abandoned, but notwithstanding, as the lateness of the evening would not allow of any further examination of the enemy's position, arrangements were made for assailing the place, and Major Wahab was directed to move forward in double quick, with ladders toescalade. This gallant officer gave the cheering signal, and the 1st division, with a spirit and animation I never saw surpassed, and with shouts of "Huzza" and "Dun Dun," rushed forward to the attack. This was only answered by a round of cannon from the Pagoda, which until now I was led by the guides to believe was undefended. The enemy in the stockade still observed a sullen silence, not a shot was fired until the division of the 34th, and ladders had got well in front of their works. It was then that volleys of grape and musketry were discharged upon the party at the distance of fifty or sixty yards with an effect and regularity hitherto unequalled in this country; several of the Pioneers with the ladders were, at this instant, knocked down, together with the leading officers, and the men, consequently, from the awful and destructive fire that fell among them, and the loss of their commanding and leading officers, were seized with panic, and lay down to secure themselves from its further effects.

The lateness of the evening rendered this first check irreparable, or otherwise I might have brought up the 3d, or supporting division, to renew the attack. But to satisfy myself more thoroughly at this momentous crisis of our actual situation, I proceeded to the head of the attacking column, and there I learnt from Lieutenant Shiel, of the 3d Light Infantry, who, in the ardour of zeal, had moved forward with some of his men, that Major Wahab had retired, his wounds not admitting of his remaining any longer in advance. I quickly surveyed the enemy's works, and saw it had a parapet, from which blazed a continued sheet of fire; under these circumstances, I had no alternative I thought left me. I must either bring up the 3d division and renew the attack, to the eminent hazard, nay certainty of losing all, or saving what remained by speedily retrograding. Of two evils I instantly chose the least, and directed Lieutenant Shiel to file away to the rear without noise or confusion. As soon after as possible I sounded the retreat, and the several parties, and such of the wounded men as could walk, assembled on the ground from which the reconnoissance was taken in the first instance. The firing from the enemy was still kept up from three positions.

On the discharge of the first cannon shot from the Pagoda, I directed Captain Bell, with one hundred men of the 28th Regiment, to move round by the left and make an effort to seize it, and overcome any other obstacles he might meet on the way. This promising officer, seconded by Lieutenant Craigue, executed their instructions as far as their means would admit of it, with a spirit and bravery that does them honor. The Pagoda, contrary to report and expectation, was found to be strongly stockaded, and not assailable without ladders, and Lieutenant Briggs, who had zealously volunteered his services to conduct the party in returning to secure ladders, was attacked by thirty or forty Burmese, who rushed upon him with drawn knives, and from whom he only escaped by jumping down a deep ravine.

Order, regularity, and discipline, which had been strictly observed until about this period, vanished, and the whole of the corps, crowded indiscriminately into one general mass, retired to the plain which I had pointed out.

On reaching the bottom of the hill, I fortunately fell in with Captain Williamson's division, which had just then emerged from the jungle on the right. From his report, I found the guides had again deceived us, for, by their account, the jungle in that direction was extremely limited, and on clearing it I had reason to suppose Captain Williamson would have come upon a plain, from which also the guides declared a part of the stockade was to be seen. This was not the case, and Captain Williamson, after innumerable difficulties, could not penetrate beyond a certain distance, and on hearing the retreat sounded, thought it advisable to desist from any farther attempt, and returned accordingly.



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Our meeting at this spot was truly desirable, for I immediately directed him to form up two hundred men to the right and left of the road, fronting the enemy, to cover the retreating columns. This arrangement I was happy to find he had, in a great measure, anticipated. My next object was directed to forming the men as they came out on the plain. This duty was intrusted to Major Ogilvie, whose utmost exertions were used to restore regularity and confidence amongst the troops.

The wounded artillery, and such of the baggage as was recovered, were shortly after sent on, preceded by a party, and the line under Major Ogilvie, followed slowly, and when it had retired to a sufficient distance, I formed such parts of Captain Williamson's covering division as I judged necessary into rear guard, with directions for its following the line, and in the event of a sally being made from the stockades, to halt, showing as large a front to the enemy as circumstances and the nature of the ground would admit of. This duty was ably executed by that cool and steady officer, aided by the zealous exertions of Captain Williams, of the 28th Regiment.

The detachment, I am happy to say, arrived at Todajee at 11 o'clock, P. M., without meeting any annoyance on the route.—The wounded, were immediately collected, and through the indefatigable exertions of the medical officers of the 3d, 34th, and 28th Regiments, and the zealous aid of Captain Milne, of the Pioneers, in procuring the means of carriage for such men as could not be provided with doolies, I was enabled to move again at 2 o'clock in the morning, an hour previous to which we had been disturbed by a few shot from an advanced party of the enemy.

Captain Murray, and Lieutenant Aldrit, of the Madras Artillery, were, from the first, zealous and indefatigable in their exertions, in bringing their howitzers to the positions fixed upon; and the steadiness and alacrity evinced by them and their men, under a galling fire, was such as has, on all occasions, distinguished that corps.

I have deemed it advisable to make this unusually long report, in order to put the Commander of the Forces in possession of the most minute events that occurred in the prosecution of this service; and in concluding, I beg leave to add, that the gallantry and good conduct of Major Wahab was particularly conspicuous on all occasions, as likewise that of the officers of his corps and division. To Captain Williamson and officers of the 3d Light Infantry, I am equally indebted for their cool and steady demeanour, under all the trying circumstances the detachment encountered. I cannot appreciate too highly the services of Major Ogilvie and Captain Milne, whose judgment, bravery and steadiness, I had frequent opportunities of witnessing. In short, to all the officers and men composing the detachment, praise is due, but to Captain Sneyd, Brigade Major, Lieutenant Briggs, of the Quarter Master General's Department, and to Lieutenant Trant, of His Majesty's 38th, the latter of whom volunteered to convey orders, I am particularly indebted for the able assistance they afforded me, and for the cool, steady courage they manifested in all times of danger and difficulty.

I have the honor to forward paper No. 2, list of killed and wounded,\* and have deeply to lament the severity of the loss sustained, particularly in the death of Captain Allen, who, after having received one wound, persisted in leading on his men, when a second shot terminated his gallant career.

No. 70. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department; dated 15th October, 1824.*

On the return to quarters of the column under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Smith, C. B., under the circumstances stated in my despatch of the 11th instant, I lost no time in sending out another force of the strength mentioned in the margin,† under the command of Brigadier McCreaigh, C. B., in the hope that the enemy might be so far elated with his success as to await his arrival in their position at Keykloo, in that, however, I have been disappointed, as will appear by the accompanying report to me from the Brigadier.

No. 70. (B)—*Copy*

\* *Return of Killed and Wounded of Detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, C. B., in the Actions of the 5th and 7th October.*

Killed—European Officers 2—Wounded 6—Ditto, ditto, Private 0—Wounded 1—Native Officers and Privates 19—Wounded 67.

*Names of Officers Killed and Wounded.*

*Killed*—Captain Allen, 34th Regiment Light Infantry, and Lieutenant Bond, ditto ditto.

*Wounded*—Major Wahab, 34th Regiment Light Infantry—Lieutenant and Adjutant Campbell, 1st Battalion Pioneers—Captain Moncrieffe, ditto ditto—Lieutenant Chalton, 34th Regiment Light Infantry, and Lieutenant Lindsay, ditto ditto.

† 420 Rank and File from His Majesty's Regiments.

350 Native Infantry from the 28th and 30th Madras Regiments.

770 Rank and File.

1 8½-inch Mortar.

1 5½-inch Howitzer.

1 6-Pr. Field Piece.

No. 70. (B)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier M. McCreagh, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated 14th October, 1826.*

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In obedience to the instructions I received from you on the 9th of this month, to dislodge the enemy from his position at Keykloo, I have the honor to report, that I marched from this at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, with three pieces of artillery and the detachments, Europeans and natives, which you had placed under my orders, and arrived at the Toodoghee stockades at seven in the morning of the 10th, where I halted to rest and refresh the troops. I marched again at two in the afternoon of that day, leaving the detachment of the 3d Madras Native Infantry, (one hundred and fifty men) to occupy the stockades as a post of communication, and reached a tolerably favorable piece of ground within about a mile of the enemy's position at sun-set, where we passed the night.

However revolting to humanity and to the customs of civilized nations, it is my duty to report to you, that during this latter march a considerable portion of the road presented to us the horrid spectacle of the bodies of the sepoy and pioneers who had been lost in the unsuccessful attack of the 7th instant, fastened to the trunks of trees on the road side, inangled and mutilated in every manner that savage cruelty could devise, and the feelings of the troops under my command were obviously raised to a very high pitch of indignation at the sight—twenty-three bodies were counted.

At break of day on the 11th, I put the column in march, with the intention of immediately attacking.

A Pagoda, situated upon an eminence, and slightly fortified, appeared to be the key to their position, as it commanded and overlooked both their stockades within very effective musket range, and would, in fact, render them untenable. The stockades were of a very poor description, the defences low and faced with crooked and irregular timber, so as to be very easily scaled at any point, even without ladders; appearances, however, led me, while reconnoitring, to believe the works altogether unoccupied, and on bringing forward a company from our advance to carry the Pagoda, we had the mortification to find that the enemy had entirely evacuated the position.

In the course of the morning I learned, from a few Burmese stragglers caught in the neighbourhood, that the Rayhoon, with his people (about three thousand, including all descriptions) had retreated the preceding afternoon to a large village called Kaghahie, where he had a reserve of one thousand more people, and a much stronger stockade. This intelligence raised a hope that his better position, combined with exultation in his late successful defence, might perhaps induce him to await my attack there; I consequently decided, that it would be right, under such circumstances, to go beyond the instructions you had given me, and leaving the detachment of the 30th Madras Native Infantry, (one hundred and eighty men) as a post of communication, I marched with the remainder of my force, (the Artillery, and about six hundred,) at two in the morning of the 12th. We found the road, as usual, embarrassed with felled trees, and in some places strong breast-works thrown across it, but our movements were perhaps too unexpected and rapid for the enemy to take advantage of these defences, and their outposts successively fled before us without firing a shot. At length, circumstances began to indicate pretty clearly, that they were in complete and disorderly route, and directing our advanced guard to hasten forward at once to the stockade, I found it entirely evacuated, the barracks within it burning, and the enemy were seen flying in all directions, through the neighbouring jungle.

We instantly moved on to the village, which was extremely large, and calculated to contain many thousands of inhabitants, but altogether deserted, and burning rapidly, having been set on fire by them in a great number of places.

Vexatious as was this second disappointment, it is in some degree satisfactory to report to you, that the information we received from some aged and infirm Burmese in it, perfectly agreed in proving that their force is in a state of utter dispersion and panic; the Rayhoon himself having fled across the country almost unattended.

Here also we found five more of the sepoy and pioneers, victims to the deliberate cruelty of this barbarian, in the same manner as those before described.

The stockade was built of straight spars and rather lofty, but somewhat unfinished, and like those at Keykloo, no barriers at the entrances—we were fortunate enough to procure two or three buffaloes, which served to refresh the troops, and at three in the afternoon, after injuring the stockade, and burning the barracks around it, I returned towards Keykloo, where we arrived at about seven, resumed our march at three in the morning of the 13th, after burning all the huts in and round the works, and arrived at Toodaghee early in the day,—moved from thence at half-past one this morning, and reached our lines here, between seven and eight o'clock, and I am happy to add that no individual of any description is missing.

Fruitless as were our efforts to overtake and bring them to action, it would still be an injustice to omit reporting to you, that the active and hearty exertion manifested in every department of the force, was exemplary,

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plary, while the spirit and steady obedience of the officers and men, gave ample token, that could we have closed with the enemy, no one would have enquired his numbers. The manner in which the Bengal Artillery was forced over the most unfavorable ground and various difficult obstacles, reflects high credit on Lieutenant Lawrenson and his detachment, and the effective exertions of the Madras Pioneers, under Captain Milne, attracted the notice of every one.

To Major Sale, of His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, who acted as my 2d in command, my best thanks are due, and I received on this, as on other occasions, very valuable assistance from Captain Aitken, of that Corps, who has for some months acted as my Aid-de-Camp.

No. 70. (C)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq. Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated October 12, 1824.*

I sometime since received information that the Prince of Sarrawuddy had pushed forward a part of his force to Thantabain, upon the Lyng river, which joins the Rangoon river above Kemmendine, and is noted in the maps, as passable from Rangoon to the Irrawuddy during the rains.

As far back as the month of July last, I was aware that the enemy had erected very strong stockades in the neighbourhood of Thantabain, but since the defeat they experienced on the 8th of that month, until very lately, being merely occupied as a post of observation, I deemed them unworthy of notice, but having now become the head-quarters of the Kee-Woongee and Sykia-Woongee, (1st and 2d ministers of the state) already at the head of a considerable force, and receiving daily reinforcements, and large supplies of military stores for the future operations of their army in this quarter, I considered it high time to interrupt their farther proceedings, and as a land column was moving upon Keykloo on the 5th instant, in the hope that mutual advantage might be derived from a simultaneous movement, I, on the same morning, directed Major Evans, of His Majesty's 38th Regiment, to embark with three hundred rank and file of his own Regiment, and one hundred Native Infantry, from the 18th Madras Regiment, with orders to attack the enemy wherever he might find him posted on the river, and could do so with every prospect of success.

The naval part of the expedition was prepared and led by that zealous and excellent officer Captain Chadds, of His Majesty's ship *Arachne*, the senior naval officer on the station.

How well my orders have been executed by these gallant officers, and the brave men under their command, the accompanying detail of operations will shew.

That their well-earned reputation and undaunted conduct, should have ensured them an easy victory over a numerous enemy, strongly posted, and acting under the immediate eye of the two first men in the state, is to me most gratifying and satisfactory.

No. 70. (D)—*Copy of a Despatch from Major Thomas Evans, H. M. 38th Regiment, to Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated October 11, 1824.*

In obedience to orders I had the honor of receiving from you, to feel the strength and disposition of the enemy upon the Lyng river, and to attack him as often as opportunities might offer of displaying the discipline and valor of the troops under my command, on the morning of the 5th instant I embarked with three-hundred men of His Majesty's 38th Regiment, one hundred rank and file of the 18th Madras Native Infantry, and a detachment of Bengal Artillery, under Captain Timbrel, on board a squadron of gun boats, flotilla, &c. &c. &c., under the immediate command of Captain Chadds, of His Majesty's Ship *Arachne*, and the first day's tide carried us as high as Pagoda-point above Kemmendine, at the junction of the Lyng and Paulang rivers. Having been joined by the armed transport flotilla, at two P. M. next day the squadron proceeded up the Lyng river with a flowing tide. Bodies of the enemy were seen moving up the right bank of the river, and numerous war boats hovered in our front, and kept up a continued but distant fire from cannon, with which they were all provided. After the flotilla anchored, the light boats in advance, under Lieutenant Kellet, of His Majesty's ship *Arachne*, pursued the enemy's war boats, and having closed with one carrying a gun and full complement of men, boarded and took her in the handsomest style, the Burmese jumping overboard to save themselves. On the 7th, after proceeding about four miles, I observed two stockades, which were taken possession of without loss, and we reached with this tide within a short distance of the large works and fortified village of Thantabain, having, in the course of the day, destroyed seven of the newly constructed war boats. On reconnoitring the village of Thantabain, I found it was defended by three long breast-works, with a very extensive stockade, constructed of large teak beams, and fourteen large war boats, each mounting a gun, were anchored so as to defend the approach to it.

Having



Having consulted Captain Chadds, we advanced to the assault, the steam boat, with the *Satellite* and bomb ketch in tow, and the troops in their boats ready to land when ordered. In passing the breast-works we received a smart running fire from jinjals and musketry, which was returned with showers of grape from the *Satellite*, and observing the enemy evidently in confusion, I directed the troops and scaling ladders to be immediately landed, and in a few minutes every work about the place was in our possession. During this night some fire-rafts, of a most formidable appearance, were floated down the river, but very fortunately passed without touching any of the vessels.

At six o'clock next morning, we again moved with the tide, and in passing a narrow neck of land at the junction of two rivers, were received with a brisk discharge of musketry from a long line of breast-works, and a cannonade from a very large stockade on our right. The fire of the latter was soon silenced by the well-pointed guns of the *Satellite*.

The troops and Pioneers were ordered then to land, and this formidable stockade was carried by assault without a struggle. It is, without exception, the strongest work of the kind I have ever seen—the length of the front and rear faces is two hundred yards, and that of the side faces one hundred and fifty. It is built of solid timber, fifteen feet high, with a platform inside all round, five feet broad and eight feet from the ground—upon this platform were a number of wooden guns, and piles of single and double-headed wooden shot, and many jinjals, and below, we found seven pieces of iron and brass ordnance. In front, the stockade is strengthened by breast-works and regular demi-lanes, and would contain with ease above two thousand men. In the centre of this stronghold, we found the magnificent bungalow of the Kee Woongee, who, I presume, fled early in the day, altho' we found the house was perforated by balls in many places, and the rooms much stained with blood. I cannot doubt but the enemy's loss must have been severe, but we only found seventeen dead bodies, which they had not time to carry off.

The advanced boats having pushed up the river some miles, without seeing any other works, I considered the objects you had in view fully accomplished, and we, accordingly, began to move back to Rangoon. Had not the most marked respect for the British arms been shewn during our whole progress upon the river, I should have regretted that the enemy afforded me no opportunity of bringing my troops into regular contact with them; but the reduction of the most formidable stockades I have ever seen, fully garrisoned by men, as far as I could see, all armed with muskets, and animated by the presence of the two ministers of state, Kee Woongee and Sykia Woongee, sufficiently denotes the terror we inspired, and leaves me the satisfaction to report, that not one man was lost to the service during the operations above detailed. I cannot adequately acknowledge my obligations to Captain Chadds, for his zealous, judicious and cordial co-operation, and the spirited conduct of Lieutenant Kellet, in command of the advanced boats, attracted the notice of every one. To Captain Timbrel, Bengal Artillery, who volunteered his services, and Captain Waterman, Assistant Deputy Quarter Master General, who accompanied me, my best thanks are due, and I need scarcely add, that every officer and man evinced, on all occasions, that cheerful readiness and determined valor you have so often witnessed.

I cannot close my report without mentioning the very meritorious services of Brevet Captain Wheeler, and the detachment of Pioneers that accompanied me, their prompt and ready zeal in situations of difficulty and danger was not less conspicuous than their indefatigable exertions in performing other parts of their laborious duty, and the very gallant style in which they repeatedly dashed forward with scaling ladders, was as honorable to themselves as it was a gratifying mark of faith and confidence in the troops employed.

Herewith I have the honor to transmit a return\* of captured ordnance, in addition to which much powder and an immense quantity of Petroleum oil, and warlike stores, were destroyed at the different stockades.

No. 71.—*Extract*

\* *Return of Ordnance and Stores taken and destroyed by a Detachment, under the Command of Major Evans, His Majesty's 38th Regiment between the 5th and 10th October, 1824.*

Brass Ordnance, two  $\frac{1}{2}$ -pounders, one 1-ditto, one  $1\frac{1}{2}$ -ditto, and one  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ditto.

Iron ditto, one  $\frac{1}{2}$ -pounder, and three  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ditto.

Jinjals, iron, 22.

Rockets, signal, 53.

Carriages, one  $\frac{1}{2}$ -pounder, and two  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ditto.

500-lbs. of Gun Powder, a few Iron Shot, and 400 gallons of Earth Oil, besides 7 Wooden Guns and Carriages, destroyed on the 9th instant.

*General Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing of a Detachment, under the Command of Major Thomas Evans, of His Majesty's 38th Regiment, in the Attack on the Enemy's Stockades near the Village of Thantabin, on the 8th and 9th instant.*

*His Majesty's 38th Regiment*—Killed: none—Wounded: Two Rank and File—Missing: none.

*1st Battalion Madras Pioneers*—Killed: none—Wounded: One Rank and File—Missing: none.

No. 71.—*Extract from a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated 16th October, 1824.*

If I can trust the information I receive, I may conclude that the united strength of the Burmhan empire is now collecting in my front. I have not a doubt that part of the Bundoola's army was present at all the late affairs, but their presence does not appear to have yet given any additional confidence to the troops we were in the habit of encountering, although it is certain, they are now very generally armed with muskets.

The Bundoola, all the prisoners say, has arrived at Donobew, with unlimited powers, and is to make a general attack upon our position early in the ensuing moon. Preparatory orders from him had been received at those posts nearest our line, to cut quantities of bamboos of a certain length, and collect all the earth-oil and cotton the country could supply. These materials were, of course, intended for the construction of fire rafts, but Major Evans's party having destroyed all the earth-oil collected, that part of the General's plan is so far disarranged.

The court of Ava has already made great exertions in supplying their army in this quarter with such materials as the country and capital contain, all or great part of which has been successively captured by the troops under my command. What farther exertions in that respect they may be capable of making, I cannot judge, but if any inference can be drawn from the wooden guns, double and single-headed wooden shot, lately found in their stockades, and the rude lumps of ragged iron used as shot, I should conclude their arsenal department must now be at a very low ebb.

Since last I had the honour of addressing you, one hundred and eighty bullocks have arrived from Madras, and more are daily expected. They are the best caste of the draft cattle on that coast, and will be highly useful.

No. 72. (A)—*Extract Letter from Captain Barnes, Commanding the East India Company's Frigate Hastings, to George Swinton, Esq.; dated Cheduba Roads, 21st September, 1824.*

I have great pleasure in transmitting to you, for the information of the Right Honorable Lord Amherst, Governor General in Council, an account of a most daring, well-conducted, and successful attack made by two cutters, belonging to the H. C. frigate *Hastings*, under my command, on four boats, belonging to the enemy, on the coast of Ramree; and trust that my entering somewhat into detail will be excused, as I am anxious to do justice to the officers and men who so gallantly achieved the dispersion of the enemy, whose numbers were so disproportionate to their little force.

On the morning of the 10th instant, at daylight, the look-out at the mast-head announced three large boats to be in sight, close under the shore of Ramree, and about five or six miles distant from the frigate, rowing to the southward. I immediately directed the two ten oared cutters to be manned and armed, and sent six marines in each, placing both boats under the command of Lieutenant Harrison, second of the frigate, Mr. Graves, master's-mate, being in charge of one boat, with orders to bring them alongside, if possible. Some time after the cutters had left the ship, I observed a fourth boat, and could plainly perceive they were all full of men; our launch unfortunately being absent watering, I manned and armed the two boats belonging to the pilot brigs *Meriton* and *Planet*, with European seamen and marines, and dispatched them to the assistance of the cutters; but, owing to the start they had of them, and these being very heavy pulling boats, they were not able to assist in the capture, which I cannot better describe to his Lordship than by transmitting the very modest, but mainly letter of Lieutenant Harrison, describing the affair. Annexed I have the honor to send a list of the arms captured,\* and understand a considerable quantity was lost in the boat that was bilged, and which was the largest of the four, and had their sirdar on board it, who, it is believed, escaped.

No. 72. (B)—*Copy of Report from Lieutenant Harrison, to Captain Barnes; dated on board the Frigate Hastings, Cheduba Roads, 10th September, 1824.*

In pursuance of your orders this morning, I proceeded with the two cutters under my command, in pursuit of four boats belonging to the enemy, as seen from the *Hastings*, pulling along the Ramree coast to the southward;

\* *List of Arms captured.*—15 muskets, 1 bayonet, 130 spears, 95 swords, 1 swirl gun.

A large quantity of gun-powder, the major part damaged by water.

Some musket ammunition that had been taken from our troops at Ramoo.

A quantity of musket balls and flints.

southward; after a smart pull of about six miles, I had closed with the chase so near as to enable the cutter, under the command of Mr. Graves, to interrupt the two sternmost boats of the enemy, while myself succeeded in turning the two boats in advance; they then seemed inclined to receive us warmly, by giving loud cheers, which we immediately returned by our seamen and marines with their accustomed spirit; a fire of musketry now commenced on both sides, and the enemy, perceiving our intention of laying them on board, immediately beached their boats; we pursued so closely as to enable us to do considerable mischief; three boats were captured and towed into deep water, six of the enemy made prisoners, and the fourth boat, I regret to say, was bilged and rendered useless; so precipitate was their retreat, that they left every thing behind, and amongst various articles, a great number of arms, of all descriptions, have been captured.

I feel much pleasure in bringing to your notice the zeal and exertions of Mr. Graves, to whom the highest praise is due, as well as the satisfactory conduct of every body employed, particularly the seamen, whose great exertions in pulling deserves my best thanks, and although the second division of boats were not up at the commencement, I have every reason to suppose they aided in enabling me to effect my purpose without the loss of a man: as the enemy could not be estimated at less than four hundred effective men, their loss in killed and wounded I have no means of ascertaining correctly, but I should imagine it to exceed sixty.

No. 72. (C)—*Extract Letter from Lieut.-Colonel Hampton, Commanding at Cheduba, to Lieut.-Colonel Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated 23d October, 1824.*

Captain Barnes, of the H. C.'s frigate *Hastings*, having intimated to me his intention of making another reconnoissance on the enemy's coast, with the frigate and gun-boats under his command, and having made a requisition for two hundred men of my regiment, I ordered the flank companies to be completed to that number, with the usual proportion of European commissioned, and native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, under the command of Captain Vincent, for the service, furnishing, at the same time, two European artillerymen for each of the gun-boats of the third division flotilla, under Captain Finucane.

The whole embarked on the 15th instant, on board the frigate and buoy-vessel *Planet*, and with the H. C. surveying ship *Investigator*, proceeded the same afternoon to the point of attack.

I have the honour to transmit, for his Excellency's information, a copy of Captain Vincent's report.

No. 72. (D)—*Copy of Letter from Captain Vincent, to Lieutenant and Adjutant Margrave; dated Cheduba, 18th October, 1824.*

I have the honor to report the return of the detachment embarked under my command, for service on the island of Ramree, and to state, for Lieut.-Col. Hampton's information, that having, in conformity to his instructions, placed myself and troops at the disposal of Captain Barnes, commanding the H. C. ships of war and gun-boats on this station, we were, on the morning of the 16th instant, joined by one hundred seamen and marines, and soon after landed in front of a breast-work, which had been occupied by the Burmese during the morning, but evacuated immediately on our advancing to attack it. I then pushed on to the stockade, described by Lieut.-Col. Hampton as being in an unfinished state, but found it completely destroyed, a few sticks only remaining to mark its actual situation; learning, however, from the guide, that there was a fortified village a short distance in front, I proceeded on till we came to a stockade, which we found totally abandoned, although capable of defence against any but a British force, without guns. As I had the advantage of your valuable services on this, as well as every other occasion during the day, I must request that you will do me the favour to afford Lieut.-Col. Hampton any information he may be desirous of obtaining as to the strength of this post, its peculiarity of construction, and description of buildings within it, the report itself being too unimportant to intrude any thing further on the Lieutenant-Colonel's attention, than merely to state the nature of the service on which the detachment was employed.

Conceiving it probable that the Burmese had returned to a stockade which I understood was no great distance from us, I did not consider it advisable to delay longer than was necessary for the destruction of the buildings in and about that we were in possession of; and after a march of nearly a mile, had the satisfaction to find the guide's information correct; but although inferior to the other only in size, we were allowed to enter this second stockade, as usual, without resistance, the Burmese having fled in all directions on the appearance of the advanced guard.

As the abandonment of this last stockade evinced but little inclination, on the part of the enemy, to afford us an opportunity of doing more in that direction, I thought it advisable, after firing the whole of the buildings (from many of which I had the satisfaction to see large quantities of powder explode), to return to the beach, and bivouac near the breast-work we had possessed ourselves of on landing. I ought to have mentioned



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before, that we were joined in the morning by a party of the Calcutta Militia, doing duty on board the gun-boats; these men were stationed as a piquet in rear of the line, the piquets of the regular Native Infantry being thrown out in directions whence a night attack was more to be apprehended; it appears, however, that between three and four in the morning, a few of the enemy had the temerity to advance on the sentries, and actually fired amongst them, wounding three privates, and one of them so badly as to render amputation of the right arm necessary; I am happy to add that the piquet behaved with the greatest steadiness on this occasion.

Having made a march of about four miles to the northward, where it was reported some large boats were in a creek, and finding only one, which was immediately destroyed, the detachment returned to the beach, and re-embarked on board the boats held in readiness for that purpose.

Although this report has nothing to detail of a brilliant nature, it must nevertheless be gratifying to Lieutenant-Col. Hampton, that the conduct of every individual belonging to the detachment was such as to ensure, on any future occasion of greater difficulty, every possible advantage which bravery and devotion to its interests can bestow; and though it may be considered presumption in me to speak of the merits of any other branch of the service than that to which I immediately belong, I cannot, in the present instance, avoid bringing to the notice of the Lieutenant-Colonel, the highly meritorious conduct of the officer-, seamen, and marines of the H. C.'s frigate *Hastings*, and surveying-ship *Investigator*, who acted in conjunction with the troops, not only as regarded their readiness to meet every obstacle which the nature of the service led us to expect, but likewise in their steady and prompt obedience to the rigid rules of discipline, which the peculiar nature of the enterprise rendered so essentially necessary to be observed.

No. 73. (A)—Despatch from Captain Barnes, Commanding the H. C. Frigate *Hastings*, to George Swinton, Esq., &c. &c. &c.; dated 19th October, 1824.

Captain Ross, of the H. C. Marine, and commanding their ship *Investigator*, having delivered into my charge, on the 7th instant, a division of gun boats, five in number, under the direction of Captain Finucane, of His Majesty's 14th Regiment of Foot, I thought this additional force might be employed to advantage for the purpose of covering a landing of troops on the north part of Ramree, for the purpose of destroying some stockades and breast-works the enemy possess on the sea face—and as I had learnt, that the Burmahs had some strong defences at a short distance in-land, I applied to Lieutenant-Colonel Hampton for the aid of two hundred sepoy, which that officer was pleased to grant, and on the evening of the 14th, the troops being embarked on board the *Hastings*, and *Planet*, pilot brig, we weighed and proceeded to our position. The frigate drawing too much water to approach the shore near enough for her guns to prove useful, I placed the gun boats close in shore, abreast of the enemy's works, and in the morning disembarked the whole of our force, consisting of two hundred sepoy, 40th Regiment, commanded by Captain Vincent.

Commanded by Lieutenant	{ Europeans, Marines, 26 } { Ditto, Seamen, ..... 57 }	<i>H. C. Frigate Hastings.</i>
H. Wyndham,.....		
1st of the <i>Hastings</i> ,.....	{ Ditto, Seamen, ..... 40 }	<i>Volunteers from H. C. Ship Investigator,</i>

and myself went on board the *Elizabeth*, gun boat, to give such directions as I might think requisite. A smart fire was kept up by the boats on the enemy, who shewed themselves in force, and fired smartly on the boats, but with the exception of one shot from a large jinjal that hit the *Burrampooter*, and a few musket balls that struck the *Megna*, which was placed by her gallant commander, Mr. Boyce, so close to the bank, it was hard to miss her—no accident occurred, the whole of the enemy flying into the jungle as soon as the troops landed, leaving their jinjals behind them. The position held by the enemy was exceedingly strong and well chosen, being composed of a well-formed breast-work fronting the sea, with a nullah of considerable width between it and the high sand bank forming the shore; the tide flowing into the nullah, so that the place was capable of good defence. The rear of the stockade was also entrenched at the distance of about 100 yards, and that backed by a thick jungle. As the force, about noon, moved off into the interior, and being unable, from my weak state of health to march with them, I beg leave to give the remaining account of the reconnoissance in the language of my first Lieutenant, who commanded the nautical party on shore.

I have much pleasure in mentioning, that on the morning of the 16th, Mr. Midshipman Laughton landed about a mile and a half to the south of our first position, and, with the crews of the *Burrampooter* and *Irawaddy*, burnt a respectable Chowkey belonging to the enemy, who fled on his approach. Hoping this diversion may meet the approval of the Right Honorable Lord Amherst, Governor General in Council.

No. 73. (B)—Report

No. 73. (B)—*Report from Lieutenant Wyndham, to George Barnes, Esq. Captain H. C. Frigate Hastings.*

In obedience to your orders of the 16th instant, I proceeded on shore with the seamen from the *Hastings* under my command, to co-operate with Captain Vincent, in the destruction of the enemy's stockades. The landing of the force having been effected in sight of the enemy, without opposition, about one mile to the southward of Umlabeen, I was joined by Lieutenant Lloyd, with forty seamen from the *Investigator*. A large body of the enemy were seen in their trenches half a mile to the southward, but immediately our force was put in motion, they disappeared among the jungle, and we then occupied a breast-work guarding the road to the interior: a short halt was made for arrangements and the guides to be landed.

At noon we were again put in motion, and commenced our march to the stockades along a narrow pathway, admitting, in many places, only two abreast, and intersected with rivulets. In about twenty minutes, we were upon the spot of the expected stockade; but the enemy had previously demolished it, leaving nothing but a few of the large posts standing at its angles, and the entrenchments not filled up.—From this place, we pushed forward about one and a half mile more, and came upon a regular and well-constructed stockade capable of containing four thousand men, with a double fence round a sand breast-work, and well filled up between with pointed bamboo stakes inclining outwards. I regret to say that Wm. Williams, seaman of the *Hastings*, was severely wounded by one of them running into his foot. Here again the enemy fled upon the approach and firing of the light troops in advance, when our party triumphantly entered the gates and took possession. A small jinjal, with a pair of colors were taken, and the stockade set on fire, which consumed the whole of the interior buildings, and from the explosion of some concealed powder, did damage to the breast-work and outer fences; from this we marched on the left, and destroyed another large stockade, which had no outwork, but a breast-work inside the stockade, about 4 feet 6 inches high, and barracks sufficient to contain three thousand men; from hence we marched down to the beach and occupied our former position within the breast-work, and slept under arms for the night. Here another accident occurred from the going off of a musket, which I am very sorry to add, severely wounded one of the *Investigator's* seamen through the arm. About half-past three o'clock next morning, we were aroused from our slumbers by the enemy, who commenced an attack upon our picquets. We received them with cheers, and every one was at his post instanter. The enemy, when they found us on the alert, and our picquets commenced firing upon them, retreated immediately to the woods, and nothing more was seen of them. We continued under arms till day-light and then commenced a circuitous march of about four miles to the northward, and passed three villages in the rear of Umlahbeen; but as they appeared to be Mug habitations, with no work of defence about them, they were not destroyed. We then marched towards the sea, and came up in the rear of the breast-works, which the frigate under your command, upon a former occasion, drove the enemy from. We proceeded along the beach to the position held by us during the night, where we halted, refreshed the men, destroyed the buildings, and embarked the force.

I have much pleasure in bringing to your notice the good conduct of the officers and seamen you did me the honor to place under my command; and I feel confident, had the enemy stood, they would have shewn themselves to be British seamen.

No. 74. (A)—*Copy of Letter from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., to George Swinton, Esq.; dated Head-Quarters, Rangoon, 7th November, 1824.*

For the last fortnight I remained under a very considerable degree of uneasiness at not hearing of, or from the expedition I had sent against Martaban on the 11th ultimo, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, of H. M.'s 41st Regiment, apprehensive that the strong currents that prevail on this coast on the change of the monsoons, might have driven them either past the port or out to sea, and the consequent deprivation of provisions and water; but the arrival at head-quarters last night of my Aid-de-camp, who accompanied Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, as a volunteer, dispelled all apprehensions, and now enables me to transmit you, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, the detail of an achievement, no less honourable than beneficial to the British arms, reflecting the highest credit on the able, judicious, and gallant officer that led, as well as every individual composing the force under his command.

No. 74. (B)—*Extract further Letter from same to the same; dated Head-Quarters, Rangoon, 7th November, 1824.*

By this opportunity I have the honour to transmit you Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin's report of the fall of Martaban, which will be read with interest, as evincing another proof of the impression our arms have made  
on

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on the minds of the enemy. It will scarcely be credited, that upwards of four thousand men, well armed, and well prepared for the attack, from the unforeseen impediments the expedition met with in reaching its destination, and fighting behind defences of a very formidable nature, should be driven out of them by a mere handful of British troops. On this occasion you will be pleased to see the handsome manner in which Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin speaks of the 3d Madras Native Infantry, one of the corps which retired from the stockade at Keykloo.

No. 74. (C)—Copy of Report from Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B.; dated Martaban, 2d November, 1824.

The force you did me the honour to place under my command, for the capture of the town of Martaban and its dependencies, cleared the Rangoon river on the morning of the 14th ultimo; but owing to the ignorance of the people acting as pilots, with calms and contrary currents, the expedition did not reach Martaban till the morning of the 29th.

It was my intention to have landed on my arrival at Martaban, but the tides which run rapidly here, rendered it almost impracticable, and the ships having it in their power to get nearer the defences in the evening, I deferred landing till the next morning at day-break. I took two opportunities this day to see the whole front of the place, with Captain Waterman, Assistant Quarter-Master General, and Captain Kennan, commanding the artillery. Its appearance was uncommonly strong and commanding, and differed from any thing we have seen about here. The place rests at the bottom of a very high hill, washed by a beautiful and extensive sheet of water; on its right a rocky mound, on which was placed a two-gun battery, with a deep nullah under it. This battery communicates with the usual stockade of timber, and behind this a work of masonry, varying from twelve to twenty feet thick, with small embrasures for either cannon or musketry. The stockade runs along the margin of the water for more than three-quarters of a mile, where it joins a larger pagoda, which projects into the water in the form of a bastion. The defences then continue a short distance, and end at a nullah, on the other side of which all is thick jungle. The town continues to run in an angle way from the Pagoda for at least a mile, and terminates in the house of the Myoon, close to a stockade up the hill. The whole defence is the waterline, with its flanks protected.

The rear of the town and works is composed of thick jungle and large trees, and open to the summit of the hill: as we moved along the place all was silent, not a gun to be perceived, but a slight wicker-work to hide every thing behind the embrasures in the Pagoda, and few men to be observed on the works. They never offered to fire on the boat, though rather close in shore. The second time we went to look at it, the same silence prevailed, so that we were induced to think the place abandoned. Shortly, however, after this remark, the ships had approached nearer the works, when a well-directed fire was opened on them from the fort on the height, and down the line a well-pointed gun, from the Pagoda, with grape, was at the same time fired at my boat, and wounded a seaman of the *Moirra*, whose arm was amputated an hour after. I was prepared for a determined resistance by the quantities of boats filled with men crossing; as we went up the river, two Chokeyes opened a smart but useless fire on us—I made it a rule never to fire first.

All the night of the 29th there was a cannonade from both sides, and the excellent practice of Captain Kennan, of the Madras Artillery, commanding, assisted by Lieutenant M'Gregor, of the Bengal Artillery, in the bomb vessel, must have done great execution among the defenders of the works, whose repeated cheers informed us that their numbers were great.

I had made up my mind to storm the escalade immediately under, and to the left of the rocky battery on the enemy's right; and when in, to storm the battery itself, and then the business could be but easy, as we should take all the works in flank.

At five o'clock in the morning of the 30th, the men composing the first division, were in their boats. Ninety-eight men of His Majesty's 41st regiment, seventy-five of the 3d Native Light Infantry, eight of the Bengal Artillery, and thirty-eight seamen of the Royal Navy; about two hundred and twenty men; and I was fully aware that these men would have the business to themselves, as I had no where to wait for the remainder of the force, and every boat was already occupied. The advance sounded a little after five, and the boats rowed off, and soon came under a very heavy fire of all arms. On approaching the shore, I perceived there had been a misunderstanding with respect to the spot at which I wished to land, and we had got on the wrong side of the nullah. As we could not carry the ladders through the mud, I ordered the boats to push off and put in at the place I appointed; at this time a heavy fire of artillery and musketry was on us, and the lascars would not face it. Lieutenant Keele, of the *Arachne*, commanding the naval force, with me, pushed on shore, and gallantly went to see if the nullah could be passed: he came back almost directly, and informed me there was a boat in the nullah, over which the men could go, and the side of the rock to the battery appeared practicable.

Trusting



Trusting to the gallantry of the people with me, I determined to try it, and from the men getting on shore, there was not a halt till we had possession of it. It was stormed under a heavy fire of musketry, and the rock not high, but to appearance impracticable, and in the opinion of the enemy it was so.

The enemy did not leave the fort till we were within a few paces of them, and they even threw stones at us, when we were too much under the fort for the fire to reach us. It is due to Captain Burrows, of His Majesty's 41st Regiment, and Lieutenant Keele, Royal Navy, to say they were in first. I now felt secure of the place, and after waiting till the men had recovered from the exertion, and to get them together, they marched down along the works, and cleared all before them. The 3d Light Infantry flanking us in the wood, I proceeded to the Pagoda, near which they appeared disposed to stand; however, they only suffered the more by it. On entering the Pagoda, I was surprised not to find it full, but on looking over the wall, they were in hundreds, rushing down, taking the water, and crossing the jungle. There were about one hundred and twenty muskets bearing on them, and their loss was very severe.

All opposition was now at an end, and on marching through the town it was, as usual, deserted, except by a great many women. The Woonghee had six elephants ready, and had escaped with, as I am told, a good deal of property. The emptiness of the houses showed every preparation had been made, if the place was captured, to prevent our getting any property. I inclose you a return\* of the guns taken, as also the ordnance stores, and the quantities of the latter immense, kept in stockade about half a mile up the hill, and a regular manufactory to make the powder. I had it blown up yesterday.

Our loss has been comparatively small, seven killed and fourteen wounded. Captain Booth is not badly wounded. In this immense place, with so many facilities to escape, I cannot guess what the enemy's loss may have been; but from the prisoners, of whom we have a great many, and other sources, it must have been great, as allowing that two-thirds of the numbers reported were within this place at the attack, there must have been between three and four thousand.

Where every one contended honourably, it would be difficult to select for your particular notice. I must ask your best thanks, however, for Captain Waterman, 13th Light Infantry, Assistant Quarter-Master General, for the advice and assistance I have had, and still have, from him; for Lieutenant Cochrane, His Majesty's 41st Regiment, Acting Brigade Major; for Captain Kennan, Madras Artillery, commanding; Captain Hepehlin, detachment 41st Regiment; Captain Williamson, 3d Native Light Infantry, which regiment vied in this attack with British courage; and Lieutenant McGregor, of the Bengal Artillery, who armed his men with muskets, and were distinguished in the attack; Lieutenant Keele, of the *Arachne*; Lieutenant Baizely, of the *Sophic*, and their respective crews, behaved with their usual gallantry.

Lieutenant Keele's unremitting exertions with this little force, as also the share he has taken in the fall of the place, together with the good understanding kept up between the services, I leave for you, sir, properly to appreciate.

Your son, and aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Campbell, of His Majesty's 38th Regiment, will present you this despatch, a volunteer on the expedition, whose gallantry and other qualities make me very sorry to part with him.

No. 75. (A)—Copy

\* Return of Killed and Wounded of a Detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, in the approach to the attack of Martaban, on the 30th October, 1824.

Martaban, 2d November, 1824.

Madras Artillery—1 gunner killed; 2 gunners wounded.

His Majesty's 41st regiment—2 rank and file killed; 1 captain, 1 serjeant, 3 rank and file wounded.

3d Light Infantry—1 rank and file killed; 1 havildar, 3 rank and file wounded.

Navy—1 mariner, 1 seaman, killed; 1 mariner, 1 seaman, wounded.

Row-boats—1 gun-boat lascar killed; 1 gun-boat lascar wounded.

Name of the Officer Wounded.—Captain Booth, of His Majesty's 41st Regiment, (slightly.)

Return of Ordnance and Stores captured at Martaban by the Troops, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, His Majesty's 41st Regiment, on the 30th of October, 1824.

Iron guns, &c. mounted on the works—4 four-pounders, 3 three-pounders, 1 one and a half-pounder, 2 one-pounders, 3 half-pounders, 48 wall-pieces. The wall pieces destroyed.

Iron guns, &c. found in the arsenal—1 six-pounder, 2 one-pounders, 52 wall-pieces. The wall-pieces and unserviceable guns destroyed.

In the expense magazine—2,000 round iron-shot of different sizes, 500 grape-shot, 10,000 musket cartridges, 6,000 cartridges for wall-pieces, 500 lbs. loose gunpowder.

In the arsenal and magazine—5,000 round iron-shot of different sizes, 1,000 grape-shot, 26,000 lbs. gunpowder, 10,000 lbs. saltpetre, 5,000 lbs. sulphur, 500 muskets, 52 wall-pieces, 20,000 flints, 100,000 musket-balls, 9,000 lbs. lead.

No. 75. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated 25th November, 1824.*

Since I had the honor of announcing the capture of Martaban by the troops under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, I have received intelligence of the submission of Tenasserim, and the town and small province of Yeah—these places, of their own accord, requested our protection, and the whole Burmese coast, from Rangoon to the eastward, is now subject to the British arms. The enemy's troops which fled from the captured towns and assembled at Yeah, embarked there in forty boats, and, I understand, have since landed in the district of Dalla. The reiterated accounts I have lately received from all quarters of a numerous army collecting in the neighbourhood of Prome, for the purpose of expelling us from Rangoon, now fully convince me the effort will be made. Maha Bundoola is said to have been nominated to the chief command, and I make no doubt we shall, ere long, have the whole strength and talent of the empire to contend with in this neighbourhood. Lieutenant Colonel Miles, with the European part of the force detached to Tavoy and Mergue, has returned to head-quarters.

Herewith I have the honor of enclosing a report from Lieutenant Greer, of the Honorable Company's Marine, of a gallant little affair with the enemy's boats on the 7th instant.

No. 75. (B)—*Copy of a Despatch from Lieutenant S. W. Greer, Commanding the H. C. Cruizer Thetis, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated 14th November, 1824.*

I have the honor to report, that on Saturday the 7th instant, at 11 A. M. I left the ship in a row boat with a guard of six sepoy of the Bombay Marine Battalion, for the purpose of waiting on the senior officer at Rangoon. Abreast of a small creek, a little below Baseen creek, six war boats pulled out and stood up close along till abreast of Baseen creek, when eight more boats of the same description joined them, they then came out and endeavoured to cut her off by pulling across the river, ahead of the row boat.—I kept up a constant fire from the 12-pounder and musketry until two of the boats came along side, I immediately jumped on board of them with the sepoy, and succeeded in bayoneting every man; in one of the boats there appeared to be a chief, whom I shot in the act of darting a spear at me.—The other twelve boats were coming close up, but seeing the fate of the two, made off towards the shore, upon which I kept a smart fire while within range; I am sorry to state, that during the action, one sepoy and one row boat-man were severely wounded, the former in two places: in each of these boats were from thirty to forty men.—I cannot conclude this report without recommending strongly to your notice the gallant conduct of the sepoy of the Bombay Marine Battalion in leaping into the enemy's boats, and for the destructive and well-directed fire they kept up on the approach of the enemy, whereby great numbers were either killed or wounded before they came alongside. The conduct of the row boat-men deserves every praise.

No. 76. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated 8th December, 1824.*

The long-threatened and, on my part, no less anxiously wished-for event has at length taken place: Maha Bundoola, said to be accompanied by the Princes of Tonghoo and Surrawuddy, appeared in front of my position on the morning of the 1st instant, at the head of the whole united force of the Burman empire, amounting, upon the most moderate calculation, to from fifty to sixty thousand men, apparently well armed, with a numerous artillery and a body of Cassay horse. Their haughty leader had insolently declared his intention of leading us in captive chains to grace the triumph of the golden monarch; but it had pleased God to expose the vanity of his idle threats, and crown the heroic efforts of my gallant little army with a most complete and signal victory.

The enemy had assembled his forces in the heavy jungle in our front, during the night of the 30th ultimo, and being well aware of his near approach, I had previously made every necessary arrangement for his reception, in whatever way he might think proper to leave his impervious camp. The absence of Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, at Martaban, and of a strong detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Mallett, which I had sent to display the British flag in the ancient capital of Pegue, had much weakened my lines, but I had been too long familiar with the resolute courage of British troops to have felt any regret that fortune had given me an opportunity of contending with Bundoola and his formidable legions, even under circumstances of temporary disadvantage.

Early

Early in the morning of the 1st instant, the enemy commenced his operations by a smart attack upon our post at Kemmendine, commanded by Major Yates, and garrisoned by the 26th Madras Native Infantry, with a detachment of the Madras European Regiment, supported on the river by as strong a naval force as could be spared. As the day became light it discovered numerous and apparently formidable masses of the advancing enemy issuing from the jungle, and moving at some distance upon both our flanks, for the purpose of surrounding us, which I allowed them to effect without interruption, leaving us only the narrow channel of the Rangoon river unoccupied in our rear.

Bundoola had now fully exposed to me his plan of operations, and my own resolution was instantly adopted, of allowing, and even encouraging him to bring forth his means and resources from the jungle to the more open country on his left, where I knew I could at any time attack him to advantage.

The right corps of the Burmese army had crossed to the Dalla side of the Rangoon river, and in the course of the morning was observed, in several divisions, crossing the plain towards the site of the ruined village of Dalla, where it took post in the neighbouring jungle, sending on a division to occupy the almost inaccessible ground on the bank of the river, and from which they soon opened a distant fire upon the shipping. Another division immediately broke ground in front of Kemmendine, and for six successive days tried in vain, every effort that hope of success and dread of failure could call forth to drive the brave 26th and a handful of Europeans from this post, while tremendous fire-rafts and crowds of war boats were every day employed in the equally vain endeavour to drive the shipping from their station off the place.

The enemy's right wing and centre, occupied a range of hills immediately in front of the great Dagon Pagoda, covered with so thick a forest as to be impenetrable to all but Burman troops, and their left extended nearly two miles further, along a lower and more open bridge, to the village of Puzendoon, where their extreme left rested. They were no sooner thus placed in position, than muskets and spears were laid aside for the pick-axe and shovel, and in an incredibly short space of time every part of their line, out of the jungle, was strongly and judiciously entrenched.

In the afternoon of the 1st, I observed an opportunity of attacking the enemy's left to advantage, and ordered Major Sale, with 400 men from the 13th Light Infantry, and 18th Madras Native Infantry, under Major Dennie of the former, and Captain Ross of the latter corps, to move forward to the point I had selected, and I never witnessed a more dashing charge than was made on this occasion by His Majesty's 13th, while the 18th Native Infantry followed their example with a spirit that did them honor, carrying all opposition before them. They burst through the intrenchments, carrying dismay and terror into the enemy's ranks, great numbers of whom were slain, and the party returned loaded with arms, standards, and other trophies. Having correctly ascertained every thing I required, I now, as I originally determined, abstained from giving any serious interruption to the indefatigable labor of the opposing army, patiently waiting until I saw the whole of their material fully brought forward, and within my reach. About sun-set in the evening, a cloud of skirmishers were pushed forward close under the north-east angle of the Pagoda, who taking advantage of the many Pagodas and strong ground on our front, commenced a harassing and galling fire upon the works. I at once saw we should suffer from their fire, if not dislodged, and therefore ordered two companies of the 38th Regiment, under Captain Piper, (an officer I have often had occasion to mention) to advance and drive them back. Were it permitted on such an occasion to dwell upon the enthusiastic spirit of my troops, I would feel a pleasure in recounting the burst of rapture that followed every order to advance against their audacious foe; but it is sufficient to remark, that the conduct of these two companies was most conspicuous: they quickly gained their point and fully acted up to the character they have ever sustained. At day-light on the morning of the 2d, finding the enemy had very much encroached during the night, and had entrenched a height in front of the north gate of the Pagoda, which gave them an enfilading fire upon part of our line, I directed Captain Wilson, of the 38th Regiment, with two companies of that corps, and 100 men of the 23th Madras Native Infantry, to drive them from the hill.—No order was ever more rapidly or handsomely obeyed. The brave sepoy's vying with their British comrades in forward gallantry, allowed the appalled Burmese no time to rally, but drove them from one breast-work to another, fighting them in the very holes they had dug, finally to prove their graves.

In the course of this day Colonel Mallett's detachment returned from Pegue (having found the old city completely deserted) and gave me the additional means of attacking the enemy the moment the time arrived.

During the 3d and 4th the enemy carried on his labors with indefatigable industry, and but for the inimitable practice of our artillery, commanded by Captain Murray, in the absence, from indisposition, of Lieutenant Colonel Hopkinson, we must have been severely annoyed by the incessant fire from his trenches.

The attacks upon Kemmendine continued with unabating violence, but the unyielding spirit of Major Yates and his steady troops, although exhausted with fatigue and want of rest, baffled every attempt on shore, while Captain Ryves, with His Majesty's sloop *Sophie*, the Hon'ble Company's cruiser *Teignmouth*, and some flotilla and row gun-boats, nobly maintained the long established fame of the British navy, in defending the passage



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passage of the river against the most furious assaults of the enemy's war-boats, advancing under cover of the most tremendous fire-rafts which the unwearied exertions of British sailors could alone have conquered.

Captain Ryves lost no opportunity of coming in contact with the much-vaunted boats of Ava, and in one morning five, out of six, each mounting a heavy piece of ordnance, were boarded and captured by our men of war's boats, commanded by Lieutenant Kellett, of His Majesty's ship *Arachne*, and Lieutenant Goldfinch, of the *Sophie*, whose intrepid conduct merits the highest praise.

The enemy having apparently completed his left wing, with its full complement of artillery and warlike stores, I determined to attack that part of his line early on the morning of the 5th. I requested Captain Chadds, the senior naval officer here, to move up to the Puzendoon creek during the night, with the gun flotilla, bomb-ketch, &c. and commence a cannonade on the enemy's rear at day-light. This service was most judiciously and successfully performed by that officer, who has never yet disappointed me in my most sanguine expectations. At the same time, two columns of attack were formed agreeably to orders I had issued on the preceding evening, composed of details from the different regiments of the army, the first, consisting of 1100 men, I placed under the orders of that gallant officer, Major Sale, and directed him to attack and penetrate the centre of the enemy's line, the other, consisting of 600 men I entrusted to Major Walker, of the 3d Madras Native Light Infantry, with orders to attack their left, which had approached to within a few hundred yards of Rangoon. At seven o'clock both columns moved forward to the point of attack. Both were led to my perfect satisfaction, and both succeeded with a degree of ease, their intrepid and undaunted conduct undoubtedly ensured; and I directed Lieutenant Archbold, with a troop of the Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard, which had been landed the preceding evening, to follow the column under Major Sale, and take advantage of any opportunity which might offer to charge.

The enemy was defeated and dispersed in every direction, and the Body Guard, gallantly charging over the broken and swampy ground, completed their terror and dismay. The Cassay horse fled, mixed with the retreating infantry, and all their artillery, stores, and reserve depots, which had cost them so much toil and labour to get up, with a great quantity of small arms, gilt chattahs, standards, and other trophies, fell into our hands. Never was victory more complete or more decided, and never was the triumph of discipline and valour over the disjointed efforts of irregular courage and infinitely superior numbers, more conspicuous. Majors Dennie and Thornhill, of the 13th Light Infantry, and Major Gore, of the 89th, were distinguished by the steadiness with which they led their men; but it is with deep regret I have to state the loss we have sustained in the death of Major Walker, one of India's best and bravest soldiers, who fell while leading his column into the enemy's intrenchments, when the command devolved upon Major Wahab, who gallantly conducted the column during the rest of the action, and I observed the 34th Madras Native Light Infantry on this occasion conspicuously forward.

The Burmese left wing thus disposed of, I patiently waited its effect upon the right, posted in so thick a forest as to render any attack in that quarter, in a great measure, impracticable.

On the 6th, I had the pleasure of observing that Bundoola had brought up the scattered remnant of his defeated left, to strengthen his right and centre, and continued day and night employed in carrying on his approaches in front of the Great Pagoda, I ordered the artillery to slacken its fire, and the infantry to keep wholly out of sight, allowing him to carry on his fruitless labour with little annoyance or molestation. As I expected, he took system for timidity, and on the morning of the 7th instant, I had his whole force posted in my immediate front—his first line intrenched so close, that the soldiers in their barracks could distinctly hear the insolent threats and reproaches of the Burmhan Bravos.

The time had now arrived to undeceive them in their anguine but ill-founded hopes. I instantly made my arrangements, and at half-past eleven o'clock every thing was in readiness to assault the trenches in four columns of attack, under the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles, my second in command, and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonels Mallet, Parlb'y, brodie, and Captain Wilson of the 38th Regiment. At a quarter before twelve, I ordered every gun that would bear upon the trenches to open, and their fire was kept up with an effect that never was surpassed. Major Sale at the same time, as directed, making a diversion on the enemy's left and rear. At 12 o'clock the cannonade ceased, and the columns moved forward to their respective points of attack. Every thing was done under my own immediate eye; but where all behaved so nobly, I cannot particularize; but must in justice state, that Captain Wilson's and Lieutenant-Colonel Parlb'y's divisions first made an impression, from which the enemy never recovered. They were driven from all their works without a check, abandoning all their guns, with a great quantity of arms of every description, and certainly not the least amusing part of their formidable preparations was a great number of ladders for escalading the Great Pagoda, found in rear of their position. The total defeat of Bundoola's army was now most fully accomplished. His loss in killed and wounded, from the nature of the ground, it is impossible to calculate, but I am confident I do not exceed the fairest limit, when I state it at 5000 men. In every other respect the mighty host, which so lately threatened to overwhelm us, now scarcely exists. It commenced its inglorious flight during

last

last night. Humbled, dispersing, and deprived of their arms, they cannot, for a length of time, again meet us in the field, and the lesson they have now received will, I am confident, prove a salutary antidote to the native arrogance and vanity of the Burmese nation. Thus vanished the hopes of Ava; and those means which the Burmese government were seven months in organizing for our annihilation, have been completely destroyed by us in the course of seven days. Of 300 pieces of ordnance that accompanied the grand army, 240 are now in our camp, and in muskets, their loss is to them irreparable.

Our loss in killed and wounded,\* although severe, will not, I am sure, be considered great for the important services we have had the honour to perform.

Of my troops I cannot say enough: their valour was only equalled by the cheerful patience with which they bore long and painful privations. My Europeans fought like Britons, and proved themselves worthy of the country that gave them birth; and I trust I do the gallant Seapoys justice when I say, that never did troops

more

\* *General Report of Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Army under the Command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., from the 1st to the 7th December, 1824.*

Head-quarters, Shoe Dagon Pagoda, 8th December, 1824.

The Right Wing of the Governor General's Body Guard—Missing 2 Horses.

*Bengal Artillery*—Wounded—3 Rank and File, 3 Lascars, and 1 Bheesty.

*Madras Artillery*.—Killed—1 Lascar.

Wounded—3 Rank and File, 4 Golandauz, and 1 Lascar.

*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry*.—Killed—1 Lieutenant, 1 Serjeant, and 3 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Captain, 2 Ensigns, 1 Serjeant, and 20 Rank and File.

*His Majesty's 38th Regiment*.—Killed—10 Rank and File.

Wounded—2 Lieutenants, 47 Rank and File, 3 Lascars, 1 Camp-color man, and 2 Cooks.

*His Majesty's 41st Regiment*.—Wounded—9 Rank and File.

*His Majesty's 89th Regiment*.—Killed—1 Serjeant.

Wounded—1 Captain, and 6 Rank and File.

*Madras 1st European Regiment*.—Killed—1 Serjeant or Havildar, and 3 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Lieutenant, 3 Serjeants or Havildars, 1 Drummer or Bugler, and 9 Rank and File.

*Madras 3d Regiment Light Infantry (Native)*.—Killed—1 Major.

*Madras 9th Regiment Native Infantry*.—Wounded—1 Lascar.

*Madras 12th Regiment Native Infantry*.—Wounded—1 Serjeant or Havildar, 6 Rank and File, and 1 Dooley Bearer.

*Madras 18th Regiment Native Infantry*.—Wounded—2 Rank and File.

*Madras 26th Regiment Native Infantry*.—Killed—2 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Ensign, 1 Jemadar, 1 Serjeant or Havildar, 42 Rank and File, 3 Bheesties, and 3 Dooley Bearers.

*Madras 28th Regiment Native Infantry*.—Killed—1 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 1 Subadar, 5 Serjeants or Havildars, 1 Drummer or Bugler, 16 Rank and File, 1 Dooley Bearer, and 1 Bheesty.

*Madras 34th Regiment Light Infantry, (Native)*.—Killed—1 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Jemadar, 1 Serjeant or Havildar, and 5 Rank and File.

*Madras 43d Regiment Native Infantry*.—Wounded—1 Lieutenant, and 2 Rank and File.

*1st Battalion Madras Pioneers*.—Wounded—1 Serjeant or Havildar, and 4 Rank and File.

*Madras 30th Regiment Native Infantry*.—Wounded—1 Jemadar, 1 Serjeant or Havildar, and 6 Rank and File.

*Names of Officers Killed and Wounded*.—Killed—Major Walker, of the 3d Regiment M. N. Light Infantry; and Brevet Captain and Lieutenant O'Shea, of His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.

Wounded—Captain Clarke, severely, of H. M. 13th Light Infantry; Ensign J. Blackwell, slightly, ditto; Ensign R. W. Croker, severely, ditto; Lieutenant J. S. Torrens, severely, not dangerously, of H. M. 38th Regiment; Lieutenant A. H. McLeroth, severely, ditto; Captain R. C. Rose, severely, of H. M. 89th Regiment; Lieutenant C. Butler, slightly, H. C. Madras 1st European Regiment; Ensign Smith, severely, of the Madras 26th Regiment Native Infantry; Lieutenant J. C. Torriano, severely, ditto 28th ditto; Ensign O'Brien, severely, ditto ditto; and Lieutenant Scott, slightly, ditto 43d ditto.

*Return of Ordnance and Military Stores Captured by the Force under the Command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., in the different attacks between the 1st and 7th December, 1824.*

Brass Guns—One 8-pounder, one 6-ditto, and six 5-ditto.

Iron Guns—One 8-pounder, three 6-ditto, one 5-ditto, four 4-ditto, six 3-ditto, four 2-ditto, and 195 swivels.

Gunpowder destroyed, lbs. 10,000

Round Shot, . . . . . 360

Muskets, . . . . . 900

Spears, . . . . . 2000\*

Intrenching Tools, . . . . . 5000

Many Stands of Muskets, besides Spears, Swords, and other Implements taken and destroyed, of which no account has been received.

*Additional Return of Ordnance Captured from the Enemy, by the Force under the Command of Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., and brought in since the 8th Instant.*

Iron Guns—One 4-pounder, one 3-pounder, and five swivels.

\* We are authorized to state, that amongst the small arms taken from the enemy, there are some hundred stand of those taken from us at Ramoo.—Ed.

Rangoon,  
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more strive to obtain the palm of honor than they to rival their European comrades in every thing that marks the steady, true and daring soldier.

My obligations to Captains Chads and Ryves, and the officers and seamen of his Majesty's Navy are great and numerous.—In Captain Chads himself, I have always found that ready alacrity to share our toils and dangers, that has ever characterized the profession he belongs to; and the most cordial zeal in assisting and co-operating with me on every occasion. I have also to notice the good conduct of the Honorable Company's cruisers, the gun flotilla and row-boats, nor ought I to omit mentioning the handsome conduct of Captain Binny, acting agent for the Bengal transports, in volunteering both his European crew and ship for any service. On the present occasion she was anchored off Dalla, and sustained some loss from the enemy's fire. I may also add, that every transport in the river was equally anxious to contribute every possible assistance to the public service.

To Lieutenant Colonel Miles and Major Evans, commanding the 1st and 2d divisions, my most particular thanks are due, for the alacrity and promptitude with which my orders were carried into effect by their respective divisions; and Major Frith, of his Majesty's 33th Regiment, commanding in the Pagoda, attracted my particular notice, by his steady method of conducting all the severe duties of that important post.

The services of the Artillery from the three Presidencies, commanded by Captains Timbrell and Montgomerie, under the general direction of Captain Murray in the lines, and of Captain Russell, of the Bombay Artillery, in the town and its vicinity, were most conspicuously brilliant.

To Captain Cheape, commanding engineer, and every individual of the department, the greatest credit is due; and the conduct of Captain Wheeler and the Madras Pioneers is justly a theme of praise to every officer whose command they are placed under.

The extent and long continuance of our late operations necessarily entailed a most arduous and severe duty upon my Deputy Quarter Master General, Major Jackson, whose zeal, talent, and activity, entitle him to my fullest approbation.—Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, my Deputy Adjutant General, performed the duties of his station with that ability and cheerful readiness that has ever distinguished him, and from my personal staff, Captains Snodgrass and Campbell, I received every aid and assistance that devotion to the service could command.

Many points may remain unnoticed, upon which the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council may desire to be informed, and I have therefore directed my 1st Aide-de-Camp, Captain Snodgrass, an officer of long standing and experience, and who has seen much service, to be the bearer of this despatch. He enjoys my fullest confidence, is intimately acquainted with all my views and intentions, and most capable of affording any information that may be required, and I beg most earnestly to recommend him to the kind protection of the Right Honorable the Governor General.

*No. 77.—Copy of a Despatch from Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated December 10, 1824.*

Upon returning to Rangoon on the evening of the 8th instant, I found the enemy's corps of observation, on the Dalla side of the river, had not been wholly withdrawn, probably from ignorance of what had taken place on the preceding day, in front of the great Pagoda; and as I was well aware they would not remain long after the news of Bundooolah's defeat had reached them, I at once determined to assault their works.

Detachments from His Majesty's 89th, the Honorable Company's 1st Madras European Regiment, and the 43d Madras Native Infantry, were immediately ordered under arms, and just as the moon arose they moved across the river under the command of Major Parrier, of the latter corps, landed and jumped, without a moment's hesitation, into the enemy's trenches; many Burmese were slain in the short conflict that ensued, they were driven at the point of the bayonet into the jungle in their rear, and ten good guns, with many small arms, fell into our possession.\*

Major

\* *Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Army under the Command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., on the 9th December, 1824,*

*H. M. 89th Regiment.—Killed—1 Rank and File.*

*Wounded—2 Lieutenants, 1 Assistant Surgeon, 3 Sergeants, and 22 Rank and File.*

*Madras 1st European Regiment.—Wounded—1 Captain and 7 Rank and File.*

*Madras 12th Regiment N. I.—Killed—1 Rank and File.*

*Wounded—1 Captain, 1 Sergeant or Havildar, and 3 Rank and File.*

*Madras 30th Regiment N. I.—Wounded—2 Rank and File, and 1 Bheesty.*

*Madras 43d Regiment N. I.—Wounded—1 Rank and File.*

*Madras 1st Battalion Pioneers.—Wounded—1 Rank and File.*



Major Farrier kept his ground during the night, and in making a reconnoissance early in the morning, found the enemy still occupied some stockades in the jungle, in considerable force. I, in consequence, directed Lieutenant Colonel Parlbv, with a reinforcement of His Majesty's 89th Regiment, under Major Basden, and three hundred of the 12th and 30th Madras Native Infantry, to join Major Farrier, and attack the enemy wherever he might be found—Lieutenant Colonel Parlbv's coolness and judgment fully confirmed the high opinion so justly entertained of him: he drove the enemy in great confusion from all their strongholds in the jungle, and they are now only seen in unconnected groups at a great distance on the plain.

Lieutenant Colonel Parlbv bears the most honorable testimony to the valor and intrepidity of Major Basden and His Majesty's 89th Regiment, and pays the highest compliment to Major Farrier and all the troops employed, as well as Captain Russell of the Artillery, who accompanied him.

No. 78. (A)—*Extract Letter from Captain Chads, of His Majesty's Sloop Arachne, to Captain Coe; dated Rangoon, December 8, 1824.*

On the 30th ultimo, the enemy's boats were seen by the Honorable Company's cruiser *Teignmouth*, at the advanced post above Kemmindine, coming down in great numbers, loaded with men. The same evening they came forward with fire-rafts, which obliged the *Teignmouth* to slip and go below Kemmindine to avoid them; this unfortunately left that post exposed to a most furious attack on every side, the enemy's war-boats on its front; but it was nobly defended by its garrison, under Major Yates, and the enemy repulsed. On the next day, 1st December, the enemy were seen in great numbers advancing towards Dalla, about five thousand men; and they also surrounded the Dagon Pagoda, where a constant heavy fire has been kept up. Captain Ryves, of the *Sophie*, in command during my absence, procured a guard of one hundred sepoys from the General for the transports, and placed this ship in her old station, about a mile and a half in advance of the shipping, to enfilade the Madras lines, and also ordered the *Teignmouth* back to her station, to support the post at Kemmindine. At daylight I returned and found things in this state, with the exception of the *Teignmouth* having been again driven from her station during the night by fire-rafts, and the post at Kemmindine again subject to furious and incessant attacks. I immediately sent the pinnace up, under Lieutenant Kellett and Mr. Picker, admiralty midshipman, to gain information and reconnoitre, and shortly after, three gun-boats, under Mr. Coyde, midshipman, with a party of my seamen to fight the guns: this assistance was most timely, as the garrison was sorely pressed in every direction; from which critical situation, Lieutenant Kellett's highly judicious and determined gallant conduct immediately relieved them, by clearing both their flanks of the enemy by showers of grape-shot. This service performed by a single boat, in the face of hundreds of the enemy's boats, was the admiration of the whole garrison; and Major Yates had expressed himself to me in terms the most gratifying, for the able assistance Lieutenant Kellett afforded him.

The *Teignmouth* shortly afterwards resumed her station, and was constantly engaged with the enemy's war-boats, which had long guns in their bows, and annoyed her a great deal. In the afternoon, finding the enemy were making every effort to gain that post, and as it was of the last importance, both in a military and naval point of view, I ordered the *Sophie* up for its support, with three more gun-boats, and our party under Lieutenant Kellett to remain. Whilst this post is held, the enemy cannot annoy the shipping at Rangoon by fire, as the distance is great, and the winding of the river, with the fire-booms laid out, throw all the rafts upon the opposite side. The enemy upon the Dalla side having begun to throw up works, I ordered the *Satellite* armed transport, in charge of Lieutenant Dobson, of the *Larne*, with a party of seamen from this ship, to the support of the *Good Hope* transport, already for some time stationed there, and several of the small gun-vessels. These vessels have been, from first to last, occasionally exchanging shot with the enemy, dismounting their guns

as

*Names of Officers Wounded.*—Lieutenant A. B. Taylor, H. M. 89th Regiment, slightly.  
Lieutenant A. Doudall, ditto, severely.  
Assistant Surgeon J. Walsh, ditto, slightly.  
Captain J. Roy, 1st European Regiment, slightly.  
Lieutenant Glover, 12th N. I. severely, arm amputated.

*Return of Ordnance and Military Stores Captured from the Enemy by the Force under the Command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., in the different attacks at Dalla, between the 8th and 9th December, 1824.*

Brass Guns—two 1-pounders, one 7-ditto, and two 8-ditto.  
Iron Guns—two 3-pounders, one 6-pounder, and eleven Swivels.  
Powder destroyed, cwt. 15  
Spears captured, ..... 22  
Entrenching Tools, .. 20  
Musquets, ..... 24

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as fast as they got them up; and the commander of the *Good Hope*, Mr. Binny, is entitled to my best thanks, for handsomely coming forward on this occasion, and for the essential service he has performed.

Early on the 3d, the *Sophie* took her station off Kemmindine. With the ebb, the enemy again brought fire-rafts down, not lighting them until within a very short distance of the ships, with their war-boats firing their shot over them, to prevent the approach of our boats. The *Sophie* cleared them, but the *Teignmouth* was touched, and on fire for a short time without damage. During this day, the enemy became extremely daring, finding their shot went farther than ours; upon which I sent the *Sophie* two long nines, which kept them farther off. The enemy's boats becoming more bold, it was thought right to endeavour to give them a check; and Captain Ryves thinking they might be surprised, laid his plans accordingly, and succeeded to the fullest extent. A report of this gallant attack I inclose (No. 2), which will again bring to your notice, officers I have already mentioned to you for their good conduct. The result of this defeat of the enemy's war-boats has been highly beneficial, not one having ventured within gun-shot since. The two ships, however, have had their hands quite full, in keeping up a constant fire on the enemy attacking Kemmindine, and throwing up works against them, to mount guns in, which were dismantled as soon as got up, without their having done any material damage. In the evening, Sir A. Campbell communicated to me his intention to attack the enemy's left wing towards Ponsendown, and requested a diversion to be made by a naval force up that river; a report of which I inclose (No. 3), and which ended in the total defeat of that portion of the enemy's force.

In the afternoon, finding the enemy at Dalla strengthening themselves, I sent the *Powerful* mortar-vessel over, and threw a few shells, which had considerable effect.

On the 6th, in the morning, finding the enemy still persisting in his attacks on Kemmindine, I sent the mortar-vessel up there, which rendered the post very essential service, and relieved the garrison considerably. The enemy's war-boats still continue in sight in great numbers, but at a respectful distance. On the 7th, in the morning, the enemy were seen very busy with rafts and boats for fire, and with the strong ebb they brought them down, reaching nearly across the river; but as their boats now do not venture close, they were fired earlier; they consisted of upwards of twenty-six rafts and eight large boats, all lashed together. The *Sophie* just touched the outside one without injury, and held her ground. At noon, the troops at the Pagoda made another sally, and carried the whole of the enemy's entrenchments, taking their guns, ammunition, &c.; on receiving this information, I immediately sent every disposable man from this ship, under Mr. Manly, the master, with twenty sepoy in the steam-vessel, up to Captain Ryves, to endeavour to intercept their boats and cut off their retreat; and in the night they went up far beyond Pagoda-point, without seeing above four or five small boats, the enemy having retreated, and deserted the neighbourhood of Kemmindine.

Thus, Sir, has this formidable attack ended in the total discomfiture of the enemy; having called forth from the very small force I have the honor to command, in every instance, the greatest gallantry and uniform good conduct, under the utmost exertions by day and night, the greatest part of them having been in the boats since the starting of the expedition to Pegue, on the 26th ultimo.

From Captain Ryves I have received all the aid and counsel that a good and valuable officer could afford, and his determined perseverance in holding his ground, when the fire-rafts came down, merit the highest commendation; and from his ready and zealous co-operation with the post at Kemmindine, that place was greatly relieved in the arduous contest it was engaged in.

Of Lieutenant Kellest I cannot speak in terms sufficiently strong to express my admiration of his uniform gallantry.

Lieutenant Goldfinch's conduct has also been most conspicuous, together with all the midshipmen named in my reports, not one of whom but have shewn individual acts of great bravery.

Also to Mr. Manly, master of this ship, who has, from necessity, been frequently left in charge during my absence, I feel much indebted.

These officers, the seamen, and marines I had the pleasure to serve with, I earnestly beg to recommend to your most favorable attention.

No. 78. (B)—(Report No. 2.) *Arachne*, Rangoon, 8th December, 1824.

Captain Ryves having thought it practicable to surprise the enemy's war-boats, who were annoying the ships with their long guns very considerably, placed the whole of his disposable force of Europeans, about seventy in number, under the orders of Lieutenant Kellest, of this ship, and Lieutenant Goldfinch, of the *Sophie*, Lieutenant Clarke, of the Bombay Marine, with Messrs. Pickey, Coyde, Scott, and Murray, midshipmen; Mr. Clarke, Bombay Marine, and Mr. Lindquist in charge of the gun-boats. The force was put into the three men of war's boats and six gun-boats, and, as the moon went down on the morning of the 4th instant, shoved off, and pulling up on the contrary shore to the war-boats, by daylight came abreast, and boldly made a dash at them, notwithstanding their great number and size; they were taken by surprise, but did not run till  
our

our boats were within pistol shot, when their confusion was great, and they fled with all haste, keeping up a smart fire; their large boats with heavy guns were fixed on by our boats, and from the fire of grape were soon unmanned and captured. Lieutenant Kellett came up with some of the first, with heavy guns, and Lieutenant Goldfinch, passing him whilst taking possession, captured the boat of the commander of the war-boats, with the flag, her crew running into the jungle. The chase was continued three or four miles, when Lieutenant Kellett judged it prudent to secure his prizes, having an enemy of considerable force in his rear, up another branch of the river.

The result of this gallant exploit was the capture of seven large-war-boats, four of which carried long nines on the bows; and on their return they cut adrift and brought down a large floating stockade from Pagoda-point; and what adds to the value of this service is, that it was performed without the loss of a man.

Lieutenant Kellett's conduct on this and on former occasions speaks for itself, and I trust will meet with its due reward.

Lieutenant Goldfinch is a valuable officer, and merits every praise; and Lieutenant Kellett reports the high gallantry of Lieutenant Clarke and the midshipmen commanding the boats, and of every individual under his command.

*Dimensions of the largest war-canoe.*—Length, 83 feet; breadth, 12 feet 6 inches; depth, 5 feet 6 inches; pulling 52 oars, with a 9-pounder.

*No. 78. (C)*—(Report No. 3.) *Arachne, Rangoon, 8th December, 1824.*

Sir A. Campbell, commander of the forces, having wished for a diversion to be made on the left flank of the enemy's line, posted on the Poussendown river, whilst he attacked them in front, I proceeded with the whole of the disposable force I had, consisting of a few gun-vessels, three gun-boats, and several merchant-boats, to make an appearance, with about forty Europeans; I also took the steam and mortar-vessels, and in the evening of the 4th, dropped to the mouth of the river, and, waiting till the last of the flood, took our station off the village of Poussendown about four o'clock. At six, I opened the fire of all our vessels, and made every appearance of landing, which brought the enemy down to us in great force, and their loss from our fire, and particularly the shells, was very considerable, ours only five natives wounded; this was continued till seven o'clock, when a signal, previously arranged, was made from the Pagoda for our fire to cease as our troops advanced, and in a few minutes we had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy driven from every post in the greatest confusion, not knowing which way to run, from the variety of attacks at the same time. The loss of the guns, ammunition, &c. was very great.

Mr. Reed, admiralty midshipman, and Mr. Guthers, boatswain, were with me, and rendered me much service; and the conduct of all merits my best praise.

*No. 78. (D)*—Copy of a Despatch from H. D. Chads, Senior Naval Officer, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated on board the *Arachne, Rangoon, 10th December, 1824.*

It becomes a most pleasing duty to me to recommend to your favourable notice, officers in the Honorable Company's Service, whose good conduct has been conspicuous in the recent attack of the enemy. The first I ought to name is Mr. Binny, agent for transports of the Bengal division, in charge of the *Good Hope* transport—that ship, Sir, with the British crew of the *Resource*, who handsomely volunteered, did all the duties of a man of war, in silencing the enemy's guns as they mounted them at Dalla. Mr. Hornblow, also agent for transports of the Madras division, in charge of the *Maira*, has also shewn very great zeal in forwarding all the late arduous services, and the British crew of his ship, in charge of the mortar vessel, have continued their usual good conduct. In the attack on the enemy's war-boats, Lieutenant Kellett speaks in high terms of the gallantry of Lieutenant Clarke, and Mr. Boscowen, of the Honorable Company's cruiser *Teignmouth*, and Mr. Lindquist, in charge of the row-boats; this latter young officer, I have also had reason to be much pleased with.

*No. 78. (E)*—Proceedings of the Hon'ble Company's Row Gun Boats, from the 26th November to the 10th of December, 1824, from the Government Gazette of the 3d January, 1825.

November 26th.—At two P. M., left Rangoon with eleven row boats, (Nos. as per margin,)\* under the immediate orders of Captain Chads, R. N. for Pegue. At four P. M., received sailing instructions to lead next

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\* Nos. 2, 3, 6, 13, 15, 18, 21, 23, 32, 39, 41.



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to the boats belonging to His Majesty's ships. At half-past seven P. M., in passing Synan fort, enemy fired great guns and musketry—passed on without noticing it. At ten P. M., anchored in a direct line across the river.—Man of war's boats on the starboard and larboard bows, flats, &c., with troops and artillery in the rear, closed in by two row gun boats.

27th.—At half-past three A. M., weighed and proceeded up; man of war's boats ahead; flats astern; river shallow and narrow; two row boats closing in the rear: at eleven A. M., anchored close on the starboard shore—the rear guard some distance astern—at three P. M., all boats arrived—at four P. M., weighed and proceeded up—at six P. M., anchored in six feet water, taking up the same position as yesterday.

28th.—At day-light weighed and proceeded up; at noon came to a small village named *Abo*, made fast to the shore; river fifteen or twenty yards broad, fordable at low water.

November 29th.—At nine P. M. proceeded up, enemy fired a few muskets from several villages,—at 1 P. M. arrived at Pegue, landed the troops, and received orders to bring up twenty men to assist in dragging forward the artillery; reconnoitring party returned and reported the place to be evacuated by the enemy; re-embarked the artillery, and anchored for the night; river forty yards broad, and fordable at low water.

November 30th.—At noon dispatched four row gun boats under the orders of Captain Chads, to reconnoitre up the river; embarked all the troops, having previously hoisted a white flag in the ancient city of Pegue,—at 4 P. M. reconnoitring party returned; proceeded down, four boats being ordered as a new guard; grounded several times during the night

December 1st.—At ten A. M. Commodore made signal to close and anchor,—at three P. M. weighed and proceeded down,—at eight P. M. passed three vessels with foraging party on board,—at nine P. M. Commodore made signal to close an anchor.

December 2d.—At three A. M. weighed, and proceeded down; at day light heard a heavy firing in the direction of Dagon Pagoda: at eight A. M. arrived off Rangoon, and found it besieged by the enemy; disembarked the troops, and anchored in advance of the fleet, forming a direct line across the river; at noon manned seven row boats with seamen from the *Arachne*, and received orders to despatch them to re-inforce Kemmindine,—at two P. M. received orders to proceed with two row boats, to communicate with the foraging party, for the purpose of recalling the troops, then marching across the country with cattle,—at four P. M. anchored abreast of Pussandawn creek,—at seven P. M. observed some of the enemy's boats reconnoitring; when within grape-shot distance, opened fire on them, which caused their immediate retreat,—at eight P. M. gun vessels on the foraging party came down and anchored; went on board and held a communication with Captain Jones, N. I.; learnt he had one hundred men escorting a herd of cattle in a direction for the enemy's entrenchments. On the flood, dropped up about two miles, and despatched a *Mug*, who volunteered his services for a small sum, to prevent the escort advancing.

December 3d.—At 7 A. M. foraging party came down abreast the vessels, embarked them and made sail for Rangoon; received orders to proceed immediately to Kemmindine; at 11 A. M. arrived at Kemmindine, found it closely besieged by the enemy—six war boats within bow-shot annoying the shipping then riding flood; having eight row-boats, anchored them on the *Sophy's* starboard quarter, brought the cables aft, and got the guns to bear up the river,—at 7 P. M. enemy sent down two fire rafts, and accompanied them in the rear with war-boats, keeping up a heavy fire of great guns and musketry on the boats and shipping, which did no damage except cutting away the *Sophy's* after shroud on the starboard side; kept up a smart fire from the row-boats and bow-guns of the Hon'ble Company's cruizer *Teignmouth*; fire rafts passed clear of all; in the course of this night, enemy made three attacks on Kemmindine stockade; row-boats' position advantageous for flanking the right of the stockade.

December 4th. At 3 A. M. all boats, (Nos. as per margin\*) alongside His Majesty Sloop *Sophy*; at 4-30. P. M. left for the purpose of attacking the enemy's boats, laying about one mile above their entrenchments; our boats pulled up all silence astern of each other on the larboard shore; enemy occupying the starboard; at day-break Burmese sighted us from their boats, and opened a smart fire of six pounders and musketry; Lieutenant Kellet, in the *Arachne's* pinnace, and commanding, issued orders to form a line, and advance to board; the line being formed without the least confusion, gave three cheers and advanced, firing; the enemy also advancing, and never did I witness a better spirit and cheerfulness in the row-boats' people than on this occasion; in ten minutes we got within grape-shot distance, and then confusion commenced in the enemy's boats; they pulled in shore, and made for the jungles; we then advanced, as fast as possible, without regard to the line, and took possession of seven boats, three of which had six-pounders in the bow; one with a nine-pounder, and the other three muskets, spears, &c. in great number; and also took the flags, one of which was red, bordered green, Brahmeni goose in the centre;—in the boats with guns were found one hundred round shots

\* Nos. 2, 3, 6, 13, 32, 39, 34 and 41.

shots and five barrels of inferior powder: as soon as we were in possession of the enemy's boats, we gave way for the *Sophy*, but in passing their entrenchments, experienced a volley fire of musquetry; but three cheers from a British sailor has a powerful effect on my inexperienced warriors, and invariably inspires them with confidence. I regret to say that one war boat escaped us. Two attacks on Kemmindine stockade this day, but shipping and boats quiet, otherwise than flanking the stockades; notwithstanding the duty of this day, fortune favoured us all, and not a man touched.

December 5th. At 9 A. M. returned to Rangoon in No. 6, for a supply of ammunition, having fired about 450 rounds since the 3d instant; at 3 P. M. returned to my station with four hundred rounds; the enemy all silent afloat during the night, but mounted two six-pounders abreast of the H. C. cruiser *Teignmouth*, with which they hulled her several times. Row boats at anchor in their station.

December 6th. Row boats at anchor in their station; at 8 A. M. enemy made a desperate attack on Kemmindine stockade, but were driven from both flanks by the *Sophy's* and boats' guns; at 9 they retired with three horrid yells.

December 7th. At 7 A. M. enemy sent down 26 rafts of split shin beam, lashed together, placing six large boats on them filled with petroleum oil; war boats in the rear firing at the shipping and boats; all boats away to tow rafts; got clear of the ships, and let it go; lost two irons grapnels in the raft.

December 8th. At 4 A. M. steam vessel arrived from Rangoon; at 5 A. M. made all boats fast astern of her; at 5-30 P. M. proceeded up in chase of the enemy's boats, but unfortunately could not fall in with them; no firing from the enemy's lines; at 7 P. M. received orders to return to Rangoon with all boats except four; at 8 P. M. received orders from Captain Chads to be ready to start at midnight.

December 9th. At 1 A. M. rendezvoused alongside the transport ship *Good Hope*, waiting the flood to attack Dalla; at 1-30 left, and proceeded up Dalla Creek, anchored by the stern and fired on the enemy's flank; shot from our troops falling about and in the boats very thickly. Troops having routed the enemy, weighed and proceeded to the China wharf. At day light commenced transporting a reinforcement with the artillery to Dalla; at 1 P. M. left with six boats to make a diversion on the enemy's left flank. Troops proceeded out to attack them on the right; at 3 P. M. anchored in shore off H. M. ship *Arachne*.

No. 79.—Copy of a Despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Mallet, to Captain Snodgrass, Military Secretary to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated Head-Quarters, Pegue River, 30th November, 1824.

I have to report for the information of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., that I proceeded with the force which he did me the honor to place under my command, in boats up the river, on the afternoon of the 26th instant. The advanced boats were fired on while passing Syriam-point, from the right bank of the river. The expedition proceeded without further molestation, passing a large village, with a stockade on each side of the banks, in a deserted and ruinous state, on the 27th instant, distant from Rangoon about twenty-three miles.

On the morning of the 29th, a short distance in advance of the anchorage ground, we passed a village and stockade on the right bank, where there were four large fire rafts moored across the river, to appearance just finished, though, in consequence of our sudden approach, there was not time for their being used against us. At some considerable distance beyond this village the advanced boats were fired on by a party of the enemy. At half-past one on this day, the force anchored opposite Pegue. The houses on the banks of the river were all deserted, and finding that the ancient city was about a mile inland, I immediately gave directions for the landing of the troops. This was effected (agreeably to orders issued the day previous) with perfect regularity and steadiness.

In rear of the village is a plain on which the detachments formed, and the artillery landed without loss of time. Beyond the plain, along a very considerable extent, are the remains of one side of the ancient rampart and ditch, all parts of which being surrounded with jungle, I sent out a reconnoitring party, which was accompanied by my Brigade Major Captain Briscoe, His Majesty's 41st Regiment, and Captain Jones, of His Majesty's 89th Regiment, who acted as my Aid-de-Camp. During their absence I advanced with the guides, crossed the causeway that led to the city, and then formed to wait the return of the party, who after having proceeded to the great Pagoda of Shoe Madoe, reported that the inhabitants had all fled on their approach, and that the city and every part adjacent was entirely deserted. On hearing this intelligence, I proceeded with the Grenadier companies of the Madras European Regiment, and 28th Regiment Native Infantry, to the city and Pagoda, and hoisted the British colours. Among the houses were found a few old men and women, from whom I ascertained that from one hundred and fifty to two hundred fighting men were all the place contained: these had, on our arrival, dispersed in the jungle.



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The object of the expedition having been thus completed, I made arrangements for my departure. The force was re-embarked the same evening, when Captain Chads, Royal Navy, with myself, deeming it advisable to reconnoitre the upper part of the river, and endeavour to ascertain the existence of a high road to Prome, he proceeded with the man of war's boats about six miles beyond Pegue, and on his return on the afternoon of the 30th instant, the whole weighed for Rangoon.

I cannot close this dispatch without expressing the high gratification I felt on witnessing the steadiness and order with which the troops landed, and the ardour they evinced during the advance towards the city, all being in full expectation they were leading the attack of a well-defended fortress; and I have only to regret, that the premature retreat of the enemy deprives me of the gratifying part, that no doubt I should otherwise have had to perform, that of stating every one under my command had done his duty.

I feel much indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Brodie, commanding the detachment of the 28th Regiment Native Infantry, as also to Captain Forbes, commanding that of the 1st Madras European Regiment, for the promptitude and zeal with which they landed and formed column; and great praise is due to Captain Murray, Madras Artillery, for landing the Guns, (which, with the assistance of the Naval part of the force, was effected with speed) over the steep and rugged bank of the river, as well as to Lieutenant Macartney, of the 1st Battalion Pioneers, for his arrangement regarding the scaling ladders.

I must call the particular attention of the Brigadier General to the zeal and ability shewn by Captain Chads, Royal Navy, in his conducting the flotilla, and the valuable assistance I at all times received from him.

In conclusion, I beg to notice the assistance I derived from Captain Briscoe, His Majesty's 41st Regiment, and Captain Jones, His Majesty's 89th Regiment, together with that of Captain Russel, Bombay Artillery, and Lieutenant Trent, His Majesty's 38th Regiment, Acting Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, and the good and steady conduct of the whole of the officers and men, both naval and military, merits my warmest praise.

*No. 80.—General Order by the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, Secret Department, 24th December, 1824.*

The official despatches already published in an Extraordinary Gazette having announced the late brilliant achievements of the British arms at Rangoon, the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council now proceeds to the discharge of a most gratifying duty, in signifying, in the most public and formal manner, his high admiration of the judgment, skill and energy, manifested by Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, in directing the operations of the troops under his command, on that important and arduous occasion.

The Governor General in Council requests Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell to accept the cordial thanks of the Government, and to notify to the brave officers and men under his command the sentiments of admiration with which it regards the gallantry, spirit, and enthusiasm evinced by them, throughout the severe and protracted conflicts with the enemy, which terminated in his entire rout and dispersion, with great slaughter and the loss of two hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, and most of his military stores. His Lordship in Council has remarked with particular approbation the recorded instances of meritorious conduct displayed by Lieutenant Colonel Miles, second in command, and Lieutenant Colonels Mallet, Parlyb, and Brodie; Majors Evans, Sale, Frith, Yates, Dennie, Thornhill, Gore, Wahab, Farrier, and Basden; and Captains Piper, Wilson and Ross. The Governor General in Council entertains also the highest sense of the efficient services and honorable exertions of Captains Murray, Russell, Timbrell and Montgomerie, of the Artillery; of Captain Cheape, commanding Engineer; Captain Wheeler, of the Madras Pioneers; Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy and Major Jackson, Deputy Adjutant and Quarter Master Generals; and of Captains Snodgrass and Campbell, Personal Staff to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell.

The Governor General in Council seizes this opportunity of expressing his warm acknowledgements to Captain Chads, of His Majesty's Ship *Arachne*, the senior naval officer at Rangoon, and to Captain Ryves, of His Majesty's ship *Sophie*, for their distinguished personal exertions, and requests the former to convey to the officers and crews of His Majesty's ships, of the Honorable Company's cruisers as well as the officers and men of the transports who volunteered their services, the sense which Government entertains of their gallant conduct in the several actions with the enemy's war boats, when they so conspicuously displayed the irresistible and characteristic valor of British seamen. On these occasions, His Lordship in Council observes, that Lieutenant Kellett, of His Majesty's ship *Arachne*, and Lieutenant Goldfinch, of His Majesty's ship *Sophie*, particularly distinguished themselves.

The high encomium bestowed by Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell on the conduct of all the troops under his command, in which he states that their valor was only equalled by the cheerful patience with which they bore long and painful privations, and that whilst his Europeans fought like Britons and proved themselves worthy of the country that gave them birth, the gallant Sepoys successfully obtained the palm of honor in rivalling



rivalling their European comrades in every thing that marks the steady, true and daring soldier, has been perused by the Governor General with peculiar gratification; and His Lordship in Council requests the Brigadier General to take the most effectual means of making known to his troops at large the high estimation in which their valorous deeds and exemplary fortitude are held, and specially to mark the admiration of Government of the heroic manner in which the native troops have so nobly sustained the long and well-earned fame of our Indian army.

The Governor General in Council deeply laments the loss of Major Walker, of the 3d Madras Native Light Infantry, emphatically styled by Sir Archibald Campbell, "one of India's best and bravest soldiers;" of Brevet Captain and Lieutenant O'Shea, of His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; and of the gallant soldiers who have fallen in the service of their country. His Lordship in Council trusts, that the brave officers who have been wounded in the several actions with the enemy, may soon be restored to the public service.

*No. 81. (A)—Copy of a Despatch received from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, κ. c. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Govt. Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated 16th December, 1824.*

When I had the honor to address you on the 10th instant, I did not expect I should so soon have the pleasure of communicating to you, that it has again pleased God to favor us with a great victory over the army of Bundoola, re-collected after his late defeat, and considerably re-inforced on his retreat; which latter circumstance induced him and his chiefs to determine upon one more great effort to retrieve their disgrace. For this purpose they succeeded in rallying and forming, with the re-inforcements mentioned, a force amounting to between twenty and twenty-five thousand men, and returned to the village of Cookain, about three miles from the great Pagoda, and immediately commenced intrenching and stockading with a judgment, in point of position, such as would do credit to the best instructed engineers of the most civilized and warlike nations.

On the evening of the 12th, a deserter from the enemy (amongst much other information) declared it to be their intention to attack our lines on the morning of the 14th, (pronounced a fortunate day by their Soothsayers), determined to sacrifice their lives at the dearest rate, as they had nothing else to expect than to do so ignominiously, by returning to the presence of their King, disgraced and defeated as they had been. This information was too circumstantially given to be disregarded, and I prepared accordingly. On the 13th, the enemy's movements left little doubt on my mind of the truth of the deserter's information.

About half-past two, on the morning of the 14th, a formidable fire-raft was launched from a little above Kemmendine (which, however, effected nothing) and, at the same time, their emissaries succeeded on setting fire to Rangoon, in several places at once, by which one-fourth of the town has been destroyed; notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the garrison and well-disposed part of the inhabitants to get the fire under.

The 14th past without any other attempts on the part of the enemy; during the day, however, he was seen above Kemmendine, to transport large bodies of troops from the Dalla to the Rangoon side of the river. For many urgent reasons, I determined to attack Bundoola on the following day, rather than wait his pleasure as to time and place of meeting. The position he had taken up (though formidable) was still more favorable than any he had yet presented me with. I also derived much advantage from a knowledge of the ground the enemy were in possession of, having been over it with a part of my force upon a former occasion.

On the morning of the 15th, my columns of attack were formed as follows: the right, consisting of two hundred of His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and three hundred of the 18th and 34th Madras Native Infantry, under the direction of Brigadier General Cotton, with one field piece and a detachment from the Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard, under the command of Lieutenant Archbold. This column I directed to make a detour round the enemy's left, and if possible, to gain the rear of his position, and there wait the preconcerted signal of attack from me. I marched myself with the left column, which consisted of five hundred Europeans, from the 33th, 41st, 89th, and Madras European Regiments, and three hundred natives, from the 9th, 12th, 28th, and 30th Regiments of Madras Native Infantry, five field pieces, and a detachment of the Body Guard, under the command of Lieutenant Dyke, intending to attack the enemy in front. On arriving before the enemy's position, it appeared truly formidable, and such as I would hardly have felt myself warranted in attacking with a less force than ten thousand men, had I not, from experience, known and appreciated the valour of the troops I had the honor to command. Of this column two divisions were formed, giving the command of one to Lieutenant-Colonel Miles, of the 89th, and the other to Major Evans, of the 38th Regiment.

My dispositions being complete, the preconcerted signal guns were fired, and I had the pleasure to hear Brigadier General Cotton's reply, which assured me that all was ready on his side. The artillery now opened,

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and the three columns rushed on to the assault with the most determined and enthusiastic bravery, and in less than fifteen minutes were in full possession of this most stupendous work; making the enemy suffer most severely, and obliging him to leave his camp standing, with all the baggage, and a great portion of their arms and ammunition. On returning, we were disappointed to find that Bundoola did not command in person, having retired to a distance, leaving his orders with a Chief in the immediate command of the post, whom we found had been mortally wounded in the assault. Whilst this was going on within, the Governor General's Body Guard made some gallant charges amongst retreating Infantry and Cassay Horse, dealing death and destruction to all around. When it is known, that thirteen hundred British Infantry stormed, and carried by assault, the most formidable, intrenched, and stockaded works I ever saw; defended by upwards of twenty thousand men, I trust it is unnecessary for me to say more in praise of men performing such a prodigy. The prisoners declared that our appearance before their works, was treated by them all (from their Generals downwards) with the utmost derision and contempt, so confident were they in their immense superiority in numbers, and the fancied security of the works they had constructed.

Our gallant friends afloat were determined not to let this auspicious day pass without their share of its operations, Captain Chads directed that intrepid and enterprising officer Lieutenant Kellet, of His Majesty's ship *Arachne*, to proceed in command of an expedition up the river, and avail himself of any opportunity which might offer of attacking the enemy's war boats. He soon came up with a fleet of two and thirty, and after some little manœuvring to encourage the enemy to a confidence that they would, by their superiority in rowing, keep their own distance, suddenly put the full power on the *Diana* steam boat, and immediately cut through the midst of their fleet, throwing their commanders and crews into the utmost consternation. Some making for the shore, and others leaping over board in the middle of the river; all abandoning their boats, leaving Lieutenant Kellet at leisure to take possession of and bring away thirty out of the thirty-two originally discovered, and to destroy, on his return, several fire-rafts, as well as materials and combustibles for their future construction. Every day's experience of the zeal and cordiality with which Captain Chads, (and every individual composing the naval part of the expedition) co-operates with me in carrying on the combined service, increases my sincere obligations, and merits my warmest thanks. Although I have already endeavoured to describe to the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, the enthusiastic bravery of the troops engaged yesterday, still I cannot omit to mention the able and judicious aid I received from my second in command, Brigadier General Cotton. The movements by which his column was brought to the point of attack, through an intricate country, were well executed, and the attack itself afterwards was conducted with the most beneficial effects, to the general success of the day. To Lieutenant Colonel Miles and Major Evans, who led the other columns of attack, every praise is due. The exertions of Captain Montgomerie, commanding the artillery in the field, together with those of Captain Cheape, and Lieutenant Underwood, of the engineers, were most conspicuous. Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, Deputy Adjutant General, and Major Jackson, Deputy Quarter Master General, afforded me on this day, as well as on all former occasions, their able and zealous aid.

In the list of wounded\* will be seen, with regret, the name of Major Sale, of His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, an officer whose gallantry has been most conspicuous on every occasion since our arrival at Rangoon.

\* *General Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Army under the Command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., in the attack on the Enemy on the 15th of December, 1824.*

*Head-Quarters, Rangoon, 16th December, 1824.*

*The Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard.*—Killed—1 Jemadar, 2 Rank and File and 4 Horses.

Wounded—1 Lieutenant, 4 Rank and File, and 8 Horses.

*Bengal Artillery.*—Wounded—1 Lieutenant, and 4 Lascars.

*Madras Artillery.*—Wounded—1 Lascar.

*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.*—Killed—3 Lieutenants, 2 Sergeants, and 7 Rank and File.

Wounded—2 Majors, 2 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, 2 Ensigns, 2 Sergeants, and 40 Rank and File.

*His Majesty's 36th Regiment.*—Wounded—1 Serjeant, 1 Trumpeter, and 7 Rank and File.

*His Majesty's 89th Regiment.*—Killed—2 Rank and File.

Wounded—18 Rank and File.

*1st Madras European Regiment.*—Killed—1 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Serjeant, and 7 Rank and File.

*9th Madras Native Infantry.*—Wounded—3 Rank and File.

*13th Madras Native Infantry.*—Wounded—1 Captain.

*30th Madras Native Infantry.*—Wounded—1 Rank and File.

*50th Madras Native Light Infantry.*—Wounded—1 Subadar, 1 Jemadar, 1 Serjeant or Havildar, and 10 Rank and File.

*1st Battalion Madras Pioneers.*—Wounded—3 Lieutenants, and 1 Rank and File.

*Names of Officers Killed and Wounded.*

**KILLED.**—*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.*—Lieutenants Win. Darby, John Petry, and James Jones.

*The Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard.*—Jemadar Shun Loll Sing.

gon.—I am happy to say that his wound, though severe, is not dangerous, and I trust his valuable services will not long remain unavailable.

No. 81. (B)—*Extract Letter from Captain Chads, of His Majesty's sloop Arachne, to Captain Coe; dated Rangoon, 16th December, 1824.*

Within these last three days, the enemy having returned, and re-commenced offensive operations, particularly by annoying us with immense quantities of fire-rafts, one of which consisted of upwards of sixty canoes, besides bamboo rafts, all loaded with oil and combustibles, I thought it probable these preparations might be destroyed; and as I had before sent a force up the Pain-lain branch of the river, without finding any thing, I this time ordered one up the Lyne branch, under Lieutenant Kellett, of this ship, to consist of the steam-vessel, with this ship's marines and soldiers, (kindly granted by Major Yates, commanding Kemmendine) amounting in all to forty men, for her defence, the pinnaces of the *Arachne* and *Sophie*, and to tow the Honorable Company's cruiser *Prince of Wales*. Before daylight yesterday morning, they proceeded with the first of the flood, and at a short distance above Pagoda-point, saw large numbers of the enemy's war-boats, at least two hundred, who retired in good order as they advanced, keeping up a smart fire from their long guns, five boats having them mounted, and taking their distance that the carronades should not reach them; when about seven miles up, a raft was drawn right across the river, and set on fire by them to prevent the advance of our vessels; but an opening was found, and Lieutenant Kellett, now seeing the river quite clear, with great judgment, decreasing the power of steam, deceived the enemy, and lulled them into security, when putting on the whole force of steam, and casting off the *Prince of Wales*, he was immediately within grape and musketry distance; the enemy, finding themselves in this situation, drew up in a regular line to receive them: this gallant little band was not, however, to be daunted by their show of resistance, but nobly dashed on, although the *Prince of Wales* was out of sight; the heavy fire from the boats, carronades, and musketry, threw the enemy into confusion and panic, and they flew in all directions, leaving us in possession of three of their large war-boats, the chief's one, mounting three guns, and pulling sixty oars; the other two, one in their bow, nine and six-pounders, with about forty other boats of all descriptions, many of them loaded with ammunition and provisions for their army before Rangoon.

The securing of thirty of these boats and destroying the others, took up the whole of the flood; when Lieutenant Kellett, having most fully accomplished my instructions and wishes, returned, destroying, on his way down, quantities of materials for fire-rafts, and a great many canoes laden with earth oil. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded must have been very great; ours, I rejoice to add, not a man hurt, the steam-vessel having been stockaded to secure the men.

I cannot find words sufficiently strong, in which to recommend Lieutenant Kellett's uniform gallantry to you; his conduct on this, as well as the former occasions, proves him a most valuable officer. Lieutenant Goldfinch, of the *Sophie*, I have also frequently had occasion to name to you, and, with pleasure, I repeat my former recommendations; he was in the *Sophie's* pinnace, with Mr. Murray, midshipman. Mr. Tomlinson, admiralty midshipman, commanded this ship's pinnace, and Mr. Winsor, admiralty midshipman, was in charge of the steam-vessel, and shewed his usual judgment and good conduct.

Lieutenant

WOUNDED—*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry*.—Major R. H. Sale, severely, not dangerously—Major W. H. Dennie, slightly—Captain (Brevet Major) George Thornhill, severely, not dangerously—Captain James McPherson, severely, not dangerously—Lieutenant (Brevet Captain and Adjutant) Michael Fenton, slightly—Lieutenant (Brevet Captain) Robert Patison, severely, not dangerously—Ensigns A. Wilkinson and Thomas Blackall, slightly.

*Bengal Artillery*.—Lieutenant O'Hanlon, severely, since dead.

*The Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard*.—Lieutenant Archbold, slightly.

*Madras Pioneers*.—Lieutenant and Brevet Captain F. Wheeler, Lieutenant J. Macartney, and Lieutenant J. A. Campbell, severely, not dangerously.

*18th Madras Native Infantry*.—Captain D. Ross, slightly.

*Received too late for the Return of the 6th of December, 1824.*

WOUNDED—*H. M. Navy*.—8 Seamen.—*H. C. Service*.—8 Seamen.

*Return of Ordnance and Military Stores Captured in the Enemy's Works, on the 15th of December, 1824, by a Detachment from the Force under the personal Command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B.*

ORDNANCE—*Iron Guns*.—Three 3-pounders, one 2-pounder, five swivels,  $\frac{3}{4}$ -pounders, and 33 jinjals.

Muskets, brought in No. . . . . . 870.

Ditto, destroyed . . . . . 500.

Gun Powder, lbs. . . . . . 5000.



Lieutenant Kellet speaks in the highest terms of the determined steady conduct of every man under him, soldiers, sailors, and marines; and feels much indebted to Lieutenant Collinson, commanding the H. C.'s cruiser *Prince of Wales*, for the able assistance that vessel rendered him.

During these operations, the commander of the forces, Sir A. Campbell, attacked the enemy in the same direction, and gained a most brilliant victory.

In addition to the foregoing reports, Captain Coe has transmitted to Mr. Croker a letter from Captain Mitchell, of H. M.'s sloop *Slaney*, giving an account of the co-operation of a party of seamen and marines from that vessel, under the orders of Lieutenant Matthews, first of the *Slaney*, with the force employed, in May 1824, under Colonel M'Creagh, in the reduction of the island of Cheduba; in which service the following officers and men of the *Slaney* were killed or wounded, *viz.*\*

No. 82.—*The following Copies and Extracts of Despatches from Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. v., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government in the Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Head-Quarters, Rangoon, January 14, 1825.*

Some peasants that have come in, state Bundoola's late army as still dispersing, and himself, with only a few thousand men, at Donabue; but using every exertion in his power not only to stop the fugitives, but issuing orders for fresh levies, said to be little attended to.

When the Burmese grand army were here, they uncovered some of the walls of the old Portuguese fort and factory at Syriam, and by throwing up parapets, &c. &c., rendered it a tolerable strong post, which had since continued to be occupied by a small force of the natives of the Syriam district, and I have reason to think they had been joined by some of the men who deserted from their Chiefs when ordered to go and retake Martaban. Although this post did not offer us any annoyance whatever, yet I did not wish to leave it occupied, from the facility its contiguity to the river afforded of being troublesome to our boats on the breaking up of the British army from Rangoon; I therefore, on the morning of the 11th instant, detached a small force against it, consisting of two hundred men from His Majesty's 47th Regiment, with a detachment of seamen and marines from the Royal Navy and the Honourable Company's Flotilla, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Erlington, with orders to scour that part of the country, as far as the Syriam Pagoda, of any enemy to be met with. The Lieutenant-Colonel, in the course of a few hours, came before the fort and the bridge over the nullah leading to it. From the landing-place having been broken down, much labour and some delay was occasioned in repairing it, during which the enemy, from behind the works, kept up a smart and well directed fire on the head of the column, which caused some loss, but no sooner were the troops able to cross, than they rushed on and gallantly carried the place by storm. The Lieutenant-Colonel afterwards went on to the Syriam Pagoda—also found to be occupied by a small force of the enemy, who fled after the discharge of one volley, and seeing the British troops rush on to the assault.

Lieutenant Colonel Erlington speaks in the highest terms of the gallant and good conduct of every individual composing his little detachment, and the Lieutenant-Colonel himself merits my best thanks for the performance of this duty.

To prevent the enemy from again finding security in those posts, the chief engineer is now employed in blowing them up.

Herewith I beg to enclose a return † of killed and wounded, and also of the ordnance captured on this occasion.

No. 83.—*Extract*

\* Corporal of Marines, killed; Lieutenant H. B. Matthews, slightly wounded; and 4 seamen wounded.

† *General Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing, of a Detachment under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Erlington, in the attack on the Portuguese Factory and Stockades of Syriam, on the 11th and 12th of January, 1825.*

Rangoon, January 14, 1825.

*His Majesty's 47th Regiment.*—Killed—1 Ensign, and 1 Rank and File.

Wounded—2 Captains, 1 Serjeant, and 18 Rank and File.

*1st Battalion Madras Pioneers.*—Wounded—1 Ensign, and 4 Rank and File.

*Seamen of H. M. Ships Arachne, Sophie and Larne.*—Wounded—3 Europeans.

*Seamen of the Transport David Scott.*—Wounded—1 Seaman.

*Gun Boats.*—Wounded—1 Serjeant, and 3 Lascars.

*Names of Officers Killed and Wounded.—His Majesty's 47th Regiment.*—Killed—Ensign J. M. Geddes.

Wounded—Captain Backhouse, (slightly).—Captain Forbes, (severely, not dangerously.)

*1st Battalion Madras Pioneers.*—Wounded—Ensign McLeod, (slightly.)

*Return of Ordnance and Stores Captured at Syriam by a Detachment under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Erlington, H. M. 47th Regiment.*

Serviceable Brass Guns, mounted, one 2-pounder.

Serviceable Iron Guns, one 4-pounder, two 3-pounders, twenty jinjals.—The jinjals were destroyed.

N. B. Six Wooden Guns, 12-pounders, Caldnine, lined and hooped with iron.—destroyed. A small quantity of gun powder and musket balls.—destroyed. About 50lbs. of grape and round shot.—destroyed.

No. 88.—*Extract from a Despatch from Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated January 15, 1825.*

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All my sources of information from the interior of the country, give me to understand, that the immense army lately before us, is still dispersing in spite of every effort of some of their Chiefs to stop them; but it will be seen by the information contained in the enclosure, No. 1, received this-day, that the collection of another army is in progress.

I last night received a most extraordinary communication from the General Maha Bundoola, (enclosure, No. 2.) Although not immediately to my address, the bearer of it was instructed by that General, to deliver it to me in person.

The stranger mentioned in the pass, addressed to his Chiefs, as being the bearer of his letter, is a Bengal Lascar, a deserter from the transport ship *David Scott*, and who deserted from her the very day she arrived in this river, went into the jungles and was there made prisoner. He was brought near to our shipping at Kেমেন্দিন, by a large Burmese boat, and then drifted off in a canoe. He is to return this evening with my answer.

ENCLOSURE No. 1.

January 15, 1825.—The Carians employed in the intelligence department returned last evening, and state that Mounsooazar, Lansago, Meech-ee-a-on, named Mounkea-on, Oon Shaonda Maungee, are reported to have arrived at Prome, and are endeavouring to collect another army, with a view to make a last effort against the British troops at Rangoon; that if they are not victorious, they will yield, but that they will most assuredly make the effort, as artillery and muskets are said to have been brought down from Ava; when the attack will be made they do not know, neither are they acquainted with the exact force the above Chiefs have been able to collect.

The Carrians state the greater part of the Bundoolah's army have dispersed, Cassay Horse, &c. and that great efforts are making to re-collect them, but with little success, as those sent to seize the fugitives are invariably opposed by them, and that constant fighting occurs between the two parties. The people declaring that it is useless to attempt to cope with a force so far superior in every way to themselves.

No. 2.

*Translation of a Letter from Woen-Sheondah, Alioon Mynghee (Maha Bundoolah) addressed to Messrs. Gibson, Arratoon, Sarkies, Turner, Snowball, and Manuel (Ventura) Greeting.*

The Chiefs of Munnypoor, by name\* Jaewyhe and Marwy (small men) forgetting their allegiance to the Golden King, revolted from his authority, and ran away into the country of the English, which the King heard. For many years friendship has subsisted between the two nations, and therefore it was not right that the English should have received and kept these two rebels, therefore the King gave an order that they should be demanded, and I then sent from Arracan to the British chokies at Shalpuree ("Pawah") and Gunda Pullung, (Rutna Pullung) on the subject, but the people there would not attend to what was necessary to be said, and with the few men that were there, the said people made fight.—How strange it is, that for two paltry men, war should break out between our nations, therefore, did I afterwards remain with my troops at Arracan, waiting daily in the hope of hearing and understanding the reason of this; but I never could succeed in thoroughly getting to the bottom of it. Therefore, when I could only learn that on account of these two paltry men, war had commenced, and the ancient friendship of the two nations been destroyed, I returned from Arracan, and on my way heard that the English had taken Rangoon, Martaban, Merguie, and Tavoy,—and upon this, too, I received the King's orders to proceed and ascertain the causes of this proceeding, and to find out from the English, why they had devastated our provinces. In obedience to this order, I arrived at Sembewghewin, and with the view of obtaining correct information dispatched three Chiefs, Mynghee Maha Mynzla Yaza, (Chehey woon) Mynghee Mynzlohraha Mynghoon, and Myndeim Mynghaon, each in command of a division of the army, consisting of ten thousand musketeers, coolies attached two thousand, three thousand fighting men (not musketeers) with six thousand working men, and two hundred horse, with orders to proceed to Rangoon. At the Sheo Dagon Praw of Rangoon, at Kymendine, Dalla and Kambha (Kokaine) there was much fighting, and many men wounded, which I have understood from the reports of the Chiefs, whom I sent down to command;

now,

\* Chorjeet and Morjeet.

Rangoon,  
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now, on hearing this, I moved from Sembewghewn with my force, and arrived at Deneboo on the 15th of Peazoo, (thirteen days since) I hear, Mr. Gibson, that you are now at Rangoon, and you are a man whom the Golden King has conferred great honors on. You, Messrs. Arratoon, Sarkies, Turner, Snowball, and Manuel, are merchants, who have carried on traffic between the two nations, and it will therefore be proper that you should do every thing in your power for the service of the King, under whose protection you have long lived. The English having invaded the country, I am now very anxious to learn with what views or intentions they have come; whether, with the wish of devastating all our kingdom, or for what purpose; therefore, some of my people having captured a foreigner, I send this dispatch by him, and when it reaches you, desire that you will afford me all the information regarding the wishes or intentions of the English, that you can obtain from them. No date to this letter.

## No. 3.

*Translation of a Purwanneh, or Order, to the Burman Chiefs, addressed to them by Maha Bundoolah, the Generalissimo.*

I, Maha Bundoolah, having with me an immense army! elephants, horses, &c., have arrived at Deneboo on the 15th of Peazoo, (thirteen days since) and having first understood and ascertained the state of affairs, will then act as may be best. I have now sent a foreigner, by name Kummoo, with this—let him pass and re-pass, without hindrance or molestation, and ask him no questions—When the Chief of an army gives an order, whether to fight, or any thing else, the soldier will obey it; but, till he receives an order, his duty is not to do any thing of his own account. As for the foreigners who, during the present war, may have been taken or put to death, or ill-treated, that is now irrevocable; but now, should any of them fall into our hands, take care that they are not killed, or maltreated in any way. In the present case, the bearer has fallen into our hands, and is returning with this dispatch, having received every kindness, and good treatment, as well as food and money, and therefore let him go backwards and forwards without molestation.

*No. 84.—The substance of the depositions given in by most of the Prisoners taken on the 15th December, 1824. Government Gazette.*

The stockades at Kokaine or Cambah, were occupied by about twenty thousand men, commanded in chief by the Ex-Governor General of Assam, by name Maha Silwa, with the Maha-lut-Woon, Maha-Wee-lah-Meangee, Atawoon-Meinge, Moha-Mulah-raj, with other inferior officers. The Maha Bundoolah had his head-quarters at a village near Tadaghee, between it and the Morace Nulla. After the defeat of the enemy by the British troops, on the 5th and 7th, the great body of their force concentrated at Cambah, with the only two guns they had, while in this stockade it was currently stated throughout the army, that an order had arrived from the King to the Maha Bundoolah, directing him to desist from attacking the British force, as he had sent down Moon-shooe-za to endeavour to negotiate, and if he did not succeed, the Maha Bundoolah might then carry on the war.

The messenger, it is asserted, who brought this order was insulted and ill-treated. The Maha Bundoolah would not see him, and said, what are the British that we should be afraid of them, they are not soldiers; I will drive them out of Rangoon, and ordered preparations to be made for attacking the Shew Dagon Praw and Kem-mendine at one and the same time, on the 16th. When our troops were observed, they felt themselves quite confident in the strength of their works, and that nothing could carry them.

Moon-shooe-za is stated to have reached Henzadah, or Doneboo, and is expected to join the Maha Bundoolah in the course of seven days, for the purpose of endeavouring to open a negotiation with the British general.

The Chiefs who have fallen in the several actions are the Chucka-Woon, Maha-lut-Woon, Mala-mullah-Meangee, Bassein-Row, Mainc-Chain-Maunghee, Kā-Mā-Nee. The Bundoolah's brother, Moungoolah, was wounded through the thigh in the action of the 5th.

It is supposed that the force will be re-assembled to the number of twenty thousand, under the Maha Bundoolah in person, near Tadaghee.

*No. 85.—Substance of the information comprised in certain Documents taken in the entrenched position of the Burman Army, on the 15th December, 1824. Government Gazette.*

(Sheet 1st.)

An order from the King, dated 15th Natoh, 1186, details the names of twelve Chiefs with their forces, placed under the Maha Silwa's orders, and calls on them all to proceed to Henzawuddee, (Pegu) and fight with cheerfulness for the honor of their King and country.

The above date corresponds with the 4th or 5th December, 1824.

(Leaf 2d.)





Same paper. List of property brought with Bundoolah from his own house.

Silver Talee, 1—Silver spoons, 2—Silver Kutorah, 1—Silver drinking cup, 1—Silver Peek Dawn, 1—Silver Pawn box, 1—Gold ring set with cat's eye, 1—Ditto with emerald, 1—Ditto cornelian, 1—Plain gold ring, 1—Gold chain, sawfish, 1—Gold ornament for neck, 1—(a charu) a box to keep it in—A hog's tusk, being without an orifice, supposed to be a charm against sword or musket—A velvet and gold dress—A gold embroidered cap—A velvet great coat—A set of chintz bed curtains—A velvet coat with gold lace—A red Ungurka—A broad cloth Chudder—A ditto great coat—4 or 5 plain Pucholes—A broad cloth Purdah, worked—A black velvet coat—A cream coloured do.—A white cloth Chudder—4 Cheek Pacholes (Dhooties)—1 dyed ditto, large—combs, pipe, and other trifles.

Statement of money disbursed, same paper—Also a copy of an agreement between the Chief of Tullongillon and a man called Mousa: the latter agrees to furnish *two men* to proceed to Rangoon, and fight for one hundred and twenty tickals each, fifty to be paid in advance, and the remainder on their return. Also a letter, reporting all well, unfinished; a filthy song—A charm.—Also a return of 15 muskets dispatched to Rangoon, with 20 barrels of gun powder, 8 of balls—no date.

A return of 139 spears, and 33 swords, dispatched to Rangoon—No date.—Also 2 large and 2 small guns; an account of expences (trifling) on the march—(Leaf 3d.) An order from Bundoolah and Chekia Whoon, jointly addressed to Maha Silwah—No date, time, or place.—Tells Maha Silwah that they, the writers, are his Chiefs, and that their orders must be respected, that a large force has been placed under Maha Silwah's command, and that the Maha Bundoolah's and Chekia Whoon's orders are, that he must forthwith proceed to Henzawuddee, and do his utmost to drive the foreigners in the sea; that if he succeeded in obtaining a victory, his wealth and honors will be infinitely increased by the King; and so will those of every soldier who can *take* a foreigner.—Ordered to explain this to his troops.—Power of killing any man who may flinch, or be inclined to desert, granted to Maha Silwah, at discretion, by virtue of this authority—(Leaf 4th.)—From Bundoolah, addressed to the King's head treasurer—No date, time, or place—directs him to prepare for the *Elephant Force*, 84 guns, for each gun 2 Vis of gun powder. Total 168 Vis. Balls for each gun 25. 2100 total. Elephant Howdahs 42—Rammers 84—Portfires 84—Ropes 166—Powder-horns 126—Gunnets 250.—That having got them all ready, he will take and deliver them over to the Naimu-Jhaya-Yaown, Chief of elephants, and take special care that every thing is according to the number stated.

Leaf 5th—A letter from some private soldier telling his son not to be alarmed for his safety; reporting all safe and well.

Leaf 6th—A letter from or by order of the King, dated Natch 4th, 1186, or about 24th Nov. last, addressed to Jeyah Sceree Keedien, appointing him chief of artillery.

Rout pursued from Chaguin to the Shew Dagon Pagodah.

From Chaguin to Keeawtotoin, Tullockkillion, Pagahm, Shembem Gheon, Muroowhay, Semboungwhey, Meraday, Promé, Kanghain, Henzada, Denobew, Yanguinchungatt, Turratabain, Kullyicallah, Keoogoo, Mowabee, Rogie, Rykaloo, Yavungbeingwheing, Kokeim, Shew Dagon. No date.

Statement of cotton bales delivered to different chiefs, and return of arms missing—No date.

Entrenching tools, sixty-eight, compliment, forty-eight remain,—swords, twenty ditto, sixteen ditto,—axes, six ditto,—Oolees chissels, twenty ditto, seven ditto,—round ditto,—gauges, twenty ditto, five ditto—stick and bits, twenty ditto, two ditto,—nails 600 ditto, 480 ditto.

Same paper contains two or three separate accounts with the above.

Account of men employed in building boats, and of sundry expences incurred.—Same paper contains a copy of a letter from a person to his chief, in which he reports, that having arrived at Donneebo, he was seized by prince Surrawuddee, and placed in confinement, till he chose to produce ten boat builders; that, at last, having obtained them, he was set at liberty when their work was done, and received 150 tickals.

Same paper contains more accounts of expences incurred in building and repairing boats, procuring workmen, &c. &c.

Statement of money refused by men who had received advances at Donneebo, and refused to march.

Statement of money advanced to 20 men proceeding towards Rangoon, and the amount recovered from them on their return to Dunmibeu for not having completed the duty on which they were sent.

Same paper—statement of money recovered.

No. 86.—*Extract from a Private Letter from Rangoon, dated the 17th December; from the Government Gazette of the 6th January, 1825.*

About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 14th we were roused from our sleep by an alarm of fire, and found that the town had been designedly set on fire in different places.—The houses being constructed of very inflammable

inflammable materials, the flames raged with great violence, and we were under considerable anxiety in regard to our powder magazines, &c. The boats of the fleet were immediately employed in removing the powder, and we subsequently succeeded in extinguishing the fire.

While this was going on in the town the enemy were not idle. Fire-raft after fire-raft came down the river, signal fires were lighted all round our lines, and an attack was made on Kemmendine. Our troops kept steady at their posts, and the enemy were deterred from carrying into effect their intended attack upon our lines. The 14th was passed in making the necessary arrangements for forcing the enemy's entrenched position at Kokaine. At ten o'clock of the 15th, the troops destined for the attack moved off from the Pagoda in two columns, the right under Brigadier General Cotton, the left under Col. Miles; the whole superintended by by Sir A. Campbell.

On reaching the ground, in front of the enemy's position, the left column was halted, and formed into two divisions.

In the mean time, General Cotton's division, which was ordered to proceed by a road to the right, in order to turn the enemy's left, and to attack his rear, had reached the position assigned to it. At half-past one every thing was ready; the preconcerted signal was made, the columns advanced, and in ten minutes we were in possession of the whole of the enemy's entrenched position, which was six miles in circumference, and surrounded by a ditch of eight feet. The place was much stronger than we had anticipated, but nothing could restrain our gallant troops. Archbold, who with 60 of the Governor General's Body Guard, was attached to General Cotton's division, fell in with the enemy's horse, and gave immediate orders for attacking them. The enemy were in the act of charging, but turned to the right-about when within four or five yards of the Body Guard; they suffered severely for their temerity, and many of them escaped to report their defeat.—Archbold had a very narrow escape. His horse was wounded in three places; two shots struck his saddle, and he himself was wounded on the right foot, but is doing well. Poor O'Hanlon received wounds in both his arms, and another shot pierced his breast, and he expired to our great regret about 11 o'clock yesterday.

Our attacking force, which only comprised 1300 Infantry, 160 Cavalry, and 100 Artillery, was opposed to 20,000 Burmese, entrenched in one of the strongest positions I ever saw. The enemy's force was commanded in chief by the ex-governor of Assam; he was one of the first to decamp; but one chief of rank, with three others of somewhat inferior note, was killed. The Bundoolah's brother was wounded in the thigh, and the enemy's loss on the 15th, is supposed to have amounted to at least 8000 men. We have got three guns, standards, golden chattahs, and a large number of small arms.

They have received a sound drubbing, and I doubt whether the barbarous and despotic means they use to collect and keep together their force will enable them to face our troops again. The war will, I think, be concluded here; for the whole disposable force of the empire seems to have been collected and vigorously employed, with the exclusive object of recovering Rangoon. In this they have totally failed, after successive attempts, and I scarcely think they will offer further resistance; if they do, it will be a last effort by Bundoolah, in person, to recover his honor, if possible, and with the full knowledge of the fate which awaits him at Ava if he fails.

During the time that the troops were engaged on shore, a detachment went up the river, and succeeded in capturing thirty of the enemy's war boats.

P. S. We have just heard that the Maha Bundoolah has taken up a position between Taga-hee and the Moorai nullah, where, it is said, he will make another stand; but I doubt it, for he has lost his artillery, a great part of his small arms, and his troops are very badly off both for ammunition and provisions.

No. 87. (A)—*Extract Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Richards, Commanding in Assam, to D. Scott, Esq., Agent to the Governor-General on the North-east frontier; dated on the River, off Gowahatty, 15th November, 1824.*

I commenced operations about the 20th ultimo, by detaching Majors Cooper and Waters, the former to Kulliar, and the latter to Rahachokey, with the intention of repossessing ourselves of the country west of Kulliar, which is as much as I can do, being without the means of marching a corps in the interior, which I consider absolutely necessary.

From the result of several successful enterprises, of which I have the pleasure to send you copies, I am happy to say this object has been accomplished; but as the Boora Rajah and his followers are still on the borders, I have sent orders and instructions to Majors Cooper and Waters, to attempt their destruction, and I have every hope they will fall into our hands, or be obliged to try the road to Munnipore, in which case their annihilation is certain, as the Naghas will no doubt cut them up.



No. 87. (B)—*Copy of Letter from Major Cooper, to Captain Bayldon, Major of Brigade in Assam; dated Kulliar, 31st October, 1824.*

I have the honour to report, for the information of Lientenant-Colonel Richards, commanding the troops in Assam, that having obtained information of a party of sixty Burmahs being at Dickaree, in Char-doar, under Coggutie and Hillee Fookans, belonging to the Moogun Rajah, I detached a party of forty men there, under the command of Lieutenant Watson (Chumparun Light Infantry), in three police row-boats, on the evening of the 29th instant, considering my detachment to be within one day's journey of Kulliar.

I have now the satisfaction of reporting, that Lieutenant Watson's party succeeded in surprising the enemy yesterday afternoon in some huts at Dickaree, in which little affair Coggutie Fookan, and six Burmahs were killed, Hillee Fookan and four Burmahs, two Doannes, and thirteen women and children taken prisoners; also a small war-boat and nine indifferent muskets have been taken.

The surprise of the enemy, I am happy to state, has set at liberty two Christians (natives) in the employ of Mr. Bruce, of Juggy-gassal, named Henry Collins, and Frederick Swain, also a native merchant, named Shaik Saharge, who were permitted, on paying a sum of money, to leave Joorhaut eight days ago.

Lientenant Watson's party and prisoners joined me again to-day; he reports, that the men of the corps behaved in a steady and spirited style. I must, in a great measure, attribute their success to the judicious arrangements adopted by Lientenant Watson for the attack, and to the military ardour and zeal, for the good of the service, I have, on all occasions, observed him to possess, and which I trust will, at a proper time, meet with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's favourable consideration.

I have also to report, the Chumparun Light Infantry and four gun-boats reached Kulliar this evening, and that the post is unoccupied by the enemy, who, I am informed, are principally collected at Namgong.

This detachment has been much longer in reaching Kulliar than I expected, owing to the easterly winds, strong current, and the tracking grounds being covered with strong and high reeds.

No. 87. (C)—*Copy of a Letter from Major Waters, Commanding the Dinagapore Local Battalion, to Lientenant-Colonel Richards, Commanding in Assam; dated on the River Kullung, 29th October, 1824.*

I have the honour to report to you, that I arrived on the evening of the 27th inst., at a point of the river opposite the village of Moree Kullung, about one-third of the distance between Jaggee and Rahachokey, where I received intelligence from Lientenant Neufville, of the Quarter-Master-General's Department, of a party of the enemy, amounting to about two hundred and fifty men, being stationed at the village of Hautgong, a few miles inland on the north bank.

I determined on surprising them, and with that view proceeded at one A. M. yesterday morning, with a detachment of one hundred Light Infantry of the Dinagapore Battalion, which I deemed sufficient, having ascertained that their post was open. After a fatiguing march of seven hours we reached their position, and completely succeeded in effecting our purpose, the enemy having no intimation whatever of our approach; owing, however, to the thickness of the jungle, and the numerous outlets from the village, their loss has been comparatively small; we did not remain to ascertain the exact amount, but those found killed were chiefly Usseel Burmese. Had a small party of Cavalry been with the detachment, not a man could have escaped, as the enemy effected it with great difficulty, and only by abandoning their women and baggage. After continuing the pursuit some distance over very heavy ground and through grass jungle, and finding that I could not gain upon them, I returned to the village of Hautgong, and subsequently to my boats.

I have every reason to be highly satisfied with the steadiness and cheerful exertion of the men in this fatiguing march of thirty-five miles, exposed to almost incessant rain, and through a country mostly inundated; and feel particularly indebted to the officers who accompanied the detachment (all being on foot), Lientenant Neufville, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Lientenant Jones, of the 46th Regiment, temporarily doing duty with my corps, and Assistant Surgeon C. Stewart, for the active assistance afforded me by them in every respect; and I beg further to add, that the correct information I received from the Intelligence Department, paved the way to ultimate success.

No. 87. (D)—*Copy of a Letter from same to the same; dated Rahachokey, on the River Kullung, 3d November, 1824.*

It is with extreme satisfaction that I have the honor to report to you the successful result attending an attack on this post, on the morning of yesterday.

On approaching Rahachokey, I had every reason to believe, from the information received from Lieutenant Neufville, of the Quarter Master General's Department, that my attack on Hautgong had directed the attention of the enemy to the line of the great river, and that they were quite unaware of my advance up the Kullung, or that our attack had been made from that quarter.

I therefore again resumed the expectation of being able to effect another surprise, which was confirmed by repeated intelligence in progress.

On the night of the 1st instant, I arrived at the situation which was conceived the best distance from the enemy's post, from whence to push on the detachment destined for the surprise, and having embarked one hundred men on the gun and light boats, I reached the landing place about two miles below the point of attack, which I received, by this arrangement, at early day-break.

Having rapidly reconnoitred the situation, I divided my men in two parties, directing Lieutenants Neufville and Jones, of the 46th Regiment, to conduct the one by the right into the village, and proceeding myself, with Mr. Assistant Surgeon Stewart, with the other by the left, through an unfinished stockade which the enemy were throwing up.

The party under Lieutenant Neufville immediately pushed on, and fortunately came first on the enemy's chief guard, all of whom were either bayoneted or shot; and the alarm being given, the body rushed out of their houses for the purpose of escaping on the opposite side, under a heavy fire; this threw them on my party, which had made a detour by the left, where they were received with great loss. The remainder were pursued nearly two miles, and many killed and wounded in the jungles; their loss cannot be estimated at less than one-third of their number. I am happy to say no casualty occurred on our side, with the exception of one sepoy wounded by a musket-ball.

I had previously been informed that a party of sixty Burmahs, from the main body at this post, had been detached the preceding morning in the direction of Hautgong (for the purpose of ascertaining from what quarter the attack of the 28th ultimo had been made, and also to arrange themselves in the villages), and on my return from the pursuit I directed my attention towards them, as Lieutenant Neufville had received information of their expected return to their head-quarters.

At mid-day their approach was announced, apparently in total ignorance of the defeat of their main body; and, in consequence, I proceeded with the officers and a party of forty men, with a view of laying in ambush. The plan was, I am happy to add, attended with complete success; and the enemy's loss, in killed and wounded, amounts to nearly half their number, the remainder flying in the greatest confusion towards Namgong, after a feeble attempt at returning our fire.

I have the honor to acquaint you, that I have sent down those of the prisoners brought in from the jungles by the villagers, who are Usseel Burmese, to await your orders. The Doannees will be useful here in clearing our ground.

It is with just satisfaction that I again bring to your notice the active and zealous assistance I derived from the officers under my command (Lieutenants Neufville and Jones, and Mr. Assistant Surgeon Stewart); in the second affair—Lieutenant Jones contributed personally to the loss of the enemy.

The very steady and spirited conduct of the men was also very praiseworthy.

P. S. I had omitted to notice, that many of the enemy's arms were found in the guard-room and other places, consisting chiefly of old muskets and a great number of swords, of which some belonged to chiefs.

*No. 87. (E)—Copy of Letter from same to the same; dated Namgong, 6th November, 1824.*

In continuation of my despatch, of the 3d instant, I have the honour to report, that early on the following morning information was given me, that the main body of the enemy, under the Boora, or Mogaum Rajah (the Burmese Governor of Assam), had quitted the stockade in which they had taken post at Namgong, and had moved to another situation, with the intention of retreating across the hills into Mumpore; I accordingly ordered out a strong reconnoissance, in the hopes of surprising them, or at least of compelling them to retire within their stockade; and having a sufficient party for the protection of the guns and fleet, I proceeded with Lieutenants Neufville and Jones, and Mr. Assistant Surgeon Stewart towards Namgong.

After marching a few miles, I received intelligence that the enemy had commenced their flight towards the hills, leaving a Fookan and eighty Burmese to cover their retreat; in consequence, I pushed on, but was not able to cover the distance in one march, and after continuing it for twenty-five miles, bivouacked for the night. The next morning I advanced, and occupied the stockade, which I found quite evacuated by the enemy, who had gained too much upon us to render a pursuit practicable, unless by the Cavalry. From the villages I learnt that, immediately on the alarm being given by the fugitives from Rahachokey, of our attack on them, and the loss sustained, together with the appearance of the wounded, the main body of this post were

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seized with the utmost panic and consternation; and the Booralh Rajah and Fookans determined on instant and precipitate flight; this they effected, leaving behind them all their baggage, plunder, military stores, and heavy property; the greater part of the plunder was immediately seized and secreted by the villagers, and we found the stockade already much destroyed.

We have captured twenty iron guns, a number of boxes of powder, a manufactory of which had been established, and for which the materials captured are of superior quality, three war-boats (one very large), the state-boat of the Boora Chief, and a number of small ones.

From the appearance of the stockade, and the intelligence gained from the villagers, I am of opinion that our account of their numbers must have been correct, and that they were at least thirteen hundred in all, of whom four or five hundred were Usseel Burmese. The stockade is defended principally by stakes and spikes, thickly set all round, but could not have held out if attacked, being clearly exposed to the fire of the guns, and also commanded from the opposite banks of the river. The enemy appear to have been totally unprepared for our rapid advance, as all their houses and works were in progress, in a very extended scale, as if for permanent residence. They have fled towards the hills, in a south-easterly direction; but I have not yet been able to ascertain whether they will attempt to cross, or whether they propose to skirt them, directing their flight towards their former positions at Mauroo and the eastward.

I am informed by Lieutenant Neufville, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, that a body of Sauns and Unjphas is said to be at Jookauth; but as they are now opposed to the Burmese, the latter must find themselves on every side beset with difficulties.

I have left a Subadar's party with the gun-boats at Rahachokey. I have taken post for the present at Namgong, pending your further instructions.

*No. 88.—Copy of a Report from Lieutenant-Colonel A. Richards, Commanding in Assam, to Captain Shuldham, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Eastern Division; dated Camp, Moura Mookh, 9th January, 1825.*

I have the honour to report, for the information of Brigadier-General Shuldham, Commanding Eastern Division, the arrival at this place of the force noted in the margin\*, on the morning of the 6th instant, and to detail the operations against the enemy subsequent to that period.

About three hours after we arrived, intelligence was brought that a party of the enemy were about three miles off on the road to Jorhaut, I immediately detached a company from the 46th Regiment, under Lieutenant Jones of that corps; they proceeded under the guidance of Lieutenant Neufville, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, to the spot, but unluckily the enemy were found on the move, and only about ten of their stragglers were seen and pursued, but without effect; had Lieutenant Jones had a small party of Cavalry, few of the enemy could have escaped: further news being received, that two parties were in the hills to the southward, and one of them considerably to my rear, I deemed it expedient to endeavour to dislodge them, as, were they allowed to remain, they would have it in their power to command the road between this and Kulliabur, and cut off our supplies, and also deter the inhabitants from returning to their houses; I therefore detached Captain MacLeod, Commanding Rungpore Light Infantry, with near two hundred men of that corps, yesterday at four p. m., so as to reach Cutchery Haut by day-break if possible, and after dislodging the party there, to send an officer and one hundred men to Kuleanee, in the hopes of surprising the party there. Another detachment of a company from the 57th, under Lieutenant N. Jones, of that Regiment, went off last night at eleven o'clock to Podurallee, which place is on the direct road from Cutchery Haut to Jorhaut, the present head-quarters of the enemy; Lieutenant Jones will place his party in ambush to intercept the fugitives from Cutchery Haut, as it is expected they will take that direction. In order to enable the Brigadier-General to comprehend the situation of the different points of attack. I do myself the pleasure to enclose a sketch.

There being a road also from Cutchery Haut, via Deogong, to Jorhaut, I sent off a patrol of a company from the 57th Regiment, under Lieutenant Hopper of that corps, he marched this morning at four o'clock, with directions to go about twelve miles on the Deogong road, and to attack any small party he might fall in with; he was to lay in ambush for the day, and to send forward Hurcurrahs to Deogong, to learn if there were any party of the enemy there, and if they did not exceed three hundred men, and in an open situation, he was to move and attack them to-night, as the moon rises; but at noon, to-day, certain intelligence being brought in, that there are four hundred men at Deogong, I ordered Captain Martin, Commanding 57th Regiment Native Infantry,

\* Flotilla of Gun Boats; Detachment of Artillery; 46th Regiment; 57th Regiment; Dinagepore Local Battalion; Rungpore Light Infantry.



Infantry, to proceed instantly with another complete company from that corps to reinforce Lieutenant Hopper, and to make the attack—but I suspect the advance of Lieutenant Hopper in the morning will have caused them to retire. In addition to the above parties, I have to report, that Captain Waldron, with one hundred and fifty men of the 46th Regiment Native Infantry, marched from hence at eleven this forenoon, to attack another party of one hundred and twenty at Deonpoora. When I know the result of these expeditions, I shall do myself the honour to report.

I ought to have mentioned, that Lieutenant Neufville has accompanied Captain Martin, and that from the best intelligence I have been able to obtain, the enemy's force now in Assam amounts to between six or eight thousand men of every description, under Sam Phokin, who, with the main body, is stationed at Jorehaut.

No. 89. (A)—*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Richards, Commanding in Assam, to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Eastern Division; dated Camp, Moura Mook, the 13th January, 1825.*

I had the honour to report to you, in my letter of the 9th instant, the march of several detachments against the enemy; I have now the honour to transmit copies of letters from the different officers, who have all returned to the fleet, detailing the particulars of their operations. I feel much obliged to the officers and men who have been employed. The object for which they were detached has been completely fulfilled.

I am happy to state, that, notwithstanding the fears of the inhabitants of those places visited by my detachments, I do not think the enemy will dare to venture to molest them again, after their late defeat at all points.

The detachments under Captain M'Leod and Lieutenant N. Jones having joined me this forenoon, I have to report my intention of advancing to-morrow morning upon Joor Haut, at which place the enemy are concentrated and stockaded.

No. 89. (B)—*Extract of a Letter from Captain Martin, Commanding a Detachment of the 57th Regiment Native Infantry, to Brigade Major Bayldon; dated Camp, Deoorgong, 10th January, 1825.*

About eleven o'clock P. M., the detachment under my command moved silently forward, and as we approached the stockade of Deoorgong, Captain Neufville led us by a considerable detour to the right, to avoid two advanced posts, and to get into the rear of the stockade.

We were now in sanguine hopes of effecting a complete surprise, but the enemy must have had scouts on the plain, as we were challenged by both out-posts. At a short distance from the stockade, signal-lights appeared from both chokies, and the alarm had evidently been taken; at this moment a small party of men that had broken from the rear, by mistake, suddenly appeared in front, and a few shots were fired, but immediately stopped.

The detachment now pushed on rapidly, and entered the stockade as the last of the fugitives were quitting it on the opposite side; they were pursued to the jungle; six men were killed and seven taken. The only casualty I have to regret on our part, is the death of one sepoy by an accidental shot.

This stockade consisted of a double fence of bamboos, but without a ditch. The amount of the enemy's force within it could not, I imagine, have exceeded two hundred men.

No. 89. (C)—*Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant Waldron, Commanding a Detachment of the 46th Regiment Native Infantry, to Brigade Major Bayldon; dated Moora Mookh, 13th January, 1825.*

Having ascertained that the enemy, to the number of one hundred, or one hundred and twenty, were in the stockade, distant four or five coss, and judging from the time they had been absent, that it might be more, I immediately ordered the men under arms, leaving a small party to guard the knapsacks, and proceeded over a very bad road, which greatly distressed the men. A little before day-break, I crossed the Dhonseera again (about a mile below the stockade), and proceeded along its right bank, and reached the stockade about sunrise; a fog allowing me to come up unperceived, the enemy were completely surprised, and about twenty were killed, amongst whom was a Phokun and five Usseel Manas: thirteen prisoners were taken.

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No. 90.—*Copy of a Letter from Lieut.-Col. A. Richards, to the Deputy Adjutant General, Eastern Division; dated Gowree Sagur, 27th January 1825.*

I have the honor to report for the information of Brigadier General Shulldham, commanding Eastern Division, that at half an hour after ten o'clock this morning, many hundreds of the enemy attacked my advanced position at Namdong Nulla, over which there is a fine pukka bridge, and where Captain MacLeod commanded with the Rungpore Light Infantry. The bridge is distant from my present camp about three-quarters of a mile on the high road to Rungpore. On hearing the firing, I ordered the troops under arms, and moved on to the support of Captain MacLeod with two companies of the 57th Regiment and the Dinagopore Local Battalion, leaving the remainder of the former corps, under Captain Martin, to defend the camp, as the hurcarras acquainted me that the enemy meant to attack in three divisions. On my reaching the scene of action, I found that gallant officer Captain MacLeod, and his little band, defending the position in a steady soldier-like manner. As I perceived the enemy were collecting and spreading to the right and left in a very heavy jungle, in which it was impossible our troops could act with effect, and that those in our immediate front were keeping up a very sharp fire of jinjals and muskets. I ordered the party on the bridge to retire to the front division and lay down and cease firing. The enemy thought this was the prelude to a retreat, and set up a shout and came forward; but our fire from the advanced division soon made them retire; after this the enemy were apparently gaining confidence, and began to show themselves boldly,—I therefore gave them half an hour to collect, and to induce them to suppose we did not meditate an attack. At the expiration of that time, I directed Captain MacLeod to charge their position with the Rungpore Light Infantry, followed by the Volunteer Cavalry, in number twenty-eight, under Lieutenant Brooke, Sub-Assistant Commissary General; this was performed with the utmost gallantry, and the enemy fled after giving their fire, but were overtaken, and Captain MacLeod reports, that full sixty were killed in the charge, amongst whom were three Phokuns, mounted on horse-back; their horses were taken, as also forty-one muskets, and thirty-six spears, and four prisoners. The number killed in the charge is, independent of those that were killed in the first attack, who were all immediately carried off as they fell, and it is supposed they must have lost near one hundred killed, as the attack lasted one hour and twenty minutes. On our side, I regret to say, Lieutenant and Adjutant Kennedy, Rungpore Light Infantry, was wounded in the head (slightly.) The other casualties are one sepoy of the same Corps, and one horse attached to the Cavalry wounded. The conduct of the Rungpore Light Infantry, and the Volunteer Cavalry, which belong to the same corps, merit my warmest approbation. To Captain MacLeod, commanding Rungpore Light Infantry, and Lieutenant Brooke, who commanded the Volunteer Cavalry, and whose conduct is reported by Captain MacLeod, to have been most conspicuous, my best thanks are especially due; as also to Lieutenant Fleming, Officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary General, who joined the Rungpore Light Infantry in the charge; and to Lieutenant and Adjutant Kennedy, and Mr. Surgeon Thomson of that corps, for the zealous assistance afforded by them during the action.

I trust the guns, spare ammunition, and supplies will arrive in camp in the course of the night or to-morrow morning, which will enable me to move forward to the attack of Rungpore on the day following.

I omitted to mention in my letter of yesterday's date that forty-six prisoners have been taken subsequent to my former letter of the 19th instant.

No. 91. (A).—*Copy of a Letter from D. Scott, Agent to the Governor General, North-east Frontier, to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to the Government in the Secret and Political Department; dated Kulleabur, 7th February, 1825.*

I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, copies of despatches received from Lieutenant Colonel Richards.

2.—By a private letter from the same officer, of date the 2d instant, I learn that the fort of Rungpore was delivered up to our troops on the 1st, and that Sham Phookan and the Rajahs Chunder Kaunt and Jysing, had been in camp.

No. 91. (B).—*Copy of a Despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel A. Richards, Commanding in Assam, to Captain Shulldham, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Eastern Division; dated 29th January, 1825.*

In continuation of my letter of the 27th instant, I have to acquaint you, for the information of Brigadier General Shulldham, commanding Eastern Division, that I was joined by Lieutenants Bedingfield and Burlton, with

with two howitzers and two twelve-pounder carronades on the same evening, and having arranged every thing for our advance towards Rungpore, I marched at day-break on the 29th in the following order:

1st.—The detachment 64th Regiment (Light Company leading) the advance guard from which a havildar's party was sent one hundred paces on in front.

2d.—The Volunteer Cavalry.

3d.—The Brigade of Howitzers, drawn by elephants.

4th.—The 57th Regiment right in front.

5th.—Two twelve-pounder carronades on elephants, with ammunition attached.

6th.—The Dinagepore Local Battalion.

7th.—The Rungpore Light Infantry.

8th.—The spare ammunition.

I was aware that the enemy had a stockade across the road, near Rungpore, as Lieutenant Neufville, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, had gone out to reconnoitre on the morning of the 26th, and got to it without being perceived. He reported that it was defended by two hundred men and some guns, and that he was fired upon from a fortified tank, a little in advance on the right, and which appeared to command the before-mentioned stockade, and that a gun was also fired from the left, which he considered must have been from the fort of Rungpore, as he observed the tops of pukka buildings and mosques in that direction, distant about three-quarters of a mile; and he also stated that the whole country he traversed was a deep jungle.

Before advancing, I gave directions to Captain Waldron, commanding the advance guard, to storm the stockade across the road, if he thought he had a chance of carrying it, but if not, to turn into the jungles, right and left, and act as a covering party, which latter plan he adopted, as the fire of the enemy was extremely heavy. It may be here proper to remark, that the stockade had been greatly strengthened and re-inforced since Lieutenant Neufville was there, and that the first discharge from the enemy, who were entrenched, brought down more than half of the leading division, which caused a momentary check.—At this time the guns and column were about two hundred paces in the rear. On the first shot being fired, I gave directions for the elephants to be cast off from the howitzers and prepare for action; whilst this was performed, I advanced near to the stockade to examine it, and immediately returned to the head of the column, and ordered a couple of shells and a round or two of grape to be thrown in, and for Captain MacLeod to prepare to assault with the right wing of the 57th Regiment, which was accordingly done in the most gallant style, assisted by the detachment 46th Regiment, who rushed forward to support him, and I had the pleasure to see the enemy fly at the moment our troops began to scale and break down the stockade. At this period I was unfortunately wounded, but gave orders for the guns and column to advance, and sent for Major Waters and gave him directions to carry the stockaded tank on the right, or any other outworks the enemy might have, and I would be up so soon as my wound had been dressed. Herewith I have the pleasure to enclose a copy of that officer's letter, stating what occurred from the time he assumed the command until I joined, which I was able to do in a dooly in about twenty minutes.—Captain MacLeod, with the Rungpore Light Infantry, took possession of a mosque on the left, about four hundred yards from the fort, and another party was detached to occupy another mosque on the right side, by which means the south side of the fort was invested, and the enemy driven in at all points.—As the fort appeared an extensive place, and full of guns and men, who shewed themselves on the walls and gateways, I deemed it advisable to order the camp to be pitched, and to have the place reconnoitred, which was done the same evening, and it was considered necessary by the artillery officer, that two more guns should be ordered from the fleet, and that people should be immediately sent out to cut and collect materials for a battery, which was complied with.—In the course of the day we fired a few rounds of shells, carcasses, and round shots at the fort, to give them a specimen of the means we had of annoying them, which they returned by constant discharges of cannon.

I am sorry to say that our loss, in wounded, is very heavy,\* but from the nature of the service, and the troops being for a time unavoidably exposed to a cross fire of twenty pieces of ordnance, all of which were captured,

\* *General Report of Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Force under Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Richards, in Action with the Enemy near Rungpore, on the 29th January, 1825.*

*Head-Quarters, near Rungpore, 29th January 1825.*

*General Staff.—Wounded.—One Lieutenant-Colonel, and One Lieutenant.*

*46th Regiment.—Wounded.—One Havildar, Four Rank and File, severely.—One Jemidar, Two Havildars, Twenty-one Rank and File, slightly.*

*57th Regiment.—Wounded.—Eleven Rank and File, severely.—One Subadar, One Havildar, and Seven Rank and File, slightly.*

*Rungpore Light Infantry.—Killed.—Two Rank and File.*



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captured, and a large body of men, armed with musquets, it is providential that we suffered so little. I have particularly to lament the severe wound that enterprising officer Lieutenant Brooke, Sub-Assistant Commissary General, received at my side, at my first advance to the stockade, but I trust that as the surgeon's report of his case is favorable, he will soon be restored to health and the service.—I have not been able to ascertain the loss the enemy sustained in this affair, but it cannot, I have every reason to believe, be less than one hundred men killed and wounded.—To the whole of the troops employed on this occasion my best thanks are due for the zeal they evinced; but I feel it incumbent on me to bring to the notice of the Brigadier General commanding the division, the gallantry and steady conduct of the following officers who had the good fortune to be more immediately engaged; viz. Major Waters, my second in command, for the judicious arrangements he adopted, after I had been disabled; to Captain Waldron, commanding a detachment 46th Regiment; Captain Martin, commanding 57th Regiment, the right wing of which carried the stockade by assault; Lieutenant Bedingfield, commanding the Artillery, as well as to Lieutenant Burlington, attached to the same; to Captain MacLeod, commanding Rungpore Light Infantry, for taking possession of a commanding position before the enemy were aware of its importance; and to Lieutenant Neufville, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, for his gallant conduct in leading the advance, and for the correct intelligence he gave me, by which means I was enabled to form the plan of operations with such success, and I trust that our attack on the fort will be equally fortunate, the result of which I hope to have the pleasure of reporting in a day or two.

I cannot close this despatch without recording my approbation and thanks to Captain Bayldon, Major of Brigade; Lieutenant Neufville, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General; Lieutenant Brooke, Sub-Assistant Commissary General; and Lieutenant Fleming, officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary General, the Staff attached to this force, for the prompt and great assistance I have at all times received from them in the execution of their respective duties.

No. 91. (C)—*Copy of a Report from Major E. F. Waters, to Captain Bayldon, Major of Brigade, Assam; dated Camp, before Rungpore, Assam, January 29, 1825.*

I have the honor to apprise you, for the information of Lieutenant Colonel Richards, commanding in Assam, that agreeably to his instructions, I repaired to the head of the column on his being wounded, and on assuming the temporary command, I perceived Captain Martin in possession of the stockade and posts on the right flank, and the Burmahs in full and precipitate retreat towards the fort, from which a strong fire was opened. I immediately ordered the artillery to the front, which soon silenced the enemy's fire. Precautionary measures were then taken for the security of the posts vacated by the enemy, and a verbal report of circumstances made to Lieutenant-Colonel Richards.

No. 92. (A)—*Extract of a Dispatch from David Scott, Esq., to the Secretary to Government in the Secret and Political Department; dated Kulliabur, 9th February, 1825.*

I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, copies of dispatches received from Lieut. Colonel Richards, together with copies of the correspondence alluded to in the 7th and 8th paragraphs of that officer's letter to the address of Captain Shuldham.

No. 92. (B)—*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel A. Richards, Commanding in Assam, to D. Scott, Esq., Agent to the Governor General, North-east Frontier; dated Camp, near Rungpore, 4th February, 1825.*

I have the honor to enclose for your information the accompanying documents relative to the surrender of the Fort of Rungpore.

No. 92. (C)—*Copy*

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*Names of Officers Wounded.*—Lieutenant-Colonel A. Richards, (slightly,) commanding the Force, Lieutenant J. Brooke, (severely, not dangerously,) Sub-Assistant Commissary General.

*Return of Ordnance, &c. captured at the Stockade and Fortified Tank, near Rungpore, on the 29th January 1825, by the Force under Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Richards.*

Brass Guns, one 2-pounder.  
Iron Guns, three 2-pounders, and 19 swivels.  
Iron Balls, of sizes, 250.

No. 92. (C)—*Copy of a Dispatch from Lieutenant-Colonel A. Richards, Commanding in Assam, to Captain Shuldham; Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Eastern Division; dated 2d February, 1825.*

In continuation of my dispatch of the 29th ultimo, I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of Brigadier-General Shuldham, commanding Eastern Division of the army, that on the moon setting, on the morning of the 30th, the enemy, in small parties, came out and attacked the picquets, but were soon compelled to retire, with the loss on our side of two sentries killed, and on their part, as far as is known, of one man killed.

The firing from the fort continued during the whole of the night and morning at intervals; but as they had not the range of our camp, I did not return a shot, as the place is too extensive to have made any great impression, and our supply of ammunition being but small, I was anxious to reserve it for the day of attack.

About ten o'clock on the morning of the 30th, a flag of truce was seen coming from the fort, and I sent out Captain Bayldon, M. B., and Lieutenant Neufville, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, to receive it.

Those officers having met the herald, and conducted him to the outer picquet, reported to me that he represented himself to be a native of Ceylon, by name Durmadur Burmacheree, many years resident in Bengal and the Eastern Islands, in the employment of various well-known public servants, and conversant with our manners and customs, at present Raj Gooroo, or chief priest, to the Saum and Burmese authorities in Assam, and an accredited messenger from Saum and Baglee Phokuns to me.

I accordingly directed him to be admitted, under the usual forms of precaution.

After his introduction, he said that he was deputed by the Phokuns to enquire, what were the objects of our present advance upon Rungpore? To which I replied, that my instructions were to clear the country of Assam of all opposing forces, and to occupy it on the part of the British government, for the protection of the inhabitants; that I was surprised at the question, since I conceived the Phokuns must have been already apprized of our intentions by Mr. Scott's (A. G. G.) communication in reply to theirs.

The Gooroo expressing his total ignorance of the receipt, by the Phokuns, of Mr. Scott's letter, I explained the general tenor of the contents, which he promised faithfully to deliver to the Phokuns, and to return in the course of the day with their reply. I also took the opportunity of bringing forward a messenger of the Phokuns returning with dispatches from Mr. Scott, who had arrived in camp the same morning, and of delivering the letters to the Gooroo for transmission to the Phokuns.

These proved to be the delayed communication above adverted to.

Within the period stipulated in the armistice, the Gooroo returned, stating, that he had not met with any opportunity of delivering the letters privately, which it was necessary to do, to avoid the jealous suspicions of the numerous conflicting factions into which the enemy were divided; that he had every reason to believe the two great chiefs, Saum and Baglee Phokuns, to be unanimous, and disposed to enter into treaty with us; that he trusted much to his own sacred influence over them, and all the others, to bring matters to an amicable adjustment; and requested a continuance of the truce till the morrow. He also asked for some definite explanation of our wishes.

To this I acceded, adding, that he was authorized to say to the Phokuns, that if they decided on making terms of alliance with us, I was ready to meet them; if on fighting, I was equally ready; and if they wished to retire out of Assam into their own country, I was willing to permit them to do so, provided that they took the directest route, committed no ravages on the road, and carried away none of the inhabitants now in their possession, by compulsion. To this latter alternative I was induced by finding, from the Gooroo, the impracticability of a plan proposed by me to separate the two factions, by admitting the friendly-disposed portion to the benefit of terms, provided they would come over and abandon the others to their fate in a continuance of hostilities with us. This he declared impossible, since the latter considerably preponderate in strength over the former, though headed by the chiefs, and that the slightest suspicion of such an inclination, would entail bloodshed and destruction, not only on their families here, but in their own country. I was also compelled reluctantly to reflect on the total want of means in my power to prevent their escape, or to pursue them, in which case all hope of rescuing the captive Assamese inhabitants must have been abandoned. It was at the same time clearly pointed out to the Phokuns, and understood by them, that any act of plunder or aggression committed by the retiring party in progress through Assam, or in the territories of our allies, would be tantamount to an infringement of engagements, and again draw down on them our arms.

The following morning the Gooroo returned, accompanied by two inferior Phokuns, (the brother of Saum Phokun and Hathee Phokun,) with a friendly offering, and a letter from the chiefs, of which No. 3 is a translation.

After much desultory conversation, the Gooroo returned with my reply, and an exchange of presents.

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On the following morning, a message was brought from the Gooroo by his brother Ruttun Pal, stating that, in compliance with my terms, one portion was preparing to evacuate the fort for their own country, and that the remainder were ready to surrender; also that the chiefs were anxious to wait on me to adjust the various points of capitulation.

I accordingly invited them to a conference, and directed the officers of my staff to proceed to meet them and conduct them to me.

The principal chiefs, Saum Phokun, Sheick Phokun, and Nabaroo Phokun, (Baglee Phokun having joined the other party and quitted the fort) having been introduced, we proceeded to arrange the terms of treaty, of which the principal are as follows:

On the part of Saum Phokun, &c., that all his followers should deliver up their arms and warlike stores, of all descriptions; and that possession of the fort be given to us the moment the evacuating party should have quitted it.

On our part, that their wives and personal property should be guaranteed; their wives, children, and all who may be voluntarily attached to them, secured to them, in conformity with instructions from Mr. Scott, A. G. G., that they should remain in every respect in their present situation, until the arrival of Mr. Scott, or instructions from him respecting their ultimate destination; and that having once entered into bonds of friendly alliance with us, they shall not eventually be delivered over to the King of Ava, in case of a peace, should he make such a stipulation, of which they entertained great dread, and were most anxious to receive positive assurances.

These points being settled, the chiefs expressed their willingness to surrender without delay, and I, accordingly, directed Major Waters to take a party and receive charge; when I had soon the satisfaction of seeing His Majesty's colors flying on the top of the palace in the inner fort, under a salute from the battery in camp.

The examination of the fort fully justified the opinion I had formed of the importance of the acquisition, by the mode adopted, and of the utter inadequacy of my means of preventing the escape of the greater part of the garrison, should we have proceeded to the assault. The place is of very great extent, and surrounded by deep swamps and jungle, with a ditch; the sorties to the three gates were strongly defended; and on them and the walls were more than two hundred pieces of ordnance ready for service.

The garrison was reported to consist of ten thousand of all classes, of whom, perhaps, one-third were fighting men, of these, seven hundred have surrendered with the Phokuns.

I have the honour to transmit a return of the ordnance, arms and military stores captured.\*

By the acquisition of Rungpore, I may now consider myself in entire possession of Assam, and it is a source of great self-gratulation to me, that that important point has been accomplished with so little loss on our side, considering the means of annoyance possessed by the enemy, in defending a country peculiarly unfavorable to regular military operations.

My total dependence for supplies in the fleet, which is twenty miles distant (at the mouth of the Dikho river, now not navigable) would have rendered it impossible for me to proceed further, under any circumstances, until the arrival of land carriage from the provinces; and I therefore consider the prospect of peaceable evacuation of the remaining portion of the country as an object gained of the most vital importance, while the possession of the capital secures a key to all points from whence any future irruptions may be attempted from the eastward.

*No. 92. (D)—No. 1.—From the Burmese Authorities in Assam, to the Agent to the Governor General.*

Moonkoong Aloonapoo and Mueeng-Amah Muntue, (the one a Phokun commander-in-chief of the forces, and the other a state counsellor) represent for the information of the Presence who has come into Assam, by orders of the Honorable Company's government, that the Prince of Moonkoong and the Prince of Assam, in cast were brothers, descended from Indra, and as our titles, Swurjee Rajah, (celestial princes) signify, alighted from heaven, by means of a gold and silver ladder.

We

\* Return of Ordnance and Military Stores surrendered by Capitulation to the Force under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. Richards, on the 1st February, 1825.

Brass Guns,—one 12-pounder, Danish, twenty-one, from 3-pounders downwards.—Total 22.

Iron Guns,—one 40-pounder, one 9-pounder, English.—941, from 3-pounders down to Swivels.—Total 913.

Brass Guns,—Twenty-two.—Iron Guns 943.—Grand Total—965.

Muskets—332—Swords—226—Spears—225.

Several thousand Iron Balls of sizes, and a considerable quantity of Gunpowder, were found in the Fort.



We participated in equal shares in the territories of Moonkoong and Assam, which we have held until the present time.

The deep friendship we have professed and signified, by the endearing terms of brotherhood, remains still unimpaired.

A treaty of alliance between, on the one hand, the Princes of Moonkoong and Muceug, with their statesmen, Phookuns and Barooas, and on the other, with your government of Bengal, would realize the attainment of all our common objects.

The Assamese letter your Agent sent by the hands of our Kutkee of Moonkoong, he delivered to me at Jorhat, on the 4th of Puash, 1746, Assam era, which I recognized as an authentic document.

Should you adhere to your former manifestations, I am willing to meet them.

At present, a large force, officered by your nation, has advanced as far as from Kanjee Ranga to Mohoora. Such a demonstration of your troops will prevent the negotiation of the terms proposed.

If desirous of prosecuting the advance of an accommodation you have made, we are, in Assam, here, ready to meet them, but must depend for instructions upon the authorities of our government in Moonkoong,—ourselves being merely subordinate agents.

The three letters we received from you, were sent by an express horseman to Moonkoong, with injunctions to proceed there day and night.

The answer to these letters, which we despatched by a Kutkee, will reach us five months hence.

I am but an inferior agent, and can, consequently, give you no further decisive answer for the present.

Do you, until we receive an answer to our despatches, remain with your forces in the neighbourhood of Kulliaur and Char-Dooar, while we take our quarters in the vicinity of the country immediately in advance of Kanjee Ranga.

In the meantime, the traders who have come to vend their wares, will be allowed to traffic as formerly, while you will be expected, in your turn, to reciprocate the privilege. We will make a definitive arrangement upon the return of the answer to our despatches to our government.

There exists no enmity between our two nations.

*No. 92. (E)—No. 2.—Translation of a Letter from the Agent to the Governor General, to Saum Phokun and Baglee Phokun.*

#### AFTER COMPLIMENTS.

Your letters, in the Bengal and Burmese characters, have been received, and the contents understood. You write, amongst other matters, proposing an armistice, and requesting that the British troops may not advance further until you receive an answer from Moonkoong, which will take four or five months.

My friends, the purport of my former communication to you was to acquaint you, that war having been declared between the Honorable Company and the King of Ava, the invincible armies of the former power were advancing by sea and land to the golden capital, and that a favorable opportunity was therefore offered to the people of Moonkoong and the other conquered states of Sham, to throw off the grievous yoke imposed upon them by the Burmese.

In respect to the kingdom of Assam, our orders are to occupy that country, and to destroy all opposing forces; but, considering that you and your countrymen were acting against us by compulsion, we were desirous of affording you an opportunity of returning to your own country unmolested, and there adopting such measures as might enable you to regain your national independence, for which purpose we offered aid in the event of your evincing your sincerity.

The proposal you make, that our army should halt at Kalliaur, cannot therefore be listened to for a moment, nor can we enter into any negotiation with the Burmese authorities respecting the country of Assam, which you must well know we have ample means of occupying in despite of any opposition the armies of that nation are capable of making. Considering these matters, you will best consult your own safety and the future welfare of your countrymen, by entering heartily into our cause, and availing yourselves of our aid to re-establish the independence of your country, and avenge yourselves of the many injuries suffered at the hands of the Burmese.

*No. 92. (F)—No. 3.—Translation of a Burmese Letter.*

Moonkoong Aloompo, alias Saum Phokun, represents, on the part of himself and the others chiefs, to the English Commander in Assam, that the inhabitants of Assam were originally slaves to the Burman Emperor, and that an embassy was sent by the Rajah to the King of Ava to solicit assistance, and to request he would

send

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send troops into Assam ; in consequence of which, men from five states, all subject to the Burman authority, were collected and ordered to invade the country. Now, a number of the chief men of Assam have invited you to come in to turn us out, and we are aware of this ; but these Assamese wish for their own benefit to provoke us to war with each other, by which both parties would suffer ;—we therefore, to prevent this, are willing to evacuate this country, and to prove our sincerity. We depute Durmadur Burmacheree, a native of Ceylon, and our high priest, to apprise you of this, and as the people in Assam are now inimical to us, we will immediately retire to our own country, and inform our King of it, and we hope you will not molest us on our journey, and that you will send orders to the Chokies under your control, to allow us to pass unmolested—this is absolutely necessary, or if we are attacked in our retreat, it will cause much bloodshed.

No. 92. (G)—*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel A. Richards, Commanding in Assam, in reply to the foregoing from Saum Phokun ; dated Camp, before Rungpore, 31st January, 1825.*

I have received your friendly letter by the hands of Durmadur Burmacheree, high priest, and fully comprehend its contents.

I am willing to permit your force to retire from Assam, and will not commit hostilities or molest you with any attack from my army, provided you go peaceably, and without committing depredations on the country or inhabitants of Assam. Your wives, children, and such people as are willing may accompany you, but none of the inhabitants of Assam are to be taken away by force. I will give orders to all under my authority, and to Chokies not to molest you on your way out of Assam, which you will leave immediately, and by the most direct route.

No. 93.—*Despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Richards, to Captain Shuldham, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Eastern Division ; dated Camp, near Rungpore, 8th February, 1825.*

Since my last despatch to your address of date the 3d instant, I beg to apprise you, for the information of Brigadier-General Shuldham, commanding Eastern Division, that, in consequence of intelligence communicated to me, that the Sing Phos (a hill tribe,) were plundering and carrying off the inhabitants of Assam into slavery, I deemed it advisable to detach some parties from my force in pursuit of these depredators, with a view not only to repress their incursions, but to drive them back to their own territory. The first detachment, consisting of the Volunteer Cavalry, with one subadar, one jemadar, five havildars, and one hundred and five rank and file, under the command of Captain Martin, 57th Regiment, proceeded on the morning of the 2d instant, to a village named Kudulpurra, on the banks of the Dullung Nuddee, distant from my camp about seven miles N. E., where the Sing Phos were reported to be in a stockade, but the plunderers had, it appeared, received intelligence of our advance, and, in consequence, having previously divided into three separate parties, they fled. Captain Martin, on being informed of this circumstance by some villagers, pushed on the Cavalry in pursuit of one party, consisting of about forty men. The horsemen soon came up with them, and entirely dispersed them, killing five, and wounding several who got into the heavy grass jungle, and escaped further pursuit.

In the meantime Captain Martin, with the Infantry, was conducted by a detour to the right of the post of the Sing Phos' main body, but found they had also recently quitted it. He, however, perceived in the vicinity, a body of about thirty armed men, with several women interspersed amongst them. As he advanced, they threw down their arms, and declared themselves to be Burmese retiring from Rungpore, on the faith of their capitulation, but as their situation, in the midst of the Sing Phos, was suspicious, Captain Martin very properly determined to secure them for future investigation. After this, Captain Martin, with great judgment, continued the pursuit of the Sing Phos, until the Cavalry came on the track of the flying enemy, but found they had quitted all the path-ways, and taken a direction through thick reed jungle, which rendered further pursuit unavailing.

Captain Martin reports, that on passing through the village of Kadulpurra, every hut was filled with stocks newly made to confine the unhappy villagers, from which he had the pleasure to rescue a few, whom the Sing Phos had not had time to carry off, and that he had the gratification to see several other villagers issue from the grass, who had taken advantage of the rapid flight of the Sing Phos and thick jungle, to make their escape ; and there is no doubt, but a number of these unfortunate people have, by this timely movement, been restored to their homes.

Captain Martin having accomplished the object for which he was detached, returned in the evening to camp, and I feel much indebted not only to him, but also to Lieutenant Neufville, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, who voluntarily accompanied and conducted the detachment, and to the native commissioned, non-commissioned officers and sepoy, for the perseverance they manifested on this occasion.





conveying the copy of a dispatch from Lieutenant Neufville, commanding at Nowa Deng Mook, of which the enclosed is a duplicate.

*Copy of a Report from Lieutenant J. B. Neufville, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General, Commanding Detachment, to Captain Martin, Major of Brigade, Assam; dated near Wakeyut, in the Now Dheeing, June 15, 1825.*

I have the honor to report, for the information of Colonel Richards, commanding, that the state of the weather having resumed a favourable appearance on the 4th instant, and intelligence up to the evening of that day, reporting no alteration in the strength or disposition of the enemy, I prepared to proceed against them according to my original intention, and leaving a party of two gun-boats, with thirty sepoy, and the proportion of non-commissioned officers under a subadar, to protect the post and passage of the Theing, embarked the remainder of the detachment on covered canoes and rafts.

At day-break on the 5th, we commenced our progress up the Now Dheeing. The delay and difficulties in the passage proved much greater than I had anticipated, and we did not reach the large deserted village of Leeyung till the evening of the 8th.

Here we were obliged to leave the gun-boats and girdwarees, and by dragging the canoes up the rapids with great labor, in which all hands were obliged to assist, arrived, on the afternoon of the 9th, at a point opposite Dupha Gaum, which I now found to be situated three or four miles inland on the right bank.

As it was evident that we could proceed no further by water, we occupied the remainder of the day in unsuccessful researches for a road, in which, I regret to say, the Purbuttea Phookun, (whose eminent services I have frequently brought to the notice of the commanding officer,) was killed by a party in ambush.

Early on the following morning, the Ghaee Gaum (Chief) of Wakeyut, who came over to me, informed me that I had passed about two miles above the proper landing place, and that he would thence shew me a good and practicable road.

At the same time, we received the gratifying intelligence, that a body of the enemy of 400 foot and 100 horse, (in reality less than half that number) had moved down to Dupha Gaum to oppose us.

I accordingly dropped down immediately, landed the detachment, and marched towards them.

On reaching Dupha (about eight miles,) we found the enemy occupying a stockade of very considerable strength, and on our appearance, making hasty preparation for defence.

They were unable, however, to stand the very prompt and gallant manner in which Lieutenant Kerr brought up his men to the assault, at once gaining possession of a commanding line of fire upon their trenches, in which lie their principal security, and abandoning these, the whole body pressed for escape through the gate at the opposite face. Their loss was but trifling, since they were covered from our fire by the carriers of their own works (about fourteen feet high and nearly solid, armed by double and triple rows of chevaux de-frise,) and we had no immediate mode of entrance but by the gate, to gain which there were two long faces of the place to traverse without cavalry, therefore all hope of overtaking them was vain, and they were immediately lost sight of in the jungle.

The enemy being now concentrated at Beesa Gaum, I made arrangements for attacking them, and as their works were said to be very strong, determined to carry them by a night surprise, by which I should have the benefit of a diversion to distract their attention.

With these views, we marched on the afternoon of the 11th, expecting to reach the post at about two in the morning by moonlight, but such was the nature of the road, that, after proceeding about eight miles in as many hours, I was obliged to halt at an open spot, on the bank of the river, for the remainder of the night, and the next morning occupied the village of Gakhind, where the men were enabled to get some food and rest, which, notwithstanding their assertions to the contrary, they were evidently much in want of.

While there, I received information from several quarters, that the enemy had abandoned Beesa Gaum, and had gone off towards their own country immediately on the arrival of the fugitives from Dupha, and shortly afterwards a letter was brought from the Gaum of Beesa to the same effect, adding that, as they had carried off all his people and property, it would be needless for me to take my whole detachment there since he could give me no supplies or assistance.

As, however, I had very great reason to suspect treachery on the part of the Beesa Gaum, and that he was endeavouring to entice me into a snare, I resolved upon proceeding immediately without countermarching the orders previously given for the mode of attack, or departing from any of the necessary precautions during the line of march. The event proved the justice of my suspicions, for, on arriving within about two miles of Beesa, I was informed by my scouts and some Assamese deserters, that the enemy had returned from their feint, and had been received into the stockade belonging to the Gaum, with whom they were acting in concert, and shortly afterwards the advanced guard saw two mounted Burnese, who immediately fell back.

When

When within a quarter of a mile from the post, we saw the enemy on the open spot below the first stockade, drawn up in line, with some horse on their right, advancing as to oppose us; we immediately debouched from the jungle to the clear plains below, (the bed of the river) and formed line in the front.

No sooner was it put in motion preparatory to the charge, than the enemy faced about and commenced a rapid retreat to the stockades, followed up by us as quickly as the required preservation of regularity and the inequality of the ground would admit.

Entering the first stockade, we found that they had already gained the second, and successively they abandoned their five very formidable defences before us without once attempting a stand.

The whole affair was conducted by the steady advance of the bayonet, not a shot being fired by us throughout.

On quitting their last stockade, they took to precipitate flight, in which manœuvre they have so decided an advantage over us, that I did not attempt harassing the men by an unavailing and hopeless pursuit.

Early on the following morning, I directed Ensign Bogle, with eighty men, to press upon their rear as far as the villages of Nimko and Kesson, to the first pass, (about eight miles) in order to confirm their confusion, and also to cover the escape of the Assamese captives.

This duty he performed in the most able manner, and the result, giving liberation to several hundreds of these unfortunate people, must be equally gratifying to his own feelings, as it is creditable to his tact and judgment.

From the top of the first pass, the extreme rear of the enemy were seen clearing the second, and I conclude their flight to have been in great panic, from the gilt chattals, silver swords, and other insignia of the chiefs, abandoned on the route.

Before quitting Beesa, we endeavoured, as far as possible, to burn and destroy the houses and works, but with all the assistance we could procure, could but partially effect our purpose from their great strength and extent. They are all, however, too much dismantled to be again tenable without considerable repair.

In the detail of operations, the commanding officer will perceive how entirely I must have been indebted for success to the active and zealous co-operation of the officers under me. Lieutenant Kerr and Ensign Bogle, most nobly seconded by the men, who, I may venture to assert, in all that regards the soldier, as well in cheerful endurance of more than ordinary fatigue and privation, ardent alacrity on every prospect of service, and steady bravery when opposed to the enemy, could have been surpassed by no troops whatever.

Captain Bedford, of the Survey Department, who accompanied us throughout as a volunteer, gave me the benefit of his experience and personal assistance on every occasion.

*No. 96.—Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, c. b., Commanding the Sylhet Frontier, to Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated on the River near Budderpore, 25th October, 1824.*

I have the honour, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to report, that intimation having been received from some of the burkarus of the Intelligence Department, that the Burmese army in Cachar were retiring towards Munnipore, I directed a reconnoissance this morning to be made: accordingly, a party under the command of Captain Hawes, accompanied by Lieutenant Fisher, of the Quarter Master General's Department, proceeded up the Barak river at day-break, attended by the flotilla to Jutrapore, where a disembarkation was effected, and the party marched across to Tiloyan, which place was found evacuated, and the works partly destroyed; from the intelligence collected from the natives of Cachar, who had been captives with the Burmese, it appears that the main body of the army, which occupied a large cantonment at Doodpatlee, left, in progress to Munnipore, early yesterday morning, and the rear guard vacated Tiloyan early last night; the same body is said to be now at Banskandy, on the route to Munnipore, and distant from my present position four days' march in the dry season; but at present, I regret to say, the country remains so much under water, that it would be impossible to march regular troops across, consequently the enemy are now beyond pursuit.

*No. 97.—Extract from a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Innes, c. b., Commanding the Sylhet Frontier, to Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated on the River near Panchgaon, 30th October, 1824.*

I have the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I proceeded up the Barak river on the morning of the 26th, towards the posts lately occupied by the Burmese force at Tiloyan and Doodpatlee. The first-named place is occupied by a detachment of the 52d Regiment, under Captain

Cachar,  
1825.

Captain Lister, and I have instructed that officer to have the outward defences destroyed, the palisades on the summit renewed, and the hill itself rendered tenable by a small body of men; the stockades on the heights to the south of Tiloyan have been directed to be destroyed also.

The Burmese position at Doodpatlee consisted of seven stockades of a most formidable nature: from their extent, and the number of huts, I should not imagine the strength of the enemy to have been less than ten thousand men. The whole of the stockades, with the exception of a principal one erected round a pukka house, I have directed to be destroyed; in it I have posted Rajah Ghumber Sing, with his levy, he having returned with a great proportion of his men, not being able to come up with any part of the enemy's rear-guard.

Cachar may now be esteemed entirely vacated by the enemy, for as far to the eastward as Banskandy, they are said to have passed six days ago, in full retreat for Munnipore.

*No. 98.—Extract of a Despatch from Brigadier General Shulldham, Commanding Eastern Frontier, to Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated Head-Quarters, Eastern Division, Sylhet, December, 1824.*

I have the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, my return to this station from Cachar, whither I proceeded for the purpose of ascertaining the actual state of the country and roads, the most advantageous position for concentrating the whole of the troops on the frontier, to be in readiness for a forward movement, as also the inspection of the corps stationed in Cachar.

The water in the country through which I passed, between Silhet and the frontier, is subsiding fast, but the saturated state of the ground admitting of little or no absorption after a shower of rain, still renders it expedient for the troops to remain in their boats; however, I trust, on the arrival of the public cattle, it will be sufficiently dry to admit of their being encamped, when I purpose moving up with the Brigade here by water to Telayn, and breaking ground thence to the Munnipore frontier.

The obstacles in making a road from Budderpore to Doodpatlee being trifling, I have directed Major Swinton, with the Pioneers, to commence training the road from the latter place towards Munnipore, by the route pointed out by Lieutenant Fisher, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.

*No. 99.—Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General T. Shulldham, Commanding Eastern Division, to Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated Camp, near Doodpatlee, 21st January, 1825.*

I have the honor to report my arrival at this post, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, at which place, with the 3d Brigade, (now complete in corps, the 22d Regiment Native Infantry, having just reported their arrival,) and Captain Scott's detachment of Artillery, with the heavy train, I must await the arrival of the public cattle, consisting of one thousand large and five thousand Bunjaree bullocks; four hundred of the former being required to complete the train, and the latter for the conveyance of supplies, which by my last report from the Deputy Assistant Commissary General of the 15th instant, had not reached Silhet, but were expected there in four or five days, and may be looked for here about the latter end of the month, when I shall be enabled to move forward with the troops above enumerated, and take up an eligible position in the vicinity of Chireepore, about six miles in advance of Banskandy, to which place the Pioneers have succeeded in opening the road.

The assistance of the hill people, if procurable in any considerable numbers, will be most necessary and essential towards opening a sufficient passage through the forest, the size and number of the trees being such as to render it impossible for the Pioneers to effect, calculating their rate of progress during the last month, with only reed jungle to contend.

*No. 100.—Copy of a Letter from Brigadier General T. Shulldham, Commanding Eastern Division of the Army, to Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated Camp, Banskandy, 24th February, 1825.*

With reference to my letter, No. 78, of the 16th instant, I have to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the arrival at Banskandy this day only, of the detachment therein detailed, having been delayed on the banks of the Badree nullah five days, by heavy rain, which rendered the road over the Badree hills so difficult, that the train and rear-guard did not join me for three days after reaching that ground



ground with the Infantry Brigade, where, keeping in view the health of the men, I was induced to stand fast until the weather cleared up, and was only yesterday enabled to resume my march in progress to this place.

From the heavy obstructions caused by the late rain, both to the progress of the Pioneers and cattle, loaded with supplies, in getting through the forest, I shall be under the necessity of halting here, until the road is made completely through the forest to Noongshie, and sufficient supplies laid in there to avoid the risk of my being separated from them, as Lieutenant Fendall, Sub-Assistant Commissary General, who joined me to-day, states, the utter impossibility of loaded cattle of any description being able to proceed in the forest for a considerable time after a fall of rain, from the slippery state of the ascents and declivities, also quagmires, in which the animals sink so deep, they are obliged to be dug out by parties of coolies sent to assist them along.

*No. 101.—Extract of a Report from Brigadier-General T. Shulldham, Commanding Eastern Division of the Army, to Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated Banskandy, 26th February, 1825.*

The last ten days and nights have been attended with frequent torrents of rain, and the nature of the country is such, that it is with the greatest difficulty loaded animals, of any description, can proceed from hence to the great forest, distant only twelve miles, and attempting a passage through it, under present circumstances, is quite impossible.

*No. 102.—Extract of a Letter from Brigadier-General Shulldham, Commanding Eastern Division, to Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army, dated Camp, Banskandy, 11th March, 1825.*

I have the honor to report, that I have just returned from the Jeery, and the state of the roads is such, that it is quite impossible to send supplies on to the advance, either on camels, bullocks, elephants, or men, the two former lay dying, and some dead on either side, and their loads scattered about perfectly spoiled, a few elephants have also died, and one of the Nuwabs broke his leg yesterday, by falling down a steep hill.

*No. 103.—Extract from a Letter from Brigadier-General T. Shulldham, Commanding Eastern Division, to Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated Camp, Banskandy, 23d March, 1825.*

The several reports I have had the honor to submit, subsequent to that of the 5th instant, will have informed his Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, of the utter impossibility of maintaining a position to the eastward of the great forest, and that I was, consequently, compelled to withdraw the whole of the party in advance, from the total impracticability of keeping them supplied with the means available for that purpose.

*No. 104. (A)—Copy of a Despatch from Colonel Robert Stevenson, Quarter Master General of the Army, to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Political Department; dated 2d July, 1825.*

I have the honour to transmit you, for the information of government, copy of a letter this day received from Lieutenant Pemberton, Officiating Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, who volunteered to accompany Gumber Sing from Sylhet to Munnipoor.

*No. 104. (B)—Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant R. B. Pemberton, Officiating Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, to Colonel Robert Stevenson, Quarter Master General of the Army; dated Munnipoor, 14th June, 1825.*

Lieutenant Brown's letter of the 12th ultimo, will have apprized you of my having volunteered to attempt reaching Munnipoor, accompanied by Gumber Sing, and a detachment from his Levy.

I have now the honour to inform you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the Brigadier General, commanding the Eastern Division, having sanctioned the proposal, I left Sylhet on the 17th ultimo, accompanied by Gumber Sing, expecting to reach Banskandy by the direct route of Goo-babgung, Byragie Bazar, &c., but on arriving at the former village, the road was found impracticable from the

achar.  
225.

heavy rain that had fallen for several preceding days, and it became necessary to adhere to the left bank of the Barak river, by which circuitous route we reached Banskandy on the 23d. The following day was employed in making the necessary preparation for the march, and on the 25th, the force, consisting of five hundred muskets, under the personal command of Gumbeer Sing, crossed the Cheree Nullah, passed the low swampy ground in the vicinity of Luckipoor, and after traversing a range of hills, north of the Barak, encamped on the borders of the forest, west of the Jeree Nullah.

2. From this Nullah commences the ascent of the numerous and irregular ranges of hills, extending, without a single interval of level ground for eighty miles, to the valley of Munnipoor.—I have the pleasure to annex a list of the few Naga villages in this route, all of which are situated on, or near the most lofty points of the different ranges, and the various places at which we halted.

	M.	F.	Yds.
From Banskandy to Tookmu Nullah, .....	11	5	89
Jeeree Nullah, .....	6	7	204
Mookroo ditto, .....	11	4	0
Village of Kala Naga, .....	2	7	73
Barak Nullah, .....	4	4	167
East side of Kamboon, .....	7	0	0
Noongba, .....	5	7	56
Moonjiron Kooa, .....	3	7	5
Right bank of Erung Nullah, .....	4	2	39
Village of Awang Kool, .....	3	2	185
Eyee Nullah, .....	3	6	0
Village of Noonie, .....	3	5	148
Left Bank of Eyee, .....	5	0	163
Valley of Munnipoor, .....	10	2	197
Town and Stockade, .....	11	0	5

Total Perambulator distance, ..... 96 ... 0 .. 11

3. Our progress had been considerably retarded by rain, and on reaching the village of Moonjerion-do, on the 1st instant, we were compelled, from the same cause, to halt for three days, in which time the provisions became exhausted, and from that period to the day we entered Munnipoor, the men had but a scanty and precarious supply of bad rice, obtained at most exorbitant rates from the Nagas of the different villages through which we passed. To these deprivations Gumbeer Sing's men, composed entirely of Munnipooreans, submitted without the slightest appearance of dissatisfaction, and cheerfully continued to advance, though constant rain had so much swollen the Nullahs, that it was necessary to throw bridges over the three principal ones, the Euraing, Eyee, and Toobut, the timber for which was, in each instance, cut immediately after marches, rendered peculiarly harassing from the mountainous nature of the country traversed.

4. On the 10th instant, the force marched from the left bank of the Eyee Nullah, and commenced the ascent of the hills forming a western boundary to the valley of Munnipoor, parties had been previously detached to take possession of two Naga villages, one on either flank, in which the Burmahs had stationed pickets twelve miles in advance of the town. At three p. m., the village of Koongakool, on the left, was reached by one of the parties, and a few of the Burmahs captured, and the other party was equally successful at Miangkeenow, where a large portion of the enemy was killed, and some taken—the men were so much exhausted by the day's march, and want of food, that it was necessary to halt, although at such a crisis, rapidity of advance was most advisable.

5. At two o'clock p. m., on the 11th, while attempts were making to obtain a small supply of rice for the men, from the few neighbouring villages, information was received that the Burmahs had evacuated the stockade in the town, and we took possession of it the following day: every thing of value had been carried off, and nothing was found in the stockade but a few muskets, two iron guns, and about one hundred and twenty maunds of rice in hu-k; the enemy, consisting of six hundred fighting men, and as many followers, retreated in a southerly direction, and information being yesterday given, that they had stockaded themselves at a village called Undro, about ten miles distant, Gumbeer Sing and myself, with two hundred men, went in pursuit of them. On reaching the Eric Nullah, six miles distant, we found that the enemy had again retreated, and subsequent intelligence proving that they had altogether left the district, I returned to Munnipoor, and Gumbeer Sing proceeded to the Towban Pergumah, to make such arrangements for procuring supplies for his men, as the exhausted state of this once fertile district will permit.

6. As the principal objects contemplated in attempting this advance were, the obtaining some accurate information regarding the different passes into the country, its resources, and the strength of the enemy, my attention is now wholly directed to their accomplishment; and I hope in a few days after my return to Sylhet, to have the pleasure of transmitting plans of the town, stockade, and surrounding country, together with a map of the route from Banskandy, and such information as may eventually prove useful.

7. The favourable mention of Gumber Sing's name will not, I trust, be considered presumptuous. To his energy, perseverance and skill, is the success of the undertaking principally attributable, and should his co-operation in any subsequent advance be required, it will, I doubt not, be such as to reflect equal credit upon himself and men.

No. 105.—*Extract of a Letter from Mr. C. Tucker, Commissioner at Sylhet, to Brigadier Wilson, Commanding in Sylhet and Cachar; dated Paunchgong, July 25, 1825.*

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 13th current.

Yesterday I had an interview with Rajah Gumber Sing, from whom I received the following information. He did not retreat from Munnipore, in the comore acceptance of the term, but returned with Lieutenant Pemberton, agreeably to the previous instructions he had received from me. He has left in Munnipore a force, consisting of three hundred men and twenty horse, under the command of Nun Liag Senna Putty. These men are armed with musquets received from the British government, and have plenty of ammunition. To this force he has added seven hundred of the inhabitants of Munnipore, armed in their own way, who came in and voluntarily offered their services to aid in expelling the Burmese. The whole are stockaded in a commanding position.

Gumber Sing is confident that the force of the enemy, at present on the confines of Munnipore, is insufficient to dispossess the party he has left there, and he considers it very improbable that reinforcements can, in the present disturbed state of the Burman empire, be sent to their assistance. He admits that it would be impracticable to send troops from hence before the end of September, which is the earliest period at which his own men can go, and then only in small parties, of one hundred or one hundred and fifty, at a time. With regard to provisions, he likewise admits that they are very scarce, on which account, principally, he left only three hundred men in Munnipore.

No. 106.—*Return of the Staff and Forces serving on the South East Frontier and in Arracan, under Brigadier General Morrison; dated 1st February, 1825.*

<i>Division Staff.</i> —Colonel Morrison, c. B.,		...	...	...	...	Brigadier General, Commanding.
Colonel McBean, c. B.,		...	...	...	...	Brigadier General, Commanding.
Lieutenant T. Hawkins,		...	...	...	...	Aide-de-Camp to General Morrison.
Lieutenant J. Clarke,		...	...	...	...	Aide-de-Camp to General McBean.
Lieutenant W. B. Scott,		...	...	...	...	Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.
Captain J. Drummond,		...	...	...	...	Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Lieutenant J. Paton,		...	...	...	...	Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Captain A. Bannerman,		...	...	...	...	Assistant Commissary General.
Captain J. Taylor,		...	...	...	...	Deputy Assistant Commissary General.
Lieutenant J. Frederick,		...	...	...	...	Sub-Assistant Commissary General.
Lieutenant H. Gordon,		...	...	...	...	Deputy Pay Master.
Surgeon S. Grant,		...	...	...	...	Superintending Surgeon.
Surgeon J. Grierson,		...	...	...	...	Field Surgeon.
Captain J. Hawkins,		...	...	...	...	Acting Deputy Commissary of Ordnance.
<i>Artillery Division.</i> —Lieutenant-Colonel A. Lindsay,		...	...	...	...	Commanding.
Lieutenant J. S. Keilby,		...	...	...	...	Adjutant and Quarter Master.
<i>1st Brigade.</i> —Lieutenant-Colonel W. Richards,		...	...	...	...	Brigadier Commanding.
Captain Fernie,		...	...	...	...	Brigade Major.
<i>2d Brigade.</i> —Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, c. B.,		...	...	...	...	Commanding.
Captain A. Burnett,		...	...	...	...	Brigade Major.
<i>5th Brigade.</i> —Lieutenant-Colonel Fair,		...	...	...	...	Brigadier General.
Captain Anderson,		...	...	...	...	Acting Brigade Major.
Captain R. L. Austin,		...	...	...	...	Deputy Pay Master.



2d Local Horse, ...	621								
Artillery Division, ...	667								
1st Brigade, ...	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>44th H. M.'s, . . . . .</td> <td>744</td> </tr> <tr> <td>26th B. N. I., . . . . .</td> <td>113</td> </tr> <tr> <td>49th B. N. I., . . . . .</td> <td>1052</td> </tr> <tr> <td>54th H. M.'s, . . . . .</td> <td>767</td> </tr> </table>	44th H. M.'s, . . . . .	744	26th B. N. I., . . . . .	113	49th B. N. I., . . . . .	1052	54th H. M.'s, . . . . .	767
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2d Brigade, ...	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>42d B. N. I., . . . . .</td> <td>911</td> </tr> <tr> <td>62d B. N. I., . . . . .</td> <td>1138</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10th M. N. I., . . . . .</td> <td>622</td> </tr> <tr> <td>16th M. N. I., . . . . .</td> <td>1062</td> </tr> </table>	42d B. N. I., . . . . .	911	62d B. N. I., . . . . .	1138	10th M. N. I., . . . . .	622	16th M. N. I., . . . . .	1062
42d B. N. I., . . . . .	911								
62d B. N. I., . . . . .	1138								
10th M. N. I., . . . . .	622								
16th M. N. I., . . . . .	1062								
5th Brigade, ...	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>2d L. Infy. Bn., . . . . .</td> <td>1033</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mug Levy, . . . . .</td> <td>553</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Pioneers, . . . . .</td> <td>649</td> </tr> </table>	2d L. Infy. Bn., . . . . .	1033	Mug Levy, . . . . .	553	Pioneers, . . . . .	649		
2d L. Infy. Bn., . . . . .	1033								
Mug Levy, . . . . .	553								
Pioneers, . . . . .	649								
	11209								
Absent on leave or duty, and sick, ...	1864								
	-----								
Effective, ...	9343								
	-----								

*Flotilla serving in Arracan, under Commodore Hayes.*

The *Vestal*, Bombay Cruizer. The Honorable Company's Surveying Ships *Research* and *Investigator*. The Armed Brigs *Helen*, *Henry Merriton*, *Planet*, *Shophia*, and *Asseerghur*. The *Trusty* Ketch, and Steam Gun-vessel *Pluto*. Ten Gun Pinnaces and eight divisions of each of ten Gun-boats, each carrying a 12-pounder carronade, besides Transports and Mug and country boats. Besides the crews of the vessel and boats, they carried a Flotilla Marine, about 600 strong.

At Cheduba, the Honorable Company's Frigate *Hastings*, Captain Hardy, with a division of Gun-boats.

*No. 107.—Copy of Orders by Brigadier General Morrison, Chittagong, January.*

The following are the arrangements for the movements of the troops to Ramoo and Cox's Bazar.

By Water.—13th instant, His Majesty's 54th Regiment, to embark on boats.

15th instant, 10th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.

Officers under orders to proceed by water to Cox's Bazar, are reminded of the necessity of providing themselves with tonnage, for which they will be entitled to draw boat-allowance, agreeably to the regulations.

*No. 108. (A)—Extract from a Letter from Brigadier General J. W. Morrison, c. B., to Lieutenant-Colonel James Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated Camp, Mungdoo, 3rd February, 1825.*

\* In my last of the 1st instant, I had the honor to report the receipt of intelligence, that the enemy had evacuated their defences at this place, which, on our arrival here, I found to be correct: they abandoned the stockade early on the morning of Tuesday, taking with them their artillery, after having burnt the Golahs stored with grain.

It will be satisfactory to his Excellency to learn, that the peasantry evinced no alarm on our entering the Arracan territory: they remained quietly at their homes, and, on one occasion, where there was some difficulty in advancing the guns, came spontaneously forward to give assistance at the drag-ropes. Every precaution has been adopted to give encouragement to this favorable disposition. In concert with the Political Agent, I have issued a proclamation, of which the enclosed is a copy.

*No. 108. (B)—Proclamation by the General Commanding the Forces, and the Agent to the Governor General.*

We hereby, in concert, proclaim and give notice to all the Kions and Chageins, and all the Ryots under them, inhabitants of the province of Chota Anuk, by the Mugs called Myoapha, that the said province is taken possession of by the Company.

Do you all wait upon us, and obey our orders. Let none of you run from your homes.

If any of you, disregarding these injunctions, abscond and unite with the Burmese, then, on this appearing, you will be considered in the same light as the Burmese, and treated accordingly. And if any of the English soldiers, or of the Mug coolies, or others, shall commit depredations or outrages upon the persons or property of any inhabitant of Chota Anuk, whether Mug or Moosulman, such person apprehended and brought in to us, will be immediately punished by military law.

Take heed that you pay strict attention to the orders hereby proclaimed.\*

No. 109. (A)—*Extract from a Letter from Brigadier General Morrison, c. n., Commanding Detachment against Arracan, to Lieut.-Col. James Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated Camp Myoo Moa, 23d February, 1825.*

I have the honor to report, that in furtherance of the arrangements communicated in my letter of the 15th instant, the columns marching, arrived at this place and the vicinity yesterday morning: the embarkation of the troops proceeding by water, has been attended with difficulty and delay, arising from the storm on the 17th instant, which compelled the gun-boats, conveying His Majesty's 54th Regiment, to return to Mungdoo on the 18th, with a loss of much baggage and camp equipage, thrown over board. The Mug flotilla having part of the 5th Brigade, were entirely dispersed, and seven boats stranded; no lives, however, were lost.

Last night I learnt from Brigadier General McBean, that the attempt to reach the transports outside the Naaf, would be again made on the 21st, and as the weather was then moderate, I indulge the hope, that they arrived in safety.

It will be satisfactory to his Excellency to learn, that measures have been adopted for bringing forward supplies from Mungdoo; and that nearly four thousand Bringarree bullocks reached Teak Naaf on the 20th instant. I trust a serious want will not be experienced. In the mean time, I hope to establish a communication with Commodore Hayes, who has entered the Ooratumg river, with part of the fleet under his command. He has favored me with the copy of a report made by the officer he had sent in advance, which, as containing some information that the Commodore may not have had the opportunity to forward, I herewith enclose.

No. 109. (B)—*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant C. Armstrong, to Commodore John Hayes, &c. &c.; dated off the Arracan River, 21st February, 1825.*

I have the honor to report to you, I proceeded with the vessels to the supposed latitude of Mosque-point, (20° 14') and finding the entrance of a river, which, from the correctest information we possessed, led me to believe it to be the Arracan river, I entered, crossing over a bar one and three quarters and two fathoms low water, and after a slight survey, discovered a stockade that might give annoyance to the vessels in passing. I landed with Lieutenant Cootes, a detachment of His Majesty's 54th Regiment, a party of the Bombay Marine Battalion, and the European crew of the *Pluto*: on perceiving us, the enemy fled: it was situated in a strong position, being on a point, with a jungle in the rear.

On the 16th, the spies, &c., belonging to the Quarter Master General's Department, being closely pursued by the Burmese, were obliged to retreat to the vessels; they informed us we were in the Mion river, on which information, I proceeded to the south-eastward, in quest of the Arracan river, which we entered on the same night.

On examining the river, the pilot which I had obtained, informed me of a new stockade commanding the channel, about eight miles from the entrance, to which we proceeded with the *Asserghur*, *Pluto*, and gun-boats. After firing a few shot, we landed, and found it deserted; it was not quite finished, in a very strong position, and had the day before been garrisoned by five hundred men, and employed the villagers around two hundred days to build: it is one hundred yards square, and full of barracks, the whole of which we burnt, (named by the natives Patinga.)

On the 20th, the spies gave me information, that the Governor of Arracan, with one hundred war boats and two thousand men, were coming down the river to attack us that night, I moved out in the centre of the river, and kept the people under arms all night; this morning hearing guns in the offing, I proceeded out to join the fleet.

Mosque-point is situated in latitude 20° 5' 40" north, being nine miles to the south of the situation given by the East India Directory, (which is 20° 15' north) about east south-east from the Mion river.

No. 110.—*Extract*

\* Note by the Brigadier General.—The plainness of the language made use of in the proclamation has been stated by the Political Agent to be necessary, in order to convey its intent in a style adapted to the understandings of those to whom it is addressed.

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No. 110.—*Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Morrison, to the Adjutant General of the Army; dated Camp Kay Krang Dong, 20th March, 1825.*

The crossing of the troops (intended for the advance on Arracan), from Myoo Moa having been effected, I do myself the honor to repeat the same for his Excellency's information, and at the same time to express my hope, that the division will be enabled to move forward in the course of a few days, with the whole of its necessary material complete.

The right of the present position is now occupied by the 2d Brigade pushed forward to Natonguay, who are, at five miles from this, covering the working parties employed in rendering passable the numerous tide Nullahs: the left, is retained at Chang Kraing by H. M. 44th Regiment, the 5th Brigade, and a wing of the 2d Light Infantry Battalion, under Brigadier General Macbean, threatening the enemy's stockades at Kheon Peela.

The information I obtain of the enemy's intentions, is vague and desultory, but I have reason to believe that they are strongly entrenching themselves at the Mahattee, to dispute the passage of that river, while they seem bent on maintaining, with a force of 3000 men, the defences on the Prombra.

It appears certain that reinforcements have arrived from Ava, and that a column consisting of a small detachment of Cavalry and 1300 Infantry, with five pieces of brass and one of iron ordnance, reached the capital on the 18th instant.

The country in the vicinity is rich, populous and productive: provisions of all kinds are brought to the camp in abundance, and the native shew a confidence, the gratifying tribute to those principles of justice that the British government ever desire to be maintained, even in an enemy's territory.

I have the satisfaction to state, that the troops continue healthy, and that the climate hitherto may be considered salubrious.

No. 111. (A).—*Extract of a Letter from Commodore Hayes, Commanding the Flotilla, to the Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief; dated on board the Research, off Oriatong Pagoda, 25th February, 1825.*

I am to state for his Excellency's information, that I left Mungdoo on the 16th instant, under an understanding with General Morrison, that I was to take on the major part of the fleet to Arracan river, with General McBean and Brigadier Fair, as the head of His Majesty's 54th, the Madras 10th, and left wing of the 16th Native Infantry, with half the gun-boats; leaving Captain Crawford with the other half and Mug boats to join General Morrison in the Mion, who was proceeding to its entrance with the main body of the army.

On the morning of the 17th, we cleared the Naï, to join the transport ships destined to convey the advance Brigade above-mentioned to Arracan, but at one P. M., a violent storm commenced from the northward, which continued round the compass until the morning of the 19th, and prevented the embarkation of the troops in question; being thus unfortunately disappointed, and feeling anxious for the safety of our small squadron\* of vessels, sent to explore the entrances of the Mion and Arracan rivers, (in communication with General Morrison,) on the 10th instant; I, consequently, proceeded in quest of them, with the *Research*, *Vestal*, *Helen*, *Trusty*, *Ospray*, and *Gonga Saugor*, armed vessels, the *Isabella* and *Asia Felix*, transports, and five commissariat sloops, leaving Captain Crawford to follow with the gun-boats, &c.

On the 21st, I was joined by Lieutenant Armstrong to the eastward of the Mion, who had that morning left Arracan river, in consequence of an expected attack from the Burmese forces, reported to consist of seventy war boats and two thousand men; Lieutenant Armstrong also reported, that the Mug inhabitants friendly to government, were much alarmed and wanted to be taken off, (but that he had no means of supporting them,) and that it was absolutely requisite to give them immediate support and protection for the general good of the service; under such impression, I determined to proceed into the Arracan river without loss of time, and, accordingly, entered it during the same evening, with the vessels above-mentioned.

On the 22d, I was joined by the Monshee, employed by Captain Drummond, to procure intelligence of the enemy's proceedings, he informed me that there was a stockade half-way to Arracan, called Chamballa, which it was requisite to take to clear the way to Arracan, that it contained only one thousand Burmese fighting men, and would easily fall to us, if speedily attacked; that all the heads of the villages were confined in the stockade, and if liberated, we should have the whole country with us: believing his information to be correct, I determined, with the small means at my command, to attempt the capture of the place, and dispatched a messenger

\* *Asseerghur*, *Pluto*, *Thames*, *Asia*, and *Africa* Gun boats.



messenger to General Morrison, with intimation to such effect, a copy of which is herewith forwarded for his Excellency's information.

On the 23d, at two P. M., came in sight of the stockade, (as it was called erroneously,) at three P. M., made the signal, No. 1. Soon afterwards the enemy opened his fire upon the gun-boats, *Gonga Saugor* and *Vestal*, the headmost vessels; when the *Research* got within half pistol shot, we commenced a heavy cannonade and steady fire of musketry upon the stockade and breast-work, which was returned by the enemy, with great regularity and spirit (his musketry in particular, being ten-fold that of our whole force,) on ranging to the northern end of the stockade, with intent to anchor and flank it, as well as allow the other vessel's room to come into action, we found ourselves raked from forward by another stronger battery and stockade, which we had no idea of, nor were the latter works known to our informants, (which may be the case, considering the rapidity with which the Burmese throw up their works of defence, I am not inclined to impute treachery to our informants, although it is difficult to suppose them ignorant of such important works,) finding myself disappointed, and our best men falling fast, wore round and ranged up again from the southward, in like manner as before, covered the other vessels engaged, and ordered them off; after a severe conflict of two hours duration, seeing that any further contest was a useless waste of the lives of my brave companions, (as we neither had men enough to keep the place if taken, nor sufficient means to land them with effect, owing to the absence of the *Pluto* steam gun-vessel, upon which I had calculated to land one hundred men on the beach, under her commanding battery,) having seen the whole clear, wore round again; on hauling to the wind, grounded about half a mile from the stockade, as did the *Asseeghur*, and *Asia Felix* transport, (the *Isabella* transport having grounded previously, did not join in the action,) the contest terminated about five P. M., and although the vessels mentioned remained in the position, they grounded until three A. M., next morning, the enemy did not attempt to fire at any of them, which shews the crippled state he was reduced to better than any other comment; in fact, the river part of the southern stockade and breast-work was completely battered down, and the works deserted by the enemy, who retreated into his other stronger holds, so that our possession of the deserted one, would have availed us nothing, as we could not have maintained it with our small force, and left the vessels capable of defence. I grieve to state, in the first instance, the premature fate of my valued friend Major Schalch; he was mortally wounded by my side, on the front part of the poop, and fell into my arms; he lingered in great agony until half-past three o'clock this morning, when his gallant spirit fled for ever: in the next place, I am to lament the loss of Mr. Rogers, 2d officer of the *Research*, (formerly 2d officer of the *Asia*, free trader,) the other lamented disasters are detailed in the casualty reports, herewith submitted for his Excellency's information, the whole of which were occasioned by the enemy's musketry, although he fired from several pieces of ordnance, and numerous jinjals. To account for our loss, I need only add, that the river part of the Burmese works is not more than musket range across, and that the *Research* was never without pistol shot, while in action with the enemy on the 23d instant.

I am impelled, by a sense of common justice due to the troops, to express my admiration of the steady and gallant conduct of His Majesty's 54th, the Madras details of the 10th and 16th Native Infantry, the 11th Bombay Native Infantry, and Calcutta Militia present on the occasion, and I humbly presume to recommend Captains Grindly and Tolson, and the officers under their command, to his Excellency's consideration. Lieutenant Coote, of His Majesty's 54th, fought by my side, and a more gallant officer I have never seen in action. The gun-boats were admirably served, and exceeded my expectation, as did the *Trusty*, and *Asia Felix* transport, all the officers and men of the larger vessels of war did justice to the high character I had previously formed of them, and every effort which can be drawn from courage, zeal and fidelity, may be confidently expected from the whole, on the most arduous service hereafter.

In conclusion, although we have not effected our object, we have gained a complete knowledge of the navigation of the river, more than half-way to Arracan, and ascertained the best mode of capturing Chamballa, and the booty it contains. Whenever the advance Brigade joins us, and co-operates by land, perhaps our misfortune may prove the means of inducing the enemy to risk a farther contest when so reinforced, and terminate the Arracan conquest, as the place in question is said to be of more importance than the capital.

P. S.—While writing the above disastrous report, I was visited by Mharee, the Jemadar of Oriatong district, who says he made his escape from Chamballa, when we drove the enemy out of his southern stockade: he added, that several more Mugs, heads of villages, got off at the same time; that there were three thousand Burmese soldiers opposed to us, besides pressed Mug men, and that they retreated into the stronger fort or stockade.—He farther observed, that the three stockades communicated with each other for such purpose; by his account, there were five Shoee Tees,\* or golden Chattahs. Nackoonda, the Ramoo conqueror, the Rajah

of

\* We saw five golden Chattahs, three large and two smaller sized.

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of Arracan's son, or Seeredogee, or secretary, and other inferior Chiefs—all the Mungdoo and Loadhong troops were posted therein, to retrieve their lost character, and the commander of Mungdoo was in triple irons; he earnestly intreated that we would not leave them to the rage of the barbarous Burmese. I told him we were not going farther, that in two or three days we should return with a sufficient force, and take Chamballa; that I merely came to Oriatong for water, &c. for the troops and vessels, which was indispensable for our farther proceedings; that if the vessels had been supplied, I would not have lost sight of Chamballa for a moment. We are now only four short reaches from it, (none of them three miles in extent) at the most commanding station of the river; the creek close to us, to the westward, runs into the Mion, near the General's headquarters; we completely cover the Arracan river, from its entrance to this station, and alike intercept all communication from the northward.

In concluding the casualty reports,\* I am to bring to his Excellency's particular notice, the very gallant conduct of the following officers, viz. Mr. Royce, commanding the *Trusty*, and Captain Jellicoe, of the *Asia Felix* transport, who remained at anchor with their vessels off Chamballa a considerable time; I am the more indebted to Captain Jellicoe than any other person, as I had no reasonable pretension to expect such assistance from him. With regard to Mr. Royce, the case is different, I expected much able aid from him, in consequence of his established character for undaunted courage and zeal in the service. Mr. Kent, commanding the *Thames*, first class gun-boat, greatly distinguished himself, as did Mr. Charles Ramsay Richardson, in the *Africa*, Mr. Charles Montriow, in the *Gunga Saugor*, Charles Avery, of the *Asia* gun-boat, and Mr. Oakshot, in charge of the *Osprey* gun-pinnace; the whole of the crews of the vessels just mentioned are equally entitled to the most favorable notice of his Excellency. In consequence of the loss of the second officer of the Flag-ship, I have been enabled to promote Messrs. Richardson and Montriow to the situations of 2d and 3d officers of the H. C. S. *Research*, as a just reward for their gallant conduct on the occasion in question, and trust such proceeding will meet his Excellency's approbation.

No. 111. (B)—*Roll of the Detachment of the Flotilla and Transports engaged in the attack of Chamballa Stockades, on the 23d February, 1825.*

Honorable Company's ship *Research*, ten 12-pounder carronades, Commodore Hayes.

Flag Captain Crawford absent, Lieutenant Armstrong acting, *Vestal*, Bombay cruiser, six 12-pounder carronades, four long brass 12-pounders, 1st Lieutenant W. Guy commander.

Honorable Company's brig *Asseerghur*, six brass 6-pounders, two 12-pounder carronades, W. Warden commander.

Honorable Company's brig *Helen*, (hired) six brass 6-pounders, J. W. Higgins commanding.

Honorable Company's ketch *Trusty*, six brass 3-pounders, J. Boyce commanding.

Honorable Company's steam gun-vessel *Pluto*, four brass 24-pounder carronades, two brass long 6-pounders, not in action, T. C. Minchall commanding.

Honorable Company's gun-pinnace *Osprey*, two 12-pounder carronades, Mr. Oakshot, gunner, in charge.

Honorable Company's gun-boat *Gunga Saugor*, one 12-pounder carronade, Charles Montriow, Master's Mate of the *Research*, in charge.

Honorable Company's large gun-boat *Thames*, two 24-pounder carronades, Richard Kent commanding.

Honorable Company's gun-boat *Africa*, one 12-pounder carronade, C. R. Richardson, 3d officer of the *Research*, in charge.

Honorable Company's gun-boat *Asia*, one 12-pounder carronade, Charles Avery, Boatswain's Mate of the *Research*, in charge.

Honorable

\* Report of Killed and Wounded on board the Flotilla, in the action with Chamballa Stockades, February 23rd, 1825.

	Killed.	Wounded.
<i>Research</i> , ... ..	3	14
<i>Asseerghur</i> , ... ..	0	1
<i>Helen</i> , ... ..	0	2
<i>Trusty</i> , ... ..	0	3
<i>Gunga Saugor</i> , ... ..	0	2
<i>Thames</i> , ... ..	0	1
<i>Africa</i> , ... ..	1	3
<i>Asia</i> , ... ..	0	2
<i>Asia Felix</i> , ... ..	0	3
Number of Men killed, .. ..	4	31
Killed. Major Schialch—Mr. Rogers, 2d Officer of the <i>Research</i> .		

Honorable Company's Transport Ship *Asia Felix*, G. Jellicoe commander.  
 Honorable Company's Transport Ship *Isabella*, J. McNeil commander, not in action.

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*Military Forces with the Flotilla Detachment.*

His Majesty 54th Regiment, 2d Company, Captain Grindley, commanding,	Lieutenant Coote,	40 Men
Detachment of the Honorable Company's Madras 10th and 16th Native Infantry, Captain Tolson commanding, fit for duty,		} 170
Flotilla Marines, on the different vessels,		
Calcutta Militia,		100
Bombay 11th Regiment Native Infantry,		12
Flotilla seamen, in the different vessels,		18
		140*
Soldiers and Sailors, Total,		488

No. 112. (A.)—*Copy of a Despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel W. L. Watson, Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Political Department; dated 14th April, 1825.*

I have the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to transmit, in original, a despatch this day received from Brigadier General Morrison, c. b., commanding the South Eastern Division, dated 2d April, announcing the capture of Arracan, after a succession of the most brilliant operations against the enemy.

No. 112. (B.)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General T. W. Morrison, Commanding South Eastern Division, to W. L. Watson, Deputy Adjutant General of the Army; dated Camp Arracan, April 2, 1825.*

The Almighty has been pleased to permit that the exertions of the South Eastern Division of the Army should be crowned with complete success. Arracan was yesterday taken, and the ten thousand men that acted under Atown Mungza have, as a military body, been nearly annihilated. The proceedings that have led to this result, I shall now have the honor to detail for the information of the Commander-in-Chief.

On the 24th ultimo, the arrangements for the movement of the force from the camps on the Oorating were completed, and the head-quarters of the division were established with the 2d Brigade in advance at Chabatee Bheong, within two miles of the enemy's position in the Padha hills.

On the 25th ultimo, boat and pontoon bridges were thrown across the Chabatee and Wabraing rivers, and in the evening a reconnoissance was made, to ascertain the situation of the passes through the hills, and the obstacles to be encountered. The natural ones were considerable, arising principally from the steepness of the ascents, and from the course of deep tide nullahs.

On the 26th, the troops then present, crossed the Wabraing by day-break, and were formed into four columns, as per margin,† the right and centre columns then advanced to force the two ascertained passes, while the left, with the gun boats under Captain Crawford, H. C. Marine, were to ascend the river, which appeared to flow through the hills. The boats, however, having grounded on a shoal, Captain Leslie landed his men, and was then directed to skirt the river, and if possible to pass by the extreme right of the first range of hills, with a view of attacking the enemy from their rear, or of intercepting them in their retreat.

The centre column had not proceeded far, ere the tocsin of alarm and shouts from the hills gave notice where they were occupied, and that the enemy were in force. The advance, consisting of the Light Infantry Companies

\* Flotilla Seamen, absent with General Morrison, in Mug boats, Ten.—Twenty out of the number on board the *Pluto*, not in action.

† Right column under Brigadier Grant, c. n., one 12-pounder, two 6-pounders.—The 2d Brigade.—One Company 2d Light Infantry Battalion.—One Company of regular Pioneers.—Centre column, Brigadier Richards.—Two 12-pounders,—two howitzers,—Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay.—The 1st Brigade,—two Companies 2d Light Infantry Battalion.—One Company regular Pioneers.—Left column—to act with the gun-boats.—Captain Leslie, His Majesty's 54th Regiment.—Two Companies His Majesty's 54th Regiment.—Two Companies 2d Light Infantry Battalion.—Rifles Company Mug Levy.—Two Companies Mug Pioneers.—Reserve.—Lieut. Colonel Walker, c. b., His Majesty's 54th.—One 12-pounder, two 6-pounders.—Three Companies His Majesty's 54th Regiment.—Three Companies 20th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—Two Companies 49th.—Three Companies temporary Pioneers.—One Company Mug Pioneers.—Second Local Horse.



Companies of the 26th, 28th, 49th, and 63d Regiments, under the command of Captain Mason, 49th Regt. was directed to gain the summit, which was effected in the most gallant manner. The column then moved to its left, to the attack of a stockade, while the Light Infantry companies, keeping nearly parallel to it, drove the enemy from several entrenched positions along the crest of the hills: two rounds from the 12-pounders caused the but partly finished stockade to be abandoned; the men who retired from it, immediately occupied strong ground on the heights above. Here the left column, from being compelled to diverge from the river, joined, and a smart fire was continued, till the Grenadiers of His Majesty's 44th Regiment and left Grenadiers, 49th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, began to ascend at two different points: the enemy then fled; on which the centre column retraced its steps, and defiled through the abandoned pass, which the left column proceeded in furtherance of the orders first given. The ground on the north side of the hills proved to be an extensive plain, intersected by several deep tide nullahs belted with jungle. In such a country, the flying foe easily escaped, as the Cavalry was unable to pursue, till assisted by the labor of the Pioneers. The forward movement was, however, continued till the three columns united at the Jeejah river: here it was intended to have halted, till the Artillery, under the protection of the reserve, could be brought up, but a few companies of the 49th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Smith, having been pushed across to ascertain what was in front, the report was made that the enemy were approaching in column, supported by Cavalry. So desired an opportunity was immediately embraced, the low state of the tide and sandy bottom of the river enabling the troops to pass without impediment.—The heads of the columns had, however, no sooner debouched from the jungle, than the enemy fled, and reached, with but little loss, their works that covered the fords of the Mahattee.

The troops had now been under arms nine hours, and were still anxious to proceed, but a consideration for their physical strength, with an unwillingness to remove still further from the supplies, whose arrival must necessarily be retarded by the nature of the country passed over, caused me to direct, that positions, where shelter from the sun might be obtained, should be occupied. The fire of the enemy, while they opposed us, was noisy, but ill-directed. A further consequence of this day's action, beyond the advantage immediately gained, was, that the enemy abandoned their stockades at Kheong Peela, (alia- Chamballa).

The troops, with the exception of the reserve, which did not arrive till near midnight, having gained their exertions to enable the Artillery to join, bivouacked by brigades.

On the 27th, when the fog dispersed, the order of advance was resumed, and Major Carter, His Majesty's 44th Regiment, with three companies of that corps, covered by the Light Infantry Company, His Majesty's 54th Regiment, was directed to carry a small hill in front of the enemy's works while the remainder of the force moved forward in columns, at quarter distance, with the Artillery on the reverse flank.

The enemy's position was well chosen, being situated on a peninsula, protected by a broad river, whose fords are only passable at nearly low water, and whose banks are not only steep, but were covered with sharp stakes. Their defences consisted of deep intrenchments along the margin, with epaulments left to protect them from an enfilading fire: in the rear, high conical hills, surmounted by pagodas, and surrounded by entrenchments, served as numerous citadels, and appeared to be occupied.

On the advance of the party under Major Carter, the enemy that occupied the hill, retired across the river, when a fire from those parts of their works that commanded it, was immediately opened—four 12-pounders, two 5½-in. howitzers, and two 6-pounders were placed in position, while the first brigade was moved to the right to attack a column that appeared in that direction,—and which I now judge to have been an intended reinforcement: it did not, however, long remain in sight, or reach Mahattee.—The fire of the artillery soon silenced the enemies', and checked the effective fire of their musquetry; and as the fords were then passable, the 2d Brigade took ground to the left, in order to cross to the right of the enemy's defences. The 1st Brigade and two Regiments of Horse were moved at the same time forward, the reserve (formed as on the preceding day, with the addition of three companies 2d Light Infantry Battalion and Rifle Company Mug Levy) following.

On the 2d Brigade descending into the river, the enemy abandoned their post, while the troops on the right (the situation of the ford having been ascertained) crossed, but from the steepness of the bank on the opposite side, had great difficulty in entering the works. A Regiment of Horse, with the Rifle Company Mug Levy, were pushed over still further to our right, to gain the road, by which the enemy were retreating, and arrived in time to do some execution among their rear—and to prevent the destruction of bridges on the road to Arracan.

I have omitted to mention, that, during the commencement of the action (which lasted about two hours) I received the pleasing intelligence of the near approach of Brigadier General McBean with the 5th Brigade.

On the 28th, it was necessary to halt to obtain information, and allow of a junction being formed of the troops still in the rear, and by the Flotilla, under Commodore Hayes, who was in progress for that purpose; in the evening this was effected, and the enemy's position partly reconnoitred.

On the 29th, the division moved forward at day light; the advance under Brigadier General McBean consisted as per margin;\* a considerable delay was occasioned by fog, and which at first prevented the great strength of the enemy's position from being discovered. It occupied a range of connected hills, (since ascertained to be from three hundred and fifty to four hundred and fifty feet in height) strong by nature, and rendered still more so by art, escarpment, abbatiss, and masonry having been resorted to, where those means could be most efficaciously employed. One pass alone leads through them to the capital, and that was defended by a fire of several pieces of artillery, and about three thousand musquets: the whole number of the enemy ranged along the heights may be estimated at from eight to nine thousand men; the ground in front is an extensive valley entirely clear of jungle, but in depth not altogether out of the range of the enemy's artillery.

Where the advance halted, it was partly covered by a tank, and Brigadier General McBean made a disposition for acquiring the principal hills in the first range at the commencement of the pass. Four pieces of artillery were ordered forward to cover the attack, and the troops for the assault, consisting of the Light Infantry Company, His Majesty's 54th Regiment, four Companies 2d Light Infantry Battalion, and the Light Infantry Companies of the 10th and 16th Regiments Madras Native Infantry, with the Rifle Company Mug Levy, were placed under Major Kemm; a support of six Companies 16th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, under Captain French, of that corps, followed.—The assault commenced, and in spite of a well-directed fire and of the steepness of the ascent, which was occasionally nearly perpendicular, many gained the summit—Lieutenant Clarke, Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier General McBean, with several of the Light Infantry Company of His Majesty's 54th Regiment, got their hands on the trench; but even with the assistance such a hold afforded, were unable to maintain their ground; large stones were rolled on them, and smaller ones discharged from bows; the consequence was, they were precipitated to the bottom. In this attempt the efforts were persevered in till every officer was wounded.

I cannot here avoid interrupting the detail to make known to his Excellency, that on no occasion could British gallantry be more conspicuously displayed; the conduct of the officers was emulated by the men, and European and native troops vied with each other to equal the example set.

The guns, in the ardour of the moment, had been advanced by Captain Lamb, who commanded them, so far, that on the retreat of the troops they became too exposed to be longer served: and the retiring them at the time was impracticable without the hazard of sacrificing the men, who would have been obliged to effect it by the drag ropes.

While the attack was being carried on at the pass, the right of the enemy's position was cannonaded, but without any apparent effect: the 12-pounders and heavy howitzers were afterwards moved to play upon the works at the pass; the fire was continued for an hour, but it appearing to be but a useless waste of ammunition, I caused it to be discontinued, and those guns to be withdrawn: at the same time an encampment was marked out, the tents were pitched, and at one o'clock the troops fell back upon them, with the exception of the advance, which was continued during the day in the position they occupied; in the dusk of the evening, the wounded were brought off, the guns withdrawn, and the whole retired without further loss, though a heavy fire had been continued by the enemy at intervals during the day.

From observations made, the conviction was established, that the right of the enemy's defences was the key of his position. Here the natural obstacles were the greatest, the approach being protected by a small lake, the ascent being more abrupt, and the height being more considerable. These seemed to have given a confidence in its security, and though the summit was crowned with a stockade, and part of the way up thickly abbatiss'd, the number of men to guard it was not considerable. This point was therefore selected for the principal future attack; at the same time, the construction of a battery for four mortars, two 24-pounders: four 12-pounders: and two 5½ inch howitzers, to play on the works at the pass, and to draw the enemy's attention entirely to that point, was ordered; the senior engineer officer, Lieutenant Thomson, received directions to that effect, and the day of the 30th was employed in bringing from Mabattee the necessary materiel. At half-past seven that evening ground was broke, by three o'clock the battery finished, and before day-light, completely armed, when the guns opened, and continued during the day a heavy cannonade, which had the effect of checking the enemy's fire, though it was not entirely silenced.

Instructions

\* One Ressala of Horse.—Two 6-pounders.—Two Howitzers.—5th Brigade.—Six Companies His Majesty 54th Regiment.—2d Light Infantry Battalion.—Rifle Company Mug Levy.—One Company regular Pioneers.—One ditto Mug ditto.—Sixteen Scaling Ladders.

Instructions were given to Brigadier Richards to make a night attack, with the force as per margin,\* on the right of the enemy's position; at half-past eleven, the appointed rocket signal of success was thrown up, and Lieutenant Wroughton, Surveying Department, in a short time after returned from the height, bringing the grateful intelligence, that though the fire of the enemy had been heavy, the stockade had been gained without a man on our side being killed, and with only a few slightly wounded. A copy of the Brigadier's report of the affair is herewith enclosed.

A re-inforcement of the remainder of the 1st Brigade, with two 6-pounders, on elephants was immediately despatched: arrangements had also been made for storming the works at the pass, on the morning of the 1st, should the fire from the Battalion have produced such an effect as would almost ensure the certainty of success. Brigadier Richards was also directed to commence at day-light an attack on the defences of the intervening heights.

The difficulty of carrying the guns up the hill caused a delay, and it was near seven o'clock before one was mounted, a few rounds from which silenced the fire of a 6-pounder that the enemy had planted on the next summit. When the Brigadier advanced to assault, the enemy did not stand; advantage was taken of the panic of the moment: the detachment under Brigadier General McBean, which consisted as per margin,† allotted to the attack of the pass, was directed to move forward: the enemy were soon seen abandoning all the heights; from that moment opposition ceased, and Arracan was gained.

It has been my province to lay before his Excellency a succession of operations, which have accomplished the first object directed by the instructions, emanating from the Governor General in Council; but to the duty of doing justice to the merits of the force collectively, and to individuals separately who have had the opportunity of putting themselves more conspicuously forward, I own myself incompetent, and must trust to his Excellency's discernment to appreciate how truly a claim to his approbation has been perfected by the division, more from his knowledge of what they have had to encounter, than from any representation I am able to make.

The political agent, T. C. Robertson, Esq., not only previous to the force quitting Chittagong, but to the present period, has been zealously and indefatigably engaged, in rendering every assistance that the civil power could command: his arrangements on all occasions have tended to the advantage of the whole, and to the accommodation of individuals; and I truly rejoice at this opportunity of publicly acknowledging that the greatest benefit has been derived from his presence.

Commodore Hayes has, on all occasions, rendered an aid the most effectual, and had it not been for the assistance afforded by the flotilla under his command, the arrival of the force before Arracan would have been almost impracticable. Every exertion was made by him to co-operate, and when insurmountable obstacles prevented the further approach of the gun-boats to the scene of action, he landed two twenty-four pounders, and, with the British seamen, dragged them and their appurtenances a distance of five miles, to the encampment before Arracan, rendering them available for any service on which they could be usefully employed.

Brigadier General MacBean gave me the benefit of his judgment and experience, and the effectual aid of his directing superintendance: to offer a further remark on the known zeal of one, who has so firmly established his claim to honourable fame, would, I fear, in me, be but an assumption—to his Excellency, the claims of Brigadier General MacBean are fully known.

The assiduity and attention of Brigadier Grant, C. B., commanding 2d Brigade; of Brigadier Richards, commanding 1st Brigade; of Brigadier Fair, commanding 5th Brigade; and of Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay, commanding Artillery Division, demand that I should state to his Excellency, that their example and their directions materially contributed to the success of our operations.

Did the limits of a despatch allow of my mentioning separately the officers who commanded corps, I should feel myself most particularly bound to name them; and proud should I be in being the instrument of more especially recording their deserts, than, while bearing testimony to the merits of all, in saying that every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, performed his duty, equally by gallantry in the field, and by the willing endurance of privations, that the division might move forward.

I may, however, I hope, be pardoned in representing, that the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Lieutenant Scott, rendered me the most effectual assistance; that the 1st Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Captain

\* Right Column.—Major Carter, His Majesty's 44th; 2 Companies His Majesty's 44th Regiment; 2 Ditto (Grenadiers), 26th Regiment; 30 Troopers (dismounted) Left Column; 2 Companies His Majesty's 44th Regiment; 1 Ditto 26th Regiment (Light Infantry Company) 1 Ditto 49th Regiment (ditto, ditto,) 30 Flotilla Seamen, Reserve, under Captain Shelton, His Majesty's 44th Regiment; 2 Companies His Majesty's 44th Regiment; 2 Ditto (Grenadiers) 49th Regiment; 40 Pioneers.

† A Subaltern's Detachment of Artillery; 60 Troopers (dismounted); 2d Brigade, (except 4 Companies His Majesty's 54th Regiment, who were attached to the 5th Brigade); 4 Companies 2d L. S. Battalion; 30 Flotilla Seamen; Detachment of regular Pioneers, with six Scaling Ladders.



Captain Drummond, conducted the duties of his department with judgment, with the greatest personal exertion, and with the most indefatigable perseverance. The 2d Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Lieutenant Paton, has also established his claim to a particular notice. The Assistant Commissary General, Captain Bannerman, has had no common difficulties to encounter in effectually arranging for the continued supplies for the troops; the means of conveyance by land, at his command, never exceeded a week's supply. The Superintending Surgeon, Dr. Grant, has, on every occasion, provided for the comfort and relief of the sick and wounded, and with other medical officers, was ever forward, while the troops were engaged, to render immediate assistance. To Lieutenant Wroughton, of the Survey Department, I am particularly indebted, not only for the reconnoissances he made when we neared the enemy, but especially for discovering the paths by which Brigadier Richards, with the column under his command, gained the right of the enemy's position. Lieutenant Thompson, the senior Engineer officer, displayed zeal and practical proficiency in the performance of his duty. To Captain Wilkie more especially, and to the other officers of the Pioneers generally, the advance of the division may be mainly attributed: a road of nearly one hundred and fifty miles in length has, by the labor of the Pioneers, under their judicious directions, been completed: many morasses rendered passable, and innumerable Nullahs bridged. I much fear that the continued exposure to the sun will for some time deprive the division of the benefit of Captain Wilkie's services, who persevered in doing his duty, till success crowned our efforts, though suffering from severe indisposition.

If ever instances of mental energy triumphing over bodily infirmity were exemplified, they have been displayed by Colonel Gardner, of the 2d Local Horse, who, on each occasion, when there was a probability of the Cavalry being engaged, caused himself to be removed from his palanqueen to be placed on his horse, though so weakened by long sickness, as to be unable for any length of time to prolong the exertion.

This dispatch will be delivered by Lieutenant Bellew, my military secretary: he has entitled himself to my confidence, and is enabled to afford his Excellency the best information on many points connected with this country.

For my Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant Hawkins, I beg to solicit his Excellency's notice, and to strongly recommend him for any mark of approbation; and I can confidently assert, that both from talent and education, he promises to prove a credit to the profession.

Enclosed are returns\* of the casualties that have occurred during the several actions with the enemy since the division entered Arracan, and also of the ordnance found in position on the east front of the heights covering the

\* *Return of Wounded of the South Eastern Division of the Army, under the Command of Brigadier General Morrison, C. B., in action with the enemy on the 26th March, 1825.*

*2d Local Horse.*—Wounded—two Rank and File and three Horses—two Horses missing.

*Right Wing His Majesty's 44th Regiment.*—Wounded—one Serjeant, four Rank and File, one Bheestie, and one Bullock-man.

*Right Wing His Majesty's 54th Regiment.*—Wounded—one Drummer and one Rank and File.

*26th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.*—Wounded—two Rank and File and one Bheestie.

*49th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.*—Wounded—two Rank and File.

*Return of Killed and Wounded of the South Eastern Division of the Army, under the Command of Brigadier General Morrison, C. B., in action with the enemy on the 27th of March.*

*2d Local Horse.*—Wounded—two Horses.

*Artillery Division.*—Wounded—two Rank and File.

*Right Wing His Majesty's 44th Regiment.*—Wounded—four Rank and File.

*His Majesty's 54th Regiment.*—Killed—one Serjeant.

Wounded—nine Rank and File.

*26th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.*—Wounded—one Captain, two Subadars, one Serjeant or Havildar, and thirteen Rank and File.

*42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.*—Wounded—one Lieutenant, one Serjeant or Havildar, and ten Rank and File.

*49th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.*—Wounded—six Rank and File.

*Left Wing 62d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.*—Wounded—three Rank and File.

*Pioneers.*—Wounded—one Serjeant or Havildar, and six Rank and File.

*Names of Officers Wounded.*—Captain Seymour, 26th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.—Lieutenant McKean, 42d Bengal Native Infantry severely, not dangerously.

*Return of Killed and Wounded of the South Eastern Division of the Army, under the Command of Brigadier General Morrison, C. B., in action with the Enemy between the periods of the 29th March and 1st April, 1825.*

*Camp, Arracan, April 2, 1825.*

*General Staff.*—Wounded—1.

*2d Local Horse.*—Wounded—6 Rank and File and 1 Horse.

*Artillery Division.*—Killed—1 Bombardier.

Wounded—3 Rank and File and 5 Gun Drivers.

the capital: the quantity captured is so widely dispersed, that there has not yet been time to allow of its being ascertained.

Several Sirdars have surrendered themselves, and prisoners are hourly being brought to the camp. Grounding my opinion on the general assertion of the captives, I may venture to suggest the probability, that not one thousand of the Burmese, who were serving under Atown Mungja, will reach Ava, but by the permission of the Governor General.

*No. 112 (C)—Extract from Division Orders, Camp Kaykrangding, 24th March, 1825.*

On the breaking up of the present camp, Protection Detachments are to be formed, consisting, at Chankring, of—One Company His Majesty's 44th Regiment—2d Light Infantry Battalion—10th Regiment Madras Native Infantry—16th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.

One Company Kaykrangding—One Ressala of 2d Local Horse—His Majesty's 54th Regiment—26th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—49th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.

The

*His Majesty's 44th Regiment.*—Wounded—4 Rank and File.

*His Majesty's 54th Regiment.*—Killed—2 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Volunteer, 1 Sergeant, and 12 Rank and File.

*26th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.*—Wounded—2 Rank and File.

*42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.*—Wounded—1 Rank and File.

*2d Light Infantry Battalion.*—Killed—2 Havildars and 6 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Major, 1 Jemadar, 5 Sergeants or Havildars, 1 Drummer, and 35 Rank and File—2 Rank and File since dead.

*10th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.*—Killed—1 Havildar and 6 Rank and File.

Wounded—13 Rank and File.

*16th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.*—Killed—1 Captain, 1 Havildar, and 9 Rank and File.

Wounded—3 Lieutenants, 1 Sergeant or Havildar, 29 Rank and File, and 1 Bheestie.

*Mug Levy Rifle Company.*—Wounded—1 Subadar, 1 Havildar, and 6 Rank and File.

*Pioneers.*—Wounded—1 Captain.

*Names of Officers Killed and Wounded of the South Eastern Division of the Army under the Command of Brigadier General Morrison, C. B., in action with the Enemy between the periods of the 29th March and 1st April, 1825.*

*Camp, Arracan, April 2, 1825.*

*Killed.*—16th Regiment Madras Native Infantry—Captain A. French.

*Wounded.*—General Staff—Lieutenant J. Clark, A. D. C. to Brigadier General McBean, severely, not dangerously.

*His Majesty's 54th Regiment.*—Captain E. A. Evanson, severely, not dangerously—Lieutenant H. W. Harris, severely, not dangerously—Volunteer Mr. J. Graham, slightly.

*2d Light Infantry Battalion.*—Major W. H. Kemm, slightly.

*16th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.*—Lieutenant J. R. Sword, severely, not dangerously—Lieutenant F. E. White, slightly—Lieutenant R. S. Gledstones, slightly.

*Pioneers.*—Captain P. B. Fitton, severely, right leg since amputated.

*Return of Ordnance, Ordnance Stores, &c. taken at Mahaltee and in the Enemy's fortified position on the heights of Arracan, on the 1st of April, 1825, by the South Eastern Division of the Army, under the Command of Brigadier General Morrison, C. B.*

*Arracan, 5th May, 1825.*

NATURE.	NO. OF IRON.	NO. OF BRASS.	REMARKS.
9 Pounder,.....	1	..	Burst.
6 ".....	2	..	
4 ".....	7	..	
3 ".....	4	..	
2 ".....	5	..	
1½ ".....	* 2	..	* One of these is burst.
1¼ ".....	..	1	
1 ".....	1	2	
¾ ".....	7	3	
½ ".....	..	..	
Total,.....	29	12	

Jinjals 10, Musquets 52, Loose Shot of different sizes 385, Powder about 280lbs.

Of the Iron Guns, 22 are of Cast Iron, of which one of them a 6-pounder, marked on the Tranneous 1785, appears to be a good serviceable gun; the whole of the rest are good for nothing.

The Senior Officer of the whole to command. Names and dates of commissions of officers to be employed on this important duty, to be immediately sent to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

The following are the arrangements for the advance of the Force:

Head-Quarters to be established this evening on the south bank of the Chebatta river.—To march at day-light to-morrow morning for the same place.

Four Ressalas of the 2d Local Horse.

Artillery Division Head-Quarters, with four 12-pounders.

Two 5½ inch howitzers.

Two 6-pounders.

First Brigade Native Troops.

Left Wing 2d Light Infantry Battalion.

Rifle Company Mug Levy.

To embark at 6 A. M. for the same destination.

Five Companies His Majesty's 44th Regiment, on board the gun-boats that will be appropriated for their conveyance, and proceed to the Chebatta river, where it will land and join the 1st Brigade. Horses and cattle belonging to the officers to be crossed to the camp of Kaykrangding this evening, and proceed with the column of march to-morrow.

On Saturday, the 26th instant, the 5th Brigade to move to Kaykrangding, under the arrangements communicated yesterday, as for to-morrow, by the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General; on Sunday the 27th instant, four Companies His Majesty's 44th Regiment.

Four Companies 2d Light Infantry Battalion are to cross to Kaykrangding, under directions that will be issued by Brigadier General McBean, who will be pleased to effect a junction of his column with the advance column when the arrival of the Commissariat cattle will permit him to move forward.

The troops, on leaving their present encampment, are to be supplied with two days provisions.

*No. 112. (D)—Copy of a Report from Brigadier W. Richards, Commanding 1st Brigade, to Captain Scott, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General; dated Camp, before Arracan, April 1, 1825.*

I have the honor to report to you, for the information of Brigadier General Morrison, c. B., Commanding the South Eastern Division, that the storming party he did me the honor of entrusting to my charge yesterday evening, completely succeeded in effecting the object desired, with the bayonet, and without the loss of a man. That after the junction of the remainder of my Brigade, with the two six-pounders, I made my arrangements for prosecuting the success I had obtained last night. The result of which is well known to the Brigadier General.

In making this report, I cannot refrain from expressing my most sincere thanks to every officer and man, both European and Native, engaged under my orders, for the spirit and gallantry they displayed. And I feel it my duty to state, that I received every assistance from my Brigade Major, Captain B. Ferrie, and from the active exertions of Captain Hugh Gordon, who volunteered to accompany me.

I cannot close this letter without stating my high sense of gratitude to Lieutenant Wroughton, of the Surveying Department, who accompanied me for the purpose of pointing out the road, for the judgment and ability with which he executed the difficult task of leading my advance to the point of attack, to which I chiefly attribute my having so completely succeeded in gaining possession of such a very strong post (the key of the enemy's position) without any loss.

*No. 112. (E)—Copy of a Report from Brigadier W. Richards, Commanding 1st Brigade, to Captain Scott, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General; dated Camp, before Arracan, April 1, 1825.*

I deem it my duty to bring to the notice of Brigadier General Morrison, c. B., Commanding the South Eastern Division, the very gallant conduct of a Havildar of the Light Company of the 26th Regiment Native Infantry, by name Summen Sing, who was one among the very first of those who entered the enemy's stockade yesterday evening, and who by displaying an example of coolness to those who followed him, clearly shewed what a noble weapon of offence the bayonet is, when wielded by a resolute and determined soldier.

In mentioning the gallant conduct of an individual of the 26th Regiment Native Infantry, I cannot refrain from stating, that the corps, altogether, has been, ever since it has been employed on the present service, most exemplary in every respect, whether it regards their gallantry, discipline, and steadiness in the field, or their patient endurance of privations, to which such a service as the one they have been engaged in has called on them to endure. I therefore trust, that the Brigadier General will do me the honor of bringing these circumstances to the notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the impression which may have been attached



to the name of the Regiment, in consequence of the participation of some few dissolute characters in the unfortunate mutiny of the late 47th Regiment at Barrackpore, may be removed.

No. 113.—*Copy of a Report from Commodore J. Hayes, Commanding the Flotilla, to Captain F. Champagne, Military Secretary to His Excellency the Commander in Chief; dated Poodoo Prang Plains, Arracan, April 2, 1825.*

I am to request, that you will inform his Excellency, that on the 25th of March, at Kray Kingdong, the following final arrangements were made by General Morrison and myself for the disposal of the Flotilla, on the projected attack of the enemy's capital, viz. under Mr. Higgins, the *Helen* and *Trusty*, armed vessels, with half the 5th division of gun boats, were stationed at the southern part of Chumballa, or Kune Pela reach, to support the troops left in possession of Hancarrah, or Chanerain island, and eventually to take possession of Chamballa stockades, on the enemy's moving towards Arracan.—The *Sophia*, armed brig, with the other half of the 5th division gun boats, were left to support the detail of troops left at Kray Kingdong, and to protect the transports; the 8th division of gun boats, and *Pluto* steam gun vessel were stationed under Captain Crawford, in advance with Brigadier Grant.—The 1st and 7th division of gun boats, under my personal command, with the *Research*, *Asseerghur*, *Isabella*, *Brougham*, *Goliah*, *Jessy*, and four commissariat sloops, with the guns, ammunition, provisions, &c. were destined to proceed into the Mongie, and form a junction with the army at Mahattie, near the capital.

On entering the Mongie river, I received a dispatch from Mr. Higgins, commanding the detachment of the Flotilla in Chumballa-reach, stating that the enemy had evacuated the stockades, and that he had, agreeably to my order, taken possession of the same, and awaited my farther commands; in consequence of which information, I directed that the *Sophia* and gun boats, at Kray Kingdong, should immediately join Mr. Higgins, and instructed the latter officer to proceed with the whole detachment up the Chumballa-reach to Arracan, and cause a diversion in that quarter, making every possible impression upon the enemy in his power, without losing the vessels under his command.

Finding we could not approach Mahattie nearer than six miles, with the larger vessels, for want of water, we left them, reduced to their native crews, with one warrant officer in charge of each, and proceeded on the gun boats *Osprey* and *Gonga Saugor*; we effected the desired junction with the army on the afternoon of the 23th: having communicated with General Morrison, and ascertained that the gun boats could not approach the capital within range of their guns, it was determined, that the seamen and marines combined, should land and act with the army, taking with them two twenty-four pounder carronades, and requisite ammunition with us—the General proposing to make a preliminary attack upon Arracan fort early next morning, and that I should join the camp as above stated. I accordingly landed two twenty-four pounders, and put myself at the head of seventy flotilla seamen, besides officers and warrant officers, together with the crews of the gun boats present, amounting in all to two hundred and fifty men: we succeeded, by great exertion, in dragging the guns and carrying the shot and ammunition on the men's shoulders to the camps, where we arrived at 7 p. m. on the 29th ultimo, Captain Crawford being previously detached with the 8th division gun boats, to endeavour to approach Arracan by a channel between Mahattie and the Chamballa-reach: perhaps it is here necessary to observe, that the gun boats brought up the mortars, howitzers and two twenty-four pounder field guns, with all their requisites, to Mahattie.

On the 31st, General Morrison having determined to carry the heights commanding Arracan, I furnished, at his request, the following details, from the flotilla, for the occasion; viz. for the advance attack, under Brigadier Richards, Lieutenant Armstrong, Mr. Howard, Mr. Montrion, Mr. Keymer, two warrant officers, and thirty seamen; for the support of the same under Brigadier General McBean, Captain Crawford, the commander of the *Asseerghur*, Acting Lieutenant Richardson, Mr. Pruen, Mr. Jackson, four warrant officers, and forty seamen; myself to accompany the General, commanding in chief, with the main body of the army. Upon this subject I have only to add, that the advance columns, under Brigadier Richards, were completely successful, and covered themselves with glory, and that I have every reason to be proud of the gallantry and good conduct of every officer and man under my command, with the Arracan army; Lieutenant Armstrong has invariably distinguished himself ever since the flotilla left Cox's Bazar.

No. 114.—*Extract from a Despatch from Brigadier General J. W. Morrison, Commanding South Eastern Division, to Major W. L. Watson, Deputy Adjutant General of the Army; dated Camp, Arracan, April 9, 1825.*

Since my despatch of the 2d instant, nothing of any moment has occurred; parties were sent in pursuit of the flying foe, they overtook hundreds of stragglers, but (with one exception) failed in encountering any collected

collected number, that exception obtained in the instance of a body of the enemy, amounting to about three hundred men, who, attempting to make their escape across the plain, were pursued by a Russalah of the 2d Local Horse, under Lieutenant McLean, and were accounted for as killed, prisoners, or drowned in the river, which they had to pass in order to reach the road leading to Talak.

I have as yet been unable to obtain any positive information as to what has become of the dispersed force; a large proportion, who had families in the country, are represented to have embodied themselves in the population, while others are stated to be wandering in the jungles, and others, again, to have, by a circuitous route, gained the road to Talak, which place many of the Sirdars were endeavouring to reach by unfrequented paths through the mountains.

The views that led to the attacking the enemy on the eastern side, are proved to have been justly founded, though the object has not been entirely completed—the intercepting their return to Ava: it is, however, nearly certain, that they have not been able to re-assemble in any force, and I still hope the measures that have been adopted, and proposed to be pursued, will yet enable me satisfactorily to account for the fugitives.

Brigadier General McBean, with part of the force, as per margin,\* embarked yesterday in such vessels as Commodore Hayes could render available for their reception, in order to co-operate with the flotilla in an attack on the island of Ramree, with Chynda on the main land.

*No. 115.—Copy of Despatch from Lieutenant Colonel R. Hampton, Commanding at Cheduba, to Lieutenant Colonel James Nicol, Adjutant General of the Army; dated Cheduba, February 8, 1825.*

Captain Hardy, commanding the Hon'ble Company's frigate *Hastings*, having sent me two Burmese prisoners taken in Ramree island on the 22d ultimo, by a party sent on shore from that vessel, and having from those individuals obtained what I considered sufficient information regarding its localities, defences and means of resistance, as to justify my making a descent on the island, with a view to its capture, I addressed him on the subject, stating, that if he would make arrangements for the transportation of part of the force under my command, I should be most happy to join him, (Captain Hardy being at this time most actively employed in surveying and reconnoitring the harbor and creek of Ramree,) and had not the least doubt, provided the information proved correct, that with his cordial co-operation and assistance, we should neither find much difficulty nor trouble in accomplishing the object.

Captain Hardy came over to Cheduba on the 27th, and after a short consultation, (although he was of opinion that our European force was not sufficient, yet he was unwilling to throw any obstacle in the way,) the business was determined on.

By five p. m., on the 29th, the detachment detailed in the margin,† was embarked on board the dépôt ship *Francis Warden*, the armed brig *Planet*, and the flotilla of gun boats. The brig having the artillery on board, sailed that afternoon, and on the following morning, the remainder of the vessels got under weigh; but from light and variable winds, and the intricacy of the entrance into Ramree harbour, we did not reach the mouth of the creek until the morning of the 2d instant.

At one p. m., Captain Hardy, accompanied by Major Murray, Captain Hull, commanding the Artillery, and my detachment staff, Lieutenant Margrave, went for the purpose of examining the localities of the creek, and to ascertain the landing place which had been pointed out by one of the guides. About five p. m., the party returned, and reported that the plain pointed out appeared a favorable spot for landing at high water, and just above it, the creek was strongly staked across. About three hundred yards further up the creek, there was a second row of stakes, much stronger, and defended by a battery, from which the enemy opened a heavy but ill-directed fire upon the boats, from jinjals and musketry. About half a mile up the creek, beyond the second row of stakes, the angle of a stockade was visible.

Arrangements being made for landing the troops as early in the morning as possible, to benefit by the flood tide, the distance from the vessels to the landing place being about four miles, by half-past nine, a. m., nearly the whole force was landed without opposition.

I immediately

\* Artillery—Four 6-pounders—Two 5½-inch howitzers—Two 5½-inch mortars.

Infantry—Four Companies His Majesty's 4th Regiment—Four Companies His Majesty's 5th Regiment—Eight Companies 40th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—16th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.

† Forty-eight Artillery-men with two Brigades of guns.

Five Hundred and Twenty men of the 40th Regiment Native Infantry.

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I immediately formed a column, of the strength specified in the margin,\* with a view of attacking the enemy in flank, and driving him from the breast-work which defended the creek, to enable Captain Hardy to proceed with gun boats, to remove the stakes, and to accompany the troops to the principal stockade, leaving Captain Skardon with the reserve of about one hundred and eighty men, and the two brigades of guns, under Captain Hull, to act in concert with Captain Hardy, as circumstances might render it necessary.

The column of attack, I regret to say, was led by the guides in quite a different direction to the place I wished to carry, and had to surmount obstacles never contemplated from the information received. The gallantry of the party, however, overcame every difficulty which presented itself, and drove the enemy out from all his intrenched positions at the point of the bayonet, obliging him to take shelter in his usual place of resort, the jungle, from which a galling fire was kept up, until he was dislodged by our troops.

It being now half-past three p. m., the detachment quite fatigued and exhausted, for want of water, and finding that it was totally impracticable to advance by the road pointed out, the jungle being so very close as not to admit of a file of men abreast, and lined by the enemy, who had now opened a fire upon our rear, we were about five miles distant from the boats, without any possibility of communication, and it appearing evident that we had been most treacherously deceived, it was deemed prudent and advisable to return to the boats, so as to arrive in sufficient time to re-cross the the nullahs, which had so greatly impeded our advance.

The enemy re-occupied every hill and plain as we quitted, and continued firing on us from jinjals and matchlocks, until checked by the arrival of the reserve, when a few well-directed rounds from the 6-pounders, field pieces, dislodged them from their lurking places, and effectually silenced their fire, which enabled us to re-embark the whole force by six p. m.

When every man composing the force did his duty, it is difficult to discriminate individual merit, but I should consider myself wanting in duty were I not to bring to the notice of his Excellency the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Bell, of the Bombay European Regiment, commanding the Marines, and of Lieutenant Coxe, commanding the Light Company of my own Regiment, who were conspicuously forward on every occasion, shewing an example to their men, which did them honor and credit.

To Captain Hardy, who commanded the naval part of the force, and who was engaged with the gun-boats during my absence, endeavouring to remove the stakes, and force a passage of the creek to the enemy's breast-work, and whose officers and seamen exerted themselves to their utmost, my sincere and grateful thanks are due, as well as for his cordial co-operation and assistance on every occasion, wherever the public service required it.

Herewith I do myself the honor to enclose a return of killed and wounded.†

No. 116. (A)—Copy

* His Majesty's 54th Regiment, .....	6
Marines of the Hastings, .....	30
Seamen, .....	60
40th Regiment Native Infantry, .....	330
Total, .....	426

Total, 426

† A Return of Killed and Wounded during the Operations on the Island of Ramree, on the 3d February, 1825.

	Killed.				Wounded.					Total.	
	Europeans.		Natives.	Total.	Europeans.		Natives.				
	Privates.	Havildars.			Privates.	Seamen.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Sepoys.		
His Majesty's 54th Regiment, } Acting { ....	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	One wounded, since dead. One ditto, ditto ditto.
Bombay European Regiment, } Marines, { ....	1	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	3	
Seamen, .....	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	
40th Regiment of Native Infantry, .....	0	1	2	3	0	0	2	1	9	12	
	2	1	2	5	4	4	2	1	9	20	

One Master's Mate killed, and one European Seaman and one Lascar wounded, in the gun-boats.



No. 116. (A)—*Copy of a Report from Brigadier General W. Mac Bean, c. B., to the Adjutant General of the Army; dated Ramree, May 6, 1825.*

Commodore Hayes having determined upon sending the brig *Meriton* to Calcutta, and as it is but lately I have had the opportunity of making my report to Brigadier General Morrison upon the proceedings of the expedition under my command, I have thought it would be advisable to transmit you copies of the same, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

No. 116. (B)—*Copy of a Report from Brigadier General W. Mac Bean, c. B., to Brigadier General Morrison, c. B., Commanding South Eastern Division; dated Ramree, April 23, 1825.*

I have the honor to inform you, that the flotilla weighed early on the morning of the 17th instant, at the mouth of the Arracan river, and having fine weather, with moderate breezes, the whole were anchored the night of the 18th, within three miles of Cheduba-roads. It being necessary to take in a supply of water, the ships and boats proceeded to Low Island, situated to the southward of Ramree. Several of the Mug inhabitants from Ramree, having joined us the night of the 20th, gave information that the island had, two days previously, been evacuated by the enemy; to this no very implicit faith was given. The artillery, and detachment 40th Bengal Native Infantry, having joined, the fleet was anchored the night of the 21st, at the entrance to the Ramree creek, and dispositions being made for landing the troops, the same was carried into effect the following morning. The numerous rows of stakes the enemy had driven across the creek, presented so formidable and effectual an obstacle that, with every exertion on the part of the seamen and lascars, it was nearly two hours before a passage could be cleared for the small boats. So soon, however, as the advance, under Captain Shelton, His Majesty's 44th Regiment, could be disembarked, I proceeded with Commodore Hayes, to the town of Ramree: the road, to appearance, had lately been made, and was commanded, in many parts, by fortified heights, and well-constructed intrenchments. The creek is practicable for boats to the town at high water, distance from its entrance about seven miles; by land, from the great intrenchment, considerably less. No opposition whatever was made, and the island taken quiet possession of in the name of the British.

The enemy, to protect him against a landing by the creek, had thrown up a long line of intrenchments upon the right bank, constructed with great judgment, and made particularly strong by the numerous traverses placed in all directions.

The defences of the town consist in a stockade of considerable extent and some strength, situated about the center of it, this being protected by several forts upon hills, and one of them completely commanding the road by which you approach. The inhabitants are in quiet occupation of their houses, and Napat Nunn, at their solicitation, has been continued in his office of Jemedar, charged with the maintenance of peace and good order upon the island.

I have directed that eight Companies of the 40th Bengal Native Infantry, with the Detachment of Artillery from Cheduba, under the command of Major Murray, should constitute the garrison of Ramree, and consider they will be quite equal to all the duties that may be required of them at present.

To Commodore Hayes, I am most indebted for his hearty co-operation upon all occasions, and feel the fullest confidence from his able assistance. I have every reason to be satisfied with the officers and soldiers under my command, and am happy to inform you they have continued to be healthy.

Herewith is transmitted a return of captured ordnance.\*

No. 116. (C)—*Copy of a Report from Brigadier General W. Mac Bean, c. B., to Brigadier General Morrison, c. B., Commanding South Eastern Division; dated Ramree, May 5, 1825.*

Part of the force under my command having arrived at the entrance of the Sandowey river the 28th last month, it was determined by Commodore Hayes and myself, that the troops should be put into boats and proceeded up the following day.

The *Macnaghten* transport having grounded in the passage from Ramree, Captain Anderson, with four hundred and fifty of the 16th Madras Native Infantry on board, never joined us.

A stockade

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*Return of Ordnance and Stores Captured at Ramree, by the force under Brigadier General MacBean, c. B., April 22, 1825.*

Brass Gun, one 2-pounder—Iron Guns, one 6-pounder—one 2-pounder—three 1-pounders—13 Jingals—60 Muskets—264 Dows—150 Spears—1200 Flint, Europe—six 24-pound Shot, Europe—four 12-pound Shot, Europe—three 9-pound Shot, Europe—two 6-pound Shot, Europe—140 Grape Shot, Europe—20 Cwt. of Leaden Balls—5 Cwt. of Iron Balls—4 Cwt. of spare Lead—a quantity of Gun Powder destroyed.

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A stockade at the mouth of the river was evidently evacuated, and information was at this time given by inhabitants, (Mugs) that the enemy had also left the stockades at Sandowey.

The boats having moved about eight miles up the river, Commodore Hayes leading, about dusk came upon a stockade intrenchment, the enemy had also constructed breast-works in different commanding points, and had staked the river below the intrenchments; a space, however, had been left sufficiently wide for the boats to pass. The troops had been landed for the night, and being re-embarked early the next morning, the whole were in progress up the river at four o'clock.

No opposition was made to our passage, and having reached Sandowey soon after seven o'clock, the stockades were taken possession of; there are two, neither of any strength, though the ground upon which one is constructed had been well chosen; many acts of cruelty are reported to have been committed by the Birmahs previous to departure, and four bodies were found, said to be executions that had taken place for refusal to accompany them in their retreat.

It did not appear to me there was any object to be gained by remaining at Sandowey. I therefore determined upon embarking the troops, and that they should join the division.

I have to repeat how much I owe to Commodore Hayes, and my admiration in him of the good effects of a zealous and animated example for enterprises.

The officers and men under my command have given me much cause to speak well of them, for although the enemy has not given us the opportunity of a meeting, they have suffered much from continued exposure to extreme heat, and, in a variety of ways, have undergone much fatigue, and which they have borne with becoming spirit and cheerfulness.

Captain Hull, Artillery, was obliged to proceed sick to Cheduba, without furnishing me with any return of the captured ordnance.

I am happy to acquaint you the troops have continued remarkably healthy, there being at present only two Europeans sick.

*No. 117. (A)—Extract from a Despatch from Brigadier General J. W. Morrison, c. b., Commanding South Eastern Division, to the Adjutant General of the Army; dated Arracan, May 31, 1825.*

The enclosed despatch (in original), I received from Major Bucke during last night. The objects contemplated in sending this expedition have been, but partially accomplished, but the reconnoissance made puts us in possession of correct information, as to the exact nature of the country through which the division may yet have to march. The troops appear to have greatly suffered from fatigue, although the actual distance of each march never exceeded nine miles. The Commander-in-Chief will, I trust, approve of the resolution Major Bucke came to when he found that the enemy were prepared. The hurkurrahs he alludes to as having been taken and shot, I have the satisfaction of stating, had rejoined the camp, the one fired at not having been touched, and the other, who was made a prisoner, having effected his escape. It does not appear to me that the Burmese were in force at the pass of the highest range, (the furthest spot reached,) or that there was any thing to indicate that considerable resistance would be offered; but as little more information could be gained, and it had been, I find, fully ascertained that the enemy had retreated from Cheedoo Tora to Chalung, where the remnant of their force from this province, with re-inforcements, were collected, the whole, amounting to three thousand men, under a chief named Mengee Maha Silwa, (Attown Mungja, Tooroo Wyn, and his son having been taken to Ummerapoorra,) no advantage could have accrued from still further pressing forward, particularly as every mile advanced, seems greatly to have multiplied the difficulties to the bringing up of supplies.

*No. 118. (B)—Copy of a Report from Major N. Bucke, Commanding a Detachment, to Brigadier General Morrison, c. b., Commanding South Eastern Division; dated Camp Talak, May 27, 1825.*

I have the honor to report to you the return of the detachment under my command to this place last night.

I now proceed to relate the movements of the detachment, since my last despatch of the 18th instant. At three p. m., the 19th instant, all arrangements having been made, I marched to a place called Poongue Chekayne, a distance of four and a half miles, a steep ascent the whole way; descending the hill a little only, on the opposite side, for fresh water—very scarce—halted for the night.

Marched again at day light; on the 20th, crossed several ranges of mountains in succession, till we reached Ghose Chekayne, a halting place, where fresh water is procurable. The troops and cattle arrived at

their

their ground much fatigued, late in the day, some of the enemy's scouts were seen here by Captain Drummond's (Assistant Deputy Quarter Master General) hurcarrals, who proceeded on in advance.

March 21st, marched a t4 A. M.; the advance reached Ya Brang Chekayne; at 11 A. M. baggage and rear guard not up till night; the route this day very mountainous; Ya Brang is a mere halting place, with fresh water; some of the enemy's scouts again seen at this place by Captain Drummond's people, but decamped.

May 22d, halted the detachment, being much enfeebled, and many sick, Captain Drummond, with the advanced Picket, under an European officer, proceeded in advance early in the morning, to obtain intelligence of the enemy, &c. &c.; at about 3 P. M., I received a note from Captain Drummond, dated Kookree Nullah, telling me he had been forward as far as Ackowyn, the next halting place, where fresh water is to be had, I therefore resolved to move forward the next morning, and joined Captain Drummond at Ackowyn about noon, on the 23d instant. We found this march an extremely harassing one, over a continuation of mountains as before.

From some information obtained, that the enemy had a post at Tantabain, the next stage, I had partly arranged a plan for surprising the enemy by a night movement, with the effective part of my detachment lightly equipped, leaving my sick and camp standing. When about half-past five P. M., one of Captain Drummond's guides came running into camp, bringing information the enemy were in the jungle and on the road, only a few miles in our front; their strength could not be ascertained; they were represented to be in two parties; one of the guides had been shot, and the other two taken prisoners by the enemy. From the little knowledge to be obtained of the enemy's force, and convinced they must now have correct information as to the strength of my detachment, and its movements, the many obstacles which so mountainous a country presents to my getting up my supplies from Talak, the country through which we have passed, not presenting a village or any kind of resources, added to the daily deficiency in my force from debility, I considered it advisable to secure the honor and safety of the detachment, by retiring on my supplies at Talak, rather than be decoyed by the enemy too far into their country, to effect my retreat.

The sufferings and hardships the troops have already undergone are very considerable. I have been obliged to serve out to the European officers, salt rations, from the commissariat supplies.

The complete object intended by your instructions, for this detachment to execute, has not been effected, but I feel convinced as much in the way of a reconnaissance has been accomplished, as the means placed at my disposal allowed of, without risking sacrifice of the detachment. The physical powers of the men and officers, at the end of the last two days' march, had been so enfeebled, they would scarcely have been able to resist the attacks of the enemy. The success attending an assault, after a long and fatiguing march, must have been doubtful, and seems to justify the determination I came to of retiring. Two elephants had been sent back for supplies as unloaded, and two have died from fatigue and accident. I am only waiting the return of Mr. Nelson, who has proceeded towards Aeng, when I shall embark the detachment, and return to Arracan. With your permission, I purpose landing the troops at Bulseparah, and marching into cantonment, which I calculate upon reaching on the 1st or 2d proximo.

Captain Drummond proceeds by land with the elephants, under an escort of a Company from the 1st Light Infantry Battalion.

*No. 119.—From the Government Gazette, February 24, 1825.*

*"Rangoon, 31st January.*—The enemy, we are led to suppose, is in force at Lyng and Paulang, and at these places our first rencontre will take place. Many and strange are the reports upon the state of affairs higher up the river. Bundoola is said to maintain a sullen and suspicious attitude in the Mangoe Grove at Denobew, and to be busily employed in repairing an old fort near the village; whilst Moun-shoe-za is encamped in his immediate front with twenty thousand men, vainly endeavouring to gain access to the fallen chief, who, doubtful of his countryman's sincerity, or dreading his Sovereign's resentment, will hold no communication with any one not living within the pale of his own defences, and will not even receive or listen to the friendly protestations of Moun-shoe-za's emissaries. Should such a state of affairs actually exist, we must, of course, soon reap advantage from it.

"Our accounts from the eastward are most satisfactory. The country, towns, and villages, enjoy profound tranquillity, and the frontier chiefs of Siam seem well-disposed to respect our occupation of the conquered provinces. An embassy of Taliens (the ancient Peguers) who have long lived under the protection of the Siamese government, is now on its way from Martaban, to confer with the British general at Rangoon. They denominate themselves the representatives of the most degraded and humbled country in the world, who, at this important juncture, wish to assert their ancient rights, and who have an army of five thousand men ready, at the word of the British general, to enter the territory of their cruel and implacable foe, and revenge the slaughter of their fathers and grand-fathers. They state, that they come with the full sanction and approbation of His



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Siamese Majesty, who they declare is also ready to act in conjunction with the British, should such be their wish, by ordering a corps of observation of thirty thousand men, now stationed upon the Burman frontier, to move upon any given point in the enemy's dominions.

"Here matters are gradually assuming a more favorable appearance. Since yesterday, no fewer than five hundred people, men, women, and children, have come into Rangoon, and thrown themselves upon our mercy. Their example will be followed by the mass of the population, the instant escape can be effected."

*Rangoon, February 3.*—A letter from three Taliens (Siamese Chieftains,) to the English Commander in Chief, intimates their arrival with ten thousand men in Canjapoorce, and that they have received information of the English being in possession of Martaban, as also, that frequent battles continue to take place between them and the Burmahs; should such be the case, and their services be accepted as allies, they will be happy to advance and join the English with five thousand men, whom they have already dispatched to Mipkasath, (this is close to Martaban) state, that they have done this in consideration of the ancient friendship subsisting between the two nations, and which they are most anxious to preserve, as well as to carry on a friendly and commercial intercourse, and hope therefore, that the British will, as heretofore, respect their Talien gods, and temples, and priests, and take into their particular care, the Abassees, now living in Martaban, who are their own brothers, as it were, in caste and in country. The Burmans having, for a series of years, oppressed and tyrannised over us, we became the humblest of nations, and at last took flight and found refuge in Siam. The King of that country being a lover of justice, the protector of the distressed, and a true servant of God, took pity on our misfortunes, and under his authority, we received and continue to receive, happiness, honor, promotion and subsistence. The orders of the King, in former years, have always been, that during the months of Natch and Peeazoo, (December and January) we should, with our forces, advance into the Burman territories, and carry off as many Burmans, Abassees, and Tavoy people, as we could secure; but now, the country being under protection of the English, we, considering our long friendship, have refrained from so doing this year, and have not established, as usual, chokees and posts for the purpose. We also hope, that the English will not molest any people, or confine them, provided they should resort into the Martaban district for purposes of traffic, which they are very anxious to do, if sure there would be no obstructions opposed to free and open communication. Be assured, that this is the real wish of our hearts, and in this is nothing of falsehood or deceit. Further, we hope, that if the inhabitants of Martaban, or Tavoy, or Mergui, wish to come to us for purposes of traffic, that they may not be prevented, as we also promise not to prevent any of the people under our authority from resorting to the British posts, and that constant friendly intercourse may be kept up, as should always be the case between two nations so long connected by friendship, and that friendship daily made more firm (by the English cheerfully assenting to this proposal.) Further, we have not yet any correct or certain information, whether or not the English have taken Rangoon, and still hold it, which we have casually heard to be the case, therefore beg to be favored with information on the present state of affairs at that place; and also to be told, whether it is the intention of the English, after gaining victories, as we hear that they have done, to advance to Ava. Let this information be sent quickly by the bearers of this letter, and on receiving it, a communication will be made to the King of Siam, and then let the two nations go hand in hand together, to complete the business.

*Dated Peeazoo 27th, 1186, or about the 15th of January, 1825.*

Names and Titles of the writers of the above as written—(Mynghee Jo Bingeeah, Maha Zoh Ka'Ra Ma) Zazah Deeh Buddhee Seeree Zaiash Unazoon.

*Rangoon, February 3.*—A letter from Bhingeeah Maha Rotharamah Udyk Podhee, Seree Zurah, and Unenaroon, Talien Chieftains, dated about the 20th of December 1824, addressed to the following men:

Sameinduncop, Rajah of Kuddok.

Bhingeeah Surein, Chief of Jurrah.

Nabaing, Chief of Phullojoon.

Bhingeeah Toorah, Chief of Seurreameiv.

Bhingeeah Eyndagoo, Chief of Molah Meaing.

Kheynein Bheeh, Chief of Uttorah Miorw.

Chekey (or Major) Onpan, Chief of Lamaing.

Nathain, Collector of Revenue.

Nattope, Collector of Revenue.

Na Shoe Egan, Chief of Carrians.

Nu Kheaing, Chief of Carrians, and

Rajah Chokain, Chief of Carrians,

states, Whereas, in days of yore, we and the Burmans were inveterate enemies, and we fled from our country, in consequence of their conquest and subsequent oppressions. We have since become subjects of the King ("of White Elephants") of Siam, and have laid under his protection of late years. We, having command of several thousand men, have always been prepared for war on this frontier, and when lately hearing of a quarrel between the English and the Burmans, we sent parties of 5000 to seize and harass the latter. You met them, received them as friends, and assisted them with supplies. For this we felt very thankful, and have anxiously hoped for an opportunity to return such kindness. Now, we have lately heard that the English have taken possession

possession of Martaban, and that, in consequence, your losses and sufferings, from separation or dispersion of your families, have been very great. Therefore we request you will come to meet our men at Cadaing Chaine, where we have sent 301 men, under three Chiefs, and should you then wish to have a meeting with ourselves, you will come on to Meek Huthat, at which place we shall rest with 10,000 men. And receive you with great kindness and friendship.

N. B. The three writers of this are Taliens, commanding troops in the service of the King of Siam. The people to whom it is addressed, are supposed to be men who, having deserted Martaban and its vicinity on its capture, are now living close to the Siamese frontiers.

No. 120.—*From the Government Gazette, March 10, 1825.*

*The Letter from Siam.*—The Chief of the country of Zaky, of Lagoon and Jumma; the splendid hero and renowned warrior of great splendour, dignity and riches; the prince, the ruler over fifty seven provinces, possessed by my ancestors from the remotest generations. The lord and chief of the nine tribes of the Siamese people. The illustrious prince, possessing the richest throne in the east. The name of the second Chief is Bemsagan Loom Yat. The name of the third, Shoom Zova Banzagan Lan Cheg. These three Chiefs were present in Durbar, with three and thirty Wazeers, and being unanimous, having but one mind and one object, represent this to his Excellency.

To the governor over sixty tribes, and the great conqueror over countries, the English hero—the champion of the world—the tamer of elephants—the general victorious over the Burmese, mild and merciful—the leader of leaders—the inspirer of bravery,—this request is written in the year of the Hegira, one thousand one hundred and eighty-six. A year greater than any seen by our ancestors. A year more auspicious than all former years. In which the conqueror of provinces, the English hero, by command of his King, came with an army to attack the Burmese, over whom he has been victorious; who has not molested the inhabitants: but has permitted the poor to remain in their dwellings. This intelligence having reached us, diffused general joy: We have likewise heard that many many Wazeers and Burmese soldiers have been sent to the regions of death by the invincible warriors. The English hero, who is seated on a throne, and is exceeding beneficent, has ordered that neither vexation nor trouble is to be given to the people remaining in their houses. Against your power, no enemy can draw an arrow. The poor and the cultivators, in your prosperity, find ease. Further, we are of opinion, that if you continue fighting after this manner for one year, or one month, neither the name nor vestige of the Burmese will remain. Then will the poor in tranquillity pass their lives, and the name of their merciless enemies will be obliterated. We are likewise persuaded, that to the people living under the shadow of the standard of your clemency, not even a cause of trouble can arise. The great chief Leagat, the second, Bungan Khoon, the third, Bungan Khasan Cheydoo Ghom Thuham. The chief of the countries of Laboom and Jamaz, all being assembled, and being unanimous, and having but one mind and one object, I have described it to the great English hero and conqueror, and I wish to be informed of your circumstances, and every wish in your mind. This request is addressed to the presence of the illustrious enthroned English conqueror.

No. 121. (A)—*Extract from a Letter from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. v. and k. c. t. s., to George Swinton, Esq. Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Rangoon, 3d February, 1825.*

Shortly after the final defeat of Bundoola's army, on the 15th December, I, from motives of policy and humanity, circulated the enclosed Proclamation. A Talian Chief came in some time afterwards, to ascertain whether or not, the Proclamation really emanated from authority, and on being assured it did, returned to make its contents more generally known, contriving, at the same time, to introduce a copy into the enemy's stockaded lines at Panlang, where a great part of the force consisted of Pegners:—

The consequence has been the disaffection and desertion of the major part; many of them bringing their arms along with them, have retired into the Dalla district, maintaining so good a front, that, although followed by a Burmese force, the latter dare not to attack them. I have sent a strong detachment to support our friends, which has already joined them, and they are now mutually co-operating in covering the retreat of the women and children, coming in by thousands to Rangoon. The whole flotilla has been employed on this service for four days past.

No. 121. (B)—*Proclamation.*

Inhabitants of Pegue: what folly can actuate you to attempt any further opposition to the British arms, you know and have seen, how weak and contemptible all the efforts of the Burmese army have proved, in combat with the troops I have brought against them.

Against

Against you, inhabitants of the ancient kingdom of Pegue, and the noble Talian race, we do not wish to wage war. We know the oppression and tyranny under which you have been labouring for a length of time, by the cruel and brutal conduct of the Burmese government towards you; they acknowledge you by no other title than the degrading and ignominious appellation of slaves; compare, therefore, your condition with the comfort and happiness of the four maritime provinces; viz. Mergue, Yeah, Tavoy, and Martaban, now under the protection of the English flag; follow their example to enjoy their blessings, by placing yourselves under my protection; it is a duty you owe to your aged and infirm parents, to all your female relatives, your wives and innocent children, instead of keeping yourselves and them in constant terror of your lives, and like wild beasts, frequenting the jungles, and that in trying to support the hopeless cause of your merciless conquerors the Burmese—choose from amongst yourselves a chief, and I will acknowledge him!!!

No. 122. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Rangoon, February 11, 1825.*

Deeming it of importance previous to the troops finally breaking up from quarters, to dislodge the enemy's advanced division from their defences, on the Lyng river, I directed Lieutenant Colonel Godwin to proceed with a body of troops to Tantabain, and summon the enemy to retire from his works, which, in the event of the summons not being attended to, he was farther directed to take possession of, by force of arms. A detail of the operations of the column is herewith sent, affording me another opportunity of bringing to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, the judgment and decision of Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, and Captain Chads, R. N., (appointed by Captain Alexander, to the naval command on that service) and bearing no less honorable testimony to the irresistible intrepidity so often displayed both by soldiers and sailors on this expedition.

No. 122. (B)—*Copy of a Despatch from Lieutenant Colonel Henry Godwin, His Majesty's 41st Regiment, Commanding, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, &c. &c. &c.; dated Rangoon, February 9, 1825.*

The force you did me the honour to place under my command, on the 5th instant, for the capture of the enemy's works at Qungalle, or Tantabain, reached that point on the 6th, at five in the evening.—I am to premise, that on the morning of the 6th, the flag of truce was sent up with the two Burmese prisoners, conveying your proclamation, and which was received by the enemy, and replied to most respectfully, explaining the inability of the chief to surrender, in a language of mildness rarely used by this vain and barbarous people.

The position of the enemy was a strong and imposing one, upon the point of a peninsula, forming an angle of one thousand four hundred and forty paces, strongly stockaded and abattised down to the bank of the river, but entirely open to the rear.

The *Satellite*, armed ship, towed by the steam boat, and directed by Captain Chads, His Majesty's ship *Arachne*, laid her broad-side on so admirably, as to enfilade the whole of the principal face of the works.

At half-musket shot, we were received with thirty-six pieces of artillery, independently of jinjals, and two thousand men. This was forcibly replied to by the guns of the *Satellite*, assisted by Captain Graham, of the Bengal Rocket Troop, who, by the most excellent practice with his rockets from the steam boat, surprised them with an arm of offence, that will prove a most formidable weapon.

I perceived from the *Satellite*, the work all around was easily assailable, and, in ten minutes after the signal was made, the place was stormed—leaving in our possession thirty-four pieces of cannon. The enemy suffered severely, and were followed for a mile and a half.

I have again the pleasure to mention the name of Lieutenant Keele, of His Majesty's ship *Arachne*, who with Lieutenant Hall, of His Majesty's ship *Alligator*, and their boats' crews, were the first to enter the enemy's position, and their conduct was most conspicuous. These were followed by Captain O'Reilly, with the Grenadiers of His Majesty's 41st Regiment.

Our loss, I am most happy to say, is comparatively nothing; and this is accounted for by the boats, containing the troops, being placed under the land, out of the enemy's first opening their fire, till they were to storm by signal.\*

The

\* Return of Killed and Wounded of a Detachment, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, at the Capture of Qungalle, or Tantabain Stockade, 6th February, 1825.

His Majesty's 41st Regiment.—Wounded—1 Rank and File.  
30th Madras Native Infantry.—Wounded—1 Sergeant or Havildar.  
43d Madras Native Infantry.—Wounded—1 Rank and File.



The next day, the 7th, the two branches of the Paulang river were reconnoitred; the right by Captain Chads, whom I accompanied, and the left by Lieutenant Keele, for eighteen miles up, and an immense quantity of fire-rafts were destroyed.

May I request your thanks to Captain Chads, His Majesty's ship *Arachne*, commanding the naval part of the expedition, for the large share he had in the capture of this post; for Captain Graham, Bengal Rocket Troops; Captain Waterman, His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Assistant Quarter Master General; and Lieutenant Cochran, His Majesty's 41st Regiment, my Acting Brigade Major. The conduct of the details of the European and Native corps reflects the highest honour on their respective Regiments, and merits your warmest approbation.

No. 123. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, dated Rangoon, February 12, 1825.*

I do myself the honor of addressing you, I trust, for the last time from a place I have so long anxiously endeavoured to leave. The greater part of the land column is encamped at a day's march from hence; and I hope to see the river and Bassien divisions in progress on the 13th, when I will join the camp and put myself at the head of a force, although small, carrying into the field with it, every feeling that ensures success.

The enclosed Return will correctly inform you upon the strength of the different columns; and I have only to assure you, that limited as their numerical strength will undoubtedly appear, every possible arrangement and sacrifice of the usual comforts of both men and officers, has alone enabled me to take the field with such a force.

I calculate upon forming a junction with Brigadier General Cotton, soon after the fleet enters the Ir-rawaddy; and with Major Sale, in the neighbourhood of Henzedah; when I shall push on to Prome as rapidly as possible.

About three thousand inhabitants have lately come into Rangoon; they appear well disposed, and have promised to do their best to provide us with draft cattle and hackeries: I have reason to place some faith in their promises, and am rather sanguine in expecting they will essentially contribute to the equipment of a column of reserve, which I hope will be ready to move forward upon Prome early next month.

The Talian Chiefs, mentioned in my despatch of the 3d instant, have not yet arrived, although I am apprized of their having left Martaban in a gun vessel for this place, many days ago; and the season is now too rapidly advancing to admit of my waiting another hour for them; I will, however, direct Brigadier M'Creagh, who I leave in command at Rangoon, to receive them with every possible attention, and endeavour to turn the sentiments which they now profess, to the public advantage.

I have ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant Smith to assume the command at Martaban, with directions to cultivate a good understanding with the Siamese; and to encourage the disaffected Peguers, without entering into the slightest pledge or promise, beyond mere countenance and support, while he may chance to remain in their neighbourhood.

No. 123. (B)—*Distribution of the Army under the Command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B. and K. C. T. S., serving against the Dominions of the King of Ava.*

To proceed by land under Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B.

	Rank and File.
Rocket Troop, ... ..	36
1st Troop Horse Artillery, ... ..	92
Governor General's Body Guard, ... ..	523
European Infantry, ... ..	1230
Native Infantry, ... ..	600
Pioneers, ... ..	257

Total 2468

To proceed by water under Brigadier-General Cotton.

	Rank and File.
Rocket Troop, ... ..	12
Artillery, (Foot), ... ..	108
European Infantry, ... ..	799
Native Infantry, ... ..	250

Total 1169

Major Sale's

Navy.—Wounded—4 Seamen, and 2 Lascars.  
Drowned—1 Seaman.

Return of Ordnance, &c. Captured at Tantabin by the Force under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, on the 6th February, 1825.

Brass—one 10-pounder, ten 3-pounders, and one 1-pounder.

Iron—two 7-pounders, one 6-pounder, one 5-pounder, four 4-pounders, six 3-pounders, and one 2-pounder.

Of Jinjals, Muskets, Shot, Powder, Spears, &c. taken, no estimate made.—The Powder was mostly destroyed.

*Major Sale's Division.*

	Rank and File.
Artillery, (Foot.) ... ..	13
European Infantry, ... ..	267
Native Infantry, ... ..	500
Total	780

*To remain at Rangoon, fit for duty, till further orders.*

	Rank and File.
European Artillery, ... ..	78
* Ditto Ditto, ... ..	112
* European Infantry, ... ..	237
Native Infantry, ... ..	1975
* Ditto Ditto, ... ..	1255
Native Artillery, ... ..	62
* Ditto Ditto, ... ..	62

Total 3781

To be left at Rangoon, fit for Garrison duty only, European Infantry, 134

\* To remain at Rangoon for the present, or until the next column moves.

*No. 124. (A)—Extract of a Dispatch from Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B., dated 23d February, 1825.*

"My letter of the 12th instant, would inform you of the immediate advance of the different columns composing the small field force from the army under my command. The land column, under my own immediate orders, arrived here yesterday, a distance from Rangoon, by the road, of fifty-nine miles, without having met the slightest opposition, although a strong division of the enemy, under Maha Silwah, waited our approach in the old Talian fort at Mophie, until I had actually made my disposition for attack, when it broke and dispersed into a close jungle in the rear.—The Carian inhabitants of the country through which we have passed, have viewed the expulsion of the Burmese with much satisfaction; they have received us with kindness and friendship; their ruined villages and fields laid waste, convince me they must be sincerely happy at the change, and I have endeavored to confirm the hope of peace they entertain, by the enclosed proclamation, which has already procured us some assistance in rice, road-making, and slaughter buffaloes.

"I have not heard directly from Brigadier General Cotton, since I left Rangoon, but prisoners inform me Panlang has been taken with great ease, the Kee Woongee and his troops retiring before my marine column upon Donoobew; there, by all accounts, the whole Burmese force still remains, with what intention I cannot understand, for by all the rules of modern warfare, the position at Donoobew is turned the instant I reach the Irrawuddy, either at Saraoo or Naugur; the intervention of a broad and rapid stream, with the want of pontoons, will necessarily prevent me from deriving the full advantage my situation would otherwise give me, but I shall at least prevent the Burmese army from crossing to the left bank of the river in sufficient time to cover Prome. I do not, of course, expect to reach that point without some fighting, but to the best of my information, there is nothing now in my front that could materially impede my progress."

*No. 124. (B)—Proclamation by Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B. and K. C. T. S., Commander of the English Army in the Dominions of the King of Ava.*

INHABITANTS OF THE BURMAN EMPIRE!

The English forces have come amongst you to seek redress for the cruel murders and numerous insults your arrogant court had the presumption to inflict upon, and offer to, the subjects of the British Government, in a time of profound peace.

A great and generous nation, confident in its own strength, like that of the British empire in India, tried every thing possible by mild and temperate expostulation to make your court sensible of the enormity of its conduct, and the inevitable consequences that a perseverance in it would occasion. These remonstrances tended only to increase the insolence of the court of Ava.—Recourse to arms was, therefore, the only measure left to the English, in support of their own rights and dignity. What that appeal has already produced, it is unnecessary for me to say. You all know it.—The bravery of my troops has already deprived the court of Ava of its maritime provinces of Mergui, Tavoy, Yeh, Martaban, and the island of Cheduba.—The ancient kingdom of Pegu has become a desert, from the ravages of war. The most powerful armies, possible for your court to get together, have been sent against us.—We have dispersed them like chaff! Since the arrival of my force at Rangoon, in the month of May last, we have, at different periods, taken from you more than seven hundred pieces of artillery, and small arms, too numerous to be counted, and your loss in lives, has been, as you all know, most enormous; and with you, on that account, I lament the tears of aged parents, sisters,

sisters, widows, and innocent children. All this has been endured merely to support the folly and obstinacy of your court, to whom our peaceable desires have been made known. Yet, it still abstains from offering any reparation for the wanton cruelties and unprovoked injuries I have already mentioned. It only therefore remains for me to carry the victorious English arms not only to your capital, but to the remotest parts of your kingdom, till your court is brought to a proper sense of that justice, honor, and policy, due from one neighbouring state to another.

Having thus briefly explained the cause of our coming in arms amongst you, you will see and fully understand that to your own King and government alone have you to attribute all the past calamities of the war, and such as may still ensue from its further progress. My most anxious desire is to alleviate those miseries towards the peaceable and innocent inhabitants, to the very utmost of my power. Shew yourselves therefore deserving of that feeling towards you by keeping, as we advance, yourselves, and your families, peaceably and quietly in your houses, and you may depend upon the most inviolable protection of your persons and property. Bring to my army such articles of the produce of your farms and industry, as you wish to dispose of; every thing will be paid for with the most scrupulous fidelity. I ask you not to take up arms, or any part whatever in the war; I have troops sufficient for all the objects I have in view, without any further aid—May the spirit of your forefathers direct your hearts to follow the line of conduct I have laid down for your guidance, which will ensure for you, as I have already promised, my fullest protection, and every respect to your religion and temples, &c. &c.

Given under my hand and seal, at Rangoon, the first day of February, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-five.

*No. 125. (A)—Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Camp, before Donabew, March 29, 1825.*

In my last from Sarrawah, dated the 3d instant, I had the honor to report to you my uninterrupted march to that place, and my very early prospect of reaching Prome, if not prevented by a resistance on the part of the enemy at Donabew, which, from the information I then had, I had little reason to contemplate.

On the 7th instant, I distinctly heard a heavy cannonade in the direction of Donabew, lasting from seven in the morning until two in the afternoon, when it entirely ceased: I hoped, in consequence, the place had fallen, and the general information of the natives, in the course of the night and following day, tended to confirm me in that opinion. I, in consequence, continued my forward movement on the 9th, and reached the town of U-au-deet on the 10th, a distance from Sarrawah of twenty-six miles.

On the morning of the 11th, I received a few lines from Brigadier General Cotton, informing me that the firing of the 7th, proceeded from an attack made by him on one of the enemy's out-works at Donabew, which was, in a very gallant style, carried, with a loss to the enemy of from four to five hundred men, killed, wounded, and prisoners; but, that on pushing on his column for the assault of part of the principal work, he found it too strong for farther perseverance, and, consequently, withdrew his troops, stating, that neither he nor Captain Alexander deemed it proper to make any further attack until re-inforced, or hearing from me,—a resolution, from what I have seen, I most fully approve of.

My small and inefficient equipment rendering me wholly dependant on the flotilla for supplies, the free and open communication of the Irrawuddy necessarily formed an object of primary importance, and not wishing to leave the key of all my future operations subject to any farther contingency, I, at once, resolved to return my whole column to assist in the reduction of a place apparently possessing every advantage that the skill, art, and labor of an ingenious people could bestow upon it.

During the night of the 11th, I commenced my march back to Sarrawah, where a most difficult and arduous task awaited me—the passage of the Irrawuddy, with from ten to fifteen canoes as our only means of crossing. The zeal and exertion of the heads of departments and commanding officers of corps, with the cheerful assistance of every soldier, lightened all our labors, and on the morning of the 18th, I had the pleasure of seeing my whole force on the west bank of the river.

By great labor, in making roads, &c., I reached this place on the 25th instant, and on the 27th, opened a communication with the marine column. We are now, night and day, employed in preparations for the reduction of Donabew. It is commanded by Maha Bundoola in person, and the garrison is rated at fifteen thousand fighting men, of whom ten thousand are musqueteers.

Herewith I enclose Brigadier General Cotton's report to me of his late operations: and I have the honor to forward you a dispatch from Major Sale, acquainting me with the annexation of the province of Bassein to our other conquests in this quarter, which has deprived the enemy of all his maritime possessions from Cape Nagrais to Tenasserim. I hourly expected the junction of Major Sale's detachment with this force.

*No. 125. (B)—Copy*



No. 125. (B)—Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Willoughby Cotton, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated Panlang, February 24, 1825.

I have the honor to acquaint you that the water column embarked and proceeded to Pagoda-point on the 16th instant. On the 17th, they reached Teesit, where three stockades, destroyed by Brigadier General Fraser, sometime since, were found re-built, but evacuated. They were immediately destroyed. The light division of boats from His Majesty's Navy, under Lieutenant Smith, of the *Alligator*, was fired upon, some few miles in advance, the same evening, from the bank, where the enemy had a stockaded breast-work, and lost two men killed and one wounded—the boats pulled, under fire of their carronades, immediately in-shore, and destroyed it. On the morning of the 18th, I directed Major Basden, commanding the advance, to reconnoitre the right bank, and burn another stockade we had discerned the evening before, which was done, and the flotilla proceeded up the river. On approaching Panlang, we anchored the body of the column, and I proceeded with Captains Alexander and Chads, of the Royal Navy, and Captain Steel, Assistant Quarter Master General, to reconnoitre in our front, directing the advance division to follow in support. On reaching the light division, at dusk, who were resting on their oars, we found ourselves in sight of one of the outward stockades of Panlang, on the left, called Yoathet. It was too late to complete a reconnoissance, but the light division were anchored immediately out of gun-shot, supported by the advance, which took a position in their rear. During the night, some formidable fire-rafts were launched by the enemy, but owing to the precautionary measures adopted by Captain Alexander, their effect was totally lost.

2. The following morning (the 19th), I proceeded, at day light, accompanied as before, to perfect the reconnoissance, and to arrange for the attack. It was then ascertained, that opposite to Yoathet stockade, there was another on the right bank, named Mighee, and about a mile further up the river, on the point of land formed by the river dividing, was discovered the very extensive stockade of Panlang.—All were at this time occupied. As it was desirable to bring up the armed vessel *Satellite*, and as the tide did not serve until a late hour, ample time was given to arrange the columns of attack, and direct the powerful arm of artillery I had with me to distract their attention and shell the outer stockades. A point of land, about five hundred yards distant from the outer works was immediately occupied, and a battery of four mortars and two six-pounders, erected under the direction of Captain Kennan, and Lieutenants Onslow and Symes, whose exertions enabled it to open in an hour from the time they received the order,—two columns of attack were formed on the right and left banks, the right under Lieutenant-Colonel O'Donaghue, and the left under Major Basden, with orders to attack the stockades situated on their respective banks, and then advance, according to circumstances, after their reduction.

3. The *Satellite* having grounded as she was coming up, the exertions to get her off delayed the attack until five o'clock, when the steam vessel arrived singly, and immediately proceeded in advance, and anchored between the two stockades, the boats advancing a little in her rear, when the attack was immediately made.—The enemy fired from both their positions, but deserted them the moment the troops landed to storm them.—The right column, which I joined from the steam boat as it was pulling for the shore, and the left, advanced by the respective banks. The Tantabeen creek was forded by my personal order, with the column under Lieutenant-Colonel O'Donaghue, and the branch of the river leading to Yanganchinyah still interposing, no time was lost in re-embarking the troops and pushing them to attack the main stockade—the last hope of the enemy.—It was found deserted; the Burmese having left it by both flanks, and one day's operation was crowned with complete success by half-past six o'clock. These objects have been effected, I am truly happy to add, with the loss, naval and military, of only two men, which I attribute to the enemy having been completely distracted and panic-struck by the fire of the mortars in their out-works, and to the rapidity with which the gallant combined force advanced from one position to the other, until the main point was in our possession. The rockets were of the most essential service, and I consider them as one of the most formidable weapons to make use of against the Burmese.—The enemy, whose force is estimated at between four thousand and five thousand men, and a considerable number of war boats, were commanded by the Kee Woongee, who is reported to have left the outer stockade as the troops landed.

4. The alacrity, zeal, and courage manifested by the officers and men, collectively and individually, I beg to bring to your notice in the strongest terms—I trust also I may be allowed to express, in the warmest way, the obligations I am under to Captain Alexander and Captain Chads, of the Royal Navy, for the invaluable assistance I derived from the known experience and judgment of those gallant officers. To Brigadier Mallet, His Majesty's 89th Regiment, second in command with this column, I am particularly indebted for the assistance I received from him. To Lieutenant-Colonel O'Donaghue, 47th Regiment, and Major Basden, His Majesty's 89th Regiment, who, as I before stated, conducted the two columns to the attack, I wish to offer my  
strong

strong acknowledgements for the gallantry and zeal they displayed in leading them. To Captain Steel, Assistant Quarter Master General, who was with me reconnoitring, I owe much for his judicious assistance, and beg to recommend him to your notice as a most active and enterprising officer. My best thanks are due to Captains Ker and Laurie, of the Adjutant General's Department, and the whole of the Staff of the Madras Division were most anxious to display their zeal for the service. To Brigade Major Sadlier, and Captain Wainright, of the 47th, and Lieutenant Wilson, of the 13th, who are my personal Staff, I return my warm acknowledgements for their activity and zeal. To Captain Kennan, who commands the Artillery, every praise is due, and he speaks of Lieutenants Onslow and Symes as being most eminently useful under his orders. The practice of the portion of the Rocket Troop we had on board the steam boat, under Lieutenant Paton, was excellent, and materially aided the operations of this evening; and I beg to bring that officer strongly to your notice. I have requested permission from Captain Alexander to express my obligations to Lieutenant Smith, of His Majesty's ship *Alligator*, for the gallantry and judgment with which he has always conducted the light division of boats, and I beg leave to bring him to your particular notice. He has mentioned to me, that he has derived great assistance from Lieutenants Keele and Kellet, of the Royal Navy. Lieutenant Colonel Mallett has reported to me, in the highest terms, the exertions of his Brigade Major, Captain Young, of His Majesty's 89th Regiment.

5. The stockade of Panlang is one of the best constructed I have seen; and by cutting off (which I have done) two-thirds of it, and running a work across it, I have rendered the remainder a post of considerable strength; and flanked as it will be by the *Satellite*, fully equal to repel any attack, and keep open the communication of the river. The exertions required to get off the *Satellite*, and for the formation of this post, with the reconnoitring party which it was necessary to send, to ascertain the depth of each branch of the river leading to the Irrawaddy, have necessarily delayed us here for some days, but we shall move to-morrow by the one leading to Yanguichynyah.

No. 125. (C)—Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Willoughby Cotton, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated near Youngyoun, March 9, 1825.

1. I do myself the honor to report to you the operations and progress of the column under my command, since the date of my last despatch—the 24th ultimo.

2. On the 25th of February, the flotilla proceeded to Mezlee, about ten miles from Panlang, up the branch of the river leading to Yanguichynyah. Information was this day received, that the light and advance divisions had, the evening before, taken up a position in the river Irrawaddy, commanding the entrance of the branch leading to Panlang.—The report received was, that the passage, though extremely intricate, might be made good.—The following morning, (the 26th) we were enabled to proceed to Talynda, the distance estimated to be eighteen miles from the last anchorage.—Here commenced the shallows, and the heavier vessels grounded.—On the 27th, it was found necessary to unload the steam vessel and gun schooners, for which purpose boats were allotted; and the remainder of the flotilla joined the advance division in the Irrawaddy.—I proceeded, on the 28th, to reconnoitre, and first came in contact with the enemy at Youngyoun, about ten miles above our position.—They occupied the left bank of the river, as we advanced, and appeared to be an outpost from Donabew, the white Pagoda of which, was visible about ten miles higher up the river.—The right bank was deserted, except by a few Carrians.

3. The whole of the flotilla, except those employed in assisting the heavy vessels through the shallows and over the bar, were directed to proceed and occupy the position reconnoitred the day before.—When they had advanced about half-way, it was discovered, that the enemy had occupied a post on the right bank, and pushed on thirteen war boats.—The latter were driven away by the boats of the light division, while a few men of the 89th Regiment were landed, who dispersed the former, killing some and taking one prisoner, at the expense of four men slightly wounded. The flotilla occupied the position pointed out, resting the left upon an island which here divides the river; two 6-pounders were placed upon the point, completely commanding the space between the island and the left bank, which is about one-third of the whole width of the river; and giving us free intercourse with the right bank.

4. The last of the vessels having arrived on the evening of the 5th instant, the flotilla got under weigh early on the morning of the 6th, and took up a position about two miles below Donabew, while I proceeded with Captain Alexander, Royal Navy, in front to reconnoitre. It was evident that the enemy had prepared to receive us below his position, having a succession of formidable stockades, commencing at the Pagoda, and continued increasing in strength, until completed by the main work, which is lofty, upon a very commanding site, surrounded by a deep abattis, with all the customary defences. The guns appeared to be numerous, and the garrison were seen in crowds upon all the works. At half-past one o'clock P. M., I sent, by the prisoner



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taken on the 1st, a flag of truce, with a summons to surrender the place, giving one hour for a reply, which arrived at half-past three. It contained a civil but decided refusal to accede to the proposed terms. A party of one hundred and sixty men of His Majesty's 89th Regiment, covered by the light division, and some row boats, had been prepared to land on the right bank, to reconnoitre a point opposite the main stockade, which was in possession of some men belonging to war boats, that were lying under cover of the bank of the river. This party was immediately advanced, some of the war boats retired under the guns on the opposite side, where they were unassailable, and the object of the reconnoissance was completely gained. During the time that our boats were in progress, and while lying at the point, the enemy kept up an incessant fire from about thirty pieces of cannon, many of heavy calibre.—The precision with which they were directed, gave a coloring of truth to the report, that the Chief, Bundoola, had been for some time practising his artillery. The range had been well ascertained, and the river was commanded all across.—The point is well adapted for a battery of heavy mortars; an island above the main stockade would be available for the same purpose; and by attacking on that side, the necessity of previously carrying the lower stockades would be obviated.—This was the plan of attack I was most anxious to adopt.—The objections to it are as follow.—In consequence of your short despatch of the 2d instant, from Sarrawah, and to supply the wants of the column under my command, I despatched, on the 5th, eight flat boats to Panlang, to bring provisions for both columns.—This entailed upon us the absolute necessity of maintaining the command of the river between Donabew and that post, or hazarding the capture of a convoy, upon which the success of the whole campaign will depend.—The column you did me the honor to place under my command, was originally composed of seven hundred and fifty bayonets, (Europeans) exclusive of the 13th Regiment Native Infantry, stationed at Panlang.—Of these, twenty-five men were left to guard the armed transport *Satellite*: about twenty-five more were sick, a proportion less than I could have expected—small guards are required for the different boats, leaving me about six hundred bayonets disposable for the attack of a strong place, the garrison of which is no where estimated at less than twelve thousand men, well furnished with artillery and muskets. It is obvious, that this small force could not be separated.—Upon consulting with Captain Alexander, whether, if I passed the position for the purpose of attacking above it, he could keep open the river below us, it was his opinion that one half of the force would be requisite for this important purpose. Your despatch from Lain. of the 24th ultimo, depending upon me for the conquest of this position, devolved upon me the necessity of making the attempt; and I had no option but that of landing below the whole of the work, and attacking them in succession, while the flotilla defended the river.

5. Preparations were accordingly made to commence with the Pagoda stockade; and at sun-rise, on the 7th instant, five hundred bayonets were disembarked one mile below the Pagoda;—the men were formed into two columns of equal strength, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel O'Donaghue, 47th, and Major Basden, 89th Regiments; two 6-pounders were landed under Captain Kennan, of the Madras Artillery, and Lieutenant Paton, of the Bengal Artillery, had charge of a small rocket battery. Both columns were led with unexampled steadiness; while, at proper range, a steady fire was opened from the guns and rocket battery. All were exposed to a heavy fire, which was kept up by the enemy to the last, with a perseverance and spirit that has been seldom evinced by the Burmahs.—The gorges of this strong work were narrow, and completely occupied by the gallant troops, who were forcing an entrance, which, when made good, left the enemy, who are reported to have been three thousand men, no alternative, but a passage over their own formidable defences. They were overtaken in the last abbatis, where they stood to fire, until closed upon by the troops inside, and checked by others who had run round outside in search of an entrance to the body of the work.—The dead, the wounded, and the panic-struck fell in one common heap, in and close about the abbatis; and when I state, that of the two latter, two hundred and eighty were brought in prisoners, I cannot estimate the loss of the enemy in this affair, at less than 450 men. Ours was about 20 killed and wounded.

6. The second defence is about 500 yards from the Pagoda stockade, and the same distance from the main work, from which it is distinct, though commanded by it.—For the immediate reduction of this place, two more 6-pounders, four 5½-inch mortars, and a fresh supply of rockets were brought up, and placed in position at a house in advance of the captured work.—The enemy kept close, inducing the supposition that he intended to reserve his strength for the large stockade.—When it was presumed that a sufficient impression had been made from the batteries, 200 men, under the command of Captain Rose, of His Majesty's 89th Regiment, advanced in two parties to the storm; a destructive fire was immediately commenced from all parts of the face of the work, which caused the columns to diverge to the right of the point of attack, and got into a ditch, described to be filled with spikes, and scarped, so as to expose it to the fire of the work.—All who presented themselves were knocked down; and here, I regret to say, that Captain Rose, who had received one wound, fell by a second shot while persevering in the attack, and shewing a gallant example to his troops.—Captain Cannon, also of the 89th, a brave and deserving officer, was killed,—others were wounded, and the loss, in men, extremely heavy. The party was, at length, directed to retire. The two 8-inch mortars, and four light 12-pounders from the gun boats, were landed to increase the battery. The enemy strengthened the work,

and



and towards evening brought more heavy guns into play. It became necessary, after our day's loss, of which a Return\* is enclosed, to consider what would be the ultimate result of the operations; and although I feel confident that I could have carried the second work, it would have been with a further loss, which would prevent an attempt upon the main stockade, and I should have been either left in a position exposed to one of superior strength, or have to relinquish the post after carrying it at a great sacrifice. There was another alternative, and, with much regret, the conviction that I should thus best forward the service, induced me to adopt the measure of re-embarking and occupying a position until I could receive a reinforcement. The guns and stores of every description were re-shipped, and, after spiking the enemy's cannon, and destroying the numerous jinjals and other arms which had been taken, the troops marched out steady at 2 o'clock A. M. on the 8th instant, and embarked with perfect regularity, without any description of loss.

7. The wounded among the prisoners were dressed by our surgeons, and as they would prove only an incumbrance, the whole were permitted, in the evening, to go where they pleased. None of the prisoners expressed a wish to return to Donabew, but they generally retired to villages to the southward.

8. The gallantry and perseverance displayed by the troops, the cheerfulness with which they underwent the labour of bringing up heavy mortars and artillery, deserve that I should mention them to you in the most favourable terms. To Lieutenant Colonel Mallett, and the officers of every arm, to those of the general and personal Staff, I am much indebted for their unabated exertions throughout this arduous day. To Lieutenant Colonel O'Donaghue, and Major Basden, I beg to draw your attention in the strongest way for the able manner and gallant style they conducted their respective columns to the points of attack at the Pagoda stockade.

9. The flotilla has dropped to Youngoun, and occupies the strong position from which we moved on the 6th instant. I have directed the wounded to be conveyed to Rangoon, and have taken advantage of the opportunity to direct a further supply of provisions to be sent when the boats return.

P. S.—A Return of captured ordnance, &c. is inclosed.†

*No. 125. (D)—Copy of a Despatch from Major R. Sale, 13th Light Infantry, Commanding, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c., dated Bassein, March 6, 1825.*

After a tedious passage we arrived off Pagoda-point, Great Negrais, on the evening of the 24th February. The next day, I dispatched boats with Lieutenant Fraser, R. N. and Lieutenant Kershaw, Assistant Surveyor, with a flag of truce, to reconnoitre, with orders to endeavour to secure its reception, and to avoid hostile measures. The boat bearing the flag, went a-head, towards a large boat of the enemy's, apparently also reconnoitring; but upon our nearer approach, the boat immediately pulled away, and when within range of their guns, they opened their fire upon the boats, which they continued, without effect, while any were in range—the boats passed on, and after reconnoitring another stockade, about a mile further, returned.

The

\* *General Return of Killed and Wounded, of the Water Column, on the 7th March, 1825.*

*Madras Artillery.*—Wounded—6 Rank and File, and 1 Gun Lascar.

*Bengal Artillery.*—Killed—1 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Rank and File, and 1 Bheestie.

*His Majesty's 47th Regiment.*—Killed—3 Rank and File.

Wounded—18 Rank and File.

*His Majesty's 89th Regiment.*—Killed—2 Captains, 1 Serjeant, and 8 Rank and File.

Wounded—3 Lieutenants, 1 Serjeant, and 52 Rank and File.

Missing—1 Rank and File.

*1st Madras European Regiment.*—Killed—1 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Drummer, and 9 Rank and File.

*Pioneers.*—Wounded—4 Rank and File.

*NAMES OF OFFICERS KILLED.*—Captains R. C. Rose and Charles Cannon, of His Majesty's 89th Regiment.

*NAMES OF OFFICERS WOUNDED.*—Lieutenants W. J. King, C. G. King, and J. Currie, of His Majesty's 89th Regiment, slightly.

*His Majesty's Ship Arachne.*—Wounded—2 Seamen.

*H. C. Cruiser Teignmouth.*—Killed—1 Seaman.—Wounded—1 Seaman.

*Gun Boats.*—Killed 1 Lascar.—Wounded—1 Officer, and 9 Lascars.

*NAME OF OFFICER WOUNDED.*—Mr. A. F. Derby, gun-boat *Ankerst*.

Grand Total of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, 129.

† *Return of Ammunition and Stores Captured and Destroyed in the Fortified Post in advance of Donabew, the 7th March, by the Force under the Command of Brigadier General Cotton, A. D. C. to His Majesty.*

Iron Guns, mounted on the Works—four 6-pounders; two 4-pounders, and 58 Jinjals—Total 64, destroyed.

A very considerable quantity of Round and Grape thrown into the river, the number could not be exactly ascertained. About 3 Cwt. of Powder destroyed, and several thousand rounds of Musket and Jinjal Ammunition; Three Hundred and Sixty-two Muskets destroyed; Six Hundred and Thirty Spears ditto, and a great number of Intrenching Tools, of various descriptions.

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The next morning, the 26th, the fleet weighed and stood in for the river, and having made arrangements for landing one hundred and fifty of the 13th Light Infantry, fifty of the 38th, and one hundred of the 12th Native Infantry, His Majesty's ship *Larne*, and Honorable Company's cruizer *Mercury*, took up such good positions, as by a few rounds completely to drive the enemy from their works, and the troops immediately landed without opposition. Here was found six 6-pounders, two large wooden guns, and twenty-one jinjals, with a quantity of loose powder.—I now left a party of the 12th Native Infantry to destroy the works, and the transport *Carron* to bring away the guns: I then proceeded with the rest to the next stockade, in the same order, and the effects of the guns from the *Larne* and *Mercury*, were as decided as before, not any of the enemy waited the landing of the troops—here we found two 9-pounders and thirteen jinjals—opposite to this point, and on Little Negrais, there were other works which we destroyed.

We anchored here for the night, and the next morning, the 27th, the fleet proceeded with a fine wind up the river, having, at an early hour, despatched a reconnoitring party to the extreme point of Little Negrais, where there were some deserted stockades and excellent wells.

On the 28th, I sent a boat to reconnoitre, and endeavour to post a proclamation, so as to meet with notice. This had the effect of causing a visit from two Carriars, who not understanding the Birman writing, had brought it back, and from this time we had constant communication with the Carriars, who proved perfectly amicable.

On the 1st March, we came to a large village, called Narputtah, which was quite deserted.—We were now told by all, that the head person of Bassein had superintended the partial defence at Negrais, whence he retired, upon our attack, and returned to Bassein. The panic then became general, and I am informed by all, that the people were divided in opinion, some wishing to defend, and others to resign and trust to us. The result was, that the town was destroyed by fire and totally deserted.

On the evening of the 3d instant, we anchored off the smoking ruins, and I immediately landed the troops, and took post in the area of the principal Pagoda.—I found, upon going over the ground, that although the town has been so generally burnt, yet there are still some good private houses remaining—I have sent out proclamations in various directions, and have every reason to expect many of the people will return. The principal Arab, Adghee Mahomed, an old man, is among those who have already come in. From all that I can learn, I cannot expect any extensive supply of cattle for carriage, but I trust soon to have it in my power to send a more detailed and satisfactory account.

The general system in this part of the country appears to be for the stronger party to plunder and molest the weaker, and to drive them from their homes. I understand, that the head person of Bassein has retreated to Lamina, which is represented to be six days journey by the country boats, and that none larger can get to it; there are about two hundred followers, and one hundred musquets said to be with him; but they have not any stockade, and the town is said to be already partially burnt.

I have made every exertion to get a courier to proceed by land, but have not succeeded in effecting this, nor can the boats proceed by the creeks to Rangoon at this season, or I should have sent them by that route; failing in this, I have dispatched two armed row-boats to Rangoon by the outer passage, Lieutenant Kershaw taking this dispatch.

I have the honor to enclose a Return of the ordnance taken at Bassein, and wait further orders.\*

No. 126.—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department; dated Donoobew, April 2, 1825.*

My dispatch of the 29th ultimo, would inform you of my arrival in front of Donoobew, as well as of my motives for having retraced my steps to that place.—I have now the honor to acquaint you, that the fort and different redoubts fell into our hands this morning, with all the ordnance, stores, depôts, &c. &c., having been

\* *Return of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores, &c., taken in the Works at Bassein, by the Expedition under the Command of Major Sale, His Majesty's 13th Regiment Light Infantry.*

Bassein, 5th March, 1825.

Ordnance, Iron, serviceable—two 9-pounders, six 7½-pounders, two 6-pounders, and one 4½-pounder.

Jinjal—unserviceable—one 1½-pounder.

N. B. Shot, loose, round, of different diameters—349.

Bullets, leaden, Carbine and Pistol—2597.

been evacuated and abandoned by the enemy in the course of last night, and it affords me great satisfaction to add, that this important point has been gained with a very trifling loss on our part\*.

I found the fort of Donabew much too extensive to be surrounded by my small force; and, although fully aware of the great importance of every hour of the declining season for military operations, I preferred the loss of time to the loss of lives, and resolved to take advantage of our means and science in the reduction of the place. I, in consequence, ordered some heavy guns and mortars to be brought up and landed, and with much laborious exertion on the part of all employed, our mortar and enfilading batteries were opened yesterday, and the breeching batteries had just commenced their fire at day-light this morning, when the enemy's small rear guard was discovered in full retreat towards the jungle. The place was immediately taken possession of, and, in addition to the long list of guns, &c. found on the works, we have taken granaries and depôts of grain sufficient for the consumption of this force for many months; all the wounded and sick found in the place join with the deserters who have come in, in positively asserting the death of Maha Bundoolah; and, from the circumstantial manner in which the story is told by all, I can have no doubt of the fact. He is said to have been killed by a rocket while going his rounds yesterday morning, and no entreaty of the other chiefs could prevail upon the already panic-stuck garrison to remain longer together. They have fled through the jungle, in the direction of Lamina, and I have reason to hope few of them will again appear in arms against us. During the siege, the enemy made several bold and desperate sorties on our line, but were, on all occasions, quickly repulsed. In one of these sorties, a scene at once novel and interesting presented itself in front of both armies. Seventeen large elephants, each carrying a complement of armed men, and supported by a column of Infantry, were observed moving down towards our right flank: I directed the Body Guard, under Captain Sneyd, to charge them, and they acquitted themselves most handsomely: mixing boldly with the elephants; they shot their riders off their backs, and finally drove the whole back into the fort. On this occasion, I also observed the energy and activity of the Bengal Horse Artillery and Rocket Troop, under Captains Graham and Lunsden as very conspicuous.

The unremitting zeal and activity of Lieutenant Colonel Hopkinson and Captain Grant, Commanding Officers of Artillery and Engineers, during a most trying period, merit my peculiar notice, and their skill and attention in carrying on the approaches before this place, reflect upon them the highest credit.

I now

*General Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Operations of the Army under Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., before Donabew, from the 25th of March to the 1st of April, 1825.*

*Donabew, 2d April, 1825.*

*Horse Brigade.*—Killed—1 Rank and File, 1 Lascar, 1 Syce, and 1 Elephant Coolie.

Wounded—1 Syce, 1 Elephant Coolie, 2 Mahouts, and 2 Troop.

*Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard.*—Killed—3 Troop.

Wounded—3 Troop.

*Foot Artillery.*—Wounded—1 Lieutenant, and 2 Rank and File.

*His Majesty's Royal Regiment.*—Wounded—1 Rank and File.

*His Majesty's 38th Regiment.*—Killed—2 Rank and File.

Wounded—12 Rank and File, and 1 Bheestie.

*His Majesty's 41st Regiment.*—Wounded—1 Serjeant, 3 Rank and File, 1 Lascar, and 1 man of the Qr.-Master's Establishment

*His Majesty's 47th Regiment.*—Killed—3 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Lieutenant, 6 Rank and File, and 3 men of the Quarter Master's Establishment.

Missing—1 Hospital servant.

*His Majesty's 89th Regiment.*—Wounded—3 Rank and File, and 1 Lascar.

*1st Madras European Regiment.*—Wounded—1 Rank and File.

*26th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.*—Killed—1 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer or Bugler, and 4 Rank and File.

*43rd Regiment Madras Native Infantry.*—Wounded—1 Rank and File.

*1st Battalion Pioneers.*—Wounded—1 Rank and File.

*Flotilla.*—Wounded—2 Rank and File, 1 Seaman, and 3 Lascars.

NAMES OF OFFICERS WOUNDED.—*Madras Artillery.*—Lieutenant Symes, severely, not dangerously.

*His Majesty's 47th Regiment.*—Lieutenant John Gordon, severely, not dangerously.

*Return of Ordnance and Military Stores Captured at Donabew, by the Force under the Personal Command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., and K. C. T. S., on the 2d April, 1825.*

*Ordnance.*—Brass Guns—1 9-pr., 1 8-pr., 1 5½-pr., 1 5-pr., 1 4½-pr., 1 3-pr., 12 2-prs., 3 1½-prs., and 7 1-prs.

Iron Guns—1 24-pr., 1 12-pr., 1 9-pr., 3 8-prs., 2 7-prs., 4 6-prs., 7 5½-prs., 5 5-prs., 5 4½-prs., 20 4-prs., 7 3½-prs., 2½ 3-prs., 16 2½-prs., 12 2-prs., and 2 1½-prs. Total 139.

Iron Carronades.—1 12-pounder.

Jinjals.—269.

The whole of the Ordnance was mounted on the works.

A considerable quantity of the undermentioned Stores was found, which there has not been time to calculate.

Shot and Grape of different sizes. Gunpowder, Sulphur, Saltpetre, Musket Balls, and Pig Lead.



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I now beg leave to acknowledge my obligations to Captain Alexander, c. b., His Majesty's ship *Alligator*, senior naval officer, and commanding the flotilla, for his hearty and cordial co-operation on all occasions since we have served together, and for his very great exertion on the present occasion, in bringing up stores and provisions.

Since we have been before Donabew, eleven of the enemy's large class war boats have been captured by our advanced boats, under his own immediate orders; making, with others evacuated by their crews, 38 first-rate war boats now in our possession, and I have every reason to think that only five of the large squadron the enemy had stationed at this place, have succeeded in escaping.

A vast number of other boats of an excellent description have also fallen into our hands.  
In the course of to-morrow, part of my force will be again in motion towards Prome.

No. 127. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, κ. c. b., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Sarrawah, April 9, 1825.*

I had the honor of addressing you on the 2d instant from Donabew, announcing the occupation of that important place by the troops under my command.

It being of the utmost importance that I should again appear on my former line of march on the eastern bank of the Irrawaddy; left Donabew on the night of the 3d, and arrived with an advanced guard, consisting of H. M.'s 38th and 47th Regiments, opposite to this place, on the 7th Instant, and by the exertions of the boats of His Majesty's Navy, under Lieutenant Smith, of His Majesty's ship *Alligator*, sent on by Captain Alexander to superintend the passage of the river, I had these two corps crossed over to Sarrawah, in the course of the day. The rest of the force has since been arriving and crossing in succession, and I trust by the day after to-morrow the whole will be over.

The enemy's late large force stationed at Donabew, continues dispersing in small bands all over the country; the death of Mahah Bundoola, as already stated, appears by the concurring testimony of the flying enemy, and local authorities most fully confirmed. Notwithstanding the severe duties the force has lately had to perform, its state of health, I am happy to say, is excellent; the heat by day is very oppressive, and the common palls used by European soldiers, afford little protection from the sun; but the deserted state of the towns and villages has hitherto enabled me to put the troops very generally under cover, and to this I ascribe, in a great measure, their healthy state; when, however, the inhabitants choose to remain in their houses, I shall take care they are not interfered with in the occupation of them.

Brigadier General Cotton, whom I left at Donabew for a couple of days, delivered the enclosed report to me yesterday, and many more discoveries in guns, stores, &c., are yet expected to be made.

By Brigadier General Cotton, and all the officers embarked on the flotilla, the zeal and incessant labor of His Majesty's Navy is mentioned in terms of high admiration, and it affords me much pleasure to forward to you the high and honorable testimony borne by Captain Alexander, c. b., senior naval officer with this force, to the meritorious services and exertion displayed by the Honorable Company's gun boats and flotilla.

Here I was yesterday joined by Brigadier McCreagh with the Battalion Companies of His Majesty's Royal Regiment, and the 28th Native Infantry from Rangoon, with the first supply of Elephants sent to this force, the second shipment of these animals, twelve in number, (one died) under escort of the 30th Madras Native Infantry, I expect will join me in the course of a very few days, these arrivals will prove a most timely aid to our Commissariat Department.

No. 127. (B)—*Copy of a Report from Brigadier General W. Cotton, Commanding Madras Troops, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, κ. c. b., &c. &c. &c.; dated Sarrawah, April 8, 1825.*

In obedience to the commands you did me the honor to leave with me, on your moving with the advance of the army on the 3d ultimo, I beg leave to acquaint you that I caused the Pagoda and two other outer stockades to be totally destroyed on the 4th, withdrawing, by working parties, all the guns and jinjals that were in the works. A very large quantity of gunpowder blew up in various directions on the stockades being fired, the breast-work has been filled up, which extended on the left flank of the main work. Inventories of all stores have been taken, all the muskets collected, and directions given for the cannon to be placed on the bank of the river in park, ready for embarkation, and to be forwarded by return boats to Rangoon, when opportunity may occur. I beg to mention, that several brass guns have been discovered, not included in the report made to you, that were buried, and I received information the day before I quitted Donabew, that guns and stores of every description had been thrown into the tank in the fortress the night they evacuated the place.

I have

I have apprized Lieutenant Colonel Conry of this, with directions immediately to ascertain the point.—I have left the Madras European Regiment with 350 of the 22d Native Infantry, and a detail of artillery, in garrison, which I hope you will approve of; and desired the Lieutenant Colonel in command, to forward with the least possible delay, every reinforcement of men and provisions to your army.—In order to forward this most essential service, I have left with the Lieutenant Colonel a sum of money to enable him to pay the boatmen instantly, and also the natives who bring in provisions.—I have also, by your instructions, requested, that every conciliation may be used to the inhabitants, and have no hesitation in saying, I am confident he will find every supply willingly brought.

No. 127. (C)—*Copy of a Report from Captain Thomas Alexander, c. B., Royal Navy, Senior Officer, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated Honorable Company's Steam Vessel Diana, off Sarrawah, April 9, 1825.*

Gun Boats, 1st Division, Captain Finnucane, His Majesty's 14th Regiment of Foot.

2d Division, Lieutenant Laughton, Bombay Marine.

3d Division, Lieutenant Rowbund, Bombay Marine.

4th Division, Mr. Lindquist, Bengal Marine.

5th Division, Mr. Hutton, Bengal Marine.

Gun Vessels *Swift*, Fleming commander, *Sulkea Packet*, *Elizabeth*, *Saugor*, *Tyger*, *Emma*, *Powerful*, and *Tom Tough*, Mortar Vessels.

The names of the other commanders I will forward to-morrow.

The conduct of the Honorable Company's flotilla I have the pleasure to command, has been such as to merit my warmest praise; their hardships, privations, and fatigue for the last six weeks, have been borne with cheerfulness, and their conduct against the enemy's works and war boats, steady and creditable.

The officers commanding divisions of gun boats and vessels, as per margin, have my best thanks, particularly Captain Finnucane, His Majesty's 14th Regiment, whose zeal and activity has always been conspicuous.

I request you will be pleased to recommend these officers to the favorable attention of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council.

No. 128. (A)—*Extract of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, k. c. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department; dated Turrif Mein, April 20, 1825.*

My advance from Donobew to this place (thirty miles from Prome) has been made without opposition or annoyance of any kind, on the part of the enemy, and if I except the totally deserted state of the country, and the consequent difficulty of obtaining supplies of any kind, our line of march on this bank of the Irrawaddy is yet unmarked by any act of hostility since we left Rangoon.

Prome is reported fortified, and said to be occupied by a large force, but in every way so much dispirited, that I trust, either by treaty or force of arms, to take possession of the place without much difficulty.

From Lieutenant-Colonel Smelt at Rangoon, my accounts are most satisfactory—The chiefs of Syriam and Dallah, had voluntarily come in, and made their submission: others were expected to follow their example, and reports, although unsupported by positive authority, state that the Siamese army is again in march towards Martaban, having only been recalled in consequence of an apprehended insurrection in some part of Siam.

Late last night a letter, of which the accompanying is a translation, was brought to my camp, and from the style in which the original was put up, bearing also the royal seal, I have not a doubt of its having emanated from the highest source in the state: a copy of my answer is likewise enclosed, and it will be my most earnest endeavour to induce the court of Ava to an immediate acceptance of the basis of a treaty.

No. 128. (B)—*Menghi Seree Maha Nuddah Somjeon; Attawoon Privy Counsellor: Menghi Woojneah, deputed by the Sun-descended King to Prome, and being in his confidence, to Sir Archibald Campbell, General in Chief of the Army, sent by the Governor General in Council, on the part of the Honorable the East India Company.*

From the creation of the world, the two governments have lived in peace and amity, and have never before been engaged in war, or had any dispute, the two nations living as it were in unison, and with friendly and commercial

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commercial intercourse constantly subsisting between them; in the year 1185, in consequence of the matter arising from the conduct of a certain paltry chief, war commenced, and has lasted for upwards of twelve months, occasioning much bloodshed and loss of lives to the armies and people of both nations.

These two nations being both great and powerful, it would be highly desirable that a communication should be opened between them, that their people may again enjoy the blessings of peace, from which happiness must occur to their subjects: and the chiefs through whose means these desirable objects can be obtained, would be held and considered to be highly enlightened, and to have rendered special service to their respective states. For this purpose we have sent William James, a British soldier, and two Clashies taken prisoners by us, with two soldiers of the state, to deliver this letter, and hope that no delay will occur to prevent a speedy reply being given to this communication.

No. 128. (C)—*Sir Archibald Campbell, General in Chief of the British Forces, employed against the dominions of the King of Ava, has the honor to acknowledge a communication from Menghi Seree Maha Nuddah Sonjeon, Attawoon Menghi Woojneah, deputed by their Sovereign to Promé, and empowered to enter upon a negotiation, for the purpose of restoring the bonds of peace and amity, which had hitherto so long and happily existed between the two nations.*

The English Commander begs to assure the deputies of the King of Ava, that they will find him now, as he ever has been, ready to meet them on terms of negotiation. Sir Archibald Campbell having made his arrangements for the military occupation of the city of Promé, he trusts the Burmese chiefs will not occasion a further effusion of blood, by offering opposition to this measure, and also that the deputies will fully shew the sincerity of their intentions, by meeting him, for the purpose of holding their first conference at Muggeeziék, where he pledges himself, they will be received and treated with every attention and honour due to their exalted character, and where the necessary arrangements can be entered upon, for the protection of the inhabitants of Promé, and the surrounding country, in their persons and property.

The English General has to offer his thanks, for the restoration to liberty of the European soldiers and two Clashies.

No. 129. (A)—*Extract of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department; dated Promé, April 26, 1825.*

With my despatch of the 20th instant, I had the honor to transmit to you copies of a communication from two Attawoons, notifying their authority from His Majesty of Ava, for entering upon negotiations for peace with me, and my answer to it.

The messenger who conveyed my answer was carried a short distance above Promé, to the residence of the Prince of Sarawaddy, who, in council with the Attawoons, returned the enclosed, No. 2.—The latter paragraph immediately created a suspicion in my mind, that the retention of Promé was more at heart than any serious wish or direct authority to sue for peace. The opinion too, was much strengthened by a report I that very day received, of thirty pieces of brass artillery, and a considerable re-inforcement in troops, being on their way down from Ava. Under the above impression, and the appearance of the weather threatening an early change to rain, I sent back to the Attawoons to inform them, that, as I had already intimated, the submission of Promé to the British arms, could not be dispensed with, that I would be before the place on the following morning, but would halt my column at a certain distance for the purpose of receiving the deputies if they thought proper to meet me.—My messenger, on reaching Promé, found the place already deserted by the deputies, and all the public authorities, and the whole Burmese force retreating in the greatest hurry and confusion. He therefore returned to me without delay, bringing back my letter, and by pushing rapidly forward, I arrived here soon after day light yesterday morning, just in time to save the existing part of the town and its extensive granaries from the fury of the flames.

No. 129. (B)—*The Menghi Seree Maha Nuddah Sainjeon and the Menghi Woojneah, deputed by the Sun-descended King, to regulate the affairs of the kingdom at Promé, have the honor to address the General in Chief of the British Army, Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.*

We sent two men, by names *Sahawah Pandaw* and *Yean-ownas-ratah*, to convey a letter, with a view to bring about an amicable adjustment of the differences existing between the two great nations, that had formerly

been



been so long on terms of peace and amity:—by the hands of these men, we received no answer, but by the hands of *Khyboo* and *Nashaine* a letter, sealed, was brought; these men falling in with our messengers near Shewadon, the whole four came on together, when we received the letter of the British General, which contained very satisfactory news, and which we thoroughly understood, and are much delighted that a prospect is thus opened to us of restoring peace to the two great nations.

The European and other prisoners that were with us, we sent back, and those that were taken at, and near Donabew, must have fallen into your hands when that place was taken. On enquiring of the chiefs, who have come from thence, they declare they were all left. That these two great nations might not continue in enmity, these persons have been sent.

Upon the arrival of the British at Prome, the differences subsisting between the two great powers can be investigated, and means taken for bringing them to an amicable adjustment, as your letter invites the authorities at Prome to a conference at *Muggeeziek*, and that if we fail in doing so, it would be considered as a want of inclination to adjust the dispute on their part, and that on reaching Prome, the service of the two Kings could be executed.

There are armies on both sides, and the space between them would afford sufficient room for a meeting to take place. Let the British army stay on such ground as it may select on the arrival of this letter, by which the inhabitants of Prome will be delivered from great trouble and distress.

No. 130.—*Copy Letter from Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B., to George Swinton, Esq. ; dated Head-Quarters, Prome, 26th April, 1825.*

On the 24th instant, I arrived with the head of my column in the neighbourhood of *Shindam Mew*, eight miles from this place, and concerted measures with Captain Alexander, commanding the flotilla, for attacking Prome on the following day. I have, however, the honour to inform you, that the enemy did not await our advance, but retired during the night, apparently in the greatest confusion, and I yesterday morning took possession of the place without firing a shot, the enemy leaving in the different works about 100 pieces of artillery, and extensive granaries well filled with grain. The surrounding hills were generally fortified to their very summits, and commanded our advance, presenting a position of a very formidable appearance, and, in reality, so naturally strong, that 10,000 steady soldiers could have defended it against any attack of ten times that force. The stockade itself is complete, and great labour must have been bestowed upon it; indeed, both in materials and workmanship, it surpasses any thing we have hitherto seen in this country.

The town was on fire when we entered it; but whether intentionally so or by accident, I cannot ascertain. One whole quarter has been completely reduced to ashes, and with it, I regret to say, much grain has also perished.

The inhabitants are coming in in great numbers, and even chiefs of towns and villages are now suing for passes of protection. They appear highly delighted in being relieved from a state of oppressive tyranny, that either compelled them to take up arms in a hopeless cause, or drove them into the jungles, with their families, to lead a life of wretchedness and want.

No. 131. (A)—*Copy Letter from the same to the same ; dated Head-Quarters, Prome, 2d May, 1825.*

It affords me the greatest pleasure to forward, for the information of the right honourable the Governor-General in Council, another instance of the zeal and judgment with which Captain Alexander, commanding the flotilla, has uniformly co-operated with me on this service, and another proof, if any such be wanting, of the gallantry, spirit, and enterprise, displayed on all occasions by that part of His Majesty's navy serving on this expedition. It has now been proved to me, beyond a doubt, that strong reinforcements of troops and thirty pieces of cannon were within a short march of Prome, when I took possession of it. These troops have now very generally dispersed, and the guns taken by the men-of-war-boats are, no doubt, part of those intended for the defence of this place.

Prince Sarrawuddy is retiring direct upon the capital, with the remnant of his people. Desolation marks his track, and the nearest cottage does not escape the incendiary's torch. Prompt and decisive measures alone saved Prome from the general conflagration, and its inhabitants from a wretched fate. They, with their *Thurkie* (Civil Governor) at their head, have very generally returned to their houses, and have received the kindest reception; nor shall the proud characteristic of our country be forgotten in extending shelter and protection to the suffering families that have been wantonly exposed to the inclemency of an approaching monsoon, by the barbarous policy of their own countrymen.

No. 131. (B)

No. 131. (B)—*Copy Letter from Captain Alexander, of His Majesty's Ship Alligator, to Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B.; dated Honorable Company's Steam-boat Diana, off Promé, 2d May, 1825.*

I have great satisfaction in informing you that the light division of men-of-war-boats, under the command of Lieutenant Wilkinson, of His Majesty's ship *Liffey* (and whom I sent to reconnoitre up the river on the 27th ultimo), returned last night, having succeeded, after a long chase, in capturing and destroying five enemy's large war-boats, pulling from fifty to sixty oars, with their arms and ammunition, and bringing down three others with their guns, &c., as also a boat laden with thirteen guns of different calibres, jinjals, 520 spears, and destroying the same number.\*

This service has been performed under the greatest fatigue, from the great strength of the current which kept the boats under a heavy fire from 500 musqueteers and 50 horse, under the command of the Prince of Sarrawuddy, who was retreating to the left bank near Foundain, destroying the villages, grain, and boats of every description. The capture of the war-boats liberated 3,000 boats and canoes, with families, they were driving before them, and all the people claimed protection, and returned with Lieutenant Wilkinson, many of whom are lying on the opposite side of the river waiting for passes to their villages below.

I am happy to state this service has been performed without a casualty. Four of the enemy were found killed as the boats returned. The boats got up to Meeayday, a distance of between fifty and sixty miles; at some of the rapids they did not pull a boat's length in an hour.

P. S. Three large boats laden with rice, salt, and paddy, are among the captured vessels brought down, and the jolly-boat of the *Bannerman* transport, and a lascar belonging to her, captured at Rangoon.

No. 132.—*Copy of a Letter from Major W. Frith, Commanding Mergui, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., Commander of the Forces at Rangoon; dated Mergui, February 7, 1825.*

On the 29th ultimo, information having been brought me that a Siamese Flotilla had made its appearance within a short distance of this town, committing several acts of depredation on the villages, I dispatched Lieutenant Drever, with fifty Sepoys in country boats, in search of them.

He found them as described, about eight hours row from this, amounting to near thirty sail of large boats, well armed, pulling from sixty to eighty oars each. He made towards them, under English colours, and on hoisting a white flag, it was immediately answered. A conference ensued, in which the Siamese Chief regretted that his ignorance of our conquests in this quarter had led him into acts of aggression on a country now under the British protection, and promised to come the following day to Mergui, and release all the prisoners he had taken.

On the following day he made his appearance with only nine boats, the rest he stated would be here on the morrow, when all the prisoners he had taken should be released, and again renewed his protestations of respecting our conquests in this quarter, at the same time requesting of me a paper for the King, explanatory of the causes of his sudden return without accomplishing his orders respecting the intended hostilities in this quarter. This I promised to give him on the release of all the prisoners he had taken in this neighbourhood.

He remained here till the 2d, when three boats came in, and he released ninety prisoners. But being informed that we were dissatisfied at the rest not arriving as promised, on the evening of the same day taking advantage of the flood tide, he weighed anchor and went off apparently in great alarm, with the whole of his fleet, at the very hour fixed for paying me a third visit.

The boats of the Honorable Company's cruiser *Thetis*, which arrived on the 31st January, and some country boats, with Sepoys, were immediately sent after them, but night coming on, could not ascertain their course.

It is with regret I have to inform you, that I have just heard of the town of Tenasserim, and several other villages, having been plundered, and a considerable number of the inhabitants carried off on the following day by this party. The Chief states himself to be high in rank in the employ of the King of Siam, and the inhabitants of all the surrounding country, as well as those of this town, are in the greatest state of alarm and trepidation.

No. 133.—*Extract*

\* Return of Ordnance and Military Stores captured at Promé, on the 25th April 1825, by the Force under Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B.

Iron Guns, of different sizes, from 12 to 1-pounder, 29.—Brass ditto, 12.—Total 101.  
About 1,050 Shot of size, including 300 English Shot, and 500 lbs. of Lead.

No. 133.—*Extract of a Letter from Major W. Frith, Commanding Mergui, to Brigadier McCreaagh, c. B., Commanding at Rangoon; dated Mergui, March 15, 1825.*

Av.  
1825.

I beg to acquaint you, that on the 6th Instant, information was brought me that two Siamese boats, about twenty-five miles from this, took off a boat belonging to this place with ten men in her, three of whom escaped and returned. I immediately sent off the boats of the *Thetis* cruiser, which was here at the time, with a native as a guide, who escaped from the boat; they returned the night following, without being able to see or hear any thing of them.

On the 10th, I again had information that these boats were off the bank of Mergui Island, and took away twenty people from a small village. The next morning I sent out Lieutenant Drever, with fifty Sepoys, in six hired boats, to do their utmost to seize some of the marauders. Mr. Drever remained out three days without seeing any of the Siamese, he was at the village which had eighteen people taken from it. I regret to say the inhabitants of Tenasserim have left it, some are here and others in the jungle. I am endeavouring to persuade them to return to their homes, and that I will send thirty Sepoys to remain as a protection for them.

No. 134.—*Extract of a Letter from Major W. Frith, Commanding Mergui, to the Officer Commanding Rangoon; dated Mergui, March 23, 1825.*

I beg leave to inform you, that I have this moment received information, that about sixteen hundred Siamese have landed near Tenasserim. I have ordered boats to be procured to take an Officer and fifty Sepoys, to ascertain the views of the Siamese, and to desire they may return to their own country, and not molest the inhabitants.

No. 135. (A)—*Extract of a Letter from Major W. Frith, Commanding Mergui, to the Officer Commanding Rangoon; dated Mergui, March 27, 1825.*

I had the honor to inform you in my note of the twenty-third, the information I received respecting the Siamese near Tenasserim.

Early on the morning of the 24th instant, I sent Lieutenants Drever and Barnett, with fifty Sepoys, to ascertain the correctness of the report. The party returned to-day, bringing with them a Siamese Chief and fifteen men, with five muskets, and a few pikes: about twenty men, with their arms, escaped into the jungle.

This Chief says there is another, higher in rank than himself, going about the island, with twenty-four boats, taking off all he can lay hold of. These are the people who left this on the 2d of February. This man says they returned home and told the governor that this country was under the protection of the English. They were not believed, but ordered back to carry off every one they could lay hold of. Enclosed is the name of the governor, and the place he resides at. I intend writing and make him acquainted with the prisoners I have here, in hopes he may release those he has from this country.

No. 135. (B)—*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant J. Drever, Commanding Detachment 7th Regiment Native Infantry, to Major Frith, Commanding Mergui; dated Mergui, April 2, 1825.*

I have the honor to report, agreeably to your instructions, I embarked on the morning of 29th ultimo, with the party, as per margin,\* in some country boats, manned by Burmese, and proceeded in a southerly direction, until the morning of the 31st, in search of those Siamese pirates, who for some time have made such destruction in this province; when I discovered six boats, I immediately made my boats form line, so as to prevent their ascertaining the number of ours, which I am happy to say, had the desired effect, as they did not appear alarmed until we got near them. I then gave order for Lieutenant Bingham and Assistant Surgeon Lindsell, to proceed in two fast pulling boats, and I accompanied in a third. We very soon overtook and boarded four of them: two made their escape. Those taken, made but little resistance, I suppose in consequence of our rear boats coming up. They proved to be four Siamese war-boats, well manned and armed, as per margin; † after securing them, we proceeded to the island of Yerqudam, in the Burmese territory, about ninety miles from Mergui, when we discovered twenty-six more; they approached us for some time, but at length returned and landed about four hundred men, who took up a strong position on shore, and about four hundred remained in their boats, all well armed, some boats having guns in their bows. I then hoisted a white flag,  
and

\* 2 Lieutenants,—1 Assistant Surgeon,—2 Subedars,—1 Jemadar,—95 Rank and File.

† 4 Chiefs,—105 Men,—8 Burmese, their prisoners,—10 Jingals,—50 Muskets,—60 Spears,—70 Swords.



and a small boat came with a man in it, with a message from the Chief, the Raja of Sampon, who was at Mergui in February last, requesting I would come on shore, to which I replied that I wished him to come and see me: he said he would, provided I would separate from my boats, which I did, and waited for some time. He then sent some of his chiefs, who would scarcely approach sufficiently near to make themselves understood; however, I called to them to say, that I would not see any one but the Raja. He then came, but instead of one boat, brought his whole flotilla, and attempted to get between me and my boats, but seeing his intention, I prevented him—I then pulled up to his boat, asked him to come on board mine, which he refused; in short, I used every means to persuade him, but to no effect.—I then asked him by whose authority he had taken possession of this island, having built houses for himself and people, and how he can dare to molest the inhabitants of the province of Mergui, well knowing, from a former interview, about two months ago, that they were under the British protection. His reply was, that he was sent by his King, and that he did not care for us. I told him that my orders were to bring him to Mergui to see the governor, and that I had no doubt but that his boats would be returned to him on his arrival, when he explained matters; during the conversation, I held his boat, as he would not allow any one to come near him but myself. He then, like lightning, darted into his cabin, and a man who was by his side during the conversation, made a cut at me, which, fortunately, I escaped, and several men presented their muskets, no doubt but with a hostile intention. I therefore gave orders for our men to fire, and I can scarcely say which commenced; finding our musketry heavy, he pulled off, and I regret to say, that in consequence of all our boats' crews deserting their oars for some time, we could not again come up with his flotilla: he must have suffered severely from our fire, as we continued chasing for about an hour, when we got so far distant, and no hope of coming up with him, I thought it advisable to return to the island. The enemy's fire was very well directed for some time, and I regret to say, two men of ours were killed, and two wounded, one of them, an interpreter, who has left a widow, the other a Burmah, and two Sepoys wounded.

I beg leave to bring to your notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Bingham, and Assistant Surgeon Lindsell, as also all the Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Officers and Sepoys.

On my return to the island I set fire to the houses. In one of the boats we took, I found a small Union Jack of ours, which these pirates took from the signal-post at Tenasserim.

*No. 136. (A)—Copy of a Letter from Major Alexander Balmaine, Commanding the Province of Tavoy, &c. &c. &c., to Captain Snodgrass, Military Secretary, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. &c.; dated March 3, 1825.*

I have the honor to forward for the information of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., commanding the forces, a letter received on the 1st instant, from an officer of the Siamese government (who is now, with five thousand, at Paumzee,) and also an English translation.

This forenoon I had an interview with the ten Tavoyers, who are alluded to in the letter, but they only desired to have three days leave to see their relations here and to return to Siam, as their families were there; and of some, the fathers and mothers had been carried away at an early period of life from this place.

*No. 136. (B)—Copy of a true Translation of a Siamese Letter from Major Alexander Balmaine, Commanding 7th Regiment Native Infantry, to the British Officer Commanding at Tavoy; dated Tavoy, February 23, 1825.*

The commander of the British forces at Tavoy has forwarded a letter signifying, that certain people, to the number of one hundred at least, had been carried off by our people, and taken to Siam from the provinces of Tavoy and Mergui.

The Siamese at the frontier posts have, heretofore, been accustomed to make inroads into these provinces, and to carry off the inhabitants, and the late act of this description was done inadvertently, as the Siamese were not aware that the British had fully occupied Tavoy and Mergui. About fifteen men who were seized, have arrived at Bancoek, the capital.

They have been treated with kindness, and had all their wants supplied—these men, and all Tavoyers, have been told that they are at liberty to return to their own country. The head of the party of Tavoyers has been sent with his people to Tavoy, as the Siamese now know that the English have taken possession of the countries of Mergui and Tavoy.

The Siamese are desirous of keeping on friendly terms with the British.

“(Here follows a list of ten names of Tavoyers who have returned.)”

These people report, that all their relations reside in Tavoy.

A letter has been entrusted to Nae La, who accompanies the party, who knows the road.

May the British and Siamese remain on terms of amity.—Sealed on the 23d day of February, 1825.

*No. 137. (A)—Copy*

No. 137. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel H. E. Smith, Commanding at Martaban, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. B., &c. &c. &c., Commanding British Forces; dated Martaban, March 17, 1825.*

Agreeably to your instructions, I remained at Rangoon until the arrival of the deputies from the Siamese camp, whom I accompanied back to Martaban on the 20th ultimo, but owing to the intricacy of the navigation of its river, at this season of the year, I regret to say we did not land until the 5th instant. On the following day, I wrote to the Chief the substance of the subjoined letter, No. 1, in answer to the one forwarded to you at Rangoon prior to your march from thence, and despatched it along with the deputies, who personally expressed their gratitude for the attentions and civilities they had experienced both at Rangoon and at this place.

On the 7th, I received intimation that another deputation, headed by the Chief's son, and a Sirdar of consequence, was on the opposite side of the river, waiting our permission and assistance to cross. Boats were immediately ordered to convey them over, and at the same time, I directed suitable accommodations to be prepared for their reception in the town.

In the course of the ensuing forenoon, the visitors arrived, and were received with due honours, they brought me a letter, of which No. 2 is a translation. On the succeeding day, I had a personal conference with them on the subject of the correspondence that had already passed, and on their ultimate views and intentions, when it was clearly and unequivocally stated, that the Tallyen Chiefs, with their followers, were ready and willing to aid us in any measures that might lead to the overthrow of their inveterate enemies, the Burmese—that they were, in fact, at our entire disposal, and only waited our orders to advance with their forces, and act as we might think proper to direct. The son, however, added, that as his father was on the eve of paying us a visit, he begged I would suspend the discussion of our future plans and operations until he arrived; to this, of course, I assented.

It is not unworthy of remark, that on the first arrival of the deputies, their general conduct and demeanor exhibited a considerable degree of alarm and agitation, which, however, soon subsided, and before they took their departure, which almost immediately succeeded the interview, they became familiar and unembarrassed, and had altogether acquired a confidence in our character, which promised an advantageous result.

I had nearly omitted to state, that in the course of conversation, I was led to understand, that our assistance would be essentially requisite to enable their army to cross to our side of the water, and that its subsistence depended also upon our means of supply—as the prize stores of Martaban were capable of furnishing them with abundance of grain, I offered our assistance to obviate this difficulty, and immediately issued instructions for placing every boat, procurable in the vicinity of this place, at their disposal, and allotted ground and villages contiguous to the town for their encampment, and every measure was adopted to bring their forces into prompt co-operation with yours marching upon Prome. Such was the state of affairs here until the 12th instant, when rumours were in circulation, that differences of opinion and some altercations had taken place among the Chieftains *over the water*, and that they were breaking up their camp, and retiring upon their own country—that a minister of the King of Siam had arrived on or about the 10th, with peremptory orders for their recall, and that the Chief, with whom we had principally been in communication, had expressed a disinclination to abandon our interests, alleging, that by such a proceeding at this crisis, he would justly incur the imputation of treachery towards us.

On the 13th, I received a letter from the commander of the Tallyen army, of which No. 3 is a translation, and on the succeeding day, the paper, No. 4, to both of which I replied, expressing my regret that circumstances had occurred to counteract our wishes, and their friendly intentions to take part with us in the further prosecution of the war. My informer also reported, that their army had actually retired.

It is difficult for me to define the true reasons for this apparently inconsistent line of policy on the part of these Chieftains, but have no doubt, that on further inquiry, I shall be enabled to ascertain the actual state of the case, which I will take the earliest opportunity of communicating to you.

No. 137. (B)—*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Smith, Commanding Province of Martaban, Addressed to the Chiefs Row Row, &c. &c., Commander of the Army of Dooa ra Wuddu; dated Martaban, March 6, 1825.*

The commander of the British forces, General Sir Archibald Campbell, Knight, Commander of the Bath, &c. &c., having received a letter from the principal Siamese Chiefs, exercising power and authority over a body of five thousand Abasee and Tallian warriors, encamped in the vicinity of Martaban, the same is hereby acknowledged, and the contents thereof understood.

The British General takes this occasion, through me, to express the satisfaction he feels in recognizing the friendship and amity which has so long subsisted between the English, Siamese; and Abassee nations, and which it now becomes the interest and policy of all parties to cement more firmly than ever.

The Supreme British Government of India has, at all times, manifested an invariable desire to be at peace, and upon the most friendly and amicable footing with the neighbouring states; but the aggressions, cruelty, and violence, so often exhibited by the Burmans, without provocation, upon British subjects, for some time past, could no longer be tolerated, and the English Government was, at length, compelled to vindicate its honor by an appeal to arms; numerous armies were, accordingly, directed to proceed into the dominions of the King of Ava, not with a view of aggrandizing the present extensive British territorial possessions, but for the sole and only purpose of retaliating upon the offenders, and chastising and humbling the arrogance, pride, and insolence of the rulers of the Birman empire. This object has been partly accomplished by the destruction of their armies in the vicinity of Rangoon, the capture of all their sea-port towns, and the demolition of their numerous stockades and fastnesses, and the British forces are now advancing from different quarters, by land and water, to carry punishment and dismay into the very capital of his dominions.

In order to ascertain the further views and wishes of the Chiefs now encamped in this province, acting by authority, and in conjunction with the wishes of the dignified King of Siam, as well as to evince the high estimation in which his Majesty is held by the several British authorities, the English General, Sir Archibald Campbell, has deputed me (a Colonel in the army, serving under his command) to proceed to Martaban, for the purpose of conferring with the said Chiefs, upon the most eligible means of attacking, distressing, and destroying their common enemy, the Burmans, and the Colonel has, accordingly, arrived at Martaban, in charge of the Deputies sent by the Siamese Chieftains, who are, consequently, invited to a friendly personal interview with the said Colonel Smith, at the earliest practicable period, which will, no doubt, tend to facilitate arrangements for the mutual benefit of both nations, and should any matters come under discussion, that may require specific instructions from the Governor General in Council, the Colonel will lose no time in laying them before his government, for the ultimate decision of that high and superior authority.

Colonel Smith begs to offer his prayers for the health of his Majesty the King of Siam, and for the prosperity and stability of government, as also for the ultimate restoration of the ancient dynasty of Pegue; and the Colonel, in conclusion, assures the Chiefs, to whom this letter will be presented, that he will avail himself with cordial satisfaction (as far as his authority may extend) of any events in the future operations of the war, which may enable him to afford assistance for the attainment of that desirable object.

No. 137. (C)—*Zow, prá, muha, ecu tha, yem maa ee, e raza, Ron-Ron, Commander of the Army of Dooa,ra,wuddee, represents.*

That he was exceedingly gratified with the purport of Colonel Smith's letter, which he no sooner perused, than he dispatched to the King of Siam's principal Minister, for the purpose of being submitted to his Majesty, by whose commands, the army of Dooa,ra,wuddee is encamped in these territories.

The commander of the army of Dooa,ra,wuddee is fully aware of the cordial friendship which has subsisted between the English nation and the Tully,ens from the earliest period of prosperity of their antient kingdom of Pegue, and which he trusts, please God, if again recovered by conquest, from their enemies, will, under more happy auspices, expand, like the opening bud, into blossoms of future greatness and prosperity, and afford occasion to their latest posterity, to remember with thankfulness, the friendly concern of Colonel Smith, for the Tully,en nation, who are never ungrateful for the favors they receive from their allies.

As Uttean, the present place of encampment of the commander of the Dooa,ra,wuddee army, is too far distant to enable him to obtain, with facility, the honor of the consultation and interview intended him by Colonel Smith, it is his intention to advance to the village of Tur,ru,na. In the mean time, Thu'myen, Dino'wuttee, and Biuncea Bur,um, the son and foudjar of the commander of the Army of Dooa,ra,wuddee, will wait on Colonel Smith with this letter, and learn his intentions with respect to the time in which the movement of the Dooa,ra,wuddee forces may be required.

No. 137. (D)—*Zow, prá, muha, ecu tha, yem maa, ee, e raza Ron-Ron, Commander of the Army of Dooa,ra,wuddee, represents.*

That he sensibly feels the kindness and hospitality which Colonel Smith manifested towards his son and foudjar, whom he deputed to wait on the Colonel, and begs to acknowledge the favour shewn himself by the loan of his boats, and the offer of corn to aid the subsistence of his troops.

That



That he had it in contemplation to visit Colonel Smith on the 11th of the present (Siamese,) month, for the purpose of consultation and advice; but in the interim, his Majesty's minister having arrived from Dooa,ra, wuddee with a dispatch, stating that "the season of the rains was approaching, when it would be no longer practicable for the troops to return either by land or water, and that it was, moreover, desirable that the lands should be cultivated at their proper season," it is now become necessary that he should, in obedience to his Majesty's commands, return with his army to his country.

But should any event occur to Colonel Smith, or any business intervene, which he may wish to communicate, he will please to dispatch a messenger with a letter to the commander of the army of Dooa,ra,wuddee, at Myke,sath, Kud,dyn,sing, or Meena,noo,ee, (contiguous places,) where his troops will be stationed.

That in the event of any of the Abassee or Siam subjects having occasion to visit the country of Martaban, it is hoped they will be admitted in the same manner as the subjects of the English government will be received in our dominions of Dooa,ra,wuddee, as it is desirable that the friendship now subsisting between the two nations, should be preserved and increased.

As a token of his friendship, the commander of the Dooa,ra,wuddee army has sent to Colonel Smith a pair of elephant's tæth and some bees' wax, and begs to subjoin his prayers for his welfare.

No. 137. (E)—*Been,ya Laghooon, Khoom Khan, brother of the great Chief, represents to Colonel Smith, Commander of the Country of Martaban.*

That he has been exceedingly delighted with the assurance given him by the interpreters, of the friendship he bears towards the Siam and Abassee people, as also with the hospitality and kindness with which Colonel Smith received his nephew.

That he has sent by the interpreters, a horse and a ring, which he will receive from their hands, and keep as a memorial of his esteem and regard, and begs to subscribe his prayers for Colonel Smith's welfare.

No. 137. (F)—STATEMENT.

Shoue-mong, a native of Martaban, who fled his country about eleven years since, and after being employed during that period alternately in the service of Ron-Ron, commander of the army of Dooa-ra-wuddee, and his brother Beenya Lagoon Khan, seized the opportunity of the decampment of these Chieftain's troops, from the territories of Martaban, to return to his own village, relates,—

That, about a twelve month since, he was in attendance on Ron-Ron's brother, at the court of Siam, when a European gentleman was introduced to the King, to whom he presented, in the name of his master, a diamond ring, and five hundred musquets: on the receipt of this present, he heard his Majesty observe to his ministers, "I acquiesce with their request of intercourse," and shortly after the court was dismissed.

That, after the departure of the European gentleman, on his Majesty's receiving intelligence of the capture, by the English, of the provinces of Martaban, Tavoy, and Mergui, he expressed his admiration of their valor and prowess. At this period, Ron-Ron was on the eve of departure from the capital, with the Dooa,ra,wuddee army, to the frontiers of the Burmah dominions, on which occasion his Majesty gave him an audience, and told him, that as the Burmah dominions were now likely to fall an easy prey to the arms of the English, whose newly acquired territories were now blended with those of Siam, it would be politic to cultivate the friendship of that nation, whose power was becoming more extensive than ever, and desired him to forbear making captives, as hitherto, of the Burmah-Tullyen subjects, but to destroy, without distinction, every Burmese, and that he was at liberty, moreover, to use every gentle means to attach to his interests and service, whatever fugitive Tullyens chance might throw in his way, which his Majesty observed, would not be difficult to effect at the present juncture, when the fear of the enemy would compel them to become wanderers from their native homes.

That Ron-Ron, in prosecution of the views of his Majesty, left the capital about six months ago, with his army, consisting of three thousand Tullyens and two thousand Siamese, and after a march of twenty-six days, arrived at Myke-sath, a town situate on the eastern borders of the Martaban territories, and distant about six days march from Martaban.

Here Ron-Ron began to meditate schemes of personal aggrandizement, in furtherance of which he opened a communication with the English authorities at Martaban and Rangoon, for which his Majesty's known friendly sentiments towards them furnished him with a good pretext. He thought it, however, prudent, previously to the dispatch of his letters to Martaban and Rangoon, to sound the inclinations of the Tullyen Zemindars of these places, as also those of Taik-kull-a and Pegue, to whom he immediately, on his arrival at Myke-sath, sent emissaries for the purpose.

They no sooner were informed of the designs of this Chieftain, than they unanimously promised him their aid and support, recommending, at the same time, his acting in concert, and with the advice of the English, who, they

they observed, appeared to be indifferent as to the sovereign who should, hereafter, be placed on the throne of their ancient kingdom of Pegue.

Ron-Ron, encouraged by these assurances, now dispatched four of his subordinate officers to the commanding officer of Martaban, with a request, that he would direct them to be escorted to the General commanding the troops at Rangoon, for whom they were entrusted with a letter; at the same time to give this measure the appearance of being conducted with his Majesty's sanction, he dispatched a messenger with a letter to the court of Siam, the purport of which he carefully concealed from those around him.

But the Siamese ministers who were, from prudential reasons, associated with him in authority, soon discovered the nature of his connexions with the Tullyen Zemindars and Chieftains, and, moreover, suspecting the motive of his negotiation with the English, instantly made known the circumstance, with every exaggeration, to the court of Siam.

Incensed at the presumption of a man, whom he had raised from obscurity to the dignity of command of the Doo-ra, wuddee army, his Majesty instantly dispatched one of his principal ministers, with peremptory orders for his re-call.

Ron-Ron, from this unexpected summons, at the critical moment he was strengthening his interest with the local authorities of Rangoon and Martaban, was thrown into the utmost consternation; he bewailed his fate with tears, and returning into his apartment, refused to see any one for several hours, and on the return of Colonel Smith's men, entrusted with the care of the boats, he repeatedly expressed his wish, rather to die than suffer the reproach of duplicity and treachery, which he said he feared Colonel Smith would, with too much appearance of justice, impute to him.

*No. 138.—Translation of a Letter from the Prime Minister of Siam, to the Address of Colonel Smith.*

Ega Maha Sina de Pudee Amachee, (Prime Minister) of the golden country of See Ayoktharah Durrawuddy, sends this letter to Colonel Smith, commander of the English army at Martaban, in the year 1186, (1824) in the month of Natho, (December) by the favor of our fortunate King, whose virtues are unequalled, and who has rigorously kept the Ten Commandments, and at whose golden feet I am always prostrate, to attend to his commands, have ordered Jo Prah Maha Yeotha eay Mah eay Rajah Egah Maha Sina de Pudee Seerce Zaah Roonnaron, with his army, to join and assist the English to fight, and totally annihilate the Burmese; on his way, he encamped at Camboree, and took great precaution to guard every point accessible by the enemy. He forwarded a letter to me from thence, conveying the happy intelligence of the English having taken possession of Martaban, and other countries of the Burmese. The Burmese have all along been our enemy, and I have derived great satisfaction from this tidings. From such a happy result, Martaban and See Ayoktharah Durrawuddy, must now be considered as one; we must be friendly with one another, and a free intercourse should subsist between both its inhabitants. I was glad to hear also, after Jo Prah had arrived at Atharam, he sent intelligence of it to Colonel Smith, and communicated our willingness to assist him in joining to destroy the Burmese, and that our proceedings were approved of by the Rangoon General, (Sir Archibald Campbell.) Whilst we were greeting on the happy tidings of your successes over the Burmese, our mirth was changed into deep sorrow. We have had the misfortune to receive the intelligence of the death of our beloved King, who, tired with the cares and troubles of this world, has left it to join the angels of heaven. It becomes the duty of all his ministers, chiefs, officers of rank, vassals, &c. to pay the last obsequies to his remains, and the year 1187, (1825) and the month of Kachoon, (May) has been fixed on for the funeral, at which time it is expected, we will have all assembled in the golden country, and after taking the oath of allegiance to the newly installed King, the funeral rites will be performed. Owing to these preparations, I was induced to order Jo Prah back immediately to Durrawuddy. Just as my letter reached him, he was on the eve of returning with his army, as he was suffering severely from indisposition. Jo Prah is arrived at Durrawuddy.

I have investigated the case of Jora Muthagee, and the men and women apprehended by the petty General and Cheque; some of these people have their relations in our country; but, perhaps, the petty General and Cheque brought them over, with the expectation of being promoted to a higher post, or remunerated by the King. Martaban formerly belonged to the Burmese, and was at war with the Siamese: a number of people of the former place, having relations in our country, were anxious to come over to them, but were fearful of taking the step, apprehending detection, but now Martaban and Durrawuddy must be considered one. The road is clear, and nothing can impede a free intercourse with each other, as the English and ourselves are on the most friendly terms. I have, therefore, issued orders, that those who are willing to remain in my country, have my permission to do so, or retire from it, as they please. Jora Muthagee and others, who were brought over, have received every attention from me with respect to their eatables and clothing.

Jo Prah,

Jo Prah, our General, having learnt by the way of Penang, that the army at Rangoon was suffering much from illness, acquainted me with the circumstance: I received the intelligence with a great deal of grief and concern, yet I did not place credit on the report, owing to the distance from which the report reached him. I sent an order, however, to General Jo Prah, to learn whether the report was correct or not. Beenneah Yeathana Say, Beenneah Suttee Selung, Beenah Seehah Rajah Thameeng like Nayeau, were deputed to accompany Jora Mutheegee, with a letter to obtain the truth of the story.

Our General, Jo Prah, sent me information, that Mou Yea had arrived, with thirty followers, at Manwa, with a letter from Colonel Smith. Hearing of this intelligence, I felt extremely happy, and which letter I have since received. Having maturely deliberated on the contents of the letter, I issued a promulgation that Jora Muthagee, with men and women that were apprehended and brought over, had my permission to return, or remain in my country, as it suited their own inclinations best; and such as have been inclined to return, I have placed under charge of Moweah, to see them safe to their destination, amounting in all, men and women, to seventy-nine souls, and with Cheeragee Mumeah Chan, who, with his family, have lived here a long time, twenty-six more, making a total, including old men, women, children, and men, one hundred and five souls. All this I have done, because the English and ourselves are friends, and we will join you, and destroy the Burmese race entirely. A number of people that have settled here for a long time from Moon, Tavoy, and Tanasserim, to these also have I had my orders communicated, and I have left it to their option, either to remain in our country, or return to theirs. Being on such friendly terms with you, I send this letter. So soon as the rainy season is over, our General, Jo Prah, will immediately join you to fight and disperse the Burmese, as he is already in possession of my commands to do so. When the Burmese are conquered, tranquillity and peace will reign on all sides, and our friendship will increase day by day. I send two letters, one written in Siamese, the other in the Burmese language. The contents of both are the same.

*No. 139.—Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, May 9, 1825.*

It affords me the utmost satisfaction to acquaint you, that perfect tranquillity exists in this part of the country, and the reinforcements that were on the road from Ava for the defence of this place, have re-traced their steps with the utmost precipitance, nor am I aware of any force of the enemy being now betwixt me and the capital.

The inhabitants of Prome are returning from the jungles in vast numbers, and I trust soon to see a plentiful bazar established. The governors of the surrounding districts, are also coming in to offer their submission, and placing themselves and their districts under our protection; one has already given me up nine elephants belonging to the state, and I am promised, by the same person, ten more. Another has brought me in five guns, some jinjals, and a few musquets, and all make fair promises of affording me every aid in their power; I have, therefore, little doubt of being able to keep my troops well supplied; they are already pretty generally under cover, and I very soon hope to have that essential comfort completed. The weather has been bad for the last week, and, to all appearance, the monsoon has commenced, and at a much earlier period than usual.

We have suffered some small loss on the river by the oversetting and immediate sinking (in a heavy squall,) of two of the gun flotilla, the *Sophia* and *Swift*, the former, loaded with native provisions, and the latter, with ordnance and stores; but I am not without hopes that some of the latter may yet be recovered; the crews were all saved, with the exception of one soldier of his Majesty's 87th Regiment, and a follower.

*No. 140.—Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Godwin, Commanding His Majesty's 41st Regiment, to Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. &c., Commander of the Forces in Ava; dated Prome, May 24, 1825.*

The force you did me the honor to place under my command, namely, one troop of the Right Honorable Governor General's Body Guard, two guns of the Horse Artillery, ten Flank Companies of European, and six of Native Infantry, with Pioneers, &c., for the purpose of penetrating into the country, in the direction of Taunu, in the first instance, and to alter my route as impediments might present themselves, or advantages gained by it; and of gaining information of this unknown country, and ascertaining what its real resources were, left Prome, on the 5th instant, and continue its route east by north, till the 11th.

The troops having got into a mountainous country, with heavy roads, want of water, the probability of the monsoon, and the total absence of all supplies in this almost uninhabited country, determined me to change my route. Previously to this, however, I halted the troops, and proceeded with a small escort, accom-



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panied by Captain White, Assistant Quarter-Master General, and Captain Snodgrass, your Military Secretary, to gain the summit of the range, to see what the country appeared on the other side. At the end of twelve miles, we arrived at a spot, where we saw an immense tract of interminable forest, without, to the eye, a dwelling.

The route was now changed to the left, west and by north, in the direction of the fortified town of Meeada, situated sixty miles north of Prome, on the Irrawaddy, and thence we reached on the 17th, and found it totally destroyed. The country on this line, after we had descended the hills, was, in most instances, beautiful pasture, or cultivated land, with a great deal of plantation; the roads very good, but without resource—not a grain of rice to be had. The villages burnt and destroyed, and the people mostly living in their hakeries in the jungle. From Meeada, we turned directly south, and reached Prome on the 23d, making a circuit of 139 miles.

I have the honor to state, in the whole of this march not an enemy was seen. The villages were all destroyed, till our reaching about 25 miles from Prome. The inhabitants, where we met with them, appeared in perfect confidence of good treatment, and in several instances, received, at their request, protection. Your proclamations always satisfied them. The disinclination to part with their cattle or carriages, was universal; though they have been agreeably to your instructions, most liberally paid for; and all that ability possessed by Captain Jones, of the Madras Commissariat, of which you, Sir, are so well aware, has been put to the test in procuring the supply he has brought in, amounting to about six hundred head of cattle. The grain is all taken away, and nothing is to be expected either in supply or cover, for the troops, after twenty-five miles north of Prome. The roads are very good on the route to the north.

Captain White, Assistant Quarter-Master General of the Madras Division, has surveyed and laid down the features of the country, and all local information has been most ably obtained; and the detachment has been conducted without unnecessary fatigue, by the indefatigable exertions of this officer.

*No. 141. (A)—Copy of a Report from Captain J. J. Snodgrass, Assistant Political Agent, to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Calcutta, June 28, 1825.*

By desire of Sir Archibald Campbell, I have the honour to enclose you a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Smelt, commanding at Rangoon, of some late occurrences in the neighbourhood of old Pegue, by which it will appear, that the enemy's division, under Sykia Wonghee, stationed in that quarter, has been finally routed and dispersed by the Tallyen inhabitants. The letter was received just as I left Prome.

*No. 141. (B)—Copy of a Report from Lieutenant-Colonel W. Smelt, Commanding, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., Commanding the Forces serving against the Dominions of the King of Ava.*

I have the honour to report for your information, that one of the principal Tallyen Chiefs now remaining at Pegue, and who was most active in the late contest against the Chekia Woon and his party, this day came into Rangoon, bringing with him one of the royal family taken prisoner at Pegue, and a few stands of arms captured from the enemy. The Tallyen Chief, named Beata, has earnestly solicited the protection of the English, and distinctly states, that the small number of his followers, at present amounting only to a few hundred, renders his stay in Pegue, without our assistance, so hazardous, that he must leave that part of the country, should his entreaty for one hundred sepoy not meet with success. The country about Pegue is so fertile, and abounds so much with cattle, which are promised to be constantly supplied, that, independent of many other most important advantages to be derived from our possession of the place, such as elephants, boats, &c. &c., I am induced to think the occupation of Pegue, by a small force, will greatly tend to the safety of the lower provinces, and add much to the future comforts of the army. Under this impression, and with a view to the protection of the many thousands soliciting our assistance in that quarter, I have ordered two hundred sepoy to proceed to Pegue, whither they will be transported in boats, voluntarily brought for the purpose by the Tallyens, and where they will remain till further orders.

The prisoner named Mounyo, is uncle to the present King, and it appears, left the court either in disgrace or through fear, about twenty-eight years ago: twenty of which he spent in Rangoon, and the last eight at Pegue. It being well ascertained, that he has taken no part in the war, and that he remained quiet at Pegue, on the departure of the Chekia Woon from that place, I desired his chains to be taken off. He is an elderly man, and in mean attire, and on being questioned, begged permission to remain here, saying, that he had always been at enmity with the Court, and had now no wish to mingle more with the Burmese. He is living at present in the house of Mendamah, the Tallyen Chief, where he will be taken care of for the present; but I have the honour to request your instructions on this head, as I am at a loss how to act regarding him.

*No. 142.—Copy*

No. 142.—*Copy of a Letter from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., General in Chief of the British Forces serving in Ava, to the Ministers of His Majesty the King of Ava, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, August 6, 1825.*

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Actuated by the purest motives of humanity, to spare the further effusion of human blood, as well as to avert the more than probable fatal consequences, that the operations of another campaign will entail upon His Majesty of Ava, and his family; I am induced once more, most seriously to call to the reflection of you, his State Counsellors, the awful responsibility you owe to both your King and country, by a further perseverance in the war: you already know, that I am fully authorized by the Right Honorable the Governor General of India to treat upon, and conclude a peace with any person or persons duly accredited to meet me for that purpose, by the King of Ava; it is therefore unnecessary, at present, to say any thing more upon that subject.

Hitherto I have conducted the war with every possible degree of mildness and humanity, of which I know you are well aware, but how far it may be in my power to control it under that system, for the time to come, after the junction of the Siamese army with my force, it is impossible to say.

The events of the contest, since the arrival of the English army under my command, in the dominions of his Burmese Majesty, my present commanding position, and the further ample means I possess for the future prosecution of the war, (if you force upon me the alternative,) will, I am sure, exonerate me from the suspicion of being actuated by any other motives in now addressing you, than those I have already avowed, and which I trust you will duly, and, before it is too late, fully appreciate, and act accordingly.

No. 143.—*Copy of a Report from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq. Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, August 18, 1825.*

A confidential native that I sent out on the 4th instant, to watch and report upon the movements of the enemy, returned a few days ago, and stated matters in such a circumstantial manner, (Enclosure A.) corroborated with reports from other quarters of the enemy's advance, and actual arrival at Meeaday, (B. and C.) as induced me to send Brigadier General Cotton in the steam vessel, as far as that place, to reconnoitre.

The General found the enemy, as my information stated, in considerable force; he thinks from sixteen to twenty thousand men, (D.) apparently well armed, and with a large proportion of artillery, busily entrenching his position, already tolerably strong by nature.

The total of this army, I have reason to think, upon the most moderate calculation, will not fall short of forty thousand men, under the chief command of a half brother of the King, named Memeaboo, second Commander-in-chief of the Burmese army, since the death of Bandoolah, the intermediate one having been put to death soon after his elevation, by order of the King, on suspicion of revolutionary principles.

Besides the army which I have stated, I am aware that the Court of Ava is making other preparations of considerable magnitude, for the ensuing campaign; the season here has been, upon the whole, very mild; but the Irrawaddy (from the effect of the melting of the snow and mountain torrents,) has been, to a very great height, overflowing its banks every where that it is not bounded by high ground to the water's edge: the low grounds are, in consequence, at present, utterly impassable, especially for artillery, as ascertained by a reconnoissance which I ordered for that purpose, under the orders of the Deputy Quarter Master General of the Madras Division, (E.) If the enemy remain quiet at Meeaday, it would, perhaps, be better to allow him to be so, rather than harass the men by returning again to quarters, until the season will admit of the opening of the campaign for a continuance of it. But, should he commence to detach by either of my flanks, which his numbers will easily enable him to do, and mine too few to prevent, I shall be obliged the instant the state of the roads will at all enable me to move, to do so, and endeavour to bring him to a general action.

My present force, fit for duty at Head-Quarters, will be seen on reference to the return, (F.) small to be sure, but with it, I anticipate every success, such is my confidence in the gallant troops I have so often had the honor to lead into action.

The stockade at Donabew is almost in total ruin all round, from the swelling of the heavy mounds of earth thrown up, to support the large wooden uprights, (or duggies.) I therefore intend giving it up altogether as a military post, ordering the 22d Madras Native Infantry, now chiefly quartered there, immediately to join the Head-Quarters here, as also the 12th Regiment of Madras Native Infantry, (the corps which I detached in the last campaign, with Major Sale to Basseen), from Rangoon. The 3d Native Light Infantry now at Martaban, (by far the strongest corps in my force,) I intend to withdraw from that place to Rangoon, leaving there a detachment of from one to two hundred men, merely for the police of the country, this I am induced to do, from the excellent disposition shewn by the Zemindars in that part of the country,

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together with my confidence (I hope not a misplaced one,) in the true and sincere offer of union made by the Siamese; and lastly, the placing a force at my disposal at Rangoon, either to join the Head-Quarters in advance, or to check any movement, the enemy may seem disposed to make by Thongo. The force to be kept thus disposable, will consist of the 3d and 34th Regiment of Native Light Infantry, and the Honorable Company's 1st Madras European Regiment now at Donabew, in strength from about two hundred and fifty to three hundred rank and file. On the whole of these corps being ordered to leave Rangoon, the garrison of that place will be made to consist of about two thousand men, composed of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, a proportion of detachments hourly expected from Madras, amounting in all to about eighteen hundred men, (Native Infantry,) besides which there will be three available, all men recovered from hospitals, &c.

At present Brigadier Smelt has two hundred Native Infantry, (from the 9th) at Pegu: the 34th Light Infantry, I intend ordering thither immediately, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pepper, of the Madras Army, an officer whose character on that establishment, stands high for many good military qualities. The detachment of the 9th will then, of course, return to Rangoon. Brigadier Smelt has also a small detachment at Bassein, no longer required there, it will also return to Rangoon, and its commander, Captain Fenwick, an officer upon whose experience and capability of arrangement I can rely, I shall order to Martaban, in command, for the purpose of communicating with the Siamese.

From Rangoon supplies are now coming up rapidly, as will be seen by the annexed extract of a letter this day received from Brigadier Smelt, of the 5th instant. When down there I further arranged, that by each cargo canoe, two and three sepoy's should be sent to Head-Quarters. By that means I look for the arrival here, before the end of the month, of all the native details stated in the return, (F.) to be at Rangoon, for the corps in advance. The European details I also expect by the same period, by the boats of the flotilla.

My different communications to you will, I trust, convince the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, that I have never let slip an opportunity, by kindness or otherwise, whether in arms or in the administration of the government of the country, of trying to conciliate the Court of Ava, in the hope of bringing it to amicable terms; but such is not the disposition of this people: force of arms alone can only bring them to any such bearing. That *ultima ratio*, I feel to be now near at hand, in the result of which I have, again, to express my sanguine hopes of success, from the determined valour and discipline of the force I have the honor to command.

No. 143. (A)—*Information obtained from a Burmese, named Nah-mow-lah, sent out on the 4th Instant for information.*

On the 8th August, the Kee Woongie, with three thousand men, arrived by water at a village called Moon; and Khaw-nun-bo, about the same time, with five thousand, arrived at a village called Jubay, (situated about three miles inland.) A mile and half distant from the last mentioned village, is another, called Sandown, where a Chief, named Shaun-so-booah, with four thousand Shams, is likewise stationed. A confidential Chief of the Kee Wongies has arrived at Shac-a-la-da, with two thousand men. The Kee Woongie has also dispatched about two thousand men to occupy different villages in the vicinity of Madia.

At Mu-ab-saygoyne, (on the opposite side of the river,) are four thousand men, commanded by the Shud-do Woon, or head cook to the King.

The different parties already enumerated, (amounting to about twenty thousand men,) are under the command of the Kee Woongie.

The boats which conveyed this army, with their arms, &c. &c. from Ava, are in number about one thousand. Twenty thousand baskets of paddy have already arrived at Madie. The current price is about fifty or sixty Rupees the one hundred baskets.

Men-mun-boo, with twenty thousand men, was at Mengoon, and was stated to be about proceeding to Patanago: by this time he must have arrived at that place, or Malown.

The whole force acting against the English, is under the command of this Prince: I also heard that more men were to be sent from Ava to join him.

Before this army left Ava, the King melted down a number of the silver bars, left him by his grandfather, and mixing copper with it, was to make it equal to the common bazar tickal. He gave to each man one hundred and fifty of this coin.

The Musgie of Malown, receiving this sum for each of his men, only gave them fifty out of the one hundred and fifty, and which coming to the ears of Men-mun-boo, he ordered the Musgie to be killed for the defraud.

The King has made new Musgies and governors for every town and village now under British protection. These Musgies, &c. are now at Madie, and waiting to assume command the instant the British retreat.

From Nan-bun-zaick, very nearly to Madie, there is neither house, inhabitant, or enemy.

No. 143. (B)—*The*



No. 143. (B)—*The Information of* —————, *a Burmese.*Ava.  
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On the 8th of this month (August) the Keewoongee, and Koucamboo, a General, arrived at Meeaday with 13,000 men, from which force Koucamboo has advanced two or three miles outside of Meeaday with 6,000 men, a considerable number of the men of this force arrived in boats, the remainder came by land; they brought with them about eight hundred boats to a village called Magouhie, three miles inland from Meeaday, one thousand men are posted under the command of one Balagheo, and one thousand more are at the same place, under command of the Meeaday Musgui, and five hundred Shams (not Siamese) are there also, under a Sham Chief, in the village called Yea Boah-geah. About thirty miles from Prome there are one thousand men commanded by a Chief named Napo', opposite Meeaday (on the other bank of the river). At a village named Kaoo, three thousand men are posted, under the command of Chadoown; from the force above mentioned, the Burmese have sent parties in advance, as far as the neighbourhood of Yean-ben-zeek, about twenty miles from Prome; these parties are in strength from fifteen to one hundred men, and from five villages in the neighbourhood of Yean-ben-zeek, all the inhabitants have fled into that town, through fear; and the report had reached there, that the enemy were this day, (12th August,) certainly to enter and occupy Yean-ben-zeek. These small parties of Burmese have received particular orders to keep a good look out for the *English*; and are disposed of in a chain of small posts of communication, to convey intelligence as quickly as possible to Head-Quarters of our movements.

On the 5th of this month, (August,) the King's half brother "Memeeah Boo," who is Commander-in-chief of the Burmese forces, arrived at Maloon with ten thousand men, as his main body, but before he came, he had already sent several Chiefs there with parties of men, so that there may be now, at Maloon, about twenty thousand men.

N. B. This information is confirmed by the statement of the Yean-ben-zeek Musgui, with the exception of a trifling difference in the numbers of the Burmese.

No. 143. (C)—*The Statement of* —————, *a Burmese.*

The Keewoongee, with seven thousand men, and Koucamboo, with six thousand men, arrived at Meeaday a short time ago—Chado-own (King's head cook,) is at the town on the opposite bank to Meeaday, with three thousand men. Memeeah-boo, with between twenty and thirty thousand men, is in Maloon, and in Thongo are twelve thousand men, under command of Prince of Thongo and Cheeka-oon. The deponent states this to be the current talk in this army of its future destination, viz.

"When the weather becomes settled and the roads passable, a part of this force is to march on Thongo, to form a junction with the twelve thousand men now posted there. Chado-own (head cook,) is to march about the same time along the west bank of the river, and destroy every village from Padown to Donabew, and attack Donabew—he will have a large body of troops, number unknown. The Thongo division is to march on Rangoon the same time, and attack Rangoon; and Meen-mee-boo, the King's half brother, is to attack Prome with his whole force, all at the same time."

"Rice and salt is in abundance from Meeaday to Ava. Salt fish is unusually scarce. Attawoon-mom-eik has been beheaded by the King for cowardice, in not defending Prome. The King has ordered the Prince of Sarrawaddy to Ava—he is going, but very slowly; Mon-shuzar is in distress, and is a prisoner to his house. The property of all strangers (foreigners,) is seized, and many are in irons. The King has liberally given money to the army from his private treasury.

No. 143. (D)—*Copy of a Report from Brigadier General Willoughby Cotton, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., Commander of the Forces; dated Prome, August 16, 1825.*

I have the honour to report, that agreeably to the instructions I received, I proceeded with fifty men of the Royal Regiment, on the morning of the 13th ultimo, in the steam boat, up the river, to reconnoitre the positions the enemy occupied.

We discerned them on the morning of the 15th, at Meeaday, on the left bank of the river; distant from hence about forty miles. A large nullah runs into the Irrawaddy, immediately below Meeaday, from the point of which they were ranged, to the extent of a mile and a half, up the bank of the river. This bank has several Pagodas upon it, for the most part near the nullah, all of which they were stockading, and had entrenched; and they had thrown a ditch and breast-work between them and the river, to protect their boats, which were ranged underneath.

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In our progress of passing their line of defence, they opened sixteen guns of different calibre, from three and four to six-pounders upon us; but as the width of the river is, at least, fifteen hundred yards, their shot fell short.

The force they displayed, I estimate, at the least, to be between from sixteen to twenty thousand men, and appeared to be all armed with musquets, and I counted twenty golden chattahs. They had also a small force on the right bank, with jinjals, opposite the right of their line, as it faced the river. On our return, I disengaged the gun boats I had in tow, to cannonade their line, and make them develop their whole force; and it was then ascertained, they had an advance across the nullah I have named, thrown on the road leading to Prome, and occupying some Pagodas, which overlook it, which they were stockading. This party were working also on a breast-work on the side of the hill, which would also command the road. Three golden chattahs were visible with this force.

Having fully ascertained their points, I proceeded back to this place to make my report accordingly.

P. S. I should conceive they have, at Meeaday, four hundred boats, but I saw only one regular war boat.

No. 143. (E)—*Copy of a Report from Deputy Quarter Master General S. W. Steel, to Major Jackson, Deputy Quarter Master General to the Expedition; dated Prome, August 17, 1825.*

I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Commander of the forces, the progress of the reconnoitering detachment, which he did me the honour to place under my orders; and which, in conformity with the instructions from you, dated the 12th instant, moved on the following morning.

13th August.—The first day's march was to the village of Na-tu-leen, the distance estimated to be about nine miles. The road was tolerable, until after the passage of the Loth-ho nullah, immediately beyond which is a swamp, about five hundred yards wide. Heavy guns could be passed over this nullah by a strong bridge. The swamp was deep, and the soil tenacious, opposing a very serious obstacle to every description of loaded cattle, and quite impassable by guns. Foot passengers can cross the swamp by a bridge, (nearly ruined,) which extends completely over it. From this place the regular road was so bad, as to induce the guides to lead the party over the bridges between fields of paddy, which were rugged, slippery, and interrupted occasionally by a deep bog, caused by the draining of the water from one field to the next. This description of path continued, with little variation, until the Nawain nullah was reached, and forded at about the depth of three feet and a half. The party encamped on the right bank of the nullah, close to the village of Na-tile-ten. The provisions arrived at three P. M., the bullocks having been assisted across the swamp by fifty Burmans, and the gunnies brought over the nullah in canoes.

14th August.—The path to the village of Dagbo, about one mile, was over ridges of the nature already described: the road from that village, for one mile, is heavy, but the soil becomes a fine sand immediately on entering the forest, which commences at about that distance, and continues with little change for many miles. The party encamped near a fine clear stream, about ten miles from the last ground. The road through the forest is passable by any description of wheeled carriage.

15th August.—The road, at the commencement of this day's march, is of exactly the same description as in the latter part of yesterday; it becomes gradually worse, but still passable by carts, about one mile before arriving at the village of Dureudabo, whence it is heavy, and occasionally very deep, until it enters between paddy fields, and becomes extremely difficult one mile and a half from Mee-boo. This village is one mile north of Neyann-benzick, but as the road leads into the former village, and there is a nullah between them, nearly impassable, I determined on halting at Mee-boo, the distance marched about ten miles.

The intelligence here procured of the enemy's position and intentions, is as follows:—That Maha Silwa, the Keewoongie, and Chuddawoon, are at Meeaday, with their respective forces. Kyankyambo has his Headquarters at Moyon, a place described to be one coss east of Meeaday, whence he has issued orders for a movement upon Prome, by the road which the Keewoongie took in his retreat. The Chuddawoon is to command a body that will move on the right bank of the river towards Puddawn, while the other Chiefs come by water. I dispatched two men to a village, two coss north-east of Mee-boo, where similar intelligence was procured, and it was stated, that no movement had then taken place. Mynyaboo, the King's brother-in-law, is said to be at Memboo. The inland route which the party pursued, having been adopted from the reported impracticability of the road by the river side, inquiries were made respecting a route farther east, which does exist, but was stated to be too circuitous, and too full of the impediments incidental to the season, to authorise my quitting the road, by which the party had advanced, and which would, under other circumstances, have been that of their return. The loads upon the provision bullocks were equalized, in preparation for longer marches.

16th August.—The detachment marched to Dayho, where it remained till the evening, when, as the Nawain nullah is very liable to overflow, the whole moved across and encamped on the left bank.

17th August.—The





AT RANGOON.				PRESENT FOR DUTY.							SICK, PRESENT.															
CORPS.				Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Surgeons.	Assistant Surgeons.	Staff Sergeants.	Subaldars.	Jemadars.	Sergeants or Havildars.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Surgeons.	Assistant Surgeons.	Staff Sergeants.	Subaldars.	Sergeants or Havildars.	Drummers.	Rank and File.		
Artillery,...	{	European, ... ..	...	0	1	3	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	
		Native, .. ..	...	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	6	6	3	49	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	10
*Detachment, His Majesty's Royal Regiment, ... ..			...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	
*Ditto, ditto 41st Ditto, ... ..			...	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	49	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	
*Ditto, ditto 89th Ditto, ... ..			...	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	14	
Ditto, 1st Madras European Ditto, ... ..			...	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	10	
9th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, .. ..			...	1	4	11	0	0	1	8	10	52	19	598	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	31	
12th Ditto Ditto, ... ..			...	1	3	9	0	1	2	9	10	51	19	776	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	97	
34th Ditto Ditto, ... ..			...	1	0	9	0	1	2	6	10	46	29	473	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	
*22d Left Wing (Ditto), .. ..			...	0	3	4	0	1	0	4	4	22	8	359	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	109	
*Details of Corps, .. ..			...	0	1	11	0	1	2	8	8	41	19	784	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	1	143	
Total, ....				3	12	50	1	5	8	37	48	230	103	3280	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	5	468	
AT DONABEW.																										
1st Madras European Regiment, ... ..			...	1	1	6	0	1	2	0	0	25	15	227	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	
22d Regiment Madras Native Infantry, ... ..			...	1	1	7	0	1	2	6	5	33	10	354	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	43	
Total, ....				2	2	13	0	2	4	6	5	58	25	581	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	52
AT MARTABAN.																										
3d Madras Light Infantry, ... ..			...	1	2	9	0	1	1	8	8	57	30	869	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	21	
AT TAVOY AND MERGUI.																										
7th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, ... ..			...	1	2	7	0	1	2	9	10	59	20	730	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	
From Rangoon, omitted in the above.																										
*Detachment H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, ... ..			...	0	2	5	0	1	0	0	0	9	7	120	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	35	
*Ditto ditto 38th Regiment, ... ..			...	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	71	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	37	
*Ditto ditto 47th Ditto, ... ..			...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	38	
Total, ....				0	2	6	0	1	0	0	0	14	10	230	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	110

N. B. The Corps and Detachments marked thus\* are either on the way to join Head-Quarters, or ordered to do so by water.

No. 143. (G)—*Extract of a Letter from Brigadier Smelt, Commanding at Rangoon, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated Rangoon, August 5, 1825.*

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“ I have much pleasure in acquainting you of the success which has attended the arrangements adopted for the speedy collection of the bullocks, whose daily arrival at present seems to keep pace with the ability of the Commissariat to load. The amount of the number dispatched since your departure to 2d instant, is two hundred and seventy-six, and I trust that a few week's continuance of these active exertions, will ensure the collection at Prome, of the entire quantity of provisions you may require.”

No. 144. (A)—*Extract of a Report from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, September 7, 1825.*

I have already informed you, that I had addressed the ministers of his Majesty of Ava, under date the 6th ultimo, on the heavy responsibility that attached to them in carrying on the war, &c. transmitting to you a copy of that communication.

The time had scarcely elapsed for my reception of an answer, when such did actually arrive. Yesterday evening a war boat, under a flag of truce, presented itself at our advanced post on the river, having on board a deputation, consisting of two leading characters and about twelve followers. Upon being conducted to my quarters, and all seated, I asked to what circumstance I owed the honour of their visit. The leader of the deputation replied, that they were the bearers of a letter, (delivering it in great form,) adding, that he was acquainted with its contents, and instructed to communicate verbally many good words on the benefit that would accrue to both countries on the restoration of peace, which they understood we were anxious for. I replied, they were rightly informed, as the desire of the British government was to be on terms of peace and cordiality with all its neighbours, and that I made no doubt, if the feeling was mutual, that most desirable event would soon be brought about. They replied, that such was their most earnest desire.

They then asked if I would, in return to their being sent me, allow two British officers to visit their Commander-in-chief, that such a measure would be received as an esteemed mark of my confidence in them, and a pledge of our wishing to return to terms of peace; I replied, that I would, with the greatest pleasure and confidence, comply with their request, as a compliment to their coming to me, or if it would be more acceptable, that I would meet their young Prince and his party at any central place that might be pointed out betwixt the two armies. They, however, preferred the former. I therefore selected for that complimentary mission, Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, my Deputy Adjutant General, an officer who had volunteered his services upon his first joining the force, to be employed in any thing of that nature I might have to do with the Court of Ava, and Captain Alexander, who was present at the conference, proposed Lieutenant Smith, of his Majesty's ship *Alligator*, to accompany him as the other—two officers of conciliating manners and much firmness of character. They were accompanied, at my special request, by the Armenian merchant, Mr. Sarkies Manook, as interpreter, a man well known and respected at the Court of Ava, and one who has been of much service to me, since the opening of the last campaign.

In the course of the day, the whole party took their departure, the Burmese in their own boat, mine in two, under flags of truce, carrying with them a letter from me to the address of their generals.

No. 144. (B)—*Officers of the Advance Army to the English Commanders and Officers.*

In former times, the gold and silver road was always open between our two nations, and we were as one on terms of friendship and alliance.

To preserve this friendly understanding, we wrote to the great officers of Pouwah, (Arracan,) and Henzawaddy, (Rangoon,) several times; we also sent messengers to the same effect, but this was all in vain.

Sarkies and the Musgie of Pelugheun, (Mahomed Suffi,) as in duty bound, wrote a petition and letter to Menzager, the brother in law of the King, to this effect.

That it was the wish of the English nation to be on the same friendly terms as formerly, and that the gold and silver road should be again opened for trade.

The petition and these letters arrived, also the messengers Ne-shoe-mew and Ne-shoe-zu, who, by direction of those who sent them, said, the English want peace, the Siamese army is about to join them, if they do, they are not answerable for what may afterwards happen.

Now we well know that the Siamese cannot come. But if it be your wish that our two countries should be on the same terms of amity and friendship as formerly, come and solicit the King's youngest brother,

W w

who

who has received authority over the large Burmese armies, and is fully empowered by the King to treat, and you will receive your answer according to the tenor of your terms.

Send back our messengers soon.

*No. 144. (C)—Letter from Sir Archibald Campbell, &c. to the Burmese Deputies.*

The General in Chief of the English army has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a communication by the hands of Mawhnoo, Nanew, Zayab, Soo and Mawluuatpo, Cereez-zay-gurh, through the medium of the General of the advance army of the Burman empire.

The English General regrets the non-receipt of the various communications said to be addressed to him as commander of the armies in Henzawaddy, otherwise prompt answers would have followed.

Nothing can be more true than the English nation wishes for a restoration of that peace and amity, that formerly so happily existed between it and the dominions of the King of Ava: when the British government resorted to war, it was in vindication of its honor and rights, wantonly infringed upon by the Burmese authorities, the hitherto result of which will, it is hoped, afford so salutary a lesson as to prevent the Burmese government from ever again disturbing the repose of so powerful a neighbour. Measures having in view the security of that object, together with competent indemnification for the expences of the war, will form the basis of a treaty of peace, upon which the British commander is ready to enter with the least possible delay, with such persons as may be fully and officially accredited to him for that purpose.

The British officers Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy, c. b., and Captain Smith, second in command of the British war boats, together with Mr. Sarkies, will have the honor of conveying to the presence of the Prince General in Chief of the Burmese army, the English commander's congratulations of his appointment to the high and honorable trust reposed in him by his royal brother and sovereign.

The abovementioned British officers are also fully authorized, by the English General, to enter upon such armistice as may be agreed upon betwixt them, and any person duly authorized to treat upon such a measure by the Burmese General in Chief.

This mission being accomplished, it is requested that the abovementioned officers, with Mr. Sarkies, may be sent back with the least possible delay to Prome.

*No. 145. (A)—Extract Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, September 19, 1825.*

My dispatch of the 14th instant, will have conveyed to you the communications of the officers I had sent to Meeday, to the 12th instant. This morning, the return of those officers to my Head-Quarters, put me in possession of the enclosed documents. The line of demarcation for the armistice differs a little from what I formerly mentioned, but still is perfectly satisfactory to me for every purpose I had in view. The expected meeting of the 2d proximo, will take place with every eclat I can give it, and I trust in its having the desired effect, but confess, I am not very sanguine, such is the consummate pride and presumption of the people I have to deal with—in the mean time, every military preparation will be going on with unabated, or, if possible, with increased vigour, to enable me to strike an early blow, should such a measure be unfortunately necessary.

*No. 145. (B)—Copy of a Report from Lieutenant Colonel F. S. Tidy, and Lieutenant William Smith, R. N., to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. &c.; dated one mile below Meeday, Monday, 12th September, 1825.*

In obedience to your letter of instructions, dated the 7th instant, we proceeded with the boats, as per margin, in company with the war boat carrying the flag of truce, which had been sent in to you at Prome, and arrived at this place at two o'clock p. m.

When within about five miles of Meeday, we were met by six war boats, each carrying a Chief of 500, four of whom had golden umbrellas, and having bands of music and singers in most of the boats. On arriving at a jetty, (built the same day for our accommodation) several Chiefs of a much higher rank, came into the boat, and at one time we counted at least ten golden umbrellas, six of those carrying golden drinking cups and swords. On our landing, we were conducted (by two Chiefs, still higher in rank, and followed by the others) with much ceremony through a guard of about two thousand musketeers, to a commodious house, built the same day for our reception.

This morning the Keewoongee sent the late governors of Prome and Sarrawaddy, (Mamzougla) to compliment us in his name. We thought this a proper opportunity of saying, that we had arrived with authority



authority from you to return the visit of the officers they had dispatched to Prome, and to take such preliminary steps, as our limited powers would enable us, for the purpose of forwarding the object which it appeared, both countries were desirous should be accomplished, and that, as all matters of ceremony had been gone through, we proposed that we might proceed to business, urging the necessity of our speedy return to Prome, in compliance with your orders. They observed, that *their* officer had found the British commander at Prome, who had been pleased to see him at once, but that the Keewoongee was only second in command, and had no authority to act, but that he had dispatched a boat for instructions, the moment our approach was announced, to 'Memiaboo,' at his Head-Quarters at Maloon, and hoped, that we would not think of returning without giving them an opportunity of shewing how much in earnest they were in their pacific disposition, and that they really were doing what they believed the best, to the establishment of a permanent friendship between the two countries.

Every thing that we had as yet seen or heard assured us, that we had no reason to doubt their sincerity; and, therefore, after some discussion, we agreed to remain here till dispatches should be received from 'Memiaboo,' which are looked for to-morrow; when we hope to accomplish the object of our mission.

P. S. The guard was withdrawn the moment we landed, except a few men to keep order amongst their own people, and which it was left to us to dismiss or retain.

No. 145. (C)—*Extract Report from Lieutenant Colonel F. S. Tidy, Deputy Adjutant General, and Lieutenant William Smith, R. N., Commanding Light Division, to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. &c.; dated one mile below Meeday, September 18, 1825.*

In continuation of our proceedings at this place, from the date of our last communication of the 12th instant, we have the honour to state that, on the 13th, at noon, we were waited upon by the Attawoon Menginee Maha Menla Rajah, and the Woodcock Maha Senkeeyah, who informed us, that the Keewoongee would be glad to see us the next day, at any hour most convenient to ourselves. One o'clock was the hour fixed upon for that purpose. Early on the 14th, we received a visit from the late governor of Prome and Serrahwaddy, and a former Raywoon of Rangoon; this visit was awowedly to compliment us, but it was evident they had other motives; for instance, in conversation with Mr. Sarkies Manook, they observed, that as he was the interpreter between the two nations upon this occasion, they wished him, if any strong language emanated from us in the expected interview (to day,) with the Keewoongee, he would explain it in the mildest way possible; and that, in his interpretation of any strong language from the Burmese authorities, it should be, in like manner, softened down to us, evidently to deceive the attentive listeners. At the hour appointed, we proceeded to Meeday, in his Majesty's ship *Alligator's* pinnace, accompanied by a number of Chiefs, of high rank, in war boats and war canoes, and were received near the house of audience by a guard of musketeers, who lined each side of the road in single file, crouched with the butts of their muskets towards us, the pan open and cock down: on our arrival, we were conducted to the Keewoongee by his principal officers. After the usual complimentary ceremonies, we stated the object of our mission to be, to return the visit of the Burmese officer, whom he had sent to Prome, and to enter upon such further measures, as our limited powers authorized towards the restoration of peace and amity between the two countries. In reply, the Keewoongee observed, that no man was more averse to the war than himself, from the beginning, and that, if it now depended upon him, he would make peace with us *then*; but that, unfortunately, he had not yet received power from his court to enter into any negotiation, but he expected it so confidently, that he hoped we would not return to Prome before its arrival; and that, if our instructions were peremptory, we must, of course, obey them; but that, if we could remain for one or two days longer, he begged of us to postpone our return as a mark of friendship to himself. Our desire to accomplish the object of the mission induced us to acquiesce in this proposal. We retired with an assurance from the Keewoongee, that he would visit us the following day, which, however, he was prevented doing by indisposition, but sent down the Attawoon and Woodcock, attended by all his principal officers, to wait upon us, and make his apologies. On the morning of the 16th, it was intimated to us by the former governor of Bassien, and the Raywoon of Rangoon, that the Keewoongee had received full powers from the court of Ava, and that he would be ready to receive us, at our hour, the next day. Accordingly, we proceeded, attended as formerly, to the house of audience, where, without much difficulty, but many ceremonies, we had the satisfaction of concluding an armistice, agreeable to the tenor of your instructions; which we have now the honor to enclose, signed, on your part, by us; and on the part of the Keewoongee, by the Attawoon Menginee Maha Menla Rajah, and the Woodcock Menginee Maha Senkeeyah.

No. 145. (D)—*Form of Armistice.*

Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b. and k. c. t. s., Commander in Chief of the British forces in the kingdom of Ava, Political Agent, &c. &c. having empowered Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, c. b., Deputy

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Deputy Adjutant General, and Lieutenant Wm. Smith, of the Royal Navy, Commanding the Light Division to conclude an Armistice with the Burmese army, with a view to the restoration of peace and amity between the British government, and the government of His Majesty the King of Ava: These officers were met on the 17th of September, by the Attawoon, Menjee Maha Menla Rajah, and the Woodcock Maha Seeree Senkagali, duly authorised by Sahdo Menjee Maha Mengon, first Minister of the King, when the following articles were agreed upon, signed by, and exchanged between the parties deputed, as abovementioned.

1st.—There shall be a cessation of hostilities between the British and Burmese armies, from the date hereof to the 17th day of October next included.

2d.—The first Minister of the King, Sahdo Menjee Maha Menjou, being invested with full powers from His Majesty for that purpose, will meet the British authorities (duly qualified by their government,) at the village of Newbenziek, being half-way between the two armies, on the 2d day of October next; there to enter into negotiations for the re-establishment of peace and amity between the subjects of the two countries.

3d.—A line of demarcation shall be drawn between the two armies, commencing at Comma, on the western bank of the Irrawaddy, passing through the village of Newbenziek, and continuing along the road from that village to Thongo.

The respective parties engage to prevent their troops or adherents passing the said line, and further give assurance that all parties or detachments belonging to either, shall be immediately re-called to their own side of the line respectively.

It is further agreed, on the part of the British commander, that this cessation of hostilities shall be observed by the several British armies on the frontiers of these dominions; which shall remain without making any forward movement before the 18th day of October next, when this armistice shall cease and determine. The Burmese authorities engaging, that this article shall be reciprocally observed.

4th.—Two officers from each army are to meet on the 23d instant, at the village of Newbenziek, to mark off the ground for the encampment of the respective Chiefs and their followers, and to make such other arrangements as they may deem requisite, preparatory to the meeting of the said high Commissioners.

5th.—The state of the King of Ava's first Minister absolutely requiring, that he shall not move without the attendance of five hundred men with fire arms, and five hundred men with swords—the British Commander will, of course, be attended by a corresponding number, should he deem it expedient.

Done at Mecaday, this 17th day of September, 1825.

No. 146. (A)—*Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, October 5, 1825.*

Agreeably to the appointment I mentioned in my last letter, under date, 19th ultimo, as having been entered into with the Kee Wonghee and Burmese Commissioners, I reached Newbenziek, on the evening of the 30th ultimo, where we found the ground cleared for our encampment, a square space, at the distance of 800 yards from our line, regularly tutted for the Burmhan guard of honour, and a Lotoo, or house of conference, erected in the intermediate space, equidistant from both lines. Merely a safeguard of twenty-five Burmese had reached the spot, as a protection to the houses that had been built.

A few minutes before two o'clock, on the 2d, two Burmese officers of rank, arrived in camp, to conduct me to the Lotoo, and having dispatched Colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith, R. N. to the Burmese cantonment to pay a similar honor to the Kee Wonghee, at two o'clock, Sir James Brisbane, (who I requested to act as 2d Commissioner,) and I, with our suite, walked down to the Lotoo, and met the Burmese Commissioners entering the house, arrayed in splendid state dresses. After the usual compliments had passed, I opened the conference by telling the Wonghees, we had met for a great and solemn purpose, involving the happiness or misery of thousands of our fellow creatures; I trusted that, during our discussions, neither party would, for a moment, forget or lose sight of the important object for which we were assembled, and I assured the meeting, it would be the proudest and happiest moment of my life, in which I signed a treaty of lasting peace and friendship between the two great nations.

Lamaynwoon, the Junior Commissioner, but evidently, the leading character, replied with much readiness, that the feelings of every good Burmah accorded with my own, and that the result of a meeting of such a nature could not be doubted; but he hoped, that the first day of our acquaintance, would be given up to private friendship, and that to-morrow or next day, we could enter upon public business. To this I, at once, assented, saying, that in meeting their wishes, I was sure I should only consult those of my own government.

A desultory conversation now ensued, in the course of which offers were made by the Woonghees, one to accompany me to Rangoon, and the other to England, and in short, every effort was made to be civil and obliging, asking when I last heard from England, how the King was, &c. &c. The meeting at length broke up, in consequence of Lamaywoon's being taken ill, and nearly fainting, probably from the cumbrous dress he wore. I procured a palanquin to send him home in, and both parties returned to their respective lines, in the same order as we advanced. On reaching camp, I requested Brigadier General Cotton, attended by Doctor Cathcart, of His Majesty's 38th Regiment, to proceed to the Burmese cantonment, for the purpose of enquiring after the Commissioner's health, and offering medical aid: the visit was considered as the greatest kindness we could shew, and Mr. Cathcart's professional aid was thankfully accepted.

Next morning, (the 3d,) the usual messengers arrived in camp, and named twelve o'clock, as the most convenient hour, for our second meeting with the Woonghees, which was agreed to.

About half-past eleven, the usual escort of chiefs, to accompany us to the Lotoo, arrived in camp, and expressed the Keewoongee's request, that only six chiefs on a side, should be present at this day's meeting. At twelve, the parties met, as before, in the Lotoo, and proceeded to concert the conditions of a peace.

After much discussion, the Woonghees requested a prolongation of the armistice, to enable them to refer to Ava, on points of such importance, and their request was readily granted, as, from the continued wetness of the ground, I find I cannot move with comfort to my troops before, perhaps, the middle of November. A copy of the renewed armistice is herewith sent.

No. 146. (B)—*Prolongation of the Armistice.*

The British and Burmese high Commissioners having met, in pursuance of the Articles concluded on the 17th day of September, have found it expedient to prolong the existing armistice between the two powers. For this purpose the British Commissioners have, on their part, deputed Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy, c. B., and Lieutenant W. Smith, R. A.;—the Burmese authorities having also nominated the Attawoon Menga Maha Menla Rajah, and the Woodlock Maha Seere Senkeeah: the said deputies met upon the 4th day of October, and agreed that the armistice, with all its stipulations, shall be extended to the 2d day of November next included, agreeable to the instructions of the two contracting authorities.

Done at Neubenzieck, this 4th day of October, 1825.

No. 147.—*Extract Report from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, October 23, 1825.*

I am no longer permitted to harbour a doubt upon the result of the Woonghee's reference to Ava, with our proposed basis of a treaty of peace.

The above information has been circumstantially detailed to me, as received from different quarters, and I have reason to think the imperial order, "instantly to attack us," reached Meaday many days since. Fear, or a better motive, has delayed its being carried into effect; but as life is the certain forfeit to disobedience, I conclude at least an effort to drive us from our position must yet be made.

No. 148. (A)—*Extract Report from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, October 24, 1825.*

No movement of importance in advance of the line of demarcation, appears to have been made by the enemy since I closed my dispatch of yesterday, and as this apparent inactivity may, perhaps, arise from indecision, or difference of opinion among the Burmese Commissioners, I have seized the opportunity it affords, of addressing a letter to them, of which the enclosed is a copy, and which will, I trust, draw some explanation from them of their present extraordinary conduct.

If hostilities must be renewed, it appears, in great measure, immaterial whether the enemy attacks me in my lines at Prome, or awaits my attack in his position at Meaday; in either case, I trust the result will not be doubtful.

To prevent his throwing the main body of his army into the kingdom of Pegue, (which common tactic points out as his surest line of defensive operations) at present occupies all my attention, and against even that contingency, I hope to provide without materially retarding my advance upon his capital.



Ava.  
1825.

In a former communication, I detailed to you the strength of the columns now forming at Pegue, under Lieutenant Colonel Pepper, and to which I have since added a very strong wing of the 12th Madras Native Infantry, insuring, I trust, an uninterrupted advance on that line, and the ultimate reduction of the city of Tongho.

In addition to the above force, I now purpose forming another column at Rangoon, to be composed of the second wing of the 12th Native Infantry, the European corps expected from Madras, and numerous Native and European details arrived, or daily expected from that presidency. The dismounted troops of the Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard, are also about to proceed to Rangoon, to await the arrival of Captain Sneyd, with the remount horses for the corps, when they will prove a valuable acquisition to the field force to be assembled there, and for the command of which I will send an officer of rank and experience from the force at Prome.

From the comparative mildness of the late monsoon, I expect this column will be able to move by the end of November, and its commander will receive such instructions from me, as the developement of the enemy's designs may, from time to time, seem to require.

P. S. It will be gratifying to the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council to know, that I am rapidly completing my Artillery and Commissariat in draft and carriage cattle, and by the end of the month we will, I trust, be provided in both departments to the extent required.

*No. 148. (B)—Letter from General Sir Archibald Campbell, to the Burmese Commissioners.*

The English General presents his best respects to the Keewoongee and Lamaynwoon, and begs they will do him the favor to say, when he may expect the arrival of the English prisoners from Ava.

The Governors of Tavoy and Mergui will be restored the instant they arrive from Bengal, the General having sent his own son for them on the day after his return to Prome, from the conference at Neoun-zick.

The English General also expects, according to the rules and customs of war amongst civilized nations, the Burmese Commissioners will notify to him, some days previous to the expiration of the existing armistice, whether the late negotiations are to be followed up by any further pacific measures, or whether it is still the wish of the Burmese government to have recourse to further hostilities.

*Prome, October 24th, 1825.*

*No. 149. (A)—Extract Report from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c. ; dated Prome, October 29, 1825.*

The enclosed copy of a letter, just received from the Burmese Commissioners, in answer to mine to their address, under date the 24th current, will better explain the sentiments still entertained by the Court of Ava, than any thing I could write upon the subject.

Enclosure C. contains some heads of information upon the enemy's movements, &c. and enclosure D. is the copy of a letter from me to the Keewoongee, (to which I have received no answer,) upon the subject of establishing a post at the village of Goondown, in consequence of the above information.

*No. 149. (B)—Translation of a Letter from the Kee-woonghee and Lamayn-woon, to the English General in Chief.*

For the purpose of terminating the war, which existed between these two great nations, we met at Neoun-zick.

On our parts, we then spoke the truth, plainly from our hearts: but not so the English Generals, they brought forward too many subjects, totally unexpected by us.

From these causes, nothing has been done effectually. But an armistice was agreed upon for a certain time. Now, during the existence of this armistice, the English Generals acted neither true or sincere towards us! By command of a Burrashib, armed sepoy, ships, and boats, passed to Rangoon by way of Modeen, (Cape Negrais,) and officers with troops, from Megawaddy, (Cheduba,) crossed over to Sandaway, and are in motion. This shews no wish or desire for peace: we must consider, from what we see so plainly, that the English Generals are not sincere or true, and this is the cause why we have not sent any petition to our Lord, the Prince General in Chief, to release the English prisoners now under the Golden Feet.

If you sincerely want peace, and our former friendship re-established; according to Burman custom, empty your hands of what you have, and then, if you ask it, we will be on friendly terms with you, and send our petition for the release of your English prisoners, and send them down to you.

However, after the termination of the armistice between us, if you shew any inclination to renew your demands for money for your expenses, or any territory from us, you are to consider our friendship at an end—this is Burman custom.

*No. 149. (C)—Information of Napee-ah, a Burmese Trader, and Nanyean.*

About ten days ago we left Prome for Meeaday, for the purpose of obtaining information; we arrived at Meeaday, passing as traders—and we discovered that upwards of thirty thousand men composed the army at Meeaday, under the Keewoonghee. We heard that Saddawoon was ordered to Commo, with three thousand and three hundred men—Nathoun Bo, was ordered to Paloh with three thousand and three hundred men—Penzala Bo, was ordered to occupy the village of Peenbook—a short distance from Neunbenziek, with three thousand and three hundred men. On Saddawoon's arrival at Commo, he fired some guns, which were heard by the great army, and a report was spread through the Burmese camp, that the English had attacked them, (by night,) and the greatest confusion and terror prevailed throughout the Burmese army, until the true cause was known, and they are daily in expectation of the English advancing on them.

*Copy of a Letter received from the Musgui of Meeaday, by the Musgui of Prome.*

I have received your letter, and understand the contents, as well as the news it contains, for which I am obliged—you and I know each other from our youth, and being friends, ought to assist each other. Any thing in my power that I can do for you, I will—you will, I hope, do the same for me. The Keewoonghee has told me that you and the Musgui of Padoun have done very wrong in taking protection from these *rebels*, the English strangers—but I spoke in your favour.

As to the position of affairs between these English and ourselves, I really can give you no information at present, or whether it will be peace or war. But we are to have in Moboun the Keewoonghee and his army.

	<i>Place.</i>	<i>Number of men.</i>	<i>Commanded by</i>
	Between Meeaday and Mobon,	4000	Poundo-lah.
	Meeaday Point, -----	6000	Kiou-kam-boh.
	Kee-mie-gow, near it, -----	9000	Pinzala Bo.
At		9000	Muhake Meah.
		3000	Female Chief.
		9000	Shaum Chief.
		3000	Cassay Chief.
		300	Shaum Chief.
	West bank at Meezagine, -----	6000	Sadawoon.
	Total	49,000	

(Cavalry.)  
(Cavalry.)

*Information of the Bearer of the above Letter.*

When I was at Meeaday, the most positive orders came from the King to the Keewoonghee, to attack the English directly. The Burmese Chiefs were much grieved at this order, and the Keewoonghee declared publicly, "it would cost him his life, but it was better so, that he should, than sacrifice thousands of his poor people." The Burmese army are now burning the wood of the stockade as firewood; and no notice taken of it by the chiefs. I hear the King's half-brother has made a stronger stockade at Maloon,—the wood small.

The Musgui of Meeaday gave me (privately,) a letter for the Prome Musgui, an answer to one I brought him.

*Examination of a Boy, son of the Musgui of Meeaday, brought to Prome by General Cotton.*

After the Burmese army had burnt our village of Goondown, we all fled; about three days ago, I, with four people and two canoes, returned to try and collect our lost people from the jungles; while at the village, the English fire ship came there, and the English Chief called me, and brought me in it to Prome. The Burmese have

have already entered the district of Meeawaddy in arms, I heard from some, three thousand strong, from others, six thousand. But I am not quite certain as to the exact number, but am sure they are there in force.

*No. 149. (D)—Note from Sir Archibald Campbell, to the Kee-woonghee.*

The English General was in hopes, that the measure so kindly adopted by the Keewoonghee, of sending troops to Patòh and Palòh, would have put a stop to the disgraceful outrages committed upon the defenceless inhabitants of the villages on the banks of the river, in this, however, he has been disappointed, as the villages of Goondon, and Little Commo, have since been plundered and totally destroyed by fire—which the Keewoonghee, he is sure, will join him in lamenting.—To prevent acts of a similar nature, however, from taking place still lower down the river, the English General is sending a small force to be stationed on the site of the village of Goondon, which will make the British and Burmese out-posts equidistant from the line of demarcation, and so near as to render it impossible for thieves and robbers to exist between them.

*Prome, 26th October 1825.*

*No. 150.—Report from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, November 16, 1825.*

I have now the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, that I will move forward, at the head of the first division of the army, tomorrow morning; the rest of the force following me on the two subsequent days—I regret to say, that my intention of making a last appeal to the Burmese Commissioners, previous to re-commencing hostilities, has been unfortunately frustrated by late aggressions on the part of the enemy; and is, for the present, unavoidably laid aside.

A party of reconnoissance, from the 22d Native Infantry, having moved, some days since, a few miles in front of our advanced posts, were met by a party of the enemy, which instantly fired upon them, and, although Lieutenant Bird, who commanded the Native Infantry, had the forbearance not to return the fire, he was, subsequently, attacked by a considerable body of Shans, and compelled to retire skirmishing with the enemy; His Lordship in Council will, therefore, I trust, agree with me, that while so marked a disposition to war is manifested, it would be equally vain and injudicious to urge our demands with any thing but force.

The enemy having pushed forward a division of his army upon the road, by which we will advance to within a few miles of Prome, and it appearing desirable that our columns should not be harassed and delayed at the very commencement of our march. I yesterday directed Colonel Macdowall, of the Madras army, to move forward with four regiments of Madras Native Infantry, and dislodge the enemy from his posts.

The troops will, I hope, return to camp to night or to-morrow morning, and the Colonel's report will be herewith transmitted.

I have embarked his Majesty's Royal Regiment, made up to nearly seven hundred strong, under the command of Brigadier Armstrong, on board the flotilla, and the zeal and very cordial and courteous disposition of His Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane, insure to me every possible aid and assistance from our marine column of attack.

The corps at Pegue, under Colonel Pepper, will, I trust, be able to move forward early in December, and the one from Rangoon, about the latter end of that month.

I purpose leaving a Brigade of Native Infantry, and a considerable number of convalescents to garrison this place.

151A *Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B. &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, November 18, 1825.*

In continuation of my letter of yesterday, I much regret to state, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, that the important movement therein contemplated, could not be carried into effect, owing to the enemy's superior force and the strength of his positions.

The point upon which the different corps were directed to move, was the village of Watty-goon, distant from Prome twenty miles, where my information led me to suppose a body of only two thousand five hundred Shans and Burmese were assembled, and from the easterly position they had chosen, with the apparent purpose of harassing our right flank in advancing, or of falling into our rear, annoying the garrison of Prome, and endeavouring to intercept our communication with that place.



For the purpose of dislodging this force, (as I yesterday did myself the honor of stating) I placed two brigades of Madras Native Infantry, under the command of Colonel McDowall, directing him to approach the enemy's position at Watty-noon, with three regiments of Native Infantry, so as to assail his left flank, while Major Evans, with the 22d Native Infantry, was ordered to move upon the front of the position, and to attack in concert with the main body: I also moved forward the 18th Native Infantry to the ground, left by the 22d, to be in readiness to afford support to the latter corps if required. The uncertain state of the roads and country did not permit of the columns being accompanied by Artillery.

The 22d Native Infantry came upon the enemy's position at Watty-noon, and Major Evans, from the firing on his right, considering Colonel McDowall's column in the act of attacking, gallantly moved forward to take his share in the engagement, but finding himself mistaken in that point, and the enemy much too numerous and strongly posted to be assaulted by a single regiment, he deemed it prudent to retire, which appears to have been done with steadiness and regularity.

The columns under Colonel McDowall's immediate command, approached the position of Watty-noon by the left flank, as directed, and reached that point after a sharp conflict with the enemy's troops in advance; but the apparent strength of the position, and his very superior numerical force, did not, in the opinion of the senior officers, warrant an assault with the means at their disposal, and a retreat was determined on, in the course of which the 38th Native Infantry, which had been delayed by unforeseen and untoward circumstances, came in most opportunely upon the enemy's flank, and materially checked his following up our retreating column.

I have to lament the loss of a good and worthy officer in Lieutenant-Colonel-Commandant McDowall, and several other brave officers and soldiers, as will appear by the list of killed and wounded; but it affords me peculiar satisfaction to observe, by the concurring testimony of the officers employed, and the official reports of commanding officers herewith transmitted, that the troops engaged conducted themselves with that steadiness and valour which has ever eminently distinguished the sepoy's of the Madras army.

No. 151. (B)—*Copy of a Despatch from Major R. Lacy Evans, Commanding 22d Regiment Madras Native Infantry, to the Deputy Adjutant General to the Forces, Prome; dated Camp, Zecoup, November 17, 1825.*

In conformity with the orders received on the 14th instant, from the Quarter Master General's Department, I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of General Campbell, K. C. B., that I moved with the regiment from our encampment on the Nullah, at eight o'clock on the night of the 15th, to co-operate with Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant McDowall, in a simultaneous attack upon that part of the enemy's force reported to be in the vicinity of, or at the village of Wattynoon. At twelve o'clock, P. M., the guide reported that we were not far from the advance guard of the enemy, on which I halted till about four o'clock, when I again advanced, and at about six came up with a body, stated by the guide to be their advance piquet, consisting of about five hundred men, on whom I commenced a skirmishing attack, following them through the jungle on either side the road.

During this operation, we heard a heavy firing in front to the right, which, conceiving to be Colonel McDowall's column driving in the enemy on his side, I expedited my advance, covered by the Light Company under Captain Bird.

On coming to an opening in a very thick part of the jungle, which the guide pointed out as the entrance to the enemy's position, I found my advance checked by a very heavy fire, on which I immediately formed the regiment into line in rear of the advance, and as much to the right as the jungle would admit of.

Conceiving the check experienced by the Light Company to be caused by a body of the enemy drawn up for the defence of this entrance to their position, I brought up two Companies to its support, with a view of forcing the passage, bringing my Regiment into line upon their position, and commencing an attack, in conjunction with that I hoped to find Colonel McDowall making on their main body.

On coming up with these two Companies, I found myself under a heavy, well-directed and destructive fire, from what appeared to be a bastion of a fortified position.

I found the leading subdivision of the Light Company nearly annihilated, and both the officers of that company wounded; that the men of the other companies were falling in numbers, and perceiving no indication that my hopes of a conjoint attack on the other side were correct, together with the guide's report, that the enemy were five thousand strong, supported by Cavalry, I determined to retire.

The regiment marched off in good order, and was almost immediately pursued by a strong body of the enemy.

On gaining some ground, I thought it advisable to re-form my line to check their advance. Seeing that the fire from the right wing, which was first formed, had the desired effect, and that the left was well locked up, I resolved on continuing my march, apprehensive that should the other columns of attack not have shewn themselves, the main body, with the Cavalry, might have been brought to act against me.

We, then continued our march without interruption, the enemy following with great boldness, and galling our rear for about three miles, during which operation we suffered severely in killed and wounded; those unable to move, with assistance of the litter, I regret to say, we were unavoidably obliged to leave on the ground.

The Regiment, though considerably exhausted from marching all night, and the operations of the day, marched in good united order till we were within five or six miles of camp, when unfortunately, from the want of guides, all of whom made off at the commencement of the affair, we took a wrong road, the direction of which we followed for about five miles. On retracing our steps, we met two sepoy of the 18th Regiment Native Infantry, who thinking to lead us by a short road into Captain Ross's camp, brought us through a deep swamp and jungle, which caused our having many stragglers, and prevented our arriving in our present position till four in the evening; the regiment having been under arms for twenty hours.

I think it my duty to state to you, for the General's information, my entire satisfaction at the constancy and perseverance with which the Regiment sustained itself under the very heavy and destructive fire from the enemy's work, until they received my orders to move off, and the steady manner in which they retired under the enemy's galling fire.

I beg particularly to recommend to the General's notice the conduct of Captain Bird and Lieutenant Darby, who were both wounded with the Light Company; and I am much indebted to the whole of the officers for their assistance and support under such trying circumstances.

Lieutenant Hay, though severely wounded, continued with his company till the enemy had ceased to interrupt our march.

To Lieutenant and Adjutant Bird I feel particularly indebted for the very active and useful aid I derived from him during the whole of these operations.

Lieutenant D'Montorency, of the Quarter Master General's Department, who conducted my march, displayed much gallantry and zeal in this affair, being almost constantly in advance under the enemy's fire.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a return of our loss, which I am sorry to say, is very severe. Thirty-seven wounded men were brought into camp, although all the dooley bearers, with the exception of one set, ran off during the action.

Many of those reported missing, fell into the rear from exhaustion during our long and harassing march.

The pain I still feel from my wound, and the amputation of my finger, will, I hope, plead my excuse for any inaccuracy in this report, as well as for my not having made it immediately on coming to my ground last evening.

No. 151. (C)—*Copy of a Despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Brook, 28th Regiment Native Infantry, to Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy, Deputy Adjutant General, &c. &c.; dated Prome, November 17, 1825.*

I have the honor to state, for the information of the Commander of the forces, that the force under the command of the late Brigadier McDowall, marched from this on the evening of the 15th, at 6 o'clock P. M., and had proceeded about 12 miles, when the advanced guard, under Captain Coyle, 28th Regiment, fell in with a party of the enemy to the number of one hundred, or one hundred and fifty men, apparently advancing. After the exchange of a few shots, during which time two sepoy were wounded, the enemy were driven back with loss, as we afterwards ascertained by seeing, on our return, three bodies on the spot where the affair took place.

After crossing a nullah, the troops were halted for about an hour and a half, after which we proceeded forward, and heard a shout from a party of the enemy, who had occupied a village about four miles from the spot we had halted at.

About day-break, a bugle was heard a considerable distance to our left, and about half-past seven it was again heard, and shortly after a heavy firing commenced from the spot where the bugle sound was heard, which was then answered by our bugles; we then advanced as rapidly as possible for about the space of an hour, during which the firing continued on the left, principally musquetry, but latterly of heavy guns also, when we discovered the enemy in front, to which we were advancing; six companies from the 28th were ordered as a flanking party to the right, when a severe conflict took place, the enemy being in great force, and provided with jingals and muskets, disputed every inch of ground with great resolution. About this period, Captain Coyle was wounded in the arm by a musket ball, and a contusion on the breast by a spent jinal ball. After proceeding in this manner about four miles, the 43d Regiment was ordered to take the place of the 28th, which

was in front of the column, and proceeded fighting their way for about a mile, when they unexpectedly arrived in front of some strong works, from which a well-directed and heavy fire was kept up. The Grenadier Company, under Ensign Elsey, 43d, was ordered to advance to that part of the works, from which the heaviest fire proceeded, to endeavour to keep it under, on which service it advanced with the most determined resolution; but on arriving near the works, the firing became so heavy and galling, that it was found necessary to return. At this time, I regret to state, Brigadier McDowall was shot in the head by a musket ball, and died immediately; and nearly at the same moment Lieutenants Manning, Ranken, and Ensign Elsey, 43d Regiment, were obliged to be brought away, being all severely wounded. Lieutenant Ranken, I am sorry to say, is since dead of his wounds.

Unprepared as the force was with means for assault, I found it necessary, after taking the advice of the senior officers, to direct the retreat to be sounded, the rear guard, commanded by Captain Wiggins, assisted by Captain McLeod, who, in a most gallant and judicious manner covered the retreat, which was made in as regular a manner as circumstances and the nature of the country would admit of, being a complete jungle, and under a severe and heavy fire from great numbers of the enemy, who were in the jungle, and on our right and left, nearly surrounding our column and threatening to cut off our retreat, assisted by numerous bodies of Cavalry, to the number of five or six hundred.

After a dreadful harassing march of ten miles, which, during the latter part, was rendered still more distressing by the men dropping on the road from fatigue, having rested only an hour and a half since their departure from Prome, we at length reached a river, or large nullah, about nine miles from Prome, which having crossed, I allowed the troops to rest for about an hour, (the enemy had left pursuing us,) when we proceeded and arrived at Prome, at about half-past seven last evening.

I am sorry to say, from the want of a greater number of doolies, and absolute exhaustion of the bearers, notwithstanding the exertion of the sepoys, and the officers giving their horses to bring in the wounded, &c. I was obliged to leave the dead and some wounded men in the rear.

I feel it the greatest pleasure in making known to the Commander of the forces, that the conduct of both officers and men deserves every praise, especially for their conduct during so harassing a retreat: their exertions were unremitting.

I am particularly indebted to Captain Wiggins, Commanding the 43d Regiment, and Captain McLeod, for the able manner they covered the retreat, also to Captain White, Assistant Quarter Master General, and Captain Johnston, M. B. Captain Coyle was, I am sorry to say, wounded early in the action, whereby I was deprived of the service of that valuable officer during the retreat, and the command of the Regiment devolving on Captain Bell—his conduct and exertions deserve my best thanks. Mr. Assistant Surgeon Sutherland, of the 28th, deserves every praise for his attention to the wounded;—in his attention to the men he was unremitting, as also Mr. Assistant Surgeon Cumming, 43d, who was equally so.

I reckon the enemy, from the very large bodies I saw in different parts of the jungle, to amount to, at least, ten or twelve thousand Infantry, and every way well armed.

Enclosed is a list of the killed and wounded, &c.,\* of the two Regiments under my command.

No. 151. (D)—Copy

\* *General Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the Army under the Command of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., in Action with the Enemy on the 16th November, 1825.*

*Head-Quarters, Prome, 17th November, 1825.*

*22d Regiment Madras Native Infantry.*—Killed—1 Havildar and 16 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Major, 1 Captain, 4 Lieutenants, and 58 Rank and File.

Missing—2 Havildars, 7 Rank and File, and 1 Bheestee.

*28th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.*—Killed—10 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Captain, 1 Havildar, and 18 Rank and File.

Missing—15 Rank and File.

*43d Regiment Madras Native Infantry.*—Killed—1 Havildar, and 25 Rank and File.

Wounded—2 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 1 Subadar, 5 Havildars, 47 Rank and File, and 1 Bheestee

Missing—17 Rank and File.

*Staff.*—Killed—1 Lieutenant-Colonel-Commandant.

*Name of the Officer Killed.*—Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel-Commandant R. McDowall.

*Names of the Officers Wounded.*—43d Madras Native Infantry.—Captain H. Wiggins, slightly—Captain A. McLeod, slightly—Lieutenant T. C. Ranken, dangerously, since dead—Lieutenant E. C. Manning, severely—Ensign W. Elsey, dangerously—Soobadar Soobramoory, slightly.

*28th Madras Native Infantry.*—Captain H. Coyle, severely and dangerously.

*22d Madras Native Infantry.*—Major R. L. Evans, severely—Captain C. M. Bird, severely, not dangerously—Lieutenant J. P. Hay, severely, not dangerously—Lieutenant F. Darby, slightly—Lieutenant J. Shapland, slightly—Lieutenant M. Poole, slightly.



*No. 151. (D)—Copy of a Report from Lieutenant-Colonel D. C. Smith, Commanding 38th Regiment Native Infantry, to the Adjutant of the Forces; dated Camp, near Prome, 17th November, 1825.*

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Commander of the forces, that, in obedience to orders, I marched from camp at Thomba-la, with the 38th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, at 7 p. m., on the 15th instant, and arrived near to the village of Saagie, at 4 o'clock next morning; here the guides refused to proceed, from not being able to find the road in the dark, and I was obliged to wait until daylight, and only reached Saagie at 6 a. m., 16th instant. I was induced to make this movement in preference to proceeding by the direct route to Wattygoung, in the hope of finding Colonel McDowall's detachment, whose bugles were heard near this place, and also on account of my being too late to proceed direct to Wattygoung, which I could not hope to reach before 12 o'clock.

On arriving at the village of Saagie, I heard some firing in the direction of Wattygoung, and which appeared about seven miles distant:—the reports becoming heavier and more frequent, I proceeded towards Wattygoung at 7 o'clock, and came up with the firing at 12 o'clock; here I observed the enemy in considerable numbers, consisting of Cavalry and Infantry, with jinjals and small guns. I directed the Light Company to advance in front and skirmish with what appeared to be the rear of the enemy, while the Regiment emerged from the narrow road in the jungle and formed column of companies when they proceeded to the attack, the Light Infantry ceasing firing and joining the regiment; the enemy were so much taken by surprise that they fled before the Regiment could reach them, having only lost a few men by the firing of the Light Infantry.

The enemy's Cavalry having made some movements, which I thought indicated an attack on the Regiment, I formed square and remained for sometime in this position, repeatedly sounding the bugles to attract the attention of Colonel McDowall's detachment, but without effect, as no answering sounds were heard; the firing which, on our arrival, had been very heavy, now entirely ceased, and not being able to ascertain the position of the detachment, I had no option left but to retreat or permit myself to be surrounded by an overwhelming force, without hopes of succour or subsistence of any kind.—I therefore commenced my retreat about 1 o'clock, and as I heard no more firing on either part, I trust the diversion made by the 38th Regiment Native Infantry, in favor of Colonel McDowall's detachment, suggested and arranged by the Commander of the forces, was effected, although from the badness of the roads, and the distance being much greater than expected, not precisely in the manner dictated to me; the retreat was effected without any opposition by the enemy, and the regiment reached the village of Saagie at 4 p. m., 16th instant, halted two hours, and marched into Prome at 7 o'clock a. m., 17 instant.

The nature of the duty in which the Regiment was employed did not afford an opportunity of distinguishing itself by any shining military exploit, except that the Light Company, under Captain Dowden and Lieutenant Willis, dashed down upon the enemy in a most spirited style, and retreated, and ceased firing upon the signal being given, in the most orderly manner, and the whole of the Regiment prepared for action with zeal and alacrity, as well as the best order. I must, in justice to the Regiment, beg leave to call your attention to the severe and harassing march endured by the corps throughout the whole affair, in which the officers and men bore almost total want of rest for two nights and one day, with the greatest patience and cheerfulness.

*No. 152. (A)—Copy of a Despatch from Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to the Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Prome, November 30, 1825.*

The enemy, in closing in upon our front, has been unremitting in his endeavours to intercept our communication with Rangoon.—Large bodies of troops for this service have lately passed our flanks on both sides of the Irrawaddy, and the state of that river, covered, as it has lately been, with large and valuable convoys of stores and treasure, has necessarily caused me much anxiety, and retarded my moving forward.

Shndoun-Mew, and the Sarrawaddy districts have been over-run by these itinerant bands, and I have been under the necessity of detaching Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, with a strong Detachment, for the purpose of driving the enemy from Shndoun, and, if possible, of surprizing any parties he might have in that neighbourhood. On the night of the 24th, the Lieutenant-Colonel marched to Shndoun, but the enemy receiving intelligence of his approach, fled to the interior, and the Detachment returned to quarters after clearing the left bank of the river for fifteen miles below Rome.

On the western bank, I deemed it of importance to retain possession of Padoun-Mew, and for that purpose stationed one hundred men of His Majesty's Royal Regiment, and one hundred of the 26th Madras Native Infantry, at that place, under the command of Captain Deane, of the Royals, and supported on the

river by a division of the *Flotilla*, under Lieutenant Kellett, of the Navy. This party was repeatedly attacked by the enemy in great force, and the meritorious conduct of both officers and men, as detailed in the enclosed copies of letters from Captain Deane, will, I am certain, obtain for them the approbation of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council.

The first division of His Majesty's 87th Regiment, in coming up the river, was fired at from the bank by a party of the enemy, and two men were unfortunately killed, with one officer wounded. The soldiers immediately landed, and drove the enemy from his post with some loss. The particulars are detailed in a report from the commanding officer, Major Gully, of which a copy is herewith enclosed.

Two divisions of His Majesty's 87th Regiment, with the treasure boats, have now arrived, and I purpose marching out to attack the enemy to-morrow, the consequence of which will, I trust, be felt by all the dependent corps which have so long annoyed us.

*No. 152. (B)—Copy of a Report from Captain C. Deane, Commanding Detachment, to the Adjutant General of the Forces, serving in Ava; dated Puddown, November 20, 1825.*

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Commander of the forces, a brush which took place between the party under my command, and the enemy this morning.

In the early part of the morning the fog was so thick as to preclude our seeing any thing in our front, and on its clearing up, I discovered, by means of a reconnoitering party, that the enemy were in considerable force on the edge of the jungle in front of my left, and shortly after, I discovered them marching in three columns across my front, for the attack of my right, left, and centre—their main object being evidently to gain the right of the village. I, consequently, detached a party to turn their left, and had, in a few minutes, the satisfaction to observe that column retiring in confusion, and with considerable loss. I then moved forward, with the remainder of my party, to attack their centre, which also retired in confusion, after a very few rounds,—during this time, their right was engaged with a strong picquet which I had placed to dispute the passage of a bridge on the left of the village—they effectually did. In both the defence of my centre and left, I was much indebted to the prompt assistance afforded me by Lieutenant Kellett, R. N.

The enemy's force consisted of two gilt chattahs and about eight hundred men, armed with musquets and spears, with two or three jinjals; their loss I conceive to have been about twenty-five or thirty men killed. We had not, I am happy to say, a single man wounded. The enemy, however, from the great extent of the village, succeeded in setting it on fire at both ends, but very little damage was done, as we extinguished it almost immediately. The Rajah and all his attendants deserted the place the moment the firing commenced; he has, however, just returned, and appears much more composed, and highly delighted with the result.

*No. 152. (C)—Copy of a Report from Captain C. Deane, Commanding Detachment, to the Adjutant General of the Forces; dated Puddown, November 25, 1825.*

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Commander of the forces, another affair which we have had with the Burmese this morning.

A little before day-break we had embarked twenty men of the Royals and thirty sepoy's of the 26th Madras Native Infantry, in the light row-boats, intended to co-operate with Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin's, on the opposite side of the river. They were just in the act of shoving off from the shore, when the enemy, to the amount of five or six thousand, made a rush at our works, howling most horribly, and at the same time, setting fire to the village, which they had entered at all points.—We had fortunately got an eighteen pounder into the battery late yesterday evening, which, added to two twelves, which we had before, did great execution.

Lieutenant Kellett, R. N., was at the moment shoving off with the row-boats, but instantly returned to our assistance, with all his men, and kindly undertook the superintendence of the guns, the well-directed fire of which so mainly contributed to our success.—The enemy, after nearly two hours sharp firing, retired in admirable order, carrying off great numbers of dead and wounded, so much so, that we have not been able to find more than ten or twelve dead bodies. I am happy to add, with the exception of one man slightly grazed in the elbow by a musquet shot, we have not a man either killed or wounded. The Rajah's house was very early in flames, and is burnt to the ground; indeed, I may almost say, the village is completely destroyed. The guns in the boats were also of the greatest assistance in scouring the village with their grape. We got possession of one jinjal and three musquets. The enemy appeared to have several mounted men, but I cannot say what they were.

I duly received the Deputy Quarter Master General's instructions, to place myself under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, but I have as yet heard nothing of him, except being informed by a Serjeant's

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party of His Majesty 41st Regiment, who came down in the boats (and arrived during this affair, in which they took part) that he was on his way down, I thought it most prudent to report direct, not knowing how long it might be before he arrived.

*No. 152. (D)—Copy of a Report from Captain C. Deane, Commanding Detachment, to the Adjutant General of the Forces; dated on the River, near Promé, November 26, 1825.*

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Commander of the forces, that the enemy appeared in great force this morning at day-break all along our front, and had a good deal of skirmishing with the picquets, but we could not succeed in drawing them within musket-shot of our works. They are all armed with muskets, and have a great many jinjals, and two or more guns, with which they annoyed us very considerably, having taken up a position in the woody part of the village, from whence they opened a musket fire on the boats. From this I determined to dislodge them, and sent out a strong party for that purpose; these came close upon them, and drove them out, with, I have every reason to believe, considerable loss. They are, however, by no means discomfited, and are, I understand, determined to entrench themselves round us, and make regular approaches, as their orders are peremptory to carry the place. In confirmation of this, a number of their entrenching tools were left behind by the killed and wounded. Our only casualty this morning, I am happy to say, is one lascar severely, but not dangerously wounded. The shot first grazed the jaw bone, entered the shoulder, and came out under the arm-pit. From one of the prisoners taken this morning, whom I have, by this opportunity, forwarded to Major Jackson, I learn there are absolutely five thousand and five hundred men now here, and that a further force is hourly expected down from Puttow-down, where he says, the Sethawoon now is.

*No. 152. (E)—Copy of a Despatch from Major W. S. Gully, Commanding, to Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, c. B., Deputy Adjutant General.*

I have the honor to state, for the information of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, commanding the forces, that on the morning of the 25th instant, while in progress to this station with three companies of His Majesty's 87th Regiment under my command, I was suddenly attacked, from a steep bank covered with jungle, by the Burmese, near the village of Theacombine, when, after a smart skirmish, they retreated in great confusion: their loss I could not ascertain, as they carried off their killed and wounded.\*

I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of both officers and men, particularly with that of Captain Bowes, who commanded a small party in advance, and sustained, with great coolness, the first and heaviest part of the enemy's fire, after having been wounded by almost the first shot.

I beg leave to bring to the notice of Sir Archibald Campbell, the good conduct of Mr. Volunteer Hutchins on this occasion, and, in fact, ever since he has been with the Regiment.

*No. 153. (A)—Copy of a Despatch from Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq. Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Camp, on the Heights of Napadee, December 4, 1825.*

My last letters would apprise the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, that the main Burmese army, amounting to between fifty and sixty thousand men, had taken post in the immediate vicinity of Promé, and I have been, for the last ten days, anxiously awaiting an attack upon the strong position we had, with much labour, cleared, and prepared for giving full effect to the movement and operations of our columns, and every possible encouragement has been held out to induce the enemy to meet us once, on open ground. Finding him, however, much too wary to be drawn from his strong holds in the jungle, and suffering much annoyance and inconvenience from his marauding parties, and want of forage, I, on the 30th ultimo, took measures for making a general attack upon every accessible part of his line, extending on the east bank of the Irrawaddy, from a commanding ridge of hills upon the river, to the village of Simbike and Sembeh, upon the

\* Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing in a Detachment under the Command of Major Gully, His Majesty's 87th Regiment, in Action with the Enemy near Theacombine, on the 25th November, 1825.

His Majesty's 87th Regiment—Killed—2 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Captain.

Name of the Officer Wounded—Captain James Bowes, (slightly.)



left, distant from Prome, eleven miles in a north-east direction.—The enemy's army was divided into three corps. The left corps, commanded by Maha Nemiow, an old and experienced General, who had been sent down from Ava, to introduce a new system of conducting the war, was stockaded in the jungles at Simbiki and Hyalay, upon the Nawine river, and this corps amounted to fifteen thousand men, Burmese, Shans, and Cassayers, of which seven hundred were Cavalry. The centre, under the immediate orders of the Kee-Woonghee, was strongly entrenched upon the hills of Napadee, inaccessible, except on one side by a narrow path-way, commanded by seven pieces of artillery, and on the river side, the navigation was commanded by several batteries of heavy ordnance. This corps consisted of thirty thousand men, and the space between the left and centre corps, a thick and extensive forest, was merely occupied by a line of posts. The enemy's right, under the orders of Suddoowoon, occupied the west bank of the Irrawaddy, strongly stockaded, and defended by artillery.

Leaving four Regiments of Native Infantry in the works at Prome, on the morning of the 1st instant, I marched upon Simbiki, with the rest of the force, to dislodge the corps of Maha Nemiow, from its position on the Nawine river—and as previously concerted, His Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane, with the flotilla, and the 26th Madras Native Infantry, acting in co-operation on the bank of the river, shortly after daylight, commenced a heavy cannonade on the enemy's centre, and continued nearly two hours to attract his chief attention to that point.

On reaching the Nawine river, at the village of Ze-ouke, the force was divided into two columns, the right column under the command of Brigadier General Cotton, continuing to advance along the left bank of the river, while, with the other column, I crossed at the ford of Ze-ouke and advanced upon Simbiki and Lombek, in a direction nearly parallel with the Brigadier General's division.

We had to contend with every disadvantage of a difficult and enclosed country, nor did our information upon the position occupied by the enemy, enable me to make any previous fixed arrangement for intercepting the retreat of an enemy to whom every foot-path in the jungle was familiar, and whose irregular flight would, I was aware, be made by every path that promised safety at the moment. My object, however, was, that whichever column should have the good fortune to fall in with the enemy first, should attack him vigorously in front, while the other should endeavour to occupy such positions as would enable it to cut in-upon him, when driven from his defences. The route followed by Brigadier General Cotton brought him in front of the stockaded position at Simbiki, which he at once assaulted, and when his fire first opened, the column under my own direction, was about a mile and a half distant to his left and rear. I, in consequence, detached Brigadier Elrington to guard the fort at Ze-ouke, and the main road leading to Neoun-benzick, and the position of the Kee-Woonghee, while, with the rest of the column, I pushed on towards Sagee, in the hope of falling in with the enemy retiring upon Wattygoon. Brigadier General Cotton and his gallant Division, did not allow me time for completing this movement. In less than than ten minutes every stockade was carried, the enemy completely routed, and I had only an opportunity of cannonading his panic-struck masses, as they rushed fast through the openings of the jungle in my front.

The attack upon Simbiki was most handsomely led by Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, of His Majesty's 41st Regiment, with the advanced guard of the right column, consisting of the Light Companies of His Majesty's Royal, 41st, and 89th Regiments, and the Light Companies of the 18th and 23th Regiments of Madras Native Infantry; and His Majesty's 41st Regiment, under Major Chambers, stormed at another point, with the usual intrepidity of that gallant corps. The enemy left three hundred dead upon the ground, with the whole of his Commissariat and other stores, guns, from four to five hundred muskets, and upwards of one hundred Cassay horses. The body of the old commander Maha Nemiow, seventy-five years of age, was also found among the dead.

The enemy's left corps thus disposed of, and finding, from the testimony of all the prisoners, that Meeaday had been fixed upon as the point upon which to re-unite in the event of any disaster, I at once determined upon marching back to Ze-ouke, for the purpose of attacking the centre, under the Kee-Woonghee, on the following morning. At six in the evening, the whole force was again assembled at Ze-ouke, where it bivouacked for the night, after a harassing march of about twenty miles, which the troops underwent with the greatest cheerfulness and spirit.

At day-light on the morning of the 2d, we were again in motion. It was my intention to have cut in upon the river so as to divide the Kee-Woonghee's force; but the impassable nature of the intervening country prevented my reaching Pagaon, the point I had selected for breaking through his line, and the only road that could be discovered, led to the front of the fortified ridge of Napadee, already alluded to, which, from its inaccessibility on three sides, could only be attacked by a limited number of men in front. Early in the morning, I detached Brigadier General Cotton's division, with orders to endeavour to push round to the right, and gain the enemy's flank by every path that could be discovered, but, after great exertion, the effort was abandoned

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abandoned as wholly impracticable. Our artillery being placed in position, opened with great effect, while His Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane moved forward and cannonaded the heights from the river I, at the same time, directed Brigadier Elrington to fall in through the jungle to the right, where the Brigadier informs me, the enemy opposed him with great gallantry and resolution, defending every tree and breast-work with determined obstinacy. To the Brigadier's left, I directed six companies of his Majesty's 87th Regiment, under Major Gully, to advance and drive in the enemy's posts to the bottom of the ridge. This service was performed with much spirit, and the enemy was driven from all his defences in the valley, retreating to his principal works upon the hills.—The appearance of these works was sufficiently formidable, and the hills I have already mentioned could only be ascended by a narrow road, commanded by artillery, and defended by numerous stockades and breast-works filled with men, apparently all armed with muskets. As soon as the artillery and rockets, under Captains Lumsdaine and Graham, directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson, had made an impression upon the enemy's works, and silenced several of his guns, I ordered the troops to advance to the assault. The 1st Bengal Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Sale, and consisting of his Majesty's 13th and 38th Regiments, under Majors Thornhill and Frith, was directed to advance by the breach, and storm the heights in front, and the six companies of his Majesty's 87th Regiment, advanced through the jungle to the right, and drove every thing before them on that side; nothing could surpass the steadiness and resolute courage displayed in this attack. Scarcely a shot was fired in return to the enemy's continued volleys. His Majesty's 38th Regiment, which led, first entered the enemy's entrenchments on the heights driving him from hill to hill, over precipices which could only be ascended by a narrow stair, until the whole of the formidable position, nearly three miles in extent, was in our possession.

During the attack, his Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane afforded me the most able co-operation and I do myself the honour to enclose his Excellency's report of the good conduct of the officers and men of the Honourable Company's Service, serving on board the *Flotilla*, and I much regret to observe the name of Captain Dawson, of his Majesty's ship *Arachne*, who was conspicuously forward in the attack, amongst the list of killed.

Lieutenants Underwood, Commanding Engineer, and Abbott, of the Bengal Engineers, who had closely reconnoitred the enemy's position, both volunteered to lead the columns, and were, I am sorry to say, both wounded on that service.

I have also to regret the loss of many promising young officers and brave soldiers; but I am happy to observe that our loss, considering the extent and strength of the enemy's positions and great numerical superiority, has not been great, and I owe it to the troops to say, that the impression of their own steadiness and intrepidity upon the minds of the enemy, could alone have secured to them the brilliant successes of the 1st and 2d with so few casualties, as will be found in the returns I have the honor herewith to transmit.\*

The

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\* *General Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the Command of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B. in Action with the Enemy on the 1st December, 1825.*

*2d Battalion 1st or Royal Regiment.*—Killed—1 Serjeant and 2 Rank and File.

Wounded.—1 Ensign and 5 Rank and File.

*H. M. 41st Regiment.*—Killed—2 Lieutenants, 1 Serjeant, and 11 Rank and File.

Wounded—3 Serjeants and 25 Rank and File.

*H. M. 69th Regiment.*—Wounded—2 Rank and File.

*18th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.*—Killed—2 Rank and File.

*1st Battalion Madras Pioneers.*—Wounded—1 Lieutenant, and 4 Rank and File.

*Names of the Officers Killed.*—Lieutenants T. B. M. Sutherland and William Gossip, of H. M. 41st Regiment,

*Names of the Officers Wounded.*—Ensign J. Campbell, of the 2d Battalion 1st or Royal Regiment, since dead—Lieutenant J. Smith, of the 1st Battalion Madras Pioneers, dangerously.

*General Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army, under the Command of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B. in Action with the Enemy on the 2d December, 1825.*

*Bengal Engineers.*—Wounded—1 Lieutenant.

*Madras Engineers.*—Wounded—1 Lieutenant.

*Bengal Horse Artillery.*—Killed—1 Gun Lascar.

Wounded—11 Rank and File.

*H. M. 38th Regiment.*—Killed—1 Lieutenant, and 1 Rank and File.

Wounded—11 Rank and File.

*H. M. 47th Regiment.*—Killed—3 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Serjeant, and 26 Rank and File.

*H. M. 87th Regiment.*—Killed—2 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Major, 1 Lieutenant, 2 Serjeants, and 21 Rank and File.

Missing—1 Rank and File.

*38th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.*—Killed—1 Rank and File.

The defeat of the enemy's army on the east bank of the Irrawaddy has been most complete. He has been driven from all his strong positions in this neighbourhood, with the loss of all his artillery, great quantities of ammunition and warlike stores; and, although it is impossible, from the nature of the ground, to calculate the extent of his loss in killed and wounded, I am satisfied he has suffered most severely—and I am much mistaken if the Burmese commander will again assemble a force within many thousands of the number lately in our front.

The right corps of the enemy's army, under Sudda Woon, appears still to occupy some high ground on the west bank of the Irrawaddy. Measures are now in progress for attacking that division, and I have no doubt, it will be dislodged from its defences to-morrow morning.

On the 6th, I propose marching upon Meeaday by the Neoun-benziek road, with the 1st Division of the army. Brigadier General Cotton, with the 2d Division, will remain a few days longer to act in co-operation with the flotilla, in the event of the enemy having rallied in his defences on the river between Promé and Neoun-benziek. I have no certain information upon his next rallying point. Meeaday, on the east, and Maloune on the west bank of the river, are both fortified, and are furnished with artillery. They are both named as the probable points of re-union, and I shall lose no time in appearing before whichever they have chosen for that purpose; but I think it important that one Division should continue to act in co-operation with the flotilla, until it is clearly ascertained that the navigation of the river is open between this and Meeaday.

I have to solicit the attention of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, to the judicious and cordial co-operation afforded me by his Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane, and the boats of his Majesty's Squadron employed on this service. My best thanks are due to Brigadier General Cotton, for the able manner in which he led his column, and for his judicious and decisive attack upon the enemy's left at Limbike. The services of Brigadier Elrington, Lieutenant Colonels Godwin and Sale, Majors Frith, Chambers, Thornhill, and Gully, who led columns, also claim my notice. Lieutenant Colonel Hopkinson, Commanding Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Pollock and Captain Graham, of the Bengal Artillery, merit my fullest approbation for their exertions, and Captain Lunsdaine, of the Bengal Horse Artillery, although badly wounded, refused to quit the battery, and continued, from his chair, to direct the fire of his guns.

Brigadier General Cotton informs me that he received every aid from the experience of Brigadiers Armstrong and Brodie, serving under his command.

From my Deputies, Adjutant and Quarter-Master General, Lieutenant Colonel Tidy and Major Jackson, and from my Military Secretary, Captain Snodgrass, I received every aid and assistance during these operations: and Captain Smith, of the Bengal Army, volunteered his services, and accompanied me as Aid-de-Camp on the occasion.

No. 153. (B)—Copy of a Despatch from Commodore Sir James Brisbane, c. b., to Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, k. c. b., &c. &c. &c.; dated Honorable Company's Steam Vessel *Diana*, Pagoda Point, in advance of Promé, December 3, 1825.

In transmitting herewith a list of the casualties which occurred in that part of the flotilla under my orders, and of the guns, stores, and craft captured in the attack upon the enemy's position at Pagoda Point, during the

Wounded—1 Serjeant and 7 Rank and File.

1st Battalion Madras Pioneers.—Wounded—2 Rank and File.

Name of the Officer Killed—Lieutenant H. C. K. Proctor, H. M. 83th Regiment.

Names of the Officers Wounded—Lieutenant Abbott, Bengal Engineers, slightly—Lieutenant Underwood, Madras Engineers, severely, not dangerously—Captain and Brevet Major Backhouse, and Lieutenant J. Gordon, of His Majesty's 47th Regiment, severely, not dangerously—Major W. S. Gully, of H. M. 87th Regiment, slightly.

Lieutenant J. S. Baylee, of H. M. 87th Regiment, dangerously, since dead.

Return of Ordnance and Military Stores captured from the Enemy in the Operations of the 1st and 2d December, 1825, by the Army and Flotilla.

Napadee, Camp, December 4, 1825.

Iron Guns—Four 1½-pounders and 12 Jinjals, taken during the operations of the 1st December, a very considerable quantity of Gun-powder, and a great number of Muskets destroyed.

Brass Guns—One 32-pounder, One 9-ditto, and Two Swivels,.....	} Taken by the army in the operations of the 2d December, a very considerable quantity of shot and gun-powder found on the works, also a number of Jinjals not yet collected.
Iron Guns—One 9-pounder, Four 6-ditto, One 4-ditto, One 3-ditto, Two 2-ditto, and Four Swivels,.....	
Iron Carronades—Two 12-pounders and Two 6-ditto,.....	
Brass Guns—One 6-pounder.....	
Iron Guns—Three 12-pounders and One 2 ditto.....	} Taken by the flotilla about a ton of gun-powder, 400 muskets, and a large quantity of round shot, of different descriptions.



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the whole of yesterday, I beg to have the honor of bringing under your Excellency's notice, the highly distinguished conduct of the officers and men belonging to that branch of it which is in the service of the Honorable Company. It is extremely gratifying to observe, that on this, as on other recent occasions, they have uniformly vied with the Light Division (composed of the boats of the squadron) in zeal, gallantry and exertion. Indeed, since my arrival at Head-Quarters, I have derived no small satisfaction at the promptitude, good order and regularity which have been conspicuous in the details of the Flotilla. One common feeling animates the whole of this force, which has produced the happiest results.

I regret to announce to you, amidst the decided advantage of the acquisition of an important post, the death of Captain Dawson, of the *Arachne*. In him the service has lost a gallant and highly meritorious officer, whose recent promotion to the rank of Commander, is a proof of the opinion I entertained of his professional character.

No. 154. (A)—*Copy of a Dispatch from Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Head-Quarters, Camp, on the Heights of Napadee, December 5, 1825.*

In my despatch of yesterday, I mentioned my intention of attacking the enemy's right wing, under Sudda Woon, posted on the west bank of the Irrawaddy.

Having concerted measures with his Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane, I directed Brigadier General Cotton to cross the river, in the course of last night, with the Division under his command, and, if possible, to land above the position occupied by the enemy.

This the Brigadier General effected, and I had the pleasure, early this morning, of seeing my orders carried into the fullest effect, as detailed in the letter herewith enclosed.

No. 154. (B)—*Copy of a Dispatch from Brigadier General W. Cotton, C. B., to Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., Commander of the Forces.*

You did me the honor of placing a proportion of the Division under my command this morning, with orders to attack and dislodge the right wing of the enemy's army, situated in a series of stockades on the right bank of the river.

This operation was performed in conjunction with the navy and flotilla, and, I am happy to add, was attended with the most complete success. The enemy retired from their stockades on the river from the severe fire from four howitzers and some rockets, ably directed by Lieutenants Paton and Seton, of the Bengal Artillery; but, on taking possession of them, it was discovered they had a stockaded work about half a mile in the interior, completely manned and occupied by guns: Brigadier Armstrong, Colonel Brodie, and Colonel Godwin immediately moved upon its centre and right, and I took the Royals to the left, and the work was carried instantly, the enemy leaving three hundred dead on the field, and dispersing in every direction; I have sent in several prisoners, and from three hundred to three hundred and fifty muskets were broken by my men, having been abandoned by the enemy. I have set fire to the whole of their defences, and have only to add my warmest acknowledgements to Brigadier Armstrong, who commanded the advance, to Colonel Brodie, who had charge of the Light Companies, and Colonel Godwin, who commanded the reserve, and to every officer and man who was engaged.

The Adjutant General's and Quarter Master General's Staff, under Captains Hitchens and Steele, and my own Personal Staff, Captain Wainwright, 47th Regiment, and Lieutenant Wilson, 13th Light Infantry, I venture to bring to your notice for their zeal on this and every other occasion. The artillery taken consisted of one eighteen-pounder carronade, and five others, from four to six-pounders, with a large quantity of jinjals.

The operations of this day naturally connecting me with His Majesty's navy and the flotilla, I hope it will not be construed into presumption my venturing to bring to your Excellency's notice the most cordial co-operation and valuable assistance I derived from His Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane, who directed, personally, the whole of the boats who cannonaded and cleared the advance of the troops, from their disembarking above their position to their entering the enemy's works.

I am happy to say this service was performed with the trifling loss of one man killed and four wounded.

No. 155. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Head-Quarters, Meadey, December 19, 1825.*

The enemy defeated and driven from his positions at Limbike, Napadee, and on the west bank of the Irrawaddy, as detailed in my dispatches of the 4th and 5th, I, on the 6th instant, marched back with the 1st

Division

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0 Pioneers.

Division of the army to the villages of Zeouke and Natalaen, upon the Nawreie river, from whence the roads to Watteegoon and Neounbenzeik branch off, and where I had ordered the Commissariat of the army to assemble.

Aware that the enemy had been long employed in fortifying the banks of the river, from Meeaday to Paloh, it became an important consideration to endeavour to turn these positions, naturally strong, and extremely difficult of access. For this purpose, I determined to march upon Meeaday, with one division, by the route of Watteegoon, Seeyangoon, Seindoop, and Tonkindine, turning the positions as high as Bollay, while the division, under the orders of Brigadier General Cotton, should march by the road of Neounbenzeik, nearly parallel with the river, and in communication with the flotilla, on board of which I had placed a force consisting of His Majesty's Royal Regiment and details, commanded by Brigadier Armstrong, to act in close and constant co-operation with the Naval forces under His Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane. From Tonkindine it was my farther intention to have turned Meeaday by its left, and to have posted one division of my army in its rear previous to attacking it in front.

Pursuant to this plan of operations, I marched upon Watteegoon, with the 1st division, on the 9th instant, directing Brigadier General Cotton to commence his march upon the 12th, by which arrangement the approach of the two columns upon Paloh would nearly correspond, and His Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane, was to move forward on the same day.

On the night of the 11th instant, we were visited with a heavy fall of rain, which continued for thirty hours, to the great injury of the roads; our Commissariat has sustained a heavy loss in its transport, and in spoiled and damaged provisions, an evil of all others least easily remedied in my present situation, and I lament to say, that numerous fatal instances of Cholera have occurred in both divisions of the army. Delay unavoidably ensued, and I did not reach Tonkindine till the 16th instant: on patrolling to Bollay, on the river, I found the enemy had abandoned his position at Paloh, and the expectations I had formed from the flank movement of the 1st division were fully confirmed. At Bollay, we opened a communication with the flotilla and Brigadier General Cotton's division, the report of whose march I have the honour to enclose, which, with the other letters herewith transmitted, will, I trust, afford the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, a satisfactory proof of the consequences resulting from the operations of the first, second, and fifth, and the subsequent movements of this force.

Finding that the enemy had retreated from Meeaday with the greater part of his army, I, on the 17th instant, moved forward to Tabboo with the advance.—From Tabboo, I directed the Right Honourable the Governor-General's Body Guard, under Captain Dyke, to push on towards Meeaday by two roads, and feel the enemy's advanced posts. The enemy had evacuated the place, but at five miles beyond it, Captain Dyke came up with his rear, and took some prisoners, with a war-boat, containing three guns; the Cavalry having come suddenly upon six, while close under the bank of the river.

The country over which the army has marched, bears ample testimony to the panic and dismay in which the enemy has retired, while the numerous dead and dying, laying about the country, afford a melancholy proof of the misery and privations which his troops are suffering. His loss in killed and wounded, all the prisoners affirm to have been very great, and desertions to a great extent are daily taking place.

Patangoh and Melloon are the points that have been chosen for re-assembling the army, and in front of which I hope to be, with some part of the force, in the course of a few days, although some delay will unavoidably ensue before the state of the Commissariat will permit the whole force again to move forward.

P. S. I have just received information that Melloon had been evacuated.

*No. 155. (B)—Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier General Willoughby Cotton, Commanding Madras Troops in Ava, to Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., Commanding the Forces in Ava; dated Camp, at Ing-goun, December 19, 1825.*

I have the honour to acquaint you, that in consequence of the heavy fall of rain, during the night of the 11th, and following day, I did not move the division under my command, from the encampment at Zecoope, till the forenoon of the 13th instant.

The column arrived at Meiong, on the Irrawaddy, on the 14th, at which place I halted during the 15th, and marched on the 16th to Bollay, but was obliged to encamp three miles to the southward at Seimbow, in consequence of encountering an impassable nullah. Halted on the 17th at the above encampment, while the Pioneers, and strong working parties were employed, under the directions of the Engineer officer, in constructing a bridge, and the Commissariat officer was engaged in bringing up the provisions.

The bridge was completed yesterday morning, the 18th, and I moved the column to its present encampment.

During

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During the march of the 16th instant, between Peumbi-Ihlan and Pulho, the column passed through the enemy's strongly-stocked position, extending two miles and one furlong—the works towards the river were particularly well adapted for defence, and the whole commanded by stockades on the hills to the rear; with abattis and entrenchments.

I have much satisfaction in stating, that the Commissariat, with the division under my command, have suffered in a very trifling degree from the breakage of carts, &c., and that the entire department will arrive in camp during this forenoon.

No. 155. (C)—*Copy of a Letter from Commodore James Brisbane, to Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated Honorable Company's Steam Vessel Diana, off Meeaday, on the Irrawaddy, December 18, 1825.*

Adverting to that part of your letter of the 15th of November last, in which you do me the honour of expressing your readiness to receive my opinion upon any points connected with the future operation of the combined force, which the proximity of our movements may enable me to afford you; I avail myself of that proof of confidence on your part to lay before you such observations as have occurred to me in the advance of the Flotilla to this place. Having embarked His Majesty's Royal Regiment on the afternoon of the eleventh instant, under the Command of Brigadier Armstrong, I proceeded from the Muisguis, a Pagoda Point, early the next morning, with the Flotilla under my orders. From the rapidity of the current, and the numerous shifting sand-banks, it became absolutely necessary to track or kedge the heavier boats along the banks of the river, which were, for the most part, lined with breast-works, until we reached Yeondoun, a military post, recently occupied by the Royals. The enemy had previously retired, apparently a short time before our arrival. Proceeding up the river, I came in sight of Meong, where, by previous arrangement, the Flotilla came into communication with Brigadier General Cotton's Division, for the purpose of attacking the enemy in his strong posts of Pethoh and Palloh. Brigadier Armstrong and myself having made a reconnoissance, as a preliminary measure, we found, to our great surprise, that these important posts had been abandoned. In advancing up the river, it is impossible not to be struck with a degree of admiration at the happy choice of situation of the enemy's positions, aided as they are by the decided natural advantages which the face of the country presents. The extensive and formidable works which have come under my own personal observation could have been erected only by the manual labour of the masses of men at the command of a barbarous government. When I consider these advantages, I cannot imagine why the enemy should have so hastily relinquished them, unless the recent successes of your force, and the knowledge of your advance, had so far operated on their fears as to leave no hope of their retreat on your turning their positions.

The channel of the river was, in many places, so narrow as to oblige the boats to pass within two hundred yards of the banks, on the one side or the other. The destruction which the enemy might have caused, had they been so inclined, is self-evident. The total abandonment of the enemy's works enabled the Flotilla to pass on towards Meeaday, of which we came in sight yesterday afternoon; and on sending Captain Chads, with the Light Division ahead, to reconnoitre, that officer reported to me, that this formidable post had that morning been evacuated by the Burmese troops, commanded by the Kee Woongee, in person, as your advanced guard made its appearance, and that a war-boat, with three guns, had been captured, which, in the hurry of their retreat, they could not take with them.

No. 155. (D)—*Copy of a Letter from Brigadier Richard Armstrong, to Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Tidy, C. B., Deputy Adjutant General; dated Steam Vessel, Meeaday, December 19, 1825.*

For the information of the Commander of the forces, I have the honor to inform you, that the whole of the troops composing the water column, being embarked on the 11th instant, Commodore Sir James Brisbane moved with the Flotilla up the river on the morning of the 12th.—In proceeding up, a number of defences were observed on both sides, generally breast-works, with here and there embrasures for guns, and the situation invariably chosen with great judgment for the annoyance of boats ascending the river. Yewndoun, however, was not strengthened from the time of my being recalled from that post.

On the 13th instant, the Flotilla having arrived within two miles of Peloh (or Succadoun, as more generally named by the Burmese) and being well aware that the enemy were long employed in erecting defences there, it was considered necessary by Sir James Brisbane, as well as myself, to reconnoitre it. We accordingly proceeded with the boats of the Light Division, and soon found that these works, like all we had previously met, were entirely abandoned, and proves, in the most convincing manner, how completely broken, disarranged, and panic-struck, the enemy's army must be, from the success of our operations on the 1st, 2d, and 5th instant,

for



for it is not easy to conceive a chain of stronger works than here presented themselves, extending at least one mile in length on the eastern bank of the river, erected on bold undulating ground, every advantage of which was admirably applied, so that the possession of the lower defences, had they been attacked in succession, would have exposed the troops to an enfilading fire, and would thus have been untenable. The defences consisted of abattied breast-works on the river, with reverses running up the heights, and two strong stockades, the most northern (or upper) of which was constructed of very strong plank, about nine feet high, the whole of the faces thickly abattied, and each of them at least one hundred and eighty yards in length. Time would not allow me to examine the continuation of these works, which I am aware were carried into the interior, and rested on the road to Prome, but those running near the river were in themselves so extensive and well-built, that great multitudes of men must have been long and indefatigably employed in their construction; and had the enemy attempted their defence, they could not have been carried without very severe loss on our part. In fact, in our possession, I might say they would be impregnable.

On the western bank, immediately opposite, a great number of defences were also erected, which ran entirely up the commanding hill, where they likewise had a well-constructed stockade.

As both sides of the river (which in this part is narrow) were thus strongly defended, it would have been impossible for the Flotilla to proceed up until either side had been reduced, had not the enemy, by his flight, thus rendered nugatory one of the best positions and chain of field defences I have ever seen.

Every means the time would allow, by fire and otherwise, were used to destroy these works.

The Flotilla arrived at Meeday early on the morning of the 17th instant.

No. 156.—*Copy of a Despatch from Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Head-Quarters, Patanagoh, December 31, 1825.*

Adverting to my last dispatch, I have now to state, that the information I received, regarding the evacuation of Melloon by the enemy, was erroneous. Certain information of his having rallied at that point reached me shortly after I began my march from Meeday, with the leading division of the army, and it was at the same time stated, that a Chief of rank had been sent up to Ava, after the defeats at Prome, for the purpose of representing to His Majesty, the hopeless state of his affairs, and the impossibility of our progress upon the capital being arrested by any military arrangement.

On the 26th ultimo, these reports were confirmed by the arrival of a messenger to the steam vessel, under a flag of truce, communicating that Kolein Menghie had arrived at Melloon, deputed by His Majesty the King of Ava, and with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace with us. In answer to this message, I, in concurrence with the Civil Commissioner, sent Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy, and Lieutenant Smith, R. N., to the Burmese camp, to ascertain what arrangement the King of Ava's Commissioners proposed making with us—a truce of twenty-five days was requested, and positively refused, as previously determined on, the above officers being directed to say, as was afterwards communicated in writing, that nothing beyond twenty-four hours would be given for the first meeting with the Burmese Commissioners, and that the truce was at an end as soon as the British officers should have left the place. On reaching Melloon, on the following morning, the 29th instant, I found the place strongly occupied, and the river, on the enemy's side, covered with boats, which they attempted to escape with, until a few shots from our guns (by which one man was slightly wounded) fired over the headmost boats, shewed our determination to prevent it, and the attempt was given up. In the mean time, I received information that the *Diana* steam vessel, the Head-Quarters of His Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane, was passing the enemy's works unmolested, and accompanied by two Burmese war-boats, and although the enemy appeared throwing up entrenchments on the opposite shore, and marching and counter-marching his troops, as if making preparations for defence, I accepted his forbearance to the steam boat, as a proof of his sincerity and desire to treat: hostilities here ceased, and in the course of the day a correspondence commenced, and led to negociations which I earnestly hope will render this the last military dispatch I shall have to make upon the war in Ava.

No. 157. (A)—*Copies of Despatches from Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., Senior Commissioner, and C. T. Robertson, Esq., Civil Commissioner, in Ava and Pegue, to the Right Honourable Lord Amherst, Governor General in Council, &c. &c. &c.; dated the Commissioner's Office, Camp Patanagoh, January 20, 1826.*

It is with extreme regret that we have to report, for the information of your Lordship in Council, that the treaty concluded with the Burmese ministers, on the 3d instant, not having been ratified by their sovereign,

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and none of the conditions having, within the stipulated period, been fulfilled, all amicable intercourse with the authorities at Melloon was necessarily broken off, and hostilities re-commenced on the morning of the 19th instant, with the attack and capture of the enemy's position at that place.

The particulars of this action will be communicated in the military despatches, and we shall take an early opportunity of submitting our sentiments upon the ulterior policy which it may, in consequence, be expedient to pursue.

In our present address, we conceive it sufficient to refer your Lordship in Council to the detailed account of our proceedings, given in the documents transmitted by this opportunity to the Secretary to Government in the Political Department, for the most clear and convincing evidence, that every admissible effort has, on our part, been made to avert an event which, however deeply to be regretted, will, we feel confident, be admitted by the Government to have been, under the peculiar circumstances of our situation, altogether unavoidable.

No. 157. (B)—*Copy of a Despatch from Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Head-Quarters, Camp Patanagoh, January 20, 1826.*

My despatch of the 31st ultimo, brought the operations of the army under my command down to that date, and expressed my sanguine expectations, that it would prove the last communication which I should have to address to you, relative to the war in this country.

These hopes have been unfortunately frustrated by the policy of a court, apparently destitute alike of every principle of honor and good faith.

The signature of a treaty of peace, by the British and Burman Commissioners, on the 3d instant, and the pledge, on the part of the latter, that the same would be ratified by the King of Ava, within fifteen days from that date, and some specific articles, as therein stated, carried into effect within the same period, has already been brought to the knowledge of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, by the proceedings of the British Commissioners, recorded in their despatches, under date the 3d instant. All occurrences of a purely political nature since then, will now, in like manner, be furnished by the same authority.—I shall, therefore, proceed to the detail of military events resulting therefrom.

On the 18th, the day appointed for the return of the ratified treaty, &c. the Commissioners finding that, instead of a fulfilment of this promise, a further delay of six or seven days was solicited, under such equivocal circumstances, as left no doubt that a total want of faith guided their councils, it was definitively declared, that their request could not be complied with, and a secret article proposed to them in which it was stipulated (together with the performance of others already agreed to) that they should evacuate the fortified and entrenched city of Melloon, by sun-rise, on the morning of the 20th: on their positive rejection of this proposition, they were told, that after twelve o'clock, that very night, (the 18th), hostilities would re-commence. Deeming it of the utmost importance, that no time should be lost in punishing duplicity of so flagrant a character, I ordered the construction of batteries and the landing of heavy ordnance from the Flotilla, to commence immediately after midnight, and every requisite arrangement to be made for an early attack upon Melloon. His Lordship in Council will be enabled to appreciate the zeal and exertion with which my orders were carried into effect, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson, Commanding the Artillery, and Lieutenant Underwood, the Chief Engineer (aided by that indefatigable Corps the first Battalion of Madras Pioneers, under the Command of Captain Crowe) when I state, that by ten o'clock the next morning, I had eight and twenty pieces of ordnance in battery, on points presenting a front of more than one mile on the eastern bank of the Irrawaddy, which corresponded with the extent of the enemy's line of defence on the opposite shore—I yet cherished hopes, that the formidable appearance of our preparations would have induced them to make some farther communications in the morning, instead of again risking the renewal of hostilities with troops of whose decided superiority they had so recently received the most convincing and humiliating proofs. In this I was disappointed. At day-light, I perceived that the preceding night had been devoted by them to preparations equally laborious, and the construction of extensive and well planned works, with a view to the resistance on which they had resolved.

At eleven o'clock, A. M., (the 19th,) I ordered our batteries and rockets to open their fire on the enemy's position, it was warmly kept up, and with such precision of practice, as to reflect the highest credit on this branch of the service.

During this period, the troops intended for the assault were embarking in the boats of His Majesty's ships, and the Flotilla at a point above our encampment at Patanagoh, under the superintendance and direction of Captain Chads, of His Majesty's ship *Alligator*, senior naval officer, on whom this charge devolved, in the absence of His Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane, in consequence of extreme indisposition.

About



About one p. m. the desired impression having been produced by the cannonade, and every thing reported ready, I directed the Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sale, consisting of His Majesty's 13th and 38th Regiments, to drop down the river, and assault the main face of the enemy's position, near its south-eastern angle, and Brigadier General Cotton, with the Flank Companies of His Majesty's 47th and 87th Regiments, and His Majesty's 89th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter Blair; His Majesty's 41st Regiment, and the 18th Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, and the 28th Madras Native Infantry, with the Flank Companies of the 43d Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Parlbly, to cross above Melloon, and after carrying some outworks, to attack the northern face of the principal work.

Although the whole of the boats pushed off together from the left bank, the strength of the current, and a strong breeze from the north, carried Lieutenant-Colonel Sale's Brigade to the given point of attack, before the other columns (notwithstanding every exertion) could possibly reach the opposite shore; Lieutenant-Colonel Sale was unfortunately wounded in his boat, but the corps of his Brigade having landed, and formed with admirable regularity, under the command of Major Frith, of his Majesty's 38th Regiment, rushed on to the assault with their usual intrepidity, and were, in a short time, complete masters of a work which, although certainly not so well chosen, in point of position, as others we have met with, yet had been rendered most formidable by labour and art, and at the same time, such as to afford the enemy a presumptive assurance of security in their possession of it. This is fully evinced, by the circumstance of the Chiefs, with Memiaboo at their head, (contrary to the Burmese custom in all such cases,) having remained within their defences till they saw the troops crossing to the assault.

When Brigadier General Cotton saw that the works were carried by the 13th and 38th Regiments, he very judiciously ordered the Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Hunter Blair, to cut in upon the enemy's line of retreat, which was done accordingly, and with much effect.

Thus was accomplished, in the course of a few hours, from the re-commencement of hostilities, forced upon us by perfidy and duplicity, a chastisement as exemplary as it was merited. Their loss, in killed and wounded, has been severe, and the accompanying returns of captured ordnance, ordnance stores, arms, and ammunition, will sufficiently demonstrate how seriously they have suffered in these particulars; a species of disaster which their government will, doubtless, more deeply deplore, than the sacrifice of lives, or the shame of defeat. Specie, to the amount of about thirty thousand rupees, was found in Memiaboo's house, and a very ample magazine of grain, together with about seventy horses, have also fallen into our hands. It will prove highly gratifying to his Lordship in Council to learn, that advantages so important have been secured with so small a numerical loss, as is exhibited by the returns of killed and wounded: amongst the wounded I include, with particular regret, the names of Lieutenant Colonel Sale and Major Frith: the latter having succeeded to the command of the column, on his senior officer being disabled, received, at its head, in the moment of success, a spear wound, which I fear is of a serious nature. Major Thornhill, of his Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, was the third, on whom the accidents of war threw the perilous distinction of leading these troops, and he conducted their movements to the close of the affair, in a style worthy of his predecessors in command.

Where zeal displays itself in every rank, as amongst the officers whom I have the happiness to command, and all vie with each other in the honourable discharge of duty, the task of selecting individual names, for the notice of his Lordship, becomes difficult and embarrassing, and I am compelled to adopt the principle of particularizing those alone, on whom the heaviest share of exertion happened to devolve on this occasion: it fell to the lot of the Artillery to occupy this conspicuous station in the events of the day: in behalf, therefore, of Lieutenant Colonel Hopkinson, commanding the whole, and of Lieutenant Colonel Pollock, commanding Bengal Artillery, and Captains Lumsden, Bengal Horse Artillery, and Montgomerie, Madras Artillery, commanding the batteries, I have to solicit your recommendation to his Lordship's favourable attention. The Rocket practice, under Lieutenant Blake, of the Bengal Horse Artillery, was, in every way, admirable: of three hundred and four rockets, which were projected during the day, five alone failed of reaching the spot for which they were destined, and uniformly told in the works, or in the ranks of the enemy, with an effect which has clearly established their claim to be considered a most powerful and formidable weapon of war.

The conduct of His Majesty's 13th and 38th Regiments during the advance, and their gallantry in the storm, far exceed all that I can write in their praise. I sincerely hope that I shall not long be deprived of the services of their two brave Commanders.

Brigadier General Cotton's arrangements for intercepting the retreat of the enemy, and the movement of Lieutenant Colonel Hunter Blair to effect the same object, merit my warmest commendations.

To Captain Chads, of the Royal Navy, and every officer and seaman of His Majesty's ships, and the Honourable Company's Flotilla, I am deeply indebted, for the able and judicious manner in which the troops

were



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were transported to points of attack so near to a formidable work which they had to assail.—I have the honour to enclose Captain Chads' report, together with his return of killed and wounded.\*

Upon this short, but important service, I derived every support from the zeal and ability of my Staff, general and personal.

Lieutenant Wilson, of his Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Aid-de-Camp to Brigadier General Cotton, who will have the honour of delivering this dispatch, was present during the whole affair, and is well qualified to give any further information which may be required by his Lordship on the subject.

No. 157. (C)—*Copy of a Report from Captain H. D. Chads, of His Majesty's Ship Alligator, in Command of the Flotilla, to Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.; dated Honorable Company's Steam Vessel Diana, off Melloon, January 20, 1826.*

I have the honor to enclose you a return of the casualties on board the Flotilla, in action yesterday at Melloon, also an account of the boats captured.†

As this service was performed under your own immediate eye, it would be presumptuous in me to speak of the gallantry and zeal displayed by every individual in the Flotilla, but which I trust was such as to merit your commendation.

No. 158.—*Deposition*

\* *General Return of Killed and Wounded in the Army under the Command of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., in the Attack on the Intrenched Position of Melloon, on the 19th January, 1826.*  
Camp Patanagob, before Melloon, 20th January, 1826.

*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.*—Killed—1 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 3 Rank and File, and 2 Bheesties.

*His Majesty's 38th Regiment.*—Killed—4 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Major, 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 4 Rank and File, and 6 Bearers.

*Bengal Engineers.*—Wounded—1 Lieutenant.

*Flotilla.*—Killed—4 Lascars.

Wounded—5 European Seamen and 9 Lascars.

*Names of Officers Wounded.*—Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Sale, H. M. 13th Light Infantry, Commanding Brigade, severely, not dangerously.

Major H. Frith, H. M. 38th Regiment, severely.

Lieutenant W. Dixon, Bengal Engineers, slightly.

*Return of Ordnance and Military Stores, Captured on the 19th January, 1826, in the Operations against the Enemy at Melloon, by the Forces under the Command of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.*

Brass Guns—One 42-pounder, One 6-ditto—One 4-ditto, one 1-ditto and ten Jinjals.

Iron Guns—two 4½-pounders, two 2-ditto, one 3½-ditto, three 3-ditto, ten 2-ditto, thirty-one 1-ditto, two ½-ditto, and eighty Jinjals.

Iron Guns, long—seven 12-pounders, ten 9-ditto, and two 6½-ditto.

Iron Carronades—one 24-pounder and one 12-ditto.

Iron round Shot, of different sizes, 11,000

Ditto ditto, for Jinjals, 7,000.

Gun-powder, destroyed, Tons 20, Cwt. 1, and Qrs. 3, in boxes of 45 lbs. each.

Muskets, 1,700.

Musket Balls, 100,000.

Spears, 2000.

An immense quantity of refined Salt Peter and Sulphur—Iran, unwrought, upwards of one ton—also a quantity of Grape, quilted and loose, but the exact amount of the above articles cannot be ascertained for want of time.

† *Return of Killed and Wounded, on board the Flotilla at Melloon, 19th January, 1826.*

	Killed.	Wounded.
Boats of H. M. S. <i>Alligator</i> , ...	None.	{ 4 severely. 1 slightly.
3d Division of Honorable Company's Gun Boats, 1		{ 6 severely.
4th Division of Honorable Company's Gun Boats, 1		{ 1 dangerously. 1 slightly.
5th Division of Honorable Company's Gun Boats, 2		{ 1 dangerously.

*Return of Boats Captured at Melloon, 19th January, 1826.*

War Boats	} 3	15 Gilt.	... ..	In good condition.
Large accommodation Boats,		} 7	... ..	In good condition.
			1	... ..
Large Store Boats, ...	} 33	... ..	... ..	In good condition.
			16	... ..
Cannoes and Boats of various description, ... ..	} 200	to 300		

*No. 158.—Deposition of Raja Saha Nouratha. From the Government Gazette of the 16th February, 1826.*

I am a writer by profession, and was in the service of the King of Ava. At the conclusion of the treaty between the British Commissioners and the Khee-Woonghee, and Kolein Meinghee, two sirdars, named Moola Wyne, and Kee-Wyne, were sent off to report what had passed to the King. They stated what had been settled about money and territory, but no more: then the Raj Gooroo said, that the English also required the liberation of the prisoners. The King said, you tell me two different stories, which shall I believe? Therefore to discover the real truth, the King sent for the Atawong Mong Khaein. Great delay occurring in the return of the first messengers, one of the secretaries was also dispatched to ascertain the causes; till the fifteenth day expired before any one returned: then the gentlemen came over with another paper, which they wanted the Burmese to sign, but they, through fear of the Sultan, from whom no order had arrived, hesitated, although they had the four lacs ready to pay. Then the gentlemen, provoked at their refusal, said, the war would recommence at midnight, and went away. The Chiefs consulted with Memia Bo, saying, the fifteen days have expired, and to-morrow the peace is at an end; should the English begin fighting, what are we to do?

Memia Bo replied, remain quiet, and if they confine themselves to mere firing, don't let us return it. Next day, the English fire became too hot for the men to endure, and many began to retire.

I had charge of the grain, and know well, therefore, how many men there were. There were twenty thousand, of whom one half had muskets. The King's brother-in-law is at Chalein, with about ten thousand more. Those who ran from this, will join him. The Sultan has, ere this, melted down all his bars of gold and silver, to pay his troops. He cannot immediately pay the sum mentioned in the treaty. Give him time, and he may do it.

*No. 159. (A)—Copy of a Despatch from Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Scinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Head Quarters, Pakan-yay, February 4, 1826.*

The laborious duty of collecting and destroying the enemy's artillery and stores, together with a heavy fall of rain, prevented my leaving Patanagoh with the first division of the force, before the morning of the 25th ultimo. We have since advanced eighty-five miles into the enemy's country, and, generally speaking, over very bad roads, but without having occasion to fire a shot, with the exception of a very daring and gallant charge made by a reconnoitring party of the Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard, under the Command of Lieutenant Trant, and Subadar-Major Quazee Wallee Mahomed, upon a considerable body of the enemy's infantry. The particulars of which I have the honor herewith to enclose. The Chief killed, is now ascertained to have been Maung-toung-bo, a Commander, who was the terror of his countrymen from his cruel disposition. We are now opposite to Sem-bew-ghewn, where, and at Chalein, the enemy had strong posts watching the road from Arracan, but evacuated those defences on our approach, and are now concentrating at Pagh-mew what force they can.

*No. 159. (B)—Copy of a Despatch from Lieutenant T. A. Trant, 95th Foot, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, to Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Tidy, C. B., Deputy Adjutant General, &c. &c. &c.; dated Watmachaote, January 30, 1826.*

I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Commander of the forces, that having been directed by the Deputy Quarter Master General to reconnoitre the road in advance, I proceeded this morning, accompanied by an escort of thirty-four men of the Governor General's Body Guard, commanded by Subadar Major Kajee Balie Mahommed, in the direction of Yaymaughean, and marched for ten miles without seeing any appearance of the enemy.

At this distance I observed a small picket of Burman Cavalry rapidly retreating, and conceiving them to be detached from the force under Montaung-bo, I thought that, by intercepting them, we might approach the Burman camp undiscovered. We therefore pursued them as rapidly as the nature of the country would admit, for about two miles, and at the same time they entered a small valley, surrounded by steep hillocks, where between four and five hundred Burmahs, well armed with muskets, were bivouacked.

These were immediately charged by the Body Guard, who, pressing on the crowd, sabred or shot about fifty men, amongst whom was a Chief of rank, (supposed to be Montaung-bo) and completely dispersed the remainder, part taking refuge in their boats, and others running to the hills, where the acclivity was so great,

that we could not pursue them. Finding this to be the case, about one hundred men, recovering from the panic into which they had been thrown, took post on the crest and side of the hill, and from thence kept a sharp, but most ineffectual fire of jinjals and musketry, by which I am happy to say, only one man and a horse were wounded; but as I perceived their numbers were increasing, and that several men had been detached to our rear, apparently with the view of annoying us when returning, I thought it prudent to retire.

The Body Guard behaved with their usual gallantry, and the coolness, zeal, and courage manifested by Subadar Major Kajee Balie Mahommud made him so very conspicuous during the affair, that I trust I may not be considered presumptuous in bringing his conduct to the notice of the Commander of the forces.

No. 160.—*Copy of a Despatch from Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Head-Quarters, Camp, Pagahm-Mew, February 11, 1826.*

My last communication made you acquainted with my belief, that the enemy were concentrating upon Pagahm-Mew; subsequent intelligence established the fact. Part of the fugitives from Melloon had been rallied at that point, and there re-inforced by fresh levies from Ava. The command of the whole, amounting to sixteen thousand men, was given to Ta-Yea-Soo-gean Woondock, *Nai-Woon Baren*, (King of the Lower Regions,) who had pledged himself to his sovereign to achieve some signal success at the expense of the British, whom, in the insolent language of his court and nation, he styled the invading army of rebellious strangers.

A reconnoissance effected on the evening of the 8th, discovered the enemy in force, and strongly posted about five miles in advance of the village of Yesseah, where I had that day encamped with my leading division.

The report of Burman prisoners gave us to understand that the enemy had resolved to defend two positions; the first having for its appui, the Logoh-Nundah Pagoda; the second, within the old walls of the city, which had undergone some partial repairs, and the numerous Pagodas in and about Pagahm;—the former to be occupied by seven thousand, the latter by nine thousand men. At this particular crisis, I considered it of importance that the decisions of the Court of Ava should not be left to depend upon hopes cherished under a false confidence in the promises of their new commander. I therefore took measures for attacking the enemy on the morning of the 9th, and ordered Brigadier General Cotton, whose division was twelve miles in the rear, to march with three of his corps at such an hour during the night, as would ensure his joining me by daylight. Thus re-inforced, I marched at nine o'clock.

Four miles from our camp I found, for the first time, since the commencement of the war, the enemy prepared to dispute the ground with us in the field, in front of his first position. The disposition of his troops and his plans for receiving our attack, exhibiting marks of considerable judgment.

The road from Yesseah to Pagahm leads through a country much overgrown with prickly jungle, which, whilst it renders it difficult for regular troops to diverge from its direct course, either to the right or left, is, in some places, so thick, as completely to mask the formations and other manœuvres of large bodies. The Burmese General availing himself of these advantages, and, probably ignorant of the re-inforcement the leading division had received during the night, drew up his army in the form of a crescent, both its flanks being considerably advanced, and the main road running directly through its centre, thinking, no doubt, that we must advance by it, till opposed in front, when the Wings would close in to attack us on both flanks and in the rear, which his great superiority in numbers would have enabled him to effect, had we fallen into the snare. But the advance of the British force was conducted in such a manner, as soon to detect the object of his formation, and he was instantly assailed upon both flanks. His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry led the right attack, (under my own immediate direction,) accompanied by four guns of the Bengal Horse Artillery, and a small Detachment of the Body Guard, supported by his Majesty's 89th Regiment. His Majesty's 38th Regiment, that on the left, supported by his Majesty's 41st, and two guns of Madras Artillery, under the direction of Brigadier General Cotton—whilst Lieutenant-Colonel Parby, with the 43d Madras Native Infantry, advanced on the bank of the Irrawaddy, our extreme left, to prevent the enemy throwing troops to our rear in that direction. They received our attack on both flanks tolerably well-formed, and with a show of resolution, but were soon obliged to give way before the rapid fire and steady charge of British soldiers.

Part of their troops broke by the 38th, retired into a well-constructed field-work, but were so closely pursued, that they had not time to form for its defence; here, from three to four hundred of them perished, either by the bayonet, or plunging into the river to escape. The enemy perceiving both his flanks attacked, and seeing our centre apparently without troops, pushed a column by the main road, towards an eminence in our rear, covered with Pagodas, but was checked, and retired on seeing the 89th in reserve. Several times during the day, they attempted, with their Cavalry, to turn our right—and vigilantly watching every opportunity



nity which might offer, to effect this purpose. They, at one, time came down in great force and good order, towards a small party of His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—unfortunately, my force in Cavalry did not enable me to avail myself of similar opportunities; but the very few I had of the Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard, under the command of Subadar Major Quazee Wallee Mahomet, acquitted themselves with marked gallantry, and entirely to my satisfaction. The first of the enemy's positions being thus carried, the troops were re-formed, and after a short halt, led to the attack of the second, which they soon forced without much opposition. The enemy, thus defeated at all points, left me in possession of Pagahm-Mew, with all its stores, ordnance, arms, and ammunition.\*

Our loss during the operations of this day, although of five hours duration, and continued over four miles of ground, I am happy to say, is comparatively small, a circumstance which I attribute to the want of their usual security behind works, whereby they were not only protected, but afforded a rest for their arms, which has often been the cause of considerable loss to us whilst advancing to the attack.

Every individual engaged, conducted himself so perfectly to my satisfaction, that I will not particularize any; a copy of the Order which I issued upon the occasion, and which I beg leave to enclose, will best express to His Lordship my feelings towards the gallant troops, I have the honor to command.

I cannot close this dispatch without communicating to His Lordship the gratifying intelligence, that the operations of this force, by land and water, since the fall of Melloon, have released from the tyranny of the enemy, from twenty-five to thirty thousand inhabitants of the lower provinces, who had been detained and driven before his retiring boats and army, many of them since the commencement of the war; from three thousand to four thousand family boats have passed Pagahm, downwards, since its occupation by us.

P. S. From the information of prisoners of war, and others, I am led to understand, the enemy will attempt further opposition to our progress towards the capital, at a place called Pooway Sawah, which I hope to reach in the course of a very few days.

G. O. *Head-Quarters, Pagahm-Mew, 9th February, 1826.*—Providence has once more blessed with success the British arms in this country; and in the decisive defeat of the imposing force, posted under and within the walls of Pagahm-Mew, the Major General recognizes a fresh display of the military virtues which have characterised his troops from the commencement of this war.

Early on this day, the enemy, departing from the cautious system of defence, behind field-works and entrenchments, which forms their usual device of war, and relying on their great numerical superiority and singular advantages of ground, ventured on a succession of bold manœuvres on the flanks and front of the British columns. This false confidence has been rebuked by a reverse, severe, signal and disastrous.

Their troops, of either arm, were repelled at every point, and their masses driven in confusion within their city.

The

\* *General Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the Army under the Command of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., in Action with the Enemy at Pagahm-Mew, on the 9th February, 1826.*

*Bengal Horse Artillery.*—Wounded—1 Rank and File, and 1 Horse.

*Right Honorable the Governor General's Body Guard.*—Wounded—1 Serjeant or Havildar, 1 Rank and File, and 1 Horse.

*His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.*—Killed—1 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Captain and 6 Rank and File.

Missing—1 Rank and File.

*His Majesty's 38th Regiment.*—Wounded—4 Rank and File.

*His Majesty's 41st Regiment.*—Wounded—1 Rank and File.

*1st Battalion Madras Pioneers.*—Wounded—1 Rank and File.

*Name of the Officer Wounded.*—Captain E. T. Tronson, His Majesty 13th Light Infantry, severely, not dangerously.

*Return of Ordnance, Arms, &c. Captured from the Enemy on the 9th February, 1826, by the Army under the Command of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B.*

Brass Guns, long—two 1½-pounders, five 2-pounders, seven Swivels, and two Jinjals.

Iron Guns, long—five 1½-pounders, seven 2-pounders, one 2½-pounder, ten 3-pounders, one 3½-pounder, one 4½-pounder, seven Swivels, and ninety-two Jinjals.

Round Shot, for different Calibres, .....	1760
Bar Shot, .....	8
Muskets, .....	172
Musket Balls, .....	26000
Gun Powder, Tons 3, Cwt. 10	
Flints, .....	20000
Steel Bars, .....	135
Lead, lbs. ....	740
Sulphur, lbs. ....	252

Ava.  
1826.

The storm of Pagahm-Mew which followed, exhibited the same features of intrepidity and self-devotion.

The frequency of these acts of spirited soldiery on the part of his troops, renders it difficult for the Major General to vary the terms of his praise; but he offers to every officer and soldier engaged this day, the tribute of his thanks, at once with the affection of a commander, and the cordiality of a comrade.

*No. 161.—From the Government Gazette of the 27th March, 1826.*

In addition to the intelligence furnished by the above public dispatches, we have been favoured with the perusal of private letters from Pagahm, dated the 11th and 14th ultimo, and from Rangoon the 5th March. By the latter we learn, that, according to the information of a native who arrived there on the 3rd, the army had advanced to Tiroup Mew. At the time this man left Ava, every preparation was making for our reception there. Four hundred pieces of cannon are, by his account, mounted on the walls, and thirty thousand men with muskets, besides an innumerable multitude, armed with spears and swords, are ready to defend them. On the river, there is a large fleet of fire boats, filled with all manner of combustibles, to be cast loose into the stream on our approach, to destroy the flotilla. The works are said to be much improved and strengthened. There are three walls, two of brick and one of wood, with ditches, abbatis, &c. &c. The report of the King's abdication, in favor of his son, gains ground. He is said, by some, to have fled to Amepapura; by others to Monchabo; but all agree that the young prince remains in Ava, to share the fate of the imperial city.

Various particulars of interest have been derived from intercepted documents, and the depositions of prisoners of credibility. The former, shew the Burmese Chiefs to have kept up a tolerably active system of espionage, and even give reason to think that they had sanctioned an attempt to assassinate some of the leaders of the British forces. We may hope, however, that their emissaries outran their orders in this respect, and only speak of such a purpose as an idle bravado, or an additional claim to reward: we shall give the details in our next. From the deposition of one of the prisoners, it appears certain that the King of Ava had repeatedly endeavoured to obtain the aid of the emperor of China, but all the reply he received, was a promise that he should find an asylum in China, if compelled to fly his country, and an offer to mediate between him and the English. The advice to retire to the ancient city of Mon-so-lo, is said to have originated with the Queen, but the Prince of Sarawadi dissuaded the King from the measure, and recommended him, rather to concede the terms demanded by the English. This he would have done, it is supposed, when Sir Archibald Campbell advanced to Pagahm, but for the interference of the arrogant and ignorant Chief, who commanded in the action, at that place. This man, named Ta-ya-soo-zang, a slave of Bundoola, asserted, that the success of the English was entirely owing to the incapacity of the generals by whom they had been opposed, and undertook, if twenty thousand men were placed under his command, to drive the English out of the country. The King was weak enough to credit his vaunts,—fifteen thousand men were raised at the rate of three hundred ticals a man—the individual above named, received the title of Nawing Phuring, or "*Prince of Sunset*," and he was sent to supersede Memia Bo, and the other generals. The result is shewn in the public dispatches, and the boaster received the chastisement he deserved. After the action on the ninth, the Prince of Sunset fled into the jungles. Memia Bo, whom he insulted on joining the army, has sent people to search for and arrest him, and threatens to put him to death, if caught: some reports state, that he had been taken and put to death by Memia Bo.

On the 13th, in the afternoon, Mr. Price and Dr. Sandford returned to camp—the latter had refused to leave Ava, on this occasion, unless his liberty was finally given him, and he was accordingly permitted to remain at large—the only difficulty now made by the Burmese court, regarded the money payment; but as no doubt exists of their ability to re-imburse us the expences of the war, to much more than the amount demanded, we should scarcely think they will persist in their refusal. The British Commissioners having refused to recede from their demands, Mr. Price had once more gone back to Ava.

There is very little expectation, that any opposition will be made between Pagahm and Ava, even if the voice of Ava is still for war. The dispatches speak of a place called Powa-Chowa, on the Peninsula, formed by the confluence of the Khain-dowain with the Irawadi.

It is satisfactory to find all accounts concur in the temper and condition of our force. The men are all in high spirits; the only things requisite to keep English soldiers in good humour, provisions, being abundant—the Flotilla is well up with the army, and the people of the country returning to their towns and villages by thousands: they are much more afraid, apparently, of the Burmese, than of the English Commanders.

We are indebted to a private letter for the following interesting extract:

"At eight A. M., on the morning of the 9th, the advanced guard, consisting of thirty-four troopers of the Body Guard, and fifty men of his Majesty's 13th, having moved forward about three miles, fell in with a very strong

strong picket of the enemy, who saluted them with a shower of musket and jinjal balls. Their fire, however, was more noisy than mischievous, and they contrived invariably to miss the party. General Campbell and his Staff followed close upon the advance, with a couple of six-pounders and a howitzer, the number of the enemy enabling them to outflank the advance, a body of them succeeded in throwing themselves between the party and the main force, when the remainder of the 13th coming up through the jungle, spread, by bugle call, to the right and left, with as much steady and composed alacrity, as if they were exercising on the glacis of Fort William, and dispersed their opponents. In the mean time, the advance pushed on in open skirmishing order, and the Commander-in-chief was left with a mere handful of men and the guns, when, on entering into a little plain, the few men of the 13th, about sixteen, who were foremost, were charged by a mass of Munnypore Horse: the bugle sounded to close, but they were too few to make head against the Cavalry, and retired precipitately upon the guns. In this they would scarcely have succeeded, if the Subadar Major of the Body Guard, with the Jemadar and seven troopers, the escort of the Commander-in-chief, had not interposed to cover their retreat. Dashing past the skirmishers to the right and left of them, the troopers deployed in their rear, and without any thing like precipitancy or flurry, they kept the Munnypore Horse in check, falling back gradually, till within range of the guns: they then filed off on either hand to make way for the guns to open, which they did with grape and shrapnell, most effectually. I hear that Sir Archibald Campbell observed, after the action, that he had never witnessed more steady and gallant conduct than that displayed by the troopers of the Body Guard on this occasion—no Cavalry in the world could have acted better."

No. 162. (A)—*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel W. Smelt, Commanding Lower Provinces, to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Rangoon, January 13, 1826.*

I have the honor to forward to you a copy of two letters, dated the 4th and 6th January, 1826, from Lieutenant-Colonel Pepper, Commanding a Detachment in the Pegu district, detailing a gratifying account of his operations in that quarter.

Private accounts have reached me, which I have no reason to doubt, that an attack on the strong post of Satoung, which was supposed to have been evacuated, with a party detached by Colonel Pepper, of the 3d Regiment Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Conry, did not succeed, with the loss of two officers and ten men killed, two officers and sixteen men wounded. I regret to say that Lieutenant-Colonel Conry, a most able and intelligent officer, was killed, also Lieutenant Adams: Lieutenant Harvy, wounded severely, Lieutenant Power, slightly. I am in expectation that Colonel Pepper, with a reinforcement and guns, will have taken Satoung, before he receives Sir A. Campbell's recall to Pegu, in consequence of the treaty of peace having been agreed to.

No. 162. (B)—*Copy of a Report from Lieut.-Col. H. H. Pepper, Commanding Detachment, to Brigadier Smelt, Commanding Lower Provinces; dated Camp at Shoegeen, January 4, 1826.*

I have the honour to report to you, that this place fell into my hands yesterday, without opposition, indeed, I found it completely deserted. Our preparations were all made for storming it, and it was not till reaching its base, that I had the least idea of its being abandoned, as our route was opposed in several instances by parties in the jungles, who fired on our advance. It was particularly fortunate, that by taking the route of Mickeoo, instead of the high road, I was enabled, by sending forward the 3d Light Infantry, to secure the whole of the boats at that place, and drawing off three hundred of the enemy to relieve the inhabitants, otherwise, I should have found it most difficult, if not impossible to have succeeded.

It is my intention to move forward with as little delay as possible; but as a further supply of provisions will be necessary, I am forced to remain for the present: and should the indents from the Commissariat officer here be received with this, may I request you will be good enough to push them forward by the Satoung river, a branch of which falls into that of I'egu.

Satoung is now the only post of the enemy between this and Martaban. I have, therefore, resolved to detach Colonel Conry and 3d Light Infantry, for its reduction, by water, that once accomplished, does away every impediment to a free communication between Rangoon and Tongho, though it seems absolutely necessary that a detachment be fixed there.

I was forced to leave an officer's party and one hundred and fifty men at Mickeoo, for its protection, and this number might be transferred to Satoung, they not being required at Mickeoo, after the capture of the former place. Boats are in great numbers, both here and at Mickeoo, and reliefs might take place, first from Mickeoo



and again from hence; but I beg to suggest, that as my future movements require the presence of every man I can muster, it will be most necessary that the detachment from my force at Pegue and Mickeoo should be relieved: in my report to the Commander of the forces, I have mentioned this circumstance, as my numbers are very small, and I shall be obliged if you can meet my wishes. The resources of this province, I have not yet been able to ascertain, but nothing indicates them to be great. There is little or no rice here, nor do I yet observe a single bandy, or any number of cattle. Some of the people are returning, and I expect the whole will do so in a few days—our march for the most part was through bad roads, particularly the nearer we approached this; but the troops are in good health and excellent quarters.

No. 162. (C)—*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Pepper, Commanding Detachment, to Brigadier Smelt, Commanding Lower Provinces; dated Camp Shoegeon, January 6, 1826.*

Since my letter to you of the 4th, I have the honor to acquaint you, that a communication has reached me from the officer I left in command of the detachment at Meckeeo, stating that his post, was attacked on the morning of the 4th instant, by a party of the enemy, to the amount of four or five hundred men from Satoung, that he was fortunate enough to beat them off, and with little injury to his own men; one only being wounded in the groin. The various calls I have for the services of my men has forced on me the necessity of directing the party I left at Pegu to join me, and to escort the provisions, ammunition, &c., in store there, to this place; but as there is little doubt of the fall of Satoung, Pegu requiring but a very small detail, a native officer's party I considered as sufficient, and therefore directed Captain Kitson to leave one, as well as the sick and convalescent men, and a native dresser to attend them.

I trust, with reference to my letter of the 4th, that it will be in your power to relieve the whole of the men now absent from my command, for I am well assured, after providing a Garrison at this place, when I move forward, I shall still be very inefficient for the execution of the further object to which the Commander of the forces calls my attention in his instructions for my rule and guidance.

There are several strong posts between this and Tongho, each of which I am told will require to be reduced, and as I must keep open a communication, sepoy in small details, will, for this purpose, be required, and my effective strength will naturally be decreased as I advance; thus situated, I hope it will be in your power to take charge of Satoung, or the objects obtained will, I fear, be in some danger of being defeated.

No. 163. (A)—*Copy of a Report from Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Head-Quarters, Camp Yandaboo, 45 miles S. W. of Ava, March 2, 1826.*

Herewith I have the honor to transmit to you Lieutenant-Colonel Pepper's report to me, of the operations against the enemy, of the detachment under his command.

All the Lieutenant-Colonel's measures appear to have been taken with much promptitude, and carried into effect with that spirit and judgment, I had reason to expect from his well-known zeal and professional abilities. With him, I much lament the loss the service has sustained in the fall of Lieutenant-Colonel Conry, and the other brave officers mentioned in his report.

No. 163. (B)—*Copy of a Report from Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Pepper, Commanding Detachment, to the Deputy Adjutant General of the Forces in advance to Umrapproah; dated Camp Shoegeon, January 14, 1826.*

Adverting to my letter of the 4th instant, notifying my intention of sending the 3d Light Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Conry, for the reduction of Setaung, a stockade on the eastern bank of the river of that name, and midway between Shewghun and Martaban, for the purpose of opening the communication between my Detachment and the Lower Provinces:

I have now the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Commander of the forces, that Lieutenant Colonel Conry's party left this on the 6th instant, by water; on its arrival at Meekow, where an officer's party had been posted, to protect our supplies and the inhabitants of that place, who had contributed so greatly to our assistance, the Lieutenant Colonel received a report from Lieutenant Bell, Commanding there, that he had, on the 4th, been twice attacked by four or five hundred men belonging to Oudinal, the Ex-Rajah of Martaban, sent from Setaung, whom he succeeded in repulsing. This induced Lieutenant Colonel Conry to lose not a moment in proceeding.

On the morning of the 7th instant, he reached the place about noon, and instantly made his arrangements for the attack, which commenced at two o'clock.

It is with feelings of deep regret I am obliged to report its complete failure, as per accompanying dispatch, with the loss of Lieutenant Colonel Conry and Lieutenant Adams, 3d Regiment Palamcottah Light Infantry, killed—Lieutenant and Adjutant Harvey, severely, and Lieutenant Potter, slightly, wounded—one native officer and nine privates, killed—one bugler and eighteen rank and file, wounded: this party returned to Meekow on the same night.

On the afternoon of the 8th, I received this report, and instantly determined to proceed in person with a reinforcement for the immediate reduction of the stockade, which I did on the 9th, with a detail, by land and water, (as per margin,\*) and reached Meekow on the morning of the 10th; during that day, I have to state, that further accounts reached me of horrible murders and aggressions committed by the Setaung people, on the inhabitants of those villages who had sought our protection, and in a more manifest degree since their temporary success.

I was employed all that day in preparing and collecting a sufficient number of boats, to enable me to proceed early on the following morning. The whole were in motion by three A. M. on the 11th, and landed near Setaung by nine o'clock.

Having employed sometime in reconnoitring the place to take up my position, I found the creek, which flanks the north face of the stockade, running in a parallel line about one hundred and fifty yards from it, not fordable, but ascertained from my guides, that it would become so at low water.

The stockade stands on a considerable eminence, with an abrupt ascent to it, commanding every point by which the assailants must approach. It appeared of great extent, built entirely of teak timber, flanked, at intervals, with loop holes through every part of it, and its height from twelve to fourteen feet.

Pending the time when I might be able to cross the ford, the Artillery were placed in position, and opened a fire of shot and shell on every point.

I then prepared the columns of attack, as per margin.†

At two P. M., the water had sufficiently subsided to enable me to move forward the left column, which was obliged to make a detour to the left and rear of the place preceded, and having reached its position, the right and centre columns having previously been instructed to what point their attack were to be directed. The advance was sounded for the whole to storm simultaneously, and in less than twenty minutes, we were in full possession.

The fire from the enemy was most heavy and destructive, and the obstacles to be surmounted by our troops were of no common kind; every man having been up to his neck in water while crossing the creek.

It is with the deepest regret that I have to report, that our success, though complete, has been attended with heavy loss. Among the killed are Captain Cursham, 1st European Regiment, and Captain Stedman, 34th Regiment Chicacole Light Infantry, both commanding columns; and of the wounded—Major Home, 12th Regiment Native Infantry, severely, (also commanding a column,) Lieutenant Fullarton, 17th Regiment, Commissariat Department, dangerously, Lieutenant Power, 3d Regiment Palamcottah Light Infantry, again severely, together with a severe loss in the lower grades, as per return attached.‡

The

\* *Artillery by Water*—1 Captain, 16 Gunners, with 1 six-pounder, and one 4½ Howitzer.

Land Party, under Major Home, 12th Regiment, proceeded on the 9th instant,.....	} Flank Companies, 1st European Regiment, ... 78 Rank and File. } Light Company, 12th Regiment, completed to 100 Ditto ditto. } Head-Quarters, 34th Light Infantry, ..... 150 Ditto ditto. } With Pioneers,..... 25 Ditto ditto.
† Right Column, under Major Home, 12th Regiment Native Infantry,.....	
Centre Column, under Captain Stedman, 34th Regiment Chicacole Light Infantry,.....	
Light Column, under Captain Cursham, 1st European Regiment,.....	

† Right Column, under Major Home, 12th Regiment Native Infantry,.....	} Light Company, 12th Regiment Native Infantry, with two Ladders. } Light Company, 1st European Regiment, 36 Rank and File. } Head-Quarters, 34th Regt. C. L. I., with } 164 Rank and File. } 2 Ladders, ..... } Grenadier Company, 42 Rank and File. } Head-Quarters, 3d Regt. P. L. I., with } 200 Ditto. } 2 Ladders,.....
Centre Column, under Captain Stedman, 34th Regiment Chicacole Light Infantry,.....	
Light Column, under Captain Cursham, 1st European Regiment,.....	
giment,.....	

‡ *General Return of Killed and Wounded, in Action against Setaung Stockade, on the 7th and 11th January, 1826, respectively.*

*Camp Shewugheen, 14th January, 1826.*

3d Regiment Palamcottah Light Infantry.—Killed—1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Lieutenant, and 9 Rank and File. Wounded—2 Lieutenants, 1 Drummer, 2 Naicks, and 16 Rank and File.

Detachment 1st Battalion Pioneers.—Wounded—4 Rank and File.

Staff.—Wounded—1 Lieutenant Colonel and 1 Lieutenant.

Ava.  
1826.

The limits of this dispatch prevents me from particularising the zeal and devotion to their duty, of so many who fully met the expectations I had formed of them: yet I cannot refrain from bringing to the particular notice of the Major General commanding the forces, the names of Captains Cursham and Stedman, who so gallantly fell at the head of their respective columns; of Major Home, 12th Regiment, and Captain Corbet who succeeded him, (when wounded,) of Lieutenants Charlton, 1st European Regiment, and Haig, 34th Regiment Chicacole Light Infantry, who both, likewise, succeeded to the command of their columns, on the death of the before-named officers; of Captain Dickinson, Commanding the Artillery, whose heavy fire and excellent practice contributed so mainly to keep down that of the enemy's; of Lieutenant Fullarton, of the Commissariat Department, who handsomely volunteered his services, to Lieutenant Woodgate, of the Quarter Master General's Department, for his exertions in leading on the Pioneers with the ladders on both attacks; and of Lieutenant Williams, commanding 3d Regiment Palamcottah Light Infantry, not only for his anxiety and zeal, but for the able assistance I have derived from his perfect knowledge of the Burmese language.

The conduct of the Flank Companies of the 1st European Regiment, (both officers and men) has been such as nobly to sustain the high character of British soldiers.

I am happy to have it in my power to add, that the native troops, with their respective European officers, under my command, have upheld the character of good soldiers.

The unremitting attention and humane solicitude and care of the sick and wounded, by Assistant Surgeon Richardson, 1st European Regiment, is such, that I feel it my duty to bring his name, likewise, to your favourable notice.

From the numerous accounts received from the head men of Piquet villages, who had been held in captivity by the Attiwoon who defended the place, the number of the enemy may be calculated at three or four thousand men.

Upwards of three thousand dead bodies were found in the stockade, independant of those carried off, thrown into wells, and the river; their loss cannot be computed at less than double that number.

Many thousands of the inhabitants who were held in subjection under the oppressive yoke of the Burmese, are now restored to their liberty and former homes, and the gratitude evinced by them will, I am sure, prove acceptable to the warm feelings of the Major General.

Previous to quitting the place, which I did yesterday morning, I had the whole of the defences, of every description, destroyed and burnt, so completely, that not a vestige remains.

I cannot conclude without expressing to the Major General the sense I entertain of the able and ready services I have received from my Staff, not only on this but on every occasion, and I beg leave to bring their names to the favourable notice of the Major General, viz. Captain Budd, 43d Regiment, Brigade Major, and Captain Spicer, 12th Regiment, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, who, on this affair, each conducted a column to the assault.

*Flank Company 1st European Regiment.*—Killed—1 Captain, and 6 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Lieutenant, 4 Serjeants, 5 Corporals, and 11 Rank and File.

*3d Regiment Palamcottah Light Infantry.*—Killed—5 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Lieutenant, 1 Naick, and 18 Rank and File.

*Light Company 12th Regiment Native Infantry.*—Killed—2 Rank and File.

Wounded—1 Major, 1 Jemadar, and 4 Rank and File.

*34th Regiment, or Chicacole Light Infantry.*—Killed—1 Captain.

Wounded—1 Jemadar, 1 Naick, and 9 Rank and File.

*Detachment 1st Battalion Pioneers.*—Killed—1 Rank and File.

Wounded—4 Rank and File.

*List of Officers Killed and Wounded at Setoung Stockade, 7th January, 1826.*

Killed—Lieutenant-Colonel E. Conry, 3d Regt. P. L. I.—Lieutenant T. J. Adams, 3d Regt. P. L. I.

Wounded—Lieutenant and Adjutant P. L. Harvey, 3d Regt. P. L. I., severely—Lieutenant J. Power, 3d Regt. P. L. I., slightly.

*Native Commissioned Officer.*—Killed—Subadar Syed Chaund, 3d Regt. P. L. I.

*List of Officers Killed and Wounded at Setoung Stockade, 11th January, 1826.*

Killed—Captain Cursham, 1st European Regiment—Captain Stedman, 34th Regt. C. L. I.

Wounded—Brigadier Pepper, Commanding, slightly—Major Home, 12th Regiment, severely—Lieutenant Fullarton, 17th Regiment, dangerously—Lieutenant Charlton, 1st European Regiment, slightly—Lieutenant J. Power, 3d Regt. P. L. I., severely.

*Native Commissioned Officers.*—Wounded—Jemadar Money Ram, 12th Regiment, severely—Jemidar and Adjutant Mahomed. Hoossan, 34th C. L. I., slightly.



No. 164. (A)—*Extract Report from W. J. Turquand, Esq., in Charge, to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Sylhet, Commissioner's Office, January 3, 1826.*

I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, the arrival of Gumbheer Sing with his Levy, accompanied by Captain Grant, at Munnipoor, on the 18th ultimo.

I beg to annex copy of a letter from the latter, to the address of Mr. Tucker, together with copy of his route. Mr. Tucker being absent on leave of absence, having left me in charge of his department, is the cause of my addressing you.

No. 164. (B)—*Extract Report from Captain F. J. Grant, 39th Regiment Native Infantry, attached to Gumbheer Sing's Levy, to C. Tucker, Esq., Commissioner, Sylhet; dated Munnipore, December 20, 1825.*

I have the pleasure to report the arrival of Rajah Gumbheer Sing's Levy in Munnipore, on the 18th instant.

I forward the route by which the Levy proceeded, and have taken the liberty to add such remarks as occurred to me on the nature of the road, and have also subjoined a route, which I consider would be the most eligible, in case of an army being ever sent in this direction.

Of Munnipore itself, I cannot as yet give any decided opinion; as far as I have hitherto seen, it is a perfect jungle, without an inhabitant or vestige of cultivation, and from what I can learn, there is not sufficient grain throughout the whole country to subsist the Levy for more than three or four months at furthest; the Taubal Pergunnah is the only part at present inhabited and cultivated, towards which we proceed on the 22d instant.

From all the information I can collect, it would appear that the Burmah force at Kubboo is not more than three or four hundred men, and that the force of which information was received at Bans Kande, and which I reported to you at the time, is supposed to be about one thousand and five hundred, or two thousand men: they have not as yet crossed the Ningtee nullah. I am not prepared to say how far this information is to be depended on, however, as we proceed so shortly in that direction, I trust I shall be able to collect something satisfactory on the subject.

Should it be found that the force at Kubboo is so small as reported, it is the Rajah's intention, I believe, to make an attempt on that place.

No. 165. (A)—*Copy of a Letter from W. J. Turquand, Esq., in Charge, to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Sylhet, Commissioner's Office, January 25, 1826.*

I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, copy of a letter from Captain Grant, attached to Rajah Gumber Singh's Levy, dated Toubal, Munnypoor, the 2d instant, but which has only been just received by me.

No. 165. (B)—*Copy of a Letter from Captain F. J. Grant, Gumber Sing's Levy, to C. Tucker, Esq., Commissioner; dated Sylhet, January 2, 1826.*

Rajah Gumber Sing having received intelligence, on which he places the fullest reliance, that there is no Burmah force at present in the Kubboo district, which is left solely under the protection of five hundred of its own inhabitants, he has been induced to detach yesterday one thousand men of the Levy, under the Sennaputty, to that place, with the hope of its readily submitting to his authority, it having originally formed part of the Munnypoor territory, and the inhabitants having equal cause with his other subjects, to regret the tyrannical and oppressive rule to which they have been subjected under the Burmah government; should they, however, contrary to his expectations, not submit, his instructions to the Sennaputty are, to quarter his men in the different villages, which he has no doubt will either bring the Sirdar of the five hundred armed men, (who are in stockades) to compliance, or force him to cross the Ningtee river with his men.

It was my most anxious wish to accompany the detachment, but a severe attack of rheumatism confines me at present to my couch, I am in hopes, however, that I will get over the attack in a day or two, when I shall immediately proceed to the Ningtee if possible, at all events to Kubboo,

Sylhet.  
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The Rajah also remains at this place, as he has no idea that any actual hostilities will take place. Exclusive of my being detained here by illness, he also wishes for my being present, at all times, at the same place with himself: he has agreed to my going on to Kubboo, to enable me to form some opinion of the resources of the country and the nature of the road—Kubboo is only four marches from where we now are.

I beg leave to take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 10th ultimo, and to assure you that I will, as far as in my power, attend most fully to its contents. My former two letters will have acquainted you that Gumber Sing assumed the supreme authority of Munnypoor, without the least appearance of dissatisfaction having shewn itself on the part of the inhabitants.

No. 166. (A)—*Copy of a Despatch from W. J. Turquand, Esq., in Charge, to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Sylhet, Commissioner's Office, February 13, 1826.*

I have the honor to forward you copies of two dispatches just received from Captain Grant, attached to Rajah Gumber Singh's Levy, under dates the 23d and 25th ultimo, for the consideration of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council.

No. 166. (B)—*Copy of a Despatch from Captain F. J. Grant, Rajah Gumber Sing's Levy, to C. Tucker, Esq., Commissioner, Sylhet; dated Tummo, Kubboo Pergunnah, January 23, 1826.*

I have the pleasure to acquaint you, for the information of Government, of the total subjugation of the Kubboo Pergunnah, the last remaining fortified position of which was evacuated by the enemy last night, and entered by the men of Rajah Gumber Sing's Levy. The fall of this stockade gives him entire possession of the country on this side of the Ningtee river, and there is not now an enemy in possession nearer than Kingnoo, on the left bank of that stream.

My letter of the 2d instant, will have informed you of the measures adopted in consequence of information received from this Pergunnah, and the detachment, which was mentioned as having marched under the Sennaputtee for Kubboo, found the posts in the northern part of the Pergunnah evacuated by the principal Sirdar, the Sumjoo Rajah, who had concentrated the whole of his force in the Tummo stockade, where, with the assistance of the Rajah of that place, he appeared determined to oppose our advance with their united force, amounting to about seven hundred men.

Intelligence of these circumstances having been received, Gumber Sing and myself, with the remaining part of the Levy, marched, by a southerly route, across the Mirang hills into the Birmah territory, and on our way passed several very formidable stockades, which had been commenced in the different defiles, but evacuated in consequence of our unexpected advance.

On the 18th instant, we arrived in the vicinity of the Tummo stockade, and formed a junction with the detachment under the Sennaputtee. I accompanied the Rajah, who immediately proceeded to reconnoitre it. A very cursory examination was sufficient to prove the great strength of the work, and having learnt from some Munnyporean deserters, that the water was about sixty paces on the outside of the stockade, it appeared far more advisable to obtain eventual possession of the place by cutting off the supply of this indispensable article, than to attempt its reduction by assault, the success of which was at least doubtful, and could not, at all events, have been obtained but by a very serious sacrifice of lives, as we were without guns, to make any previous impression upon the defences. Should the proposed measures fail of success, it was then determined to attempt carrying the work by assault.

On the 19th, parties were advanced to within a hundred yards of the different faces of the work, under cover of a dense jungle, which screened them from the notice of the enemy, and from these points the exact spots whence water was obtained were discovered, and positions selected which appeared likely to command them; towards the close of the day our men were discovered by the enemy, who opened a very heavy fire upon them, and at night, after a very spirited resistance, the Munnyporeans succeeded in carrying and entrenching themselves in all the positions previously chosen for occupation.

The success of this movement decided the issue of the contest, as the two principal advanced posts were not more than sixty yards from the stockade, or fifteen from the supplies of water, and the enemy appeared so fully aware of the advantages we had gained, that, during the succeeding days, they made several desperate attempts to force these positions; on the night of the 21st, they made a final effort in a sally, when they were beaten back with some loss. They appear to have commenced a retreat from this period, retiring in small parties of three or four, as from the closeness with which they were invested, they could have but little hope of effecting their escape in a body, and last night, at half-past ten o'clock, they finally evacuated the stockade, which was immediately occupied by the troops of the Levy.

In addition to the successes already mentioned, I have the satisfaction to report, that information has been received of the capture of a stockade on the right bank of the Ningtee river, by a detachment of three hundred men from the Levy, which was sent in advance, by the Rajah's desire, from the force, under the Sennaputtee's command; their success has rescued upwards of two hundred Munnyporeans from captivity; and many more have been released from a state of slavery by other smaller parties, which have been employed in subjecting the refractory Nagas, inhabiting the hills in this part of the country.

For the plan which accompanies this report, I am indebted to Lieutenant Pemberton, of the Revenue Survey Department, who, by the greatest exertions, joined me on the morning of the 20th instant, and immediately made an offer of his services in any way, in which they might be found most useful. From the known zeal and abilities of this officer, and the anxiety evinced by him on the present occasion to join me previous to any attack being made on the enemy's stockade, I feel assured, that his opinion and assistance will be of the greatest advantage, should an opportunity hereafter offer, of availing myself of them. It is almost needless to add, that since joining me, he has done all that circumstances would admit to contribute to the success of the operations, by visiting continually our advanced positions, and encouraging the Munnyporean sepoy, both by example and exhortation, to steadiness, in the trying situation in which they were placed.

The character of Rajah Gumbheer Sing, for personal courage, activity, and energy, has been already so well established, and is so fully appreciated by the Government, that nothing but a sense of duty could justify any comment upon either by me—and it will, no doubt, be gratifying to know, that the activity, judgment, and skill, he has displayed on this occasion, have proved the justice of the opinion previously entertained of his merits. The steady gallantry which, without the usual aids of cannon, could force a brave enemy to evacuate a strongly-fortified position, is a very satisfactory illustration of the character of his followers, and renders any further comment upon it unnecessary.

I am happy to say, that our loss amounts to but five killed, and six wounded, owing to the cover afforded to the men of the Levy by the jungle, in the vicinity of the stockade, and the nature of the ground they occupied. The loss of the enemy is said, by some prisoners, to have been severe, but the care with which they always carry off their dead and wounded, renders it impossible for me to speak with certainty upon the subject.

A detachment of five hundred men proceeded this morning to re-inforce the party already in advance on the banks of the Ningtee river.

*No. 166. (C).—Copy of a Report from Captain F. J. Grant, Gumber Sing's Levy, to C. Tucker, Esq., Commissioner, Sylhet; dated Camp Tummo, Kubboo Pergunnah, January 25, 1826.*

I omitted to mention in my report of the 23d instant, that four small guns and a number of jinjals were found mounted on the works at Tummo. These might be turned to some use, had we a supply of powder for them. A quantity of rice and dhan, sufficient to subsist the Levy for two months was found in the stockade.

The Rajah's present intention is to proceed with the Levy to the banks of the Ningtee, and take up a favorable position on this side of that river, and to occasionally send parties of Horsemen and Infantry to harass the enemy's villages on the opposite bank: the detachment sent in advance have possessed themselves of some boats.

There is little doubt but the enemy have retired from hence with the full impression, that a Company's army have entered the Pergunnah; this has been ascertained from the report of some Munneeporeans who were in the stockade, and effected their escape on the evening the enemy evacuated it; such an impression will, no doubt, cause some alarm at Umrappora, and I trust create a diversion in favor of Sir A. Campbell.

The Levy made six marches from Towbal to this place: the two first, which lay through the Munnipore valley, are, even at the present season of the year, a swamp and deep puddle—the remaining four, the road is an excellent one, and practicable for carriage cattle. It is unnecessary my entering into a particular detail of this route, as Lieutenant Pemberton will be able to afford much more satisfactory intelligence, having surveyed it. All accounts agree in representing the route from hence to Umrappora as being a very good one, presenting no obstacles of any moment to the advance of an army, and laying over a plain the whole way after crossing the Ningtee at Kingnoo.

*No. 167. (A).—Copy of a Letter from W. J. Turquand, Esq., Acting Commissioner, to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Sylhet, Commissioner's Office, February 25, 1826.*

I have the honour to annex copy of a letter received this moment from Captain Grant, attached to Rajah Gumbheer Sing's Levy, dated Banks of the Ningtee, the 3d February, for the consideration of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council.

*No. 167. (B).—Copy*



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No. 167. (B)—*Copy of a Report from Captain F. J. Grant, attached to Rajah Gumbheer Sing's Levy, to C. Tucker, Esq., Commissioner, Sylhet; dated Camp, Banks of the Ningtee, February 3, 1826.*

I have the honour to report the arrival of Rajah Gumbheer Sing's Levy, on the western bank of the Ningtee, on the 1st instant, having made five marches from Tummoo, and found an excellent road the whole way. We found the entire country, through which we passed, deserted by the inhabitants, who evidently made a very hurried retreat, having left the whole of their cattle behind, which have fallen into the hands of the Munnyporeans, to the amount of upwards of one thousand and five hundred head, buffaloes, bullocks, &c. &c. They have also allowed the Munnyporeans, whom they seized some years ago, and have since detained in a state of slavery, to escape; I have seen, at least, one thousand of them on their return to their own country.

Parties who were detached to the opposite side of the Ningtee to try and collect supplies, report, that for three days' journey, they found the whole of the country in the same deserted state, as on this side, and devoid of resources of every description. I fear, therefore, our further advance is not possible, as there is not in camp at present more than four or five days' supply of rice, and the country affords nothing. Parties are now out in every direction, to see if provisions are procurable, but I have little hope of their being successful.

No. 168.—*Copies of Dispatches from Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., to George Swinton, Esq., Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, &c. &c. &c.; dated Head-Quarters, Camp, at Yandabo, 45 Miles S. W. of Ava, February 24, 1826.*

The late defeats sustained by the Burmese army, and which led to its almost total dispersion, together with the vicinity of the British force to the capital of Ava, has had the effect (I trust sufficiently) to humble that haughty and arrogant Court to a submission which will, no doubt, be made for a length of time subservient to its policy, so as not again wantonly to disturb the peace of the British government in India.

The Treaty of Peace, this day concluded and ratified by the Burmese Ministers of State, will be submitted to his Lordship in Council, by the British Commissioners in Pegue and Ava. I have therefore only to say, that I shall at once return, with the force under my command, to Rangoon, there to await the further commands of Government.

No. 169.—*Copies of Dispatches from Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., Senior Commissioner, and C. T. Robertson, Esq., Civil Commissioner in Ava and Pegue, to the Right Honourable Lord Amherst, Governor General in Council; dated Camp Yandabo, February 24, 1826.*

We have the honor to submit, for the consideration of your Lordship in Council, an original Treaty this day concluded by us, with the Burmese Ministers, specially deputed for the purpose of terminating the war, by acceding generally to the terms detailed in the paper, which, in our letter of the 1st instant, we reported that we had delivered to Dr. Price, of the American Missionary establishment, for the eventual information of His Majesty the King of Ava.

The original Royal mandate addressed to the Burmese Ministers, empowering and enjoining them to effect an immediate pacification, by acquiescing in the conditions imposed in the document above alluded to, will be laid before your Lordship in Council, along with this letter; and a translation will be found recorded in the copy of our Resolution of this date, transmitted by the present opportunity to the Secretary to Government in the Secret and Political Department.

Judging from the style and tenor of the King's instructions to his delegates, from their own deportment and assurances, the communications of Messrs. Judson and Price, the liberation of all the prisoners at Ava, and the full delivery of the first instalment of the money payment, we conceive that, notwithstanding the fickle character of the Court of Ava, we are justified in considering their present professions as sincere, and that the time was now arrived when we may, with confidence, congratulate your Lordship in Council upon the successful and honorable conclusion of the Burmese war.

The information derived from repeated conferences with the Burmese Agents, particularly with Dr. Price, and the liberated prisoners, have suggested the expediency of the following alteration and amendments of the former wording of the Treaty:

In Art. 3d—The local names of the "Anonpectoomiew" range of mountains have been inserted, and a passage has been added regarding the rank of officers to be employed, as Commissioners, for the settlement of boundaries.

In Art. 4th — Tenasserim, the general name of the provinces on the Coast, has been introduced, and the Saluœn river, recorded as the future boundary between the provinces of Ye and Martaban.

A clause, defining the course to be in future pursued, in disposing of the property of individuals, the subjects of either state, who may demise within the dominions of the other, has been appended to Article 8.

A hundred days, from this date, has, in the additional Article, been mentioned as the term for the payment of the second instalment at Rangoon.

*No. 170.—Proclamation by the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council.*

FORT WILLIAM, 11TH APRIL, 1826.

Whereas a definitive Treaty of Peace and Amity, between the Hon'ble East Indian Company and the King of Ava, was concluded on the 24th February, 1826, and whereas the said Treaty has been duly Ratified by the Governor General in Council, and by the Burman Government, the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council hereby publicly notifies the same.

Treaty of Peace between the Hon'ble East India Company on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava on the other, settled by Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B. and K. C. T. S., commanding the expedition, and Senior Commissioner in Pegu and Ava, Thomas Campbell Robertson, Esquire, Civil Commissioner in Pegu and Ava, and Henry Ducie Chads, Esquire, Captain, Commanding His Britannic Majesty's and the Honorable Company's Naval Force, on the Irrawuddy river, on the part of the Honorable Company, and by Mengyee-Maha-men-hlah-kyan-ten Woongyee, Lord of Lay-Kaing, and Mengyee Mahah-men-hlah-thu-hah-thoo-Atwen-woon, Lord of the Revenue, on the part of the King of Ava, who have each communicated to the other their full powers agreed to, and executed at Yandaboo, in the Kingdom of Ava, on this Twenty-fourth Day of February, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-six, corresponding with the Fourth Day of the decrease of the Moon Taboung, in the Year One Thousand One Hundred and Eighty-seven, Gaudma Æra.

*Article First.*—There shall be perpetual Peace and Friendship between the Honorable Company on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava, on the other.

*Article Second.*—His Majesty the King of Ava renounces all claims, and will abstain from all future interference with the principality of Assam, and its dependancies, and also with the contiguous petty states of Cachar and Jynteeah. With regard to Munnipore, it is stipulated, that should Ghumbeer Singh desire to return to that country, he shall be recognised by the King of Ava as Rajah thereof.

*Article Third.*—To prevent all future disputes respecting the Boundary Line between the two Great Nations—the British Government will retain the conquered provinces of Arracan, including the four divisions of Arracan, Ramree, Cheduba and Sandoway, and His Majesty the King of Ava cedes all right thereto. The Unnoupectowmien, or Arracan Mountains, (known in Arracan by the name of Yeomatoung or Pokhingloungrange,) will henceforth form the boundary between the two great nations on that side. Any doubts regarding the said line of demarcation, will be settled by Commissioners appointed by the respective Governments for that purpose, such Commissioners from both powers to be suitable and corresponding in rank.

*Article Fourth.*—His Majesty the King of Ava cedes to the British Government, the conquered provinces of Yeh, Tavoy, and Mergui, and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependancies thereunto appertaining, taking the Saluœn river as the line of demarcation on that frontier; any doubts regarding their boundaries, will be settled as specified in the concluding part of Article Third.

*Article Fifth.*—In proof of the sincere disposition of the Burman Government to maintain the relations of Peace and Amity between the nations, and as part indemnification to the British Government, for the expenses of the war, His Majesty the King of Ava agrees to pay the sum of One Crore of Rupees.

*Article Sixth.*—No person whatever, whether native or foreigner, is hereafter to be molested by either party, on account of the part which he may have taken, or have been compelled to take, in the present war.

*Article Seventh.*—In order to cultivate and improve the relations of Amity and Peace hereby established between the two Governments, it is agreed, that accredited Ministers retaining an Escort, or safeguard of fifty-men from each, shall reside at the Durbar of the other, who shall be permitted to purchase, or to build a suitable place of residence, of permanent materials, and a Commercial Treaty, upon principles of reciprocal advantage, will be entered into, by the two high contracting Powers.

*Article Eighth.*—All public and private debts contracted by either Government, or by the subjects of either Government, with the others previous to the war, to be recognized and liquidated, upon the same principles of honor and good faith, as if hostilities had not taken place between the two nations, and no advantage shall be taken by either party of the period that may have elapsed since the debts were incurred, or in consequence

quence of the war; and according to the universal law of nations, it is further stipulated, that the property of all British subjects, who may die in the dominions of His Majesty the King of Ava, shall, in the absence of legal heirs, be placed in the hands of the British Resident, or Consul, in the said dominions, who will dispose of the same according to the tenor of the British law. In like manner, the property of Burmese subjects dying under the same circumstances, in any part of the British dominions, shall be made over to the Minister, or other authority delegated by his Burmese Majesty to the Supreme Government of India.

*Article Ninth.*—The King of Ava will abolish all exactions upon British ships or vessels in Burman ports, that are not required from Burman ships or vessels in British ports, nor shall ships or vessels, the property of British subjects, whether European or Indian, entering the Rangoon river, or other Burman ports be required to land their guns, or unship their rudders, or to do any other act not required of Burmese ships or vessels in British ports.

*Article Tenth.*—The good and faithful ally of the British government, His Majesty the King of Siam, having taken a part in the present war, will, to the fullest extent, as far as regards His Majesty and his subjects, be included in the above treaty.

*Article Eleventh.*—This treaty to be ratified by the Burmese authorities competent in the like cases, and the ratification to be accompanied by all British, whether European or Native, American, and other prisoners, who will be delivered over to the British Commissioners: the British Commissioners, on their part, engaging that the said treaty shall be ratified by the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, and the ratification shall be delivered to His Majesty the King of Ava in four months, or sooner, if possible, and all the Burmese prisoners shall, in like manner, be delivered over to their own government as soon as they arrive from Bengal.

(Signed)

LARGEEN MIONGA WOONGEE. L. S.

*Seal of the Lotoo.*

(Signed)

SHWAGUIN WOON ATAWOON. L. S.

(Signed)

A. CAMPBELL *Major-General and Senior Commissioner.*

(Signed)

T. C. ROBERTSON, *Civil Commissioner.* L. S.

(Signed)

H. D. CHADS, *Captain Royal Navy.*

*Additional Article.*—The British Commissioners being most anxiously desirous to manifest the sincerity of their wish for peace, and to make the immediate execution of the Fifth Article of this Treaty as little irksome or inconvenient as possible to His Majesty the King of Ava, consent to the following arrangements with respect to the division of the sum total, as specified in the Article before referred to, into instalments, viz., upon the payment of twenty-five lacs of rupees, or one-fourth of the sum total, (the other articles of the treaty being executed,) the army will retire to Rangoon.—Upon the further payment of a similar sum, at that place, within one hundred days from this date, with the proviso as above, the army will evacuate the dominions of His Majesty the King of Ava, with the least possible delay, leaving the remaining moiety of the sum total to be paid by equal annual instalments in two years, from this twenty-fourth day of February, 1826, A. D. through the Consul or Resident in Ava or Pegue, on the part of the Honorable the East India Company.

(Signed)

LARGEEN MIONGA WOONGEE. L. S.

*Seal of the Lotoo.*

(Signed)

SHWAGUIN WOON ATAWOON. L. S.

(Signed)

A. CAMPBELL, *Major-General and Senior Commissioner.*

(Signed)

T. C. ROBERTSON, *Civil Commissioner.* L. S.H. D. CHADS, *Captain, Royal Navy.*

### No. 171.—*General Orders by the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council.*

The Relations of Friendship between the British Government and the state of Ava, having been happily re-established by the conclusion of a Definitive Treaty of Peace, the Governor General in Council performs a most gratifying act of duty, in offering publicly his cordial acknowledgements and thanks to Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell and the Army in Ava, by whose gallant and persevering exertions, the recent contest with the Burmese empire, has been brought to an honorable and successful termination.

In reviewing the events of the late war, the Governor General in Council is bound to declare his conviction, that the achievements of the British army in Ava, have nobly sustained our military reputation, and have produced substantial benefit to the national interests.

During a period of two years, from the first declaration of hostilities against the Government of Ava, every disadvantage of carrying on war in a distant and most difficult country, has been overcome, and the collective



collective forces of the Burman empire, formidable from their numbers, the strength of their fortified positions, and the shelter afforded by the nature of their country, have been repeatedly assailed and defeated. The persevering and obstinate efforts of the enemy to oppose our advance, having failed of success, and his resources and means of further resistance having been exhausted, the King of Ava has, at length, been compelled to accept of those terms of peace, which the near approach of our army to the gates of his capital enabled us to dictate. Every object, the Governor General in Council is happy to proclaim, for which the war was undertaken, has been finally and most satisfactorily accomplished.

With sentiments of the highest gratification, His Lordship in Council further declares his persuasion, that the result of the contest, by teaching the Burman nation to know and respect the power which it had for a series of years insulted, by its haughty demands and unprovoked aggressions, will prevent the interruption in future of those friendly relations, which it is the interest of both States to maintain, will pave the way for a freedom of intercourse hitherto unknown, and promises to open to commerce new and advantageous sources, calculated to promote the interests and the prosperity of both countries.

To the consummate military talents, energy and decision manifested by Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, to the ardor and devotion to the public service, which his example infused into all ranks, and to the confidence inspired by the success of every military operation which he planned and executed in person, the Governor General in Council primarily ascribes, under Providence, the brilliant result that has crowned the gallant and unwearied exertions of the British troops in Ava. Impressed with sentiments of high admiration for those eminent qualities so conspicuously and successfully displayed by Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, His Lordship in Council rejoices in the opportunity of expressing to that distinguished Soldier, in the most public manner, the acknowledgements and thanks of the Supreme Government for the important service he has rendered to the Honorable East India Company, and to the British nation.

The thanks of Government are also eminently due to the senior officers, who have so ably and zealously seconded Major General Sir Archibald Campbell in his career of victory. Brigadiers General Cotton, MacBean, and MacCreagh, deservedly hold a high place in the estimation of His Lordship in Council, who has repeatedly had occasion to notice, with applause, the gallantry, skill, and promptitude displayed by those officers in the execution of the various important operations entrusted to their direction.

Animated by the same noble spirit, Brigadiers Miles, Shaw, Elrington, Armstrong, Smelt, Hunter, Blair, Brodie, Pepper, Parly, Godwin, Hopkinson, and Sale, have entitled themselves to the distinction of receiving from the Governor General in Council, on this occasion, the renewed expression of the sense entertained of their eminent services, for which they have, on various occasions, received the thanks of Government through Major General Sir Archibald Campbell.

Amongst those zealous and gallant officers, some have been more fortunate than others in enjoying opportunities of performing special services. The ability with which Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, of His Majesty's 41st, achieved the conquest of the fortified town of Martaban, and its dependencies, appears to confer on that officer a just claim to the separate and distinct acknowledgements of the Governor General in Council. In like manner, Lieutenant Colonel Miles, and Brigadier General McCreagh, have entitled themselves to the special thanks of government for their services, the former, in the capture of Tavoy and Mergui, and the latter in that of the Island of Cheduba.

The limits of a General Order necessarily preclude the Governor General in Council from indulging the satisfaction of recording the names of all those officers, whose services and exploits at this moment crowd upon the grateful recollection of the Government, by whom they were duly appreciated and acknowledged at the time of their occurrence. His Lordship in Council requests that those Officers will, collectively and individually, accept this renewed assurance, that their meritorious exertions will ever be cordially remembered.

The frequent mention, in the public dispatches, of the gallantry and zeal of Lieutenant Colonel Sale, deservedly marks that officer as one who has established peculiar claims to the distinguished notice of His Lordship in Council. The services of the Bengal and Madras Foot Artillery, under Lieutenant Colonel Hopkinson, and Lieutenant Colonel Pollock, and of the Bengal Rocket Troop and Horse Artillery, under Captains Graham and Lumsdaine, demand also the special acknowledgements of Government. The Governor General in Council acknowledges, with peculiar approbation, the gallant and indefatigable exertions of that valuable corps the Madras Pioneers, under Captain Crow. His Lordship in Council desires further to express the high sense which Government entertains of the zealous and meritorious services of Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, and Major Jackson, and the Officers of the Adjutant General's, and Quarter Master General's Departments, and of Captain Snodgrass, Military Secretary, and Captain John Campbell, Personal Staff of the Commander of the Forces in Ava. The services of Superintending Surgeon Heward, and the Officers of the Medical Department, and of Captain Fiddes, and the Officers of the Commissariat, are fully appreciated by His Lordship in Council.

The Governor General in Council finds himself at a loss for adequate terms to describe the satisfaction, with which the government regards the general good conduct of the troops, European and Native, who have served in Ava. Their patient endurance of the fatigues, privations and sickness to which they were unavoidably exposed in a hostile country, and in an inclement season, subsequent to the capture of Rangoon, was not less conspicuous and praiseworthy than the spirit and determined resolution with which they maintained, during that period, an incessant and most harassing warfare of posts. Their irresistible gallantry in storming the Burmese stockades, however strong their defence by nature or art, and the success which crowned their repeated encounters with the enemy, reflect equal credit on the troops, who achieved those exploits, and on their leaders, who, justly confiding in British energy, discipline, and courage, were never deterred by the most formidable disparity of numbers or difficulties of position, from assaulting the enemy whenever the opportunity could be found.

While the Governor General in Council enumerates, with sentiments of unfeigned admiration, the 13th, 38th, 41st, 89th, 47th, 1st, or Royals, 87th and 45th Regiments, the Honourable Company's Madras European Regiment, and the Bengal and Madras European Artillery, as the European troops, who have had the honour of establishing the renown of the British arms in a new and distant region, His Lordship in Council feels that higher and more justly merited praise cannot be bestowed on those brave troops, than that amidst the barbarous hosts whom they have fought and conquered, they have eminently displayed the virtues, and sustained the character of the British soldier.

To the Native troops of the Honourable East India Company, who have so often successfully emulated their European comrades in arms, the highest meed of approbation and applause is not more cheerfully accorded than it has been honorably won. The Madras Sepoy Regiments, destined for the expedition to Ava, obeyed with admirable alacrity and zeal, the call for their services in a foreign land, involving to them many heavy sacrifices and privations. This devotion to their government reflects the highest credit on the character of the Coast army, not more honourable to themselves, than it is doubtless gratifying to the Government of Fort St. George, as affording unequivocal proof of the sentiments of gratitude and attachment with which that army acknowledges the paternal anxiety and care that ever watches over and consults its best interests and welfare. The detachments of the Bengal Native troops employed in Ava, consisting of a portion of the Governor General's Body Guard, commanded by Captain Sneyd, and details of Native Artillery, have been animated throughout by the noblest spirit of gallantry and zeal; the former, more especially, are, in a peculiar degree, entitled to the warmest thanks of the Supreme Government for their voluntary offer of service beyond sea, and for their distinguished conduct in the field, under their Native as well as their European officers.

The conduct of that portion of the Naval branch of the expedition which belongs to the East India Company, has been exemplary and conspicuous for gallantry and indefatigable exertion, and it has fully shared in all the honourable toils and well-earned triumphs of the land force. The Governor General in Council experiences the most sensible gratification in offering to Commodore Hayes, to Captain Hardy, Senior Captain of the Bombay Marine, and to the several Commanders and Officers of the Bombay Cruizers, which have been employed in the Irrawaddy, and to the Officers in command of the armed brigs and divisions of gun-boats, the cordial thanks of Government for their zealous and meritorious services. Although not commanding in person the Honourable Company's Naval Force in the Irrawaddy, Commodore Hayes has amply entitled himself to the special notice and consideration of government on this occasion, since it was mainly owing to his professional and unremitting exertions, that the Armed Flotilla from this port was so efficiently equipped, and thus enabled to acquit itself in a manner which has repeatedly been honoured with the approbation of his Excellency the Naval Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Squadron in the East Indies, and the officers of the Royal Navy, under whose orders they have been employed, in conjunction with the armed boats of His Majesty's ships. The Governor General in Council has not overlooked the spirit and bravery characteristic of British seamen, manifested by several of the masters and officers of transports and armed vessels in various actions with the Burmese in the vicinity of Rangoon.

It belongs to a higher authority than the Government of India to notice, in adequate and appropriate terms, the services of His Majesty's Squadron, which has co-operated with His Majesty's and the Honourable East India Company's Land Forces, in the late hostilities with the government of Ava. The Governor General in Council, however, gladly seizes this opportunity of expressing the deep sense of obligation, with which the Supreme Government acknowledges the important and essential aid afforded by his Excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane, in person, as well as by the officers, non-commissioned officers, seamen and marines of His Majesty's ships, which have been employed in the Irrawaddy. Inspired by the most ardent zeal for the honour and interest of the nation and the East India Company, his Excellency, the Naval Commander in Chief, lost no time in proceeding with the boats of the *Boadicea* to the Head-Quarters of the British army at Prome, and directing, in person, the operations of the river force, rendered the most essential service in the various decisive



decisive and memorable actions which, in the month of December last, compelled the Burmese Chiefs to sue for peace.

But, while recording his gratitude to those who have partaken of, and survived this arduous contest, the Governor General in Council must also advert to the early and deep regret occasioned by the death of Commodore Grant, under whose personal direction the ships of the expedition first proceeded against Rangoon. The heartfelt satisfaction arising from the success of the British arms in the Burman dominions, must now also be tempered with feelings of sorrow for the loss of the many brave officers and men who have fallen in the course of the war. Their memory will ever be associated with the heroic deeds and splendid triumphs of the British army in Ava, and will be regarded with affection and respect by their Sovereign and their country.

In testimony of the brilliant services achieved by the army under the command of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, the Governor General in Council is pleased to resolve, that all the corps, European and Native, in the service of the Honorable the East India Company, who have been employed in the Burman country, including the corps which were detached by that officer from his more immediate command, for the conquest of the enemy's possessions of Cheduba, Negrais and Bassein on the one side, and Martaban, Ye, Tavoy and Mergui on the other, shall bear on their regimental colors the word "Ava," with the words Rangoon, Donabew, Prome, Melloon and Pagahm, as they may have been respectively present at one or more of the actions at these places. With respect to the King's Regiments, the Governor General in Council will recommend to His Majesty, through the proper channel, to grant the same distinction to them. Medals also, bearing a suitable device, are to be distributed to all the troops, which at any period during the war were employed under the command of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, including the officers and men of the Flotilla and gun-boats serving in the Irrawaddy.

The Governor General in Council cannot conclude these General Orders, expressive of his high approbation of the merits and services of the army, under Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, without intimating, at the same time, his entire satisfaction with the conduct of the two divisions of British troops, intended to penetrate into Ava from our north-eastern and south-eastern frontiers, and also of the British force employed in the expulsion of the enemy from the country of Assam.

The latter service, namely, the conquest of Assam, was achieved by the force under Lieutenant-Colonel A. Richards, with the most complete success, the capital, Rungpore, having surrendered on terms, and the Burmese troops having been entirely expelled from that country.

On the side of Cachar, physical difficulties of an insurmountable nature having arrested, at its very outset, the progress of the army under Brigadier General Shuldham, no opportunity was afforded to that army of displaying those qualities of courage, perseverance, and zeal, which the Governor General in Council is satisfied it possessed, in common with its more fortunate brethren in Ava.

Similar and no less serious impediments ultimately opposed the advance of the fine army under Brigadier General Morrison, over the mountains of Arracan, into the valley of the Irrawaddy; but the capture, by the detachment under Brigadier W. Richards, of the fort and heights of the capital of Arracan, afforded an earnest of what would have been effected, had opportunities offered, by the judgment, prudence, and skill of the commander and officers of that division, and by the valor, zeal, and intrepidity of the troops of which it was composed. The Governor General in Council deeply laments the general sickness which attacked, and utterly disabled for further effective service, the south-eastern division of the army, and the loss of many brave officers and men, who fell victims to the noxious climate of Arracan.

In testimony of the high sense entertained by Government of the services of the troops, by whom the provinces of Assam and Arracan were conquered, the Governor General in Council is pleased to order, that the several Native Corps who were employed in those countries, shall respectively bear on their colors, the words Assam and Arracan, as the case may be, and His Majesty will be solicited to grant to the 44th and 54th Regiments the same distinction. In further proof of the approbation with which the Government regards the meritorious conduct of its Native troops, serving in foreign countries, medals, with an appropriate device, shall be presented to the troops which assisted at the conquest of Assam and Arracan.

*No. 172.—From the Government Gazette of the 6th April, 1826.*

The following particulars regarding the conclusion of peace, with the Burman kingdom, were issued in our *Extra Gazette* of yesterday forenoon.

At a late hour on Tuesday night, the *Enterprise* reached Calcutta, having on board His Excellency Sir Archibald Campbell, Mr. Robertson, and Mr. Mangles, the return of whom to Calcutta, is the consequence of the conclusion of peace with the Burmese. The public dispatches, announcing the ratification of the



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treaty, were forwarded by Colonel Tidy, and Captain Snodgrass, on board the *Alligator*, which left Rangoon a week before the *Enterprise* arrived there, and may be therefore hourly expected.

The *Arachne* sailed at the same time from Madras. We have been favoured with the following particulars of this important and satisfactory event.

After leaving Pagahm Mew, Sir Archibald Campbell was met by repeated messengers from the King, offering terms short of those which had been demanded, which offers were, of course, rejected. At last, however, when the army was within four days march of the capital, Mr. Price again made his appearance, bringing with him the treaty ratified by the King, and paid down the stipulated sum of twenty-five lacs, the remainder to be paid in the manner previously determined. The prisoners were delivered up; and amongst them was Mr. Gouger. In addition to the southern provinces, or Ye, Tavai, and Mergui, we are to retain Martaban, to the east of the Sanloon or Martaban river. The ratification of the treaty took place in the end of February.

The troops commenced their return on the 5th of March by water, and had all arrived at Rangoon. Six European Regiments had been embarked, besides the Bengal Artillery, when the *Enterprise* left. Some of the transports with His Majesty's 13th, 38th, and 41st Regiments, had sailed, and it was expected that the whole would be withdrawn by the middle of May.

Since writing the above, we have been favored with the following additional details:

The treaty was confirmed on the 24th February.

The treasure, consisting of Rupees, and gold and silver bars, is on board the *Alligator*.

A party from camp paid a visit to the capital, and were received by the King with every honor.

Mr. Crawford had gone to Martaban in the *Diana* steam vessel.

A Battalion, with all the elephants, and attended by two Burmese chiefs, had proceeded from Sembewhewn to Aracan, via Aen. The road is now acknowledged to be a very good one.

Another Detachment had proceeded from Prome to Sandoway.

The following is the distribution of the British force in Ava. The garrison of Rangoon is to be formed of the Head-Quarters of His Majesty 45th Regiment, the 9th Native Infantry, two Squadrons of Madras Cavalry, and details of Native Infantry corps.

The force to be sent to Martaban, and the provinces east from thence, will consist of the 1st, 32d, and 46th Regiments of Madras Native Infantry, with a Detachment of Madras Artillery.

His Majesty's 13th, 38th and 47th Foot, with the Horse and Foot Artillery, and Engineer Department, embark for Bengal. His Majesty's Royal, 41st, and 89th Regiments, with native sick and convalescents, for Madras. The land column from Yandaboo, comprises His Majesty 87th Regiment, a Detachment of the Body Guard and Horse Artillery, the 26th, 28th, 38th, and 43d Regiments of Native Infantry and Pioneers. The Detachment on route to Arracan, consists of the 18th Native Infantry, with Lieutenants Trant and Bissett, of the Quarter Master General's Department, and that on route from Prome, of a Detachment of Horse Artillery and Body Guard, the 32d Native Infantry and Pioneers. A small division at Prome will leave as soon as the Commissariat Stores have been embarked. In Pegu, Colonel Pepper remains with a Detachment of His Majesty's 45th, and the 1st European Regiment, with the 1st, 3d, 34th, and part of the 12th Madras Native Infantry, and Madras Artillery.

The 13th Regiment was embarked on the *Almorah* and *Aurora*, which sailed on the 26th and 28th March; the 38th on the *David Clark* and *Felicitas*, on the 24th and 28th; and 41st on the *Hamayun Shah* and *Golconda*, on the 28th and 29th. The *Carron*, *East Indian*, *Macauley*, and *Sulimani*, were preparing for the 47th and 48th, and would leave in a few days.

Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., landed from the *Enterprise*, yesterday forenoon, under the usual salute from the ramparts of Fort William, due to his rank.

No. 173. (A)—From the Government Gazette of the 13th April, 1826.

For the following interesting and satisfactory statement of several circumstances connected with the late negotiations, we are indebted, as will be seen, to an intelligent and close observer, and an eye-witness of the occurrences he describes. We think his account throws much light on the extent to which the Burmese were sincere in their wishes for peace, and suggests the necessity of our understanding the feelings and notions of a people before we pass sentence upon their acts.

“The death of Bundoolah—the successive defeat of all their armies—the advance of the British towards Prome, and the consequent retreat of the Prince of Tharawottee, had made the Burmans heartily sick of a war which

which they had entered upon with such spirit, and they began to listen to the eloquent advice, the incessant pleading of Mr. Judson, to enter upon a treaty of peace. Soldiers were, at first, easily hired at sixty or seventy rupees, but at length, twice the sum was not accepted, and finally one hundred and seventy rupees a man was demanded. The enormous expense thus incurred, the impoverished state of both public and private funds, and the entire want of success, induced at least a general wish, both on the part of the King and people, for peace. So that the proposal of Sir Archibald Campbell to enter upon terms, as they fondly though foolishly supposed, of equal terms of accommodation, excited a sensation of public joy, throughout the capital and country, manifested in a manner, too plain to be misunderstood, or to allow the least suspicion of insincerity. Tables, chairs, plates, knives, forks, fowls, beef, pork, and every article, thought necessary to the accommodation of the European Commissioners, were sent down to the Burman camp. And the populace, fondly hoped, and as confidently reported, that the war was already concluded. Having no idea of any thing besides exterminating war, or terms of mutual friendship, it is not to be wondered at, that the Burman Commissioners were utterly unprepared for the hard conditions (as it seemed to them) of becoming friends to a nation, and at the same time obliged to conform to what appeared necessary to continue their enmity. A clear war, or a clear peace, was all they were able to comprehend or submit to. As the latter was now out of the question, the former was unanimously adopted. But repeated defeats obliged the Generals at Meloon, to do what they conceived their united advice to the King would induce him to sanction. A message was sent to the British Commissioners—the negotiation renewed—the articles of the treaty agreed to, and as I was well informed, a fair copy of the Burman sent up in a case to His Majesty, not with the signatures—lest the heads, or at least the hands of the unauthorized generals, should be the forfeit. The tumultuous joy occasioned by this document, accompanied by the assurance that all was now settled, was echoed and re-echoed through all the streets of the capital. Five white soldiers were sent down, together with money to pay the first instalment; but the insidious advice of the Gooroo occasioned a distrust of the British Commissioners, and finally, the government rather inclined to the side of war. The treaty was not ratified—a balance of opinions, a kind of stagnation took place in the council, of which the Pagahm General Zayyah-thoo-yan took advantage, and obtained His Majesty's order, for sixteen thousand men to be paid by a *loan* raised by forcing every man of property to make over a moiety of his effects to the King: so much distress was occasioned by this course of arbitrary proceeding, and by the consequent devastating march of this foul fiend, assisted not a little by the punctual and effectual lesson at Meloon; that the clamor for peace became now universal. The savage commander who had just marched, was already given over to his fate by every reflecting person; and a negotiation again opened with a faint hope, that a messenger selected from among the prisoners would be able to soften down the terms urged by the threat of the worst treatment if he failed. The honourable return of the Doctor, (Sandford) according to his parole given, and the terms being neither increased nor diminished, operated like a charm. They seemed now convinced that all hope was to be given up of ever obtaining any remission of the conditions once laid down, on the word of a Briton. Some new ideas about good faith were now evidently imprinted in an indelible manner on their minds. The treaty was ordered to be ratified in the secret council chamber. I saw the ceremony, and heard the opinions expressed on the occasion—which was to me completely satisfactory. I saw the war—the ever-to-be-(by me, and my fellow-sufferers,) remembered war between Bengal and Burmah, was arrived at a termination, honourable to the Company, and evidently satisfactory to the Burmese. It is unnecessary to add any thing further respecting the difficulty encountered before these same impressions could be made on the minds of the British Commissioners, so as to stop their rapid advance towards Ava. The subsequent repeated messages terminating so happily and honourably for both parties in the treaty of peace at Yandaboo, and all its attending circumstances, have been long before the public. I will only add (with some surprise for the necessity of so doing) that Amarapoora was deserted by the Court in 1825, and that Ava is now the flourishing populous capital of the Burman (not the Ava) empire.

No. 178. (B)—*Extract from the Government Gazette of the 13th April, 1826.*

We have been favoured with the following Journal of the Proceedings of the Deputation to the Court of Ava:—

February 26th.—Set off about five A. M. from Yandaboo. Meet, after day light, an officer bringing down a communication from the Burman Chiefs at Yeppadine, to the English camp. Another, who was passing down, asks, "is the weighing of the money finished." Meet the advance of the boats coming down for the transport of our troops. Bring up opposite our own advance post, for breakfast, about eight. The Lamine Zaray,\* who was in the boat with us, asked this morning for a list of the presents. He asked also, if the

\* Or Secretary of the district of Lamine.

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gilt chair (Captain Lumsden's,) had come from the ship country,\* and if it had not been taken at Mellone. The May-mya-boo lost a fine gilt chair there.

28<sup>th</sup>.—After getting on but slowly, stopped for dinner about five o'clock. Went on again for some time, and there the boatmen and passengers lay down to sleep; after the moon rose, we again proceeded with our journey. Yesterday, 27<sup>th</sup>, we continued to advance at the same slow rate, and did not arrive at Yeppadine till about four p. m. Whilst coming up, Lamine Zaray told me that a Wone-dowk, at our camp, had instructions to ask to purchase from us, for the King, a large English boat, a gun, and a shell. When remonstrating with him respecting the slowness of our progress, he replied, "and yet you may remember how quickly you expected us to communicate with the capital from Mellone." We heard that Mr. Price, proceeding towards our camp, had passed us in the night. When approaching pretty near to Yeppadine, before noon, Maha Silwa joined us; breakfasted with us, and then preceded us in his lighter boat to Yeppadine. On arrival at this place, we find that there is a small house prepared for our reception; and an invitation is given us from the chiefs there, to land and take some refreshment; after waiting half an hour, the Atwane Wone came to visit us; and upon the consideration that Mr. Price was now in our rear; and also, that the Atwane Wone appeared anxious we should not hurry on in advance; coupled with this, that he could, without seeming to do it, quite easily prevent our going on, we settled to remain for the present, and not attempt proceeding, until the moon should be well up. The Atwane Wone also said, he would come down and dine with us, at the time (after sun-set,) which we appointed. Before we sat down to dinner, Mr. Price's boat was heard coming up the river, towards the ghaut we landed at. After we had dined, he came in with the Atwane Wone, and took his dinner also; and there was a good deal of desultory conversation kept up amongst us. Just before the meeting broke up, he acquainted us, that "he had an interview with the King and Queen the day before in the morning; that great alarm prevailed on account of our deputation; that the Queen fell into hysterics, and that the King, on seeing him, had called out, "Oh Price, save me!" that this was caused by a false idea of the object of the deputation, it being said, that the chief of our flying artillery was coming up, that we were spying out the road; and that, under the guise of a present to the King, one of the articles we were bringing was a musket, so contrived as to explode without gun-powder; besides which, the King was vexed at the prospect of being exposed to the visits (or intrusion) of strangers after his misfortunes." Mr. Price went on to say, that he had in his possession an order from the general for our return, on account of the state of affairs as above related; but, that being exceedingly anxious, that the progress towards a thorough pacification, already so well begun and happily advanced, should not be interrupted, he would take upon himself to withhold this document, for the present, as by his making another visit to the capital, he hoped we should be enabled to proceed on our course, as originally intended, without there being any necessity for delivering the same. The party broke up about ten o'clock, and Mr. Price and the Atwane Wone retired together. The above-mentioned communication made by Mr. Price, although the Atwane Wone was present, was not at that time interpreted to him.

We do not know the period at which Mr. Price set off for the capital; but he told us, that we might expect him on the morrow, at the latest about three p. m.

We remained in perfect uncertainty, as to what we should think of the matter, until next day at noon, when Mr. Price walked in, and told us, that every thing was settled in a favorable point of view, and that we had nothing to do now, but proceed at once, a faster boat having been ordered, and just ready for us. He said, that he had come down the stream with considerable speed; as he had kept General Campbell's watch in his hand, and urged the boat-men to exert themselves, by pointing out the lapse of time. We re-embarked about two p. m.; the Raywone and Laurine Zaray accompanying us as before, the former in a gilt boat.

We arrived at Kyouk-to-lown; a little before sun-set; and at this juncture, the people were so anxious to proceed with us, that it was not without some remonstrance (all in good temper, however,) that we obtained time to procure a biscuit and glass of wine from a boat a little in rear of us, and to make use of this refreshment. We heard from Mr. Price, but I forget at what particular period, that we had at first been placed in a heavy boat, in order that our advance should not be inconveniently quick. It was about eleven p. m., when we came to a halt, and we found ourselves then abreast of a chokey, which I supposed to be a little way up the river face of Ava. We remained there some little time, but tired of the boat, and not seeing any appearance of our being invited ashore, we got out of the boat, and drew near to a watchfire on the bank. This evidently made the people in charge of us, determine to let us proceed to the place of our ultimate destination; so having got us into the boat, they proceeded with us, for the space of, perhaps, nearly a mile. We reached a temporary landing place, and went ashore, when we met some officers of government, who accompanied us up into the fort, and to the chief, who was to be our entertainer; the Commandant of the North-gate, or Division. Here

\* As they often denominate ours.



Here we had supper ready for us, and prepared after our own style, which our host was, perhaps, enabled to appreciate as the best, from his acquaintance with Mr. Judson; to whose family, and to himself, he had been a kind friend. At the landing place, a person calling himself John Lavendiere, introduced himself as Interpreter. He spoke tolerably good English, with considerable volubility; and, as his name partly implies, he also speaks French: he dresses in the Burman fashion; and it appears, that he was born and brought up at Calcutta. He asked me, on the way up, if General Campbell had returned from Yan-da-boh with his army. I replied, certainly not, that the General had been promised a sufficiency of boats, to convey his army down the river, that this promise had not yet been redeemed to the full extent, and that, consequently, the army remained in its position. "Ah," said he, "what lies these people tell! they reported here, that the boats had been supplied." Mr. Price supped with us. We heard that the change of feeling, or of purpose in the palace, had been altogether extreme; for the King had expressed a strong desire to have us introduced to him on *that* night; and the intention was only dropped on Mr. Price's assurance, that an interview of this kind would be unbecoming to both parties.

We were in readiness about nine o'clock next morning, (1st of March,) for the promised interview with the King; but eleven o'clock came, without bringing us any summons to repair to court. In the mean time, the question, whether we should take in our swords, was warmly agitated. On the one side it was declared, that to take into the palace weapons of war, was a thing altogether at variance with established custom; to which it was replied, that the sword was merely a part of an officer's dress. The Burman then said, that, "whilst in the Burman country, it would be no more than right for us to conform to the Burman custom; to which Mr. Price answered, that in that case, we ought to clothe ourselves in Passoes, or Burman waist-cloths. The point, however, was given up, on our part, as not worth prolonged discussion. About eleven o'clock, we had a summons to proceed to the Raundaw; but, just as we reached the head of the stairs, to go down to the street, word was brought us, that the King had lain down to sleep. We were therefore recommended to stay at home for the present, which would be better than to proceed to the Raundaw, and be inconvenienced by waiting there in the heat for a considerable time; we accordingly returned.—About 3 o'clock, or after, we had a second summons; and then a second discussion began as to the place at which we should take off our shoes. We proposed to throw them off, at the bottom of the steps of the palace, according to a mode of proceeding that we had before partly agreed upon amongst ourselves to adopt; from the opinion expressed in camp by Mr. Judson, as to what it would be right to do, and from what Mr. Price had said was his own ordinary custom; but the Burman said, that this being a particular occasion, it was proper that we should throw off our shoes at the gate, the place when we might come into the view of the King.—This was positively refused. The Burman retired, and came back after a short interval, saying, that we might approach in the manner ourselves proposed. We reached the Raundaw, which was not distant, about four o'clock; and remained there till near five. The Raundaw is nearly opposite the eastern gate of the palace; and near it are several houses of the common kind we saw in Ava, which are used as prisons. Whilst sitting in the Raundaw, \*Maun-kan-yay, who had been employed so much about us, examined Captain Lumsden's dress cartouch-box with much attention; and more, as I thought, to discover if it contained gun-powder, than from mere curiosity. At length we were acquainted that it was time to enter the palace; we therefore left the Raundaw, preceded, as before, by the presents from the British Commissioners. These were prostrated before the gate, and we made a bow. Came within the palace-yard, and had to enter two or three more gates in the same manner. There were a good many men armed with muskets, and several pieces of ordnance drawn out in display. We ascended the steps of the hall of audience, at the northern extremity, and came in sight of one of the bands, the music of which we had heard as we advanced. We proceeded along the hall, and were directed to sit down in the corner of the open space in front of the throne, at the left side of it, and at the furthest extremity of the part allotted for people to sit in. After some little time, they brought us in betel, pickled tea, and garlic, in vessels of cut glass and gold; with a guglet of cool water, covered with a gold cup. To be entertained in this manner, is esteemed a mark of particular favour. The King made his appearance; and a person then read over a list of the presents offered to his Majesty. Before coming to the palace, we had been asked if it would be agreeable to us to receive a title from the King; which having been answered in the affirmative, they, at this time, proceeded to read the titles conferred, and to invest us with them, by binding on the forehead of each a piece of gold, or gilt leaf, on which the words composing it were written. We were also each presented with a ruby ring, a piece of silk cloth, two boxes and two cups. It was then asked if we had any request to prefer; to which Captain Lumsden replied, that as peace had been happily restored between the two great nations, it was to be hoped that it might remain firm; or

words

\* A Than-daw-tsane, or deliverer of the royal word.

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words of this kind. The King then withdrew, and after some time, we also retired. Immediately after his Majesty had gone, a murmur of voices, in an under tone, suppressed during his presence, arose throughout the hall. On the way home, I spoke to the Raywone, who was walking by my side, respecting the six Bramin sepoy who had been released, one of whom had found his way to us before we set off for the palace. He asked if I had met them; but though I was able to say I had seen one, and that I knew the others were at no great distance, nothing decided was done at that time.—On the day following, they still held off from accomplishing any thing toward the release of these men, until Captain Lumsden wrote a strong remonstrance, which they threatened to shew to the British Commissioners, unless these prisoners should be delivered up; and on this they were, at length, produced on the evening of the 2nd. A Hindoostanee woman who had been captured, and kept, I believe, as a slave to the wife of some officer, contrived to come to the house where we were lodged, and begged, with much earnestness, that her case might be considered. She also was brought away along with us. It may be mentioned, that Maun-Kan-yay, when once roused to exertion about the prisoners, did not give up the question until it was quite settled; and especially he was very particular in his inquiries, to know if the woman had actually been released; probably because she was not present at the time. But the Burmans are exceedingly minute in many points of arrangement. The same man would not be satisfied with Captain Lumsden's assurance and my own, that he had given, and I had received, the only ring intended for Mr. Robertson, but obliged me to go and produce it from the place where I had it locked up. In like manner, when we were going away, every box and bundle that we had, was noted down in a list and this list consulted after our arrival in camp.

It was appointed for us to go off on the morning of the 3d; and we had thus an opportunity, as we did not set out till after sun-rise, of viewing the approach to the city: a gratification that we had not experienced on our arrival.—Near the place at which we embarked, lay the King's splendid state barge, gilt and ornamented in a very beautiful manner. There were also some gilt war-boats of the common kind. The Mycet-gnay,\* (or small river, as compared with the Irrawuddee), is about half the size of the larger stream above the junction. Its water is said to be very fine, pure and wholesome, whilst that of the great river is reckoned unhealthy. The course of the river took us in a circuit to the left, and at the tongue of land, formed by a junction of the two streams, we observed an unfinished battery, which it is probable they had been working at almost up to the time at which we saw it. At Tseejine, on the right bank of the river, we observed the first brick and mortar house that we saw up here; now intended for the British Resident, and lately the property of Mr. Price. Lower down, on the left bank, we perceived another, the property of Mr. Lansago. We had a fine view of the wall of the city, with its antique-looking close-set battlements. At the north-western portion of the river face, some defences in wood were observed. On passing this quarter, we judged that the Pyadthad, or regal spire, and consequently the palace was much nearer to the opposite side of the city, than to the side next us. We stopped to breakfast at Kyouk-talown, † twelve miles from Ava. When we came abreast of Yeppadine, the chiefs there were very anxious that we should come ashore, saying, that they themselves were going down to our camp, and that we might all go together. As, however, we were desirous to reach that point before it should be late, we declined waiting, and urged our boat-men to proceed. A short time before sun-set the Thandaw-tsane-mane overtook us, and pressed us very much to delay our progress, until the chiefs should come up. Failing in this, he called to our men to row slowly, but here he was frustrated also. It was as well that we did not consent to wait, for, with all the exertions made, we did not reach camp till half-past seven. The chiefs arrived there next morning. In excuse for this rather impudent proceeding of Mawu-kan-yay, in directing our boat-men to row slowly, I would say, that it was not with any uncivil intention; but with the idea, that he should be thereby helping to prevent some dissatisfaction on the part of the British Commissioners, if he and his coadjutors could induce us to soften down the circumstances regarding the six sepoy who had been detained; and whatever else unplesing there might be known to us, about the boats and men, &c. &c. as yet deficient. And also, that he and they wished to ascertain if we were satisfied with the treatment we had met with, and the honors conferred upon us, for on these points, I believe, they had a good deal of anxiety.

It remains to mention a few circumstances that presented themselves as worthy of remark, in the course of this deputation.

That the King's palace should be found an object of splendor, might easily have been anticipated, but it might less easily have been supposed that it should unite with this quality, chasteness of design in the structure, and taste and elegance in the ornamental part; with an arrangement of ceremonial, that accorded admirably with the rest. From the Rawndaw, we had an earnest of what might be expected within the walls, by a view

\* Called Douwtwuddee.

† Or "One Stone," which well describes the place.

of the Pyadthad, or regal spire above the throne, in all its richness of gilding and delicacy of form; the latter giving the idea of a series of small roofs, succeeding each other in decreasing magnitude, until the whole was surmounted by a handsome Tee. The well-constructed wall and gates, around the palace, shewed that the person of the Monarch was secure against all intrusion; which, beside its importance as a state affair, might not be superfluous in a city, whose population, though most likely overrated, is reckoned at a million; and where also it is found necessary to draw ropes across the streets at night, to assist in preventing robberies; any one passing the streets, after a certain hour, if unable to give a satisfactory account of himself and business, must be content to undergo confinement till morning. On entering entirely within the gates, the colonnade of the hall of audience, and that of the grand council chamber, make a magnificent appearance. The melody and softness of the music, kept time to by the quaint yet graceful attitudes of a female dancer close by; the white and commodious dresses of the courtiers, and the airiness of the building, both suiting so well to the climate they were in; lastly, the approach of the Sovereign, announced by a pleasing chant: these, altogether, formed a spectacle at once beautiful and new. On the throwing back of the open-work doors behind the throne, the King drew near, ascended the steps, and took his seat on a cushion. He was clothed in a white jacket and turban, and a silk Passow, or waist-cloth, with a number of small gold chains attached to a breast-plate in front, and carried over the shoulders and beneath the arms to the back. The opening of the doors, displayed the paneled and gilded wall of a chamber in the rear. The situation we were in, was not favorable for studying his Majesty's countenance, for we were distant thirty or forty paces, and the way the light was cast, also made against us. I would say, judging from every thing, that he appeared as if he was performing a duty that was indispensable and irksome, but which he was, nevertheless, determined should be done in a becoming manner.

We understand that Mr. Leansago was at our entertainer's house a little before we arrived there; but that, in consequence of an order to that effect, no Europeans were allowed to appear there after it.

The day after our arrival, the house we lived in was crowded to excess, with people desirous of seeing the strangers; our appearance, customs, and dress exciting curiosity among them. On the second, our host had lost all patience with the populace, and, in consequence, some of the intruders felt the discipline of the bamboo. Our worthy entertainer appeared desirous of being deputed officially to accompany the English; or probably that he might be sent to Calcutta, as the Envoy from the Burman Court; for he dropped some hint that seemed to tend that way. He considered himself as Mr. Judson's patron; and another officer, keeper of the wardrobe, stood in the same relation to Mr. Price: I heard him asking the latter, "if we were acquainted with this?"—Mr. Price told me that he had heard his patron, I think on the day of the audience, making a report to Mane Tha Gyece, the King's brother-in-law, that seven carts of the treasure which had been sent off for safety, had stopped, and were about returning towards Ava.

In conclusion, I must say of the capital, at least what we saw of it, that we found it to be a well-built town, and kept in good order.

No. 174.—*Depositions taken at Rangoon, before John Crawford, Esq., Civil Commissioner in Ava and Pegu.*

(A)—*Deposition of Henry Gouger, Esq.*

Q. What is your name, and of what country are you a native?

A. My name is Henry Gouger, I am a native of London.

Q. How long have you resided in the Burman dominions?

A. I arrived at Rangoon in the year 1822, to the best of my recollection in the month of June. I have resided in the Burman dominions ever since, with the exception of two short visits to Calcutta, of about two months each.

Q. How have you been employed during your residence in the Burman dominions?

A. As a merchant and agent.

Q. Did you reside any time at the Burman capital?

A. Yes, in all about two years and a half, including my period of imprisonment, (twenty months.)

Q. Had you, during that time, any intercourse with any of the members of the Royal family, or any of the principal officers of government?

A. Yes, I had considerable intercourse.

Q. Who were the individuals of rank with whom you had most intercourse?

A. His Majesty the King, the Prince of Sarrawaddi, his brother, and several of the Woonghees and Attawuns.

Q. How long were you in Ava before the late war, between the British and the Burmese, broke out?

A. About



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A. About seven months before the capture of Rangoon by the British.

Q. During that period did you observe any hostile preparations making by the Burmese government ?

A. Yes, I saw troops levied and sent off in various directions.

Q. Do you know against what object the march of these troops was directed ?

A. Three armies marched from Ava during the time I have alluded to—viz. one under Bandoola, one under Saya Woonghee, and one under Moun Kyayo. Bandoola's army marched towards Bengal, via Arracan, to make, as I was informed, certain claims upon the British government. The object held in view by the march of the other two armies, was not known to me at the time—there were various rumours on the subject.

Q. Do you recollect in what month the army of Bandoola marched from the capital ?

A. Yes, on the 1st day of January, 1824. It is in my recollection because it was New-year's day.

Q. Do you know where the army of Bandoola rendezvoused ?

A. I believe at Sembewghewn. I was told his head quarters were there for a considerable length of time.

Q. Do you know what claims Bandoola was authorized to make upon the British government ?

A. I was told they were the following : first, to demand the refugee Princes who had fled into the British dominions—second, to demand all the natives of Arracan, who had settled within the British boundary, and third, to demand certain British provinces, as far as Moorshedabad.

Q. From whom did you receive this information ?

A. The two first claims were the subjects of such general conversation, that at this distance of time, I cannot recollect where I received my information : I was told of the third by a person very high in rank, but whose name, from prudential motives, I wish to decline stating.

Q. Upon what occasion did the person of rank in question communicate this intelligence, and what was the language in which it has conveyed ?

A. It was mentioned to me during a visit I paid to him at his house. The intention, as it appeared to me, was to impress me with a high idea of the superiority of the Burmans over the British.

Q. On what pretext did the Burmans lay claim to the territories east of Moorshedabad ?

A. They claimed them as having formerly belonged to the kingdom of Arracan.

Q. Did you hear what became of the army of Bandoola which marched, as you have stated, towards Bengal ?

A. I heard of their passing the British frontier, and capturing Panwa.

Q. Did you hear of the affair at Ramoo ?

A. I heard of this affair during my imprisonment.

Q. In what terms was it mentioned to you ?

A. It was called by the Burmans, a glorious victory gained by Bandoola.

Q. During your residence at the court, have you ever observed any disposition on the part of the officers of government to enter into a war with the British ?

A. Yes, I have frequently heard such sentiments expressed by several officers under government, particularly by the late Saya Woonghee.

Q. Do you recollect any particular occasion on which this officer expressed his sentiments on the subject ?

A. Yes, one occasion particularly, when I took him a Calcutta Newspaper containing a conciliatory paragraph respecting the dispute, concerning the island of Shapuree, or Shemabew.

Q. What did he say upon the subject ?

A. At the time alluded to, I was not well versed in the Burman language, but what was said by the Saya Woonghee, was afterwards explained to me by an European gentleman who accompanied me, and who understood it perfectly. The expressions he used were to this effect, as far as my memory serves me—that the Newspaper paragraph alluded to was a proof of the timidity of the English, that he was of opinion, the Burmans were much superior to the British in military prowess, and that unless every demand made upon the latter were yielded, war would certainly ensue.

Q. Do you know what became of the army of the Saya Woonghee, to which, in a former part of your deposition, you have alluded ?

A. The army, as I was informed, marched to Cassay, where it suffered dreadfully from sickness. The Saya Woonghee himself, an old man, fell a sacrifice to the climate—on his death the command devolved on his Chekay-moun-yeet, an Attawun, and shortly afterwards dispersed. A small part of it returned to Ava under his command, and, as I was informed, without having seen the face of an enemy.

Q. What, according to your opinion, led to the late war between the British and Burman governments ?

A. In my opinion, it may be attributed primarily to a desire, on the part of the Burman court, to try its strength with the British. The counsels of Bandoola, on his return from the conquest of Assam to the capital, about

about the month of December 1822, hastened the event, and I believe it is chiefly owing to his advice, that the war was so soon determined upon.

Q. What opinion did the Burman court entertain of the military character of the British nation and power in India, previous to the war?

A. The Burmans had no idea either of our numbers or strength. When I mentioned the amount of our military force, they would never believe me. They, in fact, thought themselves, in war, the most courageous and cunning people in the world; they frequently talked of their skill in stratagem. They ridiculed the idea of soldiers advancing to battle with the noise of drums and music, and exposing their whole bodies.

Q. Did you hear what was thought at court when the news arrived of the capture of Rangoon?

A. The Burmans thought the British had fallen at length into a snare, and that they were a sure prey. They were only afraid the marauders would escape before their armies could reach Rangoon. Throughout the town of Ava, there was nothing but rejoicing at the event. I was told that the King said, the arms which the English brought would be useful in his meditated conquest of Siam.

Q. Did you ever hear any person connected with the Burman government complain of any specific act of aggression on the part of the British?

A. Yes, I heard of the occupation of Shapuree by the British, imputed to us as an act of aggression.

Q. By whom did you hear this stated?

A. By several members of the Lotoo, at the time of translating the paragraph of the newspaper before alluded to, and the King, shortly after my arrival in Ava, one day desired me, when I was in his presence, to furnish him with the particulars of this affair. This, from my want of the requisite information, I had it not in my power to comply with.

Q. Are you of opinion, that the late war might have been avoided on the part of the British government by negotiation?

A. I am distinctly of opinion, that the war could not have been avoided on the part of the British government, except by concessions discreditable to its character, and injurious to its interests.

Q. What concessions do you conceive would have satisfied the Burman government?

A. I am of opinion, that yielding to all the claims I have before stated, would have satisfied the Burman Government, at least for the time, viz. the surrender of the fugitive princes, the restoration of the refugees from Arracan, and the cession of the provinces eastward of Moorshedabad.

Q. What opinion did the Burmans entertain of the British troops, during the progress of the war?

A. They acknowledged their own inferiority to the European troops, and openly confessed that they could not withstand them. They were most astounded at the impossibility of breaking their line, or arresting their advance in action.

Q. Did the moderation of the British towards their prisoners produce a favourable effect on the minds of the Burmans?

A. It had no effect upon the government that I am aware of, but it was a subject of general discourse, and theme of admiration among the common people.

Q. What, in your opinion, prevented the Burmans from negotiating during the war, when overtures of peace were made to them?

A. Chiefly the pride of the Court, which would not allow them to make any concessions. Down to a very late period they were of opinion, that no other overtures than those of perfect reciprocity would be tendered to them. Besides this, they never believed that our proposals could be sincere, to the very last moment, (indeed, on the very day of my departure,) I was asked by one of the Woodcocks, whether the British would not take the cash tendered, and afterwards march upon the capital?

Q. Do you consider the character of the Burman government to be faithless?

A. Very faithless indeed—the Burmans pride themselves upon this character.

Q. Do you conceive that the presence of a British Agent at the Court of Ava will be useful towards the protection of our commerce?

A. Yes, most certainly—heretofore, British merchants residing at Rangoon, have possessed no means of getting their grievances redressed, except by personally repairing to the Court, at an enormous loss of time, and money. Over the Viceroy's of Rangoon, there was no controul whatever, and they could proceed to acts of oppression, which they would not dare to venture upon, were a British Agent residing at the Court, who could make known to their government, any acts of injustice committed on the persons or properties of British subjects.

Q. Do you consider the presence of a Consul, or other British Agent at Rangoon, is necessary or likely to be useful?

A. Yes, I conceive such an appointment would be very useful.

Q. Have you had extensive means of gaining information, respecting the trade of the Burman dominions?

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A. Yes, I have.

Q. In what branch of the trade were you chiefly engaged?

A. I imported British cotton goods, and made returns to Calcutta, chiefly in timber.

Q. What quantity of British piece goods did you sell, from your first arrival in the Burman dominions, in June 1822, until the breaking out of the war?

A. I sold, to the best of my recollection, to the value of about 220,000 ticals of flowered silver, equal to about 275,000 sicca rupees.

Q. What quantity of teak timber did you export during the same period?

A. I exported teak timber, in all, to the extent of about five thousand and four hundred tons; of this, one or two cargoes were sent to Bombay, one to Java, and all the rest to Calcutta.

Q. What other articles did you export besides teak?

A. Chinese hortal or orpiment, Chinese raw silk, sticklac, terra japonica and horses.

Q. Are you of opinion, that the trade of piece goods, in the Burman dominions, is capable of much extension?

A. Yes, very great extension.

Q. Do you know any thing regarding the inland trade, carried on between the Burman dominions and China?

A. Yes, I made enquiry into the nature of it, and several times visited the Chinese camp, or fair, at Maday, which is distant about twelve miles from Ava, in a north-easterly direction.

Q. What articles do the Chinese import, and what do they export?

A. Their importations consist of silk, hortal, vermilion, gold, copper, quick-silver, Chinese spirits, tea, hams, dry and a few fresh fruits, fans, umbrellas, shoes and sundry wearing articles. They export little else than cotton.

Q. Is the importation of silk considerable?

A. Yes, it forms by far the largest article of import, and is very considerable. Upon enquiry at the custom house at Maday, I learnt there were two thousand seven hundred bundles of silk, which, at the rate of a tythe, had been collected as duties. This, supposing it, as I believe it was, one year's collection, would give the imports twenty-seven thousand bundles. Each bundle worth, at an average, about thirty ticals of flowered silver.

Q. Is the price reasonable and the quality good?

A. The quality is generally coarse, but the thread is round and even. It is dirty, from long land carriage, and not well crossed on the reel. It is likewise generally cased. I sent some of it to England, but have not yet received account sales.

Q. What description of tea is generally imported by the Chinese?

A. It is made up in cakes, and is of various qualities. I used to drink some of the best, and found it very palatable. It is all black tea, and bears no resemblance to the varieties exported from Canton. The result of my enquiries is, that this tea is not the produce of China, but of the Shan country, or Lao. The Burmans always informed me this was the case.

Q. Can you state the prices of the tea?

A. I cannot exactly recollect, but it is very cheap.

Q. Do you think it would answer for the European market?

A. The taste is peculiar, and I think would not, at first, at least, suit the European market. Its cheapness, however, would be a great recommendation to it.

Q. What is the quality and quantity of the cotton exported by the Chinese?

A. In quality, the cotton is short in the staple, but fine and silky. This was the character given in the Bengal market to some musters which I carried round to Calcutta. Considerable quantities are taken to our province of Dacca, yearly, by Burman boats, where I understand it fetches a higher price than ordinary Bengal cottons. Respecting the quantity, my enquiries lead me to think that it does not exceed twenty thousand bales yearly; each bale of one hundred viss, or three hundred and sixty-five pounds. This cotton is always cleaned from the seed.

Q. Do you know what is the usual price of this cotton?

A. Between fifty and sixty ticals of flowered silver per one hundred viss, or from seventeen to eighteen sicca rupees per maund.

Q. Have you any idea of the general amount in value of the whole Chinese trade?

A. Nothing beyond what can be collected from the amount of the silk and cotton, which are the principal articles of importation and exportation.

Q. What number of Chinese do you suppose composed the yearly caravan?

A. In my opinion, the number of Chinese is very small. I should think some hundreds; as far as I can recollect, one man to about thirty horses, or mules, both of which are numerous.



No. 174. (B)—*Deposition of John Laird, Esq.*Ava.  
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Q. What is your name, and of what country are you a native?

A. My name is John Laird, I was born in the town of Forfar, county of Angus, North Britain.

Q. When did you first come into the Burman dominions?

A. I came first to Rangoon in command of the Ship *Mahomed Shaw*, in March, 1820. After a stay of about one month, I returned to Bengal: I came back again to Rangoon in August or September of the same year, and have continued in the Burman country ever since, with the exception of a short absence of two months, when I visited Calcutta.

Q. How have you been employed during your residence in this country?

A. As a merchant and agent.

Q. Have you resided any time at the Burman capital?

A. I went to the Burman capital, then Amarapura, for the first time in December, 1820, and resided there, on that occasion, about three months, when I returned to Rangoon, having disposed of the goods which I took up. I visited the capital again, then Ava, in the beginning of 1823, and staid there about three months. I left Rangoon the last time, for Ava, in 1824, and did not return until released from prison by the British army.

Q. What took you to Ava upon this last occasion?

A. I was ordered up in chains by the King and Prince of Sarrawaddi.

Q. Did you go up in chains?

A. No, I paid a bribe of sixty ticals to the commander of the war boat sent from Ava to convey me, and was excused.

Q. With what offence were you charged?

A. With none whatever, that I am aware of; I was simply told that the King had called me: fifty men came to my house to put me in irons; I said, "dout put me in irons, I will make you a present." They demanded six hundred ticals, and were finally satisfied with sixty.

Q. Do you understand the Burman language?

A. I understand generally what is said, and I can speak a few words.

Q. How did you generally communicate with the native inhabitants?

A. Through interpreters, whom I always kept in my employment.

Q. Do you speak any other of the Indian languages?

A. Yes, Hindustanee and Malay.

Q. Were you agent for the Prince of Sarrawaddi?

A. Yes, and also for the late Prince of Tougo, brother to the King.

Q. Did you enjoy any privileges under the Prince?

A. Yes, I had a monopoly of the teak timber and other produce of the province of Sarrawaddi, which is the domain or estate of his Highness. The people could sell their produce to me only, as long as I gave the market price of Sarrawaddi for it.

Q. Had you a title from his Majesty the King?

A. Yes, I got one through the Prince of Sarrawaddi, to strengthen my hands as his agent.

Q. Did this title confer any power upon you?

A. Yes, a great deal, I could enforce payment of my own debts, and was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Myowun of Rangoon. I was under the authority of the Shah Bandar only, a Spanish gentleman, of the name of Lanceigo.

Q. Are you well acquainted with the Prince of Sarrawaddi?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you consider you were in his confidence.

A. As a commercial agent I was, and upon other subjects he often spoke to me familiarly.

Q. Did you ever hear his Highness express his opinion concerning a war with the British?

A. Yes, when I arrived at Ava on the 4th of March, 1824, I waited upon the Prince of Sarrawaddi. Upon that occasion his Highness asked me if I knew a Mr. Richardson, who had lately quitted Ava. I informed him that I knew this individual only as a clerk of Mr. Gouger, a British merchant, then at the capital, and afterwards imprisoned. The reason of his Highness putting this question was, that the Court, on the information of certain Mahomedan merchants, had been led to suspect Mr. Richardson to be a spy, dispatched to Bengal by Mr. Gouger, with information to the British government. His Highness then observed, "there are two chiefs of Assam and Cassay, who have run off into the British territory. Do you think the English government will deliver them up?" I said, it was contrary to the custom of the English to deliver up any person who had sought their protection. The Prince, on hearing this, said, "if they do not deliver them up, we will go to war and

and take them by force. Do you think we can beat the English?" I said no; to which the Prince replied, "see how we beat them once at Cox's Bazar. You are strong by sea, but not by land. We are skilled in making trenches and *abbatis*, which the English do not understand."—I answered, "I beseech you not to deceive yourself with this opinion, but advise his Majesty not to go to war." I added, that the English and Burmans were two great nations who had been long friends, and ought not to quarrel on account of two petty individuals like the Princes alluded to. The Prince said, "if the chiefs are not surrendered, there will be war;" and he continued to insist that they would be taken by force.

Q. Are you of opinion that the Burman Court and people generally, were anxious for a war with the English?

A. Yes, I am of opinion that, from the King to the beggar, they were hot for a war with the English. They looked upon the English as a parcel of merchants, and considered the Governor General to be of no higher rank or consequence than the Viceroy of Rangoon.

Q. What has induced you to form this opinion?

A. What I heard repeated at the Prince's levees daily, as coming from the Palace, and the opinions expressed by himself and his courtiers upon many occasions—almost daily. I judged also from the opinions expressed by Burman merchants, who were in the habit of transacting business with me.

Q. What advantage do you consider the Burmans expected to derive from a war with the English?

A. They expected to conquer Bengal, to plunder it, and extend their territories to the westward.

Q. Did you ever hear that the Burmans, before the war, were alarmed at the power of the British government in India?

A. No, I never heard so. I have always considered that the Burmans had a contempt for the British, whom they considered as merchants, who had hired a few mercenary soldiers to fight for them.

Q. Were they aware of the wealth of Calcutta and Bengal?

A. Yes, certainly. They judged of it from the reports of their own merchants who visited Calcutta, as well as by the large investments brought to Rangoon by British merchants.

Q. Do you consider that this circumstance was any inducement to a desire for war with the British?

A. Certainly.

Q. Were you ever in the presence of his Majesty the King of Ava?

A. Yes, often.

Q. On such occasions, did you ever hear any opinions expressed which led you to believe that the Court was desirous of a war with the English?

A. Yes, I remember one circumstance which struck me very forcibly, and led me to form that opinion. When I was in Ava, for the second time, in 1823, I was present at an evening levee of the King. The late Baudula, and several of his officers, who had just arrived from the conquest of Assam, were there. They had on their heads gold-wrought handkerchiefs, part of the plunder of Assam. The King took them off their heads and admired them. One of the Attawuns said to the King, "your Majesty's dominions now extend to the northern sea. There never was so great a King as your Majesty." The King smiled, and asked if, in his new acquisitions, there was any port of trade for large ships. It was answered that there was not—but that there was a considerable inland trade with Bengal by boats. The King then ordered that a proper person should be appointed Shah Bandar, for the collection of his revenues in Assam. Baudula now presented the King with two English dogs, which had been taken, and proceeded to mention what number of prisoners he had brought, as well as the hostages and presents from the native Prince whom he had left in authority. Baudula said, "I pursued the fugitives across the Burrampooter into the British territory, but as the English are on terms of friendship with your Majesty, and you derive a large revenue from their trade to Rangoon, I retired. But if your Majesty desires to have Bengal, I will conquer it for you, and will only require for this purpose the *Kulás*, or *strangers*, and not a single Burman." His Majesty smiled, but gave no reply. He was greatly pleased with what he heard during the evening, and was fidgeting about in his seat every now and then, according to his custom, when he is delighted with any thing.

Q. What *Kulás*, or strangers, do you suppose Baudula meant upon this occasion?

A. *Mahomedan and Hindu settlers* from Western India, residing at the capital, and I imagine also *Chinese*.

Q. Are these strangers numerous at the Burman capital?

A. Yes, particularly the Chinese and Cas-ayers, who I suppose form a fourth part of the whole population of the capital.

Q. What was said at Ava when news arrived of the capture of Rangoon, by the British army?

A. I heard at the levee of the Prince of Sarrawaddi, that the King had issued orders for raising an army to drive the strangers out of the country. It was said that he expressed a hope that the *Kulás* would not run away before the arrival of his army, as their fire-arms would be of great service towards the conquest

of Siam. It was the general belief that the English had come to burn and plunder the country, and carry off the inhabitants, in the manner practiced by the Burmans and Siamese towards each other on the frontier.

Q. How soon were you put in confinement after the arrival of the English at Rangoon?

A. The English were imprisoned on the 23th of May, and the Americans on the 8th of June.

Q. When you were in prison had you any opportunity of getting news of what was passing?

A. Yes, sometimes even to the capture of a sepoy's jacket.

Q. What opinion did the Burmans generally entertain of the British soldiery before the commencement of hostilities?

A. They imagined them to be a rabble, and they thought that ten thousand Burmans would beat four times the number of British troops.

Q. When did they begin to change their opinion on this subject?

A. After the capture of the seven stockades, where Thongba Woonghee, who commanded, and a Woon-dock, were killed.

Q. Did this event produce a strong impression in Ava?

A. Yes, the Court was much alarmed, but continued to assert that the English were afraid to advance from Rangoon.

Q. Whether were the Burmans most afraid of, the European or Native troops of the British army?

A. They were afraid of the European troops, and not of the Natives.

Q. What means had you of ascertaining this?

A. I ascertained it from deserters of the Burman army, who were imprisoned along with me.

Q. Are the Burmans, in your opinion, now convinced that they have been worsted by the English?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. To what do they ascribe their defeats?

A. They now acknowledge the superior courage and discipline of the British troops.

Q. Do you consider that the British trade, in the Burman dominions, is likely to receive any protection or benefit from the presence of a British Agent at the Court of Ava?

A. Yes, undoubtedly. I would return to Ava myself, as a merchant, were a British Resident appointed there.

Q. Have you had extensive means of gaining information respecting the trade of the Burman dominions?

A. Yes, very considerable means.

Q. What do you consider to be the productions of the country, either at present suited for foreign exportation, or likely to become so when the country is settled, and trade on a fair footing?

A. The following enumeration occurs to me: rice, gram, cotton, indigo, cardamoms, black pepper, aloes, sugar, salt-petre, salt, teak timber, stick-lac, kutch, or terra japonica, areca, damar, fustic, sapan wood, wood and earth oil, honey, bees' wax, ivory, with rubies and sapphires. I may add, that the following metals and minerals are found in the Burman dominions: iron, copper, lead, gold, silver, antimony, white statuary marble, limestone, and coals.

Q. What do you know respecting the teak trade?

A. I had a monopoly of the teak forests of Sarrawaddi, the principal place of produce, for one year.

Q. What do you suppose may be the annual produce of Sarrawaddi?

A. I got about seven thousand five hundred pairs of Shinbins, but, notwithstanding the monopoly, others got large quantities also.

Q. Do you know any thing of the produce of the teak forests of Laini, Prome, and Tongo?

A. No, I cannot afford any precise information respecting them.

Q. Have you ever visited the teak forests of Sarrawaddi, and what do you think of them?

A. I have. The timber is very fine, and in great quantity. It is all natural wood, the Burmans never planting.

Q. Are they capable of affording a larger annual produce than they yield at present?

A. Yes, any quantity that the market may demand.

Q. Do the forests of Sarrawaddi produce kutch?

A. Yes, in great quantity. This produce is obtained by boiling the wood of a forest tree,\* which is in plenty. It is inferior in quality to the kutch of the upper of provinces, being darker in colour.

Q. Have you ever seen any cane sugar in Ava?

A. Yes, I have seen some very fine white clayed sugar, manufactured by the Chinese of Ava. I thought the best description of it superior to Siam sugar.

Q. What

\* Mimosa Catechu.—I. C.



Q. What was the price of this sugar in the market of Ava ?

A. From thirty to thirty-six sicca rupees the one hundred vis, or three hundred and sixty-five pounds avoirdupoise.

Q. Are you of opinion that the culture of the sugar cane, and manufacture of sugar might be extended ?

A. I was told by the Chinese that nothing was wanting but a market, to enable them to produce sugar in large quantity. The Burmans prohibited the exportation.

Q. Are you of opinion that any part of the Burman territory is suited to the production of indigo ?

A. Yes, the lower parts of the country, especially the districts of Sarrawaddi and Sarwah. The soil of these is rich. I have seen indigo growing wild, and the natives cultivate a considerable quantity for home use. When the war broke out, I was on the point of establishing an indigo manufactory at a place called Tendo, in Sarrawaddi.

Q. Have you ever heard of any other person having established or proposed to establish an indigo manufactory in Pegu ?

A. Yes, Sarkies Manook, an Armenian merchant of Rangoon, established an indigo manufactory in the district of Sarwah immediately before the war, but I do not know the result.

Q. What are the principal articles of import by sea into the Burman dominions ?

A. Bengal, Madras, and British piece goods, British woollens, iron, wrought and unwrought, copper for ship-building, lead, quicksilver, borax, sulphur, gun-powder, fire arms, salt-petre, sugar, arrack, and rum, a little opium, earthen ware, Chinese and English, glass ware, cocoanuts, and betelnut.

Q. Has the trade in piece goods increased of late years ?

A. Very much, especially in British piece goods, which were not known at all to the Burmans a few years ago. The trade in Madras piece goods has declined.

Q. Do you know any thing of the trade carried on between the northern parts of the Burman dominions and China ?

A. Yes, I have made enquiry into it.

Q. Will you mention what you know respecting it ?

A. The trade is carried on at Banmo, on the Chinese frontiers, and a fair held at a place called Midai, four or five miles to the northward of Amarapura. Mahomedan and Burman merchants of Ava go to Banmo to meet the Chinese, part of whom come down to Midai in December. I have visited the fair at Midai, and think there could not have been less than four thousand Chinese there.

Q. What goods did the Chinese import ?

A. Copper, orpiment, quicksilver, vermilion, iron pans, silver, gold, rhubarb, tea, fine honey, raw silk, spirits, hams, musk, verdegriis, dry fruits, and a few fresh fruits, with some dogs and pheasants.

Q. What description of tea is it the Chinese bring ?

A. It is black tea of different qualities, made up in round cakes or balls. Some of it is of very fine flavour, and some very indifferent.

Q. Do you know of what part of China this tea is the produce ?

A. No, I do not ; but suppose it to be the production of the provinces adjacent to the Burman empire. I have made three voyages to Canton, but never saw tea of the same description there.

Q. What are the ordinary prices of this tea in Ava ?

A. When the caravan arrives the price of tea is low, but rises when it goes away. I never paid, by retail, more than one tical a vis, (three pounds sixty-five cents) for what I purchased for my own use.

Q. Do you consider this tea fit for the European market ?

A. Yes, I think the best quality is. There are much worse teas drank in Europe.

Q. For whose use is this tea imported ?

A. Chiefly for that of the Chinese residents. The Mahomedan residents also use a considerable quantity, as well as the higher classes of Burmans, all, in short, that can afford it.

Q. Are you aware that the tea plant is the production of some parts of the Burman empire ?

A. Yes, but I do not know of what part. Tea, under the name of Lepak, is consumed by all classes of Burmans, and is a great article of native trade. It is eaten in small quantities after meals, with garlic and sesamum oil, and it is customary to offer it to guests and strangers as a token of welcome.

Q. Do you know how and where salt-petre is obtained in the Burman country ?

A. Yes, I have seen it manufactured at a place called Aong-ben-le, about ten or twelve miles from Ava. The salt-petre appears as an efflorescence on the soil, which is washed and filtrated. The lye is boiled in Chinese iron pans, and the crystals form about a piece of wood inserted in the pots. The same lye affords common salt, which is separated by a process which I do not understand.

Q. Were the salt-petre grounds extensive in the vicinity of Aong-ben-le ?

A. The

A. The whole country appeared to me to be impregnated with salt-petre. It was very barren and produced nothing but a few tamarind trees and thorns. A few of the low lands, watered by a large tank, several miles long, and about two broad, afforded rice. There is another place to the southward of Ava where salt-petre is manufactured in larger quantity than at Aong-ben-le.

Q. How do the Chinese convey their goods?

A. On small horses and mules, which they do not dispose of but take back to China.

Q. What time do the Chinese take in travelling from their own country to Ava?

A. I cannot precisely say, but I have heard two months.

Q. What returns do the Chinese chiefly carry back with them?

A. The principal article is cotton, and then ivory and bees' wax, with a small quantity of British woollens, chiefly broad cloth and carpets.

Q. Have you heard what quantity of cotton is exported from Ava to China annually?

A. I have made enquiry, and seen great quantities exported. I consider the quantity cannot be less than seventy thousand Bengal bales, of three hundred pounds each.

Q. Do you know any thing of the quantity of this cotton, and whether it be cleaned or goes in the seed?

A. The greater part of it is cleaned—all that is sent on horse-back is so. The cotton of the lower provinces is of a short staple—that of the upper, long, and of a fine texture.

Q. Did you ever hear that the cotton of Pegu is sent to Chittagong and Dacca?

A. I have understood that it is, and that from it is manufactured the fine Dacca muslin.

Q. Do you know any thing of the trade carried on with the country of the Shans, or, as it is called by Europeans, the kingdom of Lao?

A. Yes, the Shans repair annually, in the dry season, to the Burman country, bringing with them stick-lac, bees' wax, a yellow dye-wood, various drugs and gums; the names of which I do not know—raw silk, lacker ware, ready-made clothes, consisting of jackets stuffed with cotton, onions and garlic, turmeric, and coarse cane-sugar in cakes. Stick-lac is the principal article. The returns are dry fish and nappi, with salt.

Q. Where are the fairs held to which these people resort?

A. The chief fair is held at a place called Plek, from six to eight miles south of Ava, on a small river which falls into the Irrawaddi, under the walls of the capital—I have been there purchasing stick-lac. The next largest fair is at the Dagon Pagoda near Rangoon. There are several minor ones along the east bank of the Irrawaddi.

Q. You have stated that you were imprisoned on the 23th of May?

A. Yes.

Q. How were you arrested?

A. I was called to the palace by a messenger who stated that the King wished to see me. When I arrived there, I was interrogated by a secretary. After the interrogatory, I was delivered into the hands of a goaler, and detained in the palace that day and following night. Next day I was interrogated by another secretary. The principal charge made against me was, that I had brought up newspapers with me when I came last from Rangoon, and did not communicate the contents to the court.

Q. What answer did you give to this charge?

A. I stated that I was forbid the court; did not understand the Burman language, and therefore had no means of communication.

Q. Had any person advised you in regard to the conduct you ought to pursue upon such an occasion?

A. Yes, the Prince of Sarrawaddi advised me to say nothing about the war, or give any information respecting the dispute about the island of Shappuri.

Q. After your second interrogatory, how were you disposed of?

A. I was kept under arrest at the palace until the 8th of June, when I was committed to the state goal, with three pair of irons, by sentence of the Lootoo.

Q. How were you treated in the palace?

A. During my stay there I was put seven times into the stocks, for not above a quarter of an hour on each occasion. I was each time released on payment of a small bribe, to extort which was the object of putting me in.

Q. Were you maltreated when sent from the palace to the state prison?

A. No, none of the prisoners were maltreated, with the exception of Dr. Judson.

Q. How were you treated in prison?

A. At first, the whole of the prisoners had one long bamboo passed between the legs over the fetters, so that one leg rested on the bamboo and the other on the platform on which we lay. We had no mats or pillows to lie on. Our food was not allowed to be brought into the goal to us, by our servants, without paying a bribe at the door. The head goaler informed us, that we might be released from this state by paying, among

us, to the best of my recollection, between two thousand and three thousand ticals. There were nine of us. We refused to pay so large a sum, and a smaller one was taken. As far as I can remember, Messrs. Judson and Price paid one hundred ticals each. Mr. Gouger for himself, and two persons imprisoned along with him, two hundred and fifty ticals. The Prince of Sarrawadi promised to pay two hundred ticals for me, but did not pay them, for I was, a second time, put in close confinement, after the Prince had quitted Ava to take command of the army, and told it was on this account

Q. Were the prisoners ever prevented from holding intercourse with each other?

A. Yes, we were at one time put in separate cells, and prohibited from speaking to each other. Indeed, we were generally prohibited conversing with each other, and for the three first months rigidly so.

Q. Were you supplied with food and clothes by the government while in prison?

A. No, with not a particle of either. We were even obliged to pay half a tical a month for permission to our servants to come in with our food, besides other occasional exactions—it is not the custom to feed any description of prisoners. The sepoj prisoners of the British army, were, contrary to custom, ordered to be fed by the King, but the goalers plundered them of the greatest part of what was ordered.

Q. How long were you imprisoned in Ava?

A. Somewhat more than eleven months.

Q. Where were you sent after being taken out of goal in Ava?

A. First to Amerapura, where we staid one day, and then to Aong-ben-le, ten or twelve miles from Ava.

Q. Were you maltreated when conveyed from Ava to Aong-ben-le?

A. Yes, we were stripped of all our clothes, except a pair of trousers and a shirt. A rope was tied round our waists, and we were bound two and two. A keeper, who had a rope two or three fathoms long, fixed to each prisoner, drove us along, and in this manner in the heat of the sun, and in the month of May, we travelled bare-footed and bare-headed to Amrapoora. At this place our feet being blistered and cut, and being no longer able to travel, we were put in irons and sent in carts to Aong-ben-le.

Q. Did any of the prisoners suffer from this treatment?

A. Yes, a Greek of the name of Constantine, was killed by it. An officer of rank, into whose charge we were delivered, accompanied us from Ava, and perceiving that the Greek could not travel, ordered a horse for him. After the Governor was out of the way, the horse was taken away. He could not go on, and was dragged for some way along the ground. A cart was then pressed, and he was put into it. He arrived close to the old palace at four in the afternoon insensible, and expired about sun-set

Q. Did you see Constantine, the Greek, dragged along the ground?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. How did he come to suffer more than the rest?

A. He was an old man, and the sinews of his legs were contracted.

Q. What do you suppose was the reason for your being taken from Ava to Aong-ben-le?

A. The Pakan-wun, appointed to the command of the army after the death of Bandula, had been for a few days our fellow-prisoner at Ava, and used to promise Mr. Rodgers, if released, to do something for our comfort. Aong-ben-le was his place of birth, and we therefore, at first, imagined we were sent there at his intercession. We were afterwards informed, that it was his intention to massacre us at the head of his army, which was to march through Aong-ben-le for this purpose.

Q. Do you know what became of the Pakan-wun?

A. He was put to death by being trod upon by elephants, on the charge of treason, about a month after he was raised to power.

Q. Are you of opinion that he intended to destroy you?

A. No, I never thought so; but I think it likely that he wished to destroy two of the party, Rodgers and Lanceigo, who had thwarted him several times as officers of the Burman government. He was a clever and ambitious man, and having been twice punished by the King, it was supposed, he wished to avenge himself, to dethrone his Majesty, and assume the government. Had he succeeded in this, he would have made peace with the English, and used us as instruments in bringing it about.

Q. How were you treated in the prison at Aong-ben-le?

A. Worse than at Ava. I was five or six times put into the stocks to extort money from me, and had to pay four times for the irons I had on.

Q. Was your property confiscated?

A. It was seized by the government, with the exception of my wearing apparel, and we lived upon the labour or begging of our servants.

Q. Did your Indian servants behave well to you during your imprisonment?

A. Yes, extremely well, particularly a Talain and Malay domestic.

Q. From what class of the natives did you receive the greatest kindness?

A. From



A. From the petty traders and poor people. The only persons of rank who paid us attention, were the wife of the Governor of Aong-ben-le and the Unsare of that place.

Q. How many Sepoys or Native Officers were confined along with you?

A. About two hundred and fifty were confined at one time, for a day or two only. Seven were left in close confinement with us, all of whom died, but one, of dysenteries brought on by irregular supplies of food. Sometimes they had nothing to eat for two or three days, and then they had too much, and eat voraciously.

No. 147. (C)—*Deposition of the Reverend Dr. A. Judson.*

Q. What is your name, and of what country are you a native?

A. My name is Adoniram Judson, and I am a native of Massachusetts, in the United States of America.

Q. How long have you resided in the Burmese dominions?

A. I arrived at Rangoon in the month of July, 1813, and have resided in the Burman dominions ever since, with the exception of two short visits made to Bengal and Madras.

Q. How have you been generally occupied during that time?

A. For the first six years of my stay, I was entirely occupied in studying the Burmese language and framing a Dictionary of it; and for the next four, in preaching the Gospel to the Natives, translating the New Testament into the Burmese language, with the other duties of the mission. For twenty-one months I was a prisoner, out of which I was seventeen in irons.

Q. Have you resided any time at the Burmese Court?

A. I have visited Ava, or Amrapura, three times, and resided there in all near three years.

Q. Had you, during that time, any intercourse with any of the Members of the Royal family, or the principal officers?

A. In my second visit to Ava in 1822, I had frequent intercourse with the palace. Knew almost every Member of the Royal family, and both the public and private officers of state, the Woonghees and Attawuns. I have spent whole days at the palace, and five or six times attended the morning levees, which is considered a matter of especial privilege. I arrived at Ava, the third time, in the beginning of 1824. I then visited the palace and renewed my acquaintance with the Chiefs; but was received coldly by his Majesty. I continued, as in my former visit, however, to visit at the houses of the King's brothers and sisters—the Queen's brother, and other principal officers.

Q. What, according to your opinion, was the cause of your being received coldly by his Majesty, during your third visit to the court?

A. I conceive, that the principal reason was the approaching rupture between the British and Burman governments.

Q. Was there any distinction made between American and British subjects by the Court of Ava?

A. Before the war commenced, it was fully explained to the Burmese government, that the American Missionaries were not subjects of Great Britain; and, under this impression, I thought it safe to visit the Court in 1824, although then of opinion, that war was impending. The imprisonment of the American Missionaries, after the commencement of the war, now convinces me, that they made no distinction. The Burmese, in fact, are of opinion, that all white men, except the French, are subjects of the King of England. Since the overthrow of the Emperor Napoleon, they even believe that France has become part of the King of England's dominions. The Americans are peculiarly liable to be confounded with the English, from speaking the same language.

Q. On your way from Rangoon to Ava in 1824, did you observe any hostile preparations making?

A. I observed none until reaching Prome, when I heard that troops were levying in all the provinces above that place. As I advanced, I saw, in several places, the conscripts quitting the villages, where they had been raised. Between Sambeguen and Peghan, I met the Bandula, proceeding in state to take command of an army assembled at the former place. I was told, that the destination of this army was the British frontier.

Q. Did you see the army, which you have now mentioned?

A. No, I did not; I passed on the opposite side of the river, and, at all events, Sambeguen, where the troops would be assembled, is several miles distant from the bank. I saw only the troops in the immediate suite of Bandula—probably not above one thousand.

Q. Were you told, and by whom, that the army of the Bandula intended to attack the British dominions?

A. I was told, that such was the intention; but I cannot specify any particular authority for this opinion. The impression was general amongst the people. No secret was made of it.

Q. Had you any personal intercourse with Bandula, on the occasion of meeting his fleet on the river?

A. No, I did not see Bandula, but my boat was stopped and examined by his orders. I stated, that I was proceeding to the capital by orders from the King, and was allowed to pass.

Q. Do you know what became of the army of Bandula to which you now allude?

A. Soon after my arrival in Ava, I heard that Bandula, with his army, had arrived at the place of his destination, and sent the Burmese government a plan of some meditated attack on the British territory. This was stated to me by a person, who had heard the King mention this circumstance at one of the morning levees. I cannot recollect the person who gave me this information, but think it was Dr. Price, who was then more in habits of visiting the palace than myself.

Q. During your residence at the Court, have you ever observed any disposition on the part of the officers of government to enter into a war with the British?

A. From the first visit I made to Ava, such a disposition has always been manifested whenever an occasion presented itself to express it. I heard such sentiments expressed by the principal officers of government, but more particularly by the members of the Royal family.

Q. Did such a disposition exist during the late reign?

A. I have understood *that it did*, but cannot speak from personal experience on this subject, not having, although in the country, visited the Court of Ava until the accession of the present King.

Q. What, according to your opinion led to the late war between the British and Burman government?

A. A jealousy of the British power on the part of the Burmans, confidence in their own prowess, on account of the recent conquests of Cassay and Assam, and a desire to extend their territory.

Q. What opinion did the Burmese Court entertain of the military character of the British nation and power in India, previous to the war?

A. They thought the British power formidable to the Hindus only, but considered themselves a superior order of men, whom the British could not withstand in battle, both on account of personal courage, skill in stratagem, and the practice of desultory modes of warfare, which would fatigue and destroy a British army.

Q. Did you hear what was thought at Court, when news arrived of the capture of Rangoon?

A. It was considered a mere marauding incursion, similar to that which the Siamese frequently make on the province of Martaban, an example quoted at the time. The king frequently expressed his anxiety for the speedy march of his troops, lest the English, who had landed at Rangoon, should escape.

Q. Who were the persons about the Court that most frequently expressed, in your hearing, a desire for war with the British government in India?

A. The Prince of Sarawaddi, brother to the king, a favorite, and the person next to him in rank; the Princess of Taongdun, the eldest sister of the king, and on that account unmarried, according to immemorial usage, a person of great intelligence, and perfectly well acquainted with the feelings of the Court; and the Seah Woonhee, the King's tutor, and, amongst the courtiers, next in influence to the Queen's brother.

Q. Can you recollect any particulars of conversations held with any of the individuals now mentioned, on the subject of war with the English?

A. I have frequently heard the Prince of Sarawaddi expatiate for half an hour together upon this subject. His language used to be to the following purport:—I render the expressions from the Burman, as accurately as I recollect them.—“The English are the inhabitants of a small and remote island. What business have they to come in ships from so great a distance to dethrone kings, and take possession of countries they have no right to. They contrive to conquer and govern the black strangers with cast, (Hindus,) who have puny frames and no courage. They have never yet fought with so strong and brave a people as the Burmans, skilled in the use of the sword and spear. If they once fight with us, and we have an opportunity of manifesting our bravery, it will be an example to the black nations, who are now slaves to the English, and encourage them to throw off their yoke.” About a month before my imprisonment, the King's sister, already mentioned, said to me in conversation, that it was obvious the English were afraid to fight; that their conduct on the frontier was mean and cowardly; that they were always disposed to treat and not to fight; and upon some occasions, when the Burman and British troops met, the British officers held up their hands to entreat the Burmans not to advance. She insisted, that the whole conduct of the British, for some time past, indicated unequivocal symptoms of fear. She added, “we shall now fight certainly, and will no longer be dissuaded. The new Governor General acts foolishly, he is afraid of us, and attempts to coax us, yet continues the usual course of aggression and encroachment.”

Q. Did you ever hear the Seah Woonhee, the King's tutor, express any opinion on the prospect of a war with the English?

A. The late Seah Woonhee was a man of few words, and of a cautious disposition. I have often heard him talk of the danger to the Burmans of the neighbourhood of the British power, and the necessity of watching their conduct. I once obtained a grant of land for a house through this officer. He took a long time in wording the document, and took especial care to mention to his people in my presence, calling upon me to understand what he said, that the grant was not in perpetuity, lest it might hereafter be claimed, he said, as the territory of the American government. In this, he appeared to me to refer to the history of

British aggrandizement in India. It was through his officers, chiefly, that I learnt the sentiments of this individual. //

Q. Can you recollect the names of any other individuals of consequence, who expressed, in your presence, an opinion on the question of a war between the Burman and British governments?

A. From the nature of the Burman government, the principal officers of state express themselves with extreme caution on all public questions. The same caution was not so necessary to the King's brothers and sisters, and therefore they expressed themselves more freely. As the war approached, this caution increased, and when the subject, upon one occasion, was introduced before one of the Attawuns, this officer did not hesitate to insinuate, that the American Missionaries were spies of the British government. I have heard the dependants of the chief ministers and other subordinate officers of government, on innumerable occasions, express similar sentiments on a war with the British, to those which I have ascribed to the Prince of Sarawaddi and the Princess of Taongduen.

Q. Did you ever hear that any proposition for the conquest of the British territories was ever entertained on the part of the Burman government?

A. In the presence of the Princess of Taongduen, I was once consulted by her officers on the practicability of conquering Bengal. My reply was, that it was as difficult for the Burmans to conquer Bengal as for the English to conquer Ava, which expression was viewed by the Burmans as affording as strong an affirmation of the impracticability of the scheme as words could convey. Their answer was, "you do not believe just now; in a little while you will be convinced." This conversation, to the best of my recollection, took place in March or April, 1824, after the march of the Bandula's army, which was the subject of discourse when my opinion was asked.

Q. Can you recollect any other circumstance affording an intimation of the sentiments of the Court of Ava, on the subject of a war with the British?

A. Nothing specific; but I may mention a circumstance which occurred to me one morning during my second visit to Ava, at the close of the year 1822. I met one of the officers of the young heir apparent, the only son of the King, then a child of about eleven years of age. I asked this person some questions respecting his young master. In the course of the conversation, he used the following expression: "this is the Prince who, when he arrives at manhood, is to rule over all your Kulá countries." This prediction in favour of the young Prince was a matter of general belief among the Burmans, and could refer only to the British territories being the only Kulá countries accessible to the Burmans.

Q. What is the meaning of the term Kulá?

A. Its original meaning was, "men having cast," or Hindus; but now it is extended to all the nations lying west of Ava, who are divided by the Burmans into *black* and *white* Kulás.

Q. Did you ever hear any person connected with the Burman government complain of any specific act of aggression on the part of the British?

A. I have always heard that the principal complaint was the refusal, on the part of the British, to deliver up refugees. This had been a subject of complaint during my whole residence in the Burman dominions. At the commencement of the war, I also heard it stated that the British had forcibly siezed an island in the Naaf river, belonging to the Burmans. Mr. Lanceigo, a Spanish gentleman, in the Burman service, who was imprisoned with me, informed me that he had told the King that the dispute concerning the Naaf island might be settled, and war avoided. The King answered, "we have gone too far, and must proceed." This expression, according to Mr. Lanceigo, was pronounced by his Majesty in a tone which seemed to indicate, that he personally regretted the prospect of war with the English.

Q. Does Mr. Lanceigo understand the Burman language, and on what terms was he with the King?

A. Mr. Lanceigo understands the Burman language perfectly, and was a great favourite of the King. He had high titles, and was Akawun, or Collector of the port of Rangoon.

Q. What sensation was produced at Ava by the success of Bandula at Ramoo?

A. A strong sensation, as I understood from others; for when the news came I was a prisoner. I saw from my place of confinement the prisoners, their baggage, arms, and ammunition, carried in public procession, and the King himself came out to view the spectacle.

Q. Have you ever heard that the Burman government has felt displeasure at the British power being an obstacle to the extension of its territories to the westward?

A. When I was at the Court for the first time in 1819, the year of his present Majesty's accession to the throne, the late Mr. Gibson, who afterwards went on a mission to Cochin China, was engaged by the King's orders, in constructing a map of the Burman dominions, together with the adjacent countries of Hindustan, Siam and Cochin China. Mr. Gibson had exhibited this map to the King, and came to me from the palace mentioning what had taken place. The King, on seeing the map, used the following expression: "you have assigned to the English too much territory." Mr. Gibson replied, that the map gave a correct representation of



the extent of the British dominions. The King answered, with evident feelings of dissatisfaction, "the territory of the strangers is unreasonably large." This was before the conquest of Assam, and it was observed that this country would be a desirable acquisition to the Burmans.

Q. Are you of opinion that the late war might have been avoided, on the part of the British, by negotiation?

A. I am of opinion that war was ultimately inevitable; but might, perhaps, have been delayed for a short time, by the British government yielding to all the demands of the Burmans, especially the restitution of the refugees. The next demand would have been for Chittagong and Dacca.

Q. What reason have you for believing that Chittagong and Dacca would have been demanded?

A. The Burmans considered that they had a good claim to them, as having once been dependencies of the kingdom of Arracan. I have heard this claim frequently urged, and to the best of my recollection, on one occasion, by the Prince of Sarrawaddi. The claim to these parts of the British dominions was so generally maintained by all classes of public officers, that if I had introduced the subject, I might have heard it insisted upon every day of my life.

Q. Did you ever see any Royal proclamations, edicts, or other public documents of the Burman government, concerning the late war?

A. It is not generally the custom of the Burman government to publish proclamations on such occasions. There was no declaration of war, which is also not customary. The people, in general, know nothing of war but by the levy of troops and contributions. When in prison, I heard a Royal edict repeated by one of the town secretaries within the prison-yard. It was when the British army had reached Sarwah. It stated that, whereas "the rebel strangers" had taken possession of Rangoon, and issued their orders in defiance of the King's authority in the lower countries, his Majesty would take the field, in person, with 100,000 Burmans, and 100,000 Shans; and it proceeded to make arrangements for his temporary absence. This was one of five or six edicts of the same nature, respecting his Majesty's departure from Ava to conduct the war in person.

Q. What was the reason of his Majesty not proceeding in person, in conformity with these edicts?

A. I do not believe that he ever seriously intended to march. The proposal to do so was intended to encourage the people, and an artifice to get some of the courtiers to volunteer their services.

Q. Did you ever hear what took place between the King and the Prince of Sarawaddi, when the latter was proceeding to take command of the army to oppose the English?

A. It was generally stated, and believed, that the Prince said to his Majesty, that after driving the English out of the country, he trusted he would not be stopped, but allowed to pursue them into Bengal. This was thrown out with the hope of getting a favourable answer from the King, who only smiled, however, without giving any direct reply.

Q. Where were you, when Lieutenant Colonel McDowall's detachment was repulsed from Wattigong, and that officer killed?

A. I was a prisoner in the Burman camp at Melloon.

Q. What brought you there?

A. I was sent from Ava to act as interpreter to the Prince Memiaboo.

Q. When were you sent back from thence to Ava?

A. Immediately on news being received at Melloon, of the British army's having advanced from Prome.

Q. While encamped at Melloon, did you see any prisoners of the British army?

A. I saw Lieutenant Scott and twenty sepoy, the latter taken at Wattigong.

Q. Do you know what was their conduct, when brought before the Burman Chiefs?

A. Yes, I was present when the sepoy in question were brought first before the Prince Memiaboo, and afterwards before Kolen Mengi, and interrogated by the latter, through a Hindustanee interpreter, with my occasional assistance.

Q. What questions were put to them?

A. They chiefly regarded the strength of the British army, and the effects likely to result from the death and defeat of Lieutenant Colonel McDowall, who was supposed by the Burmans to be a General of high rank.

Q. How did the sepoy reply, and what was the nature of their demeanor?

A. They answered with spirit, and the tendency of all their replies seemed to be for the advantage of their own government. As far as I could judge, they purposely exaggerated the numbers and resources of the British army, and in reference to the death of Lieutenant Colonel McDowall, in particular, they explained the organization of the British force, stating, that the death of a superior officer, even of the Commander in Chief, would be attended with no disorder, as the next senior officer always took his place. The loyalty displayed by them, gave offence to Kolen Mengi, who got out of humour on hearing their replies.

Q. Did the sepoy address you, or did you speak to them?

A. They

A. They recognised me with emotion, as an European, the moment I presented myself, and seemed to think that I could afford them protection. By direction of Kolen Mengi, I spoke to them in English, but they did not understand me, and I do not speak any of the languages of Hindustan. In giving the tenor of their answers, I go upon the translations of them rendered to Kolen Mengi, by the Hindustanee interpreter.

Q. Were the sepoys in irons when brought before the Burman Chiefs?

A. No, they were not in irons, but they had wooden yokes about their necks. They were afterwards put in irons and sent to Ava.

Q. Did you meet, during your stay in Ava, any of the sepoy prisoners taken on the Bengal frontier?

A. Yes, a number of the native officers were confined with me in the same prison, but, from the want of language, no intercourse took place between us. I only heard their sentiments occasionally through Mr. Gouger, an English gentleman, who was one of my fellow prisoners. I think they all died from hard treatment, with the exception of one person, whom I brought down with me to the British camp at Yandaboo.

Q. What opinion did the Burmese, previous to the war, entertain of the European troops of the British army?

A. They had a better opinion of them than of the Hindoos, but, considered them luxurious and effeminate, incapable of standing the fatigues of war, and therefore unable to contend with a people hardy like themselves, who could carry on war with little food and no shelter.

Q. What is their present opinion of the European troops?

A. They consider them nearly invincible, fierce and blood-thirsty, and discovering almost supernatural powers. I have heard them compare them, in action, to a particular class of demons called Balu, that, according to Burman notions, feed on human flesh. They have compared the rapidity of their movements to a whirlwind. The skill of Europeans in the use of artillery, and especially in that of rockets and shells, astonishes them, and is incomprehensible to them. I should add, that the forbearance and moderation of the European troops after victory, and their obedience to command, and regularity of discipline, is a subject of admiration with them. In comparison with the sepoys, they also observed, that they were indifferent to plunder.

Q. Are you aware when this revolution, in regard to the character of the European soldiery, took place with the Burmans?

A. The first circumstance of the war, which made a deep impression on the Burman Court, was the sudden and complete destruction, to use the language of the Burmans themselves, of the Thongba Woonghee, and his party, of about one thousand men, in a stockade near Rangoon. I heard from a Burmese who was present in the action, and who, for some political offence, on his return to Ava, became my fellow-prisoner, that this was effected by about three hundred Europeans. The Court being displeased with the procrastination of Kee Woonghee, had sent Thongba Woonghee, a brave but hot-headed man, to supersede him. This person was determined to fight. He sent, I think, an Armenian, as a spy to Rangoon, who brought back news, that the English were preparing to attack his stockade. The messenger was put to death for bringing accounts tending to discourage the troops, but the execution was hardly over, when the British troops presented themselves before the stockade. My informant, and other persons, afterwards, gave a most appalling account of the attack of the Balus, as they called them. The gate of the stockade was choaked up by the run-aways, and almost every man in it put to death by the bayonet. Thongba Woonghee was killed in the flight, by one of his own people. This mode of attack was totally contrary to all that the Burmans knew of war, and struck them with consternation. They stated, that, when one of the assailants was killed, another immediately took his place, and that they were not to be discouraged from advancing even by wounds, so that it was in vain to contend with such an enemy. Their imaginations were so wrought upon, that to these particulars, they added many fabulous ones, such as that the Europeans continued to advance after their hands had been chopped off in scrambling over the stockades, that the arms and legs of the wounded were carefully picked up, and replaced by the English surgeons, who were represented to be as skilful as the warriors were bold. The next circumstance, which brought about the revolution in question, was the defeat of the Bundula in his lines, before Rangoon, and his flight to Donabew, an event which struck the Burmans dumb, and, for a time, made them consider their affairs desperate. They thought the British army would then immediately march upon Ava. The Princesses of Peghan and Shuadong, with the Queen Mother, when the news arrived in Ava, sent for Mrs. Judson, and communicated to her the particulars of Bundula's defeat. The Princesses of Peghan said, on that occasion, "the Bundula's troops have piled up their arms for the use of the foreigners. They have all dispersed, and the enemy has nothing to do, but to march to Ava clapping their hands." Mrs. Judson's advice was asked by the Princesses. They wished to know whether they ought to run away or stay, and, if they staid, whether there was any chance of safety for them. They entreated her protection, and good offices with the English. Upon the failure at Donabew, the Burmans again somewhat recovered their spirits, and Bundula was supported by all the strength the country could afford. The death of Bundula, again threw the Court into consternation.

Q. What, in your opinion, prevented the Burmans from negotiating during the war?

A. All idea of negotiation is repugnant to the pride of the Burmans, and contrary to their custom. They believe the conquering party will always keep what it has got, if it can, and that negotiation is therefore useless. Overtures to treat are always looked upon either as a mark of weakness, or they are considered as an artifice to gain time.

Q. Do you know what was said of the first overture made, by Sir Archibald Campbell, to treat, from Prome?

A. The nine Europeans who were imprisoned, were sent for to translate the letter of Sir Archibald Campbell, which perplexed the Court extremely, the idea of treating, in the commanding situation in which he was then, appearing so utterly unaccountable to them. They endeavoured to explain it in various ways. Sometimes they imagined that he was induced to treat from the prevalence of great sickness in the army; at other times they imagined, that the King of England had disapproved of the war; then that the Seiks had risen against the English in upper India; but the most prevalent opinion was, that the King of Cochin China had sent a fleet of fifty ships to assist the Burmans. The King went the length of sending a dispatch, boat to the mouth of the Rangoon river, to ascertain whether the Cochin Chinese fleet had actually arrived or not.

Q. Do you think the Burmese government now understands the nature of a negotiation with an European government?

A. I think they certainly do; but nothing but actual experience could convince them. After the negotiation which led to the peace, they were still incredulous of the good faith of the British, and could not bring themselves to believe that they were sincere, until the first retrograde movement of the army. The payment of the money was a desperate experiment on their part, for they thought that the British would take it and still march on. I was questioned a hundred times over on this subject by the Woonghees, and other principal Officers of the government, having been sent for at all hours of the day and night, by the different parties for this purpose. I was asked what pledge I could give, and particularly, if I was willing to leave my wife and child behind, in order to be put to death, should the English take the money, and still advance upon the capital.

Q. Do you consider the Burman government very faithless?

A. Utterly so. They have no idea either of the moral excellence or the utility of good faith. They would consider it nothing less than folly to keep a treaty if they could gain any thing by breaking it. The fidelity hitherto observed by the British government, in fulfilling the stipulations of the late treaty, stupified the Burmans. They knew not what to make of it, but some of them have now begun to admire it. I heard many make use of expressions like the following, "these Kulas, although "they drink spirits, and slay cattle, and are ambitious and rapacious, have a regard for truth and their word, which is quite extraordinary; whereas, in us, Burmese, there is no truth." The first circumstance in the conduct of the British, which struck them with surprise, was the return of Dr. Sandford on his parole, and next, Sir A. Campbell's returning the six lacs of rupees offered, after it was within his power.

Q. Has not the conduct of the British towards the Burman prisoners produced a favorable impression?

A. This produced a favorable impression on the lower classes, but not on the government, who viewed it as a piece of policy practised by the British to conciliate the people and seduce them from their allegiance.

Q. While at the Court of Ava, did you ever hear of any intrigue going on between the Burmese government and any of the Native Princes of Hindustan?

A. I heard on three or four occasions, that the late Bandula boasted, that he maintained a secret correspondence with several Native Princes of Hindustan, who, according to him, would rise against the British, as soon as the Burmese would set them a good example. Reports of such insurrections were frequently propagated, and received with avidity by the Burman Court. There arrived in Ava, I think in 1823, eight or ten Seiks, purporting to be a mission from the Rajah of their country. They stated, they had suffered shipwreck in crossing a river, and lost the letter and presents which they had from their master, for the King of Ava. I understood, that the object of their mission was a treaty, offensive and defensive, to drive the British out of India. For a long time, they were honorably received, but during the war, they became suspected, and were, for a short time, imprisoned. They were finally sent back with letters, and a sum of money given to each individual. I heard officers of government state, that the alliance would be very desirable, particularly as the King of the Seiks had never been subdued by the English.

Q. Do you know any thing of the object of the late Burman mission to Cochin China?

A. I have understood that the object of it was an alliance, offensive and defensive, by which the two powers were to attack the Siamese from the east and west, conquer the country, and partition it between them.

Q. Do you know of any political connexion between the Burmese and Chinese governments?

A. An Embassy arrived in Ava, in 1823, which I have understood to be from the Emperor of China. A white elephant and a princess were demanded in strong language, which occasioned some alarm to the Burman Court, under an impression, that the Chinese wanted to quarrel with them. The white elephant and the princess,



princess, there being none to spare, were refused, and a number of common elephants and other presents were sent.

Q. Have you ever heard, that the Burmese claimed the assistance of the Chinese in their war with the English?

A. I never heard any mention of such a thing in Ava.

Q. Did you ever hear any of the officers of the Burman government express regret, that the Burmese had entered into a war with the English?

A. I have, in innumerable instances. During my imprisonment, a great number of public officers, falling under the displeasure of the government, were imprisoned along with me, and gaining the good opinion of some of them, I conversed intimately with them on the subject of the war. As early as November 1824, twenty stewards of townships, belonging to various Princesses, and other ladies of the palace, got into disgrace, and were imprisoned. These stated to me, that the King, who was good-natured, and unwilling to disoblige any one, had been teased and over-persuaded into the war with the English, through the intrigues of certain ambitious military leaders, particularly Bandula and Mankgaio, that in an evil hour, they induced him to do that which they all now would give the world could be undone. I said to one of the persons in question, "suppose the English were now to retire, and leave matters as they stood before the war." His answer was, "oh! how good that would be." This feeling became more general as the British army advanced, and latterly, it was universal, from the King downwards; for, from the destruction of Thongba Woonghee and his force, and the retreat of Bandula from the lines before Rangoon, they perceived, that they were no match for the British. I may add, that after these two affairs, their efforts were made with scarcely any hopes of success, but their wounded pride forbade them to make any concession.

Q. Are you of opinion, from what you know of the character of the Burman Court, that the present peace will be lasting?

A. The Burmese have been so severely punished, that I think it will be a long while before any courtier will have the hardihood to propose another war with the British government.

Q. Have you been frequently admitted into the presence of his Majesty the King of Ava?

A. During my second residence in Ava of five or six months, I saw his Majesty almost every day. I sometimes saw him at his public levees, but at all times had a free access to the palace, and have frequently conversed with the King on subjects of geography, religion, and history, for ten minutes, or a quarter of an hour together. His Majesty was incapable of giving his attention to any subject for a longer time.

Q. What is his Majesty's personal appearance and character?

A. He is a man about forty years of age, of rather a dark complexion, and in person, small and slender. His manners are graceful, and, in public, dignified. In private, he is affable and playful to boyishness. His disposition is obliging and liberal, and he is anxious to see every one around him happy. His mind is indolent, and he is incapable of any continued application. His time is past in sensual enjoyment, in listening to music, or seeing dancing, or theatrical entertainments; but above all, in the company of his principal Queen, to whom he is devoted to infatuation. His personal activity is remarkable for an eastern Prince, and scarcely a day passes, that he does not go on the river, in boats, or rides on horseback, or an elephant. He is partial to Europeans. No person of this description comes before him, without receiving some marks of kindness. The safety of the European and American prisoners is chiefly to be ascribed to this partiality. His Majesty is not bigotted to his own religion. From conversations which I had with him, on religious subjects, I am inclined to think, that he believes in the existence of one God eternal, which is not a part of the Buddhist religion—but, in truth, he is indifferent to all religions: I never saw him perform an act of devotion but once. A handsome image of Gautama stands in a recess in the audience chamber, before which, after the levee, many of the courtiers perform their devotions. His Majesty never does on such occasions; but one day, while I was in the audience chamber alone, his Majesty came walking in, in his usual brisk and lively manner. He looked about him, and, appearing to have nothing else to do, knelt before the image—made a hasty prayer and obeisance to it, and jumped up again, proceeding straight on to the stables, to see his favourite horses fed.

Q. Have you ever been in the presence of her Majesty the Queen?

A. No, never. I was never presented to her Majesty, but have seen her three or four times in the palace, passing and repassing. One day I was sitting in the hall of audience, when the King and Queen came out together from the inner apartments, his Majesty attempted to introduce me, saying, "this is the teacher I mentioned to you," but the Queen looked another way and would pay no attention, pulling the King along with her. She is much more haughty than his Majesty, and her character, in all other respects, differs widely from his, for she is reported to be avaricious, vindictive, intriguing and bigoted.

Q. Has his Majesty any family?

A. Yes, one son by his first Queen, now about fifteen years of age, and a daughter by her present Majesty, about four or five years old, the idol of her parents.

Q. Do you know any thing of the Queen's brother?

A. Yes, I have been presented to him in all, perhaps, half a dozen times; but he is of too haughty and reserved a disposition.

Q. What is the character of this person, and in what estimation is he held at Court?

A. In character, he bears a close resemblance to his sister. He is cruel, rapacious, and a great intriguer. He is in the entire confidence of his sister, and, through her, rules the kingdom. Since the death of the Seah Wounghee, he has no rival with the King, unless his Majesty's favorite brother, the Prince of Sarrawaddi.

Q. You have stated, that shortly after the commencement of hostilities between the British and Burman governments, you were imprisoned at Ava by the latter?

A. Yes.

Q. Were any grounds assigned for your imprisonment?

A. Nothing beyond its being stated, that it was the will of the King.

Q. Were you ill treated in the act of being arrested?

A. Nothing, perhaps, beyond what is usual in similar cases. I was tightly bound with cords, and thrown down, and struck with the knees and elbows in the act of being secured. The cords were so firmly bound round my arms, that the skin was cut. By a bribe of ten ticals, the officers somewhat loosened the cords, and when I was brought before the governor of the town, or chief of the police, he reproved them for treating me so harshly.

Q. Were you put in irons?

A. Yes, immediately.

Q. What prison were you lodged in?

A. That in which all malefactors condemned to death are lodged.

Q. What description of persons were confined with you?

A. Burman thieves and robbers, state prisoners, deserters from the army of an aggravated description, a few prisoners of war taken from the British, and the European gentlemen, like myself, arrested in Ava.

Q. How were you treated in prison?

A. At first with great severity, but after we had bribed the governor to the extent of about one hundred ticals each, and the goalers and other subordinate officers in proportion, we were treated with more lenity.

Q. What sort of severity was exercised towards you at first?

A. We were placed in the inner prison, and put in a sort of stocks, forbad a mat or pillow to sleep on, as well as all intercourse with our friends.

Q. Were you allowed food or clothing by the government, while in prison?

A. No, never. No prisoners are fed by the government. They must starve, unless supplied by their friends. An exception was sometimes made in favour of British prisoners of war. The King ordered each a basket of rice a month, ( lbs.) but they never got one half of it.

Q. How long did you continue in the prison at Ava?

A. Eleven months—nine with three pair of irons on, and two with five.

Q. When were you imprisoned, after being liberated from your incarceration at Ava?

A. I was sent along with the other European prisoners arrested, to a place about ten miles from Ava, and four from Amarapura, called Aongbenle, and there imprisoned.

Q. What was the cause of your removal to Aongbenle?

A. It was generally stated and believed, that the American and European prisoners were removed to that place for the purpose of being put to death, as a kind of sacrifice, previous to the Pakan-wun taking the field against the English.

Q. Who was Pakan-wun?

A. An officer raised to the rank of Woonghee, and placed in the command of the army upon the death of Bundula, and the failure of the other Chiefs, who had acted against the English.

Q. Were you personally acquainted with him?

A. I had met him occasionally in the palace, and saw him for a few days in the same prison with myself, during a short confinement, when he had incurred the temporary displeasure of the King.

Q. You state, that it was intended to put you and the other prisoners to death: what do you suppose was the reason that this intention has not put in execution?

A. The intention of putting us to death was at the instigation of Pakan-wun. This person being about a month or six weeks in power, fell into disgrace—was charged with treasonable practices, and executed at an hour's notice. The idea of putting us to death was then dropped.

Q. What character did the Pakan-wun bear?

A. Of all the Chiefs of rank, I think he was the worst man.

Q. Was the intention of putting you to death entertained at any other time, than the occasion now alluded to?

A. We

- A. We were assured, that the Queen's brother had given orders several times to have us secretly executed.
- Q. How do you consider that you escaped on these occasions?
- A. The governor refused to execute the order without the express consent of the King. He hinted it to myself in prison, and told Mrs. Judson and the wife of Mr. Rodgers so, more explicitly.
- Q. Were the prisoners' properties confiscated?
- A. They were seized with a view to confiscation, but not formally confiscated. I afterwards received the value of what was taken from me, through the instigation of the British Commissioners.
- Q. How did the natives of Hindustan in your employ behave to you, during your imprisonment?
- A. I had two Mahomedan natives of Bengal, who adhered to me faithfully throughout.
- Q. Do you know any thing of the conduct of a Mahomedan native of Bengal, a baker, in the service of Mr. Gouger, one of your fellow-prisoners?
- A. His conduct was beyond all praise. He adhered to his master at the risk of threats and punishment, and often fed him from his own labour.
- Q. Were your Indian servants imprisoned?
- A. They were confined to the house for a few days, and afterwards liberated, and allowed to attend upon us.
- Q. How many native officers of the British army were confined with you?
- A. Seven or eight.
- Q. What has become of those persons?
- A. They all died in the prison, but one.
- Q. What was the cause of their death?
- A. The want of a regular supply of food. Sometimes they were for two or three days without food. When they were supplied, they ate to excess, which brought on bowel complaints, that proved fatal to them.
- Q. Do you know what has become of the bulk of sepoy's of the British army, taken prisoners by the Burmans?
- A. They were sent to a place called Monai, in the country of the Shans, which I suppose to be not less than two hundred miles from Ava. I was informed, before leaving Ava, that on the demand of the British Commissioners, they were ordered back for the purpose of being delivered up.
- Q. What was the reason of their being sent to so great a distance?
- A. The government, on the advance of the British army, was apprehensive that the prisoners might make a disturbance, and therefore sent them off for security.
- Q. Have you read over the depositions which you have made before me, and which I have handed over for your perusal?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Are they correctly recorded?
- A. I have made two or three slight alterations with my pen, and they are now correct.
- Q. Are you prepared to swear to them on oath?
- A. In answer to this, I beg to explain, that I object, from religious motives, to taking an oath on any occasion. For fifteen years, and since entering upon my present calling, I have never taken an oath. I do not object, however, to making a solemn affirmation of the truth of what I have deposed before you, and beg leave to say, that such an affirmation was received from me, in lieu of an oath, by Governor Farquhar, of the Mauritius, in the year 1813.

*No. 148. (D)—Deposition of Agha Mahomed.*

- Q. What is your name, and of what country are you a native?
- A. My name is Agha Mahomed, and I am a native of Ispahan, in Persia.
- Q. When did you first come into the Burman dominions?
- A. In the year 1822, of Christ.
- Q. Have you ever quitted the country since your first arrival in it?
- A. Never.
- Q. Have you ever visited the capital of the Burman country?
- A. I stayed forty days in Rangoon on my first arrival, when I proceeded straight to the Burman capital, where I continued until the termination of the war between the English and Burmans.
- Q. What is your profession?
- A. I am a merchant, and brought to this country English and Madras piece goods, and English broad cloth, to the amount of about forty thousand rupees.



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Q. Were you acquainted with any of the Burman Princes or principal officers of government?

A. I was acquainted with them all, but never saw the King but once, when I presented a petition to him, which received no attention. He was proceeding at the time to a temporary palace, which he had on the river side.

Q. Do you understand the Burman language?

A. Very imperfectly.

Q. What other languages do you speak?

A. The Persian is my native tongue. I also speak Arabic, Hindustanee, and Telinga. I resided sixteen years at Masulipatam, where I acquired the two latter languages.

Q. Through whom did you communicate with the native inhabitants?

A. I kept three linguists in my employment, Mahomedans of the country, who spoke the Burman and Hindustanee languages.

Q. Do you know any particulars concerning the cause of the late war between the Burmans and the English?

A. Yes, I have heard as follows. There was a desert island between Arracan and Chittagong, the English built a house upon it, the Burmans drove them away, killing one or two persons. The Governor General wrote a letter to the King of Ava, complaining of the aggression, charging the Governor of Arracan with misconduct, and requesting he might be removed. The King was highly indignant at this letter; he gave orders to Bandula to proceed to the Chittagong frontier, saying, that a number of his slaves had run away into the British dominions; that he, Bandula, must demand them, and that if he did not find them at Chittagong, he must proceed to Calcutta with his army, and take them by force.

Q. From whom did you hear this?

A. It was the common talk of the town, about the end of 1823, or beginning of 1824.

Q. Did you ever hear that Bandula marched from Ava for Arracan with an army, shortly after the time you have just alluded to?

A. Yes, I saw myself the army of Bandula quit Ava. It did not then exceed two thousand or three thousand men. I understood it was to be recruited on the way.

Q. Did you understand what was the destination of Bandula's army?

A. It was universally said that it was destined for the British frontier, with orders to demand the refugees, in the first instance peaceably, and if they were not surrendered, to follow up his demand even to Calcutta.

Q. Can you recollect in what month and year Bandula quitted Ava for Arracan?

A. I will consult a journal which I have kept, and give the exact period as nearly as I can.

Q. Did you hear what the army of Bandula did after its march from Ava?

A. It arrived on the British frontier, fought a battle, and gained a victory, it was said, over two thousand or three thousand British troops. Bandula sent accounts of this victory with particulars, stating that he had killed great numbers, and that those who escaped alive were sent to his Majesty. Ten or fifteen days after this account, two or three hundred sepoys arrived. The prisoners were brought before the King, who caused them to be interrogated. The report was, that they stated to his Majesty that they had not fought, but been seduced by a Patan, who had come over to the British lines, and represented to them that such were the numbers of the Burman army, that it was useless to fight.

Q. Do you know who this Patan was?

A. Yes. He is now at Ava, and I have spoken to him on the subject. I do not know his proper name, but he was commonly called Khan Saheb, and was taken prisoner by the Burmans, at the conquest of Assam, being in the service of the Rajah of that country as a soldier.

Q. Previous to the commencement of the war, were the Burmans, according to your observation, desirous of continuing at peace with the English or otherwise?

A. They were very anxious for war, otherwise, why collect an army? When people are desirous of peace and friendship, they use soft words, and not harsh language, as they were wont to do.

Q. Were they of opinion, they could beat the English?

A. Certainly. The Burmans thought all the world ought to be slaves to the King of Ava, and that it was presumption to contend with his armies.

Q. What was said by the Burmans at Ava, when news reached that place of the arrival of the English at Rangoon?

A. I was told that it was considered fortunate news. The Ki Woonghee immediately called upon his Majesty, and said, that a net should be thrown upon the English, and not one should escape.

Q. When did they begin to alter their opinion on this subject?

A. After the retreat of Bandula from before Rangoon. From that time there was but one opinion, that they could not contend with the English.

Q. Are

Q. Are the Burmans at present much afraid of the British troops ?

A. Yes, of the European troops. They said, there was no standing a people who were not to be discouraged from advancing by death or by wounds. They also thought well of the sepoy, but considered them inferior to the European troops.

Q. Have you ever heard that any of the Native Princes of Hindustan sent Vakeels, or emissaries, to the Court of Ava ?

A. About two months before I reached Ava, ten or twelve Seiks arrived there, declaring they were a mission from Runjeet Sing, of Lahore. They said they had lost their letters and presents. No notice was taken of them by the Court, until the commencement of the war with the English, when they were sent back with presents, and a letter to the Seik Rajah, requesting that he would attack the English from the westward, while the Burmans attacked them from the eastward. These people departed by the route of Sylhet. I saw them two or three times, and I am under a firm impression that they were impostors. Some time before my arrival in Ava, some Mahomedans of Hindustan came there, declaring, they were envoys either from the Nabob of Oude or Bengal, I forget which. They were certainly impostors, and the Court considering them so, imprisoned them. One of the individuals in question, a Moonshree, is still in Ava, having settled in the country.

Q. Have you ever heard that the King of Ava, since the commencement of the war, sent an embassy to China, craving assistance against the English ?

A. I have heard some say that a mission was sent, and others that it was not. I know nothing certain on this subject.

Q. Are you aware, whether the Burman government experienced much difficulty latterly in recruiting its armies ?

A. Yes, the utmost difficulty. It was almost impossible to assemble five-hundred or one-thousand men, and when they were got together, they were rogues and vagabonds, picked up about the streets of Ava. The King heard that the English paid their troops monthly, and considered that this was the reason why they fought so well. Latterly, a bounty of one-hundred and a hundred and fifty ticals were given, but few troops obtained. The soldiers purchased fine cloths, ate opium and gunja, but at the first sight of the European troops, ran off.

Q. What is your opinion of the Burmans, as a people ?

A. They are stupid and uncivilised. Among the courtiers there is not to be found one man of common understanding.

Q. Were you imprisoned by the Burman government, during your residence in Ava ?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was imprisoned along with you ?

A. Four Persians, a Turk, a Jew of Constantinople, and four Natives of Hindustan.

Q. Why were you and your companions imprisoned ?

A. For the purpose of extorting money from us, because it was stated we were subjects of the British government.

Q. What reason had they for considering you a British subject ?

A. They said, I had a fair skin and a red beard, and therefore must be related to the English.

Q. How long were you in confinement ?

A. Eight days.

Q. What treatment did you receive in prison ?

A. Six of us were put in the stocks, and eight tortured, to extort a confession.

Q. Was your property taken from you ?

A. Yes.

Q. By whose orders were you imprisoned ?

A. By those of a Chief called Pakan-wun, who was afterwards put to death by the King, upon which occasion we were liberated.

Q. How long is it since you were imprisoned ?

A. About eleven months ago.

Q. Was your property restored to you ?

A. A small part of it was ; but the greater portion was plundered by the Burman officers of government, and therefore lost.

Chittagong.  
1826.

No. 149.—*Letter from the Governor General in Council at Fort William in Bengal, to the Court of Directors of the East India Company; dated 23d December, 1825.*

Honourable Sirs,

We have now the honour to reply to your dispatch dated 8th June last, stating your wish to be put in possession of the fullest evidence of the British right of sovereignty over the Island of Shapuree.

s. 2 & 3.  
of Packet.

2. On the receipt of the above dispatch, we addressed the letters, referred to in the margin, to the magistrate of Chittagong and Board of Revenue, requiring them to furnish the most full information which could be traced on their records, relative to the points therein comprised.

No. 4.  
of Packet.

3. The letter and inclosures received from the acting magistrate, Mr. Blackburn, in reply, contain nothing material. Should the reference which Mr. Blackburn states himself to have made to the sub-commissioner in Arracan, produce any additional information, we shall not fail to transmit it without delay.

No. 5.  
of Packet.

4. The reply from the secretary to the Board of Revenue, inclosing a letter from the acting collector of Chittagong, with several original documents, will of course attract the special attention of your Honourable Court.

5. From those papers you will perceive, that the first recorded measurement of Shapuree Deep was made by the British officers in 1801, A. D. at which time it was considered to form a part of the revenue division called Mouza Tek Naaf. In 1802, it was included in a lease granted to Kishen Dass Canoongo, a landholder of wealth and influence, who, it appears, intended to clear and cultivate it, but failed to perform his engagement.

6. In 1815, A. D. when Mr. R. Hunter was deputed to survey and measure the southern parts of the district, Tek Naaf and Shapuree were found in the possession of two refugee Mug chiefs, who asserted their right to the whole, on the grounds of a Sunnud granted to their father in 1790, A. D. by Mr. Bird, the collector of the district; their names were accordingly entered as Dakhilkars, *i. e.* parties in actual possession, and the lands as a Khass Mehal, or an estate in the immediate charge of the officers of Government. With respect to the above Sunnud, your Honourable Court will not fail to remark, that it carries back the evidence of our title and occupation to a remote period, and must be considered to strengthen considerably the chain of direct proof on the side of the British Government. Your Honourable Court will perceive, that some doubts attach to the *Jureb Chettahs*, or detailed measurement papers, now produced as the records of Mr. Hunter's time, from the circumstance of Mr. Patterson's signature being attached to them, instead of that of the former gentleman. The remarks made by Mr. Hunter himself, now secretary to the Board of Revenue, in the memorandum accompanying, will of course attract your notice. We may observe, that the Chettahs in question differ only from those of 1801, A. D. and subsequent papers, in describing the island as of greater dimensions than the other measurements yield.

7. Mouza Tek Naaf, including Shapuree, was measured for the third time in 1819, A. D. under the superintendance of a commissioner, Mr. C. Mackenzie, and the island was recorded in the following manner; "Shapuree Deep, in 1162, the property of Government (*i. e.* a Khass Mehal), now appertaining to the Talook of Kishen Dass Canoongo, and in the possession of Askur Shikdar, his Itmamdar."

No. 6.  
of Packet.

8. The details regarding these several measurements will be found in the proper place; a memorandum accompanies also, drawn up by the Persian secretary, in explanation of the Sunnud, dated 1790, and correcting an error which appears in the translations of the Chettahs. For the more complete satisfaction of your Honourable Court, we have annexed copies of the extracts from the records of the Chittagong collectorship, in the native languages.

9. As to the extent of the Island and the amount of any Revenue which the East India Company may have derived from it, your Honourable Court will find, that although included in leases granted to the local zemindars with a view to its being brought into cultivation, and although partial attempts have been made to clear it, the place has hitherto remained uncultivated and wholly unproductive of public revenue. The extent of the island is differently stated in the accounts of the different measurements, those having been, it is presumed, rough estimates and not actual surveys. In 1801, A. D. the square surface is entered at kahuns, or cawns, 474, or about 20 English acres; in 1815, at 4,700 ditto, or English acres 202; and in 1819, at 705, or acres 30. The proportions of chilla, or *cleared land*, in the two first measurements, are exhibited respectively, at 9 k. and 482 ditto. In the third measurement, c. k. 13. l. are entered as haselat or productive, meaning probably as pasturage ground.

10. We have only farther to state on this part of the subject, that having referred to the map mentioned in the 9th paragraph of Mr. Phillips' letter, we find that it does not throw any light on the question under discussion.

11. Previously to concluding this dispatch, we cannot resist expressing our confident persuasion, that the various reports which have been submitted to the Secret Committee relative to the origin, early events, and true



true causes of the present war, will have satisfied your Honourable Court, that the government of Ava was determined, sooner or later, to prosecute its extravagant pretensions to the possession of our eastern districts, at the known hazard of a rupture with the British power, and that under the combination of circumstances and position of affairs which arose out of the Burmese aggressions and hostile demonstrations in 1823-24, on the side both of Chittagong and Sylhet, recourse to arms could not have been avoided on our part, without exposing our honour, our interests, and the lives and properties of our subjects, to the most serious, perhaps irreparable, injury.

12. The proceedings of the Burmese in Assam had materially altered the relative position of the two powers, and placed the former, as they well knew and often boasted, in a situation the most favourable for making a sudden descent into our territories along the Berhampooter. The establishment of their authority in that country had been from the beginning, viewed with just alarm by the civil commissioner, Mr. D. Scott, (one of the most upright and intelligent of your servants) who, well aware of the grasping, restless and ambitious spirit which actuated the Burmese councils, distinctly foresaw and pointed out the danger threatening the whole line of our eastern frontier from the change of masters, which the principality of Assam had experienced. It is worthy of remark, that in the early stage of our disputes, the Burmese chiefs in Assam declared, that in 1822, Mencee Maha Silva, at the head of an army of twenty thousand men, deliberately meditated the plunder of Gowalpareh and the adjacent country, where no British force could possibly be assembled adequate to check his progress, and they made it matter of reproach against the English, that, notwithstanding the forbearance shown by them on that occasion, we were assembling troops to oppose their designs upon Cachar and Jynta.

13. On the side of Chittagong, the Burmese were acting systematically upon a plan of slow and gradual encroachment in prosecution of their favourite object of acquiring a footing in Bengal, after they had conquered all the intervening petty states, fully prepared to come to issue with us whenever we should make a stand to repel their advances. The seizure and detention of the commissariat elephant hunters during two successive years, whilst engaged in the prosecution of a most important branch of the public duties of that department, near Ramoo and Gurgunnea; and the insolent bearing and language assumed on those, as on many former occasions, by the Arracan authorities, in their communications with the local British officers, formed in themselves no light grievances. With respect to Shapuree lying, as it does, indisputably and undisputed, on the British side of the main channel of the Naaf, that island, independent of the written evidence forthcoming on the public records, was *prima facie*, from its position, a portion of the Honourable Company's territory; and it behoved the Burmese, under such circumstances, to prove their title to the place by some testimony more valid and convincing than mere assertion. We were in possession of the ground on which a party of our Sipahes had been posted; it had always been considered by us and by the Mugs to form a portion of our dominions, at least since 1790, A. D. We possessed written and recorded testimony on our side of a conclusive nature; and further, we invited investigation, and were ever ready to enter into fair and amicable discussion. The Burmese, on the contrary, never offered or pretended to produce an atom of proof, and it is worthy of remark, that they rested their claim to the Island of Shapuree mainly on the same ground that they asserted a title to Ramoo, Chittagong, Dacca, and the eastern districts of Bengal, viz. that the whole once belonged to the Mug Raja of Arracan, "whose pagodas and chowkees were there." It is true, that the Raja Tooroo Wyn deputed a messenger to the presidency in August 1823, with a letter to the Governor General, demanding, in peremptory and menacing language, the removal of the British guard from Shapuree; but, without waiting even to learn the result of his remonstrance, he proceeded, in less than a month afterwards, to carry his threats of applying force into execution, under the express orders, as was carefully promulgated, of his sovereign, the King of Ava.

14. It is now well known from the European residents at Rangoon, as well as from the later dispatches of Sir Archibald Campbell, that at an early period of our discussions with the local Burmese officers, a powerful party at the court of Ummerapura, headed by the Maha Bundoola, seized that opportunity of strongly urging the king to assemble an army for the purpose of enforcing his visionary claims on the eastern district of Bengal, and that the most extensive preparations were making in Ava for a war of conquest and aggression during some months previous to the actual rupture between the two states. The formidable Burman army, which afterwards invaded Chittagong, was assembled to overrun the southern districts; whilst the combined forces from Assam and Munnipore, after establishing themselves securely in Cachar and Jynta, were prepared to lay waste the districts of Sylhet and Tipperah. Threatened as we were simultaneously at so many and such vulnerable points, by the hostile demonstration and arrogant pretensions of a government proverbial for its ignorance, barbarism and untractableness, which had refused to listen to our *petitions*, as it insolently termed the solemn remonstrances of the Governor General in Council, and referred us to its victorious generals for an answer, an appeal to arms on our side would, we are persuaded, have been *inevitable and fully justifiable* from the necessity of the case, even had our right to the Island of Shapuree been far less clear and substantial

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stantial than is undoubtedly the fact. Had we resolved to pursue a temporizing policy under such circumstances, we must, most unwisely, and with serious loss of reputation in the eyes of all India, have tamely submitted to aggression and insult, thus augmenting the insolence and audacity of the Burman nation; and we should assuredly have been compelled to appeal to arms in the end, and at a time when we might have been engaged in other quarters, and the plans and measures of our opponent would at all events have been more matured.

15. It is well worth while to consider a little in detail the immediate and direct sacrifices which we must have made to purchase a temporary and precarious peace, after the conduct pursued by the Burmahs in 1823-24.

16. In the first place, we must have relinquished our claims to the forest land at the back of Ramoo and Gurgunna, which the Company's elephant hunters had frequented for years, as a part of the British territory, otherwise the opposition made by the Burmese, and the repeated seizure and imprisonment of the servants belonging to one of our public establishments, must necessarily have induced frequent angry and irritating remonstrances on our part, quite incompatible with the permanent maintenance of friendly relations.

Secondly, We must have tamely abandoned our right to an island which, however inconsiderable in size and actually unproductive, had nevertheless been often the subject of notice on the public proceedings, and stood recorded as a portion of the British territory.

Thirdly, We must have patiently endured the insult and wrong offered to us in the attack and slaughter of a party of the Company's troops, stationed on Shapuree, no less to preserve that which we considered and had declared to be our undoubted right, than to protect our peaceable subjects, in the vicinity, from murder and plunder.

Fourthly, We must have witnessed, in passive silence, the passage of the Burmese across the natural mountain barrier, which so distinctly separates the two empires, and their intrusion into the plains of Bengal; their subjugation of Cachar, a country, in its population, language, institutions and geographical position, essentially a part of Bengal, and the legitimate Rajah of which then actually resided under our protection; and also the establishment of their authority in Jyntia, another petty chiefship, which had long been intimately connected with, and was essentially a dependent of the British government.

Finally, we must have tolerated, without the slightest resistance, their occupation of a position which placed the richest part of the district of Sylhet and the Sudder station itself completely at their mercy, in the then state of our military force, which gave them the command of the Soorma, as well as of the Berhampooter rivers; and which, whatever number of troops we might have collected for our defence, would infallibly have led to heavy loss of revenue, the serious interruption of cultivation, and the permanent flight of many of our Ryots from their homes, through the dread universally inspired by the proximity of that sanguinary, barbarous and unspicing race.\* Is it to be believed, when the peculiar character of the government and people of Ava, and the nature of their pretensions on our eastern districts, are duly weighed, that in such a state of irritating, and, to our subjects, alarming contact, or rather collision, we could have much longer delayed to draw the sword in self-defence, whatever extent of petty outrage and encroachment we might have resolved to tolerate, in the vain hope of avoiding the necessity of war? And, if by the intrusion of this arrogant and untractable race beyond the limits which nature had placed between us, we were forced into a relative position, which rendered any long maintenance of peaceful relations not only precarious, but in truth impracticable, was there any thing at the time in the political aspect of affairs in India, or the condition of our power and resources, which could have required or justified our overlooking a succession of positive, though perhaps, separately considered, trifling acts of insult and aggression, in the idle speculation that, by recourse to temporary expedients, we might avert the evil that inevitably threatened us, sooner or later? We confidently answer in the negative. And, when we reflect on the state of affairs brought about as above, by the acts and conduct of the enemy, and not by any seeking of ours, we deliberately and conscientiously affirm, notwithstanding all the embarrassment and suffering which have been produced by the war, and to which none can be more painfully alive than ourselves, that we should have unworthily sacrificed the high interests committed to our charge, if we had longer deferred the declaration and vigorous prosecution of hostilities against the state of Ava.

17. The period selected for the declaration of war, and the measure of sending an expedition to Rangoon, have been made the theme of frequent censure, as if in reality any option had been left us in those respects. On these points we beg leave to trouble your Honourable Court with a few remarks.

18. The accounts which we had received previous to the month of March, 1824, had distinctly apprized us that a powerful Burmese army was collecting in Arracan; and we judged, moreover, from the obstinate character of the people, that there was little chance of their relinquishing their designs on the Cachar side, although in the first instance repulsed. At the same time, we knew too well, how utterly vain and futile would be any plan for protecting Chittagong, Tipperah, and Sylhet, during the approaching hot weather and rains,



by any amount of force which we could have ventured to station in their noxious and pestilential swamps and jungles. We felt convinced, therefore, that our only prospect of drawing off the Burmese from the project of invasion, which we believed them to meditate at that particular season, as the fittest for their purpose, and compelling them to direct their attention to the defence of their own territory, was the equipment of a powerful expedition to seize and hold temporarily their principal sea-port, the second town of their empire, whence at the same time, we might hope to teach an impressive and salutary lesson of our power and resources. Our success in the first of the above objects, if not complete, was at least very considerable, so much so, that we conscientiously believe the Rangoon expedition to have saved the Chittagong district from premeditated devastation and ruin, if indeed it did not ward off still more extensive and alarming mischiefs. We are firmly and deeply persuaded, that the invasion of Chittagong was no consequence of our proclamation of war, the official promulgation of which, in all probability, was utterly unknown to the Burmahs. A large force had been for months concentrating in Arracan, by the different routes leading from Ava, under the Maha Bundoola, fully bent on invading the British territory, with the views and motives already explained in preceding paragraphs. Scarcely had the Bundoola crossed the Naaf, when the first reports reached himself of the appearance of a British armament in the Irawuddi, and at the moment when the small and inadequate force, injudiciously left without support at Ramoo, was overpowered and destroyed, the fall of Rangoon became fully known in the Burman camp. The above news was rapidly followed by accounts of our conquest of Cheduba and Negrais. It was this intelligence that paralyzed the movements of the Bundoola's really formidable army, which induced him to remain at Ramoo, until he should learn the pleasure of his master the King of Ava, (into whose imagination and calculations it had never previously entered for a moment, that we should dare to attack a principal town of his dominions) and which finally caused his precipitate retreat to Ava, when the repeated successes of the British arms in the vicinity of Rangoon, began to give to the Burmese a juster notion of the character of their foe. The force of the enemy in Cachar would, we are fully satisfied, have been similarly withdrawn, had not the state of the country rendered their retreat physically impossible, earlier than the month of October.

19. With respect to the second object; although the results have failed to equal our anxious and not unreasonable hopes, we must ever maintain that the formation of an armament against Rangoon, and the coats of Arracan and Tenasserim, was in fact the only measure which could have been adopted, calculated to make an early and decided impression on our enemy, and to inspire him with a just sense of our power and resources. It was fair also to speculate, as we did, that such a measure, combined with the liberal and moderate terms of accommodation which we simultaneously offered to the court of Ava, would have brought that government to reason, and induced it to terminate a contest, which, it would then see, could not be prolonged without infinite cost and suffering to the Burmese nation at all events, however their invaders might fare.

20. Regarding the season of the year at which the expedition was equipped, besides the reasons above advanced for dispatching it as early as possible after it became evident that hostilities, and the exposure of our territories to hostile invasion, could not be avoided nor otherwise provided against, we beg to observe, that we had received no information which could lead us to believe the climate of Rangoon at all peculiarly unhealthy during the rains; and we now feel ourselves fully justified in asserting, after the experience of the season of 1825, that it is really not so. The very extensive and melancholy sickness which prevailed in Sir Archibald Campbell's army, from July to November 1824, had its first origin in an epidemic fever, of a casual, not local character, which visited Rangoon in the month of June, as it did Calcutta. We may remark incidentally, that precisely the same fever has this season raged in Upper India. The effects of the above epidemic, of course, impaired the health of the men generally, and rendered hundreds who would otherwise have escaped, wholly unable to stand the severe service and privations which ensued. The want of fresh meat and other wholesome food, in itself sufficient to have produced extensive sickness, infinitely aggravated the evil, and this was to be ascribed mainly to the entire desertion of the place by its inhabitants, an event which could not have been anticipated. Under a happier combination of circumstances, equally beyond our controul or calculation, we have no hesitation in saying, that the expedition to Rangoon would have not only produced, as it actually has done, much of the good we anticipated, but would have been unattended with any of those painful and melancholy features in the situation of the army, which cast so deep a gloom over the early stages and operations of the war.

21. It would lead to too great detail, if we proceed to point out all the other considerations which induced us to fit out the expedition during the south-west monsoon. The main part of the force was of necessity to be collected on the coast, where, during the first two months of the favourable season, viz. from 15th October to 15th December, ships cannot with safety ply. Any great delay in dispatching the armament would have given the enemy time to prepare for defence, and obstruct the passage of the river, whilst we should thereby have sacrificed the object contemplated of making an early move upon the capital, and should, in effect, have had to contend with the whole Burmese force, at a much later period of the year. Thus, the first cold season would have passed away without our being enabled to advance to Prome, and the ensuing season of the hot weather



Ava.  
1826.

weather and rains would still have overtaken our army at Rangoon, and have entailed all those hardships to which we are accused of wantonly exposing our gallant troops, by dispatching the expedition in April and May.

22. Your Honorable Court will, we trust pardon the digression we have fallen into in submitting the above general observations, on this the first occasion of our addressing you relative to the Burmah war; and should we happily succeed thereby in placing before you, in their real and just light, any of those points which have been so studiously assailed and misrepresented in the periodical publications of England, the object which we proposed to ourselves in entering upon them will be most fully and satisfactorily answered.

23. It may be proper to add, that such of the members of the present government as were not parties to the transactions above referred to, will not of course, by their signatures to this letter, be understood to express their personal knowledge of all the facts therein mentioned, or their original concurrence in measures which, at the time of their adoption, were not made known to them. But they have no hesitation in recording their unqualified acquiescence in the general views of policy which have been stated, with the sanction of the Right Honourable the Governor General, in this dispatch.

*No. 176.—From the Government Gazette of the 14th May, 1827.*

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, 14th MAY, 1827.

*Extract from a Letter from the Honorable the Court of Directors, dated the 17th January, 1827.*

We have great satisfaction in transmitting to you the following Resolutions, which were passed by the Court of Directors, on the 24th of November, and by the Court of Proprietors, on the 13th and 19th December last.

“RESOLVED,

“That the Thanks of this Court be given to the Right Honorable LORD AMHERST, Governor General, for his active, strenuous, and persevering exertions in conducting to a successful issue the late War with the Government of Ava, which was provoked by the unjust aggression of the enemy, prosecuted amid circumstances of very unusual difficulty, and terminated so as to uphold the character of the Company's Government, to maintain the British ascendant in India, and to impress the bordering States with just notions of the National Power and Resources.”

“RESOLVED UNANIMOUSLY,

“That the Thanks of this Court be given to Major General SIR THOMAS MUNRO, Bart. K. C. B., for the alacrity, zeal, perseverance and forecast, which he so signally manifested throughout the whole course of the late War, in contributing all the available Military and Territorial Resources of the Madras Government towards bringing it to a successful termination.

“RESOLVED UNANIMOUSLY,

“That the Thanks of this Court be given to Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, K. C. B., for the skill, gallantry, and perseverance, so conspicuously displayed by him, in conducting the operations of the Forces throughout the late arduous War, and which enabled him to surmount difficulties of no ordinary character, as well as for his judgment and forbearance in availing himself of every opening for Negotiations, which finally led to the happy termination of Hostilities.”

“RESOLVED UNANIMOUSLY,

“That the Thanks of this Court be given to the Brigadiers General, Brigadiers, Field and other Officers of His Majesty's and the Company's Forces, both European and Native, for their gallant and meritorious conduct in the Field, throughout the operations against the State of Ava.”

“RESOLVED UNANIMOUSLY,

“That this Court doth acknowledge and highly applaud the zeal, discipline, and bravery, together with the patient endurance of fatigue, privation, and sickness, displayed by the Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, both European and Native, employed against the Burmese, and that the Thanks of the Court be signified to them by the Officers of their respective Corps.”

“RESOLVED

“RESOLVED UNANIMOUSLY,

“That the Thanks of this Court be given to Commodore Sir James Brisbane, c. b. and to the Captains and Officers of His Majesty's and the Company's Ships, who co-operated with the Army in the Burmese War, for their cordial, zealous, and most useful exertions, and to the Crews of His Majesty's and Company's Ships and Boats employed in that service, for their spirited and intrepid conduct on all occasions, and that the Commander of His Majesty's Ships on the Indian Station be requested to communicate the Thanks of this Court to the Officers and men under his command.

Published by Command of His Excellency the Vice-President in Council,

GEORGE SWINTON, *Sec. to Govt.*

No. 177.—From the Government Gazette of the 11th June, 1827.

### FORT WILLIAM,

GENERAL DEPARTMENT, 7th JUNE, 1827.

The following Extract from the London Gazette of the 5th of December, 1826, is published for general information:

*Whitehall, 2d December, 1826.*

The King has been pleased to direct Letters Patent to be passed under the Great Seal, granting the Dignities of Viscount and Earl of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to WILLIAM PITT BARON AMHERST, Governor General of India, and the heirs male of his body lawfully begotten, by the names, styles, and titles, of Viscount HOLMESDALE, in the County of Kent, and Earl AMHERST of Arracan, in the East Indies.

By Order of the Right Honorable the Vice-President in Council,

C. LUSHINGTON, *Chief Sec. to the Govt.*

No. 178.—From the Government Gazette of the 8th October, 1827.

#### GENERAL ORDER BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF.

*Head-quarters, Calcutta, 5th October, 1827.*—The Right Honorable the Commander in Chief feels much gratification in publishing to the Army the following Resolutions passed unanimously by the House of Commons, on the 8th May last, conveying the Thanks of that portion of the British Legislature to the Officers and men of the Armies lately employed against Bhurtpore, and to the Officers and men of the Navy and Army lately employed in the Kingdom of Ava; and his Excellency directs, that they may be read and explained at the head of every Regiment in the Army:

MARTIS; 8° DIE MAII 1827.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That the Thanks of this House be given to General Lord Viscount Combermere, Knight Grand Cross of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, and Commander in Chief of the Forces in India, for his able and meritorious conduct, in the Command of the Forces employed against Bhurtpore, and particularly for the ability, judgment, and energy with which he planned and directed the assault of that Fortress, the success of which brilliant achievement has highly contributed to the honor of the British Arms, and to the permanent tranquillity of our possession in the East.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That the Thanks of this House be given to Major Generals Sir Thomas Reynell, Knight Commander of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, Sir Jasper Nicolls, k. c. b. and Sir Samford Whittingham, k. c. b., and to Brigadier Generals John Withington Adams, Companion of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, John McCombe, c. b. and James Wallace Sleigh, c. b., and to the several Officers of the Army, both European and Native, employed in the late operations against Bhurtpore, for their gallant conduct and meritorious exertions.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the zeal, discipline and bravery displayed by the Non-Commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, both European and Native, employed in the operations against Bhurtpore; and, that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several Corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That the Thanks of this House be given to Major General Sir Archibald Campbell, Knight Grand Cross of the Honorable Military Order of the Bath, for the valour and perseverance

severance displayed by him in the late operations against Ava, and for the eminent skill and judgment with which he conducted the War to an honorable termination, under circumstances of peculiar difficulty.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That the Thanks of this House be given to Brigadier Generals William Macbean, Companion of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, Willoughby Cotton, c. b. and Michael McCreagh, c. b., and to the several Officers of the Army, both European and Native, engaged in the late operations against Ava, for their indefatigable zeal and exertions throughout the War.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the zeal, discipline and bravery displayed by the Non-Commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, both European and Native, employed against the Troops of Ava; and, that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several Corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That the Thanks of this House be given to Commodore Sir James Brisbane, Knight Companion of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, for his cordial co-operations and the essential service rendered by him in the late operations against Ava.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That the Thanks of this House be given to the several Captains and Officers of His Majesty's and the East India Company's Naval Forces, employed in the late operations against Ava, for their skilful, gallant and meritorious exertions, which greatly contributed to the successful issue of the War.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the services of the Seamen and Marines, serving on board the Ships of His Majesty and the East India Company, employed in the late operations against Ava; and that the same be signified to them by the Captains of the several Ships, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour.\*

*Ordered*—That the said Resolutions be transmitted by Mr. Speaker, to Lord Viscount Combermere, and, that His Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein.

(Signed) H. H. LEY, *Cl. Dom. Com.*

By Order of His Excellency the Commander in Chief,

W. L. WATSON, *Adj. Genl. of the Army.*

No. 179.—*From the Government Gazette of the 14th Aug., 1826.*

GENERAL ORDERS BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

FORT WILLIAM; 3d August, 1826.

No. 170 A of 1826.—1. The Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, having taken into consideration the heavy losses and expences incurred by the Troops, European and Native, who were employed in the late War in Ava, Arracan, and the Sea Coast of the Burmese Territory, has been pleased to resolve, that a Donation of Six Months Full or Field rate of Batta, shall be granted to all the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates of Corps, Detachments, and Staff, (including permanent Establishments, not in receipt of increased rates of Pay for this Special Service,) who were employed for a period of not less than Twelve Months. This period to be calculated from the date of landing in the Burmese Territory, until the final termination of hostilities on the 24th February 1826, or re-entrance, which ever may have occurred first.

2. To the Officers and Men of the Ava and Arracan Forces, whose period of actual Service within the Burmese Territory falls short of Twelve Months, the Governor General in Council is pleased to grant a Donation of Three Months Batta.

3. His Lordship in Council is further pleased to grant the Donation of Six or Three Months Batta respectively, as the case may be, to such of the Officers and Men of the Flotillas employed in the Irrawaddy, and on the Coasts of Tenasserim and Arracan, as may not have drawn the Batta awarded by the Resolution of Government in the Secret Department, dated the 19th November, 1824. His indulgence of Batta to the Officers and Crews of the Flotillas, who may not have been included in the benefit of the Resolution of the 19th November, 1824, is limited to individuals on the regular Establishment of the Hon'ble Company. For those who were temporarily employed, suitable rates of Pay or Special Allowance were fixed, with reference to the nature of the Service for which they were engaged.

4. The

\* The same series of Resolutions was moved and carried, *Nem. Con.* in the House of Lords, on the 14th of May.



4. The Donation of Six and Three Months Batta, granted by these Orders, is extended to the Heirs or Assigns of Individuals entitled to receive it, who died or were killed on Service during the War, with exception to those of the Native Corps, for whom a special provision already exists, whereby the Families of deceased Sepoys, on foreign Service, receive a Pension from Government.

5. The rate of Batta to be regulated according to the Regimental Rank, in which the Individuals served at the conclusion of the War, or period of re-embarkation, as the case may be, unless entitled to a higher rate, annexed to Staff employment.

6. Corps, Detachments, or Individuals, who may have landed for the first time, in the Burmese Territory, subsequent to the termination of hostilities, are to have no claim to the Batta Donation.

7. Individuals who may have been employed with each Division of the Army, are to have the benefit of their collective actual Service, in claiming the higher rate of Donation, and Corps, &c. which may have been employed on more than one Division, during the War, (as in the case of His Majesty's 45th Foot,) are to regulate their claims accordingly.

8. Officers and Staff who have quitted the Army on Medical Certificate, or on public duty, and subsequently rejoined it before the conclusion of hostilities are, as a special indulgence, to have the benefit of the time of their absence taken into account, in claiming the larger share of Batta.

9. The claims of all detached Officers and Men, likewise all Absentees, are to be included in the Abstracts of Companies, Detachments or Departments. If Heirs, Assigns, or Agents are in India, the amount will be paid over accordingly under the order and responsibility of the Commanding Officer; otherwise the amount of all claims of this nature will be lodged in the General Treasury, until legally claimed.

10. The Batta bills, for the Donation of Six and Three Months respectively, will be referred for audit and adjustment to the Public Departments of the Presidencies, to which Corps, Departments, or Individuals respectively belong.

11. Each bill will be accompanied by a Nominal Roll of all Ranks drawn for in it, agreeably to the following Form; and Officers, &c. who may have been employed on the Staff, and whose Regiments were not serving with the Army, will prepare and submit separate Bills.

12. A Nominal Acquittance Roll of each Corps, Detachment and Department, will be prepared within One Month after the issue of the Donation, shewing the manner in which the distribution has been made, and the appropriation of all shares of Bantees or Casuals.

13. These Rolls will be deposited in the Military Audit Office, for future reference, in the event of disputed or additional claims being presented to the Donation.

14. The amount of the Batta Donation, will be debited to War Charges in Ava.

15. Any extra Batta already paid, or payable under Orders of the Government of Fort St. George, to the Troops of that Presidency, must be considered as forming part of the Batta Donation intended by these Orders, and be deducted accordingly.

*Roll of Officers, Staff, Non-Commissioned, Privates, and Public Establishments, belonging to Regiment who served with the Division of the Army during the Burmese War.*

Rank and Names.	Company or Department.	Date of landing within the Burmese territory.	Date of Re-embarkation.	Period of absence from duty, and on what account.	Date of Casualty and where.	Period of actual Service.			Remarks.
						Years.	Months.	Days.	
Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,..... &c. &c. &c.									
Establishments, .....									
„									

Examined,  
E. F.  
Adjutant.

A. B.  
Commanding the Company.  
C. D.  
Commanding the Regiment.

WM. CASEMENT, Lieut.-Col.  
Sec. to Govt. Mil. Dept.

Ava.  
1826.

severance displayed by him in the late operations against Ava, and for the eminent skill and judgment with which he conducted the War to an honorable termination, under circumstances of peculiar difficulty.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That the Thanks of this House be given to Brigadier Generals William Macbean, Companion of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, Willoughby Cotton, c. b. and Michael McCreagh, c. b., and to the several Officers of the Army, both European and Native, engaged in the late operations against Ava, for their indefatigable zeal and exertions throughout the War.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the zeal, discipline and bravery displayed by the Non-Commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, both European and Native, employed against the Troops of Ava; and, that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several Corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That the Thanks of this House be given to Commodore Sir James Brisbane, Knight Companion of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, for his cordial co-operations and the essential service rendered by him in the late operations against Ava.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That the Thanks of this House be given to the several Captains and Officers of His Majesty's and the East India Company's Naval Forces, employed in the late operations against Ava, for their skillful, gallant and meritorious exertions, which greatly contributed to the successful issue of the War.

*Resolved, Nemine Contradicente.*—That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the services of the Seamen and Marines, serving on board the Ships of His Majesty and the East India Company, employed in the late operations against Ava; and that the same be signified to them by the Captains of the several Ships, who are desired to thank them for their gallant behaviour.\*

*Ordered.*—That the said Resolutions be transmitted by Mr. Speaker, to Lord Viscount Combermere, and, that His Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein.

(Signed) J. H. LEY, *Cl. Dom. Com.*

By Order of His Excellency the Commander in Chief,

W. L. WATSON, *Adj. Genl. of the Army.*

No. 179.—From the Government Gazette of the 14th August, 1826.

GENERAL ORDERS BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

FORT WILLIAM; 3d August, 1826.

No. 170 A of 1826.—1. The Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, having taken into consideration the heavy losses and expences incurred by the Troops, European and Native, who were employed in the late War in Ava, Arracan, and the Sea Coast of the Burmese Territory, has been pleased to resolve, that a Donation of Six Months Full or Field rate of Batta, shall be granted to all the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates of Corps, Detachments, and Staff, (including permanent Establishments, not in receipt of increased rates of Pay for this Special Service,) who were so employed for a period of not less than Twelve Months. This period to be calculated from the date of landing in the Burmese Territory, until the final termination of hostilities on the 24th February 1826, or re-embarkation, which ever may have occurred first.

2. To the Officers and Men of the Ava and Arracan Forces, whose period of actual Service within the Burmese Territory falls short of Twelve Months, the Governor General in Council is pleased to grant a Donation of Three Months Batta.

3. His Lordship in Council is further pleased to grant the Donation of Six or Three Months Batta respectively, as the case may be, to such of the Officers and Men of the Flotillas employed in the Irrawaddy, and on the Coasts of Tenasserim and Arracan, as may not have drawn the Batta awarded by the Resolution of Government in the Secret Department, dated the 19th November, 1824. This indulgence of Batta to the Officers and Crews of the Flotillas, who may not have been included in the benefit of the Resolution of the 19th November, 1824, is limited to individuals on the regular Establishment of the Hon'ble Company. For those who were temporarily employed, suitable rates of Pay or Special Allowance were fixed, with reference to the nature of the Service for which they were engaged.

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\* The same series of Resolutions was moved and carried, Nem. Con. in the House of Lords, on the 14th of May.

4. The Donation of Six and Three Months Batta, granted by these Orders, is extended to the Heirs or Assigns of Individuals entitled to receive it, who died or were killed on Service during the War, with exception to those of the Native Troops, for whom a special provision already exists, whereby the Families of deceased Sepoys, on foreign Service, receive a Pension from Government.

5. The rate of Batta to be regulated according to the Regimental Rank, in which the Individuals served at the conclusion of the War, death, or period of re-embarkation, as the case may be, unless entitled to a higher rate, annexed to Staff employment.

6. Corps, Detachments, or Individuals, who may have landed for the first time, in the Burmese Territory, subsequent to the termination of hostilities, are to have no claim to the Batta Donation.

7. Individuals who may have been employed with each Division of the Army, are to have the benefit of their collective actual Service in claiming the higher rate of Donation, and Corps, &c. which may have been employed on more than one occasion, during the War, (as in the case of His Majesty's 45th Foot,) are to regulate their claims accordingly.

8. Officers and Staff who may have quitted the Army on Medical Certificate, or on public duty, and subsequently rejoined it before the conclusion of hostilities are, as a special indulgence, to have the benefit of the time of their absence taken into account, in claiming the larger share of Batta.

9. The claims of all deceased Officers and Men, likewise all Absentees, are to be included in the Abstracts of Companies, Detachments or Departments. If Heirs, Assigns, or Agents are in India, the amount will be paid over accordingly under the order and responsibility of the Commanding Officer; otherwise the amount of all claims of this nature will be lodged in the General Treasury, until legally claimed.

10. The Batta bills, for the Donation of Six and Three Months respectively, will be referred for audit and adjustment to the Public Departments of the Presidencies, to which Corps, Departments, or Individuals respectively belong.

11. Each bill will be accompanied by a Nominal Roll of all Ranks drawn for in it, agreeably to the following Form; and Officers, &c. who may have been employed on the Staff, and whose Regiments were not serving with the Army, will prepare and submit separate Bills.

12. A Nominal Acquittance Roll of each Corps, Detachment and Department, will be prepared within One Month after the issue of the Donation, shewing the manner in which the distribution has been made, and the appropriation of all shares of Absentees or Casuals.

13. These Rolls will be deposited in the Military Audit Office, for future reference, in the event of disputed or additional claims being preferred to the Donation.

14. The amount of the Batta Donation, will be debited to War Charges in Ava.

15. Any extra Batta already paid, or payable under Orders of the Government of Fort St. George, to the Troops of that Presidency, must be considered as forming part of the Batta Donation intended by these Orders, and be deducted accordingly.

*Roll of Officers, Staff, Non-Commissioned, Privates, and Public Establishments, belonging to Regiment who served with the Division of the Army during the Burmese War.*

Rank and Names.	Company or Department.	Date of landing within the Burmese territory.	Date of Re-embarkation.	Period of absence from duty, and on what account.	Date of Casualty and where.	Period of actual Service.			Remarks.
						Years.	Months.	Days.	
Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,..... &c. &c. &c.									
Establishments, .....									

Examined,  
E. P.  
Adjutant.

A. B.  
Commanding the Company.  
C. D.  
Commanding the Regiment.

WM. CASEMENT, Lieut.-Col.  
Sec. to Govt. Mily. Dept.



No. 180.—*From the Government Gazette of the 25th October, 1827.*

GENERAL ORDER BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

FORT WILLIAM, *19th October, 1827.*

No. 216 of 1827.—It affords the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, peculiar pleasure to announce, that the discipline, energy, and gallantry, manifested by the European and Native Troops employed in the late operations against the State of Ava, have been highly and justly appreciated by the Honorable the Court of Directors; and that as a token of the favorable sentiments they entertain of the brilliant services achieved by those who had special opportunities of distinguishing themselves, and as a proof of the approbation with which they regard the zeal, courage, and patient perseverance evinced by all, in a manner so eminently calculated to sustain the character of the British Arms, the Honorable Court have been pleased to award to the Troops which served in Ava and Arracan, a further Donation of equal amount to that which was conferred by the Supreme Government in General Orders No. 170 A, of the 3d of August, 1826, and in the same proportions: viz. Six Months' Full Batta for a service, in those Territories, of One Year and upwards, and Three Months Full Batta for a service of any period less than a year.

In giving effect to this Resolution of the Home Authorities, the Governor General in Council is pleased to declare, that the benefits of this further Donation, spontaneously granted by the Honorable Court, are extended to all who were entitled to the indulgence conceded in the above-cited General Orders, the provisions of which are to be considered applicable, in all their specifications, to the issue now sanctioned.

W. CASEMENT, *Lieut.-Col.*

*Secy. to Govt. Milly. Dept.*

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# APPENDIX.

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## TOPOGRAPHICAL AND STATISTICAL NOTICES.

(FROM THE CALCUTTA GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, &c.)

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No. 1.—From the Government Gazette, May 9, 1825.

*Asam.*—*The Burrampooter.*—The late operations to the eastward have already added materially to our knowledge of the countries in that direction, and will lead to the most important improvements in their geography.—Among the objects of the first interest is the real source of the Burrampooter, which there is reason to think will require a correction very analogous to that made in the origin of the Ganges, and which, by cutting off several hundred miles of a singularly and improbably devious course, will be found much nearer to the plains, through which it flows, than has hitherto been imagined. The Burrampooter has been identified with the *San-po*, which the Chinese geographers traced through Great Tibet, running from west to east.—They lost it on its turn to the south, but the Jesuit Missionaries very justly concluded, that it must pour its waters into the Bay of Bengal. In conformity with this notion, M. D'Anville was disposed to think it the same with the river of Ava, or Irrawaddy. He was, probably, in the right. Major Rennell, however, connected the *San-po* at its bend with the Burrampooter, in consequence of his tracing its course in 1765, from the east,—and not, as before represented, from the north. The enquiries to which this discovery led, furnished him with an account of its general course, to within one hundred miles of the place where Du Halde left the *San-po*; on which he adds, “I could no longer doubt that the Burrampooter and *San-po* were one and the same river”—and to this was added the positive assurances of the Asamese, that their river came from the north-west, through the Bootan mountains.—The Ava river Major Rennell identifies with the *Now Kian* river of Yunan.

The connexion of the *San-po* and Burrampooter is, however, upon Major Rennell's own showing, entirely conjectural, and it does not follow that, because the streams were traced to within one hundred miles of each other, they were the same. At any rate, if the same, we must conclude that the Burrampooter, after flowing many hundred miles, must be a deep, broad and stately stream, unless we can imagine any such diversion of its waters as would amount, indeed, to the different direction of the main river, whilst the Burrampooter was only an inconsiderable branch. The *San-po*, where left by the Chinese, is called a very large river—and the name itself, *San-po*—is said to imply *The River par excellence*. How happens it, then, upon entering Asam, to have lost all claim to such a character, and to be little more than a hill torrent, with only three or four feet of water in its greatest depth. Such, at least, appears to be the case, by the following communication from Lieutenant Burlton.—The width is rather considerable, it is true, but not sufficient to authorise the idea, that the stream has travelled some six or seven hundred miles.

Lieutenant Burlton's letter is dated “on the river Burrampooter, N. latitude 27° 54'—E. longitude 95° 24', March 31st, 1825. He reports, that he had that day got as high up the river as it was navigable—the bed of the river was a complete mass of rocks, with only a depth of three or four feet of water in the deepest

Asam.

part, the rapidity of the current was also so great, that no boat could track against it, putting the danger of striking on the rocks out of the question. He considers it as about the size of the Kullung river, (one hundred and fifty yards across) and the extreme banks as being not more than six hundred yards apart. Lieutenant Burlton regrets that he could not proceed further, either by land or water.—It was represented to be at least ten days journey to the Bramah Koond, and he had but a few days provisions left.—What he had learnt respecting the course of the river above was, “that it runs easterly till it reaches the lowest range of mountains, (Lieutenant Burlton could see this range, and supposed it to be about fifty miles distant) where it falls from a perpendicular height of about one hundred and twenty feet, and forms a large *bottomless* bay, which is called the Bramah Koond.”—Above the low range are some high mountains, which are covered with snow, and from the narrowness of the water, he imagined that the source of the Burrampooter must be there, as it seemed very improbable, such a small body of water could run the distance it is represented or supposed to do.—From what the natives said respecting the Seeree, Serbit, or Irrawuddy, Lieutenant Burlton was inclined to think that that river rises at the same place.

*No. 2.—From the Government Gazette, June 9, 1825.*

*Course of the Burrampooter.*—In our paper of the 9th ultimo, we offered some observations on the course of the Burrampooter, founded on an extract from a letter from Lieutenant Burlton, who had traced that river as far as it was navigable. The following communication respecting the Burrampooter and the country adjacent, is from another source:

Quitting the mouth of the Dikho river, which runs to Rungpore and Ghurgong, the course of the Burrampooter upwards is in a northerly direction, gradually inclining to east for a considerable distance, having on its left bank, deep jungle of high trees, marking the sites of former populous villages, laid waste by the Burmese and Singphos.

On the right bank is the Mojoulee, or island formed by the two branches of the river, which, separating at this point, unite at Sotal Paat, near Maura Mookh; on it are also found the remains of villages, of which Rütunpore alone is thinly inhabited.

After a certain space the mouth of the Booree Dheeing river appears, which runs to Borhath, Digglee ghaut, and Jypoor, on the road to the Ava territory, and furnishes water carriage thus far; thence it strikes into the heart of the Singphoh country, and finally unites with the Now Dheeing, not far from Beesagoong, also on the Burmese route. Continuing on the left bank, which is every where covered by deep forest jungle, the mouth of the Dibooroo nullah presents itself, marking the boundary of Asam proper, from the tributary territory and tribe of the Moraus, or Mowamareeahs.

The limits of this tract are bounded on the south by the Booree Dheeing river, on the west, by a line drawn between that stream and the mouth of the Dibooroo, on the north, by the Burrampooter or Luhit, and on the east, by a line drawn from the Dheeing to a point opposite the Seddeea district. The inhabited portions are on the banks of the Dibooroo, which takes its rise near the S. E. angle, and intersects, diagonally, the entire tract. The inhabitants are Hindoos, worshipping Vishnoo alone, and are subject to one Chief, called the Burseeaputtee, whose present place of residence is Rungagora, a point nearly central. He has successfully maintained his independence, and defended his country from ravage, during all the late convulsions, as well from the Burmese as the Singphos, and all the neighbouring predatory tribes. He has thoroughly embraced our interest, and seems well deserving of confidence.

Returning to the right bank from the head of the Mojoulee, the river pursues a tract now quite barren, desolate, and covered with trees and jungle, until it draws near the first line of hills, and enters on the country peopled by the tribe of Meerees, a nearly barbarous hill race, rudely armed with bows and arrows, and differing altogether in language, appearance, and habits, from the inhabitants of Asam proper. They have some villages on the bank, of which the first visible is Motgong, and shortly after Meereegong. They are very expert in the management of the bow, and make use of a deadly vegetable poison to arm their arrows, which grows in the hills of the Abor and Meeshmee tribes, and is much prized. They use it also to kill wild animals: the flesh of which is not rendered unwholesome by its operation. The Meerees are in the interest of the Seddeea Gohcin, and opposed to the Singphos.

Soon after passing Meereegong, (still on the right bank) the river washes Sillance Mookh, so called from the numerous stones and fragments of rock, washed down from the hills by the Dibong and Dibong rivers, which soon after empty themselves into the Luhit; these rise and flow from perceptible openings in the high chain of hills to the northward, and considerably contribute to the mass of the river, which, after passing their mouths, diminishes materially in bulk and importance.

After a further space, we reach the mouth of the Koondeel nullah, on which is situated the town of Seddeea, in the district of the same name.

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This district is also properly tributary to Asam, but now nearly laid waste, and inhabited principally by refugee Khangtis and Mulocks, driven by the Singphos from their original countries to the south-east. It is governed by the Seddeea Khaw, a Gohein; a Khangti prince, claiming the same descent from the god Indra, with the Rajahs of Asam; the chiefs of the Mowamareeahs, Moonkoong, Shaum, &c. &c. &c. He worships the Hindoo deities according to the Asamese heresy, but has abandoned all prejudices, except in abstaining from the flesh of cows. He appears to have no force, but has been enabled to make a stand against the Singphos by means of his auxiliaries the Meerees, Abors, and other hill tribes: he is accused, however, with justice, of having contributed in no small proportion to the plunder of Asam along the line of his frontier.

Returning to the left bank, opposite Seddeea, where ends the Mowamareeah country, commences that of the Singphos, marked, if possible, by even deeper jungle, and further on, we reach the entrance of the Now Dheeing river, which intersects it flowing from the south-east hills, (on the opposite side of which lies the Khangti country,) and throwing off the Booree Dheeing (before mentioned) in its course.—The Theinga nulla also runs through the Singpho country.

The Singpho sates, which were formerly tributary to Asam, now occupy the entire space bounded by the south and south-east hills, on the north by the Luhit, and west by a meridian line, drawn from Seddeea to the hills, excluding Theokh and Makoom, and cutting the Deepung nulla.

They are divided into twelve distinct and independent villages, or cantons, (of which Beesagong is the most powerful,) governed by their chiefs called Ghæe Gaum, and acting separately, in concert, or adversely, as circumstances or inclination may dictate.

They are professedly Bhuddists, but have no repugnance to taking the lives of animals, which the former never personally resort to, unless driven to necessity. Their native arms are the Dhow, a short square-ended sword, with an oblong wooden shield, and the bow; but they are partial to musquets, of which they have a few, but are almost entirely ignorant of the use of them.

The lofty lines of hills extending along the north-west, north and east, are inhabited by the Abors and Meeshmees, populous tribes, differing little in character from the Meerees, and others of the mountain race, of whom I have hitherto been able to gain but little information.

But the object of greatest interest to topographical science is, a clear and distinct opening in the lower lofty ranges, bearing due east, behind which is pointed out by all ranks and classes, the Brahmakhoond, or reservoir, whence flows the Burrampooter, and distant from hence not more than forty or fifty miles—six days journey.

It was formerly, in more tranquil times, a place of very extensive pilgrimage, and is still held by all Hindoos, in universal sanctity.

The stream is described as taking its rise from a circular basin, or well, in the side of the mountain, beneath the snowy region, while behind, and above it, rise stupendous ranges of impracticable transit.

Having been favored with a sight of the Geographical sketch of the tract above described, we shall endeavour to make the direction of the Burrampooter more intelligible by adverting to the latitude and longitude of some of the places mentioned in tracing its course upwards. The Burrampooter, from the mouth of the Dikho river to the Theinga nulla, presents an outline, from left to right, similar to about three-fifths of an arch—Dikho being in north latitude about  $27^{\circ} 2'$ , longitude about  $94^{\circ} 10'$ , and the Theinga nulla in latitude  $27^{\circ} 45'$ , longitude  $95^{\circ} 24'$ .

The eastern extremity of the Mojoulee, in this chart, is placed in latitude about  $27^{\circ} 20'$ , and longitude  $94^{\circ} 24'$ , and in the map in Hamilton's Hindoostan, the eastern part is in latitude  $27^{\circ} 20'$ —and longitude  $95^{\circ} 30'$ . But the Mojoulee of the present chart, appears to be an island of little more than twenty miles long by four wide, between the bifurcation of the Burrampooter, whilst the Majuli island of Hamilton extends about two degrees from east to west, and is formed between the Burrampooter and Dihing rivers. Now, as the Booree Dheeing, or Dihing river, in the chart before us, branches off from the Burrampooter at about latitude  $27^{\circ} 24'$ , longitude  $94^{\circ} 25'$ , and runs to the eastward, leaving between it and the Burrampooter a tract of country extending about forty to fifty miles by one hundred, inhabited by the Mowamareeahs and Singphos, it is probable that this is the true Majuli, noted in Hamilton's map. The eastern extremity of the Mojoulee in this chart, and the western extremity of Hamilton's Majuli, are within a short distance of each other. The Booree Dheeing river is the northern boundary of Asam proper.

The Dihong and Dibong rivers, rising in the hills to the north, empty themselves into the Burrampooter, in latitude  $27^{\circ} 50'$ , longitude  $95^{\circ} 6'$ . Beyond the Theinga nulla, the Burrampooter has not been traced on the present survey, but the opening in the mountains to the Brahmakhoond, the source of the Burrampooter, seen in the distance, is laid down about fifty miles due east from the river at Theinga nulla, and in latitude  $25^{\circ} 45'$ , longitude  $96^{\circ}$ . A rowsmith places the portion of the Burrampooter above described, about a degree and a half of latitude further south than the present account.

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On a future occasion, we hope to be able to give a more complete report, and a map of the course of the Burrumpooter through the countries northward of Asam.

*No. 3.—From the Government Gazette, June 20, 1825.*

*Asam.*—The tract of country on this side of the hills now occupied by the Singphos, was originally part of Asam, and inhabited by native subjects of that government; these were dispossessed by the encroachments of their hill neighbours, during the civil commotions, commencing with a period of about forty years, until the latter eventually established themselves on the fertile low-lands which they at present hold. As utter havoc and desolation marked their progress, they formed new settlements, bearing the names of their original seats in the hills, or more properly speaking, the designation of the Chief, by which it appears their place of residence is always known.

In consequence of this circumstance, some trifling errors were committed in the former report, and this mistake chiefly arose from the resemblance of sound, in the terminations, to Gong, a village, which should be properly Gaum, a Chief, as Beeshagaum, (Ghaegaum, or village of the) Chief of the clan Beesah. Beesah being an hereditary patronymic, the same with Defha-gaum, Luttaogaum, &c., which were throughout considered erroneously as mere local appellations.

The division into twelve cantons, Gaums, is also not strictly correct, though the term is still used to express the whole collected body of the Singphos, since there are numerous villages in excess unattached. The clans of Beesah, Defha, Luttora and Luttua, are considered as of most weight, but have no authority, by right, over the others, though very much influencing them. The Singphos appear to have subsisted almost entirely on the plunder of the low-lands, when confined to their native hills, and do not now employ themselves either in pastoral or agricultural labours, which are carried on entirely by their Asamese, slaves, to whom they are not supposed to bear the proportion of one to twenty, the whole of upper Asam, as far down as Joorhath, having been nearly drained of its inhabitants by unceasing rapine, and whole villages, if not districts, carried into captivity in each foray.

By means of some Khangtis, originally from the Bor Khangty country, Lieutenant Neufville has been able to give some more intelligence respecting the rivers. The Bor Khangty territory, before remarked, lies in a direction from this spot a little to the south of east, on the other side of the high snowy hills of the Brahmakhoond. These ranges he now finds extend back to a far greater depth than he had at first supposed, and, he is assured, to a far higher altitude than any of those now visible. The Burrumpooter, or Lahit, accessible only as far as the reservoir of the Brahmakhoond, (unless, perhaps, to the hill Mee-lmees,) takes its original rise very considerably to the eastward, issuing from the snow at one of the loftiest of the ranges; thence it falls, a mere mountain rivulet, to the basin of the Brahmakhoond, which receives also the tribute of three streams from the Meeshmee hills, called Juljung, Tisseek, and Digaroo. From the opposite side of the same mountains, which give the primal rise to the Burrumpooter, the Khangtis state that the Irrawaddy takes its source, running south, intersecting their country, and flowing to the Ava empire. This theory of the sources of the streams is thought by far the most probable; and it agrees more with the general accounts and the geographical features of the country.

A little to the northward of east, (the opening of the Brahmakhoond,) is another less defined dip in the lofty line of the Meeshmee hills, through which Lieutenant Neufville has received a route, accessible to mountaineers, of twenty days to the country of the Lama.

There is said also to exist a passage somewhere through the Abor hills to Nipal, but he could find no one able to give him satisfactory intelligence on that head.

Lieutenant Neufville has received a map of part of the Abor country, in which the names of places are probably correct, but as he could by no means make it agree with the cardinal points, it was of no use without some explanation.

*No. 4.—From the Government Gazette, June 23, 1825.*

*Asam.*—Accounts from Rungpore, in Asam, notice the escape and return of an Asamese, who had been taken prisoner about three months ago by a party of Singphos, after an attack on his native village, Kalloogong. He was conveyed by them to Jypore, from thence to Coozoogong, and afterwards to Beesagong, where he was compelled to till the ground and cut grass. At Beesagong, an immense quantity of grain had been collected, and on asking the reason, he was told that two or three thousand Burmese, and as many Singphos, were expected to attack the British force in Asam. There is a stockade at Beesagong, about one hundred and fifty yards long, with a ditch on both sides, and the walls six feet high. Beesagong seems to be about one hundred miles north-east of Rungpore.

The country on the northern frontier of Asam promises to be carefully explored, and, in addition to the report, illustrated by the map, which we published on Monday, we have now to notice the journal of a route from Rungpore to Jypore, by Lieutenant Jones, of the Quarter Master General's Department. This route generally may be readily traced on the map.

On leaving Rungpore on the 6th of May, Lieutenant Jones proceeded in a direction nearly east, on a high bund road;—about the sixth mile the bund was broken, and intersected by a jheel, too broad to throw a bridge across during the march. The country to Raja ka Talow was open, but no bund excepting close to the Talow, where there was also a pukka bridge over a small stream.

Encamped at Rosa ma ka Talow, computed distance eleven miles.

On leaving Rosa ma ka Talow on the 7th, the road to the Dekow river was through a swamp for two miles. One or two villages to the right and left were visible. After leaving the swamp, proceeded through a thick tree jungle, for about a mile, which brought the detachment to the banks of the Dekow, where the Bildar's establishment were constructing a raft to cross the men and baggage;—the river was running very strong, and from sixty to seventy yards broad, and very deep.—It took six hours to cross the detachment and baggage, although a rope was rurt across to prevent the raft from being carried down by the stream. On leaving the Dekow, passed through another mile of thick tree jungle, after which the country became open, but there was no bund whatever. The road ran through a jheel for about six miles, from one to three feet deep, which fatigued the troops exceedingly, and it was with difficulty they could prevent their cartouch-boxes from getting wet. On leaving the swamp, came upon a fine bund road, in excellent repair, and about fifteen feet above the level of the jheel, which was on both sides of it. Having proceeded about a mile and a quarter on this bund, came to a bridge over the Zizacooma. This bridge was in good repair, consisting of three arches, and built principally of stone;—after having passed over the bridge, the bund does not continue, but meets another at right angles (the regular road from Ghergong)—the road to Burhath is to the right, or nearly due east.—Encamped near the bridge, computed distance about eleven miles and a quarter.

Owing to heavy rain, and the cattle being much fatigued, the detachment did not leave the ground before half-past three p. m. on the eighth. The bund was broken in a few places, the water which divides it being very deep. A bridge of trees might be made in a day or two, but during the march it was impracticable, as there was no timber procurable within a quarter of a mile. A bridge was made just sufficient to enable the troops to cross. On either side of the bund there was a running stream; to the right, the Zizacooma nulla, and beyond, jheels, thick tree, and bamboo jungle. After having proceeded for three miles, the bund was good, and only broken in one place, which, in the rains, would require a bridge to be thrown over, or a Seringa stationed, to enable people to cross. This was the only breach of consequence between the first three miles already mentioned, and the Seera Poohree ka Talow, about three miles more. Encamped at the Seera Poohree ka Talow; very little ground for the detachment. Computed distance about six miles—direction E. and by N. and N.

On leaving the Talow on the 9th, for the two first miles, the bund was in very good repair; where broken, it was intersected by running streams; the country much the same as yesterday's march, jheels on each side—and now and then tree jungle; the bund now becomes very low, not being more than one foot above the level of the jheel.—About two miles further on, the road runs near a small hill to the right, and then becomes very thick, consisting of tree and bamboo jungle; the bund still very much broken in many places, and it would require several days to make a bridge sufficiently strong enough for horses and bullocks over a single break. The Chippera river is about two miles further on, the detachment attempted to cross on the rafts that had been constructed by the Bildars, but the current was running so very rapidly, from the quantity of rain which had fallen, that the raft became unmanageable; the detachment therefore encamped on the banks of the river.—Computed distance six miles—direction N. E.

In the mean time, with the assistance of a party of Nagahs who were encamped on the opposite side, several large trees were cut down, and after some difficulty, one was thrown across the Chippera; about two hundred yards further up, a bamboo railing was also made, which made it perfectly safe, but the baggage, ammunition, and provisions were not passed until five o'clock p. m., the next day, the 10th. This river is about one hundred feet broad and twelve feet deep. At five o'clock p. m., the provisions and all the baggage were ready, and the detachment moved off.—The road, at first, was through a thick tree jungle.—About a mile from the Chippera, there was a nulla, not much water in it, but very deep, and in the rains it would require a bridge, which might be made in a day with thirty men. To the right of the road, after leaving the thick tree jungle, there was high ground, or a line of hillocks, about a quarter of a mile from the bund; to the left, the ground was swampy and more open; the Tancook river is about six miles from the Chippera,—near the river, as usual, a belt of jungle,—the bund was broken in about ten places during this short distance—encamped on the banks of the Tancook river. Computed distance about six miles—direction nearly N. E.

In the morning of the 11th May, found the river was not to be forded by the elephants, so a raft was constructed of large dimensions, which was ready at twelve a. m., but all the baggage was not got over until sun set.

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Every thing being ready, on the 12th May, the detachment moved off. About half a mile from the river, observed the road branch off in two directions, the one to the left leading to Jeypoor. The bund appeared, as far as the eye could reach, much higher, broaded, and in better order, than the one to the right, which led to Burhath. About a mile further, there was an extensive break in the bund, three feet deep, which took the troops half an hour to get through. The country was now open, here and there, with clumps of tree jungle, there was also a tank of good water, but the bund was hardly broad enough to encamp a company upon. The country to the left was open for nearly a mile, but the whole was a deep jheel. The remains of several old villages were to be met with, and the ground in many places appeared to have been cultivated about a year ago.—The Pongmore river is about twelve miles from the Tancook, it is about fifty or sixty feet broad, and about two feet deep, but the banks are very high.—This river had a tree-bridge thrown across it.—There are also several small nullas which intersect the road, and have been made passable for troops, but it would have required much time to make any thing more than was just sufficient to bear the men. Two miles further on, came to a dry open piece of ground, sufficient to encamp a regiment. There was a running stream also just at hand. Encamped on the above-mentioned spot. Computed distance about fourteen miles—direction N. E.

The bund was intersected five or six times, by a deep nulla, for the first mile, and the jungle was very thick on both sides of the road, consisting of trees and bamboos. About the fourth mile, there was a small tank on the left hand side of the road, after which the bund takes a direction more easterly. The country again becomes more open, the ground undulating, with clumps of trees here and there; the bund is broken in many places, but not to any extent. After having proceeded on for two miles further, the road runs in a northerly direction, but the nature of the country does not alter. Burhath is about eight miles from the last encamping ground. Computed distance about eight miles.

With regard to the localities of Burhath, it is said, that there is not much tree jungle which might not be easily cleared. The grass jungle is excessively thick and heavy, and from five to eight feet high. There are old stockades to the right and left of the road, but none of the bamboo or wood-work is remaining, but the banks, or walls, are about two feet high; the ditch outside is four or five feet deep and six broad.

The one to the right was ordered to be cleared of the grass jungle for the detachment to encamp on. The stockade was about fifty yards from the river, but two large for the detachment to defend it, in case of attack from an enemy greatly superior in numbers. The Dassing, at this point, is from ninety to one hundred yards broad, it was fordable on the 13th and 14th May, but on the night of the 15th, it rose three feet. About three coss further up the river, to the east, the river is said to fall over a precipice, from forty to fifty feet high, and that it is only navigable for Seringas above Burhath. To the south-east of Burhath, about seven miles distant, there are two villages on a low range of hills, about seventy or eighty feet above the level of the plain. These were visited; one (Tasial) contains about one hundred and fifty men, women, and children, the other (Lepperar) about one hundred. There are also several other villages to the east of these, all inhabited by Asamese, driven away from the plains near Burhath, by the frequent parties of the Singphos, who have lately made it a practice to plunder and burn every village they can find. The names of some of the villages are as follows,—Lowdung, Dowponnea, and Namsung; there are also several Nagah villages within one and two days' journey from Burhath. The Asamese seem to be on friendly terms with the Nagah villagers near them; some of the villages are inhabited by both people. The country near the hills is cultivated a little;—the hills are not more than a mile from Burhath, from which they bear east.

Lieutenant Jones crossed the Dassing on the 16th of May, with the intention of proceeding to Jypore. For the first two miles there is a pathway leading through a grass plain, rather swammy, after which he came to the skirts of the hills, and passed through a very thick jungle, composed of thick trees, bamboo, and cane. He found the road dry; it was intersected every half mile by small streams; the direction nearly due north.—There were evident signs of Singphos having passed on this road only a few days before; the jungle was so excessively thick, that the elephants could with difficulty proceed.—After having made eight miles, the guide, by some mischance, missed the pathway, and, with all his endeavours, he was not able to regain it before late in the day. Lieutenant Jones was, therefore, under the necessity of returning to Burhath. The next morning he dispatched an intelligent Naick, with a party of reconnoissance, and twelve guides; they reached Jeypoor about one P. M., and returned in the evening. They state, that Jeypoor is six coss from Burhath. They saw where the elephants had gone the day before; it was about two coss further on; the latter part of the road through a jheel two feet deep.

They describe Jeypoor, as being about half the size of Rungpoor. It has four gateways, one in the centre of each face—the fort is nearly square, but overgrown with grass and reed jungle. The mud walls, they state, are in good repair, about four or five hauts high, and eight or ten broad; the ditch outside, is about six feet deep, besides what water may be in it, and fifteen or twenty feet broad. The fort of Jeypoor is about one hundred and fifty yards from the Bur Dheeing, which river is from two hundred yards to three hundred yards broad. There were no villages to be seen, nor did they meet any body on the road; neither was there any appearance

appearance of any Singphos having been lately encamped near Jeypore. The remains of several Tacoor barrees were to be seen inside the fort, but the grass had all been blown off from the roofs.

No. 5.—From the Government Gazette, February 2, 1826.

*Asam.*—We have been favored with the perusal of the Journal of an excursion up the *Diheng* river, and have much satisfaction in laying before our readers extracts from a communication so well calculated to extend the limits of geographical knowledge. The uncertainty that prevails with regard to the origin of the *Brahmaputra*, and its tributary streams, invests all researches, tending to throw light upon the subject, with peculiar interest at the present moment.

The *Brahmaputra*, just before it passes into the western portion of Asam, is formed, as is well known, of the united streams the *Lauhit* (Lauhitya, or Red river) and the *Diheng*: the former, according to the Hindus, is the *Brahmaputra* proper, and rises in the mountains from the *Brahmakoon*d, the reservoir of *Brahma*, of whom the river is fabled to have been the Son. The latter has been, hitherto, considered to be a branch of the same river, descending from a common source; but this is rendered very improbable by late investigations, and it appears to originate in a separate spring, either in the mountains or beyond them.

Both branches of the *Brahmaputra* receive a variety of feeders, the *Diheng* from the south chiefly, the *Lauhit* from the north. One of the latter is also called *Diheng*, or *Dihong*, if the information received be correct. Buchanan calls it *Dikrong*. It would be very advisable to determine whether these words have any meaning in the dialect of the country, that we may not confound names which are only similar in sound, and which, perhaps, are really less alike even in sound, than they appear to be, from our imperfect expression of words imperfectly enunciated.

Along the banks of the northern *Diheng*, and in the mountains whence it flows, reside the tribes called *Abur* and *Bor Abur*—the names of the people we have heard of before, but their site was very inaccurately defined, Buchanan placing them east of *Sodiya* and south of the *Brahmaputra*: he does not seem to have had more correct information of their character, as he states, that they are considered as cannibals by their neighbours, and that they have little intercourse with Asam. These observations will the better enable us to appreciate the following Journal; and for its further elucidation, we may refer to the sketch of the course of the *Brahmaputra*, published with our Journal of the 20th last June.

JOURNAL.—November 18th. Advanced up the *Deheng* river, the course of which is free from stones and rocks, and is mild and tranquil: the sands as frequent as in the *Brahmaputra*: Deer on the banks numerous: passed the mouth of the *Dipeng* river at 3 P. M.; a deserted *Meeree* village on each side of its debouche: met a *Dinghi*, with an Asamese on board, who had left *Suddea* in the morning, and had come through a branch of the *Kundil*, which falls into the *Dipeng*, at a short distance from its junction with the *Diheng*.

Nov. 19. No material obstacle encountered in this day's navigation, but stones are now plentiful, and sands decreased: the hills appear nigh at hand, and a remarkable break in the range occurs, whence, probably, the stream issues.

Nov. 20. The rapids increase, and some of them troublesome: passed a communicating branch of the *Lali* river.

Nov. 21. The rapids continue to obstruct the navigation: in passing them, it is necessary to get out in order to lighten the boat, and to assist in pushing it against the current—in these places, the bed of the river is shallow, but there is no want of water in its general course. The river here takes a decided turn to the N. W. Deer and buffaloes numerous, as well as the large water fowl called *Kiwari*. Musk beetles very annoying. The view of the hills is now so near, that the trees on the first range are plainly distinguishable, as well as the colour of the foliage, and the patches that have been cleared for cultivation: no habitation yet seen.

Nov. 22. After tolerable progress, arrived at 4 P. M. near *Pasial*, an *Abur* village on the right bank, at some distance inland, and the limit of the excursion, the Raja and people of the village opposing any further progress, on the plea, that the *Aburs* higher up the river, being on unfriendly terms with them, would, no doubt, endanger the safety of any who should have visited *Pasial* as friends.—It was therefore necessary to return after a stay of two days, and with such information as was to be obtained from the natives, who, though obstinate on the score of a further advance, and troublesome, from their rude habits and childish curiosity, were, on the whole, amicable and communicative.

The hills on the right bank of the river belong to the *Pasial* and *Maiyeng Aburs*, and those on the left, to *Padow*, *Silloo*, *Meboo*, and *Golimar*—enmity, though not actual warfare, subsists between the tribes of the two banks. The *Pasial Aburs* were armed respectably enough; every man had a bow and quiver of arrows; such of the latter as were intended against an enemy, being poisoned. He also carried either a light spear, or the heavy sharp sword, the *Dhao* of the *Sinphos*. The *Aburs* are not particular in their diet, and eat the flesh of the elephant, rhinoceros, hog, buffalo, kid, and deer, as well as ducks and fowls, but they expressed an

an abhorrence of feeders on beef. They exhibited also a marked predilection for brandy, although some of them gave the preference to a spirituous liquor, which, it appears, they distill themselves. Salt, cloth, and tobacco, were in great request amongst them. There seemed to be few traces of religion, although they are said to immolate animals at the shrine of a deity called Ap-hoom, whose temple is beyond the country of the Bor-Aburs: they make occasional offerings at home, and believe that disease is only the consequence of neglecting to propitiate this divinity. The name being given orally alone, is not, perhaps, very correctly expressed, but the termination *Hoom*, or *Hum*, is a common particle of mystical import in use with the followers of the Tantras and the Baudhdhas of Tibet. Reverence of the cow, however, indicates a leaning to Hinduism.

The dress of the *Aburs* consists, principally, of an article called *Churia*, made with the bark of the *Uddal* tree. It answers the double purpose of a carpet to sit upon, and the native *Dhoti*; it is tied round the loins, and hangs down behind in loose strips, about fifteen inches long, like a white bushy beard. It serves also as a pillow at night. The rest of their dress is, apparently, matter of individual taste. Beads round the neck were not uncommon; some wore plain cane basket caps, some had the cane caps partly covered with skins, and others wore them ornamented with stained hair, like our helmets, and resembling the head dresses of the *Sinhfos*. Almost every man had some article of woollen dress, varying from a rudely-made blanket waistcoat, to a comfortable and tolerably well-shaped cloak. One of these, of a figured pattern, was made with sleeves, although these were of no advantage to the wearer; it was said to come from the country of the Bor-Aburs; the texture was good, though coarse, as was that of a red cloak worn by the *Raja*.

The *Aburs* seem to have been in the habit of levying contributions on their low-land and less martial neighbours of *Asam*, and to have resented any irregularity in their payment, by predatory incursions, carrying off the people prisoners. Several *Asamese* captives were found amongst the *Aburs* of *Pasial*, some of whom had been so long amongst them, as to have become completely reconciled to their condition.

#### No. 6.—*Voyage up the Dipeng, &c.*

Although not so much the object of interest, as the most westerly of the two principal feeders of the *Brahmaputra* from the north, the *Diheng*, or *Dihong*, a knowledge of that to the east, the *Dibeng*, or *Di-bong*, is indispensable to complete the geography of this part of *Asam*. Hitherto, little notice has been taken of this stream, but the deficiency is now supplied by an account of a survey of its course by Captain *Bedford*, in 1825, after returning from his attempt to explore the course of the *Dehong*, in the end of November: the following is an abstract of his report:—

On the 4th December, Captain *Bedford* entered the mouth of the *Dipeng*: the water was beautifully clear, running in a bottom of sand and stone. On the 5th, a shallow, or bar, was crossed, above which the stream was much obstructed by the trunks of trees brought down by the current. The river continued deep, and although several rapids were encountered, they were passed without much trouble—numerous traces of buffaloes, deer, and leopards, were observed, and also of elephants, which last had not been seen along the *Dihong*, nor on one of its feeders, the *Lalee*. Amongst the trees on the banks, were several of which the wood is serviceable in the construction of houses and boats, as the *Saoo* and *Soleanna*. The *Demooroo* yields a bark, which is eaten by the *Asamese* with paun.

On the 6th, at 11 A. M., the most formidable rapid that had been met with, was passed with much difficulty, and on the following day, a shallow, extending across the river, over which the boats were forced. On the 8th, the part of the river reached, was wide, and separated into many narrow and rapid streams—in the forenoon, the mouth of the *Bhanga Nadi* was passed, so named by the fishermen, from an idea, that it is a branch of the *Dipeng* which forces its way through the forest, but, according to other information, it is a distinct stream flowing from the hills. It was not navigable even for canoes, but the mouth was one hundred and fifty yards broad, and, if it rises from a distinct source in the mountains, it must bring down a considerable body of water in the rainy season.

The progress of the survey was suspended for the greater part of the 9th, by an accident to one of the canoes, which was split from stem to stern. It was repaired, however, by the fishermen, in a singular manner. Having collected some of the fresh bark of the *Simul* tree, about half a inch thick, and tolerably strong, they fastened this to the bottom of the dingee with bamboo pins, about an inch and a quarter long, and filled up the crevices with cloth, so as to keep out the water, and this slight apparatus succeeded in rendering the dingee almost as serviceable as before.

On the 10th, the river, although much intersected with forest, continued still to widen. It appears rather extraordinary, that a stream, the mouth of which is scarcely navigable, should have thus continued to improve in practicability, and that it should have presented more than one branch, larger than the undivided river at its debouche. The difficulty is to conceive, what becomes of the surplus water, unless it be absorbed partly in the sandy soil over which it flows, or stagnates in the hollows of the deepest portions of the bed. It seems



not improbable, however, that in the rains at least, it communicates in the upper part of its course with the Diheng, and that part of its water is carried off by that channel. On Captain Bedford's voyage up that river, he noticed, eight miles from its mouth, a wide opening in the forest on the left bank, through which a stream, in the rainy season, probably comes either from the hills or from the Dipeng. Along this day's route a number of otters were observed; buffaloes, and deer, and wild ducks were numerous: the cry of the *hooloo*, or small black long-armed ape was constantly heard, and the prints of a tiger's footsteps were noticed. Some of the people declared having seen the animal.

On the two following days, the division of the river into numerous channels, and the occurrence of many shallows and rapids, rendered the advance very inconsiderable. On the afternoon of the 12th, the river presented three branches, two of which were found impracticable. In order to enter the third, which appeared to be the main stream, it was necessary to clear away a number of large blocks of stone, and employ all hands to force each boat singly over the rapids, by which means an advance of about half a mile was effected in about two hours. In the course of this day's navigation, the action of mountain torrents on the forests skirting the banks was strikingly illustrated. Besides the numerous water-courses tracked through the jungle, small clumps of trees were observable, growing upon isolated masses of rock, which had been detached by the passage of a torrent from the circumjacent surface. The subdivision of a river near the hills, and consequent destruction of the forest, seems the natural effect of the accumulation of the mountain debris, which, choking the beds of the torrents, forces them to seek new channels, and spreads them annually in fresh directions through the woods.

The progress of the 13th, was equally tedious and laborious, and two miles and a half only were made with the greatest exertions. About noon, direct advance was stopped by an impassable rapid, and the course diverged through a channel to the left, which led again to the stream above the fall: the banks of the river began here to contract, and the hills were no great distance. Foot tracks of men and animals were seen, and smoke observed amongst the forests, but hitherto no human dwelling had been seen, and none but a few stragglers occasionally encountered. On the 14th, the width of the river was reduced to between twenty and thirty yards, and as it was not above knee deep, it appeared not unlikely to be near the head of this branch, but an advance, for the purpose of ascertaining the fact, was disappointed by the appearance of the Mismees, who showing themselves unfriendly to the further prosecution of the survey, Captain Bedford thought it expedient to return. There are five villages of these people under the first range of hills, extending nearly south-west, towards Pasiel, on the Dihang; Zillee and Anoundea, containing from thirty to forty families, Maboom, containing ten, Alonga twenty, and Chunda twelve, making a total of eighty families, or about five hundred persons of all ages. They are at variance with the Abors on the Dihang, and also with the Mismees on the left bank of the Dipang. A party of these people made their appearance on the evening of the 14th, occupying the high bank which commanded the passage of the river, and upon opening a communication with them, it appeared that they were the precursors of the Gaum, or head man of Zillee, for whose arrival, as well as that of other chiefs, it was found necessary to halt. The people evinced more apprehension than hostility, and suffered the land operations of the survey to proceed without interruption.

The people collected on this occasion, were variously attired: some of them, like the Abors, were dressed in skins, but the most common dress was a coarse cotton cloth; no woollen garments were seen; many wore rings below the knee. Their ears were pierced with pieces of metal or wood, and some of them wore semi-circular caps, ribbed with cane. They were armed with dhaos, and bows and arrows, the latter are poisoned with the extract of some root. The Mismees and Abors eat together, and acknowledge a common origin. They profess to worship at a different shrine, which the former assert, is at a considerable distance. The Dipang is said to be divided, on its issue from the hills, into four branches, but above them is a deep and even stream, occasionally intersected by rocks. The source is described to be remote, but none of the villagers could give any account of it, nor of the general course of the stream, from personal observation, as they seldom leave the immediate vicinage of their native villages. The nearest village to the river was Zillee, about nine hours march, from which Maboom was half a day's journey distance. The undivided course of the stream, above a small hill, a short way above the spot where Captain Bedford had moored, and round which the Dipang winds into the low country, was ascertained by actual observation.

In reply to Captain Bedford's expressed wish to proceed, the Mismees, who gradually increased in numbers, coming in from the different villages, insisted on his waiting the arrival of the Gaum, or Chief of Alonga, to whom their interpreter pretended, the others looked as their head: whilst thus delayed, bees' wax, honey, rice, and ginger were brought for barter, but it did not appear that the Mismees were sportsmen, like the Abors, and no game was procurable; according to their own assertions, the Mismees of the left bank are much addicted to the chase, especially those of Bubbajee, whom they describe also as a fierce race of cannibals. The Zillee Mismees sometimes kill elephants with poisoned arrows, and, after cutting out the wounded part, eat the flesh of the animal.

On the afternoon of the 17th, the Gaum of Anoundea made his appearance, by far the most respectable looking of his tribe: those of Zillee, and a village called Atooma, had previously arrived. In the conference that ensued, the chiefs endeavoured to dissuade a further advance, chiefly upon the plea of danger from the rapids and the unfriendly disposition of other tribes, but they promised to offer no obstruction. On the following day, accordingly, the route was resumed, when a messenger announced the arrival of the Gaums of Maboom and Alonga, for whom it was necessary to halt. In the interview with them, fresh difficulties were started, and as there appeared to be some serious intention of detaining Captain Bedford where he was, as a hostage for some of the people carried off prisoners by the Suddea Golyin, he thought it expedient to retrace his steps, and accordingly set out on his return on the evening of the 18th. The course down the stream was rapid and disastrous—some of the boats being wrecked in the falls. On the morning of the 19th, a small stream was passed, called the Sitang Nadi, which appears to be a diverging branch of the Bhanga Nadi, and the last point where that joins the Dipang. On the afternoon, the mouth of the Dikrang was reached, and a survey of the lower part of its course commenced. It is a very winding stream, about fifty yards wide, near its junction with the Dipang, which is about eight miles above the mouth of the latter. It flows through a dense forest, and its water is thick and muddy.

On the 20th, the voyage was prosecuted up the Dikrang, or Gurmura, as it is termed by the Khamtis—above Kamjan, on the left bank, half a day's journey over land to Seddeya, the water is much more clear, and runs in a sandy bottom. The current and depth of water in these tributary streams are much affected by the contents of the main stream, the Burrampooter, and when that has received any considerable accession to its level, the banks of the smaller feeders are overflowed. The name *Gurmura*, is more properly applied to a small stream that falls into the Dikrang, from a jhil near Saddeya: above this, the river is divided into two small branches, by an island, near which are the remains of a village and bridge, and a pathway, opposite to the latter, leads to Buhbejea.

After passing the island, on the 21st, the Dikrang became too shallow for boats of any burthen, and much obstructed with dead trees, the direction was northerly, and glimpses of the hills were occasionally gained. A few inconsiderable falls occurred, and the current of the river was rather stronger than it had previously been found. The voyage was continued up the river till the afternoon of the 22d, when it became too shallow for the canoes to proceed. Some further distance was explored in a slight fisherman's boat, but the progress was inconsiderable, the water not being ankle deep. Captain Bedford, therefore, returned to the Dipang. The Dikrang contains several kinds of fish of good quality, and in the forests, along its borders, are found yams, superior to most of those cultivated, and several other esculent roots. The orange also grows wild, the fruit is acid, but not disagreeable, and the pulp is of a pale yellow, like that of the lime. Amongst the trees of the forest, is one called *Laroo-bunda*, of which the bark is used to dye cloth and nets of a brownish red tinge, the wood is also used for making canoes. The Dikrang was supposed to be connected with the Koondil, which is not the case: gold dust has been also, it is said, found in the sand, which does not seem to have been the case in this voyage.

The 24th and 25th of December were spent in examining the eastern branch of the Dipang, as far as practicable, and early on the morning of the 26th, the survey was terminated at the mouth of that river.

No. 7.—From the Government Gazette, September 21, 1826.

The following is the voyage up the Brahmaputra to which we referred on the 11th September, and which is of high geographical interest, on various accounts. The course of the river is altogether a novelty, and the supposed source, the *Brahma Kund*, is now, for the first time, the subject of European testimony. The source of the river, within the hills, is no longer doubtful, and it does not rise from this sacred reservoir. We are not satisfied, however, that the *Brahma Kund* here described, is the genuine *Kund*. The legendary account of this spot, which is to be found in great detail in the *Kalika Puran*, specifies a vast number of remarkable rocks and mountains in the vicinity, of which the following narrative presents no trace. We should have expected also, some shrine of the goddess *Kámikhyá* at this place, in addition to those she has in other parts of Asam, of which she is the tutelary deity. That the natives consider the *Brahma Kund* now visited, to be the sacred pool, is, no doubt, correct, but Asam ceased for so many centuries to be Hindu, that the legendary fables of the faith are, like its practices, forgotten.

The route followed on this occasion, commenced at the Kundil Mukh, and proceeded along the main stream of the Brahmaputra: on the 3d and 5th of March, the Balijan, Now Dibing, and Tenga Panee rivulets, were passed, and a portion of the river was now entered, running east from Sauiya, which is yet a blank upon the latest maps. The Brahmaputra, although of considerable breadth and depth in some places, is, hence, constantly broken by rocks, separated into different small branches by islands of various extent, and traversed by abrupt and numerous falls. The water is, in general, beautifully clear, but becomes turbid after rain, which



which, even in the month of March, is frequent and heavy. After every shower, the river rises, and rushes down with an accelerated impetuosity, which it is difficult to stem; several of the boats in the excursion, to which we advert, were sunk, and some of the people drowned. Iniminent danger of such a catastrophe was an every day occurrence.

On the 10th of March, the course pursued left the main stream, and proceeded up the Sukato, a detached branch on the right bank of the Brahmaputra, and like that, intersected by rapids, and endlessly subdivided by islets and rocks. No signs of life were observable in this part of the journey, and, although the banks were covered with thick forests, but few birds or beasts disturbed their solitude. The Sukato forms, with the Brahmaputra, or Ber Lohit, an extensive island, the greater part of which is impenetrable forest, but there is one village on it, of some extent, named Chata, inhabited by Mismees, who are of more peaceable habits than the mountain tribe of the same appellation. In dress, ornaments, and features, they do not differ materially from the Misnees on the Dipung. Their arms were the dhao, bows and arrows, and spears, and one man had a powerful cross bow, with a piece of ivory neatly inlaid above the trigger. Their travelling bags, covered with the strong fibres of the Sawa tree, resembling very coarse hair, completed their marching apparatus. They are not very choice in their diet, and the musk beetle is an article of their diet of very common use. This insect is found in great numbers along the Brahmaputra and its branches; it lurks in the day under stones and rocks, and takes wing chiefly at night; the smell is very powerful and offensive. The Mismees merely reject the head, and then dress the insect with their vegetable viands. After a tedious voyage of eighteen days, during which nearly forty rapids were passed, the course returned, on the 28th of March, to the Bor Lohit, or Bralmaputra. The Sukato opens above a rapid in the main stream, which is pronounced by the natives impracticable, and it has every appearance of being so. And at this point, the river, now confined to a single branch, takes a northerly direction, and passes under the first range of hills. It runs, in one part, close below a perpendicular cliff of this range, from sixty to eighty yards high, and covered from top to summit with soil and forest. The current, at this point, is strong, and its volume considerable; large rocks project, from four to six feet above the current, which have evidently been rolled down from a distance, as the hills near at hand, from two hundred and fifty to four hundred feet high, are composed of earth and small stones. The banks are every where clothed with forest, in which the Dhak, or Kinsuka, (*Butea frondosa*), is conspicuous. This tree, along the upper part of the Brahmaputra, grows to the height of fifty or sixty feet, and its clusters of scarlet flowers, contrasted with the large white and fragrant blossoms of the Koleea creeper, form a rich ornament of the scenery. The left bank of the river, below where it issues from the hills, is composed of loose granite blocks, occasionally resting on felspar, partially decomposed; the strata are, in some places, horizontal, but in others they are much broken, as if undermined and fallen into the stream. In a dry stone bed, was observed a large detached block, twenty-five feet long, eighteen high, and nearly the same breadth. It is difficult to conceive by what means so ponderous a body could have been precipitated into its present position. There are several other large rocks immediately below where the Lohit issues from the hills, by which it is separated into several small channels; but at the point where these unite, its general breadth is two hundred feet, and it flows with great force and volume. The course of the river, behind the first range, is concealed from view by a projecting rock jetting into the river, beneath which it rushes, as from a fall, with much foam and noise. Behind this, the river is said to be free from rapids, and to flow quietly along a gentle slope, which report is confirmed by the shelving outline of the distant hills. The river is also said to change its course behind the first range, and to flow from the south-east under some small hills, beyond which a higher range appears, with the snowy mountains in the distance.

After some ineffectual attempts to open a passage to the supposed head of the river, the Deo Panee, or Brahma Kund, the divine water, or well of Brahma, which it was known was not remote, and after some unsuccessful efforts to reach the villages, the smoke of which was perceptible on the neighbouring hills, a communication was at last effected with the Mismees of Dillee, a village about a day's journey from the left bank, as well as with the Gaum, or Tikla, the head man of the Brahma Kund village, in whose company a visit was paid to the reservoir on the 4th of April. This celebrated reservoir is on the left bank of the river: it is formed by a projecting rock, which runs up the river nearly parallel to the bank, and forms a good sized pool, that receives two or three small rills from the hills immediately above it. When seen from the land side, by which it is approached, the rock has much the appearance of an old gothic ruin, and a chasm about half way up, which resembles a carved window, assists the similitude. At the foot of the rock is a rude stone seat; the ascent is narrow, and choked with jungle: half way up is another kind of seat, in a niche or fissure, where offerings are made; still higher up, from a tabular ledge of the rock, a fine view is obtained of the Kund, the river, and the neighbouring hills: access to the summit, which resembles gothic pinnacles and spires, is utterly impracticable: the summit is called the Deo Baree, or dwelling of the deity. From the rock the descent leads across a kind of glen, in the bottom of which is the large reservoir, to the opposite main land, in the ascent of which is a small reservoir, about three feet in diameter, which is fed by a rill of beautifully clear water, and

then



Asam.

then pours its surplus into its more extensive neighbour below. The large Kund is about seventy feet long, by thirty feet wide. Besides Brahma Kund, and Deo Panee, the place is also termed Purbut Kathar, in allusion to the legend of Parasurama having opened a passage for the Brahmaputra through the hills, with a blow of his Kathar, or axe. The offerings made at this holy spot are very miscellaneous, and many of them very incompatible with the ordinary Hindu belief, as fowls and cows. Whatever, indeed, is eaten by the minister, is supposed acceptable to the deity, and the Mismees of this part of the country, have no prejudices in the article of food, eating beef and pork, and every variety of flesh and fowl. The visitors to the reservoir do not seem to be numerous or opulent.

The village of Dillee consists of about twelve houses, erected on platforms, from thirty to forty feet long: the lower part of the building is occupied by the cattle, which form the sustenance of the people, besides Indian corn, marwa, and yams. The Mismees also grow mustard, pepper, cotton and tobacco, but rice apparently is not cultivated. A spirit is made from marwa: it is also ground to a coarse flour and mixed with Indian corn, and then forms the commonest article of food in use. The Dillee Mismees also eat the musk beetles, squeezing them between two stones, and then grilling them. The women are not at all reserved or kept concealed: they are rather fair and of good stature, with pleasing features. They dress like Kamtees and Asamese. The men, in general, are well made, athletic, with rather fair complexions. The country is well peopled, and a number of villages are scattered over it, of which the Dillee Gaum is said to hold authority over twenty. The Tikla of Brahma Kund, who was met on this occasion, is the youngest of three brothers, who equally share in the offerings made at the shrine. Both chiefs and people displayed entire fearlessness and confidence in their visitors, and every disposition to treat them with hospitality. Want of supplies, however, prevented any stay at this point, and rendered a prompt return to Sadiya indispensable, which was effected by the 11th of April. The cloudy and rainy weather that prevailed during the greater part of the route, was too unfavourable to observation, to admit of any latitudes being laid down with confidence. The only point ascertained, is the head of the Sukato branch, which is in  $27^{\circ} 51' 21''$ . The general range of the thermometer during the route was 57 to 65, but this seems to have been ascribable to the continued rain, accompanied by easterly and north-easterly blasts from the neighbouring mountains. When the sun was out, the heat was intense. On the 30th March, the thermometer at noon, in the tent, was 102.

*No. 8.—From the Government Gazette, November 2, 1826.*

The progress of geographical discovery on our north-east frontier, has assimilated itself to the development of a well-wrought tale, in which expectation has been kept alive by a succession of incidents promising, yet retarding the donouement, and disappointing expectation only to excite curiosity. In the same manner we have been constantly coming upon the sources of the Brahmaputra, without attaining them; and, at the same time, determining a variety of new and interesting points, which, although not the ultimate object of enquiry, have not defrauded it of its legitimate reward.

A recent excursion to the east of Saddiya has, we learn, been prosecuted by Lieutenant Wilcox, who, in the first instance, proceeded up the branch of the river called the Thenga Pani, or Thenga Nadi. After passing the Mora, Tenga, Marbar, and Disavi, the stream diminished to the breadth of eight or ten yards, and the navigation was stopped by trees that had fallen into the river, or across it. Like all the streams east of Saddiya, it abounds with rapids, and, from the great inclination of its bed, it never overflows the banks, although they are low. The whole tract, through which it flows, is said to be highly fertile, but the country is thinly peopled, and the lands scantily cultivated. Such is the want of labourers in the fields, that the Sinho chiefs are obliged to put their hands to the plough themselves.

The Thenga Nadi, from this description, has not contributed to the determination of the origin of the main stream, and we had lately an opportunity of shewing, that it does not rise from the reservoir on the Lohit, on this side of the mountains, to which the designation of Brahma Kund is now applied. In the account we published in our paper of the 21st of last month, it was stated, that the river was seen flowing down a gentle slope, for a considerable distance within the first range of hills running from the south-east. On the present occasion, it has been ascertained from oral, but apparently trustworthy information, that the Brahmaputra rises by two branches, one to the north and the other to the east, the Talooka and the Talooding. The former is the smallest of the two, and its water is impure. It skirts the hills, which run off northward, and its banks are thinly peopled. The Talooding has villages on both banks: it has its source in a snowy mountain in the Khana Deba's country, from the opposite side of which issues the Irawadi. The conflux of both is said to be within the frontiers of the Lama's country, one day beyond Sitti, on the boundary, which latter is eight day's journey from Taen. Taen is the third village on the route from the Mecsnee country, to that of the Lama, but it is sometimes made in one day's march from Challa, on the Thenga, by a difficult path that passes by the Brahma Kund. This route, however, is impracticable for travellers with baggage or burthens. At Taen, the

the river is crossed by a Cane Suspension Bridge, and cattle may proceed along the remainder of the road in a circuitous direction. Bameya, the seventh stage on this route, is described as an immense hill, which can only be crossed in a direct line with the assistance of ropes.

The sources of other principal branches of the Lohit, or Brahmaputra proper, as well as of the great southern portion of the Bor Dehing, are, however, still undetermined. Of the latter, nothing has yet been published: of the former, some additional information has been obtained, but it requires verification. The sources of the Dipang are apparently not far from the frontiers of the Lama's country, as the Meesmees, situated on the former, carry on an active traffic with the latter. Of a more important branch, the *Dihang*, the Bor Abors confidently assert, that it flows from the west, and that a lake through which, or from which, it issues, gives rise to the Soobunsheeree also. The description, however, seems to be rather incompatible with the assertion, that in the north-westerly route to the Lama's territory, the Dihang is crossed from east to west at the twelfth stage, and then left.

Similar reports have been received on this, as on other occasions, of a very considerable river skirting the further side of the hills, to which the term *Sri Lohit* is applied. It is said to flow from east to west, a direction that would disunite it from any possible communication with the rivers of Asam; but this is probably an error, and the river if not altogether a nonentity, may possibly be the Irawadi. The *Sri Lohit* is said to have been crossed by the posterity of *Khunling* and *Khunlae*, the heaven-descended founders of the family, which to the period of the Burman invasion governed Asam. It may possibly, therefore, be a river of merely mythological origin.

The authority with which we have been favoured, and from which we have derived the above, comprises also some interesting notices of the Meesmee population of the mountains, and of the Bor Kamti country, which we shall insert in our next.

No. 9.—From the Government Gazette, Nov. 6, 1826.

The Mismees, who inhabit the country upon the banks of the Brahmaputra, towards the commencement of its course, are collected in small but frequent villages, the houses of which are built along the steep faces of the mountains, in such a manner, that the rock forms a side of the mansion, and supports one end of the rafters of the floor, the other and outer extremity, resting upon wooden posts: the space beneath the floor is occupied by their fowls and cattle. Besides hogs and their own hill cattle, individuals of wealth have, in store, for eating, the small cattle of Asam, and the chowri-tailed ox of Tibet—young dogs are also held in estimation. Each chief kills an animal in succession, and invites his neighbours, so that a continual round of feasting is kept up amongst them, and a record of these entertainments is preserved in the skulls of the cattle, which are blackened and hung in rows round the interior of their houses, until the death of the head of a family, when these memorials of his wealth and liberality are heaped upon his grave, and surrounded with a palisade. The vegetable diet of the Mismees consists chiefly of Indian corn, and a small grain called *bubissia*. They also cultivate small quantities of a fine white rice. Their dress consists of a piece of a thick coarse cotton cloth, which they have no notion of shaping into a garment, and all their better clothing comes from Asam and Tibet. They are exceedingly uncleanly, and rarely, if ever, have recourse to water for the purposes of ablution. The Mismees work rudely in iron and brass, but their utensils are mostly of copper, and are obtained from the Lama's country, with which they keep up an active trade. They bring from thence smoking pipes, straight swords, dyed woollens, beads, rock salt, and chowri-tailed cows, in exchange for which articles they export musk, various skins, a bitter medicinal root, some ivory, and other articles. They formerly added to the list, slaves, captured in Asam. The pipes are commonly inscribed with Chinese characters, and they, as well as the swords and beads, are probably the manufacture of China. The Mismees, on the heads of the Dipang, as well as those along the Brahmaputra, and the Abors, at the sources of the Dihang, all trade with Lama Des, or the country of the Lama of Lassa.

Bor Kamti is a country situated beyond the Langtan mountains, which give rise to the Bor Dehing, or southern arm of the Brahmaputra. The south-east portion of the Langtan mountains covered with snow, is visible from Sadiya. After taking a south-easterly bend, in which the range nearly reaches the Irawadi, it runs southwards, parallel with that river, nearly to Bhammoh. Bor Kamti, therefore, lies along the upper part of the course of the Irawadi, being a province of Moonkong, or Mogoun, and tributary to the Burman Phokun of the latter. It is separated on the east from China, and on the north from Tibet, by lofty mountains covered with snow; although accessible from the south, by the course of the Irawadi, the river here is not navigable. The mountains are inhabited by the Klunoong Mismees, who trade with both China and Tibet. They find silver in large quantities in the north-east, and iron in great abundance in the south-east parts of their mountains: of the iron they fabricate the Kamti Dhao, which are held in high estimation. The Kamtis are said to have come from that part of Shan, which is situated east or south-east of Moonkong, or Mogoun.

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but, as we observed on a former occasion, the oblique direction it follows to the S. E. renders it probable, that it joins the San-po. Now, we understand, that the former survey of the Dihong terminated in Lat.  $28^{\circ} 2'$ , and Long.  $95^{\circ} 32'$ , and the present being extended two days further in a westerly direction chiefly, may have ascended to about  $28^{\circ} 6'$ , and Long.  $95^{\circ} 34'$ . In either case, however, we must be very close upon the San-po, or not actually in it, and the latter would be the case, if Du Halde's positions are not much farther wrong, than in the example we have given from the former. The course of the Om-chu and San-po, from the west and north, respectively, will explain the accounts given by the natives of the western and northern reaches of the Dihong.

No. 11.—From the Government Gazette, March 22, 1827.

*Brahmaputra.*—Although no opportunities of personal investigation have occurred since our last, some additional light has been thrown upon the enquiry by native information, and the probability of the Dihong being the river of Lassa heightened, by the communications of the chief of the Mismees, on the Deebong, whose residence is only five days march from the Lama country, with which he maintains constant intercourse. The position which he has given, combined with that derived from other sources, seems to establish the following facts: The Dihong is formed of two branches, one running from the east, rising in the country of the Khana in about  $97^{\circ}$  E. and  $29^{\circ}$  N. It pursues nearly a westerly course to about  $95^{\circ} 20'$ , when it unites with the eastern branch from Lassa, forming the Dihong, which latter is called also Lassa Chombo, or Tzamba, or the Om-chu, and is navigable through the hills, on account of the rapids. In about  $28^{\circ} 40'$  N. it enters the Gendoos' country, giving rise to a river that runs to the eastward, and is called the Palte, from which rises the Bonash, which flows eastward, as far as the river of the Om-chu, and enters the Brahmaputra, opposite to Gowalpara. It is called the Om-chu of Du Halde: a large lake occurs in Du Halde's map, without name, south of Peitu, near the San-po, but it is much too far to the west, being about  $91^{\circ} 40'$ , nor does the Om-chu rise from it, but in some mountains south of a place called La-soi, a place which, probably, has been ascertained by the natives, and accounts received of the position of that city. We have been furnished with an outline map of the mountains, which we have had lithographed, in order to render the subject intelligible. It will be recollected, however, that all beyond the 'places reached,' both to the east and west, are from oral information only. The eastern branch of the Dihong seems rather to add to our perplexity, unless we may depend upon the probability of its course to the westward, which its position suggests the possibility of its being the continuation of the San-po, in which case it may be connected with the supposed heads of the Lohit, or even of the Salween. It is scarcely possible, however, that the natives can be mistaken in their information, and we must receive with caution. If the supposed eastern branch of the Dihong is the Om-chu, which will, probably, be the Om-chu, the source of which is at Lasoi, and the San-po, as it is termed, is separated from the country of the Meeshmees, by a range of impassable snowy mountains, running parallel with the river to the south of it, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 40'$ , and which, in the Lama country, and the Meeshmees, when they visit the Lamas, prevent all direct intercourse between the Talooka, or northern branch of the Brahmaputra. In preparing this article for the press, we received the two first numbers of the *Magasin Asiatique*, the first of which contains the memoir of Klaproth, of which we published an abstract, taken from another number some time ago. We shall give a translation of his memoir next week. In the mean time, we observe, that the San-po to above  $29^{\circ}$  N. before it turns to the S. E. in lat.  $29^{\circ} 20'$ ; whence, as before according to him, it then runs southward, through *H'lokba*, which is the Bor Khamti country, and joins the Irawadi. South of the San-po, he has a considerable river, Mon-chou, perhaps identifiable with the Om-chu, which runs from the east, immediately north of the mountains of the Meeshmees, or of the little Chombo of the sketch, and which, according to him, joins the San-po just beyond the mountains, in which the Lohit rises. Here, therefore, is a new cause of perplexity. Klaproth's materials appear to be tolerably good, and there is only one objection of importance, which immediately occurs; and that is, that they appear to be nearly a day out. Thus the upper part of the Dihong in his map, is in about lat.  $28^{\circ} 30'$ , and the extreme limit of the mountains, east of the Kund, is less than  $97^{\circ} 20'$ , instead of at least  $98^{\circ}$ . This compression of the longitude, is of some importance to his theory, as the probability is there of its travelling so long a distance, and that the question is still far from being solved.

No. 12.—From the Government Gazette, June 24, 1824.

In a former number we mentioned that Mr. Scott, the Governor General's agent, had set out across the hills, with a party, consisting of three companies of the 23d Regiment, under Captain Horsburgh.

Considerable light has also been thrown of late upon the sources of the Irawadi, which is the more important at present, as now that the San-po cannot be considered as the same with the Brahmaputra; the Savans of the Continent revert to D'Anville's supposition, and identify it with the river of Ava. The Irawadi, however, takes its rise apparently much to the south and west of where the San-po is lost in the Jesuits' maps, and its most northern branch, the Toonong, rises nearly in the same parallel with the heads of the Dehing, and at no great distance from them. We hope before long to offer some more precise information on this subject, and in the mean time, shall present our readers with the speculation to which we have adverted, at an early opportunity.

No. 10.—From the Government Gazette, February 15, 1827.

We noticed some time ago, the failure of an attempt to proceed along the Brahmaputra, in an easterly direction, and that it was proposed to repeat the undertaking at a more favourable opportunity. In the mean time, circumstances having occurred, which were considered propitious to a northerly excursion along the Dihang, towards the country of the Bor Abors, this journey, we understand, has been accomplished by Lieuts. Wilcox and Burlton. The result has not satisfactorily solved the great problem of the connexion of any of the rivers of Asam, with the San-po, the advance to a sufficient distance having been impeded by the unwillingness or inability of the hill tribes, to give the necessary assistance, but we should think little doubt can remain of the identity of that river with the Dihong, unless the geography of the Lamas is wholly erroneous. The travellers ascended the Dihong, to the village of Pashee, two days journey beyond the point reached by Captain Bedford, in his journey up the same river, of which we gave a summary in our paper of the 2d February 1826. The people of the villages along their route, offered no interruption of their progress, but expostulated with them on the toil and danger to which they exposed themselves, declined supplying them with guides, and with such information as they furnished, deceived and misdirected them. Under these circumstances, they found the natural difficulties of the route insuperable. The banks of the river rose perpendicularly from the water's edge, and were surmounted by steep hills covered with thick jungle, through which it was impossible to cut a path. Having proceeded, in a small canoe, a few miles up the river, beyond the point where a path along shore became impracticable, the travellers were stopped by a formidable rapid, which it would have been difficult to ascend, and dangerous to return by. On climbing up the rock, an unbroken reach of water was observed running for some distance in a westerly direction: according to native information, it follows this course for twenty miles, and then runs as far north. The path to the Bor Abor country goes directly to the north, and consequently, leaves the river at this point. The width of the stream is here reduced to one hundred yards, and the current is slow, but as no considerable branch had joined the Dihong on the route, all the water poured by it into the Brahmaputra, in quantity more than double the contents of the latter, must be comprised in this channel. The source of the stream is said to be remote—a tribe, called the Simongs, are in the immediate neighbourhood of the point reached, and it is supposed that the country of the Lamas is next to theirs.

The view from the Pashee village is described as most magnificent, comprehending the course of the Burhampooter from the hills as far as Seesee, its junction with the Dihong, the course of the Koondal and other streams and lofty ranges of mountain, including the snowy mountains behind the Suddya Peak, and the snowy range to the south-east, at least one hundred and fifty miles remote.

By information received from the merchants of Bhot and Lhasa, the city of Lhasa lies to the south of a large river, which is not the case in the map of Du Halde, who places it thirty miles to the north, on the banks of the Kalyu. According to Stewart, however, (Annual Register 1788) Lassa is on the banks of the San-po. This position is not wholly incompatible with Turner's account, although not derivable from it. He says, he saw from the rock of Teshoo Lomboo, the Erechomboo, or Brahmaputra, washing its northern base, running to the east, in a wide bed and many channels. From his own apartment looking south, he had the road to Lhasa on his left, or to the west, and it is possible, therefore, that the river may cross the road, and thus run south of Lhasa. We wish, however, we had some latitudes and longitudes, on which we could depend. We should then be better able to judge how far the Dihong is likely to be connected with the San-po, or how far Du Halde's map is reconcilable with other standards. We may presume the following verifications are allowable with Turner:

Shigatzee N.	29.6.	E.	89.2	Jikse.	29.10	E.	89°
Painiom ...	,,	28.58.	...	89.17	Painam	28.50	... ,,
Jhansu ...	,,	28.48.	...	89.32	Chianse	28.40	... ,,

The latitudes and longitudes, therefore, are much the same, and encourage us to put some trust in the latter, which are Du Halde's or D'Anville's.

The San-po is lost in the latter, in Lat. 26° 20' and Long. 113° 20' E. from Ferro—or 95° 30'. Hamilton says about 96°, but his map, and Rennel's give 95° 20'. The *Om-chu* disappears in 27°, and Long. 93° 50', but,

but, as we observed on a former occasion, the oblique direction it follows to the S. E. renders it probable, that it joins the San-po. Now, we understand, that the former survey of the Dihong terminated in Lat.  $28^{\circ} 2'$ , and Long.  $95^{\circ} 32'$ , and the present being extended two days further in a westerly direction chiefly, may have ascended to about  $28^{\circ} 6'$ , and Long.  $95^{\circ} 3'$ . In either case, however, we must be very close upon the San-po, if not actually in it, and the latter must be the case, if Du Halde's positions are not much farther wrong, than in the example we have given from Turner. The course of the Om-chu and San-po, from the west and north, respectively, will explain the accounts given by the natives of the western and northern reaches of the Dihong.

No. 11.—From the Government Gazette, March 22, 1827.

*Brahmaputra*.—Although no further opportunities of personal investigation have occurred since our last, some additional light has been thrown upon the enquiry by native information, and the probability of the Dihong being the river of Lassa heightened, by the communications of the chief of the Mismees, on the Deebong, whose residence is only five days march from the Lama country, with which he maintains constant intercourse. The information which he has given, combined with that derived from other sources, seems to establish the following facts:

The Dihong is formed of two branches, one running from the east, rising in the country of the Khana Deba, in about  $97^{\circ}$  E. and  $29^{\circ}$  N. It pursues nearly a westerly course to about  $95^{\circ} 20'$ , when it unites with the western branch from Lassa, forming the Dihong, which latter is called also Lassa Chombo, or Tzambo, or the Lassa river, and Kong-bong. It is not navigable through the hills, on account of the rapids. In about  $28^{\circ} 40'$  N. and  $94^{\circ} 40'$  E. is a large lake, said to be in the Gendoos' country, giving rise to a river that runs to the eastward. This, it is probable, is the Jamdu Palte, from which rises the Bonash, which flows eastward, as far as the meridian of Koliaber, then turns west, and enters the Brahmaputra, opposite to Gowalpara. It is called the *De mo-sha*, and may be possibly the Om-chu of Du Halde: a large lake occurs in Du Halde's map, without a name, south of Peiti, near the San-po, but it is much too far to the west, being about  $91^{\circ} 40'$ , nor does the Om-chu rise from it, but in some mountains south of a place called La-soi, a place which, probably, has been confounded with Lassa, in some of the accounts received of the position of that city. We have been favoured with an outline map of these positions, which we have had lithographed, in order to render the subject more intelligible. It will be recollected, however, that all beyond the 'places reached,' both to the east and west, is from oral information only.

The eastern branch of the Dihong seems rather to add to our perplexity, unless we may depend upon the direction of its course to the westward. Its position suggests the possibility of its being the continuation of the main stream, the San-po, in which case it may be connected with the supposed heads of the Lohit, or even of the Irawadi; the former is the most likely. It is scarcely possible, however, that the natives can be mistaken in this respect, but their information must be received with caution. If the supposed eastern branch of the Dihong be the prolongation of the San-po, then the Dihong will, probably, be the Om-chu, the source of which is at Lasoi.

The eastern Dihong, or lesser Chombo, as it is termed, is separated from the country of the Meeshmees, by a chain of impassable snowy mountains, running parallel with the river to the south of it, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 40'$ . They prevent all direct intercourse with the Lama country, and the Meeshmees, when they visit the Lamas, come out upon the Talooka, or north branch of the Brahmaputra.

After preparing this article for the press, we received the two first numbers of the *Magasin Asiatique*, the second of which contains the memoir by Klaproth, of which we published an abstract, taken from another source, some time ago. We shall give a translation of his memoir next week. In the mean time, we observe, that he carries the San-po to above  $96^{\circ} 40'$ , before it turns to the S. E. in lat.  $29^{\circ} 20'$ , whence, as before explained, according to him, it then runs southward, through *H'lokba*, which is the Bor Khamti country, and terminates in the Irawadi. South of the San-po, he has a considerable river, Mon-chou, perhaps identifiable with the Om-chu, which runs from west to east, immediately north of the mountains of the Meeshmees, or in the position of the little Chombo of our Sketch, and which, according to him, joins the San-po just beyond the mountains, in which the Lohit rises. Here, therefore, is a new cause of perplexity. Klaproth's materials appear to have been tolerably good, and there is only one objection of importance, which immediately occurs; his longitudes appear to be nearly a degree out. Thus the upper part of the Dihong in his map, is in about  $94^{\circ} 30'$ , instead of  $95^{\circ} 30'$ , and the extreme limit of the mountains, east of the Kund, is less than  $97^{\circ} 20'$ , instead of being at least  $98^{\circ}$ . This compression of the longitude, is of some importance to his theory, as the more protracted the course of the San-po to the east, the less probability is there of its travelling so long a journey. It must be admitted, however, that the question is still far from being solved.

No. 12.—From the Government Gazette, June 24, 1824.

*Asam*. In a former number we mentioned that Mr. Scott, the Governor General's agent, had set out early in April across the hills, with a party, consisting of three companies of the 23d Regiment, under Captain Horsburgh.



Cachar.

Horsburgh). We have now the pleasure to present our readers with some particulars descriptive of a most interesting country hitherto unexplored by Europeans.

The route from within a few miles of Sylhet to the bank of the Kullung, opposite to Ruha Chowky, lay entirely in the territory of the Jynteah Rajah, which is, in that part, about ninety-five miles in length, by an average breadth of about thirty. Of this territory, about sixteen miles on the Sylhet side, and about the same on that of Asam, consists of low-lands, similar to the ordinary soil of Bengal, but interspersed with small hills. The rest may be described as composed of about ten miles on the Asam side, and five on that of Sylhet, of hills covered with thick woods and almost impenetrable jungles, resembling, in its general characters, the Garrow hills, and of an intermediate tract of about fifty miles in extent, forming an undulating and rather hilly table land, elevated, it is supposed, from 1500 to 2500 feet above the plains, and distinguished by the absence of jungle, the coolness and salubrity of the climate, and where the soil is favorable for the production of the fir tree.

The tract last mentioned is very thinly peopled, only two considerable villages having been passed on the march. It is almost entirely waste, and, in general, covered with short herbage, and thinly interspersed with clumps and more extensive woods of fir and other trees, which give it a most picturesque and highly beautiful appearance, resembling an extensive English park. This country appears to be well adapted to feeding cattle, and such cattle as were seen were in excellent condition, but very few in number, which was ascribed by the natives to their being themselves chiefly engaged in commercial pursuits, and also to the insecurity of this species of property, owing to the violence and depredations committed by their neighbour, the Rajah of Khyram, whose territory skirted the route about four or five miles to the westward. Cultivation is very scanty, and chiefly confined to vallies where rice is grown. Yams and roots, of various kinds, are also cultivated, and upon them, the people stated, they chiefly depended for subsistence.

The whole of the mountainous country, until within a few miles of the descent into the plains of Asam, is inhabited by the people called by us Cossyahs, but who denominate themselves Khyee. They are a handsome muscular race of men, of an active disposition, and fond of martial exercises. They always go armed, in general, with bows and arrows, and a long naked sword and shield, which latter is made very large, and serves them occasionally as a defence against rain.

The people of this nation occupy the hilly country from about half-way between Laour and Doorgapore, eastward as far as Cachar. They inhabit principally the southern part of the mountainous tract, none of them, with the exception of the Jynteah family, having extended their possessions so far as the plains of Asam. Formerly they held the low lands in the Sylhet district as far as the Soormah river, but from thence they were all expelled, with exception to the Jynteah Chief, in consequence of their misconduct, about the year 1789.

The Cossyahs differ entirely in their language from the Garrows, Cacharrees, and other surrounding tribes, who speak various dialects of an originally common tongue, and they are, in general, distinguished from them in appearance by the want of that peculiar conformation of the eye-lid, which forms the characteristic feature of those tribes, in common with the Chinese, Burmese, and other eastern nations. They are governed by a number of petty chiefs, whose authority over their subjects seems to be very limited, and of whom the most powerful are the Rajahs of Khyram, or Sooloong, and of Jyntah.

The Cossyahs are ignorant of the use of letters, as far as their own language is concerned, although some of the chiefs retain Bengalee Mohurris for the purpose of carrying on their correspondence with the public officers and inhabitants of the plains. The Hindoo religion has been introduced amongst them to a certain extent, so that they have, in general, abandoned the use of beef, but they still eat pork, fowls, and drink fermented liquors, and their laws of inheritance assimilate with those of the Garrows, or rather of the Nairs, —estates and governments descending to the nephew by the sister of the occupant.

In the case of the Jynteah family, the descendants of the reigning Rajahs appear to gain admission in the course of time into the Kayt and Bayd caste, by intermarriages with individuals of those tribes, and they follow, in every respect, the customs of the Hindoos of the plains. Persons of this origin are settled in considerable numbers about the capital, and usually enjoy offices of state, but without any right to the succession, which, unless under very extraordinary circumstances, goes to the son of the Rajah's sister, called the Koonwurree, by a Cossyah husband, chosen from certain noble families in the hills, by a general assembly of the chief people.

The reigning Rajah, Ram Sing, who is an adopted son of the late Koonwurree, in the absence of direct heirs, is a man of about sixty years of age. He is a wise and active prince, and seems to be universally beloved by his subjects. In consequence, ostensibly, of a sense of the degradation his descendants would undergo, agreeably to the rules of succession already mentioned, he has never been married. The heir-apparent, his grand nephew by adoption, is a fine boy, of about twelve years of age.

In conducting the affairs of government, the Rajahs of Jynteah are under the necessity of consulting, on all important occasions, the Queen-mother, and chiefs of districts, and officers of state; and, although the appointment

ment or removal of both of the latter descriptions of persons rests with the Rajah himself, they are nevertheless enabled to exercise a considerable degree of control over him, as he is obliged, in conferring such appointments, to consult the wishes of the chief people in the interior, who seem to be of a very independent and rather turbulent character. The military establishment consists of about 150 miserably equipped Hindoostanee sepoy, and in cases of emergency, probably as many as five thousand mountaineers, armed in the manner already described. With a little tuition and proper equipment, this force might be made most efficient as a body of irregular troops, the natives of these mountains being of a warlike disposition, of a strong muscular make, and accustomed from their youth to undergo privations and fatigue.

The reception which Mr. Scott met with from the Rajah of Jyntah, was most cordial; and the personal exertions he underwent in procuring porters for the party, and composing some differences amongst them, which threatened at one time to interrupt their journey, greatly exceeded any thing that could have been expected from a person in his rank of life.

From the specimens seen, of the mechanical skill of the Cossyals, displayed in the construction of several excellent stone bridges, and of numerous monuments, composed of pieces of stone of surprising magnitude, frequently brought from a distance, and some of them weighing not less than thirty tons, there can be no doubt that workmen could be procured in the country, competent to make every requisite improvement, and to construct bridges either of stone or wood.

The Rajah of Jyntah has been applied to on the subject of constructing a road between Sylhet and Asam, with durable bridges, &c., and he has given satisfactory assurances of his disposition to afford the most active co-operation in the proposed work, which will be, no doubt, a lasting memorial of his name and government.

*No. 13.—From the Government Gazette, December 29, 1825.*

*The Nagas.*—The expedition to Munnipore, on which Lieutenant R. B. Pemberton accompanied Gumber Sing last June, and which terminated in the recovery of that province from the Burmese, has added considerably to our geographical knowledge of that part of the eastern world. We have before us an interesting narrative of the journey between Banskandee and Munnipore. The longitude of the former place is marked down at 93° 8', and that of the latter at 94° 15' east of Greenwich. From this narrative, furnished by Lieutenant Pemberton, the following account of the Nagas is derived:—

This singular race of people, says Lieutenant Pemberton, extending from the north-western extremity of Kachar to the frontiers of Chittagong, from their poverty and peculiar situation, have escaped the sufferings inflicted by a powerful enemy on the more wealthy occupiers of the plains below them. With a sagacity which has at once insured them both health and security, they have in every instance established themselves upon the most inaccessible peaks of the mountainous belt they inhabit, and from these elevated positions can see and guard against approaching danger long before it is sufficiently near to be felt. Various attempts, in the days of their prosperity and power, were made by the Rajahs of Munnipore, Kachar, and Tipperah, to reduce these savages to a state of vassalage, but uniformly without success—they steadily refused to acknowledge allegiance to either power, and policy restrained the two first from using coercive measures, where success was, at least, doubtful, and failure would effectually have closed against them the only direct communications between their respective countries.

The Naga villages are built with little regularity on the summits and crests of the different hills.—The houses consist of an extensive thatch, from thirty to fifty feet in length, almost resting on the ground, with a ridge pole of about eighteen feet high; the whole constructed in the most solid and compact manner.—In every house there are two apartments, the largest of which is public, and the other appropriated to the females of the family, who are allowed unreserved intercourse with all visitors, whether male or female. In addition to duties that may be considered strictly domestic, the Naga woman has many others to perform daily, which renders her life one of continued activity. In the morning she proceeds to the depôt of grain, stored in huts raised upon a platform about four feet from the ground, of which the people of two or more houses are generally the joint proprietors, though the more industrious are sometimes possessed of the whole contents of one granary—after filling her conical basket with grain, sufficient for the supply of the day, she returns home, and is employed for some hours in clearing it from the husk by pounding it in large wooden mortars. This task accomplished, it becomes necessary to carry a number of hollow bamboo tubes to some distant spring, where they are filled and re-conveyed home by the industrious female—She then prepares food for her husband, and a numerous family of young children, and when not employed in these indispensable duties, is generally engaged in the manufacture of a coarse cloth, called *Khès*, or clearing the rice-fields of weeds. Idleness, the bane of more civilized life, is thus tolerably well guarded against, and as the violation of conjugal duty is invariably attended by death, or expulsion from the village, infidelity is a vice which appears to be scarcely known.

Cachar.

The youth who wishes to espouse a girl, if accepted, agrees to serve her father for a term of years, generally limited to the period at which she may be considered marriageable. At the end of his servitude, a house is constructed for the young couple by their parents, who also supply them with a small stock of pigs, fowls, and rice—A long previous training has fully qualified the young bride to enter upon the duties of her new station, and the value of her services is generally so well appreciated, that lightning is not more prompt than the vengeance of a Naga for any insult offered to his laborious partner. His spear gives the ready reply to any remark derogatory to her honour, and on one occasion, great difficulty was experienced in saving an offender from its effects. Justice is administered by a council, formed of the oldest and most respectable men of the village—they summon the culprit—hear the charge—adjudge the sentence, and its execution is immediate.

Whenever a hill is to be cleared, preparatory to bringing it into cultivation, intimation is given, by the persons principally concerned, to the heads of the different families in the village; a member is then deputed from every house, and they proceed to the performance of the task; when completed, they are entertained by the person for whose benefit the land was cleared, with an abundance of boiled rice, fowls, a liquor procured, by fermentation, from rice, of which they drink large quantities, and any other savage luxury that may be procurable. When the crops, consisting principally of rice and cotton, become ripe, all participate in the labour of cutting and transporting the produce to the granaries already mentioned.—Some differences are perceptible between the Nagas of these hills, and the Koochung tribes, scattered among the ranges south of the Barak. The latter are of smaller stature, darker complexions, and more unfavorable countenances; their thirst for blood, and avidity after plunder, have depopulated the hills which were inhabited by less warlike tribes; and they are known to make predatory excursions to the foot of the hills at the southern extremity of Cachar.—Among the tribes in the vicinity of Kala Naga, the term Koochung is always associated with ideas of rapine and plunder, and the narrow gateways which protect the only entrances to their villages, are said to have been rendered originally necessary by the nocturnal attacks of those enterprising marauders. The safety of the village is entrusted to a number of youths, selected for their superior strength and activity, who are distinguished by a blue mantle of the Khés cloth, tastefully studded with cowries, and garters of red thread bound round the calf of the leg. It is difficult to conceive a more pleasing union of manliness, grace, and activity, than is exhibited by one of these safeguards, when seen standing on the very verge of some projecting rock with all the ease of conscious security. The northern Nagas generally bear some degree of resemblance to the Chinese, though the expression of countenance is in many far more intellectual—the complexion is of a light copper colour, and their hair, which is cut close round the forehead, is of remarkable inflexibility. They are distinguished by a restlessness strongly characteristic of their usual habits of life, and the muscular strength displayed in the swelling outline of their well-formed limbs, evinces men capable, from long habit, of performing journeys, which by the less practised inhabitant of the plain, would prove impossible. They never travel but in parties, each man carrying a conical-shaped basket on his back, secured by two straps, one of which embraces the chest, and the other passes round the forehead—the right hand grasps a spear, shod at the lower extremity with a pointed ferule, serving the double purpose of a defensive weapon and friendly support. In their mercantile trips to the Banskandee and Muni-poor bazars, they usually exchange their superfluous cotton for fowls, salt, dried fish, tobacco, and cloth—and are almost always accompanied by some of their indefatigable females, whose muscular power appears but little inferior to that of the men, while the superior delicacy of their sex is only discernible in faces rather less bronzed, and hair of greater length than that of their nominal defenders. Their food consists of rice, fowls, pigs, and kids—of the two last they are particularly fond—but they are rarely killed except on particular occasions; milk they never touch, and, in this respect, resemble the Garrows, who are said, by way of execration, to term it “diseased matter.”

During our stay at Moonjeronkoonao, a female died, and previous to the interment of the body, in compliance with universal custom, it was necessary to entertain the friends of the deceased. A pig was brought forth for this purpose, its legs tied, and the animal conveyed to a spot near the door of the hut which had been previously chosen as the place of interment, where it was beaten to death with large bamboos, and, without any other preparation, was conveyed to a large fire, roasted and devoured: the grave was then dug, and the body committed to the dust. It is customary to strew over the grave such articles belonging to the deceased as were of little value, and these fragments are frequently the only memorials that testify the vicinity of a grave. Their warriors are treated with greater deference; the grave of him who has fallen in action is, invariably, fenced round with bamboos, and any allusion to him is always accompanied by some expression of regard or mark of respect.

The Ferry-bridges of the Muni-porians seem to be curiously constructed, and are thus described by Lieutenant Pemberton.

For three days the Eerung nullah continued so swollen by rain as to be impassable, and two Nagas were drowned in attempting to cross it on a raft; but finding, at the end of that time, that there was little prospect of any material change, we left Moonjeronkoonao, and descending by a foot-path, scarcely passable from innumerable creepers, and the extreme slipperiness of the soil, reached the customary place of crossing the Eerung—



We found it, however, in a state of the most violent agitation, dashing, with a force and fury that nothing could withstand, over this contracted part of its rocky bed: a more favourable spot was sought and obtained half a mile higher up, where the breadth of the nullah was fifty yards, and its depth sufficient to allow a free passage to the accumulating mass of water—Gumbeer Sing's men had been sent forward the day before to collect bamboos and cane for constructing rafts, and throwing a line across the river to which they were to be attached; but previous to our arrival, all attempts to get across had failed, and even then the Maniporians, who are almost amphibious, swam it with great difficulty. The mode of constructing bridges by this active and enterprising people, is more expeditious than any other I am aware of, and requires nothing more than the materials which, in a mountainous country, are almost always procurable. The reed, upon whose strength the subsequent stability of the bridge entirely depends, is obtained in lengths varying from fifteen to twenty yards—they are connected by knots, and when made sufficiently long, one end is firmly secured to a tree near the edge of the water, and a loop made at the other extremity, through which the man who takes it across passes his arm—he then travels along the bank until sufficiently above the spot he wishes to reach on the opposite side, to counteract the effect of the stream, and plunges into the water; when near the opposite side, he is met by another man, previously sent across to fasten a length of the reed to a tree, who, with the disengaged end in his hand, dives and secures it to the loop; the connected line is then drawn tight enough to raise it above the surface of the water, and by frequently repeating the same operation, is increased to any required degree of strength: while some are thus engaged, other parties are employed cutting trees and bamboos for the bridge, the timber is worked into the bed of the river until it appears sufficiently firm, and is afterwards rendered still more secure by diagonal props so placed against the uprights, as effectually to counteract the tendency of the current to wash them down; branches of trees are then laid across, and the whole covered with a coarse mat formed of the bamboo, previously beaten flat.—This solid structure was secured to the cane line in several places, and built as far into the river as was practicable: a similar operation was performed on the opposite side, and the chasm left between them was, subsequently, occupied by substantial rafts, which, covered with branches and the same description of mat already alluded to, were secured to the cane line, and fastened to the more solid structures on either side. Horses passed over bridges of this construction with perfect safety, and they were standing uninjured when we returned from Manipoor, though torrents of rain had fallen between the period of their construction, and this last practical application of them.

No. 14.—From the Government Gazette, February 20, 1826.

*Manipur.*—We mentioned in our paper of the 26th ultimo, having been favored with various notices of the route to *Manipur*: the geographical information which they afford, is of a highly important and interesting nature, and they contribute essentially to fill up the blank in the topography of those countries, our whole acquaintance with which has depended, hitherto, on native information.

In the Asiatic Observer for July 1824, there is a brief, but interesting notice of the Burman frontiers in 1817, from the pen of a gentleman, who, it is said, travelled through the countries he describes; but the information he gives of the northern part of the line at least, appears not to be from his own knowledge, but taken from *Chaurajit*, the deposed Raja of *Manipur*, and his General, *Pitamber Singh*.

Some accounts were collected by Colonel Symes, in his Mission to Ava, and further information was obtained by Dr. Buchanan, which has been published in various numbers of the Edinburgh Philosophical Journal, or in most detail, with respect to *Manipur*, especially in the Annals of Oriental Literature. Neither Symes nor Buchanan, however, spoke from their own observation, and it is impossible to say, how far the reports they received, are entitled to credit: we may at least regard the accounts of the population, and abundance of provisions given by Buchanan, as somewhat exaggerated, when it is said, that the Burmese carried off 300,000 captives from *Manipur*, and that, before their invasion, twelve cows might be bought there for a Rupee, and as much rice as a man could eat in a year, for the same money. Still, these assertions will admit of very considerable abatement, before they can possibly leave the country in the desolate state it now exhibits, when the capital does not contain a single inmate, and a handful of men can, with the utmost difficulty, be provided with ordinary supplies. The Burmese must have undoubtedly exercised a withering sway over these unhappy regions.

*December 4th.* *Banskandi* to *Lakhipur* (Lakshmipur,) four hours. The narrow foot path, leading to the *Chiri* nullah, now fordable, passes through a dense jungle, skirting the *Barak* or *Surma* river, as far as the former site of *Lakhipur*. This was a place of some importance formerly, but was deserted on the approach of the Burmese in 1824. Some of the people have now returned, and re-established themselves on the opposite bank of the river.

*December 5th.* To *Joojoori*, six hours, on the banks of a small nullah, called by the Nagas, *Fudipuri*.

*December 6th.*

Cachar.

*December 6th.* Six hours, banks of the *Jiri*: the road runs through thick jungle, and over successive ranges of low hills.—The *Jiri* nulla is one of the most considerable of the lesser streams, and has a depth of water which might render it navigable, from its junction with *Barak* to *Noongshi*, on the N. E., but it is subject to great inequalities, and is much interrupted by dangerous rocks: at this season it is fordable, but at other times it is crossed by Bamboo rafts.

*December 7th.* Five hours, *Kala Naga Ghat*. After crossing the *Jiri*, the path winds through a continuation of forest intersected by small nullahs, with very precipitous banks, flowing through a tolerably level country. A few miles further east, the hills begin to assume a greater regularity of formation, extending in parallels running north and south, occasionally connected by transverse ridges, extending E. and W. At the ghat, the inhabitants of *Kala Naga*, and other villages in the vicinity, embark when proceeding by water to *Banskandi* and *Silhet*.

*December 8th.* Eight hours, banks of the *Makru* nullah. Three miles from *Kala Naga Ghat*, the ascent commences, leading over a range of hills that constitutes the first conspicuous feature of the country, although inferior to the more easterly ranges in height, the *Makru* range presents, from the steepness of its sides, ascents and descents of exceeding difficulty. Dense jungle, principally composed of bamboos, extends from these hills to within a short distance of their summits, when it is replaced by trees and creepers. From the top of the range, a precipitous path descends to the nullah—this stream rises in the hills to the north, and flowing in the hollow between this and the next hilly range, falls into the *Barak*, at the foot of the *Kheima-peak*: it is now fordable.

*December 9th.* Seven hours, banks of the *Barak* river, now fordable. The road leads over the *Kheibunda* range, which, rising from three to four thousand feet above the plains of *Kachar*, and extending in an unbroken line from *Allingba* to *Khima*, may be regarded as the natural limit between the mountainous country on the east, and the irregular mixture of hill and plain on the west. The village of *Kala Naga* is situated on one of the loftiest peaks of the range: the ascent to it from the *Makru* nullah, is by a narrow foot-path, direct and steep, about three miles in extent: the village consists of about sixty houses, and contains about three hundred inhabitants of the *Naga* tribe. At some distance to the north, two peaks are distinguishable, between which *Barak* is said to flow. The source and direction of this river, in the upper part of its course, are amongst the geographical problems yet to be solved. It is navigable for boats of burthen, as far as the mouth of the *Jiri* nulla, but is then so much interrupted by rocks, that the navigation is dangerous. At this place it runs north and south, but at a very short distance lower down, a hill, two hundred feet high, breasts the stream, and forces it into an easterly direction: the course from *Banskandi*, as laid down in the maps, is exceedingly erroneous.

*December 10th.* Six hours, banks of the *Sumla*, a fordable stream. Immediately after crossing the *Barak*, a very steep ascent commences to the peak, on which is situated the village of *Komberan*, at about five miles distance from the bed of the river. The village is one of the most considerable on the route, and is supposed to contain five or six hundred inhabitants: the people are *Nagas*.

*December 11th.* Two hours, *Nunghba* or *Langba*. The ascent to this village is easy and practicable, skirting a transverse and connecting ridge of hills, which runs from one of the main parallels to the other. These cross chains are less abrupt and precipitous, and are of less elevation than the principal ranges. A shower of rain detained the party at this village.

*December 12th.* Eight hours, *Munjerun Kunao*, a *Naga* village. After descending from *Nunghba*, the path lies across the *Lukchai* nullah, which rises in the *Munjerun Kunao* hills, and falls into the *Ireng*. It is the only rivulet which is flanked by any extent of level ground: all the nullahs yet crossed, may be considered as running in the bottom of deep ravines, which, when swollen by rain, they completely occupy, but this stream flows through a valley, four or five hundred yards broad, which is cultivated, and yields a crop of superior rice—the ascent to *Munjerun Kunao* is excellent, and two or three ingenious aqueducts, formed of connected bamboos, furnish a regular supply of water, which, brought from a considerable distance, falls into a trough placed near the foot path.

*December 13th.* Eight hours, *Awang Kul*, a *Naga* village. The descent from the last station leads to the *Ireng*, elsewhere called *Yekreng* nullah, now fordable, but of considerable depth in the rains. The ascent from its bed is abrupt and rocky. Slabs of a dark coloured stone are placed by the side of the path as seats. *Awang Kul*, is the common point of the two routes from *Banskandi* to *Manipur*, those by *Aqui* and *Kala Naga*.

*December 14th.* A halt.

*December 15th.* Eight hours, banks of the *Yehi* nulla, at a place called *Lima Simtham*: no village. The descent from *Awang Kul* skirts the sides of inferior ranges, terminating at the stream, which rises in the hills, N. W. of *Manipur*, and falls by a very tortuous course into the *Ireng*,

*December 16th.* Six hours, the road continues along the banks of the *Yehi*, and is tolerably good in general: in a few places, however, the hills come down abruptly to the edge of the stream, and render a detour necessary.

*December 17th.*

December 17th. A halt.

December 18th. Six hours, *Manipur*. The road runs at first over comparatively level ground, but latterly crosses a considerable elevation, the termination of a ridge running nearly north and south, the summit of which presents the first view of the valley of *Manipur*.

The amphitheatre in which the town of *Manipur* is situated, varies from 10 to 12 miles in breadth from E. to W. and 20 to 30 miles in length from N. to S. : a broad causeway still leads from the foot of the hills to the town, although overgrown with jungle and intersected with rivulets : the whole valley is now covered with dense grass jungle and extensive swamps, small hills are scattered irregularly through it, and numerous topes mark the situations where villages once were situated, not one of which is now in existence ; their inhabitants were either carried off captives by the Burmese, or found an asylum in Sylhet, where they are distinguished by their active and industrious habits. The place called the town of *Manipur*, exhibits few vestiges of having been the capital of a kingdom. Two deep and broad ditches enclose two areas, of which the inner, and smaller was occupied by the Rajas and their families, and the outer space, or that between the ditches, was tenanted by the officers of state and their dependants. Of the dwellings of the Princess or the people, no fragment remains, and the only ruins are those of some small brick temples of no interest nor extent.

The valley of *Manipur* is watered by a number of streams, which rise in the hills to the north, and flowing to the south, mostly fall into the *Ningti* or *Khyndowain*, the western branch of the *Irravati*. Many of these are navigated in canoes formed of the hollowed trunks of trees.

The principal entrances into *Manipur* from *Ava*, are by the *Kabpu Pergunnah*—one lies through a narrow defile, nearly due south of *Manipur*, the second crosses an extensive range of hills inhabited by Nagas, and unites with the former near *Tudan*, sixteen miles S. E. from *Manipur*. The former route was that taken by the Burmas, until they had made it a desert, and then they were obliged to proceed over the hills.

The richness of the soil of the valley of *Manipur*, manifested by the luxuriance of the grass with which it is overgrown, and the abundant supply of water derivable from the streams, by which it is traversed, leave no doubt of the productiveness of this sequestered spot, whenever the rank jungle shall again be levelled for the labours of the plough, and the silence of the wilderness be broken by the song of the cultivator.

No. 15.—*Memoir of the Countries on and near the Eastern Frontier of Sylhet, by Lieutenant T. Fisher, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.*

\* From the period of the earliest establishment of the British authorities in Bengal, a knowledge of the countries to the eastward of Sylhet has been among our geographical desiderata. That province itself remotely situated on the left bank of the *Brahmapootra*, or *Megna*, did not, for some years after the occupation of the rest of Bengal, attract the notice which both from its size and productiveness it might be supposed to merit, and even at the present time the topographical and statistical accounts of the district are involved in considerable uncertainty.

It could hardly be expected, while but little was known of a province itself, forming a part of the British possessions, that any attempt should have been made to push inquiries into the countries beyond it, yet the known fact, that the eastern frontier of Sylhet was only about three hundred miles from *Yunan*, the most western part of *China*, early stimulated to exertions for opening a communication with that interesting country. Accordingly, it appears, that in 1763, *Mr. Verelst*, (afterwards Governor of Bengal,) after passing along the southern part of the district of Sylhet, entered the independent state *Cachar*, near *Budderpoor*, and continued his journey to *Kaspoor*, (*Cospoor*) the capital, from whence he shortly afterwards returned, either in consequence of sickness, or because he had ascertained the impracticability of any attempts to proceed further to the eastward. It is a curious fact, and illustrative of the extreme ignorance and apathy of the natives in all matters unconnected with their immediate interests, that no traditionary account exists among them of this journey, which it may be presumed attracted considerable attention at the time it was undertaken, both among the people of Sylhet and *Cachar*, among the latter of whom none, probably, had ever before seen an European. Subsequently to *Mr. Verelst's* failure, no attempt was made to open the communication with the countries beyond *Cachar*, until 1801, when circumstances having rendered the interference of the British government necessary in the affairs of the latter country, a military force was, for a short time, maintained there. Advantage was taken of the facilities afforded by this opportunity to open communications with the inhabitants of the mountainous tract to the eastward of *Cachar*, the seat of a small valiant tribe of *Hindoos*, which had for years been involved in perpetual war for the maintenance of its independence against the *Burmah* government. The country occupied by these people is called *Munnipoor* or *Mekhley*, and is the same with that mentioned by travellers in *Burmah*, under the name of *Casay* : friendly relations were established with them, and during the subsequent years, when their country has been over-run by a foreign enemy, or rent by civil discord, their princes and chiefs have found an asylum in the British territories, and the people, at all times, have been permitted to make their pilgrimages



Cachar. pilgrimages to Gyah, Allahabad, and Muttra, &c. unmolested. It is from the reports of the natives of Munnipoor who are now in possession of Cachar, and from personal observations during a journey in the latter country to Govindpoor, that the materials were collected for forming the following Memoir, which is submitted, not in the vain belief, that it will be founded to contain complete information on the subject of the countries in question on the route to China, but in the hope that it may serve to add a few facts to our stock of intelligence on this subject, and also to assist any further inquiries which it may be thought proper to institute.

The state of Cachar is situated on the eastern frontier, and in contact with the district of Sylhet, from which it is separated by the Delaserry nulla, and the river Soormah or Barack. On the north it is divided from Assam by mountains and valleys covered with forests, to the east it has Munnipoor, an independent hill state, by which it is separated from the Burman empire, and on the south it is bounded by the wilds of Tripura. It has besides, on its north-western corner, the hill state Jynta, from which it is divided by the Keroowal nulla. Nothing can be stated with precision as to the extent of Cachar, but the following statement, drawn from the papers of the Thanadar in Oojain Raj, gives reason to suppose that it does not include more than two hundred square miles of the plain country: of the mountains, no estimation can at present be formed.

“The land in Cachar was assessed under Kishenchundra, at fifteen cohouns, or three rupees per hal.”

“Oojain Raj, extending from the Sonaie nulla to Lukipoor, two pahar, and one pahar to the southward, included 2112 houses, and paid 3500 rupees revenue.” Hence it contained  $1166\frac{2}{3}$  hals— $6\frac{1}{2}$  square miles of cultivation. Now, the probable contents of a piece of ground, thrice the size of Oojain Raj, is fifty-five square miles, found thus: from Tilaoy to Govinpoor, is six pahar of road, and by measurement eleven English miles in a direct line; a pahar’s journey is equal to about five miles, hence the contents (after allowing for the irregularities caused by the winding of the river, which, in this instance, nearly counterbalance each other) will be found fifty-five square miles, the third of fifty-five square miles, say eighteen square miles, is the contents of Oojain Raj.

Assuming the same data, and applying it to both sides of the river, we have two hundred and sixteen square miles of land between Panchgaon and Lukipoor, of which seventy-eight are cultivated, and produce a revenue of 42,000 rupees.

In noticing the most remarkable natural divisions of the country—the hills, it will be convenient to distinguish them into two sorts, viz. those lying to the north of the river Soormah, and which may be justly reckoned mountains, and those to the south of the same river, which have not so exalted a claim. The mountains north of the Soormah, have their origin to the east of Cachar, (and it is pretended even to the north east of Munnipoor) and range from east to west, along the north part of Cachar, Jyntea, and Sylhet, terminating in the Garrow hills.

Their extent is uncertain; the breadth, from north to south, being unknown; though it probably does not exceed sixty or seventy miles.

Their elevation is various in different parts of the range, but in Cachar the highest points are about 3,500 feet above the valley of the Soormah. Both the heights and vallies are covered with thick underwood and forest trees.

The hills south of the Soormah, are two branches from the Tipperah range, called the Bohman and Tilaoy hills: among the Bohman hills, some points are about 1,800 feet above the plains, but none in the Tilaoy range are higher than three hundred: like the northern hills, they are overgrown with underwood and forest trees.

The whole of the southern part of the country consists of one vast wilderness, the innermost recesses of which, where it joins the Tipperah hills, have never been explored. Trees, bamboos, reeds, and grass are yearly cut down and exported to Sylhet from this forest, without producing any sensible diminution in its size; nor can this effect be expected to take place until the increasing numbers of the inhabitants shall require the ground for the purposes of agriculture.

In the northern parts also, extensive woods cover both the mountains and vallies for a considerable but uncertain space.

The following are among their most remarkable productions:

The teak tree (*tectona grandis*) is said to flourish among these forests, but the evidence of the fact is doubtful. Jarul, Saal, Chandan, Agar, Babool, are abundant.

The Soormah, better known by the name of the Barak, is the only river of any importance in this country. It rises near Sumperoon, among the mountains on the frontier of Munnipoor, and flows first in a north-west direction, about seven day’s journey to Luckipoor, where it turns to the westward, round the northern extremity of the Bohman hills, and, continuing its course, enters the district of Sylhet at Panchgaon.—The breadth of the channel varies in different parts: at Panchgaon it is two hundred, at Govindpoor one hundred and fifty, and at Sumperoon it is said to be about twenty yards wide. In the dry season it is fordable in many places, but soon after the commencement of the rains it rises rapidly, and has then, commonly, from thirty to forty feet depth

depth of water. At Hehar, near Tilaoy, a number of broken rocks stretch across the channel of the river, and, by the rapids which they cause, prove a considerable obstruction to the navigation, except during the rainy months, when they are covered with water to the depth of twenty feet. These rocks would afford considerable facilities in the construction of a bridge, being so situated as to answer admirably for piers.

The Barak, during its course through Cachar, receives a number of small mountain streams, but no river of importance.

In the south-west part of the country are two lakes, called Chutrabeel and Kulbeel, the former containing about twelve, and the latter eight square miles. No habitations are situated in their neighbourhood, which is entirely overrun by jungle, and said to be very unhealthy.

The waters of the Barak, and its subsidiary streams, sometimes rise as early as the month of February, but, meeting with no check at this season of the year from the quantity of water in the Megna, run off rapidly, and, consequently, no permanent inundation is formed until the beginning of June: even then it is partial, and extends only around the lakes and marshes, and over the banks of rivers. It is not expected with a degree of anxiety similar to that manifested in Sylhet, the great quantity of rain which always falls in Cachar, insuring a sufficient quantity of moisture for the crops.

The want of artificial facilities for the conveyance of goods, or passage of travellers by land, in Cachar, is, in a great measure, compensated by the channel of internal navigation afforded by the Soormah, which traverses the country throughout its most considerable extent, from Kala Naga to Budderpoor. Roads adapted to the passage of wheeled carriages, or artillery, are not therefore to be found in any part of it, but paths are opened during the dry season, between the different villages, from one end of the country to the other. These often traverse considerable tracts of jungle, but may be generally supposed fit for the passage of infantry and cavalry, and of light guns, with the assistance of the pioneers. This is said with confidence of those parts between Budderpoor and Sonapoor, which came under observation during survey, and is, probably, equally true of the other parts, in the description of which the reports of the natives exhibit very little discrepancy. The country on the southern bank of the Barak does not appear to be settled to a greater distance than about three hours journey from the river, but on the northern side, the cultivation is said to extend to the foot of the mountains, beyond which a considerable and flourishing tract, called Dhurmpoor, joins the Asam frontier. The following route from Tilaoy to Dhurmpoor, was furnished by Siri Narayn, formerly a Soubahdar in the service of Kissenchundra, Rajah of Cachar.

1st day. From the Tilaoy across a level country to Kaspoor, or Goaharri, at the foot of the mountains.

2d. From Goaharri in ascent of mountains to Groomara.

3d. Groomara ditto to Mardartallee.

4th. Mardartallee to Bhurtekha. Bhurtekha is on the summit of the mountains, and from thence the descent commences on the

5th. To Japlung, a small hill fort.

6th. From Japlung to Buttra.

7th day. Quit the mountains and enter the plain of Dhurmpoor, after crossing which, in a journey of three days, you reach the Kobhee Middee, by which it is separated from Asam.

The ascent of Bhurtekha may be also effected by two other roads, one from Bikrampoor (which is the best) and the other from Berkhola, but it is only by passing over Bhurtekha, that the passage to or from Asam can be effected.

The route from Sonapoor, in Cachar, to Munnipoor, according to native information, is as follows:

1st. Sonapoor to Lukipoor, or Kurnrungabund, two pahar. Lukipoor is a town containing about five hundred inhabitants, and situated on the north of the confluence of the Jooree with the Barak. The Jooree flows from the north, and is about fifty yards wide.

2d. Kurnrungabund to Konampoopée, one day. Konampoopée is a place of encampment in the jungle, contiguous to wood and water, but devoid of habitations.

3d. Konampoopée to Jooree nulla, one day.

4th. From Jooree nulla ascend a range of hills to Noonshaie, a village of Kokris, half a day.

From Noonshaie descend the hills to the banks of Mookoorok nulla, which is about twenty yards wide, and flows from north to south into the Barak. There is here convenient encampment for a large body of people: after crossing the Mookoorok nulla, ascend the hills to Attengiri (Ottingbah) (two pahar) a Naga village, from whence descend to the banks of the Barak, north: of the two ranges of hills crossed in this day's march, the first is easy, the second difficult.

5th day. Cross the Barak river and ascend Keyrerching (Kubeetching) hills on the summit of which range is Aqaie, a large village of Nagas.

6th day. Descend the range to the eastward, to the banks of the Erung river. The Erung river is a considerable stream, (fifty yards wide?) and there is a place of encampment on its banks.

7th. Day

Cachar.

7th day. Cross Erung river, and ascend a range of hills to Langhkon, three pahar, from whence descend to Eaeie, a small nulla, flowing from the north into the Erung river, two pahar.

8th day. Road northward along the banks of the Eaeie: at three pahar is Angeing (Houchong) or Nurrungeal, from whence cross a range of hills to Moklan river, two pahar.

9th. From Moklan river, Munnipoor is a day's journey, across a cultivated and level country.

The route from Munnipoor to Cachar, according to Sri Nundee Nundun a relative of Chourjset.

1st. Jynagur one day, road over plain, northward and westward.

2d day. Ascend Lootching, the road is narrow among jungle, and zig-zagged: elephants and palankeens have crossed it: on the top of the hill is Kurrumpullum, a village of Kookies: the neighbourhood cleared and cultivated, from one-half to two pahar from Jynagur.

Descend from Kurrumpullum to Tobool nulla, on the bank of which encamp the night; nulla wide but not deeper than over knees, room for the encampment of many people.

3d day. Cross Tobool, north; afterwards cross a low hill, and reach Eaeie nulla, similar to Tobool. On the little hill, Lootching toombaha Kookie village, fifty houses: to the Eaeie one day.

4th day. Ascend hills to Nonay a hill, village of Kookies, road on height parallel to the Eaeie.

5th. Continue to Lookumree, a village of Kookies.

6th. Descend hill to Tooce Nuddee and encamp.

7th. Ascend hills. Tehingtomla (one pahar) a village, fifty houses: continue ascending to Langhkon, village, fifty houses.

8th day. Descend to Erung, north (in two pahar) which falls into Soormah. Ascend Kaybootching, in the ascent, a place called Ponam, or Pungnam, a village of Nagas, at which encamp.

9th. Ascend to Agerail, a large village of Nagas. North of Agerail, a Naga village, Yrungpbah; near the same place Phalyrungpah, also Kubutchingtomba, about two or three pahar from Agerail encamp at Aquaie.

10th. Descend to Barak nulla, at which encamp on the boundary between Cachar and Munnipoor. (Ottingbah).

11th. Cross Barak, north: ascend to Attungbah, encamp between Aquaie and Attungbah, west of Barak, a village (Congorg) of Nagas.

12th. Descend to Mokorrook N. (2 pahar or 2½) cross it, ascend to Noongtshaie village: Kookies.

13th. Descend to Joree, N. encamp.

14th. Cross Joree and proceed among low hills to Kyarahpoor-tingkol, or Konamporpee, encampment.—(Tingkol is the name for the encampment of an army.)

15th. Kumrungabund, one day.

16th. Luckipoor.

It is worthy of remark, that many of the places mentioned in the route, (given by Major Rennell, Map 1788,) occur in the two last, some allowance being made for the difference in the mode of writing the names, adopted by different individuals at two distant periods, thus: Lookumree, of the 3rd route, is evidently the same with Luckhumry of Major Rennell: Langhkon is Langeon, Penan is Pungnam, Aquaie, Aquail, and Ateenghbbah is Ottingbah.

Sri Nundee Nundun, from whom the last route was obtained, is a man of intelligence, and observation he has travelled in Hindoostan, and being a person of good family in Munnipoor, has had the advantage of a certain education.

He says there are three roads between Cachar and Munnipoor, more or less difficult, but that either of them might be easily defended by two hundred men, against any force that could be sent against them. Forts might be constructed on commanding points, and passes in the hills might be occupied, down which stones, or rather rocks, might be rolled on an assailing enemy. The mountains over which the roads pass, are covered with jungle of grass and bamboos, cleared away in places by the Nagas, who are very poor and miserable; troops, and even travellers passing these mountains, must carry their supplies with them, as nothing can be procured from the mountaineers. The passage has been effected in various periods between eight or fifteen days. When Marjeet invaded Cachar, he crossed in ten days, marching day and night, and making every exertion to arrive before information of his march, could reach Govindchundra. There was formerly a road from Kaspoor to Munnipoor, by which the distance was only four days journey, but it is now overgrown with jungle.

The remarks on the subjects of the passes between Cachar and Munnipoor, may be concluded by the following notice respecting the Nagas or Kookies, a wild people who inhabit the mountains, among which they are situated.

Of the Nagas and Kookies.

The extensive range of mountains which, after dividing Cachar from Munnipoor, passes through the independent territory of the Rajah of Tipperah, and at length terminates on the sea coast to the east of Chittagong.



is occupied in different parts by various tribes of savages which, in the parts between Cachar and Munnipoor, are called Nagas, and in places near Tipperah and Sylhet, are styled Kookies. These tribes are easily distinguished from the people of the neighbouring countries, with whom they have but few points of resemblance in external appearance, while in manners and habits, they are in direct opposition to them. The Kookies are generally dwarfish in stature, with broad shoulders, and comparatively slender limbs, the complexion is dark brown, and the features are expressive of fierceness unmingled with apprehension. The forehead is low, the eyes small, dark, and animated, the nose small, and depressed on the face, as in the Chinese countenance. The mouth is small and well-formed, and the ears large, and usually lengthened by the weight of ornaments, made of bone or metal, worn in them. The hair is dark and scanty: they have neither whiskers nor mustachios, and but little beard.

The dress consists of a blue cotton gown fastened at the neck, and descending to the knees, though they more frequently go almost naked, having nothing but a rag fastened by a string in front of the lower part of the body. In proceeding about the most ordinary transactions of life they have always their arms, which consist of an iron bill, suspended in a belt of deer or tygers skin, and a pike.

Most of the tribes to the southward are said to live a wandering life, seldom remaining many months in one place, but the Nagas and Kookies of Pytoo possess fixed habitations, usually on high points, difficult of access, and at a distance from any civilized country.

Agriculture is among these people in the very rudest state, and is confined to raking up the ground with their bills, after a few showers of rain, and planting a few grains of corn which yield them a poor and scanty harvest. They depend upon the chase principally for their subsistence, and eat indiscriminately the flesh of all animals, including tygers, elephants, jackalls and dogs. Frogs, toads, snakes, and every species of vermin are also greedily devoured by these wretched creatures, who, in times of scarcity it is said, are sometimes reduced to prey upon each other. This last assertion it may be hoped is unfounded, but the fact of their using the loathsome food above mentioned, is unquestionable, and a melancholy proof of the disgusting resources to which mankind are sometimes compelled to resort for the support of life.

Hunting parties, upon which they depend so much for their subsistence, are always composed of fifteen or twenty persons armed with pikes. When a tyger or buffalo is discovered, he is surrounded at a convenient distance by the party, who, at a concerted signal, rush altogether upon the animal, and though they occasionally lose one or two of their number, never fail to destroy him. The Pytoo Kookies, who settled near the south-east frontier of Sylhet, export yearly a quantity of strong cotton cloth called *kase*, which is manufactured by their women. They thus exchange for raw cotton, tobacco, copper and iron. The place at which this traffic is carried on is Chargola, a small town in Sylhet, the nearest to the Kookie villages, which are, however, situated four day's journey to the south of it: the intermediate country being a vast jungle.

This tribe is governed by four chiefs, three of whom are brothers, and the fourth is a cousin of the other three; their names are Landoo, Lollhoo, Bontay-loll and Rochacheboo. The tract of country over which their authority extends is two and a half days' journey in length from north to south, and about six hours from east to west. To the south of the Pytoo Kookies are others, governed by three chiefs, of whom they merely know the names, Shukboul, Bannictary and Loll-tyem. These people possess no form of religious worship, though it is said they acknowledge the existence of a God, to whom, however, they rather attribute an evil than a good disposition. They have no priests nor any persons invested with the sacerdotal character. Distinctions of caste are unknown, but there is a prejudice against oil and greasy substances, which is carried to such a length, that any one using them, or applying them to the body, is driven from the society of the rest, and can never be re-admitted. It will, hence, easily be imagined, that to throw any greasy substance on the person of a Kookie, is an act that can only be washed away in the blood of the offender.

No estimates existing of the numbers of the people, it becomes necessary to have recourse to a calculation, the materials for which will be found in our knowledge of the quantity of land in cultivation, and its product, from which we may assign 12,558 for the number of men, and about thrice that number, perhaps, for the whole population.

It must be confessed, however, that the estimate is vague. Cachar, under ordinary circumstances, always exported a quantity of grain, which it has ceased to do, since the oppressions and exactions to which it has been subjected of late years, have induced many families to emigrate, and disheartened those which remain. Besides the loss sustained by emigration, a further diminution is to be ascribed to the visits of the epidemic cholera, which, at various times, since 1817, has made its appearance in this country. The number of persons who have fallen victims to this disease is uncertain, but from the degree of alarm which it excited among the people, it should appear that it made greater ravages here than in the neighbouring district of Sylhet.

Dysenteries also are at all times very common, particularly in the mountainous parts of the country. In their attempts to cure this disease, the inhabitants rely principally upon astringents.

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Elephantiasis is so common, that almost every tenth person is affected with it: though productive of inconvenience, it does not appear to reduce the numbers of the people.

To the loss of population, sustained in consequence of the causes above enumerated, is to be opposed the accession resulting from the influx of the people of Munnipoor, many thousand of whom continue still to pour into Cachar, in consequence of their expulsion by the Burmahs from their own country.

The bulk of the population, both Hindoo and Mussulman, subsist upon rice and fish, the latter of which is found in great abundance at all times, both in the river Soormah and in all the numerous brooks which intersect the country. Of the higher classes, the Chowdries, the principal traders, and the officers of the government, are able to indulge occasionally in the eating of flesh, (principally goats and hogs among the Hindoos, and sheep among the Musselmén,) but no persons in the country, except the Rajahs, and the highest branches of his family, can afford this luxury daily.

The dress of the lower orders consists simply of a cloth, or dotee, tied round the loins, and which is occasionally converted into a turban—a chatah of about two feet in diameter, provided with a string for fastening it upon the head, is also in general use, and answers the purposes both of a parapluie and a parasol. Among the higher classes, dress is, according to the means of the party, assimilated to that of Bengal, but the materials in use, except a few shawls imported from Sylhet, are of home manufacture.

There is little or no difference in the appearance of the huts occupied by the different classes: from the Rajah to the meanest peasant, they are small, inconvenient, and unsubstantial. The Rajah Kissen Chunder, after a visit to Calcutta, in 1810, constructed a building of Masonry, on the model of one he had occupied during his journey. It is never occupied, even by the person in charge of it, who lives in a hut, resting against one of the external walls.

The few people who possess any education, are indebted for it to the instructions of their parents: their acquirements extend to nothing further than a knowledge of the Bengallee language, which they learn to read and write, and some few of them have a superficial acquaintance with the Hindustanee tongue.

The mass of the population, and all the women, are in a state of utter ignorance.

The prevailing religion is the Hindoo, and the principal casts the Brahmins, Byse, and Soodra, besides the various mixed casts, all of which indiscriminately engage in agriculture.

There are very few of the Ketri, or other military casts, all the people of which, with the exception of the Ex-Rajah and his family, are natives of Hindoostan, who have taken service, and afterwards settled in the country.

The principal deities worshiped are Kali, Juggunnath, Basoodeb (Vasudeva,) and Samva Takoor.

The Musselmén compose about one quarter of the population: they are in a state of extreme abasement, and appear scarcely sensible of any distinction between their own faith, and that of the Hindoos, except that which arises from the permission to eat the flesh of cows, and the restriction upon that of swine. They have no endowed religious establishments, no mosques, and no public places of worship, except the Durgahs, or tombs, of reputed saints. There are no Portuguese or native Christians.

The people of Cachar are generally of low stature, scarcely ever exceeding five feet, and of a dark complexion, approaching to black. Their features are mild and undisturbed by any violent emotions; they are muscular, and possess considerable bodily strength, but no patience under privations, and are generally considered cowards.

Upon a people utterly devoid of education, and with whom no pains are taken to correct, in youth, the evil propensities of their natural dispositions, it cannot be expected that much restraint is effected by a government, at once weak, tyrannical and oppressive. Accordingly, all the worst qualities of the human heart are to be found in action among the people, unchecked by any thing but their natural cowardice, yet, considering the disadvantages under which they labour, from the want of education and good government, it is certainly wonderful, that they are not much worse than they are commonly represented, although they are accused of treachery, falsehood, and ingratitude: of their intellectual abilities, it is difficult to form an estimate; they are less inquisitive than the people of Sylhet, but, perhaps, this arises from their secluded situation, and the little intercourse they have with the rest of the world. The commotions which have agitated their country, during the last four years, afforded many opportunities for men of abilities to distinguish themselves, but no native of Cachar having concerned himself in these transactions, it may be presumed, that their minds are of a grovelling, or at least an unambitious description.

## H I S T O R Y.

The early history of all nations is commonly much intermixed with fable: that of Cachar, will be found to partake of this fault, and also, of a degree of uncertainty in latter periods, arising entirely from the want of regular annals.

It is pretended that this kingdom, from its foundation, (the date of which, however, is uncertain,) has been always governed by one family, the descendants of one man, Bhima, the second son of Rajah Pandu, who, on arriving in Cachar, found it in the possession of a demon, or giantess, and her brother Hirimba, from whom it is said the country takes its ancient name. Bhim, after killing Hirimba in single combat, married his sister, by whom he had a son called Ghatotkach, who governed the country after his father's death, and was succeeded by Meghban his son, from whom the Rajahs of Cachar are said to be descended.

After Meghban, there is a blank in the history, which extends over an uncertain period of time, to the reign of Naladhawja, who is supposed to have lived about 250 years ago. According to some statements, which are, however, very improbable, his reign should be placed back at least 500 years, as there are documents in existence by which it appears that Tamradhwaja, the third in succession from this prince, governed Cachar in the year 1388, of the era Bikramajit, which corresponds with the year 1333, of the Christian era.

**RAJAH NALADHWAJA.**—The only remarkable circumstance in this reign was the conquest of Munnipoor, by the Rajah. The causes of the quarrel with that country, or whether, indeed, there were any at all, are now unknown but it appears that the people of Cachar were successful, and that Naladhawja restored Munnipoor to the Rajah of that country, on the following fanciful conditions :

1st. That a bamboo which he had planted in the town of Munnipoor, should remain for ever a memorial of his conquest.

2nd. That the people of Munnipoor should shave their heads, and tie their hairs in knots, like the Burmahs.

3rd. That they should construct no buildings more than twelve cubits wide.

**RAJAH GUROORADHWAJA.**—Nothing remarkable occurred in this reign.

**RAJAH MAKARADHWAJA.**—The Burmahs, in this reign, made an irruption into Munnipoor, and drove the Rajah of that country into Cachar, when he was hospitably entertained by Makaradhwaja, who, levying an army, and making war in his favor upon the Burmahs, restored him to the throne.

**RAJAH TAMRADHWAJA.**—The reign of this prince was rendered remarkable by the occurrence of an extraordinary piece of treachery, the motives for which are not at present known. Tamradhwaja had contracted a friendship with the Rajah of Jyntea; the latter, on some particular occasion, having constructed a boat which was considered of an unusual size, took it to Cospoor, (Kaspoor,) the residence of the Rajah of Cachar, and telling him that he had built it with the intention of presenting it to him requested his presence on board. Tamradhwaja, unsuspecting of any sinister intentions, consented, but had no sooner entered the vessel than the Rajah of Jyntea ordered her to be loosened from the shore, and dropped down the stream. The troops and followers of Tamradhwaja, running along the banks of the river, prepared to discharge arrows and other missiles into the boat, but the Rajah called out to them to desist, (being apprehensive that he might himself be slain,) and to trust to the mercy of God for his safety. He was then carried away and imprisoned at Jynteapoor, the capital of Jyntea.

On this occurrence, which filled the family of Tamradhwaja with grief and consternation, the Rani Chandraprabhavati dispatched letters to the king of Assam, (at that time a powerful prince, and upon whom it should appear, Cachar was in some measure dependant,) informing him of the treachery of the Rajah of Jyntea, and imploring his assistance in releasing her husband from captivity. The king of Assam ordered two chiefs (Sirdars,) with a considerable force, to enter Jyntea, and bring the Rajah and all his people before him. Accordingly one chief descending from the mountains at Bikrampore, and the other at Kerim, near Lukhath, they entered the Jyntea territory at nearly opposite points, and besieging Jynteapoor took it, and carried the Rajah of Jyntea, Tamradhwaja, whom they released, and all the people of Jyntea, into the presence of their master. The king of Assam, after a suitable admonition addressed to the Rajah of Jyntea, on the enormity of his offence, ordered his head to be struck off, and dismissed Tamradhwaja with honor to his dominions.

**RAJAH SOORATHAPANARAIN.**—In the first year of this reign, the Rajah assembled a council, and having received the submission of the members composing it, signified his intention to make war upon Jyntea, in revenge of the treatment experienced by his father Tamradhwaja, from the late Rajah of that country. The council, however, unanimously refused their concurrence in the measure, and when, at length, the Rajah found their determination too strong to be shaken, he abandoned his kingdom, and travelled to Assam, to implore the assistance of the king of that country. At an audience, which he had of that monarch, and while he was urging his request for an army, he was suddenly seized with illness, fell down and expired shortly after.

**RAJAH KIRTEECHUNDRA.**—The reign of Kirteechundra, the son of Soorathapanarain, who succeeded him on the throne, was not rendered conspicuous by the occurrence of any thing remarkable.

**RAJAH RANCHUNDRA.**—During this reign, the Rajah of Tipperah, (on what occasion does not appear) sent an army, commanded by a Mussulman chief, called Meer, who invaded Cachar, and possessed himself of the whole country, principally by the assistance of some rebellious chiefs or Jemadars) in the Pergunnahs Ilacondy. Ranchundra retired to Goabarie, a place, the naturally advantageous situation of which among the hills,



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hills, rendered it impregnable. From thence, he dispatched a Brahmin to the Rajah of Jyntea to inform him of the extremity to which he was reduced, and to request his assistance. The Jyntea Rajah wrote to the refractory Jemadars, and induced them to return to their allegiance, after which he entered Cachar with a small army to support the Rajah, and Meer being obliged to abandon his conquests, was, at last, shut up in Mynabund, where he was besieged, taken, and put to death.

RAJAH HURI CHUNDRA.—Ram Chundra was succeeded by his son Huri Chundra, in whose reign nothing worthy of notice occurred.

RAJAH LUKHEECHUNDRA.—The brother of Huri Chundra succeeded to the throne, to the prejudice of his sons, as it appears, they are not by the laws of the country, entitled to reign before their paternal uncles.

RAJAH KRISHENCHUNDRA.—Krishenchundra was the son of Huri Chundra, about the year 1773, and governed Cachar forty years. About the twenty-seventh year of his reign, a Mogul, native of Iran, appeared in Ilacondy with few followers, and having succeeded in establishing his authority over the land-holders and people of that part of the country, sent a message to the Rajah, requesting an interview, at which they should both be unattended. This the Rajah prudently refused, but consented to see him, being himself accompanied by three persons, and appointed Oudabund for the place of meeting. When, however, the interview should have taken place, the Mogul again proposed that they should be both unattended, but the Rajah positively refused to accede, upon which the Mogul collecting his forces, attacked and overthrew the army of the Rajah, who was compelled to flee to Goabarrie.

Had the Mogul rested here, he might probably have established his authority in Cachar, but intoxicated with success, and perhaps believing, as was vulgarly pretended, that he was assisted by supernatural powers, he gave out that he was the twelfth Imam, destined to deliver India from the yoke of the British, and attacked Budderpoor, a small fort on the frontier of Sylhet, at that time garrisoned by a Havildar, and twelve Sepahees of the Sebundie corps. The first volley, however, from the walls, killing several of his people, and wounding himself, he and his whole party were obliged to flee, and being afterwards attacked by a company of Sepahees, sent to pursue him into Cachar, he was taken prisoner, and sent to Calcutta, where he remained in confinement, and Krishen Chundra was restored to the musnud. Shortly afterwards, Kalain Sing, the Ssubadar who had commanded the company which defeated the Mogul, and made him prisoner, being discharged the service of the Honorable Company, entered Cachar with a number of other disbanded Sepahees, and established himself at Ilacondy. The Rajah complaining to the Magistrate of Sylhet, a Jemadar and party of twenty-five Sipahes were dispatched to dislodge Kalain Sing, who fled to Chanekhane, and afterwards to Jyntea, where he was seized by the Rajah of that country, but escaped from prison during the night, and after various adventures, died a few years since at Comillah.

Rajah Krishenchundra dying in 1813 was succeeded by his brother Govindchundra, the only surviving descendant of Bhim, the ancient founder of his family.

He is a man of weak character, and a pacific disposition, but tyrannical and avaricious. These last vices, perhaps, contributed in no small degree to facilitate his dethronement, an event which occurred in 1817. In the winter of that year, Marjeet the reigning prince of Manipoor, being driven from his throne and country by the Burmahs, made an irruption in Cachar, with about five thousand followers. He met with little or no opposition from the troops of Govindchundra, who, although they were armed (and in some measure disciplined) in the European manner, were disheartened by the cowardice of their chief, and disgusted by his penurious and effeminate habits. Nevertheless, at the defence of a fort on the frontier of Sylhet, considerable bravery was displayed by the followers of the Rajah, and it is probable that the repulse which was at first experienced there by the invaders, might have compelled them to retire, but the unexpected treachery of Gumbhir Singh, a brother of Marjeet, who commanded a small corps in the service of Govindchundra, decided the day, and obliged the Rajah to flee into the British territories.

In the mean time Chourjeet, the elder brother of Marjeet and Gumbhir Singh, who had been about seven years previously expelled from the throne of Manipoor, and who was now residing at Sylhet, collecting a few followers, passed through Jyntea, and spreading a report that the British troops which had been advanced towards the frontier, in consequence of the war in Cachar, were in motion to support him, succeeded in bringing under his controul all the troops and followers of Marjeet and Gumbhir Singh, and giving to each of these a limited authority over certain tracts of country, proclaimed himself Rajah of Cachar. In the early part of 1823, Chourjeet finding himself unable longer to maintain his authority against the threatened attacks of the Burmahs from without, and the rebellious dispositions of his subjects within, offered to concede his right to the British government, but, before a treaty for the purpose could be completed, he was driven from his throne by his brother Gumbhir Singh, who is now in possession of the government of the greater part of the country. Under the government of these two last princes, which has been equally oppressive and tyrannical, the country has been reduced to the lowest ebb of want and misery, and the wretched inhabitants finding no prospect of an amelioration of their condition, are fast emigrating into the neighbouring countries, Sylhet, Jyntea, and Tipperah.

No. 20.—From the Government Gazette, March 1, 1827.

Ava.

*Mission to Ava.*—"The Mission left Rangoon on the 1st September, and reached Henzada on the 8th. Here we were received with much polite attention by the future Viceroy of Pegu, who has the rank of a Wungyi, or Councillor, the highest enjoyed by a subject. He was very solicitous, however, to prevent our going further, intimating that he was himself vested with full powers to treat with us upon every possible subject.

He had no opportunity, however, of exercising his plenipotentiary powers upon the present occasion, for the Mission, disregarding his pretensions, on the afternoon of the 10th, quitted Henzada, and on the afternoon of the 14th, a few miles beyond Myanaong, or Loonzay, entered the hilly region, which is the proper geographical boundary of the Burman race—all to the south, being the Delta, or *debochement* of the Irawadi, and the true country of the Peguans, or Talains.

Pursuing our journey with hills now pressing down to the river on both sides, and, which struck us at the time as peculiarly picturesque and beautiful, after passing through the long tiresome champain of the Delta of the Irawadi, we reached Prome on the evening of the 15th. This is one of the largest towns in the Burman empire, and appeared to be not less populous than Rangoon. The inhabitants, since the war, had returned to their homes—the place was in a good measure restored, and although it had been long the head quarters of the British army, there was now no re-action or persecution. All this bore favourable testimony to the moderation of the Myowun, or governor, whom we found an extremely respectable man.

We left Prome on the 17th, and on the 20th reached Patnagoh and Melloon, the scene of the conferences in December, 1825, which led to the first treaty, which was never ratified or even transmitted for ratification, a breach of engagement, for which the Burmese received signal castigation on the spot.

On the 21st, we left those places, and on the 22d reached Renangyoung, or the "fetid oil brooks"—in other words, the Petroleum wells. In the afternoon we visited the wells, and the remarkable and sterile country which surrounds them, abounding every where with fossil remains of one of the last great changes which the globe has undergone.

On the 23d, we left Renangyoung, and in the course of the forenoon passed Senbegyoung, from which leads the best road from Aracan, and by which Major Ross and a battalion of sepoy's proceeded in the month of March last.

On the morning of the 24th, we reached Pagan, and staid there for that day and part of the following, examining the curious antiquities of this place, the most remarkable in the Burman dominions, and the extensive ruins of which, if such evidence were not too well known to be delusory, might lead to the supposition that, in former ages, the Burmese were a people more powerful and civilized than we now find them.

On the 27th, we passed the confluence of the Kyen-dwen and the Irawadi. The prospect afforded by their junction is far from imposing. Both rivers are here confined to a narrow bed, and the tongue of land which divides them is so low, and covered with reeds, that it may easily be mistaken for an island, and consequently, the smaller river to be only a branch of the larger.

The prospect hitherto presented, in a route of little less than four hundred miles, was that of a country imperfectly cultivated and inhabited, and by far the greatest part of which was covered with a deep forest, or with tall reeds and grass, among which there was scarcely any evidence of culture or occupation. We were now, however, within fifty miles of the capital, and the scene began greatly to improve. The country became level, the nearest ranges of hills to the east being at least thirty miles distant, and the Aracan mountains to the west, not less than fifty in the nearest part, and sixty or seventy in the distant. The villages and cultivation had increased very considerably, but neither here nor any where else, did we see evidence of a dense population or active industry.

At two o'clock in the afternoon, we passed Yandabu, where the treaty was dictated to the Burmans, and sailed within a stone's throw of the great tree where Sir A. Campbell's tent was pitched, and the conferences were held.

On the afternoon of the 28th, we reached Rapatong, a village on the east bank of the river. This was the spot at which the Burmans contemplated making their last effort, had the British army not been arrested in its progress by the treaty of Yandabu. Here they were encamped, under the old chief Kaulen Mengyi, the whole disposable force not exceeding a thousand men, and the greater number of these consisting, not of soldiers, but of the personal retainers and menial servants of the chiefs. Two forced marches would have carried Sir A. Campbell to Ava, on a good high road, with nothing to resist him but the dispirited fugitives just mentioned. In the evening, we reached Kyaoktalon, twelve miles from Ava. A short way before coming to that place, a deputation, headed by a secretary of the Lotoo, met us, to compliment us on our arrival, and usher us into the capital.

On the morning of the 29th, we left Kyaoktalon. After we had proceeded a few miles, an order from the Court arrived, requesting that we might stop where we were, as it was the intention to send down a deputation

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of persons of superior rank to conduct us. The promised deputation, consisting of a Woonduck, and three Saredaugvis, accordingly came, and on the morning of the 30th we arrived at the capital, anchoring about two miles below the city, opposite to the place appointed for our temporary residence. Thousands flocked down to the bank of the river, out of curiosity to see the steam vessel. A similar curiosity was displayed everywhere else on our journey, nearly the whole population of towns and villages turning out to see her.

On landing, we were received with ceremonious politeness by a Wungyi and Atwenwun, the two highest classes of officers under the Burmese government. These were the individuals who had negotiated and signed the treaty of Yandabo. The politeness which dictated the selection of these two individuals was obvious.

Our audience, under various pretexts, was put off from day to day, until the 21st of October. In the meanwhile, we were treated with attention. The expenses of the whole mission were paid, and we were put under no other constraint than that of not being permitted to enter the walls of the town, a liberty which would have been contrary to established etiquette. Meanwhile the negotiation had commenced, and on the 13th, 14th and 15th, we were present, by special invitation, at the annual display of boat-races, which take place yearly, when the waters of the Irawadi begin to fall. The King and Queen, with the princes and nobility, were all present. The splendour of this pageant far exceeded our expectation, and would have made a figure in the Arabian Nights' Entertainments, as one of the good things got up by virtue of Aladdin's lamp.

The period chosen for our presentation was that of one of the annual festivals, when the tributaries, princes, and nobility offer presents to his Majesty; and their wives to the Queen.

Boats were sent for our accommodation, and about 10 o'clock in the forenoon, we reached the front of the palace. An elephant was appropriated to each of the English gentlemen, and the procession moved on until arriving at the Ring-dau, or hall of justice, which is to the east side of the palace, where we were detained for nearly three hours, to afford us an opportunity of admiring the pomp and magnificence of the Burmese court, but above all, to afford the court an opportunity of displaying it.

At that place the whole court, with the exception of his Majesty, passed in review before us, beginning with the officers of lowest rank, and ending with the princes of the blood. The courtiers were in their dresses of ceremony, and each chief was accompanied by a numerous retinue, besides elephants and horses. The retainers of Menzagyi, the Queen's brother, the most powerful chief about the court, could not have been fewer than three hundred.

We were at length summoned into the Royal presence. The etiquette insisted upon with Colonel Symes, seemed not to have escaped the recollection of the Burman officers, and they would have had us to practice the same ceremonies he had been necessitated to submit to, but times had changed. These ceremonies consisted in making repeated obeisances to the walls of the palace, and in walking bare-footed, or at least without shoes, across the court-yard. All this we peremptorily refused, although the officers who led the procession shewed us a very good example in prostrating themselves repeatedly, by throwing their bodies prone upon the bare ground. Upon reaching the bottom of the stairs, leading to the hall of audience, we voluntarily took off our shoes, passed through the long hall, and seated ourselves in front of the throne. His Majesty did not keep us long waiting. After a hymn had been chanted by a band of Bramins in white, he made his appearance, upon the opening of a folding door behind the throne, and mounted the steps which led to the latter briskly. He was in his richest dress of state—wore a crown, and held in his hand the tail of a Thibet cow, which is one of the Burman regalia, and takes the place of a sceptre.

He was no sooner seated than her Majesty, who, whether on public or private occasions, is inseparable from him, presented herself in a dress equally rich with his, and more fantastic. Both had on a load of rich jewels. She seated herself on his Majesty's right hand. She was immediately followed by the little princess, their only child, a girl about five years of age. Upon the appearance of the King and Queen, the courtiers humbly prostrated themselves. The English gentlemen made a bow to each, touching the forehead with the right hand. The first thing done was to read a list of certain offerings made by the King to some temples of celebrity at the capital. The reason for doing this was assigned. The temples in question were said to contain relics of Gautama, to be representatives of his divinity, and therefore fit objects of worship. His Majesty having thus discharged his religious obligations, received, in his turn, the devotions and homage of the princes and chiefs.

The King did not address a word in person to the officers of the mission, but an Atwenwun, or privy councillor, read a short list of questions, as if coming from the King. These, as far as I can collect, were as follows:

“Are the King and Queen of England, their sons and daughters, and all the nobility of the kingdom well?”

“Have the seasons been, of late years, propitious in England?”

“How long have you been on your voyage from India to this place?” &c.

Bete, tobacco and pickled tea, were after this presented to the English gentlemen, a mark of attention shewn to no one else. They afterwards received each a small ruby, a silk dress, and some lackered boxes.

This



This being over, and a few titles bestowed and proclaimed throughout the hall, the King and Queen retired, the courtiers prostrating themselves as when they entered. Their Majesties had sat in all about three quarters of an hour. The Burman court, upon the present occasion, appeared in all the pomp and splendour of which it is capable, and the spectacle was certainly not a little imposing. The princes and nobility were in their court dresses, of purple velvet, with a profusion of lace and gold. The hall of audience is a gorgeous and elegant apartment, supported by ninety-six pillars, and the whole is one blaze of rich gilding.

In going through the court-yard the white elephant, and some other royal curiosities where shewn to us, and we stopped for a moment to see an exhibition of tumblers, buffoons, and dancing girls.

After the audience, the gentlemen of the mission were occupied for several successive days in paying visits to the heir apparent, the prince of Sarrawadi, the Dowager Queen, and the Queen's brother. By all these personages they were received with marked politeness and attention. The ladies presented themselves on these occasions as well as the men. There was no reserve in respect to the fair sex.

The negotiation was then renewed, and on the 23d November, besides settling some points respecting frontier, a short treaty of commerce, of four articles, was concluded.

This mission continued at the Burman capital in all about two months and a half, and quitted it on the 12th of December, after being honored with two audiences of his Majesty: the one on occasion of catching a wild elephant, and the other on that of weaning a young one, favourite diversions of the King. On the occasions in question, his Majesty threw off all reserve, and conversed freely and familiarly with our countrymen. On the day of departure presents were sent for the Governor General, and each of the English gentlemen received a title of nobility.

The Irawadi which, swollen by the periodical rains, was deep and broad in coming up, was found, in descending, to have fallen from twenty to thirty feet, and the navigation consequently proved extremely intricate and tedious. The steam vessel was in all a-ground fifteen days, and frequently ran the risk of being totally lost. The voyage to Rangoon occupied thirty-five days, which, in a small boat suited for the river, ought to have been performed in ten. At Pagan, about eighty miles below Ava, the mission was, for the first time, informed of the insurrection of the Talains. At Henzada and Donabew, the inhabitants were seen flying from the seat of insurrection. The insurgents were first seen at Paulang. This place, where the river is above sixty yards broad, was strongly stockaded in three places, and the Talains were seen standing to their arms. The steam vessel came to for a few moments, to request a safe passage for the baggage and boats which were behind, and for the boats of some merchants which accompanied them, amounting in all to about twenty-two. Boats put off immediately, and the Talains came on board without the least hesitation. They were full of friendly professions, and requested only our neutrality. Our visitors saluted us in the manner of English sepoy, standing up. This they said was the positive order of his Talain Majesty, who declared he would permit no one henceforth to crouch in his presence, or that of any other chief. They also boasted that they treated their prisoners after the English fashion, that is to say, disarmed them, and set them at liberty, without offering them any personal violence. They claimed the greater merit for this, on account of the conduct observed by the Burmans towards them, who, they alleged, put all their prisoners to death, or, as they expressed it, "divided them into three parts."

On the morning of the 17th, the mission reached Rangoon. The Burman flag was seen flying on one side of the river, and the Talain on the other, not six hundred yards asunder. The town of Rangoon was invested on all sides by the Talains, and the suburbs had been burnt to the ground. We had hardly been at anchor half an hour, and were engaged in reading our letters and newspapers, when the garrison made a sortie, and an action took place, reckoned the most considerable since the commencement of the insurrection. On both sides it was pultry and contemptible to the last degree. The Talains in one place, caught sleeping or cooking, fled to their boats, and were soon seen crossing the river in great numbers. At another post, between the town and the great pagoda, they were more vigilant, and easily repulsed a feeble and cowardly attack made by the Burmans. On the 23d, the mission left Rangoon, and in less than four-and-twenty hours, reached the new settlement of Amherst, in the harbour of which we found lying the Company's ships *Investigator* and *Ternate*, and a large fleet of gun-boats. To these, in a few days, were added the large merchant ships *Almorah*, *Felicitas*, and *Bombay Merchant*, with two trading brigs, and some schooners. This was a curious spectacle in a harbour which was not known to exist ten months ago. The settlement contains from sixteen to seventeen hundred inhabitants. Maulamhyeng, the military cantonment, twenty-seven miles further up the river, contains twice this number, chiefly camp-followers. Neither of them had a single inhabitant a few months back, but, on the contrary, were covered with a thick forest. This fine country already produces some of the necessaries and comforts of European life in a degree which, under all circumstances, is remarkable. Fowls are to be had in abundance for five rupees per dozen; a milch buffalo and calf for fifteen rupees; fish is in abundance, and of excellent quality. The best kinds are the calcop—the large mullet, and the mango-fish. It is curious, that this last is found in plenty both in the rivers of Rangoon and of Martaban, with roes for

Ava. for nine months of the year, or from December to August inclusive, whereas, in the Hoogly, three months is the utmost limit of their season.

On the 26th, the mission proceeded to Maulamhyeng, and on the 28th, ascended the Ataran river in the steam vessel. This stream, which is deep and free from danger, might be navigated for fifty miles up by vessels of three to four hundred tons burthen. It leads to Teak forests, distant about seventy-five miles, inexhaustible in quantity, and of the largest scantling.

On the 8th of February, the ship *Bombay Merchant* having been taken up for the accommodation of the mission, the members embarked that evening, and on the following morning sailed for Calcutta.

The following is a very brief sketch of what has been observed by the mission in the department of science or statistics. In the departments of mineralogy and geology, it is to be regretted that no scientific observer accompanied the mission. Our party, however, were assiduous collectors, and the collection brought back is so extensive, that it would afford men of science, a very tolerable notion of the mineralogical and geological constitution of the countries which were visited. From between the latitude of 15° and 16°, to between that of 18° and 19°, is a low alluvial country, forming the *debouchment* of the Irawadi river. Here, not a mountain or a stone is to be found, except in a very few places, such as Rangoon and Syriam. Here, a little cellular clay iron ore presents itself in low hills. In about lat. 18° 30' we quit the Delta of the Irawadi, the native country of the Talain race, and enter at once into a hilly region, which extends almost all the way to Ava, or to about the lat. of 21° 50'. The Irawadi, in all this course, is skirted by hills of from about three to five hundred feet high. The lowest portion of these is composed of breccia—calcareous sand-stone—cellular clay iron ore, with beds of sand and clay, and the highest of blue mountain lime-stone. The lowest portions are alluvial, and highly interesting to the geologist. The gentlemen of the mission discovered in these, abundance of sea shells, with fossil wood and bones. Among the latter are the bones of the fossil elephant, or mammoth, fossil rhinoceros, various ruminant animals, alligators and tortoises. An immense collection of these has been brought round for the government. Some of the bones are of great size, and all completely petrified. There are among them the teeth, and such other portions of the skeleton, as will enable the experienced naturalist to determine the *genera* and species to which they belonged. These were obtained close to the celebrated Petroleum wells. From their great induration, and having been little rolled, they are, generally, in a very perfect state. The bones, as well as the fossil wood, are found superficially in gravel, the same situation in which similar diluvian or antediluvian remains have been found in other quarters of the globe.

The ranges of mountains to the E. and N. of Ava, as far as twenty miles, and those close to the city, on the western bank of the river, are all of marble, and this of many varieties. The white statuary marble, some of which is very beautiful, is brought forty miles down the river, from a mountain on its eastern bank.

The great ranges of mountains, dividing the Burman dominions from Aracau on one side, and Siam on another, are reasonably supposed to be primitive. In the last direction, the roots of these seemed to extend to the new settlement of Amherst, where we find granite, quartz and mica slate. Some continuous low ranges, in the Martaban district, are composed entirely of quartz rock. Blue mountain lime-stone is a frequent formation in the same district, from which lime of much purity is manufactured. Detached rocks of this substance are scattered over the plains. These rise abruptly and perpendicularly to the height of from three to five hundred feet, and in one place to 1,500. They contain some spacious caves, which have been converted into places of worship. One of these rocks is so remarkable, that it deserves particular mention. Its perpendicular wall confines the Ataran for several hundred yards on its right bank, about its middle, it is penetrated by a branch of the river which flows quite through it by a magnificent arch. This is a highly picturesque object.

Neither the proper Burman or Talain country appear to be rich in metallic ores, with the exception of those of iron, tin, and antimony. The principal consumption of the country in iron, is supplied from the great mountain of Poupa, on the eastern side of the Irawadi, and near the latitude of 21°. Lao, the country of the Shans, as it is denominated by the Burmans, is, on the contrary, extremely prolific in metals. The singular passion of the Burinans for the study of alchemy, has brought collections of the ores of Lao into the market of Ava, and this circumstance enabled the gentlemen to make collections of them. The ores thus obtained, consisted of those of iron, silver, lead, copper, and antimony. The Shans possess the art of smelting all these, and bring them in their metallic state into the market of Ava. The silver ores, in the Burman dominions are, however, wrought to the greatest advantage by the Chinese. The mines exist about twelve days journey to the N. E. of Bamoo, towards the Chinese frontier.

The celebrated sapphire and ruby mines, which have always afforded, and still continue to afford, the finest gem of this description in the world, are about five days journey from Ava, in a direction E. S. E., and at two places called Mo-gaot and Kyat-pyan. The different species of sapphire, both in their crystallized and rough state, and the matrix, or rather gravel, in which they are found, were seen, examined, and collections made. In these mines are found the following gems or stones; the red sapphire, or oriental ruby, the oriental sapphire, the spinelle ruby, the white, the yellow, the green, the opalescent, the amethyst and



Girasol sapphire, blue with a reddish reflection, with the common corundum, or adamantine spar, in large quantities.

The oriental ruby, perfect in regard to water, color, and freedom from flaws, is scarce and high priced even at Ava. The blue sapphire is more common, and cheaper. One specimen exhibited to us weighed nine hundred and fifty-five carats, but it was not perfect. The red sapphire never approached this magnitude. The other varieties are all rare, and not much esteemed by the Burmans, with the exception of the Girasol sapphire, of which we saw two or three very fine specimens, and the green sapphire or oriental emerald, which is very rare. The King makes claim to every ruby or sapphire beyond a hundred ticals value, but the claim is one not easy to enforce. The miners, to avoid this sage law, break the stones when they find them, so that each fragment may not exceed the prescribed value. His Majesty last year got but one large ruby. This weighed about one hundred and forty grs. avoird. and was considered a remarkable stone. Sapphires and rubies form a considerable article of the exports of the Chinese, who are the cleverest people in the world in evading the absurd fiscal laws made by themselves and others. The use they put them to is that of decorating the caps of their mandarins, or nobility. Precious serpentine is another product of the Burman empire, which the Chinese export to a larger value.

The gentlemen of the mission examined carefully the celebrated Petroleum wells, near which they remained for eight days, owing to the accident of the steam vessel taking the ground in their vicinity. Some of the wells are from thirty-seven to fifty-three fathoms in depth, and are said to yield at an average daily from one hundred and thirty to one hundred and eighty-five gallons of the earth oil. The wells are scattered over an area of about sixteen square miles. The wells are private property, the owners paying a tax of five per cent. of the produce to the state.

This commodity is almost universally used by the Burmans as lamp oil. Its price on the spot does not, on an average, exceed from 5d. to 7½d. per cwt. The other useful mineral or saline productions of the Burman empire are coal, saltpetre, soda, and culinary salt. One of the lakes affording the latter, which is within six or seven miles of the capital, was examined by the gentlemen of the mission.

The success of the mission has been the completest in the department of botany. This will readily occur to our readers, when they recollect the talent, zeal, industry, and skill of the gentleman at the head of this branch of enquiry. Dr. Wallich has been left behind at Amherst, to complete his enquiry into the resources of the valuable forests of that and the neighbouring districts. Until this be effected, the full extent of his successful researches cannot be known. The number of species collected by him, amounted, when the mission left him at Amherst, to about sixteen thousand, of which five hundred and upwards are new and undescribed. Among these last may be mentioned seven species of oak, two species of walnut, a rose, three willows, a raspberry, and a pear; several plants discovered by him are so remarkable, as to constitute themselves new *genera*. Among the latter, may be mentioned one which has been called *Amherstia*, in compliment to the Lady Amherst. This constitutes, probably, the most beautiful and noble plant of the Indian flora. Two trees of it only are known to exist, and these are found in the gardens of a monastery on the banks of the Salwen. The number of specimens brought to Calcutta, amount to little less than eighteen thousand, among which are many beautiful live plants for the botanical garden, chiefly of the orchideous, scitamineous and liliaceous families. Dr. Wallich, when at Ava, obtained permission of the Burmese government, to prosecute his botanical researches on the mountains about twenty miles from Ava. In these, which are from three to four thousand feet high, he spent eight days, and brought from them some of the finest parts of his collection. These mountains contain several plants which are common to them with the Himalaya chain, but the greater part of their flora is rare and curious. The botany of the new provinces to the south, is considered to be highly novel and interesting, combining, in a great degree, the characters of the floras of continental India, and the Malayan countries.

In economical botany, a good deal has been effected. The tree producing the celebrated varnish, has been discovered and described, and the process of extracting and using the varnish observed. The different *Mimosas* producing Catechu, have also been determined, and the processes for extracting the drug observed. The localities of the different Teak forests, throughout the Burman empire, as well as the quality and price of the timber, have been ascertained. The valuable forests of this tree, discovered in our recent cessions, were upon the point of being minutely explored by Dr. Wallich. Lieutenant Scotland, under the instructions of Sir A. Campbell, had, just before the arrival of the mission at Amherst, made a journey by land to the Siamese frontier, in the course of which he passed through two Teak forests, towards the source of the Ataran river. The largest of these was five miles in breadth, and scarcely contained any other tree than Teak, many of which measured from eighteen to nineteen feet in circumference.

One of the oaks already mentioned, and which grows to a large size, is found in great abundance close to the new settlement of Amherst, and should it prove a valuable timber, which is most probable, it may be obtained with every facility. A fine durable timber, called by the Burmans, Thingan, and which they place next to the

Teak,



Ava.

Teak, or almost on an equality with it, is found every where throughout the new provinces. Dr. Wallich has ascertained this to be the *Hopea Odorata* of Roxburgh. Another valuable timber, the uses of which are well known in our Indian arsenals and timber yards, the Soondree, *Herietera Robusta*, is found largely in the maritime parts of the Martaban district, and of a size much exceeding what is brought from the Sunderbunds of the Ganges. Of these woods, and many others in use amongst the natives, although as yet unknown to us, specimens will be brought to Bengal by Dr. Wallich, for the purpose of subjecting their qualities to rigid experiment.

In the department of zoology, if we except the fossil bones already described, the enquiries of the gentlemen of the mission have not been so successful. The features of the animal kingdom, indeed, differ much less from those of Hindustan than the vegetable. Still there is, no doubt, much room for discovery, when the countries are leisurely explored by experienced naturalists. In the Martaban provinces, the forests of which teem with the elephant, the rhinoceros, the wild buffaloe, ox, and deer, a new species of the latter, is believed to exist. In the upper provinces, a species of mole-rat is very frequent, and thought to be an undescribed animal. Some of the officers of our army imagined that they had ascertained the existence of the jackall and fox, in the upper provinces of the Burman empire, but this seems to be a mistake. It is a singular fact, that neither these animals, nor the wolf, hyena, or any other of the genus *canis* is found there, with the exception of one animal, which is yet undescribed, and the howl of which it was, that was mistaken for that of the jackall. The feline tribe, especially the larger species, are but rare in the upper provinces of the Burman empire, but too frequent in the lower. The night before we left Maulamhyeng, a tiger was shot in the heart of the cantonment, by a party of officers who lay in wait for him. Two or three of the smaller species of this family, found in Martaban and Pegue, are thought to be as yet unknown to naturalists. In Martaban, two new species of pheasant have been found, of which living specimens have been sent to Calcutta. The celebrated elephant must not be forgotten. At Ava there is but one Albino elephant. This, a male, of about twenty-five years of age, was repeatedly seen and examined by the gentlemen of the mission, and his Majesty has made a present to the Governor General of a drawing of the animal in its state caparison, which is no bad specimen of Burman art.

As connected with this department, may be mentioned the existence at Ava, of a man covered from head to foot with hair, whose history is not less remarkable than that of the celebrated porcupine man, who excited so much curiosity in England, and other parts of Europe, near a century ago. The hair on the face of this singular being, the ears included, is shaggy, and about eight inches long. On the breast and shoulders it is from four to five. It is singular, that the teeth of this individual are defective in number; the molares, or grinders, being entirely wanting. This person is a native of the Shan country, or Lao, and from the banks of the upper portion of the Saluen or Martaban river: he was presented to the King of Ava, as a curiosity, by the prince of that country. At Ava he married a pretty Burmese woman, by whom he has two daughters. The eldest resembles her mother, the youngest is covered with hair, like her father, only that it is white or fair, whereas his is now brown or black, having, however, been fair when a child, like that of the infant. With the exceptions mentioned, both the father and his child are perfectly well formed, and, indeed, for the Burman race, rather handsome. The whole family were sent by the King to the residence of the mission, where drawings and descriptions of them were taken. Albinos occur, now and then, among the Burmese, as among other races of men. We saw two examples. One of these, a young man of twenty, was born of Burmese parents. They were ashamed of him, and, considering him little better than a European, they made him over to the Portuguese clergyman. The reverend father, in due course, made him a Christian.

With respect to the literature and language of the Burmans, the mission was placed, in many respects, under very favourable auspices. One of the members of it, Dr. Judson, had acquired a knowledge of both, far exceeding what any other European had ever done before him. Vocabularies have been collected of some of the numerous dialects spoken within the Burman dominions, and which in all, are not fewer than eighteen in number. Of the books which have been brought from Ava by the mission, may be mentioned a collection sent by the King to the Governor General: among other works which this collection contains, is a Pali Dictionary and Grammar, with Burman translations, and a History of Gautama, or Budd'ha, highly esteemed by the Burmans.

Burman History, such as it is, has been investigated with some success, and chronological tables of its principal events, true or alleged, been procured. These tables go as far back as five hundred and forty-three B. C. The first monarchs are said to have come from India, that is, from Magadha, or Bahar, and to have fixed the seat of their government at Prome, where it continued for three hundred and thirty-six years. Traces of the walls of the ancient capital are still to be seen a few miles distant from the modern town. The seat of government was afterwards transferred to Pagan, in the year of Christ one hundred and seven, where it continued for more than twelve centuries. Hence the wonderful extent of the ruins of that capital. In one thousand three hundred and twenty-two, the seat of government was transferred to Sakaing, and in one thousand three hundred and sixty-four,

sixty-four, to Ava, where it continued for three hundred and sixty-nine years, or until the capture of the place by the Talains. Alompra, or Alaong-Bura, one that expects to be a Budd'ha, made his native town, Momzaba (Motsobo,) the capital of the empire in one thousand seven hundred and fifty-two. His descendants, by a silly and superstitious caprice, have been shifting the capital ever since. One of his sons removed it to Sakaing—another to Ava—another to Amarapura; and his present Majesty to Ava again, in 1822. Each of these barbarous changes was nearly equivalent to the destruction of a whole city. From the foundation of the monarchy to the present time, there have reigned one hundred and twenty-eight kings, which gives an average of something more than seventeen years to a reign.

Of relics of antiquity, far more have been discovered than might have been expected to exist from previous accounts. The most remarkable are to be seen at Pagan, Sakaing, Sanku and Ang-le-ywa. The mission had an opportunity of examining those of the two first, which consist of temples and inscriptions. The most remarkable by far are the ruins of Pagan, which extend for twelve miles along the eastern bank of the Irawadi, and to a depth of five or six. Many of the temples are still entire, and exhibit a style of architecture, and superiority both in building and materials, which far excel the present efforts of the Burmans. In one of the old temples at this place, we found, to our surprise, images in stone, of brahminical origin. These were figures of Vishnu, Siva, and Hanuman. Near another temple was discovered a small but neat and perfect inscription in the Deva Nagari. At Pagan, we discovered not less than sixty inscriptions on sand-stone, and including Sakaing and other places, we found in all, not less than three hundred and thirty. In one place alone, the great temple of the Aracan image, near Amarapura, the late king had collected, from various parts of the country, no less than two hundred and sixty such monuments. A few of these are on fine white marble, but the greater number upon sand-stone. In form, the stones resemble the tomb-stones, placed at the head of graves in an English churchyard. Some are in the round Pali character, and others in the Burman, but the greater number in the former. They all contain dates, and generally the name of the reigning king, with references to some historical event, but the chief object is to commemorate the founding of some temple or monastery. Translations of several of these inscriptions have been effected, and good drawings made of some of the most striking of the ancient temples. Information, in considerable detail, has been obtained respecting the condition of manufacturing and agricultural industry amongst the Burmans—the state of landed tenures—the wages of labour—the price of food, and the rate of population. Barbarous as the Burmans must be admitted to be, in comparison with the Hindus—the Chinese—the Persians, and the Arabs, they have still some advantages over these nations, the natural result of the frame of society among them. The population is thinly scattered over an immense tract of fruitful country—the most fertile lands are so abundant that every man may have as much to cultivate as he chooses to occupy—food is low priced—labour highly rewarded. The people are easy in their circumstances, as far as mere food, clothing and dwelling are concerned, and there is much equality amongst them, for if there be some rich, there are none very poor, and there is scarcely any beggary. These natural advantages are far more than counterbalanced by the possession of a government lawless and despotic, and from the oppression of which, the poverty of its subjects is their best protection. No man must here presume to be rich. If he acquire wealth, it is at the peril of becoming a prey to the harpies of government. Sooner or later he will get into trouble, and his property must be ultimately swallowed up in those sweeping confiscations, which extinguish every germ of prosperity in the country.

The population and resources of the Burman empire, seem to have been greatly exaggerated. The inhabitants have been reckoned at seventeen millions—at nineteen millions, and even at thirty-three millions. Let any one accustomed to consider such matters, look at the country along the banks of the Irawadi, from the sea to Ava, a course of five hundred miles, the best part of the kingdom; he will then see that the greater portion of it is covered with primeval forest, without vestige of present or former culture, and he will be convinced of the utter improbability of such exorbitant estimates.

The following fact will convey a better notion of the true state of population and improvement, than any yet before the public. The three towns of Ava, Amarapura, and Sakaing, with the districts annexed to them, contain an area of two hundred and eighty-eight square miles, and constitute by far the best cultivated and most populous portion of the empire. It is nearly exempt from taxation, being favoured, through ancient and established usage, at the expence of the rest of the country. It contains, according to the public registers, fifty thousand six hundred houses, and each house is estimated to have seven inhabitants, which makes their total population only three hundred and fifty four thousand two hundred. Ava itself, certainly does not contain thirty thousand inhabitants, and in population, wealth, industry, and trade, is greatly below the capital of Siam. The other large towns of the Burman empire, such as Rangoon, Prome, Monchabu, Monay, &c., which are not above a dozen in number, do not any of them contain above ten thousand inhabitants. The population of Rangoon was ascertained by an actual census in our time, and found to amount only to between eight and nine thousand. It used formerly to be estimated as high as thirty thousand.



## No. 21.—From the Government Gazette, May 3, 1827.

*Bassein.*—The district of Bassein is bounded on the north by the Pasheem nullah or creek, which falls into the Irawadi a little above Meyaon, and on the south by the sea; on the east the Irawadi divides it from the province of Dalla, and on the west a range of mountains, running parallel to the coast, separates it from Gna-Gioung, which, however, for some years past, has been added to the Bassein district, which makes the sea the boundary. The area comprised within these limits, is estimated at nine thousand miles.

The country is low, and except where cleared for cultivation, overrun with jungle and forest. It is watered by the two great branches of the Irawadi, into which that river divides a little above Henzada, the most westerly of which falls into the sea at Negrais, and is known as the Bassein river. The main, or Pantano, branch passes Donabew and Pantano, and sends off the Rangoon branch, and proceeds to the sea between Dalla and Bassein, forming many ramifications in its course. The Bassein river offers many facilities to navigation, and ships of burthen may ascend fifty miles above the town. In the dry season, however, there is no flow of water into it from the Irawadi, the communication at the head of the river being interrupted by sand-banks. Small boats are sometimes dragged across. The opening of the river is generally awaited for trading with the upper provinces, but there is always a circuitous route open by the Pantano branch. Towards the end of the rains, the country is generally under water for some days. There are about one hundred lakes in the Bassein township, and twenty-seven in that of Pantano, at which fisheries are established. There is little intercourse in this part of the Burman territory, except by water.

The climate of Bassein is considered temperate. The heat is seldom oppressive, being moderated by the sea breeze in the hot weather, and by the moist atmosphere of the rains, whilst from November to February, the weather is mild and pleasant. The detachment stationed at Bassein from November 1825 to June 1826, offered no cases of general disease, and the natives are very healthy.

The quality of the soil is various, some places yielding seven hundred baskets of paddy per yoke, whilst others return less than one-third of that quantity. The rice cultivation is much the same as that of India. Maize is also grown in considerable quantities, but chiefly about the towns or gardens. Yams, both red and white, of a superior description are reared, as are sweet potatoes and other farinaceous roots—Sesame, and the Palma Christi, are grown in gardens—wood-oil is obtained in the province, and a tree call tungo-peng, from the fruit and seed of which an oil, used for lamps, is expressed, grows wild in abundance—tobacco is but little cultivated, and is of inferior quality, and the same may be said of the sugar cane—Indigo and cotton, which grow in the upper parts of the province, might be easily extended, but the chief object of cultivation in the district is grain—palms are not numerous, and areca nuts are imported from Bengal, cocoa-nuts are also brought from the Andamans, although the tree is plentiful about Bassein. Cocoa-nut oil is not procurable—mango and jack trees are numerous, and the marian, and other fruit trees, grow wild.

Silk and cotton goods, of a coarse kind, are manufactured in the province for domestic consumption, but those of a better description are imported from Ava or Bengal. Common earthen-ware is fabricated in abundance, as well as the few iron implements that are in use, as daos, knives, spears, the tees of the smaller Pagodas, and the fastenings for house and ship building, which latter arts may be considered upon a respectable footing.

The internal trade of the country was formerly considerable—the articles sent from Bassein were rice, salt, balachong, and salted and dried fish; the returns for which were silk clothes, lackered-ware, tobacco, onions, tamarinds, cotton, lac, lacker, petroleum, petroleum oil, dammer, iron, saltpetre and sulphur—the conveyance of these articles was by boats of large size, which assembled about the end of April, ready to take advantage of the rising of the river, and the prevailing winds from the south. In the want of wind, the progress of the large boats was stopped, or made only by warping, so that it was often necessary to transfer their cargoes to smaller boats, or sell them at the first mart. The productions of the district, or those of internal import, were exported for areca nuts and piece goods, chiefly to Rangoon, but boats of a large dimension were annually sent to Chittagong, and even to Dacca, before the late war.

The province of Bassein is said to have contained formerly thirty-two townships, but of these only eight remain. Bassein, Pantano, Kaybong, Donabew, Zayloom, Henzada, Kanao and Miaou: each of these is subdivided into districts, each district containing a number of villages: thus the township of Bassein itself comprises twelve divisions, and one-hundred and fourteen villages, besides thirty-seven villages unattached. A Sugi is at the head of each village division, and each township is under a Myosugi. These offices are, in general, hereditary, and they seem to involve a proprietary claim to the land, at least, during the pleasure of the King, who is the only land-holder in his dominions, and bestows or retracts the lands at will.

The population of the province is exceedingly scanty, particularly in the lower districts. The three townships of Bassein, Pantano, and Kaybong were found to contain about fifty-thousand persons, Burmans and Taliens, and thirty-thousand Karians and Kyens, making about twelve to the square mile. Taking the whole province, however,



however, the proportion may be calculated at double that rate, or twenty-four to the square mile. The Burman and Talién population is most usually on the banks of the rivers and creeks, and the Karians are to be found mostly upon the smaller nullahs. The Kyens and Zabaings chiefly inhabit the hill forests, in situations considered, by the other tribes, as unhealthy. According to general report, the province has been some time on the decline, and the existence of extensive vestiges of population, confirm the assertion. The town of Bassein, which now contains three thousand souls, formerly had thirty thousand. The decline has been progressive: attributable chiefly to bad government, but the late war contributed to desolate the country, not so much by the casualties of military operation, as by the compulsory abandonment of their dwellings by the people, and the prevalence of general anarchy and confusion.

The Burmese, Taliens, Karians, and Kyens, have all different languages, but the Burmese is generally understood: the dialects of the two last appear to be merely colloquial. Education is common. Almost all the male children of the Burmans and Taliens are taught gratuitously to read, write, and cipher, by the Poonghees, or priests: some of the female children also are taught to read and write. It does not appear, however, that these acquirements are subservient to more than the ordinary business of life, and literature and science are at the lowest possible ebb.

The revenue of the province was derived from a land-tax on the Karians; an assessment on houses in towns and villages; the rents of fisheries, and imposts on the manufacture of balachong and salt; on the sale of timber, on law proceedings, and duties and customs.

The tax on the Karians was rated at about eighteen ticals annually, per plough, or yoke of buffaloes: of this, twelve were for the government, four and a half for the Mywoon or viceroy, and one and a half for the Myosugi. For the King's use, one viss of wax, and ten baskets of paddy were levied in addition: the total produce of this was about forty-five thousand ticals.

The assessments on the towns were of a very arbitrary nature, and on particular occasions, of unlimited amount. A town being ordered to provide a certain sum for public purposes, the heads of the divisions were called together by the Myosugi, and informed of the quota expected from each, which they again exacted from the householders, according to their supposed means. Those who pleaded poverty, were not unfrequently put to the torture, whilst others evaded a full payment by the dexterous administration of bribes; but the system was a source of great oppression. Persons in the public employ were exempt, as were artificers, as their services were put in requisition whenever thought necessary for the public convenience, or that of the local authorities. The Musselmans and Chinese of Bassein were also free from any tax, in consequence of being employed to manufacture gunpowder for the state.

The fisheries in ponds and lakes were let to certain persons in the different villages, for an annual payment of about seventeen tikals each. Permission to procure turtles' eggs was also paid for. The fish was mostly made into balachong, and a charge was levied on this article when put on board of boats, for transmission to any other place. Twenty-two ticals were thus levied, without regard to the size of the boat or its contents. These sources of revenue, however, were but little productive, being usually mismanaged and easily evaded.

In like manner, every establishment for boiling salt, paid a common rate of tax, without any reference to the quantity of the manufacture. It was made in the township of Bassein in the months of February and March, chiefly by people from the towns, who annually visited the sea-coast for the purpose. The quantity usually made in the divisions of Negrais, Thingan, Narpoolah, and Pantono, was about forty-five thousand maunds a year, and the average price one tical a maund. The amount of the annual revenue raised from it was not more than four thousand and five hundred ticals. The mode of manufacture is as follows: a hole is dug in the ground, to which wooden troughs lead from the spots where the soil is washed, and the washings, or brine, thus collected. This is allowed to remain some days for the earthen particles to precipitate, and a portion of the water to evaporate, when some rice is thrown into the water. If it floats, the concentration is judged sufficient, and the fluid is transferred to large vessels, in which it is boiled to dryness.

The teak forests, in the province of Bassein, are not extensive, but good timber is procurable in the district of Lamina. The forests are on the west of the Bassein river, along the foot and upon the sides of the hills. Those in the Lamina district seem to have been regarded as the property of the state, but the Karians exercised the privilege of cutting those in the hills at pleasure. The timber was liable to a deduction of one-tenth, but this was generally remitted upon the payment of five per cent. of the value to the local officers. At the forest, two hundred shinbeams were procurable at from three hundred to five hundred ticals, according to the quantity on hand.

There were no duties on the transit of articles for ordinary consumption, but the people stationed at the chowkies took a portion for their own use. Upon articles of greater value, as cotton, &c., from the upper provinces, two and a half per cent. was levied, but the custom dues were, in general, arbitrary and undefined: ten per cent. was levied for the state, on the value of cargoes imported from sea, besides, two per cent. for the ministers.

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ministers. A variety of port duties were also charged, and there was no transacting business without fees and presents to all the authorities. Before the vessel departed, an account of sales was called for, and as the exportation of bullion was prohibited, it was necessary to show how the money received had been disposed of. The trade of Bassein was always subject to great fluctuation, and the amount of the customs, consequently, irregular and uncertain.

The revenue on law proceedings was divided between the government and the local authorities, and the latter not unfrequently were obliged to contract for their proportion. They, however, sometimes had to pay instead of receiving, and in cases of robbery, where the offenders were not secured, the head men of the villages, were punished by heavy fines, payable half to the state and half to the viceroy. The chief punishment of all crimes was fine: as fifteen ticals for abuse without blows, thirty for assault without bloodshed, thirty ticals for adultery, twenty per cent. for debt denied, from one hundred to five hundred ticals for murder and gang robbery, although they were sometimes punished capitally. All complaints were made in the form of petition, on presenting which fees were paid to the Maywoon and his officers, and various fees were paid on oaths, ordeals, appeals, &c. The Burmese code is derived from the Hindu, or the Institutes of Menu, respecting whom they have a ridiculous legend, that he promulgated his code at the age of seven years, and was, in consequence, made prime minister to Matha Mada, emperor of Ava. The provincial court consists of the Mywoon, or viceroy, Akhwen Woon, collector of revenue, Akon-kwoon, collector of sea customs, two Chekeys, or military officers, two Nakhans, or king's reporters, and two Tserays, or writers. Each member of the court tried causes separately, and at his own house; but in cases of importance, they assembled in a common hall, the Yondow, and appeals also lay to the Maywoon.

Of the hill and forest tribes settled in the province, the Karians are a fine athletic race, sober and industrious, of peaceable disposition, but not devoid of courage. They have no religion nor law, peculiar to themselves, and encourage the Burman priests to settle amongst them, and educate their children: They hold public assemblages on various occasions, at which they carouse freely, and the young men and women meet, and contract marriages. The Khyens and Zabaings, are also fine robust races: their women are reckoned handsome, but those of the former, whilst young, have their faces disfigured by tattooing, to render them, it is said, less the object of desire to the Burmans: generally speaking, the employment of the Karians may be considered agriculture, that of the Khyens, wood-cutting, and that of the Zabaings, rearing silk-worms. They all use animal food, but they are not very particular as to its quality: the flesh of monkeys is very generally eaten, and the Khyens and Zabaings hold that of dogs in estimation. They all drink spirituous liquors.

*No. 22.—From the Government Gazette, July 3, 1826.*

*Trade of Ava.*—The late influx of European intelligence has hitherto retarded the account we promised of the commerce of the Burman empire, both by sea and with the countries on its eastern frontier, and which we now offer to our readers: the particulars may be relied on, as the result of long and intelligent experience, and they will prove, we think, that even in the present state of that kingdom, the traffic with it holds forth prospects of the greatest advantage. If, however, the continuation of friendly intercourse, which may be expected, should impart to the Burman administration, corrected views of their own interests, and should induce them to consult the happiness of their subjects, the resources of the country will then be fully available, and the trade with it will become an object of primary importance to British India, or even to England.

The natural products of the Burman empire, which are articles of exportation, or likely to become so, are the following: rice, gram, cotton, indigo, cardamoms, black pepper, aloes, sugar, saltpetre, salt, teak timber, stick lac, kuth, or terra japonica, areca nuts, dammer, fustic, sapan wood, and earth oil, honey, bees-wax, ivory, and rubies, and sapphires. The mineral products are iron, copper, lead, gold, silver, antimony, white statuary marble, lime stone, and coal.

The teak forests are described by persons who have visited them to be of the most extensive description, and fully equal to any possible demand for a period beyond computation. The sugar is manufactured by Chinese, and is white and of good quality: the exportation of it was prohibited, but if this were not the case, and if encouragement were given to the manufacture, it might be carried to a great extent. The price of the clayed sugar at Ava was thirty to thirty-six rupees the hundred *vis*, or three hundred and sixty-five pounds *avoirdupois*.

The lower part of the Burman territory, the districts of Sarwah and Sarawadi especially, is considered as particularly adapted to the cultivation of Indigo—the plant grows wild, and is also cultivated by the natives for domestic use—more than one factory was about to be established by Europeans, when the war broke out.

The principal articles of import by sea, into the Burman dominions, are Bengal, Madras, and British piece goods, British woollens, iron, wrought and unwrought, copper for sheathing, lead, quicksilver, borax, sulphur, saltpetre, gunpowder, fire-arms, sugar, arrack, and rum, and a little opium, earthen-ware, Chinese and

and English glass-ware, cocoa-nuts and betelnut. The trade in British piece goods has, of late years, much increased, whilst that of Madras piece goods has, proportionately, diminished.

On the northern frontier of the Burman dominions, an active trade is carried on with China and other eastern states—the chief emporium is at a place called Banno, on the Chinese frontier, and at Midai, four or five miles to the northward of Amerapura, Mohammedan and Burman merchants of Ava, go to Banno to meet the Chinese, part of whom, not unusually four or five thousand, come down to Midai—the Chinese import copper, orpiment, quicksilver, vermilion, iron pans, silver, good rhubarb, tea, fine honey, raw silk, spirits, hams, musk, verdegis, dry fruits, and a few fresh fruits, with dogs and pheasants—the Chinese travel on small horses and mules, and are said to be two months on the road.

The tea that is brought by the Chinese, is black, and is made up in round cakes or balls; some of it is of very fine flavour, and it is all of a very different description from any that is sold in the market of Canton—the better qualities are well adapted for Europe: the retail price is but one tikal, little more than a rupee, for one vis, or nearly four pounds.—This tea is used by all who can afford it, but a cheaper sort, said to be the produce of some part of the Burman territory, is an article of great and general demand. It is eaten after meals, with garlic and sesamum oil, and it is customary to offer it to guests and strangers, as a token of welcome.

The returns of the trade with the Chinese are chiefly cotton, ivory, and bees' wax, with a small quantity of British woollens, chiefly broad cloths and carpets. The quantity of cotton is annually very considerable, it is estimated at not less than seventy thousand bales, of three hundred pounds each: the greater part of it is cleaned: the Ava cotton of the lower provinces is of a short staple, but that of the upper, long, and of a fine texture. The cotton of Pegu, it is said, is sent to Chittagong and Dacca, and is the material of the fine Dacca muslins.

Another line of traffic, is that with the country of the Shans, or, as it is termed by Europeans, the kingdom of Laos. The Shan traders repair annually, in the dry season, to the Burman country, bringing with them stick lac, bees' wax, a yellow dye wood, various drugs and gums, raw silk, lacquered ware, ready-made jackets stuffed with cotton, onions and garlic, turmeric and coarse sugar, in cakes—the chief returns are dry fish, nappi, and salt—the chief fair at which the Shans attend, is at Plek, six or eight miles south of Ava, on a small river which falls into the Irawadi under the walls of the capital: there are several smaller fairs along the east bank of the Irawadi, and one more considerable is annually held at the Dagon Pagoda, near Rangoon.

No. 23.—From the Government Gazette, May 29, 1866.

*Occupation of Amherst.*—Mr. Crawford, one of the Commissioners for Ava and Pegu, proceeded from hence to Martaban in the end of March, for the purpose of taking possession of the districts of Martaban and Yé, ceded to us by the late treaty, as well as of founding a new town, for the capital of our possessions in this quarter, a matter which became necessary in consequence of the restoration of that of Martaban itself, which is on the western bank of the river to the Burmans. I hand you a short narrative of the proceedings on this occasion, which I hope will be found to convey some useful information to your commercial readers.

Our party consisted, besides Mr. Crawford, of Captain Studdert, the senior officer of his Majesty's navy at Rangoon—Captain Hammond of the Madras Quarter Master General's Department—the Reverend Dr. Judson, of the American mission in Ava, and Mr. King, royal navy. On the 31st of March, at half-past one o'clock in the afternoon, we left Rangoon, in the steam vessel *Diana*, and at ten in the forenoon of the following day, reached the mouth of the Martaban river, distant from that of Rangoon about seventy miles. Its entrance is not less than seven miles broad. The mouth of this river, and indeed its whole course to the town of Martaban, is a difficult and dangerous navigation, and until our visit, the existence of a safe and convenient harbour had not been suspected. The position of the cape of Kyai-kami, as laid down in the chart of Lieutenant Abbot, led us to imagine that shelter might be found behind it, in the S. W. monsoon; but we had proceeded in our course a considerable way up the river, and had a good view of the land to the south of us, before appearances rendered it probable that a harbour existed. We fortunately put about ship, and returning, anchored in quarter less three fathoms, within fifty yards of the shore, in a clayey bottom. It was low water, neap tides, and the surrounding rocks and sand-banks were exposed to view. The first formed a reef of about two miles and a half in extent, running out in a north-westerly direction from the cape, and both, along with the cape itself, which sheltered us from the S. W. wind, nearly land-locked us, forming, to all appearance, an excellent harbour. About a mile and a half to leeward of us, in reference to the S. W. monsoon, was the wide mouth of a river hitherto unexplored.

After dinner our party landed, and began, with avidity, to explore the little peninsula of which cape Kyai-kami forms the extremity. For three quarters of a mile from the cape in land, on the north-eastern side, the land was elevated from ten to twenty feet above high water mark, spring tides, and on the south-western side, the whole country is of that elevation to the distance of, apparently, three or four miles, where it terminates



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minates in a range of hills, between three and four hundred feet in height. We found the land covered every where with a forest of fine timber, not very thick, and with so little underwood, that we walked into it, without difficulty, for several hundred yards. So far the situation promised every advantage for the site of a commercial town and military cantonment.

Early on the morning of the 2d, our party landed again, and explored the little tract of country before us more completely. It is at present uninhabited, but the traces of former occupation were discernible. The ruins of four small Pagodas were found close to the beach—several wells were seen not far from them, and in the same situation, were the remains of a miserable breast-work, recently thrown up by way of opposing the conquest of the province by Colonel Godwin, in 1825.

At ten o'clock, we proceeded to explore the river already mentioned. In proceeding towards it, from the place where we lay, we had all along three and a half and four fathoms water, and over the bar, which was of soft ooze, quarter less three. After entering, we carried five and a half and five fathoms, for eight miles up, ranging the river from one side to another, until the steam vessel sometimes touched the trees. For about a mile up, the river is, every where, from four to five hundred yards wide, and being soon land-locked, it forms a spacious and beautiful harbour, into which, at low-water neap tides, most merchant ships can enter, and at high water, ships of any burthen. The banks of this river would have formed by far the most convenient spot for a mercantile town—but unfortunately, they were every where low and subject to inundation. We ascended the river as far as a large creek which leads to Wagu, then distant two miles. This place, once the seat of government of a dynasty of Peguan kings, in the 13th century, is now nearly without inhabitants, having been deserted about nine years ago, in the great emigration of Talains, which then took place into the Siamese territory. The river which we had now examined, is called, in the Talain language, the Kalyen. Many small creeks issue from the main branch. We ascended one of these, on the left bank of the river, near its mouth, in our boats, as it appeared to lead to the neighbourhood of our proposed settlement. It brought us to a small village, the inhabitants of which were fishermen and salt manufacturers. These poor people expressed no apprehension at our appearance; but proceeded, without disturbance, in their usual occupation, obligingly answering all our questions. This feeling of confidence towards us is, I believe, at present, general throughout the whole Talain population, and I trust our conduct may always be such as not to forfeit it.

By dawn of day, on the 3d, we landed again and repeated our examination. Passing to the S. W. of the Cape, we proceeded along a beautiful sandy beach, shaded from the morning sun by the high bank on our left, covered with overhanging trees, many of them in fruit and flower; our Indian servants feasting upon the Jamun, which was found in great abundance. After a distance of about a mile and a half, the strand, now described, is interrupted by a bold rocky promontory, and continued again as far as the eye could reach. This promontory, as well as cape Kyai-kami, itself, afforded us an opportunity of examining the rock formation, which is very various, consisting of granite—quartz rock—clay slate—mica slate—indurated clay—breccia, and clay iron ore. The soil, apparently of good quality, and generally from two to three feet deep, as might be seen by the section of it in the wells, commonly rests on the clay iron ore, which gives the water, in other respects pure and tasteless, a slight chalybeate flavour. The distance between the furthest promontory and the river Kalyen, we computed to be about two miles, the whole a table-land, nearly level, with the exception of a few hundred yards of Mangrove on the immediate banks of the Kalyen. The peninsula thus formed, contains about four square miles, an ample space of choice ground for a town, gardens, and military cantonments. The space in question, receives considerable protection from the south-west monsoon by the little woody island of Zebo, about one hundred feet high, and lying about three quarters of a mile from the shore.

At eleven o'clock in the forenoon, we ascended the river for Martaban. During nearly our whole course up, we had the large and fertile island of Bilu on our left hand. This is the most productive place in rice within the whole province, and afforded a considerable revenue to the Burmese government. At sunset, we reached Martaban, about twenty miles from the mouth of the river. The prospect which opens itself upon the stranger here, is, probably, one of the most beautiful and imposing which oriental scenery can present. The waters of three large rivers—the Saluen, the Atran, and the Gain, meet at this spot, and immediately proceed to the sea by two wide channels, so that, in fact, the course of five distinct rivers are, as it were, seen at one view, proceeding like *radii* from a centre. This centre itself is a wide expanse of waters interspersed with numerous islets. The surrounding country consists generally of woody hills, frequently crowned with white temples, and in the distance are to be seen the high mountains of Zingai, and in favourable weather, the more distant and lofty ones which separate Martaban from Laos and the Siamese territory. Captain Fenwick, the civil superintendent of Martaban, came on board to compliment us upon our arrival. Shortly after, we landed with this gentlemen, and passed the evening with him at his house, where we concerted an expedition for the following day up the Saluen, to the caves of Kogun.

Early on the morning of the 4th, a party visited the little picturesque island of Taongzé, opposite the town, and which is covered with white temples. From thence we passed to Molameng, on the left bank of the

the river, the place first contemplated for the site of a new town, and where part of the ground was already cleared of forest for this purpose. Situated twenty-five miles from the sea, by an intricate navigation, and accessible only to craft drawing ten feet water at the most, in point of convenience it, of course, bore no comparison with the eligible situation which we had already examined. Molameng had once been the site of a town and capital, under the Hindu name of Ramapura, or the city of Rama, and the high earthen walls and ditch could still be easily traced. When the tide served at eleven o'clock, we ascended the Saluen in the steam vessel, the first of her description that had ever entered its waters. When twelve miles above Martaban, the river, hitherto disturbed and muddy, became as clear as crystal, and we had still three fathoms depth. About this place, we passed the Kadachaong creek, which leads to Rangoon, through the Setang and Pegu rivers, and thence again through several cross channels to Bassein, a direct distance of more than two hundred miles. The internal navigation of lower Pegu appears, to me, to possess natural facilities far beyond any other Asiatic country. At half-past two o'clock, we reached Kogon, distant, by computation, twenty-five miles from Martaban. The scenery in this neighbourhood was grand and beautiful—the banks of the river high, and the country, to all appearance, peculiarly fertile. Close to the left bank of this river was to be seen a range of mountains, steep, bare, and craggy, rising to the height of one thousand five hundred feet. Almost immediately on the right bank, and where the river makes an acute angle, a number of detached conical hills rose almost perpendicularly from the plain. All these hills are of a grey lime-stone. We visited the largest, which contains a spacious cave, dedicated to the worship of Buddha, and which, besides having the roof rudely but curiously carved, contains several hundred images of Buddha, a good number of them of pure white marble, equal in beauty to that of Carara, from the quarries of Ava. Around the hill is a garden belonging to a neighbouring monastery, in no very good order. The only plant in it which struck us as remarkable, was a tree about twenty feet high, abounding in long and pendulous pannicles of rich geranium-colored blossoms, and long and elegant lance-shaped leaves. It is of the class and order—*Diadelphina Decandria*, and too beautiful an object to be passed unobserved, even by the uninitiated in botany. Handfuls of the flowers were found, as offerings, in the cave, before the images of Buddha. At four o'clock, we began to descend the river, and at seven, with the assistance of the ebb tide, the current of the river, and the full power of the steam, reached Martaban.

The cultivation of the fertile tract of country which we had passed in the course of the day is meagre, and proportioned to the oppressed and scanty population of a country, which scarcely contains three inhabitants to a square mile. The objects of culture, which we observed in small patches, but growing with much luxuriance, notwithstanding the too obvious unskillfulness of the husbandry by which they were reared, were indigo, cotton, and tobacco. Besides these, the upper part of the country, which is not subject to inundation, appears to be peculiarly fitted for the growth of the sugar cane and coffee plant. Martaban, indeed, is a province of very various agricultural produce, for, besides the articles already mentioned, it yields pepper, cardamoms, areca nut, and teak wood, not to mention rice, which seldom exceeds in price twenty annas the maund—a list which can scarcely be matched in any other part of India.

On the morning of the 5th, we went through the town of Martaban, a long straggling and mean place, consisting of miserable huts, according to the custom of the country. It is situated at the foot of a conical hill, and is said to contain a population of nine thousand souls, chiefly Talains. The Chinese are very few in number, always a sure sign of bad government in a country understocked with inhabitants, and calculated by nature for commercial pursuits. We found the inhabitants preparing to move across to the British side of the Saluen. Such is the poverty, and such are the unsettled habits produced by oppression, that these emigrations are no very arduous undertaking to the Peguans. Yesterday, we heard that one thousand two hundred families, from the district of Zingai, with three thousand head of cattle, had arrived on the banks of the Saluen, with the intention also of crossing into the British territory to settle. But these are trifling emigrations in comparison with the great one which took place from the same quarter in 1816, into the Siamese territory, and which, at the lowest computation, amounted to forty thousand souls. The fugitives, on this occasion, conducted the plot with so much concert and secrecy, that, from one extremity of the province to another, they put themselves in motion towards the Siamese frontier on the same day, and took such advantage of a temporary quarrel between the officers of the Burman government among themselves, that the latter were neither in a condition to oppose their flight, nor to pursue them. By direction of the leaders of the emigration, cannon were simultaneously fired throughout the country, the concerted signal for the march. The lower orders, in their ignorance, ascribed the sounds which they heard, to their tutelary gods.

At eleven o'clock in the forenoon, we left Martaban for Kyai-kami, accompanied by Capt. Fenwick. Close to Molameng, on the left bank of the river, is the termination of a range of hills of no very great height, which extends all the way to Zea, a district which commences with the right bank of the Kalyen river. At Molameng at least, it is composed of sand-stone. In various parts of this range is found a rich and abundant ore of antimony, of which specimens were shown to us. The Zingai mountains afford blende, or the sulphu-



rate of zinc, in not less abundance : of this also, specimens were exhibited to us. The great range dividing Martaban from Lao, affords ores of lead and copper, so that this province is, by nature, scarcely less rich in mineral than in vegetable produce. At five o'clock in the evening, we reached the new harbour.

Early on the morning of the 6th, we renewed our examination of the peninsula. The day before, a party of natives had cut a road quite across the highest part of the ground, a labour of no great difficulty. The distance measured by the perambulator was found to be only one thousand yards. After seeing and examining the banks of the Martaban river, to the extent of fifty miles, we found no difficulty now in fixing upon this spot, as by far the most eligible for a commercial town. Accordingly, at twelve o'clock, the ceremony of hoisting the British flag, and fixing the site of the town, in the name of his Majesty, and the East India Company, took place. Major Macqueen, of the 36th Madras regiment, and his staff, who had arrived in the Lady Blackwood transport, joined our party. The Lady Blackwood fired a royal salute, and a party of sipahees, three volleys of musquetry. The Reverend Dr. Judson pronounced his benediction on our little undertaking, in a feeling prayer. His auditors will perhaps be thought to have entered more into the feelings of the occasion than your readers will do, when I tell you they were of opinion, that he selected for his readings, with equal taste and judgment, the 6th Chapter of the sublimest and most poetic of the inspired writers. Take the following short selections as examples, "The abundance of the sea shall be converted unto thee, the forces of the Gentiles shall come unto thee," "For brass I will bring gold, and for iron I will bring silver, and for wood brass, and for stones iron : I will also make thy officers peace, and thy exactors righteousness." "Violence shall no more be heard in thy land, wasting nor destruction within thy borders." The new town and harbour we called Amherst, in compliment to the present Governor general.

April 7th. A party of workmen commenced yesterday to clear the ground for the military cantonments, and a road having been opened all round the spot intended for them, we had an opportunity of deciding upon its eligibility. The whole country, indeed, up to the hills, and to within a few hundred yards of the Kalyen, is a dry level table land, rising gently in the centre, than which nothing can be conceived more commodious or suitable to the purposes of an European settlement. I ought here to mention, that the peninsula, from the S. W. and N. E. winds flowing without interruption over it, is admirably ventilated—that the climate—and we experienced it in one of the hottest months in the year—is, consequently, cool and agreeable, while the soil is so dry, that during our whole stay we did not see or feel a single musquito or other troublesome insect. The testimony of the natives, let it further be added, is decidedly in favour of the salubrity both of this spot and the neighbouring country, including the town of Martaban itself. In passing along the sandy beach, on the western shore, yesterday and to day, we saw the fresh tracks of leopards, wild casts, large deer and buffaloes. The latter, we were told, were the cattle of the village of Kalakóe, distant about four miles; but in the mountains, close at hand, exist wild buffaloes and elephants. In the forest, when examining the ground for cantonments, we saw one large deer, and several monkeys, and the woods abound with the common wild fowl and peacock.

In walking along the sandy beach this morning, we unexpectedly met two priests, who readily entered into conversation with us, and were very communicative. They had heard of our projected settlement, and took advantage of the circumstance to cheer us in our undertaking, and pay us a compliment at some expence to their veracity. They said that the place was fortunate—that the temple of Kyaikami was dedicated to the god of fortune, which the term imported in their language. With more effrontery they added, that they had that morning perused their sacred books, and that they there found it written, that a colony of white men would one day settle in the neighbouring country.

Captain Hammond having measured the ground with the perambulator, a matter which was easily effected along the smooth sandy beach, drew out a plan of the whole ground, and in the course of the day we were busy in allotting the ground for the various wants and necessities of a new town. The north-western promontory was reserved for government,—the high ground, immediately fronting the harbour, was set apart for the European and Chinese, or in other words, the commercial establishment, and the lower grounds, towards the Kalyen river for the native town. A ground plan of the European town was sketched, composed of ten streets, with four hundred houses, the great front street, consisting of one row of houses, and containing nineteen lots each, of sixty feet front and one hundred and sixty feet deep, being especially appropriated for principal mercantile establishments. Immediately behind the town is ground for an esplanade, beyond which and on the western shore, are the military cantonments, and to the S. W. of the whole, towards the hills, there is ample room for gardens and garden-houses. Ground for a church—a botanical garden, and an European and Chinese burying ground, are to be placed in the same situation. Regulations for the construction of the town were adopted, and in appropriating and granting lands, the liberal and comprehensive rules laid down by the Supreme Government for the flourishing settlement of Singapore, were assumed for the new settlement.

The Commissioner, on this occasion, addressed a proclamation to the natives of the neighbourhood. The following is a literal translation of this document, which in its English dress seems somewhat quaint and unpolished, although, I believe, well suited to the character of those to whom it is addressed :—



“The Commissioner of the Governor General of British India to the Talains, Burmans, and other Tribes of people. In conformity with the treaty of peace between the Governor General and the King of Ava, the English government takes possession of the places beyond the Saluen river, and at the entrance of the sea, in the district of Kyai-kami, founds a new town.

“The inhabitants of the towns and villages, who wish to come, shall be free from molestation, extortion and oppression. They shall be free to worship, as usual, temples, monasteries, priests and holy men. There shall be no interruption of free trade; but people shall go and come, buy and sell, do and live, as they please, conforming to the laws. In regard to employing the labouring people,—they shall be employed, on the payment of customary wages; and whoever compels their labour without reward shall be punished. In regard to slavery,—since all men, common people or chiefs, are by nature, equal, there shall be, under the English government, no slaves. Let all debts and engagements contracted under the Burmese government, previous to the war, be discharged and fulfilled, according to the written documents. Touching the appointment of officers and chiefs, they are appointed to promote the prosperity of the towns and villages, and the welfare of the inhabitants. If, therefore, they take property by violence, or govern unjustly, they shall be degraded and punished. In regard to government assessments, when the country is settled and prosperous, consultation will be held with the leaders of the people, and what is suitable and moderate will be taken to defray the necessary expenses of government. Whoever desires to come to the new town, or the villages beyond the Saluen river, under the English government, may come from all parts and live happy, and those who do not wish to remain, may go where they please without hindrance. Given at Martaban, the 6th of April, 1826, and the 14th of the Wane of Tag-o, 1187.”

Anxious to make a farther examination of the Kalyen river, we ascended it again at eleven o'clock, and proceeded up to the distance of fourteen miles, having every where from four to five fathoms water. At the farthest point which we ascended, the river did not exceed seventy yards in breadth, and in one or two situations the hills were within half a mile of us. No high ground was, however, any where to be found on its banks. The highest spring tides were on this morning, and afforded us an opportunity of determining the greatest rise and fall of the tides, and other important points connected with the navigation of the harbour and entrance. The greatest rise and fall in the springs, appears to be between eighteen and nineteen feet—at neaps, it is five or six feet less. On the oozy bar of the Kalyen, there were this morning, at the lowest ebb, ten feet water, and at the highest flood, quarter less five fathoms. Every morning of our residence in the new harbour, Captain Studdert, of the Royal Navy, was employed from three to four hours, with equal skill and zeal, in examining and sounding the harbour and its approaches. Between the extremity of the reef of rocks and the Diana Shoal, there is a narrow but practicable passage into the harbour; but Captain Studdert discovered a more safe, short, and easy one through the reef of rocks, which, when buoys and beacons are laid, it is to be hoped will be found easy and practicable, in the worst period of the south-west monsoon. From the description now given of the harbour, the entrance into it, and the neighbouring localities, it is obvious that the place is capable, at a very trifling expense, of being fortified in such a manner as to render it quite impregnable. A battery on the promontory completely commands the town, and protects the shipping, which may lie in good anchorage within fifty yards of the shore. An enemy entering the new passage, might be sunk from a martello tower on the high rock of Kyaikami, a few hundred yards from the promontory. A battery at either side of the entrance of the Kalyen would render the harbour, formed by this river, equally secure.

Upon the commercial advantages of the place, it is scarcely necessary to insist. Ships, as already said, may lie within fifty yards of the shore, and within seventy-five of the merchant's warehouse. Sheltered by the cape, by the long reef of rocks to the north-west of the harbour, and by the innumerable sand banks to the north of it, dry at low water, as well as by the great island of Billu, and the continent on the east bank of the Martaban river, ships will be in smooth water, except, perhaps, for a moment in the westerly monsoon, during high flood, and when the wind shifts to the west or north-west. In such a case, vessels with indifferent tackle, or in a disabled state, may slip with perfect facility into the Kalyen river, a short mile to the lee of the harbour, then accessible to merchant vessels of any burthen. The banks of the Saluen are, as before mentioned, eminently fertile, and communicate by a long navigation with the Burman territories. The Gain and Attaran open a direct intercourse with the Siamese dominions, with Lao, and thence with Yunnan in China. The new harbour itself is situated in the most central part of the Bay of Bengal. Under these circumstances, is there any thing more wanting than security for life and property, justice and moderation in the fiscal assessments, and a free and convenient market to ensure the prosperity of a country so peculiarly favored by nature? I already anticipate ships on the stocks, cargoes of British and Indian manufactures entering the port; ships loaded for China, Western India, and Europe, with rice, cotton, indigo, pepper, sugar, lac, dye woods, teak, cardamoms, ores, raw-silk of Laos and China, and twenty other commodities elicited or created by the all-powerful influence of British enterprise, ingenuity, and capital.

Ava.

At half-past two o'clock in the afternoon, we quitted the new harbour on our return to Rangoon, taking, in going out, the channel discovered by Captain Studdert, and which, in compliment to the naval commander, has been called the Brisbane Passage. It is not above fifty yards broad. We went through it with the commencement of the ebb tide, and had nothing less than five fathoms and a half. On the evening of the 9th, we made the entrance of the Rangoon river, and early on the morning of the 10th reached the town.

Our adventure has excited a good deal of curiosity at Rangoon, and I am told a considerable part of the European and Chinese town has already been bespoken. By the last accounts Captain Spiers, sent down by the commissioner, has laid down buoys, so as to make the harbour practicable without a pilot. Cantonments for one thousand men have been constructed, some houses built by the Chinese, and a good bazar formed. The *Lady Blackwood* arrived this morning. She lay a fortnight in the harbour, which was as still as a mill pond. She found no difficulty in going in or coming out. All this promises well; but the season, the commencement of the rains, is very unfavorable to the undertaking.

No. 24.—From the Government Gazette, September 18, 1826.

*Moal-mein.*—Moal-mein is situated on a small peninsula formed by the Martaban and Attaran rivers, and is, in every way, well calculated for a position, both of military defence and extensive inland trade. It possesses great advantages over the site of Martaban, for the latter place is commanded by high hills, which shut out the sea breeze, while Moal-mein is pleasantly situated on a spot that is dry, open, and, by the report of the natives, healthy. The soil is a light sandy loam. The ground undulates, and rises gradually two hundred feet from the river to the Pagoda-hill, a distance of about three quarters of a mile, in an easterly direction, affording fine situations for houses, and close under the west face of the Pagoda, a fine level ridge will hold many thousands of inhabitants.

The bank of the river, south of the sand, being higher than in any other part, and, by all accounts, never overflowed, is best calculated for wharfs, quays, &c. and the creeks here, although small at present, may be rendered useful, as the largest runs inland a considerable distance during the rains; there are several wells and a tank on the peninsula, which contain abundance of very fine water, and that of the river is at all times fresh and good. There are extensive plains to the east of the old fort, said to be very fertile, and formerly highly cultivated, which furnish ample means of supply. Iron and sand-stone are abundant, the old walls having been apparently composed of both. A small island, immediately opposite, about two hundred and fifty yards long, and two hundred broad, is admirably situated as a safe receptacle for government stores, granaries, and a powder magazine, and batteries may be placed on it to great advantage, as it commands all the rivers, and is within ordnance range of Martaban.

From the situation of three northern rivers, it is quite evident that the ebb from the two, to the eastward, viz. the "*Gain*" and "*Attaran*," forces the stream of the "*Saluen*" to take its course north of the island called "*Puloo Gune*;" indeed, this is so manifest, that the drift from the northward, invariably, and at all seasons, passes by this channel to the sea, and boats that wish to go from Martaban down the southern branch, are obliged to pull strongly to keep clear of the northern set of the tide. The entrance to the Martaban river is dangerous, and the sand shoals and rocks in it numerous, and on this account, ships of a greater draught than fourteen feet will find it difficult to get up beyond a distance of ten miles from the entrance. As an emporium for foreign trade, therefore, the situation at Moal-mein is not so good as one near the mouth of the river, as Amherst, but as an effectual check on the Burmah trade, and as a strong military position on our frontier, it will, perhaps, be considered the best that can be selected for these two important purposes.

No. 25.—From the Government Gazette, August 17, 1826.

The entrance to the Setang river is blocked up by an island off its mouth, and the approach to it is both difficult and dangerous, from the extensive shoals and breakers along the coast, which render it impossible to keep close in to the shore. The only mode of proceeding is, to edge along the eastern shoals as far as latitude 17°, which is five miles from the mouth of the river. The channel entering into the river, is about eight hundred yards broad, bounded by low sand-banks, but these are covered by the high and violent tides, which set into the Setang river, and have hitherto disappointed every attempt to make it by the western channel.

On the present occasion, a brig and row-boat went from Martaban on the 15th April, and entered the river by the western channel, following the coast alluded to with the flood: they proceeded in perfectly smooth water for some distance, but the great extent to which the land was covered, indicating a more than usually rapid rise of the tide, and suggesting the possibility of the brig's being left among shoals or breakers with the ebb, it was thought advisable to come to anchor. The boat was sent on ahead, but at the distance of about twenty miles, it was aground at high water. On the brig's anchoring, the tide was found to be running

at



at the rate of twelve knots in a westerly direction, and it retired by an easterly course, apparently by the eastern channel, by which it is supposed boats may proceed up the Setang river, although even they can only venture at particular seasons, and must take shelter from the violence of the tide in the creeks and bays along the banks of the river.

Finding it unsafe to advance in this direction, an attempt was made to reach the eastern channel, but it was not more fortunate. After standing as much to the eastward as soundings would allow, the brig was obliged to anchor at half-ebb in two fathoms and a half; as the tide fell the breakers approached the vessel, and at last only three feet water remained, the brig beating against the sands. With the returning tide, the vessel stood off, and anchored in five fathoms in the old soundings, but the row-boat accompanying her, which had been detached to sound, and had been unable to reach the brig again, was obliged to cut her cable to avoid being swamped by the force of the tide, and drove upwards of twenty miles. This was on the night of the 20th: on the morning of the 21st, she hove in sight. On sounding, it was found that the brig was now in but three fathoms, having been driven on the shoals, and about eight o'clock in the morning, she was again aground, but sustained no material injury. Taking advantage of the next ebb, the vessel descended to its former track, but not without getting into one fathom on the way. During the night of the 21st, which was the height of the springs, the tide set in with such impetuosity, that there was reason to dread every moment that the brig would founder, or part her cable, an accident equally serious in such a situation. She rode out the flood however, and then cleared the shoals. The row-boat again drove, and was no more seen till the vessels joined company at Martaban. The boat had been driven up as far as the island, whence she was carried by the ebb into the northern channel, and amongst the rocks in-shore, where she had suffered considerable damage. The following results have been ascertained by these attempts:—

In all the maps hitherto constructed, the coast from Rangoon to the island, at the mouth of the Setang river, is carried 10' or 15' too far to the south, and the coast of Martaban is laid down about 14' too far to the west.

Vessels drawing six feet water cannot enter the Setang river by the western channel. Small craft may proceed, at some seasons, up the eastern, but only at neap tides, as the tides in that are more violent, if possible, than in the western channel.

On the efflux of the tides, the greatest depth in any continuous channel does not exceed half a fathom. Soundings of two, or two and a half fathoms may be obtained at low water, but these are only in particular spots, where the water is embayed between sand-banks, or projecting tongues of land.

There is no *Bore* properly so called, no instant rush nor perpendicular advance of water, except, perhaps, in the eastern channel; but there is a tide of singular impetuosity, and a heavy swell, which it is equally dangerous to drive with or resist. The tremendous character of the tide may be easily understood by reference to the form and direction of the adjoining coasts, by which the set of the flood, the whole way from the parallel of Acheen-head, is determined into the Setang river.

No. 26.—From the Government Gazette, March 2, 1826.

*Tenasserim*.—The provinces of Ye, Tavai and Mergui, which have been lately subjected to British authority, have been for many years but rarely visited by Europeans, and are now not very generally known: we have no doubt, therefore, we shall perform an acceptable service to our readers, by collecting for them the substance of several authentic notices with which we have been favored, to which we have added a few illustrations, from works not very generally accessible.

The provinces in question occupy a narrow strip of land about three hundred miles long by fifty broad, and containing fifteen thousand square miles: it is confined between the sea on the west, and a range of mountains on the east, by which it is divided from Siam. The mountains stretch in a continuous, but irregular line from some branch of the Himalaya to the extremity of the Malacca peninsula: the main chain is flanked by several parallel ranges, diminishing in height as they approach the plains; the intervening vallies are very narrow, and only serve as outlets to the many mountain rivulets, which, uniting, form rapid streams, the greater number of which take a south-west course; but finally run nearly due west to the sea. Some of the loftier peaks may be five thousand feet high, and the whole is covered with forest scantily tenanted by the wild and independent *Karian* tribes.

The most northerly province is Ye, which borders on the district of Martaban. *Tavai*, in which, indeed, Ye has been usually included, succeeds, and the most southerly is Mergui, which is bounded by the peninsula of Malacca; along the whole line of coast lie a number of small islands; but they are most numerous opposite Mergui, constituting the Mergui Archipelago.

When first visited by European voyagers, these countries were partly subjected to Pegu, and partly to Siam. Ye and Tavai to the former, Mergui to the latter. About the middle of the 16th century, the whole of Siam



asserim.

Siam was over-run by the Peguers, the capital taken, and the family of the King, he having poisoned himself, led into captivity; at the close of the 16th century, the Siamese recovered their possessions, but in the commencement of the 17th, the coast, as far as Tenasserim, was again subject to Pegu. Towards the end of that century, the latter place was again in the possession of the Siamese. Tavai appears to have become independant in the early part of the 18th century, as in 1752, negotiations were entered into between the Government of Fort St. George, and the King, as he is termed, of Tavai. In 1760, the Burmese invaded them in the spirit of re-action that followed their throwing off the yoke of Pegu. *Alompra*, after pillaging Mergui and Tenasserim, died at Martaban; but in 1763, the Burmese again reduced the districts, and thenceforth retained possession of them until their late subjugation. Throughout the whole of the period, from the travels of *Conti*, about 1440, to the intercourse between Madras and Pegu and Ava, in 1750—the ports along the coast, are described as the scene of a most active trade, and the country as highly cultivated and thickly studded with an inoffensive and industrious race—the usual effects of Burmese rule, however, followed their conquest: the population is reduced to a scanty remnant, the trade has been utterly annihilated, and districts from which rice was an article of extensive export, are now scarcely able to support the few hands employed in the cultivation of the soil.

The province of *Ye* is of small extent: it is bounded on the north by *Kyaup Kyagee*, on the south by the *Kaleeng Aung* district of *Tavai*—the mountains and the sea, are its eastern and western boundaries—its inhabitants were computed at about five thousand, but in the disorganization, consequent upon the war, and the dread of the depredations of marauding parties of Siamese, who took advantage of the distracted state of affairs to carry off the natives, the latter sought refuge in *Tavai* and other places under British protection—the province is, consequently, a close jungle, broken, at remote intervals, by rice fields of limited extent, and those but scantily cultivated.

The town is situated on a long hill, about a hundred feet high, in some parts, above the level of the river, which washes its southern base. The soil and climate of the district are evidently favourable for cultivation. Boat timber is abundant, and of good quality, but no teak grows in the forests: the other products of *Ye* are much the same as those of *Tavai*.

The province of *Tavai*, *Darwai*, or *Dawce*, by all which appellations it is known, is bounded by *Ye* on the north, and Mergui on the south; the mountains and the sea on the east and west: the boundary line, on the north is the *Pou-thyne* or *Hengha* river, seventy-seven miles north from the town of *Tavai*—that on the south is a low range of hills, about four miles south from the *Pillow* river. The province is divided into seventy-eight districts, of which sixteen are within the fort. The population amounts to about twenty thousand souls, but it is calculated that this is less than half its number before the occupation of the province by the Burmese. We have no doubt that it is much less than half. The cleared and cultivated part does not exceed fifty square miles—the rest is jungle and forest.

The town stands upon the east bank of the *Tavai* river, at about twenty miles from its mouth—owing to the numerous shoals, no vessel of any burthen can approach nearer than within sixteen miles of the town, but prows, junks and small craft lie abreast of it, and the Chinese have sunk mud-docks, where vessels of this class are repaired or built. Opposite to *Crab Island*, where ships anchor at about twelve miles from the mouth of the river, docks might be constructed for vessels of any size, which could be launched at once into five fathoms water.

The fort consists of two walled enclosures, distant from each other from five to eight hundred yards. The extent of the inner wall is about two and a half miles: it is constructed of burnt bricks. The outer walls enclose only the north and west faces: there is a strong gateway at each point of the compass. *Tavai* lies low and is inundated in the rains, but it admits of being effectually drained, by which its salubrity will be improved: there is also a range of heights to the eastward, at no great distance, that offers an eligible site for a military station.

The province is more hilly than the other parts of the coast. It is abundantly supplied with water, being intersected by a number of streams, running usually south and west, at short intervals of two and three miles. Of these the principal are—

The *Hengah*, which forms the boundary between *Tavai* and *Ye*: it is about twenty-five yards broad: its banks are from nine to ten feet high: it runs from the eastern range into the sea; and feels the influence of the tides at about fifteen to twenty miles.

The *Henzah*, about seventeen miles to the south, which, rising in the great eastern range, winds along the western foot of a range of low hills in a direction nearly south, after which it shapes its course nearly due west to the ocean, collecting most of the smaller streams that lie between it and the preceding: its breadth is about seventy yards, and banks from twenty to thirty feet high: the soil, in some places, is nearly of that depth.

The *Tavai* rises in the same chain, and runs to the southward of west till it reaches *Kalian*, about forty miles from *Tavai*; it then flows south-west to the sea. It is navigable for large boats, fifty miles above the town,

town, having, in the month of April, a depth of about two feet, and being twelve yards broad: the height of the banks is from thirty to thirty-five feet, showing a similar extent of soil.

Although, perhaps, inferior to that of Martaban, the soil of Tavai is superior to that of Mergui, and only requires cultivation to be rendered eminently productive. The lands skirting the rivers, consist of a strong clay, without much vegetable superstratum; those along the hills are loamy in some districts, and light in others. The islands are alluvial.

Rice has always been a staple of this country, and is mentioned by the early travellers, as forming the chief article of export from all the northern ports on this coast, to the more southern points, as Malacca, and to the opposite side of the bay, or Coromandel coast. On taking possession of the country, by an estimate of the grain on hand, it appeared probable that the annual produce fell short of the annual consumption, low as that was reduced by the diminution of the population: the revival of a feeling of security and manifest confidence in their present rulers, have already produced a sensible effect, and the harvest of this season is expected to be five times greater than the consumption. At the ordinary rate, this is about two thousand and four hundred coyns of paddy, or rice in the husk, and the produce of the season will be, therefore, twelve thousand coyns; but very favorable years, it is asserted, will yield twenty thousand coyns, or eight times the quantity consumed by the present population.—This, too, is the produce of a system of cultivation very inferior to the process adopted in Western India, or amongst the Malays. Consequently, even calculating upon a very considerable augmentation of the inhabitants, there is little doubt, that, under a settled government, and with improved methods, rice may be grown in Tavai, so as once more to form a valuable article of exportation.

Tobacco, of a tolerable good quality, is grown in Tavai, but scarcely in sufficient quantities for the consumption of the province, although it might, no doubt, soon exceed that amount. The Tavayers are inveterate smokers, and their children may be seen whiffing at their segars, at two or three years of age, with as much gravity as their seniors. Indigo is cultivated, but not to any extent, although the soil and climate are considered as particularly well adapted to it. Some of a very superior quality was manufactured near Rangoon, for the Europe market; and the requisites of Tavai, although perhaps less favorable, are of a very similar description to those of the more northern divisions of the same coast. The application of this and other dyeing drugs, is familiar to the Tavayers, and most of the cloths worn by them, are dyed as well as manufactured in the province. Sugar-cane grows, but not of the best sort. The pepper plant thrives, particularly in the western districts, and nutmeg trees are to be met with. The betel-vine grows wild, but is also cultivated in gardens. The areca-tree also grows here, but to a limited extent. Other vegetable products are cardamoms, myrobalans, turmeric, besides various medicinal barks and roots. Of timber-trees, there is an endless variety, and many of them are employed in the construction of vessels. Sapan-wood has always been an article of export. Salt is manufactured in this province, and may be made to almost any extent, and wax, and honey, and elephant's teeth, are procurable from the *Karians*, whilst edible birds' nests and beche-de-mer are obtained from the neighbouring islands.

The chief mineral produce of Tavai is tin, which is still worked at a place not above a day's journey from the town, in the midst of a thick forest—there are other mines—little encouragement has been hitherto given to the working of these mines, which ought to be very profitable, as they are situated under peculiarly favorable circumstances, where provisions are cheap, and fuel abundant.

The miners, to save the trouble of digging through the hard soil, have generally preferred to sift the gravel and sand, in the bed of the Boa-ben Chaung, a stream of inconsiderable magnitude. There are about twenty Tavayers usually at work, who elect one of their number to superintend the concern, which exempts him from labour. Each workman carries with him from Tavai, on his shoulders, a supply of provisions, and the requisite tools. The latter are a wood knife, perhaps a hoe, a shallow wooden bason, about a foot in diameter, and some cocoanut shells. His first care is to build a light hut. He then begins to mine. The bason is swung over his neck by a belt, and the cocoanut shell is attached to his girdle. With this he walks into the stream, from two to three feet deep in the dry season, and lets the bason sink to the bottom. Having filled it by means of his feet, or, immersing himself in the water, by his hands, with gravel and sand, he withdraws it, and washes the contents in the stream without removing from the spot he has fixed on: the ore, in the shape of a fine black sand, subsides to the bottom of the platter. Each washing, which occupies about ten minutes, seldom produces more than a nut-shell full of ore. The largest specimen, not often weighs more than half a drachm, and its specific gravity is far inferior to that of the Junkceylon ore. Formerly these mines were wrought by from three to four hundred men during four months in the year: the nominal tax on the produce was ten per cent. but as the chiefs monopolized it, they gained much more. The miner has a profit of about sixty pices monthly over what he could get by other labor.

The tin mines lie in the midst of a dense forest of bamboos and trees. The elephants frequently attack the miner's hut and eat up all his rice, compelling him to a speedy return to Tavai. He seldom begins labor until

masserim. the sun is high, about nine o'clock, for until then the air is damp and chilly. Fahrenheit's thermometer exposed to it, averaging 65°, while the temperature of the water is from 68° to 70°.

To counteract the bad effects of damp and cold, the miners use both arrack and opium, but the latter in small quantities.

The Tavai miner smelts the ore immediately on his return to town, and coins those sorts of pice which are current in the bazar : of these, one thousand five hundred and forty-six make one pecul of Pinang, (allowing 1½ for wastage,) so that, if we state the average price of the tin of the coast to be twenty Spanish dollars per pecul, we shall have 38½ pices current for the value of one sicca rupee, which is very nearly what it was once valued at in Tavai, viz. forty pices. The established rate at present is forty-four pices for one rupee, whether Madras or sicca, although the bazar people give only forty pices for a Madras rupee, if allowed their option ; forty-four pices for a Madras rupee, seems to be above the intrinsic value of the metal.

Tin is procured, or rather was formerly so, from other places than the one before noticed, especially at Maghe, on the route to Mergui, and near the Yenge, seven miles south of Mendal.

The Tavai mines are, probably, not the limits of the tin formation northward, and there is said to be some at Martaban. On the Siam gulf it terminates about 13° north latitude.

The Tavayers smelt the ore by keeping it long exposed to a red heat in a small earthen furnace. The fire is fed with charcoal, and blown by a double bellows. The ore yields about fifty per cent. of metal, but with improved treatment would, probably, be found richer : the tin ore to the eastward, generally produces about sixty to sixty-five per cent. as worked by the Chinese.

The province is well stocked with cattle, both domestic and wild, but the favorite breed of the former is the buffalo, who is here a powerful yet docile animal. Horned cattle are few. The elephants completely overrun the forests, and rhinoceroses, wolves, monkeys, bears, deer, and wild hogs, are numerous : the flesh of the two latter is eaten by the Tavayers.

Most of the finest fruits of India, and the eastern islands, grow in Tavai. The pine apple, mango, orange, mangosteen, dorian, melon, and plantains, are found in private gardens. Neither the mangosteen nor dorian is procured north of this province. The former is rather scarce, the latter more abundant : it formed an article of export to Rangoon and Martaban, the high prices obtained at which places, tempted the Tavayers to brave, in open boats, the violence of the moonsoon. The dorian was highly esteemed at the court of Ava. The climate and soil of Tavai are favourable to the production of European vegetables.

The bazars of Tavai are well supplied with numerous articles. In them, independent of the natural products of the country, may be bought spices, piece goods, crockery, cutlery, long cloth, paper. Their own produce, tobacco, wax, lac, kasumba, sweet potatoes, yams, greens, and a variety of edible roots and leaves, flowers and seeds, and mushrooms, venison, the flesh of the elk, pork, buffalo-beef, tortoises, frogs, and other animals. The Burmans do not eat such quantities of rice at their meals as the natives of Hindoostan. They are good cooks to their own taste, and many of their dishes are not disagreeable to European palates : they use earthen and iron cooking utensils. They eat twice a day, early in the forenoon, and in the evening, and their meals are served up on trays, in the Siamese fashion. Their meats are chopped up, and put into small cups or saucers, as are different sorts of stewed vegetables. The rice is distributed on red lacquered plates to all the members of a family, who help themselves with spoons to the other dishes, although they generally eat with their fingers. They are fond of vinegar, pickles, and fruits, and *Balachong*, as seasoners or accompaniments to their food. The Pegners eat at sun-rise, a custom induced by their agricultural mode of life. The Tavayers have no objection to eat at the same table with an European. They will not always drink spirituous liquors. There are a few amongst them, who have made a sort of vow to abstain from certain luxuries and indulgencies. They allow their beards to grow, and are generally more sedate in their deportment than the rest of the people. They do not, however, shun society, or debar themselves from its innocent pleasures.

The chief tenure by which lands are held, appears to be that of prescription : there are no written documents : every one is at liberty to clear what he pleases, and has full power to dispose of it by sale or gift. His descendants succeed to it, but if he quits it for a time, another person may settle upon it, and the first possessor cannot claim it again. As long as the land is occupied, the right, whether inherent or hereditary, is never interfered with, except by one of those acts of arbitrary violence which despotic governments occasionally exercise.—The principal revenue derivable from the land, was a tax in kind, of ten per cent. upon grain,—the grain being brought to the public granaries, under the charge of an officer, termed *Keysoo*, and being allowed to be removed after deducting the above proportion. Other taxes, chiefly in kind, were levied on dammer, bees' wax, elephants' teeth, &c. and in money on cocoanut and areca trees, as well as on the use of fishing tackle, sugar boilers, &c.—the amount of these depended very much on the pleasure of the *Mi-woon*, or governor of the province, who, in common with the whole of the Burmese establishment, appears to have had no fixed allowances, but to have extorted what he could from the inhabitants. The taxes, in kind, that were not required for the supply of troops, were converted into money, and sent to Ava once in three years ; but the chief



chief source of revenue to the supreme government was, what it could extract from the governors when recalled to the capital.

The trade of Tavai has not been very extensive for some time. Chinese from Penang, Burmans from Rangoon, Martaban, and Mergui, and sometimes a country ship, have chiefly conducted it. The Tavayers have always been in the habit of trading to Martaban, Rangoon, and Mergui, and for this purpose, they have boats of from two to fifteen coyns burden. These are rarely decked, yet they will attempt to coast it up to Martaban in the most violent period of the monsoon: many are wrecked during the year in the attempt.

The rivers and creeks which run up into the heart of the forests, afford the greatest facilities for the building of boats and prows, and at a moderate rate. One of fifteen coyns burden may be built, decked, and rigged in the native manner, for about five hundred rupees. The native carpenters can build vessels of two hundred tons burden, and of any size, under European superintendance.

The imports to Tavai are cotton and tobacco, from Martaban and Rangoon. Earth oil from the latter place. Piece goods, iron and cutlery, china-ware and Europe goods from Penang. Gun-powder and fire-arms. Muslins. Betel-nut, prepared in a peculiar manner. Raw sugar, spices.

The exports are rice, birds' nests, tin, bees' wax, cardamoms, ivory, beche-de-mer, earthen cooking pots and goglets, together with other kinds of produce already enumerated.

The revenue derived from the trade, was drawn from a duty of five per cent. on all articles, not from a Burmese port, and six per cent. on exports; but these charges were usually much reduced, although the presents demanded by the officers of government, again raised the amount indefinitely.—For some time past, however, neither the revenue from the soil nor from trade has been very productive, and the people must be satisfied, that their persons and property are secure before the resources of the province can be satisfactorily developed.

*Mergui*—Although understood to signify the next portion of the peninsula to Tavai, is properly the name of the chief town only; the designation of the province being Tenasserim, or Tannathare; the old capital bore the same name, and is frequently noticed by the early travellers. It is now in ruins.

Tenasserim proper is divided from Siam by the continuation of the eastern range: on the west it is bounded by the sea: on the north it confines upon Tavai, and it is divided on the south by a small district called Prindong, from the Siamese possessions; the coast is sheltered from the south-west monsoon by high and, in most places, bold and rocky islands, which constitute the Mergui archipelago.

The town of Mergui is situated on an island formed between anastomosing branches of the Goulpia and Tenasserim rivers, where they debouche into the sea. The town lies near the mouth of the Tenasserim river, which passes to the south-west of it. A muddy creek and miry broken ground flank it on the south. It stands on a hill one hundred and thirty feet above the level of the sea. It is divided into six compartments, and contains about eight thousand people, which may be considered as nearly the population of the district, the greater portion of it having collected in the vicinity of the town for protection against the aggressions of the Burmese troops, and the kidnapping incursions of the Siamese. The houses of Mergui are built in the usual Burman fashion, with wooden posts and rafters, bamboos, matting, and leaves.

The situation of Mergui is regarded as particularly favourable. Standing on high ground, it is open to the cool sea breeze during the day, and still cooler land breeze at night. The consequence is, that in the shade it is rarely unpleasantly warm. The salubrity of the spot has been proved by the rapidity with which the European invalids sent from Rangoon recover their health and strength. The average height of the thermometer at noon, through the hottest months at Mergui, or from March to September, has been found to be not quite 84°.

Mergui possesses an immense advantage, in a safe, extensive, and commodious harbour, easy of ingress and egress, during both monsoons, for ships of any burthen. Ships of any size may anchor within a few hundred yards of the town.

The south-east monsoon prevails along the coast from the middle of May to the middle of November: the heavy rains do not set in till the middle of June, from which time, till the beginning of September, the fall is heavy and incessant. The north-east monsoon prevails for the rest of the year, when the weather is very fine and pleasant; a strong sea breeze blows the greater part of the day, and a cool land wind at night. Showers occur every five or six weeks.

The greater part of this province, like the two preceding, consists of thick jungle, and the only lands cultivated, and those but partially, extend along the river above Mergui. The crops are not adequate to the demand even of the scanty population; a sad alteration from the period when the chief of Tenasserim was Signore di molta gente, e di paese abbondante di molte vettovaglie, Lord of many people, and a country abounding with provisions.

The soil of the province, generally, has been too little investigated to warrant any decided opinion of its character. In the vicinity of Mergui, it consists in part of red clay, and in part of the debris of decomposing

Tenasserim. granite and quartz. It seems, however, not to be remarkably fertile, as the same ground is said to yield no more than one crop of rice in a year: artificial irrigation is unknown, and the whole system of cultivation imperfect. The seed grain is not sown in detached spots, and transplanted, but is scattered over the ground prepared merely by turning buffaloes into it, and then clearing it of weeds by a wooden rake: the crop yields but thirty for one. It is said, that for a considerable period Mergui has depended on Tavai for grain; but this would scarcely have been rendered necessary by the natural unproductiveness of the district, as besides the evidence above cited, the concurrent testimonies of the old travellers prove, that grain was an article of export from this, as well as the other ports, in the upper portion of the peninsula, and as late as 1759, Captain Powney, who was at Mergui, states the price of rice to be twelve pagodas a garce, whilst on the Coromandel coast, it was thirty pagodas, and adds, 'It is evident, that were the country under better government, it would yield no contemptible trade; especially in that sure article of grain.'

Several rivers cross this province, of which the *Goulpia* and the *Tenasserim* river are the principal; the former rises about forty miles from Mergui, and forms the north-east and east-south-east boundary of the island: it is several miles wide where it joins the sea. The Tenasserim river rises amongst the hills north-east of Tavai, and flows as far as the parallel of that city, through a narrow valley, just wide enough to afford it a free passage; it then keeps the line of the coast till nearly due east of Mergui, when it takes a sudden turn west, and disembogues itself into the sea by two mouths: the northern branch is open to shipping, but the southern is considered unsafe.

The old capital of the province stands upon this river, and may be approached by vessels of one hundred and thirty tons burthen. The city is surrounded by a wall of about four miles in circumference, but every house was deserted when lately visited by the commissioner: a few of the inhabitants have been encouraged to return by a small guard having been stationed there. It will, no doubt, be speedily restored, when life and liberty are again secure, to a state that may justify Pinkerton's assertion, that "it still maintains the dignity of a city."

The productions of Mergui are very much the same as those of Tavai. Rice is grown, as already observed, but, perhaps, scarcely in sufficient quantity for the local demand, a circumstance imputable to want of cultivators, not to any natural unfitness of climate or soil. Tobacco and Indigo are not cultivated, but sugarcane is grown, of a strong and healthy kind, on an island opposite to Mergui, in small quantities: it is not manufactured into sugar. Cotton is reared for domestic manufacture, and Kasumbha for exportation. Of fruit there is a great variety. The plantains are fine, the dorian abounds, and pine apples, mangosteens, oranges, limes, &c. are indigenous. Although no teak grows in the forests, there is no want of a variety of timber trees, as well as bambus and rattans. Areca and cocoanut trees are scarce, but the *Nipa* palm (*Nypa fruticans*) is abundant, a kind of palm from which toddy is extracted, a great portion of which is manufactured into a coarse kind of sugar: it also forms, by fermentation, the only spirit known to the Burmese, and which is drunk by all classes. This spirit constituted, in former times, a principal article of export, and seems to have been exceedingly palatable to the old travellers. Cæsar Frederick thus speaks of it: "The greatest merchandise at Mergim, is Nyppa, which is an excellent wine, which is made of the floure of a tree called Nypper. Whose liquor they distill, and so make an excellent drink, cleare as christalle, good to the mouth, and better to the stomake:" and he attributes to it some medicinal properties, which we may be excused from transcribing.

Other articles of export are sandal wood and lignum aloes, but the best kind of the latter comes from the islands. A more important article of exportation, and which has always been furnished by the forests of Tenasserim, is *Sapan* wood. The tree grows abundantly in the upper parts of the province, particularly between the main river, above old Tenasserim, and a smaller branch. It is, consequently, easily conveyed to Mergui, by being floated down. *Dammer* and *wood-oil*, are found in the forests, and might be exported largely. We do not observe in the lists of vegetable products we have lately seen, an article that is enumerated by the old writers, as constituting, with rice, sapan wood, and nipa, one of the chief exports—Benzoin. Barbessa, who was at Tenasserim in 1516, says, there are two kinds of *Benzui* exported from hence, and Cæsar Frederick, about 1565, says, that in the harbour Mergim, every year there lade some ships with Verziua, (sapan) nyppa, and benjamin.

An article of considerable interest in the natural products of Mergui, is its *Tin*, which metal is much more abundant apparently in this province than in Tavai. There are above a dozen places at which it is found. It is produced from Mergui hill, in the form of a fine black sand, and at several other spots within a very moderate distance of the town. Other mines are six or seven days journey off. The actual produce of metal has been, for some time past, but small, the miners not daring to leave the immediate vicinage of Mergui. The ore is collected only in the rainy season.

The forests that cover the eastern mountains, and border on the Siamese frontier, yield no unimportant tribute to the produce of both Tavai and Mergui, and various articles of value are brought down by the wild tribes, who share these thickets with the wild animals by which they are filled.

The Karians, or Kurrans, as the name is also written, are the wandering races, who prefer the independence of the woods to the restrictions of towns—they form, it is supposed, a large, though a scattered part of the population of Mergui and Tavai. They are allied, probably, to the roving tribes in the forests of Siam, but are not of one uniform stock, the term Karian being generally applied to these people, although they differ as much from one another, as from the Burmese. Those of Tavai and Mergui speak a language of their own, which, although leaning more to the Siamese than the Ava or Pegu dialects, is distinct from both—the intercourse yet maintained with them has, however, been too inconsiderable to afford a just appreciation of their numbers or condition. The Karians supply the markets with ivory, wax, honey, sesame oil, cardamoms, and other articles. The woods abound with elephants, and ivory may be procured in any quantity: the elephant is smaller than that of Ceylon; the people never catch them—the annual importation of teeth from the interior, amounted to about four thousand and five hundred viss; but there was exceedingly little encouragement given to the importer, as the Burmese governor claimed one of every pair, as his right, and took the other at his own valuation.

The wax and honey are found in the forests, in the hollows of trees, as well as in caves and rocks. The bees often anticipate the Karians in the search for the latter. The bees are of two sorts, one very small, which makes its hive in hollow trees, and seldom uses its sting; and a larger one, which suspends its comb on the boughs of trees, and under-hanging rocks, and must be attacked with circumspection. Under the old regime, every Karian house was obliged to present a viss of wax annually to the Mi-woon.

The sesame oil is used by the Burmans for culinary purposes, for unction, and for lamps; twenty-two baskets of seed are said to yield one Ava picul of oil. There is another kind of oil, used only for burning and cleaning the hair.

The plant that yields the cardamom seeds, grows wild in the forests, but the places where it is found are known to the Karians alone.

Commodities of a still more valuable description, are the produce of the islands off the Tenasserim coast, of which rarely-frequented spots we are enabled to offer some account.

Those islands immediately lying opposite to Mergui have much flat land on their east sides, and exhibit a few patches of cultivated fields, but the other groupes to the north entrance into Forrest's straits, at Domel, are either bleak barren rocks, or are composed of steep rocky hills, clothed with wood, but destitute of any plains at their base, and totally unfit for any species of cultivation. Small trickling rills of excellent water may be found on most of them, and their shores abound with delicious small oysters and great varieties of fish.

A coral bottom commonly prevails at a distance from them of two hundred yards, and often at twenty or thirty yards. The channels between the islands are, for the most part, deep, and eight and ten fathoms will be found, sometimes at a distance of a cable's length from their shores.

The islands may be considered as forming a distinct Archipelago, as there is a considerable break or opening betwixt them and Forrest's straits. They are chiefly composed of granite, mixed with some lime and iron ore, much intersected by broad veins of quartz. Black slate and sand-stone prevail on several of them.

*Lambec or Domel*, called also *Sullivan's Island*, seems to have been placed by Captain Forrest too far to the northward, for it lies in  $11^{\circ} 3'$  north, instead of  $11^{\circ} 21'$ , according to the chart by the former. It is about twenty miles long by twelve broad, and greatly partakes of the character attributed to the islands further north. It is bold, without rising into peaks above five hundred feet high, and its shores, even on the east, where it is completely sheltered from the swell which sweeps off the level spaces on the western shores of the islands, are rocky. There may be some narrow vallies betwixt the low ranges, but there do not appear any such extending inland from the beach. There is, no doubt, a good vegetable soil on the hills, as they are covered with large trees and brushwood.

In coasting Domel, the main land of Tenasserim is distinctly seen, as the hills which run along it closely approach the sea. They are by no means so high as those further north, and an elevation of more than three thousand feet cannot be given for the highest of them. The highest peak lies nearly opposite to Hastings' island, and northward of the outlet of the Kra river: this last has an extensive but an unexplored bank in front, and it appears to form a channel on each side of this bank, for the currents outside of the two extremes of the bank set nearly in opposite directions.

There is a spacious harbour, capable of containing the largest Navy in the world, situated off the north end of *St. Mathew's* island. It is formed by that end, and the islets lying along it on the south, by Phipps's, Russell's, and by Hastings's, Barwell's, and several others on the east, and is completely land-locked. The depth has not been yet laid down in modern maps. Well off the shore, it has seldom less than seventeen fathoms throughout, and ten, eleven, and twelve fathoms close in shore. A bold and seemingly navigable strait leads out to sea to the west betwixt Phipps' I. and Russell's I. Several of the islands in the groupe, of which Hastings' I. is the longest, seem much more precipitous than the preceding. Hastings' I. and Phipps' I. may be considered as respectively forming the east and west points of the northern entrance to this magnificent



cent harbour. Excellent water is procured here at a spot one hundred and fifty yards, or thereabouts, west of the bay: the island is stocked with wild hogs, and a large species of dove or pigeon, which is attracted by the berries of the island. Banian and other trees, grow luxuriantly, and rattans, the creeping bamboo, and the niphah are abundant.

St. Mathew's, or Elephant island, is bold, very hilly, and entirely covered with thick forest. There seem to be no plains along its north and east sides. The most prominent peak in the island may be from three thousand to three thousand and two hundred feet high. There are, of course, many narrow vallies, but, like those of Domel, they afford barely space for the passage of mountain torrents to the sea. From the general boldness observable in the west coasts of all the islands we have been noticing, it is probable that the I. of St. Mathew terminates also abruptly in that quarter: several hills of equal height to the St. Mathew Peak lie opposite to it on the main land. This island seems uninhabited.

A race of people termed, by the Burmans, Chalome and Pase, are to be found scattered throughout the Mergui Archipelago. But their dread of Malayan and other pirates has compelled these poor creatures to adopt an unsettled mode of life. During the north-east monsoon, they are obliged to remove from the vicinity of those islands which are most frequented, to escape being carried off as slaves by Siamese, Burmans and Malays, who then visit them in quest of the valuable commodities they afford. They appear to be a harmless, and, from necessity, an industrious race. The whole tribe consists of no more than four hundred souls. They exchange mats and the produce of the islands, for clothes and other articles, conveyed to them from Mergui. Another tribe of this race is thinly spread over the islands lying close in front of Mergui. They all seem to have adopted the religion of Buddha, and to have conformed, in a great degree, to the Burman mode of dress. They scarcely know the value of money, and are, therefore, losers in the bartering trade with the Chinese and others who visit them. Perhaps they think themselves the greater gainers, since they give away products of no use to them for others of vital importance, and are, thereby, enabled to maintain a degree of wild independence.

The products of these, and the other islands of the same, and the neighbouring clusters, which, from the great source of attraction to the eastern tribes, and important branches of the Tavai and Mergui traffic, are pearls, edible birds' nests, bich-de-mar, &c.

Pearls, of a good quality, are procurable on the shores of most of them, as well as occasionally on the coast of the Peninsula, as at Maung Magan, and Mergui. The Burmans have never dived for the oyster, and the pearls are obtained from such of the fish as are picked up on the rocks, at the ebbing of the tide; the oysters thus collected, are left to dry and putrify, when they are washed.—All pearls found on the coast, above fifty ticals in value, were claimed as the property of the *Mi-woon*, and if found in the possession of the fishermen were seized,—consequently, such pearls as were of any size, were carefully concealed, and sold privately to the Chinese and Malay traders; the spirit of enterprise also was checked, and the establishment of a regular fishery prevented. The pearls hitherto met with, are described as small, but of regular form and colour, and good lustre, but the Burmese prefer those which have a yellowish tinge.

Edible bird's nests are found in considerable quantity on the islands off the Tavai coast, but they are very generally met with throughout the Archipelago. They are in most perfection in January, but are gathered also during the six weeks preceding and following that month. The quantity obtainable in any one season is uncertain, for Malay, Chinese, Siamese, and other boats, are accustomed to come in amongst the islands, and to carry off part of the produce: it also partly depends upon the dexterity of the nester, who, by disturbing the swallows just when the nest is completed, obliges them to multiply their labours. The operation of the nester is not always free from danger, as he has to climb precipices by help of ropes and flying ladders, made of rattans, and the caves into which he has to penetrate are noisome, and, in some places, so intricate, that he is apt to lose himself. The nesters use considerable quantities of arrack and opium. It is probable, that the Burman collection did not exceed two piculs in the season, but there is little doubt, that five or six times that quantity might be obtained.

The bich-de-mar, or sea slug, is found on the same islands, and gathered chiefly at the same seasons as the nests. It is brought in, however, throughout the year. It was usually bartered for grain, in the proportion of one viss to four of rice in the husk. Tortoise-shell, ambergrease, wax, and honey, are also produced by the islands, and are brought to the main land by the Chalomes, to barter for articles of clothing and food.

The following are the coins, weights, and measures, used both at Tavai and Mergui, which we are induced to insert as likely to be of service, and as we observe they are very inaccurately given in the most recent publications on the subject.

## COINS.

The tical and tin pice were the currency of Tavai and Mérgui, but the former has been superseded by the rupee. The rates of the rupees and pice may be expected to vary, but the following was that in use at the date of our authorities:

12 Small Pice	= 1 Large one, or Kabean.
40 Kabean	= 1 Madras Rupee.
44 Ditto	= 1 Sicca Rupee.
88 Ditto	= 1 Spanish Dollar.

## WEIGHTS.

These are the same that are used throughout the Burman empire, which are made at Ava and distributed to provinces: they change their shapes upon the accession of a new king: the present weights are called *To alle*, or Lion weights, as they represent that animal according to the Burman conception of it. Those of the last reign are termed *Hansa alle*, being made in the shape of the *Hansa*, or goose. The weight of both kinds is the same.

No. 1 To	= 20 Ticals.
No. 2 To	= 10 Ditto.
No. 3 To	= 4 Ditto.
No. 4 To	= 2 Ditto.
No. 5 To	= $1\frac{1}{4}$ Ms. Rupee = 225 Grs.
No. 6 To	= $\frac{1}{4}$ Ms. Rupee and 3 anas.

The divisions of the Tical are,—

2 Tabbe	= 1 Tammoo.
2 Tammoo	= 1 Mat.
4 Mat	= 1 Tical.
100 Tical	= 1 Tabisa, or Viss.
100 Tabisa	= 1 Peiya or Ava Pical, or 250 Penang Catties.

## MEASURES.

2 Nechi Teden	= 1 Tendaum.
100 Tendaum	= 1 Teiya, or Coyan.

The tendaum is, in fact, no more than a basket: by it alone, grain is measured.—It is equal to sixteen viss, or forty Penang catties.

The measure of length is the cubit, of which there are two sorts, tadaum, of above eighteen inches, and the saumdaum, of twenty-two. The latter is termed the king's cubit, being used in measuring crown lands.

The original inhabitants of Tenasserim, understanding thereby the three provinces we have described, are considered to have been a distinct race; but their long subjection to the Siamese and Burmese has utterly deprived them of any distinguishing features, and in language, dress, and appearance, they do not differ from the Burmese. They are a mild, cheerful, good humoured race, but not very industrious, except when stimulated by the prospect of particular advantage. They are free from prejudices, eat, drink, and smoke with Europeans, and readily fall in with European habits. They are fond of music, dancing, and song. The wars of Rama are the constant themes of their public entertainments, represented by puppets. They are rather addicted to the use of opium and spirits, and strongly imbued with a passion for gaining. The women enjoy considerable freedom: those of the lower orders perform many laborious offices out of doors, and are, consequently, not unfrequently endowed with a vigour of arms that enables them to resist masculine oppression with success: although rather unreserved in their conduct, they rarely exhibit any want of chastity or decorum: they are frank, lively, and smart, and supply, by these qualifications, the want of feminine delicacy and regularity of feature, to which they have no pretensions.

The women and children contrive to gain a livelihood by beating out rice, fetching fire-wood, spinning, weaving, and other occupations.

The price of male labour is high, and may be reckoned at six rupees per month. Much labour, weaving particularly, is performed by slave debtors, or persons who sell themselves, subject to emancipation on paying

Tenasserim. the sum which they receive as purchase-money; the Burmese law acknowledging no other description of slavery. This class of people is numerous, and their bondage, under the Burman government, was little less than absolute servitude, as they rarely acquired the means of redemption. Since the introduction of the British authority, many have procured their liberty.

The laws in force in Tenasserim were those of the Burman kingdom, and justice was administered according to them, by the *Mi-woon* and his officers, particularly the two *Chekays*, or heads of the police, who attended daily for this purpose at the *Youn*, or public court. The *Mi-woon*, *Ye-woon*, or deputy governor, and *Akoo-woon*, collector of revenue, who had seats in the *Youn*, as well as courts at their own houses, were only occasionally present. All these officers again appointed deputies to superintend their private courts. From these courts, there was an appeal to the *Mi-woon*, and all severe sentences required his confirmation. The provinces, and even the principal towns, were divided into districts, under a head man, termed *Orgona*, or *Songee*, who decided disputes subject to appeal to the *Youn*, or principal court, preserved order, and collected the revenues, which he transmitted to the *Akoo-woon*. The system appears to have been sufficiently well adapted to the state of the society, but how it was administered is incontrovertibly shewn by the scanty population, and scantier cultivation of the country.

No. 27.—From the Government Gazette, March 23, 1826.

*Martaban*.—The following account of the province of Martaban compleats our view of the countries along the western coast of the eastern peninsula, lately part of the Burman empire. Martaban is the most northerly of the provinces which it has been proposed in the late negotiations with the Court of Ava to retain. It is bounded on the north and north-east by the great peninsular range, on the south by a small river called the *Bala-mein*, which separates it from *Ye*—its eastern limit is the continuation of the mountain range. On the north-west, the provinces of Chetaung and Thyam Pago divide it from the sea, whilst it is immediately contiguous to the ocean on the west, forming, with the projecting coast of Chetang, the gulf of Martaban. It contains about twelve thousand square miles.

The town of Martaban lies along the base of a low range of hills of the same name, a branch of the *Jen-yeit* mountains—and upon the north side of the Martaban river, about ten miles from its northern and thirty from its southern debouché, being, in fact, separated from the sea only by an extensive island called *Poolyung*, which divides the two branches of the Martaban river. It consists principally of two long streets, one of which leads from the wharf gate, to within two hundred yards of the great northern gate, and the other runs parallel with it, for above half the distance. These streets are stony in dry, and miry in wet, weather. In the rains, they are little better than conduits for the numerous little streams which rush down the sides of the hill, and pass along these main channels to the river. The town is defended by a stockade, comprising also a considerable portion of the adjoining hill, but the greater part of the inclosure is occupied by a thick jungle, in which *Cheetas*, and even *Tigers*, occasionally lurk.

The houses of Martaban are built of the same materials and on the same plan as those of Rangoon. The only edifice of any respectability is the great Pagoda, which is about one hundred and fifty feet high. The east wall slopes to the river, which washes its foot, at about an angle of 25°. It is nearly thirty feet to the top of the parapet.—The bazars are held in the streets by women only. Provisions are neither abundant nor cheap. Fish is rather scarce, as the town is distant from the sea. Fowls are plentiful: there are a few ducks, and a few goats, but no sheep: venison is brought for sale, and buffaloes may be had for slaughter. Yams, brinjals, sweet potatoes, chillies and other native vegetables are procurable in their respective seasons. The population of the town and suburbs is estimated at nearly six thousand persons. The whole population of the province, including the Karean tribes, cannot be estimated at more than fifty thousand. Martaban was well known to our old travellers, and is described, by *Barbessa* and *Cæsar Frederick*, as the principal emporium of the kingdom of Pegu, and a populous and flourishing place; and *Pinto*, who, notwithstanding his bad name, is only extravagant, and not altogether a liar of the first magnitude, was present at the taking of Martaban by the King of *Brama*, meaning, however, apparently, Siam, and he states, that sixty thousand people were slaughtered on its capture.

The climate of Martaban is pleasant and salubrious—the rains commence about the end of May or beginning of June, and continue, with little intermission, till September. By November, they may be considered to have ceased, and the cold season then succeeds, during which the thermometer ranges from 60 to 80 degrees. The three months of hot weather are cool compared to the same on the continent of India, as the thermometer never exceeds 90°, and at sun-rise is not infrequently as low as 65°. The land-winds, along this coast, are cool and refreshing, and although blowing from the north-east over much jungle, are far from unhealthy.



The soil of Martaban is of the most fertile description. On the immediate banks of the rivers, it is alluvial, and varies from two to six feet in depth. The substratum is commonly a stiff clay, or gravel. The un-cleared plains are evidently of a fertile composition, whilst the soil towards the hills is of a lighter description, and favourable to the growth of cotton, indigo and Sesame.

The chief rivers are, the Mautana, or Martaban river, the main stream of which rises in the mountains of China, and, after a long and turbulent course, emerges into the province through a gorge in the lower range of the great peninsular chain. It falls into the sea below the town, by two mouths, of which the southern is the main entrance.

The Daung Damee river, which falls into the preceding a short way above Martaban.

The Gyein, the Atharam, and the Wakroo, which all contribute to form the main river, and the Dangwein, which falls into the gulph of Martaban.

The chief staple of Martaban is rice, which has been always cultivated in quantities much beyond the consumption of the province. A considerable part of the surplus went to Ava, and the upper portions of the Burman empire. Some was also exported in China junks to Pinang, and elsewhere; but this trade was not encouraged, and not unfrequently prohibited by the Burman government. The Martaban rice is of good quality, and will keep in the husk for several years. When cleaned, the people know not how to preserve it, and the process of cleaning is very rudely and ineffectively performed. It is accomplished in three ways, by the wooden mortar, as in India, by the action of two groved logs, as practised at Tavai, and Mergui, and by the following method peculiar to the Peguers. Two large baskets, of a conical shape, are joined together at their apexes, the apex of the lower rising inside of that of the upper. Around this, which, with the joint, is grooved, a space remains sufficient to allow the grain to pass after it has been divested of the husk, by the revolution of the upper on the lower basket.

The cultivation of rice is exceedingly rude—artificial irrigation is unnecessary, as the quantity of rain that falls in the monsoon is amply sufficient—each village has attached to it a herd of buffaloes, which are turned into the field in April and May, and driven about it until it is worked up, grass and weeds included, into a muddy mass: a coarse harrow is then drawn over it, and the seed being sown broad cast, and roughly harrowed, no further attention is paid to it till the harvest. No such thing as a plough is known; the sowing takes place in June, and the crops are reaped in December: the grain, after being trodden out by buffaloes, is left for several days exposed to the sun, and then housed in wicker baskets.—The most fertile rice districts are those on the island of Poolyoun, between the town and the sea, those west of the town stretching towards Jenk-yeit pagoda, and the whole expanse of country towards Zea.

Cotton is another article of export from Martaban to Rangoon, Tavai and Mergui. It is cultivated in the upper districts, by the Kareans and Peguers chiefly: much of the growth of the country is consumed within it, in the manufacture of a coarse cloth—there is little care used in its cultivation, and with very ordinary skill and attention, the produce might be considerably improved.

*Mei*, or Indigo, is seldom cultivated separately, but may be seen growing promiscuously with cotton and other plants—the natives prepare the dye altogether in a rude way, and the blue cloth, which is their favorite costume, is all dyed in the province with indigenous materials.

The black pepper plant may be considered indigenous, and is cultivated in several districts, although not largely: a circumstance attributable to want of encouragement, apparently, as the pepper is of the best quality. It is brought to Martaban by the Kareans alone.

Sugar Cane, of a tolerably good quality, is reared, though sparingly. Tobacco is cultivated to a small extent, and hemp grows abundantly on some of the islands in the river. The areca nut tree is abundant, and the nuts form an article of export.

The forests of Martaban are not less the source of a supply of valuable products than those more to the southward. The Kareans bring ivory, cardamoms, wax, and honey to market—and sapan and other valuable woods are procurable, with the important addition of teak. The Martaban teak is said to be rather inferior to the Rangoon, but there is reason to think this may be prejudice, and it is unquestionably of very good, if not of the best quality. The forests in which it is found, extend to the northward and eastward of a line, about forty miles north from the town of Martaban.

Salt is made in large quantities along the Martaban coast, and finds a ready market. The whole of the upper provinces of Ava, are dependant on the maritime districts for this essential ingredient in their food. Balachong and dried fish, although not to a similar extent, are almost equally necessaries of life amongst the Burmans. The Martaban fisheries are very productive. Martaban is less rich in mineral products than its neighbours. Gold, in small quantities, is found in some of the rivers, but no other metal has been yet met within the boundaries of the district. It was once celebrated for its rubies, but these are brought from the interior, or the borders of the Laos' country.

The manufactures of this province are, of course, of a character and extent little more than adapted to domestic consumption—a considerable quantity of cloth, both silk and cotton, is made, and there is scarcely a house

house without a loom. The cloths are of the same description as those manufactured at Tavai—Martaban was once famous for its jars, but the potters seem to have abandoned their trade since the war broke out. They make excellent gurglets for holding and cooling water, which allow a little to exude, but the jars are not porous. These jars are very faithfully described by Barbessa, as *grandissimi vasi di porcellana bellissimi e invetriati di color negro*; large handsome vessels of glazed earthenware, of a black colour—he adds, that they were highly esteemed by the Moors, or Mohamedans of India, and were largely exported by them, *sono havuti in sommo pregio appresso li mori li quali gli levano di qui come la maggior mercantia che possino havere*. He adds, that lac and benjamin are exported in large quantities from Martaban: the lac is still brought from the Siamese frontier, but no notice is taken of benjamin.

Numerous boats of every size, from one of ten koyans burden, to a canoe, constantly ply in the various branches of the river. Boats of fifteen koyans sail to Rangoon and Mergui. A boat of this size is navigated by the same number of men, and may be built of teak for seven hundred tikals.

Martaban is open to a much more extensive trade than the southern provinces, as it not only communicates, like them, with Siam, but with the Burman kingdom, with Laos, and even China, as we lately observed, through Thaum-pe. From these two latter countries come lac, rubies, medicinal drugs, swords, knives, manufactured cotton and silk, sugar, candied yanseng, or earth nuts, blank books composed of blackened paper, ivory, rhinoceros' horns, &c.—They take, in return, raw cotton, salt, spices, quicksilver, red lead, assafetida, borax, alum, chintzes, piece goods, needles, and various European articles. There can be little doubt that when affairs are settled, an extensive vent will offer itself in this direction for our broad cloths and cottons.

The following are a few of the peculiarities observable in the customs and manners of the people:

The Burmans of Martaban, and the Peguers, and other tribes, are fond of rich dresses, and they generally spend all their surplus money on these.

Few of the lower ranks make use of the precious metals, except in forming rings and betel boxes, and cups: their gold rings are most commonly set off by rubies or turquoises, but the workmanship is very inferior to that even of Hindoostanee jewellers. They do not bedeck their women in the ridiculous manner that prevails in India. The fair are here content with a few rings, and it is likely that the superior freedom they enjoy, and the great share they take in employments which, on the other side of the bay, devolve on the male sex, may have induced them to renounce the incumbrances of shackles, nose rings, &c. Their husbands do not gain much by this lack of tinsel, for the silken dresses which they wear, are high-priced, and do not last long.

It does not appear that the Burman dresses accord well with cleanly habits: being all highly coloured, a want of the latter is not so perceptible as amongst the cotton garmented Hindoos, or less delicate Mus-selmans.

Ablutions, not being enjoined by civil or religious ordinances, are matters of convenience. But the anomaly is frequent, of a Burman or a Peguer punctually performing these, but neglecting to recommend them by cleanliness in dress.

Many of the people of this province wear the Karian cloth, on account of its durability and warmth. The *Mons*, or Peguers, have, in great measure, adopted the Burman costume, which is rather elegant for the men, but indecorous, in European eyes, for the women, as the leg is very much exposed in walking.

The men wear large turbans occasionally, but the true Burman fashion is a handkerchief twisted into a knot with the hair, and brought to the front of the head. Their long hair, which depends from the crown, must, like the Chinese tails, prove rather inconvenient on some occasions, especially in flying before an enemy, or in combat.

When the women turn coquettes, they wear small turbans too, and they judge right in supposing, that it adds to their charms.

In the rains, the men wear enormous umbrella hats, some of which are four feet five inches in diameter: they are of basket work. All ranks wear shoes, when they can obtain them. These are made either of wood or of leather. Officers of rank wear a leather cap, which is gilded, and looks very like the brass caps of fire-engine men in England: inferior officers have black varnished leather ones.

Children are very respectful to their parents: when a youth is about to depart on a voyage or expedition, he kisses, or lays his head at his parents' feet, intreating forgiveness of all past offences, and their blessing for the future. They return a kiss of his cheek, by which is not implied our mode of salutation, but a strong inhalation through the nose. The same practice obtains amongst the Malays and Siamese.

Marriage is a civil affair in Martaban; the youth of both sexes are not always allowed the society of each other before marriage, but they are less strict in this respect here than in Western India. Though this greater degree of liberty produce some love matches, yet the institution of marriage has not unfrequently the air of a barter; and, as the man pays often pretty high for his wife, he is apt to look upon her as a species of property.

In general he tries to gain the girl's affection, and then the consent of the parents, on which a large feast is given, and bands of music are called. Both parties defray the expenses. Some elder of the town or village joins the hands of the bride and bridegroom, who respectively take some rice, and put it towards the other's mouth: having both eaten some, and agreed to be faithful to each other, and to attend to each other's happiness, a blessing is pronounced by the elder, and the ceremony concludes. No priest is present, but they receive donations on the occasion. The man pays according to his means, money, goods, clothes, &c. to the parents of the bride and to her relations.

Should any man wish to separate entirely from his wife, with or without her consent, the children of the marriage, and his clothes, gold, ornaments, &c. are taken by her.

Should a wife desire separation, but the husband not, she must pay to him double the expense he was put to by the marriage.

When a child has attained the age of seven days, its head is shaved, and an entertainment is given: at the same time, some old astrologer inspects the Horoscope, and having foretold a fortunate hour, he bestows a name on the child. The visitors then, each present it with a piece of money or something of value.

The Martabans generally burn their dead, in compliance with the Buddhist ordinances.

The poor do not burn the body of a person who has died suddenly, but expose it to birds and dogs. The reason is not known, but perhaps the expense of large quantities of wood and earth-oil, which would be required to consume a body which has not been wasted by disease, may be the cause of the custom.

The corpses of priests are burned in the manner described by Captain Symes, and by Dr. Carey, in the Asiatic Researches, by being placed on a pile of billets, amongst which are some of odoriferous woods: it is fired by means of rockets, let off at a distance, and which reach the pile along a wire, stretched for the purpose.

The expense attending a funeral, among the generality of the people, is defrayed by a collection from the friends of the deceased. The priests are not neglected on such occasions. Food and clothes are distributed to them.

The people of Martaban are very fond of music. There were bands, part of which still remain, which were hired out on occasions of ceremony, whether on religious festivals, marriages, ordaining of priests, or burials.

The Burmans of Martaban play at chess, drafts, football. The ball being composed of wicker-work, is light. The players standing in a ring, kick it from the one to the other.

They run boat-races, at a stated period, every year, and their numerous festivals, corresponding with those of the Hindoos, in point of time, and exhibiting many points of identity with them, afford them many occasions of festivity and innocent enjoyment.

No. 28.—From the Government Gazette, April 20, 1826.

*Journal of an Excursion up the Sanluen, or Main River of Martaban.*—Having left the town of Martaban on the 20th, the tide carried us rapidly up the river, passing two grassy and level islands, lying just above the point of the junction of the *Gyein* river with the main one. We rowed along a large one called *Kachein*,\* admirably adapted for the growth of indigo and cotton; at present it is mostly covered with jungle. A little way above the north extremity of the island, a small creek on the left leads to *Bee-byet-myoo*, where a few villagers cultivate fruits. On the right lie the Pagoda and scattered village of *Pado*: a bad spot of land stretches north from this end of the island. The river here expands to about a quarter of a mile in breadth, with a full current from bank to bank: rowing along the right bank, the cotton plant was observed close to the edge of the water, and almost in a wild state. Passed, with rapidity, an old guard-house on our left, and soon afterwards came in sight of *Mabee-phra* Pagoda, prettily situated on a gentle acclivity, and soon after the *Namboa-taung* Pagodas on a low hill. Above this place is a creek leading to the village of *Lagon-pye*, where wax and honey are procurable, and close on the left, a triangular island which lies across the mouth of the *Beulein Khyauing*. This inosculating river is about half the breadth of the Sanluen. A little below *Beulein-myoo*, a division of it takes place. The branch towards the north-west is called *Chakkat-khyauing*, and the other *Daung-damee-khyauing*, as it passes the scattered villages of the *Daung-damee* district.

From the *Chakkat Khyauing*, a narrow cut, navigable only after the rains, conducts to the *Daung-weink-hyauing*, a pretty large stream which falls into the gulf of Martaban. This cross cut is called *Kyau-charet Khyauing*.

The district of *Daung Damee* contains numerous *Karian* villages, and the inhabitants, who are reckoned at from two to three thousand in number, cultivate some black pepper, gather cardamoms, and raise cotton.

Having

\* Ka is applied to many islands. In Siamese, it means an island, but the appellation bears a different interpretation in Burmese.



Having passed the mouth of the *Beulein Khyauing*, the cliffs of *Zoegabentaung*, with the Pagoda on their highest pinnacle, had a grand effect, when contrasted with the fine expanse of the river. These high cliffs are about three miles distant from the bank of the river, and they may be nine hundred feet high. In former times the chief of the least wandering *Karean* tribes resided here, but the dread of the Siamese has lately nearly depopulated the district around it. Much wax is procured here. The rocks are of lime stone. The natives burn the stone and prepare lime for the masticatory mixture. Having rowed four hours from the time of our first setting out, we next passed—

*Oonkhyauing* Pagoda, situated on the left bank or west, and about half an hour afterwards landed at *Thanée*, a small *Karean* village on the same side, but the tide still serving, pushed on to *Tunyeen-cha*, another village inhabited by the same tribe, who stated they had just fled from their late abode at *Puiyoothiggee*, on account of the ravages which the cholera had committed amongst them. The disease is not new to them.

These poor people have no medicines beyond a few simples collected in the woods. They rely therefore upon incantations and charms: they thrust a number of small slips of bamboo into the ground, forming of them a sort of labyrinth; within this the patient is placed, and some one of the tribe, expert in such things, mutters a few sentences which it is thought drive off the evil spirits under whose influence the patient is supposed to be.

The oldest man in this village said, that his age exceeded ninety-five years, but he seemed to be about seventy. These people have no perfect method of computing time. They reckon generally by the periods at which they removed from place to place. All the members of a family eat together, and observe much cleanliness in preparing their meals: they cook their food in earthen vessels, and serve it upon clean wooden platters, or on lacquered ones, when they can obtain them by barter. Their common food, when not stimulated to the chace, is rice and a sort of broth, composed of various roots and pulses, culled in the woods, and seasoned with salt and chillley, and generally fish just caught in the river: the broth and fish stand in the center of the family circle, and before each person is his portion of rice: they help themselves with spoons made of the coconut shell. They denied that they ever eat dog's flesh, like several tribes in a wilder state. They search assiduously for the large tortoise which abounds on the banks of the river, and are, on such occasions, assisted by their dogs, which are trained to the sport: by barking they cause the tortoise to hide his head, and thus detain him until their masters come up. They scrupled not to eat biscuit, ham, and whatever was offered to them, and had no objection to partake of wine and brandy.

There is another *Karean* village nearly opposite to this one.

27th.—When the tide flowed it was mid-day, we had set off some time previous. An island was found to stretch close along the east side of the river, and nearly up to the village of *Lagoon*: another occupies a large space in the middle of the river, and on which are some houses: above it is *Kaein*, a fine island, with a village on it.

The day was pleasantly overcast, when we found ourselves well advanced towards the *Sagat*, or *Krookla* strait: a squall came on and a heavy shower fell, compelling us to bring to near the bank,

The squall abating, we pushed up past the strait, which is formed by the high rock *Sagattaung* on the west, and *Krooklataung* on the east. The river being confined, rushes with impetuosity, and forms many eddies, especially on the west side, where it turned off by the foot of the *Sagat* rock. An appearance of an inscription in large characters, on the face of the rock, offered itself to notice, but on landing, it was found to arise from a number of small baked and partially gilded earthen images, so arranged in tables and niches as to look like letters: several small Pagodas crown those sharp spires of the rock which overhang the bed of the river, and greatly add to the grandeur of the approach to this curious place.

The disappointment in not finding any inscription upon the *Sagat* rock was, in some measure, compensated by the discovery of a cave to the left of the tables, containing the diminutive gods alluded to. It is two hundred and forty feet in depth, by an average breadth of fifty feet, and the height may be rated throughout from twenty-five to thirty feet. It forms a sort of natural arch, quite unsupported by pillars. The rock is composed of limestone in various stages, and the cave has been formed by the gradual decay of the softest part. It was found to be dry, but the interior quite insupportable above a minute, owing to the want of a free circulation of air, and to the smell arising from the dung of the large bats and vampires, which here shelter themselves, and which lies nearly twelve inches thick under-foot.

Many massive concretions of sparry carbonate of lime were observed in the crevices of the rock, or attached to the sides of the cave. The Boodhists of Martaban had consecrated this cave to their religion previous to their falling under the Burman yoke. Many marble images, plain and gilded, and in good preservation, stand in rows on the same places on which they had been arranged perhaps several centuries since, and several wooden ones, quite decayed by time, lay scattered about. Two rather colossal images of the greater teacher, Buddha, guard the entrance: that on the right is of brick, covered with stucco, and is in a sitting attitude, with the legs crossed. In this cave we find no marks of the rude yet grand conceptions which produced the sculptures to be found scattered over India: instead of drawing forth, with a bold hand, the statue

statue from the living marble, those who dedicated this cave filled it with gaudily painted and gilded alabaster images, which do not harmonize with the bold outline of the rock, or the gloomy grandeur of the interior. In this country no fluted columns or graceful pillars adorn the plain or add dignity to the approach to the shrine of the Burman idol.

Leaving *Sagattaung*, our boats plied up along the north-west bank, keeping a large island on the right. The force of the tide was evidently now much weakened by the strength of the current of the river, aided by the rain, which had added to its depth.

We rowed so close to the bank that the oars were frequently entangled amongst the long grass and brushwood. We made good way, whereas had we kept the middle of the channel, we should have scarcely been able to row two miles an hour. Passed betwixt two islands covered with grass, and having an excellent soil, and came to for an hour under a high bank on the right, where a large trading Martaban boat was lying: a village, consisting of a dozen houses, lies about one mile on the east of this landing place.

The banks low and grassy, and destitute of cultivation. Next above Pamlee, is Taunglephreea Point and Pagoda. This point is a black impure limestone rock, round which the current sweeps with much velocity; above it, on the right, noticed some scattered hamlets, and an old Pagoda on the left bank, now deserted: about three o'clock in the afternoon, we turned in a rugged point, and had much difficulty in forcing a passage against the current, and in steering clear of many rocks which shewed their sharp tops just above water: soon after reached Katha, a long narrow and fruitful island: we took the passage betwixt it and the east bank, termed Meejau Khyaung. It is not above fifty yards wide, but is deep, and the current in it is weaker than in the other channel. The level of the island is about six feet above the river. Here cotton, tobacco, and indigo, with some hemp, were found growing luxuriantly down to the water edge. Cultivation is carried on in so slovenly a manner here, that the long grass and brushwood often check the crops: much wild Palma Christi was also growing here. Passed two villages with Mon and Karean inhabitants mixed; one lies on the right and one on the left bank. At four o'clock cast anchor abreast of the village of Katha, and perceiving a high rocky hill on the opposite side of the river, which promised to admit of an extensive view from its top, we directed the people to make the boats fast for the night.

Ascending the steep bank, we entered the village to the utmost astonishment of the inhabitants, who consist of about three parts Kareans and one of Mons, in all about one hundred and fifty persons. It happened to be a festival day, and the villagers were decked out in their gayest attire. Their dresses were various, but mostly party coloured, some of silk, others of cotton, and in several family groupes there was a marked distinction in costume betwixt their different members, most of the Kareans in the vicinity having embraced the religion of Buddha, they have intermixed with the Taliens, but they retain the dress of their tribe. These people intermarry now with the Mon race, by which the latter will be improved, as the former have fairer complexions than they. There was one solitary Phoongee, or priest, who received, with as much gravity and affectation of dignity as any pontiff could exhibit, if so situated, the homage of the simple peasantry from the surrounding Karean hamlets, who continued to arrive until sun-set. This man performs the part likewise of village schoolmaster, and he is comfortably lodged and fed. A small cone, ten feet high, represented a pagoda, and opposite to it stood a temporary bamboo stage, decorated with flags, and covered with burning waxen tapers. The priest ascending this, delivers advice to his congregation, and reads some pages from the Pali.

It was a pleasing thing to notice a whole family arriving in a canoe, cleanly and neatly dressed, and perfectly decorous in their behaviour. They were startled at so novel an appearance there, as a white man and Indian Sepoys. But they betrayed no distrust, farther than might be looked for in people who had never seen such sorts of beings before. The women kneeled down near the pagoda, or cone, and repeated the Buddhist creed, the men seldom joining in the worship, and having each fixed a small red waxen taper to the base, were hurried away by their husbands, whose apprehensions seemed to be greater, although of a different stamp, than their own.

When the day drew to a close, the young men of the villages endeavoured to display their dancing and vocal powers to the best advantage. Several drums and cymbals were the only instruments which the village afforded. These drums are almost all of the shape of an inverted cone with the apex cut off. The dancing is pantomimic, and is by no means graceful: they make their entrée into the circle, which has been formed by the spectators, by a sudden leap, followed by some ridiculous capers.

When the young men had shewn off for about an hour, an elder of the village came forward, and began a solemn dance. He was followed by the whole of the assembly. Their movement was regulated by their united voices in slow and not unharmonious cadence. In this manner the procession danced slowly round the bamboo stage and pagoda, and the ceremony ended.

The Kayeners have not gained much by their conversion. It has only served to chain them to one track of country, and limit their views of independence, without any real equivalent being conceded to them

for the advantages the Mons derive from their superior knowledge of the cultivation of cotton, indigo, and other produce. It has operated also a very unsalutary change in the fare of these poor people, as, instead of the substantial meals of flesh they formerly enjoyed, and the moderate indulgence they allowed themselves in the use of the spirit distilled from rice, they are now restricted to a comparatively meagre diet of rice, vegetables, and fish, and are thereby more disposed to those diseases which are peculiar to wooded countries. To them the chase has now no attractions, nor are they roused to labour by the crowing of the village cock: to follow the one and to rear the other are alike useless. Under a good government, such a change might ameliorate their moral and social state. But, in so far as might be judged of their present character, any improvement they may gain in the latter, must be at the expense of the former.

The boats were moored a little way from the banks, as the moskitos were troublesome, and the night was passed rather uncomfortably; next morning, at day light, the people rowed below the Pagoda of *Meechantaung*, and we immediately commenced ascending the hill, or rather a congregated mass of rocks, partially covered with Suaggy trees. It is about six hundred feet high, and is chiefly composed of a black, compact, and coarse limestone, appearing, at first sight, like granite which had been long exposed to the action of the atmosphere: some iron and other substances are mixed with it. The ascent was found to be steep, and there is no path. It had rained during the night which made the rocks slippery. Having surmounted the first eminence where is a Pagoda, it was found requisite to descend for some way to the second ascent: a hollow sound now accompanied our footsteps as if we were treading on a huge catacomb, and we were roused from our conjectures as to the probable cause of this singularity, by the caution of my Mon guides to avoid some small openings in front, on a very steep part of the hill up which we were slowly advancing, by the help of tufts of grass and bushes. These apertures were sufficiently wide to admit of a man descending within them, or rather tumbling down them. They are not distinguishable until one approaches within a few feet of them: their depth was not ascertained, but the noise of the stones cast into one was heard for many seconds as they bounded from side to side. In another of these, many stalactites were observed depending, and it is probable that the rain water, having found a lodgment, had gradually worked a passage through the rock.

We soon gained a ridge of rocks so sharply pointed, that much caution was requisite in proceeding over them: several of the people were lamed by the deep cuts they received here. At the south extremity of this ridge there is a difficult ascent of about one hundred yards over sharp ragged rocks, bleak and bare.

28th. We got under weigh at eleven A. M., and cleared *Katha* in about ten minutes. The right bank is here very high, and ten feet of loamy soil rests on a sub-stratum of clay; advancing, we reached a spot on the east bank, where some small boats lay moored. Two hundred yards from the bank is the Karean village of *Teinbaung*, consisting of ten houses, with a population of sixty souls: it had been recently established. The women were here busily engaged dying thread and weaving cloth. Indigo is plentiful.

Pushing up the river after half an hour's halt, we passed the *Kamaee Kajein*, a rocky hill, closely approaching the north bank, having, in front of it, the islands *Taung ba Kyoan* and *Ka-chein*, and soon after the *Ka-kyein*, a rocky hill on the north-west bank, having the island *Kadol* in front of it; at half-past two o'clock, observed a high sand-bank on our right, the resort of the river turtle, some eggs (half-hatched) which the current had, by washing away the sand, exposed, were collected, but on being opened were quickly thrown away: sequestered Karean hamlets peeped occasionally out of the woods on both sides of the river. Passed the village of *Meinje*, opposite nearly to which is the *Kapein Khyauing* creek, which winds along the base of a hill. The banks are here lined with high grass and bamboos. It took us almost an hour to row past an island stretching hence to the north, and about forty minutes to clear the space betwixt it and the *Ootang Kyoan* islet: much cotton, indigo, and tobacco grow on this island: the best passage lies on its west side. The river is here about one hundred and fifty yards broad. When nearly opposite to the middle of the island, the *Shooce-ban* pagoda appears on the left. The day being far gone, and having cleared this island, it became necessary to find a spot at which we might safely pass the night; we noticed a Martaban boat, moored on the right bank, and making for it, made fast our boats to the shore. We found that the village of *Karoong* lies two miles in-land on the east, and contains about one hundred souls.

29th. Cast off at six A. M.: the banks of the river still jungly, a few patches of cotton and tobacco cultivation appear. At seven o'clock, reached *Shooce-ken* village, inhabited by sixty Kareans: a supply of poultry was here obtained. Passed *Chado Shyaung*, a hill lying close on the left bank: about three-quarters of an hour rowing above this place, the river makes a sudden turn to the left, expanding like a lake, being flanked by high ground on the right. The rain now fell in torrents: kept close along the left bank to avoid the strong currents: observed much wild hemp growing close to the water's edge: at half-past eleven, arrived at a Karean hamlet of four houses, with several others in the vicinity attached. Here a small creek, called *Byookhyaung*, appears, and a little higher up two rocky hills, towering in the distance on the left, the first is *Moojeintaung*, which has a break in the center, through which *Meejeintaung* is seen.

Leaving



Leaving the sand-bank, the river appeared as if it was divided into two banches, the boatmen took the right or east channel, as they said the western one is more rapid. The central land is Kaloonsoon, or Kalaumkyoon island, the west branch is called Jilloon Khyauing. The depth, as we pulled close along shore, was found to be two and a half fathoms on an average: the opposite bank is very high, with a strong current setting along it: even that we rowed under was so high that the trees and brushwood above it afforded us tolerable shade: the soil of this island is lighter than that of those below it, but it is fertile, and is, at least, ten feet deep in most places. In some places where the bank was found to be nearly twenty feet high, gaps, formed by slides, were observed, which, had they occurred while a boat was passing, must inevitably have overwhelmed her. Below this soil a stratum of gravel usually shews itself.

About half-past three p. m., passed Kachingchoon Island, and soon after another long and narrow one. The river is contracted here to one hundred and fifty yards. Came in sight, half an hour afterwards, of a village on the Kaloongsoon, and on landing, it was found to have been long deserted. Some plantains and other fruits of no value were procured. Leaving this spot, we kept on the left bank, to avoid a bad and rocky rapid near the east bank. It was now a quarter past five o'clock, and it was requisite that we should endeavour to look out for a good mooring station; immediately after getting beyond the rapid, we weathered the north extreme of the low land, and perceiving a very high bank, with a fine gravelly beach betwixt it and the water, the boats were run up and fixed close to the edge of it.

30th. Cast off at half-past five o'clock a. m., and rowed along under the impending bank. The country, on both sides of the river, had now a very wild and jungly aspect. About half-past nine o'clock, we brought to for breakfast, off Kyapoong, a Karean village, several hundred yards from the east bank of the river.

We had now got into the teak range, and observed many trees, but they were small, the largest having been cut down by order of the former raja. There is every facility at hand for cutting and floating down the timber, and a little encouragement only would be required to induce the Kareans to lend a willing hand. The people were bartering cotton, cloth, wax, and tobacco, for the rice in husk, salt, chillies, raw sugar, balachong, crockery, and other articles which a Martaban boat, lying at anchor, had brought: at half-past eleven o'clock, we left Kyapoong, and proceeded along the south bank: about one o'clock, passed some rocks on the same side, round which the current swept in strong eddies, obliging the boatmen to use, as on several former occasions, long poles: at a quarter past two o'clock, weathered another island, small and rocky: at half-past two o'clock, cleared the Kaloongsoon Island, where the river acquires nearly its former breadth. Kammawoon, a very rocky island, lies close above this place. We kept on its north side, where is the widest channel, and found the depth, close to the bank, from five to seven fathoms. This proved the most difficult part of the river, the stream rushing past the many sharp rocky points with an impetuosity which required the exertions of all on board to stem. It was half-past three o'clock when we cleared the island. Advancing up a broad part of the river, where our oars were sufficient to impel us at the rate of three and a half miles per hour, we soon passed the next island, which is small and not so rocky as that we had just left, and presently came in view of a deserted stockade on the west bank. The post and the island opposite, are termed *Ka Kayei*, or *Kret*. The stockade stands on the angle, formed by the junction of the *Yoonzalen Khyauing* and the main river, here termed *Hooloo*, by the Kareans, and *Jaloen*, by the Mons.

31st.—Towards dawn the rain ceased: about six o'clock, two Kayen canoes came paddling down the *Yoonzalen* branch. The people on board informed us that the source of this river lies in the *Pha Phaphoon*, or *Haphoon* range, which is seven days pulling or tracking (perhaps fifty miles) above *Ka Kret*, where we were, and that the north-west extremity of these hills gives birth to the Chettaung river: the other branch they knew little of, and only observed that they had heard, that it came from China. On looking attentively at the two branches, it seemed that the *Yoonzalen* was deep and still, compared with the *Hooloo*, which flowed with rapidity, and this made it likely that the former might be the main branch, and accordingly, after a hearty breakfast, at half-past five o'clock a. m., the party pushed on for the *Yoonzalen Khyauing*. We had scarcely advanced above a few reaches, when the stream became too narrow to admit of the supposition that it was the main branch. At eight o'clock we reached a rapid, so full of rocks and so small, that the boats stuck fast, and were nearly upset by the force of the current. It became, therefore, impossible to proceed, and we returned to *Ka Kret*, where, after some refreshment, our small fleet was again put in motion at eleven o'clock. We now took the *Hooloo* direction, but had not advanced above one reach, when we rounded the north point of *Ka Kret* Island, and further progress was debarred by various and formidable impediments: a low jumble of slaty rock lay on our left, forming an island, and the current, on the other side, running with amazing rapidity. The boats were directed to round the island, but the boatmen said, that we might proceed a short way, but it must be at the risk of our lives. At this moment two small canoes came shooting down the stream like arrows from a bow. On enquiry whence they had come, they replied that they were Kayeners, from a village several miles lower down, and that they had been on an excursion to cut bamboos, but that the current was too violent to admit of their accomplishing their purpose. They further stated, that the river could only

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be navigated in the dry season above this place, and that by small canoes alone, and at considerable risk, as the whirlpools and eddies were violent amongst the rocks, which crowded the bed of the stream: that, about eight days in advance, by this mode of proceeding, there is a stockade, called *Mein Yogee*, in possession of the Laos of Chering Mai, and that a place called Yeinbeing, forms the boundary betwixt that country and Martaban. From what we learned from these people, and elsewhere from natives, of Chering Mai, there can be no doubt that this river rises amongst the high ranges of hills north of the region alluded to, and its course probably lies betwixt the great central range of mountains, and one of the inferior ranges, as it is perceived at a short distance to rush with turbulent rapidity through a gorge, or break, in the lowest of these last.\* It is plain, that above this spot the river cannot be navigated with any advantage, else what a field for trade betwixt the central nations of Laos and Yunnan, and the Peguers of Martaban must have been laid open, and one which could not have failed of being improved by all of these nations had the means been offered.

Finding it quite in vain to attempt any further prosecution of the enterprise, we determined to return to Martaban: the river, (betwixt the north point of *Ka Kret*, and the opposite main bank) is about two hundred yards wide, and it was found close to the shore of the former to have a depth of four and five fathoms. *Nejauntaung* hill, in the Siamese range, lies hence north 38° E. We passed, exposed to the utmost violence of the monsoon, down the east side of *Ka Kret* Island: the rowers strained every nerve: we halted at several villages not before visited on our passage, which occupied us until the 2d June. The actual time spent in rowing back was somewhat above eighteen hours, and our rate of going was above seven miles an hour. The distance is about one hundred and ten miles from Martaban, to where the river emerges from the mountains.

Upon the whole it may be observed, that the river of Martaban preserves a grand and imposing appearance, from where it disgorges its perturbed waters from the mountainous regions to its embouchure, being a distance of about one hundred and forty miles.

No. 29.—From the Government Gazette, March 16, 1826.

*The Plau*.—Amongst the tribes brought to more particular notice by recent events, is a race of some interest, entitled *Plau*, the inhabitants of a district N. E. of Pegu, called by the natives *Thaum-pe*, and by the Burmans, *Tongsu*. The people have been occasionally encountered at Pinang, to which they have been brought by the little commerce they carry on, but their country and condition were but imperfectly appreciated: we have been favored with the following particulars with respect to them:

The district of *Thaum-pe*, when conquered by the Burmans, received from them the appellation of *Tongsu*: it lies about twenty-five or thirty days' journey N. N. E. of Tongo, close on the borders of Siam and Laos. The chief town, bearing the name of the district, is situated about forty miles from the hills, and in N. Lat. 19.

The *Plau* are a distinct people from both the Siamese and Burmans, and from the neighbouring tribes, differing in language, feature, and character. They are shorter, and less robust than the Burmans, and bear a greater resemblance to the Chinese, than to any other people. Their dress partakes also of the Chinese costume. They wear their hair twisted into a knot like the Burmans, and are tattooed like those people, and the Laos: like the former, also, they thrust small cylinders of wood or silver through holes made in the lobes of their ears. Their clothes are very usually quilted, which they say, is necessary by the frigidity of their climate. The people are a lively simple race, addicted to agricultural and commercial pursuits, and of very unwearied propensities—they have therefore readily been reduced to subjection by the Burmans and Peguers, for whom they, nevertheless, entertain a profound contempt—and from whose rule, whenever it becomes very irksome or oppressive, they withdraw into the thick forests, and the mountains in their vicinity.

The *Plau* profess the faith of Buddha, and, like all Bauddhists, burn their dead. Many of their customs, however, are peculiar, of which their marriages furnish an example.

Women are not immature in *Thaum-pe*: young men therefore pay addresses in person to the objects of their affection. When a youth fancies that the girl to whom he is attached favours his pretensions, he takes an opportunity of placing his silver bracelet before her. If she takes it up, he considers his suit accepted, and immediately endeavours to obtain the consent of her parents to the union. Their approbation is the prelude to an entertainment, the prominent viands at which consist of poultry, buffalo and cow beef, venison, and other game, monkey's flesh, and large rats, which are found below the roots of the bamboo, on which they subsist. The feast which lasts one or more days, according to the wealth of the parties, concludes with copious libations of an ardent spirit, distilled from rice, by a process nearly similar to that by which the Chinese distill Samsoo. Marriage being with these people a purely civil contract, they do not require the attendance of a priest at the solemnization;

\* There is no doubt that the Sanluen, or Martaban river, is the Nou Kiang, which rises in the Eastern mountains of Tibet, and flows through Yunana and Laos to the Gulph of Martaban.—ED.



solemnization; but were it otherwise, which the invocation of superior powers at the ceremony might lead us to suspect was once the case, the priest of Buddha is absolutely forbidden to converse with a woman, or be present in the company of one.

Some old person, who has gained the respect of the society, gives a cup of weak spirit to each of the contracting parties, repeating certain invocations of benignant deities and genii, to prove propitious, and when they have drank the spirit, he ties their arms together by the wrist, with a slender cord, which is the conclusion of the ceremony.

The province of Thaum-pe is governed by a Burman Chief, who resides at the capital, which is stockaded, and contains about five thousand inhabitants. The face of the country is flat and tolerably clear. Rice is cultivated to an extent, sufficient for the consumption of the district: there are numerous herds of cattle, and a considerable number of small horses: a few buffaloes are employed in agriculture.

Thaum-pe is exceedingly rich in raw produce of various descriptions. The people grow several kinds of cotton—one of which appears to be the brown or nankeen cotton. The tea plant is also cultivated, and the leaves are pickled. Two sorts of indigo are grown, the creeping indigo and the true. Blue is the prevailing colour of their dresses. Sticklac is brought down for sale, by the *Plau*, in considerable quantities, and the silk-worm is reared, being fed on the leaf of a plant called *Puja*. The forests contain a number of valuable trees, but the want of water-carriage renders this source of traffic unavailable. The mineral products of the mountains are more easily transported. Gold is found in the sands of the mountain streams. Iron is abundant, and is smelted and wrought into swords, knives and other implements. Tin, after disappearing to the north of *Taval*, again presents itself here, and is found in considerable quantities in the beds of rivers, in the form of a fine black sand. The most productive mines, however, are those of lead, and from them, it is said, the Burman armies are wholly supplied—the ore is obtained in lumps, but in what state of combination we are not informed: the working of the mines is sufficiently rude, and nothing like a horizontal shaft is attempted—the *Plau* merely digging deep pits, till they come upon the veins. From these sources, the annual exports to Rangoon, are estimated at one hundred and twenty thousand rupees, and might, no doubt, be much extended—the *Plau* carry back from Rangoon and other Burman ports, salt, areca nuts, salt-fish, broad cloth, woollens, piece goods, crockery and spices.

A commercial intercourse is also maintained between Thaum-pe and China. Traders from the frontier districts of the latter, bring spices, including the clove and nutmeg, silk, cloth, woollens, paints, paper, cutlery, and other articles, and take back the products of the country. They come annually in a caravan, consisting sometimes of a thousand persons well armed—the merchandize is transported by asses and horses.

No. 30.—From the Government Gazette, February 23, 1826.

*Mission to Siam.*—We have been favored with the following details respecting the mission of Captain Burney, whose arrival at Bangkok we have already noticed:

The brig *Guardian*, with the Mission on board, on entering the Gulf of Siam, experienced much difficulty in beating up against the N. E. monsoon, but reached the mouth of the Menam river on the 17th November. A pilot from the capital came on board on the 21st, but it was necessary to wait for the spring tides to cross the bar: this was on the 26th, when the brig crossed in 11½ feet. Between that and the mouth of the river, a distance of eight or nine miles, the vessel was taken for the most part, and through the night tides only, through the mud, with a quarter less two fathoms of water. At Paknam fort, a demand was made for the brig to land her guns, but was not persisted in.

This fort has been much enlarged since Mr. Crawford's mission, and another opposite to it erected, and between these, about an hundred yards from the right bank, a battery of forty guns has been constructed in the river, upon a foundation of loose stones: the construction does not appear very secure.

In working up the river, the brig repeatedly came so close to the bank, that the boughs of the trees touched the cabin windows, and yet the lead shewed from five to seven fathoms of water. The Menam is considered to be one of the finest rivers in the world: the map of it in Kämpfer's Japan, is said to be very correct.

On the 4th December, the vessel anchored off Mooung Mai, or New Town, a large village on the right bank, inhabited mostly by emigrants from Pegu. Other defences have been erected here. At this place, a deputation, of several Siamese Chiefs of rank, arrived, to receive charge of the Governor General's letter—they arrived with a fleet of state boats, one of which was to convey the letter, after it was placed in a cup of red wood with lozenges of mother o'pearl: this cup is used to receive the letters of the King of Cochin China and the Emperor of China. In another of the boats, the Envoy embarked, accompanied by Captain Macfarquhar and Jose Pediato, the port captain. They arrived at Bangkok at eight in the evening, and the Envoy took up his abode with Mr. Hunter, an English merchant, who has been a resident in the Siamese capital for the



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last fifteen months. As soon as intimation of the intended Mission arrived, the Prah Klang, or chief minister, commenced the construction of a house for its accommodation; but the building was not completed. Building a dwelling expressly for the Mission, was said to be a greater honour than if they had been provided with a house of gold. This house was occupied by the Mission on the 10th, and, although hastily and unskilfully put together, was not uncomfortable. It had the advantage also of being removed from the close surveillance of the minister, being near that part of the town inhabited by native Christians.

After several conferences with the minister, in which, although the most friendly sentiments were expressed, yet evident doubts of our having gained any serious or permanent advantages over the Burmese, were exhibited, the Envoy was admitted to an audience of the King on the 16th December.

Early on the morning of that day the Mission left the house in four boats. The first conveyed the sepoys: the second, Captain Macfarquhar, the interpreter, and the Envoy, with a public letter: the third, the chairs of ceremony, and the fourth, Captain Sutherland, Mr. Hunter, and a band of Siamese music. Two or three hundred small boats followed with Siamese officers, and those whom curiosity had brought to witness the scene.

On arriving at the opposite side of the river, Captain Macfarquhar and the Envoy got into their chairs, and the rest of the gentlemen mounted the small horses which were in waiting, with tolerably decent appointments. They proceeded in this manner as far as the gateway of the second court, where the native Christians only, pulled off their shoes and stockings, whilst the Envoy and his companions were requested to dismount, to leave the sepoys, and walk a short distance into a hall, in which they found several Siamese officers in waiting, with state elephants standing outside. They were detained in this hall for about an hour, and then summoned into the presence of the King, who, they were informed, had taken his seat on the throne. On their way, they passed through a body of Siamese troops, seated on their hams, with a railing on each side of the road, which was lined by two or three hundred drums, and other instruments, that made a tremendous noise. At the door of the hall of audience, all the Siamese attendants fell on their knees and forearms, in which posture they moved, before and on each side. The moment the members of the Mission entered, and saw the King, which they could not immediately do, as he was seated on a throne ten or twelve feet high at the farther end of the hall, which appeared to have been purposely darkened, they made three profound bows, whilst the Siamese struck their heads on the ground, and raised their hands joined to their foreheads the same number of times. They then moved on about twenty paces, where they again bowed, and the Siamese made their obeisances three times, after which they sat down on the carpet that covered the floor. At a signal from the Chief, entitled *Phya Phi Phut*, the Envoy rose, holding the Governor General's letter over his head, and advancing six or eight paces beyond the Chief, where a gold vase had been placed, he deposited the letter upon it, and then taking out the English address which he had prepared, read it out with a loud voice, and placing it by the side of the Governor General's letter, retired to his seat, keeping his face towards the King. The whole of the English gentlemen then, as had been previously settled, joined their hands and raised them three times against the forehead. His Majesty desired that they should approach him nearer, and they were moved eight or ten paces in advance. A Chief then read out the list of the presents, and pronounced a complimentary speech previously prepared in reply.

The King put a number of questions to the Envoy; many of them were frivolous, but others indicated his being tolerably well acquainted with the state of affairs in the vicinity of his kingdom. He was much pleased with Captain Burney's son, a boy of six years of age, who had been conducted to the audience by the previous desire of the minister, and for whom his Majesty had ordered some toys to be prepared, which were presented to him at the close of the audience. During the whole of the interview, his Majesty was masticating betel very diligently. After the conversation had ceased, a Siamese officer, bearing an instrument in the shape of a sceptre, and seated on the floor some way in advance of the Mission, rose upon his knees, and made three obeisances to the King, who took up his *kris*, and a noise like the stroke of a wand was heard, on which curtains of gold cloth were immediately drawn before the King's throne. The whole of the Siamese then made their usual obeisances towards the curtains.

The hall of audience is about an hundred and twenty feet long, by sixty feet broad, and is forty feet high. It is supported by pillars, on each of which hangs a Chinese painting on glass, representing an English officer or lady: the throne is in shape like a boat, placed upon a platform, with a small canopy, the whole covered with gold. The King wore a close dress of cloth of gold, and a dress of muslin over it: he had no crown. Immediately below the throne sat the Princes of the Blood, and on each side the ministers, according to their relative ranks: the courtiers wore, generally, the same sort of dress as the King, or transparent muslin robes over Surat Kinkhabs. Several Chinese and Cochinchinese were present, as were some Laos officers, resembling Gorkhas in appearance, but richly habited.

On leaving the hall of audience, the Envoy, and the gentlemen who accompanied him, were taken to see the white elephant, and one or two of the temples.

On the 19th, the Envoy was presented to the Wang-na with the same state and ceremony as at his presentation to the King, with the exception of making but one bow in place of three; the same questions as those put by the King were repeated by the Wang-na. This chief, who is usually called by the native Christians the second King, is a brother of the late monarch: he exercises an especial superintendance over the southern and Malayan states, and is described as a benevolent good humoured man, partial to Europeans. He is a good portly figure, and during the audience was smoking a *cigar*.

On the night of the 20th, a third presentation took place to prince Krom Mean Surin, an uncle of the present King, and superintendent of the foreign and commercial relations—he is a mild, good looking man, about thirty-eight years of age: there was less ceremony on this than on the two former occasions, but it was of the same nature, and nearly the same questions were addressed to the Envoy.

The manner in which the Envoy has been received, is clearly indicative of feelings of respect, and there has been no deficiency on the score of civility at least. We learn that abundance of rice has been sent for the use of the escort, by order of the King. The residence of the Mission does not appear to be watched, and the members are allowed to visit freely, most part of the town. The principal ministers furnish alternately supplies of fruits and vegetables, and the King's steward has sent, it is said, by special command, several dishes of meat, cooked in the Siamese fashion, which is reported to be not particularly agreeable to European palates: the *Wang-na* shews the Mission similar attentions, and a boat with ten men are placed at its disposal. The members of the Mission do not appear to think very highly of the Siamese force, from what they saw of it. The cavalry were ill dressed and equipped, and mounted on Pegu ponies, which though strong serviceable animals, were as rough and coarse as in a state of nature. The infantry, even of the King's body guard, were a poor, thin, ill set race, armed with old rusty muskets: the most formidable force, consisted of a party of stout able-bodied men, each armed with a thick stick. The Siamese soldier, when detached against the Burmese frontiers, for the purpose of making captives, or as they term it catching the Burmese, is supplied with a musket, a bamboo full of rice, and a hoe, with which last instrument he digs a hole for himself, in which he lies concealed, until some of the enemy come near enough to be surprised.

These incursions, for the sake of carrying off prisoners, attended with the perpetration of every act of ravage and cruelty, appear to have been the principal mode in which the long subsisting enmity between the Burmese and Siamese governments has manifested its existence for some years past. No course of hostilities could be more ruinous to the population of the bordering districts, and such of them as may eventually come under our authority, will gain a blessing of no slender value in protection against these harassing and destructive inflictions.

No. 31.—From the Government Gazette, January 25, and February 8, 1827.

*Journies in Siam.*—We have been favoured with some notices of the Eastern Peninsula, to the south and east of our new possessions, which we propose offering to our readers as descriptive of a country, rarely, if ever visited by Europeans, until late events led to a more frequent communication between the British and Siamese authorities. In consequence of this improved intercourse, and particularly with reference to the exchange of prisoners, several journies were performed by land, in different directions, by two of the officers of the Mission, Mr. Harris, Sub-Assistant Surgeon, and the Interpreter, Mr. Leal, to whose notes we have been kindly permitted to have access.

One of the first excursions, and which was performed by both the gentlemen we have named, proceeded from Ligor, a principality dependant upon Siam, and a town and sea-port upon the eastern coast of the peninsula. Some account of this place may be found in Hamilton, who visited this quarter in 1719, but his notice is very brief and defective. The French, when established at Siam, endeavoured to have a plan taken of the town, but were not permitted, and scarcely any notice of the place is found in the work of La Loubere. The Dutch had a factory there, from the beginning of the 17th century to the middle of the last, the remains of which are still shewn in some old brick foundations, where it is said to have stood.

The town of Ligor is at a short distance from the bank of the Ta-yung, or Tha-wung river, at about two hours rowing from the mouth of the river: from the bank of the river to the town, the road is good, leading through an avenue of trees. Ligor is, in form, an oblong square: it is defended by walls, with ramparts, and a wet ditch, which, during the rains, communicates with the river. It contains about five thousand inhabitants, and appears to have been at one time much more populous, but it has suffered considerably within the last half century, having been twice taken, and many of its inhabitants having been carried off, first by Alompra, and secondly, by one of the generals of Minderagee, the last Burmese sovereign. According to the conscription rolls of this state, the males capable of bearing arms, are about twelve thousand.

The Chief of Ligor is amongst the native princes to the eastward, who have shewn a decided disposition to cultivate a friendly footing with the English. He is, in some respects, dependant on Siam, but is absolute  
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in his own government, and has great influence at Bangkok, through his wife, who is the cousin of the King, and their daughter, who is one of the King of Siam's wives, and who has lately borne his Majesty a son and heir. There are three or four commissioners sent to Ligor, by the Siamese court, but the Chief treats them with very little consideration, and they exercise, except on occasion of his absence, no authority whatever. He has in his hands, the power of life and death.

The town of Ligor stands on a very extensive plain, which appears to reach to the great central range of mountains, and is covered with rice cultivation. There is a little pepper cultivated in the interior, and some iron ore collected; but the tin mines are much neglected, and said to be exhausted. There appears to be no direct trade with China, Cochinchina, or other foreign ports. What little trade there is, is with Siam, and it is entirely engrossed by the Chief. There is not a single brick dwelling house in the town, but a great many temples and pyramids of that material, and most of them in ruins. The Chief's house is of plank, with a tiled roof: it is situated within the fort, which consists of an old high wall, in a most dilapidated condition, and without a gun mounted in any part within or upon it.

There is no difficulty in approaching or quitting the coast of Ligor, although, from the high swell and surf, during northerly winds, and the shoal, at the end of Tantalum Island, the roadstead cannot be considered safe, during the height of the N. E. monsoon. The anchorage ground is of soft mud—there are three fathoms, at about two miles and a half from the mouth of the Tha-wang river, which is a little to the northward of the Ligor river—the two rivers join a short way inland, and the latter is little used.

The jealousy of the Siamese court, precluded the possibility of taking advantage of a favourable opportunity of proceeding from Ligor to Bangkok entirely by land, but permitted the journey, as far as the village of Pathu, situated in about latitude  $11^{\circ} 10'$ .

From Ligor the first day's journey, the 18th December, passed over extensive plains, watered by the Tha-wang river, to the village of *Nam-Jin*, or 'cold water.' The party accompanied the Raja of Ligor, whose suite consisted of between three and four hundred persons, with eighty elephants: temporary houses were erected for his accommodation at every stage. The second day's march, proceeded through thick jungles and occasional rice fields, to a place called Ban Hooa Thaphan, close to the sea shore.

The third day's route led over very bad roads to the village of Ban Clai, chiefly tenanted by Chinese, on the right bank of the Clai river, about three miles from its mouth—the river is about one hundred yards wide, opposite to the village, but it is much narrower at the mouth, being choked with the sands gathered at the bar, against which the surf beats as violently as at Madras. The bed of the river, which runs between lofty banks, is sandy, and the water very clear—the village contains about one thousand persons. This place is the *Clay* of Horsburgh's charts.

From Ban Clai to Ban Krang, the next day's journey, from half-past seven in the morning till six in the afternoon. The road lay chiefly through jungle, but several villages were passed, and a couple of small streams. The halting place was situated at the foot of a hill, on a beautiful plain, through which flowed a fine clear stream, called the Kblong Krang.

On the following day, a march of equal duration, terminated at Hooa Nah: early in the afternoon, an extensive range of lofty mountains was visible on the left of the road. The next day's march was intersected by a number of small streams, and led through thick jungle, in which tigers are sometimes encountered. The following march terminated at the Siamese village of Ban Chékram, after crossing the river of the same name. The bamboos here are of enormous size, and the joints are used for domestic vessels, for holding water and other purposes.

The journey for three days more, passed over the same kind of country, in which thick jungle, alternated with open plains, sometimes in cultivation, and small streams occasionally intersected the road. The evening of the third day brought the party to a broad and rapid river, the Tha-kham, near the mouth of which is situated the town of Phoon-phin, a place containing about 1,200 Siamese inhabitants, under the authority of a Chinese officer. It is celebrated for its steel, of which the swords of all the great officers of the court are manufactured. The Tha-kham is the northern boundary of the jurisdiction of the Raja of Ligor. A branch runs to the southward, to the town of Bandon, where it opens into the sea, and whence it is usually termed the Bandon river. The northern branch of the Tha-kham empties itself into the sea, at a place called Tha-thong, which bounds the Ligor territory on the sea coast: a number of small islands lie off the mouth of the Bandon river. The Tha-kham proceeds nearly across the peninsula, passing to Pennom, a town three days' journey from Phoon-phin, on the western coast opposite to Junkeeylon, the tin, and other produce of which island, find their way by this route to Bangkok.

During the next two days, the road ran through extensive tracts of rice cultivation, to a village a short distance from Chhaiya, one of the most considerable towns on the route. It is defended by a stockade, and contains about two thousand Siamese, besides a number of Chinese. It stands upon a broad stream, or probably an arm of the sea, and carries on a considerable traffic, chiefly in grain: the inhabitants of the province are estimated at eighteen or nineteen thousand.



On the second day after quitting Chhaiya, the road led to the sea shore, and continued for some distance along a smooth and firm beach, lined with Casuarina trees, and free from surf. The mouths of two small rivers were crossed on the second day.

On the day following, the 8th January, the travellers proceeded inland, partially through jungle, to the right bank of a large river, the Lang Sewun, on the opposite side of which was a village, containing about six hundred inhabitants, chiefly Malays—the next two days offered little variety, several streams were crossed, and the second day's halt was at Suwi, a town containing about two thousand inhabitants, with a Siamese governor of the rank of Phra: the road was good, leading between paddy-fields. The same kind of road continued throughout the two succeeding days to the town of Ch'hoomphon, on the right bank of the river so named, which pursues a very winding course, in a sandy bed, between lofty banks. The town is stockaded, and is said to contain eight thousand inhabitants. It was formerly the entrepot of a very valuable trade with the coast of Tenasserim, but subsequently to the subjugation of Tenasserim by the Burmans, Ch'hoomphon has been little else than a military post, where a force was stationed to watch the proceedings of the Burmans, and make occasional kidnapping inroads into their territory. The governor of Ch'hoomphon, soon after Mergui and Tavai came into our possession, committed the usual predatory excesses in their neighbourhood, and carried off many of the people captive, fourteen hundred of whom were recovered by the late mission of Captain Burney. His proceedings were so far from being avowed by the Court of Siam, that he was ordered up to the capital, and thrown into confinement, in which he died.

After crossing the Ch'hoomphon river, the next stage was a village named Bang-soon, and the following, at the head of a small river, named the Pathiu, near the mouth of which is a village of the same appellation, containing about two hundred Chinese and Siamese inhabitants, employed chiefly in fishing and manufacturing *balachang*. The cause we have above alluded to, here suspended the farther prosecution of the journey by land, and the party embarking on board a large boat, arrived in four days in the Menam river, and reached Bangkok in the evening of the same day, the 31st of January.

When the Court of Siam had consented to the release of the Burman prisoners, it was thought advisable to send them back in charge of some confidential person attached to the mission, in order to secure their ready and safe return—accordingly, the first detachment, consisting of between five and six hundred persons, proceeded under the superintendance of Mr. Leal, the interpreter, who, on his journey to the Tenasserim coast, and in his return to Bangkok, by way of Martaban, had an opportunity of visiting the whole of the Siamese frontier, and making himself acquainted with the topography of a tract of country, almost new to European investigation.

The party left Bangkok on the 13th February, 1826, in six junks. They sailed from the bar, on the 23d, and on the 1st of March reached Bangnarom, a place on the west coast of the Gulf of Siam, in about latitude  $11^{\circ} 50'$ ; from hence, the route proceeded overland.

The first day's march was, in the early part, over an indifferent road, but the greater part was good, with pools of water at different places; the second was also over a good road, and terminated at a place, where it branched off in two different directions, the right leading to Bangtha-pan, the left to Mergui, and distinguished by two large trees, one on the Mergui road, marked with two large crosses, and the other on the Bangtha-pan road, with four.

On the third day's march, the people suffered much inconvenience from want of water, not a drop of which was encountered. Early on the morning of the fourth, water was met with: the road here again divided into two, one leading to the E. the other S. S. E., the latter terminating abruptly, at a short distance, the former continuing to Mergui, and marked by a large stone.

The fifth day's march, came early to the foot of the Kasoon mountain, along the skirts of which ran a small rivulet—the mountain was steep, and the ascent and descent occupied the greater part of a fatiguing day. By nine o'clock, on the morning of the following day, the party arrived at the boundary of the Burman and Siamese states, marked by three tamarind trees: the place is said to be called Sing-khon-tha-pe. In the afternoon, they halted at a pagoda, where the Burmese offered their adorations.

The next day's march continued, throughout the day, along a good road to the banks of the Tenasserim river, where the party constructed seventy-five bamboo floats, for the purpose of completing the journey by water—according to impressions received on the spot, the river here was thought to be the main branch, but, according to the assertions of the more intelligent among the Burmans, it is but a branch of the Tenasserim river—the passage down the stream was very tardy, being much obstructed by trees in the river. On the afternoon of the third day, a fishing boat was seen and dispatched to Mergui, where the party arrived on the fifth day of their voyage, the 15th March, having lost four children and boys, on the journey.

The party, allowing for the detention of three days at Bangnarom, and of the greater portion of the fourth and eighth day's route, whilst engaged in ascertaining the direction of the road, and constructing bamboo floats, was about sixteen days passing from the bar of the Menam to Mergui, but their progress was necessarily

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rily slow, owing to the number of women and children, and we understand, that the Kasoon hill might have been crossed at a more easy pass. There are two instances on record of the journey, between the *old* capital of Siam and Mergui, when the French occupied it, having been made in ten days, and on one of these occasions, the party consisted of prisoners in chains, escorted by a detachment of Siamese soldiers. The late King of Siam is said, about thirty-three years ago, to have constructed the military road from Bangnarom towards Mergui, for the purpose of invading the Burmese territories: the road is described to admit elephants, and even wheel carriages. But in former times, there appears to have been a *carriage* road between the gulf of Siam and Tenasserim, as, in a letter from the Bishop of Tabraca, from Siam, in 1761, we find the following passage: "J'ai envoyé M. Martin (a Merguy). Il alla jusqu'à Piply, on l'on a coutume de quitter les bateaux, et y attendit inutilement, les *Charettes*, pendant trois semaines." Piply is the Siamese Phriphri, a large town on the west coast of the Gulf of Siam, in about lat. 13° 20', and once the capital of the Siamese empire. It is to be hoped, that our officers at Mergui will shortly be able to re-open and re-establish these old and almost forgotten roads into the rich kingdom of Siam, and thus revive the ancient and valuable commerce, which was conducted with Siam through this channel, first by the Portuguese, and afterwards by the French.

From Mergui, Mr. Leal proceeded to Tavai, by sea, and was thence sent back by the Commissioner, with instructions to proceed to the Siamese station, on the other side of the peninsula, at C'hoomphon, to deliver a number of Siamese prisoners, and receive charge of the Burmese still detained there. He accordingly started from Mergui, on the 23d March, with twelve Burman boats, and four others, containing one hundred and nine Siamese prisoners, and reached the mouth of the Pak-cham river on the 25th: he rowed up the river on the following day, and arrived at Pak-cham on the afternoon of the 26th. Mr. Leal describes the river as of considerable size. The exact site and proper name of this river are yet unknown, as the coast between it and Mergui has never been surveyed. The Pak-cham river is separated from the C'hoomphon river by a very small interval of level ground, and it is said that, during the spring tides, the two rivers often unite: the former is, throughout, broad and deep, and the latter flows in a sandy bed—both are free from rocks. It seems, therefore, probable, that they might be formed into one with little or no difficulty, and a short and direct communication would thus be formed across the peninsula, between the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Siam. From Pak-cham, Mr. Leal proceeded across the country to C'hoomphon, in the vicinity of which he arrived on the afternoon of the second day. Although accompanied by only thirty-eight Burmans, his appearance caused a considerable sensation. He was met, on starting, by three Siamese, sent to ascertain the object of his coming. At night he was joined by a chief, with about seven hundred followers, all armed, who left him after learning his destination: on the following morning he was met by the deputy governor, with three thousand men, who requested him to halt till the afternoon, when a place would be prepared for his reception. Having acceded to this proposal, Mr. Leal suspended his journey till the hour agreed on, when he proceeded, and came to a field, where he again met the deputy governor, with two other officers, and about eight thousand Siamese troops, armed in various ways, and variously habited in red, green, and white uniforms. They informed Mr. Leal that the governor was absent, but had been apprised of his arrival, and was expected immediately, till when they would attend to his wishes. They gave him a small hut to occupy without the city, but on the day following, announced that a place was ready for his accommodation in C'hoomphon: a violent rain, however, having detained him till two o'clock, it was then announced, that the governor had arrived, and was ready to receive him. On being informed of the object of the mission, he stated that the Burman prisoners had been sent back, and intimated that some delay was likely to occur before a house in the town could be prepared for the reception of the messenger. The meaning of this being justly understood to be a reluctance to admit the party into C'hoomphon, Mr. Leal thought it unnecessary to delay his return, and set out for Pak-cham on the following day. He arrived there on the afternoon of the 31st, and reached Mergui, by water, on the 3d of April. He found, that only fifty-nine of the Burman prisoners had arrived, but the rest, to the number of two hundred and thirty-seven, gradually returned, having been sent round a month's journey, by way of Bangnarom, instead of the direct and easy route of a week or ten days from Pak-cham to Mergui.

Having next set off for Martaban by sea, and arrived there on the 21st April, Mr. Leal next departed from thence for Bangkok. He embarked on boats on the Uttaran river, on the 24th, accompanied by twenty Mons, or Peguers, and three Burmans. On the 25th, he arrived at Meuang Uttaran, and the river of Khlong Bangwilai, where he passed the night. On the 26th, he passed Khlong Peli, and on the 27th, halted at a place called Phra Mongue, after encountering some difficulties on the road. On the 28th, he reach Khlong Mykut, where teak grows in considerable quantities, and whence it is transported down the Uttaran to Martaban. On the 29th, at an early hour, the party reached Khlong Mysikleet, where they rested, having experienced much fatigue. On the 30th, after passing a portion of the river, very difficult from rocks and shallows, they came to Myksath, where the Siamese troops were posted, and where the navigation up the Uttaran terminates.



terminates. From hence, they proceeded by land, on the 1st May, starting at three in morning. At ten, they came to the place where there are three shapeless piles of stones, usually known as the three pagodas, the boundary between the Burman and Siamese territories in this direction, and denominated by the latter Phra-chaidi Sam-ong, and by the former Kioc-pie. The precise position of these land-marks has yet to be ascertained, as different observers have placed them at the distance of more than one degree of latitude, and nearly one in longitude; the average seems to be about N. 15° 6', and E. 99° 7'. In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Leal reached Songola, a place containing one hundred and fifty persons, at the head of the Mekhlong river, on the eastern bank: a Siamese guard is situated here, of about one hundred men, mostly natives of Pegu.

On the following day, the 2d May, the party, after a very fatiguing journey, reached the fort of Loom-chhang, occupied by a guard of Peguers. It is a place of some traffic, a number of boats being found here, large and small: the trade is carried on with the people of the plains in cotton, cloth, bees' wax, ivory, sapan-wood, honey, buffaloes' and deers' hides and horns, tigers' skins, cardamoms, &c. Three rivers meet here, one from Songola, the Mekhlong, one coming from the S. W., the Thadin-deng, and one, the Alantay, running from the north of east.

Two boats were here procured, and the journey proceeded down the Mekhlong river. Several floats and canoes going to Bangkok, were passed on the first day's progress: the navigation of the river was difficult and laborious. Early on the third day, the party arrived at Menam-noi, a place of some importance, where the Siamese, in the late war, constructed two forts, and stationed their army under the Maha Yotha, or "illustrious warrior" Rong-na-rong, corruptly denominated Rown Rown. The employment of this force, whilst cantoned here, was rather unilitary, as the men were exercised chiefly in cultivating cotton, of which the finest description produced in Siam, grows about Menam-noi. They were also employed in cutting sapan-wood and timber, for the state boats. There is no teak in this part of the country. At a short distance above Menam-noi, is the post of Chaiyok, which seems to be the Daraik of some maps, and from whence the land journey to Tavai commences. It leads over the mountains, and through thick forests, and is exceedingly laborious: the distance, however, is inconsiderable. Two sepoy's of the 25th Battalion Native Infantry, who volunteered to convey the Envoy's dispatches from Bangkok, were eight days passing from Chaiyok to Tavai, and returning thence.

After some little detention at Menam-noi, by the military authorities, Mr. Leal was suffered to proceed, and in the evening passed the post of Thatuko. On the following day, he passed a village called Sam-sing, where lay many vessels loading with sapan-wood. At noon he reached the military station of Danclai, and about three in the afternoon, Ban-chiom, at the junction of the Sissovat with the Mekhlong: the former comes from the north. The town is of some importance, containing about five thousand inhabitants, chiefly Peguers. He stopped in the evening at Pak-phrek, a still more considerable town, having a population of about eight thousand Siamese. It is sometimes also called Kan-boori: the former town of that name, which stood at the head of the Sissovat river, was destroyed by the Burmans, in their invasion of Siam in 1766.

On the next day Mr. Leal, continuing his voyage, passed Rat-phri and Ban-chhang. An attempt was made to detain him at the former place, which he resolutely resisted, and forced his passage. Rat-phri has a population of about ten thousand. Ban-chhang, the Ban-xang of the Lettres Edifiantes, is said to contain a population of about four thousand, chiefly Chinese.

On the 8th May, the party passed Mekhlong at the mouth of the river of the same name, having about thirteen thousand inhabitants, Siamese and Chinese, and being a place of considerable traffic. From hence, the route proceeded across the mouth of the Tha-chin river, which debouches into the sea at the same place as the Mekhlong: the intervening tract is inhabited by Peguers, principally, to the number of sixteen thousand persons. The upper part of the Tha-chin, as its name denotes, is occupied almost entirely by Chinese, who are engaged in the manufacture of sugar. Lakhon Chhaisa is the name of the principal place of this manufacture. At, or a little above the mouth of the Tha-chin, a small river or canal, the Khlong Menang Luang, connects that stream with Menam at Bangkok. Starting after midnight, with the flood tide, Mr. Leal reached the Menam about three o'clock, having thus crossed the Siamese frontier in three different places, and traversed a considerable portion of the peninsula, where no European had preceded him.

No. 32.—From the Government Gazette, February 22, 1827.

*Treaty between the Honorable East India Company, and the King of Siam.*—The powerful Lord, who is in possession of every good and every dignity, the god Booth, who dwells over every head in the city of the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-thā-yā, (titles of the King of Siam,) incomprehensible to the head and brain. The sacred beauty of the Royal Palace, serene and infallible there, (titles of the Wangna, or second King of Siam,)



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have bestowed their commands upon the heads of their Excellencies, the Ministers of high rank, belonging to the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-thā-yā, to assemble and frame a Treaty with Captain Henry Burney, the English Envoy, on the part of the English government, the Honorable East India Company, who govern the countries in India, belonging to the English, under the authority of the King and Parliament of England: and the right honorable Lord Amherst, Governor of Bengal, and other English officers of high rank, have deputed Captain Burney, as an Envoy to represent them, and to frame a treaty with their Excellencies, the Ministers of high rank, belonging to the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-thā-yā, in view, that the Siamese and English nation may become great and true friends, connected in love and affection, with genuine candour and sincerity on both sides. The Siamese and English frame two uniform copies of the treaty, in order, that one copy may be placed in the kingdom of Siam, and that it may become known throughout every great and small province, subject to Siam, and in order, that one copy may be placed in Bengal, and that it may become known throughout every great and small province, subject to the English government. Both copies of the treaty will be attested by the Royal seal, by the seals of their Excellencies, the Ministers of high rank, in the city of the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-thā-yā, and by the seals of the right honorable Lord Amherst, Governor of Bengal, and of the other English officers of high rank.

Article 1st.—The English and Siamese engage in friendship, love, and affection, with mutual truth, sincerity, and candour. The Siamese must not meditate or commit evil, so as to molest the English in any manner. The English must not meditate or commit evil, so as to molest the Siamese in any manner. The Siamese must not go and molest, attack, disturb, seize, or take any place, territory or boundary, belonging to the English, in any country, subject to the English. The English must not go and molest, attack, disturb, seize, or take any place, territory or boundary, belonging to the Siamese, in any country subject to the Siamese. The Siamese shall settle every matter within the Siamese boundaries, according to their own will and customs.

Article 2d.—Should any place or country, subject to the English, do any thing that may offend the Siamese, the Siamese shall not go and injure such place or country, but first report the matter to the English, who will examine into it with truth and sincerity, and if the fault lie with the English, the English shall punish according to the fault. Should any place or country, subject to the Siamese, do any thing that may offend the English, the English shall not go and injure such place or country, but first report the matter to the Siamese, who will examine into it, with truth and sincerity, and if the fault lie with the Siamese, the Siamese shall punish according to the fault. Should any Siamese place or country, that is near an English country, collect at any time an army, or a fleet of boats, if the Chief of the English country enquire the object of such force, the Chief of the Siamese country must declare it. Should any English place or country, that is near a Siamese country, collect at any time an army, or a fleet of boats, if the Chief of the Siamese country enquire the object of such force, the Chief of the English country must declare it.

Article 3d.—In places and countries belonging to the Siamese and English, lying near their mutual borders, whether to the east, west, north, or south, if the English entertain a doubt as to any boundary that has not been ascertained, the Chief, on the side of the English, must send a letter with some men and people from his frontier posts, to go and enquire from the nearest Siamese Chief; who shall depute some of his officers and people from his frontier posts, to go with the men, belonging to the English Chief, and point out and settle the mutual boundaries, so that they may be ascertained on both sides in a friendly manner. If a Siamese Chief entertain a doubt as to any boundary that has not been ascertained, the Chief, on the side of the Siamese, must send a letter with some men and people from his frontier post, to go and enquire from the nearest English Chief, who shall depute some of his officers and people from his frontier posts, to go with the men, belonging to the Siamese Chief, and point out and settle the mutual boundaries, so that they may be ascertained on both sides in a friendly manner.

Article 4th.—Should any Siamese subject go and live within the boundaries of the English, the Siamese must not intrude, enter, seize, or take such person within the English boundaries, but must report and ask for him in a proper manner, and the English shall be at liberty to deliver the party or not. Should any English subject remove, and go and live within the boundaries of the Siamese, the English must not intrude, enter, seize or take such person within the Siamese boundaries, but must report and ask for him in a proper manner, and the Siamese shall be at liberty to deliver the party or not.

Article 5th.—The English and Siamese having concluded a treaty, establishing a sincere friendship between them, merchants, subject to the English, and their ships, junks, and boats, may have intercourse and trade with any Siamese country, which has much merchandize, and the Siamese will aid and protect them, and permit them to buy and sell with facility. Merchants, subject to the Siamese, and their boats, junks, and ships, may have intercourse and trade with any English country, and the English will aid and protect them, and permit them to buy and sell with facility. The Siamese, desiring to go to an English country, or the English desiring to go to a Siamese country, must conform to the customs of the place or country on either side: should they be ignorant of the customs, the Siamese or English officers must explain them. Siamese subjects

subjects who visit an English country, must conduct themselves according to the established laws of the English country in every particular. English subjects who visit a Siamese country, must conduct themselves according to the established laws of the Siamese country in every particular.

Article 6th.—Merchants, subject to the Siamese or English, going to trade either in Bengal, or any country subject to the English, or at Bangkok, or in any country subject to the Siamese, must pay the duties upon commerce, according to the customs of the place or country on either side, and such merchants, and the inhabitants of the country, shall be allowed to buy and sell without the intervention of other persons in such countries. Should a Siamese or English merchant have any complaint or suit, he must complain to the officers and governors on either side, and they will examine and settle the same, according to the established laws of the place or country on either side. If a Siamese or English merchant buy or sell, without enquiring and ascertaining, whether the seller or buyer, be of a bad or good character, and if he meet with a bad man, who takes the property and absconds, the rulers and officers must make search and produce the person of the absconder, and investigate the matter with sincerity. If the party possess money or property, he can be made to pay: but, if he do not possess any, or if he cannot be apprehended, it will be the merchants own fault.

Article 7th.—A merchant, subject to the Siamese or English, going to trade in any English or Siamese country, and applying to build godowns or houses, or to buy or hire shops, or houses, in which to place his merchandize, the Siamese or English officers and rulers shall be at liberty to deny him permission to stay. If they permit him to stay, he shall land and take up his residence according to such terms as may be mutually agreed on: and the Siamese or English officers and rulers will assist and take proper care of him, preventing the inhabitants of the country from oppressing him, and preventing him from oppressing the inhabitants of the country. Whenever a Siamese or English merchant or subject, who has nothing to detain him, requests permission to leave the country, and to embark with his property on board of any vessel, he shall be allowed to do so with facility.

Article 8th.—If a merchant desire to go and trade in any place or country, belonging to the English or Siamese, and his ship, boat, or junk, meet with any injury whatever, the English or Siamese officers shall afford adequate assistance and protection. Should any vessel, belonging to the Siamese or English, be wrecked in any place or country, where the English or Siamese may collect any of the property belonging to such vessel, the English or Siamese officers shall make proper enquiry, and cause the property to be restored to its owner, or, in case of his death, to his heir, and the owner or heir will give a proper remuneration to persons, who may have collected the property. If any Siamese or English subject die in an English or Siamese country, whatever property he may leave, shall be delivered to his heir; if the heir be not living in the same country, and unable to come, he may appoint a person by letter to receive the property, the whole of it shall be delivered to such person.

Article 9th.—Merchants, subject to the English, desiring to come and trade in any Siamese country, with which it has not been the custom to have trade and intercourse, must first go and enquire of the governor of the country. Should any country have no merchandize, the governor shall inform the ship that has come to trade, that there is none. Should any country have merchandize sufficient for a ship, the governor shall allow her to come and trade.

Article 10th.—The English and Siamese mutually agree, that there shall be an unrestricted trade between them, in the English countries of Prince of Wales' Island, Malacca and Singapore, and the Siamese countries of Ligore, Merdilong, Singora, Patani, Junkceylon, Queda, and other Siamese provinces: Asiatic merchants of the English countries, not being Burmese, Peguers, or descendants of Europeans, shall be allowed to trade freely, overland, and by means of the rivers. Asiatic merchants, not being Burmese, Peguers, or descendants of Europeans, desiring to enter into, and trade with the Siamese dominions, from the countries of Mergui, Tavoy, Tenasserim, and Ye, which are now subject to the English, will be allowed to do so freely, overland, and by water, upon the English furnishing them with proper certificates. But merchants are forbidden to bring opium, which is positively a contraband article in the territories of Siam: and should a merchant introduce any, the governors shall seize, burn and destroy the whole of it.

Article 11th.—If any Englishman desire to transmit a letter to any person in a Siamese or other country, such person only, and no other, shall open and look into the letter. If a Siamese desire to transmit a letter to any person in an English or other country, such person only, and no other, shall open and look into the letter.

Article 12th.—Siam shall not go and obstruct, or interrupt commerce in the states of Tringano and Calantan: English merchants and subjects shall have trade and intercourse in future with the same facility and freedom, as they have heretofore had, and the English shall not go and molest, attack, or disturb those states upon any pretence whatever.

Article 13th.—The Siamese engage to the English, that the Siamese shall remain in Queda, and take proper care of that country and of its people; the inhabitants of Prince of Wales' Island and of Queda, shall have



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have trade and intercourse as heretofore: the Siamese shall levy no duty upon stock and provisions, such as cattle, buffaloes, poultry, fish, paddy, and rice, which the inhabitants of Prince of Wales' Island, or ships there, may have occasion to purchase in Queda, and the Siamese shall not farm the mouths of rivers, or any streams in Queda, but shall levy fair and proper import and export duties. The Siamese further engage, that when Chao P'hya, of Ligore, returns from Bangkok, he shall release the slaves, personal servants, family, and kindred belonging to the former Governor of Queda, and permit them to go and live wherever they please. The English engage to the Siamese, that the English do not desire to take possession of Queda, that they will not attack or disturb it, nor permit the former Governor of Queda, or any of his followers to attack, disturb, or injure, in any manner, the territory of Queda, or any other territory subject to Siam. The English engage, that they will make arrangements for the former Governor of Queda to go and live in some other country, and not at Prince of Wales' Island, or P'ye, or in Perak, Salengore, or any Burmese country. If the English do not let the former Governor of Queda go and live in some other country, as here engaged, the Siamese may continue to levy an export duty upon paddy and rice in Queda. The English will not prevent any Siamese, Chinese, or other Asiatics in Prince of Wales' Island, from going to reside in Queda, if they desire it.

Article 14th.—The Siamese and English mutually engage, that the Raja of Perak shall govern his country according to his own will: should he desire to send the gold and silver flowers to Siam as heretofore, the English will not prevent his doing as he may desire. If the Chao P'hya, of Ligore, desire to send down to Perak, with friendly intentions, forty or fifty men, whether of Siamese, Chinese, or other Asiatic subjects of Siam, or if the Raja of Perak desire to send any of his ministers or officers to seek Chao P'hya, of Ligore, the English shall not forbid them. The Siamese or English shall not send any force, to go and molest, attack, or disturb Perak. The English will not allow the state of Salengore to attack, or disturb Perak, and the Siamese shall not go and attack or disturb Salengore. The arrangements stipulated in these two last articles respecting Perak and Queda, Chao P'hya, of Ligore, shall execute as soon as he returns home from Bangkok. The fourteen articles of this treaty, let the great and subordinate Siamese and English officers, together with every great and small province, hear, receive, and obey, without fail. Their Excellencies the, Ministers of high rank at Bangkok, and Captain Henry Burney, whom the right honourable Lord Amherst, Governor of Bengal, deputed as an Envoy to represent his Lordship, framed this treaty together, in the presence of Prince Krom Menn Soorin Thiraksa, in the city of the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-thā-yā. The treaty, written in the Siamese, Malayan, and English languages, was concluded on Tuesday, on the first day of the seventh decreasing moon, 1188 year, Dog 8, according to the Siamese æra; corresponding with the Twentieth day of June, 1826, of the European æra. Both copies of the treaty are sealed and attested by their Excellencies the Ministers, and by Captain Henry Burney. One copy Captain Burney will take for the ratification of the Governor of Bengal, and one copy, bearing the Royal seal, Chao P'hya, of Ligore, will take and place at Queda. Captain Burney appoints to return to Prince of Wales' Island in seven months, in the second moon of the year, Dog 8, and to exchange the ratification of this treaty with Phra Phak-di Bori-rak, of Queda. The Siamese and English will form a friendship that shall be perpetuated, that shall know no end or interruption, as long as heaven and earth endure.

Their Excellencies the Ministers, and Captain Henry Burney, having settled a Treaty of Friendship, consisting of fourteen articles, now frame the following Agreement, with respect to English vessels desiring to come and trade in the city of the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-thā-yā, (Bangkok.)

Article 1st.—Vessels, belonging to the subjects of the English government, whether European or Asiatic, desiring to come and trade at Bangkok, must conform to the established laws of Siam in every particular. Merchants, coming to Bangkok, are prohibited from purchasing paddy or rice, for the purpose of exporting the same as merchandize; and, if they import fire-arms, shot, or gun-powder, they are prohibited from selling them to any party, but to the government. Should the government not require such fire-arms, shot, or gun-powder, the merchants must re-export the whole of them. With exception to such warlike stores, and paddy and rice, merchants, subjects of the English, and merchants at Bangkok, may buy and sell without the intervention of any other person, and with freedom and facility. Merchants coming to trade, shall pay at once the whole of the duties and charges, consolidated according to the breadth of the vessel.

If the vessel bring an import cargo, she shall be charged seventeen hundred, (one thousand and seven hundred) ticals for each Siamese fathom in breadth.

If the vessel bring no import cargo, she shall be charged fifteen hundred (one thousand and five hundred) ticals for each Siamese fathom in breadth.

No import, export, or other duty shall be levied upon the buyers or sellers, from or to English subjects.

Article 2d.—Merchant vessels, the property of English subjects, arriving off the bar, must first anchor and stop there, and the commander of the vessel must dispatch a person with an account of the cargo, and a return of the people, guns, shot, and powder, on board the vessel, for the information of the Governor, at the mouth



mouth of the river; who will send a pilot and interpreter, to convey the established regulations to the commander of the vessel. Upon the pilot bringing the vessel over the bar, she must anchor and stop below the chokey, which the interpreter will point out.

Article 3d.—The proper officers will go on board the vessel, and examine her thoroughly, and after the guns, shot and powder, have been removed and deposited at Paknam, (post at the mouth of the Menam) the Governor of Paknam will permit the vessel to pass up to Bangkok.

Article 4th.—Upon the vessel's arriving at Bangkok, the officers of the customs will go on board and examine her, open the hold, and take an account of whatever cargo may be on board, and after the breadth of the vessel has been measured and ascertained, the merchants will be allowed to buy and sell according to the first article of this agreement. Should a vessel, upon receiving an export cargo, find that she cannot cross the bar with the whole, and that she must hire cargo-boats to take down a portion of the cargo, the officers of the customs and chokeys, shall not charge any further duty upon such cargo-boats.

Article 5th.—Whenever a vessel or cargo-boat completes her lading, the commander of the vessel must go and ask Chao Phya Phra Khlang for a port-clearance, and if there be no cause for detention, Chao Phya Phra Khlang shall deliver the port-clearance without delay. When the vessel, upon her departure, arrives at Paknam, she must anchor and stop at the usual chokey, and after the proper officers have gone on board, and examined her, the vessel may receive her guns, shot and powder, and take her departure.

Article 6th.—Merchants, being subjects of the English government, whether Europeans or Asiatics, the commanders, officers, lascars, and the whole of the crew of vessels, must conform to the established laws of Siam, and to the stipulations of this treaty in every particular. If merchants, of every class, do not observe the articles of this treaty, and oppress the inhabitants of this country, become thieves or bad men, kill men, speak offensively of, or treat disrespectfully, any great or subordinate officers of the country, and the case become important in any way whatever, the proper officers shall take jurisdiction of it, and punish the offender. If the offence be homicide, and the officers, upon investigation, see that it proceeded from evil intention, they shall punish with death. If it be any other offence, and the party be the commander or officer of a vessel, or a merchant, he shall be fined; if he be of a lower rank, he shall be whipped or imprisoned, according to the established laws of Siam. The Governor of Bengal will prohibit English subjects, desiring to come and trade at Bangkok, from speaking disrespectfully or offensively to or of the great officers in Siam. If any person at Bangkok oppress any English subjects, he shall be punished, according to his offence, in the same manner.

The six articles of this agreement, let the officers at Bangkok, and merchants, subject to the English, fulfil and obey in every particular.

*No. 33.—From the Government Gazette, 8th and 15th March, 1827.*

The final establishment of commercial relations with Siam, on a footing calculated to be beneficial to the trade of British India, with that country, renders it of some importance and interest, that the arrangements agreed upon should be duly appreciated. We have been favoured with some valuable information on this head, explanatory of the origin and object of the principal stipulations of the late treaty of a commercial character, which we propose to lay before our readers. That which we at present submit, refers especially to the measures adopted to determine a fixed rate of port and custom charges, in place of the arbitrary and uncertain demands previously enforced. It is not a little curious, however, that the past system, such as it was, originated in some measure with ourselves, at a period sufficiently remote, to give the Siamese the credit of steadily adhering to stipulations, which they considered final.

Agreeably to the past practice of the Siamese court, the King has always been the principal merchant in his dominions; but upon the accession to the throne of the present King of Siam, he made a declaration, that he was determined not to be a *King-merchant*, and not to maintain any monopolies, but to permit a general free trade. The exclusive sale of sticklac, sapan-wood, aquila-wood, ivory, gamboge and pepper, which the late King of Siam monopolized, was abolished, and the collection of the duties upon those articles was farmed out. The trade in those articles was made free: that is, only when his Majesty had no supply of them for sale. Unfortunately, the King receives a great portion of his revenues in kind. The Siamese troops, when not otherwise engaged, are employed in cultivation, and in cutting timber and sapan-wood for his Majesty. The people of Laos pay their tribute in sticklac, ivory, benzoin, and other articles. The inhabitants on its frontiers, send down cotton and rafts of teak timber. The inhabitants of the Siamese portion of Cambodia, send gamboge, aquila-wood, pepper, and cardamoms. The Chinese who farms the collection of the duty upon sugar, makes his payments in that article. To get rid of all this produce, his Majesty is obliged to become a merchant, and his officers, of course, try to sell it for him on the highest possible terms. All these officers also, are allowed to engage in commerce. Although the system of monopolies was, in some measure, reduced by the present King of Siam, yet the trade of British subjects in Siam,

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had to contend against two very great evils; the claims of pre-emption, exercised by the officers of the Siamese government, and an arbitrary and uncertain mode of levying the duties and port charges. The P'hra K'hlang, and his petty officers, always endeavoured to prevent the inhabitants of Bangkok from making any purchases, until they themselves had selected whatever articles they pleased, and for which they would not settle at once a fair price, but would keep the foreign merchant waiting, day after day, for a month or six weeks, until they either forced him to submit to their terms, or to lose the chance of selling his cargo to others to any advantage. No inhabitant of Bangkok dared make any other offer for what the P'hra K'hlang and his officers desired to possess, nor could he sell any article to the foreign merchant, without the previous permission of the P'hra K'hlang, which was never given so long as that minister, or the King's merchant, had any thing to dispose of. The foreign merchant could not go to the market unless clandestinely, and at the risk of losing his property, and bringing down most severe punishment upon the Siamese trader. He was, in fact, completely in the power of the P'hra K'hlang. Next to the P'hra K'hlang and his deputy, P'hya P'hiphut, which officer, in the time of Kæmpfer, was remarkable for "pinching strangers," the principal instruments, by which foreign trade was conducted on the above mischievous principles, were Luang Keo Ayat or Pomat, a natural brother of the P'hra K'hlang, P'hya Chula, the King's merchant, and K'hun Radsitli, his son. The two last have acquired great ascendancy over the mind of the P'hra K'hlang, and they are consulted by him on all occasions. The father professes to be a native of Persia, but is evidently a native of the Coast of Coromandel. It was his special duty to settle a price for all articles required by the King from the European merchant; a duty he generally took several weeks to execute, offering the merchant, in the first instance, about one-twentieth of the value of his goods. His son is the King's mercantile clerk, and accountant to the P'hra K'hlang; an office, in which his shrewdness, cunning, and quickness, render him extremely necessary and acceptable to the P'hra K'hlang.

The endeavours of the late Mission were, of course, strenuously directed towards correcting such a mischievous system, as is above described; and fairly opening the market to the English merchant; to which end the ministers were persuaded to insert in the treaty negotiated with them, a clause in article sixth, declaring that "British merchants, and the inhabitants of the country, shall be allowed to buy and sell without the intervention of other persons,"—a stipulation which is repeated in article first, of the commercial agreement, together with the words "with freedom and facility," and that "no export, import, or other duty, shall be levied upon the buyers and sellers from or to English subjects."

On the arrival of the Mission at Bangkok, it found that the trade of British subjects was charged a general import duty of eight per cent., heavy export duties, varying from twenty to fifty per cent., and a large sum for port and anchorage charges, sometimes styled "measurement duty." The arrangement appears, from the authority of Hamilton, to have originated with ourselves.

In the year 1684, Captain Hamilton relates, that the Siamese Envoys sent to France, visited London, and there concluded a commercial treaty with our nation. As this treaty was negotiated by King Charles the Second's Ministers, no notice or copy of it appears to exist among the records of the India Company. It would, however, be satisfactory to examine a copy of it, not only to learn the nature of its provisions, but to ascertain what authority the Siamese Envoys possessed, to execute such an instrument. Judging from such of the names of the Ambassadors, whom the King of Siam formerly deputed to Europe, as can now be traced, we should believe them to have been men of subordinate rank, and the practice and habits of the Siamese court must, indeed, have experienced very great change, if to such men, or indeed to any Siamese agents, powers could be given to enter into treaties of alliance. No Envoy, who might be now deputed by the Siamese monarch, would dare to enter into any engagements, or could perform any act which his master would consider it, in any degree, obligatory to ratify or confirm.—Captain Hamilton, however, declares, that in 1718, a Mr. Collet, governor of Fort St. George, sent an agent to Siam to annul the treaty of London, and to make a new one, detrimental to all British subjects except those employed by that governor. The revised treaty stipulated, Hamilton states, that "all British subjects that had not Collet's letter, should be obliged to pay eight per cent. new customs, and measurage for their ship, which came to about five hundred pounds sterling for a ship of three hundred tons, to sell their cargoes to whom they pleased, but the money to be paid in the King's cash, that he might deliver goods for it, at his own prices, whether proper for their homeward markets, or no." This account shows, at least, the fidelity with which the Siamese can maintain the provisions of a treaty, that may be in their own favor; for the vexatious system and heavy rate of duties, of which British merchants complained at Bangkok, are no more than what Mr. Collet appears to have introduced in 1718.

The European merchants, however, generally succeeded in evading the payment of a large portion, nay a moiety of the import duties. But the measurement duty, which was said to include certain fees to the Master Attendant and officers of the P'hra K'hlang, was regulated by no fixed rule. The charges, in fact, were made by guess, under the direction of Radsitli, and no statement of particulars was ever given to the English merchant, who was made to pay the total communicated by Radsitli. Upon the death of the late King, an increased



increased charge was made on account of the Wang-na and his officers, who were then appointed. A new fee of twenty-eight and a half ticals, and sometimes thirty-two and a half ticals, was demanded for a pass for every cargo junk that a European merchant might hire, and the Governor of Paknam had lately increased his fee from eighty to one hundred and twenty-four ticals, without declaring by whose authority, or for what reason such increase was made. The original Siamese of the document furnished to Mr. Crawford, was maintained, not to mean an engagement on the part of the Siamese government, not to increase the existing duties, but a prohibition only to its officers against committing extortion. It became, therefore, the first object of the Mission, to ascertain the precise rate of this measurement duty, and the particulars of the fees and other charges, included under the head of "anchorage dues." After some discussion, the Phra-Khlang drew out himself, and delivered to the Envoy, the subjoined list of the port and anchorage duties levied upon the ship *Hunter*, which happened then to be at Bangkok. A more absurd attempt to give a colour to imposition was, perhaps, never made, than what this official account exhibits. The obvious remedy for these arbitrary and irregular imposts was to persuade the Siamese ministers to establish, in lieu of all others, one simple impost, in the form of a duty upon tonnage or measurement; a mode of proceeding which is conformable with the established usage of the Indo-Chinese nations. The Siamese would put no faith in any European registers or papers of a ship denoting her tonnage, and it was but prudent not to propose too great innovations at once, but to let them continue their own system of measuring the breadth only of a vessel. Although a vessel's capacity to carry cargo does not depend entirely on her length or breadth, any trifling inequality which may arise in practice, from the adoption of this principle, will be, probably, more than compensated by the exemption from vexatious interference which it will secure, and, at all events, such an arrangement will enable British subjects to ascertain with some exactness, what trade can be carried on advantageously with Siam. The plan involved, however, a considerable reduction of the existing duties, not only that it might become a benefit to our merchants, who complained of the exorbitance of the existing charges, but that it might afford some counterbalance against the probable mal-practices of the Phra Khlang's department, which would attempt to add, in some way or other, to the amount stipulated, however high might be the rate.

The following is a list of the amount of import and export duties, and other charges, actually paid by several vessels which have visited Bangkok, during the last four or five years:—

Brig <i>Phoenix</i> , of two hundred and thirty-two tons, and four Siamese fathoms in breadth, .....	11,245 <i>Ticals</i> .
Schooner <i>Mariana</i> , one hundred and twenty-six tons, three and half ditto ditto, .....	6,913
Brig <i>Shannon</i> , two hundred tons, three and half ditto ditto .....	8,821
Ship <i>Caroline</i> , four hundred and fifty tons, four and half ditto ditto ...	10,157
Ditto ditto, second time .....	12,457
American Brig <i>Siren</i> , one hundred and seventy-five tons, three and half Siamese ditto ditto .....	4,840
Ditto Ship <i>Liverpool</i> , Packet, four hundred tons, four and half ditto ditto, .....	11,164
Ship <i>Hunter</i> , two hundred and thirty-five tons, four ditto ditto, .....	8,688

The loss on the presents made to the King and officers of Siam, is included in the account of charges, of only the two first of the above-mentioned vessels. The American vessels, with the exception of a few fire arms, visited Bangkok in ballast. None of the *ships* imported or exported more than half a cargo. The duties upon complete cargoes would have nearly doubled the sums quoted above, as having been actually paid by those vessels.

In addition to the *data* furnished by the foregoing list, the Mission ascertained, that the following amount of port charges and duties was actually paid by country ships in China in 1821:—

Ships of five hundred and thirteen tons, Spanish dollars 9406 57 or ticals .. ..	10,410	
Ditto, four hundred and twelve ditto, .. ..	4775 50 or ticals .. ..	7,785
Brig of one hundred and sixty-eight ditto, .. ..	3500 0 or ticals .. ..	5,688

The Mission proposed a consolidated duty of one thousand and five hundred ticals for each Siamese fathom in breadth of a vessel; and after much discussion with the Phra Kleng and other officers, the King of Siam was pleased to order the ministers to accept this proposition, with respect to vessels visiting Bangkok in ballast, and to fix one thousand and seven hundred ticals per fathom, for those arriving with an import cargo. The present King, when Prince Krom Chet, had, we understand, expressed his approbation of this mode of making one charge for the vessel and her cargo, as practised in China.

The Mission found it necessary, however, to insist upon a clause being introduced into the treaty, engaging that "no import, export, or other duty shall be levied upon the buyers or sellers, from or to English subjects."

The charge for pilotage in Siam is trifling: twenty-four ticals for a ship, and sixteen for a brig; and, with respect to the practice of making presents to the Siamese officers, a practice which tended to conciliate them,



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but the observance of which was, in some degree, optional, the Mission found, that if the presents made by an English trader consisted of muskets, clothes or other articles, the market prices of which were well known, he had a chance of receiving from the King and Phra Khläng a fair return for them; but if they consisted of watches, clocks, or expensive toys, a return of one quarter of their value only was made. The presents were generally referred to Phya Chula and his son Radsithi, to be appraised, and this duty they performed so unfairly, as to induce the Phra Khläng himself, often to double the price fixed by them. There was a convenience, however, in this system of presents, a convenience which our merchants may, perhaps, still enjoy at Bangkok. Whenever a European merchant possessed some commodity for which he could find no sale, and to re-export which might not be desirable, he tendered it as a present to the King, Wang-na, or Phra Khläng, from whom he was certain of receiving some return that would, at least, prevent him from suffering a total loss.

By entering into a calculation of the amount that vessels, of the breadth cited in the above list, will now have to pay, and comparing it with the several duties they before actually paid, it will be seen, that with one exception, the American brig *Siren*, (the loss on the presents made by the commander of which vessel, however, is not known) the new arrangement possesses the advantage not only of fixing and regulating, but of reducing the rate of impost.

<i>Phœnix</i> , paid ... ..	11,243	would now have to pay 6800, at 1700 per fathom.
<i>Mariana</i> , ditto ... ..	6,913	ditto 5950 at ditto.
<i>Shannon</i> , exclusive of presents,	8,821	ditto 5950 at ditto.
<i>Caroline</i> , 2d time ditto, ... ..	12,157	ditto 7650 at ditto.
<i>Siren</i> , ditto, ... ..	4,340	ditto 5250 at 1500 ditto.
<i>Liverpool Packet</i> , ... ..	11,164	ditto 6750 at ditto.
<i>Hunter</i> , ... ..	8,688	ditto 6800 at 1700 ditto.

The greatest reduction, it appears, will take place in the large class of vessels, but against them another expence and disadvantage must be set down. The bar, at the mouth of the Menam, obliges them to communicate with Bangkok, for the most part, by means of junks, the usual hire of which is about twenty-four ticals per hundred peculs.

*A list of the Port and Anchorage Duties levied at Bangkok, in April 1826, upon the Ship Hunter, Captain Johnson, of two hundred and thirty-five tons burthen, translated from the original Siamese.*

	Ticals.	Selungs.	Total of each.
<i>On account of His Majesty the King of Siam.</i>			
Measurement duty at 80 Ticals per Siamese fathom, the <i>Hunter</i> measuring 4 fathoms in breadth,...	320	0	
For a pass for departure, ... ..	522	0	
Ditto for admission (to the capital), ... ..	512	0	
			1354 0
<i>On account of the Officers of the King.</i>			
Chow Phya Kosa Thibody, (Phra-Khläng) for the vessel's arrival and departure, ... ..	36	0	
Phya P'hip'hut Kosa, (his deputy) for ditto ditto, ... ..	24	0	
Phya Chula, (His Majesty's merchant) for passage, for admission, and departure, ... ..	24	0	
Luang Sura Sa-Khon, (Port Captain) for ditto ditto, ... ..	24	0	
<i>Khun Radsithi, Phya Chula's son, and His Majesty's Mercantile Clerk.</i>			
For passes, for admission and departure, ... ..	12	0	
For superintending weighing, ... ..	6	0	
For superintending sale and purchase, ... ..	3	0	
			21 0
Four Interpreters, ... ..	21	0	
<i>Luang Keo Ayat, (Pomal, a natural brother of the Phra Khläng.)</i>			
For keeping the account, ... ..	6	0	
For superintending sale and purchase, ... ..	3	0	
			9 0
Klung Wisoot Sa Khon, for superintending the Interpreters, ... ..	12	0	
Clerk of the Seals, (Samian Tra) for 5 Notes, at 2 Ticals 2 Selungs each, ... ..	14	2	
Clerk Wen, for 11 Notes, at ditto ditto, ... ..	27	2	
Phya Chula's Clerk, for 11 Notes, at ditto ditto, ... ..	27	2	
Luang Sura Sa K'hon, or Port-Captain's Clerk, for 11 Notes, at ditto ditto, ... ..	27	2	

Carried forward, Ticals, ... 268 0 1354 0  
Radsithi's

	Brought forward, Ticals,...	268 0	1354 0	Siam.
Radsithi's Clerk, for 11 Notes, at 1 Tical 2 Selungs each, ... ..	...	...	...	
Four Interpreters, ... ..	...	...	...	
Clerk of the Godowns, who sat and superintended the accounts, ... ..	...	...	...	
Luang Sunowarat, (Radsithi's brother) and Luang Kopitan (Sebastian, an Interpreter.) ... ..	...	...	...	
Superintending Clerk, 8 Notes, at 3 Ticals each, ... ..	...	...	...	
Provisions supplied to all the Clerks, or Weighmen, 24 men, at 4 Ticals each, ... ..	...	...	...	
		96 0	460 0	

*On account of the Officers of the Wang-na.*

Clerk of the Seals, for 4 Notes, at 1 Tical 1 Selung each, ... ..	...	...	...	5 0
Clerk Wen, for 5 Notes, at 1 Tical 1 Selung each, ... ..	...	...	...	6 1
Clerk Luang Kalju, for 5 Notes, at 1 Tical 1 Selung each, ... ..	...	...	...	6 1
Prah Surah Phassa's, or Benedetto Wangna's Port Captain's Clerk, at ditto, ... ..	...	...	...	6 1
Clerk Khun Noochit, for 5 Notes, at 3 Selungs each, ... ..	...	...	...	3 3
Interpreter Thon Khun Noochit, ... ..	...	...	...	3 3
Clerk Khun Siayut, who sat two accounts, at 1 Tical each, ... ..	...	...	...	2 0
Clerk of the Godowns, who sat and superintended two accounts, at 2 Ticals 2 Selungs each, ... ..	...	...	...	5 0
Provisions for the Clerks or Weighmen, 6 men, at 4 Ticals each, ... ..	...	...	...	24 0
			62 1	

Total of the charges at Bangkok, Ticals...1876 1

*List of the Established Charges upon a Vessel at the Guard Houses, below Bangkok.*

## PAKNAM.

*On account of the Governor.*

One Shawl, or in money, ... ..	...	...	...	...	80 0
Nine yards of Chintz, or ditto, ... ..	...	...	...	...	12 0
Two pieces of red Cotton Cloth, or ditto, ... ..	...	...	...	...	8 0
Wide Sarongs, to the value of ... ..	...	...	...	...	2 0
Narrow ditto, to the value of ... ..	...	...	...	...	1 1
				103 1	

*On account of the Officers.*

Passes for admission and departure, at 12 Ticals each, ... ..	...	...	...	...	24 0
Eight pieces of Chintz, or in money, ... ..	...	...	...	...	8 0
Pilotage, ... ..	...	...	...	...	24 0
Inspecting Officers, ... ..	...	...	...	...	3 0
Charge of the Guns, ... ..	...	...	...	...	6 0
				65 0	

## PAKLAAT.

*Upon Arrival.*

Measurement Charge, ... ..	...	...	...	...	8 0
Eight pieces of Chintz, or in money, ... ..	...	...	...	...	4 0

*Upon Departure.*

Measurement Charge, ... ..	...	...	...	...	4 0
Inspecting Officers, ... ..	...	...	...	...	2 0
For taking a copy of the Port Clearance received at Bangkok, ... ..	...	...	...	...	0 2
				18 2	

Total of the Charges below Bangkok, Ticals... 186 3

Grand Total, Ticals...2062 4

Only two clerks and one weighman actually attended, and their attendance was limited to three hours a day, and most irregularly. They applied for remuneration and food to Mr. Hunter, declaring, that no portion of the charges made by the Phra Khlang, on such account, was ever received by them. Upon enquiry, the Phra Khlang stated, that these charges had been levied for a century past, and that whether a man performed the service described, or received the amount charged on his account, is immaterial, as the ancient customs of the country direct the charges to be set down in the manner detailed in this account. The mistake of charging for interpreters *twice*, was ingeniously explained, namely, that the second charge was for the

clerks belonging to the interpreters, but as the interpreters have no such assistants, the money would be given to themselves. Neither the King's nor the Wang-na's port captain is allowed a clerk, and Radsithi is Phya Chula's clerk. Mr. Hunter, to whom the ship *Hunter* was consigned, never saw, nor until he was shewn this list, did he ever hear of any of the numerous "Notes," for which his vessel is charged. The Phra Khleng explained, that every intelligence notifying the arrival or departure of a vessel, and every order respecting her cargo, are put down in writing, for the information of the different Siamese officers, by their clerks, who are authorized to charge for the receipt, as well as the transmission of a note. As no portion of the cargo of the *Hunter* was sold to, or purchased from the Phra Khleng, the "clerks of the godowns" were not employed, yet they are included in this list for superintending accounts which never existed. Great trouble is always given to the foreign merchants at Bangkok, by the Phra Khleng's clerks and weighmen, who seldom attend before twelve o'clock, and retired always before five. Without their joint presence, a vessel cannot receive her cargo, and a foreign merchant has daily the trouble of going himself in search of one of the two, and is often at a stand through the absence of both parties. Mr. Hunter was refused a detailed list like the above of the port and anchorage charges of the *Hunter*, but was obliged to pay, at once an amount of one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six ticals at Bangkok, and only sixty-five ticals at Paknam. Upon its being pointed out to the Phra Khleng, that these sums were not in accordance with his list, which was subsequently given to the Mission, he stated, that the difference had been remitted in favor of Mr. Hunter.

The Siamese government have no idea of what is called "a free and unrestricted trade," and an article of a treaty with these words only, and without arranging and fixing the minutest details of port regulations, and rates of duties and charges, would have been a dead letter. The ministers also were so immediately interested in their system of conducting foreign trade, that any argument, as to a less restricted trade, proving a mutual benefit to both nations, would have been entirely lost upon them.

The Mission had great difficulty before it persuaded the Siamese ministers to include Surat merchants, and the Asiatic subjects of the British government, in the benefits conceded to commerce by the treaty. Nothing can be more iniquitous than the conduct of the Siamese towards the Surat vessels. The Phra Khleng, and his officers, fix the price of every article of merchandize brought by those vessels, and take and distribute among themselves whatever portion of the cargo they please, for the purpose of retailing the same afterwards at a profit to themselves, in addition to the usual port charges and import and export duties.

The trade of native junks between Siam and Penang, and Singapore, is conducted by private Chinese merchants of Bangkok, and it is one to which the Court of Siam is as yet indifferent; as a proof of which we may state, that during the whole of the negotiations of the late Mission, no attempt was ever made to obtain any reciprocal advantage for that trade, or to secure a pledge even, that the present very moderate duties and anchorage charges levied upon it at our ports, should be continued. This indifference, however, on the part of the Court of Siam, an indifference under which the trade has increased and prospered, has begun to change, and during the last two years, many new duties have been imposed upon the Chinese junks trading between Bangkok and the Straits of Malacca. So much have these additional duties been increasing, that the Chinese traders, before the departure of the Mission from Bangkok, petitioned the Court to place their commerce upon a fixed and more moderate system of duties, "in the same *advantageous* manner as the English had secured by treaty." There is, however, no security for the continuance of the trade with Siam by native junks, and, at any rate, it must not be forgotten, that whilst our ships can navigate at all seasons, those vessels make but one voyage during the year. Messrs. Hunter and Malloch, from whom the Mission received, on every occasion, the most liberal and cordial assistance and co-operation, are decidedly of opinion, that much benefit may be derived from the trade of Siam, by making occasional visits to Bangkok: and that such a course is advantageous, no proof can be more striking than that afforded by the Surat traders, who, notwithstanding all the exactions and vexations of the present system, still send a vessel annually to Siam. The Mission witnessed the distress and extortion experienced by the Nakhoda of a Surat vessel, in December 1825, and was much surprised, indeed, to find him go again last year, to pass through the same sufferings. Merchants will, of course, judge for themselves, as to the best mode of trading with Siam, and the provisions of the present treaty will, at least, supply them with better *data* than they have hitherto possessed, for estimating the probable amount of imposts to be levied at Bangkok upon their consignments. That this treaty will, at once, change a system which has existed for centuries, no one can presume to hope. Most probably, whenever the European merchant interferes with the speculations of the Phra Khleng and his officers, who are unhappily all traders, their influence will still be secretly and powerfully employed against him. But, as the present treaty was negotiated on terms of equality, by the representatives of the two nations; as it was not dictated to the Siamese; as it was discussed and originally written in their own tongue; and, above all, as it is the manifest interest and advantage of Siam to keep it, there are many grounds for hoping that its provisions will be generally respected and maintained by that nation. We need hardly



hardly state, that the stipulations of this treaty are not to be enforced at Bangkok, until the Siamese court receive the Governor General's ratification.

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Whilst discussing the several articles of the treaty, repeated attempts were made to inscribe the different obligations in a more compressed form; to declare at once that "neither the Siamese, or the English shall intrude, &c. &c." But the Siamese ministers objected decidedly to such a construction of the sentences, stating, that it would be contrary to the Siamese customs, and that it could not possibly render the meaning of each article so clear and precise as it would be, by putting down separately what each party engaged. It was also indispensable, that the version of the treaty into the English language should be made as literal as possible, because it was well known, that the translation would undergo much examination at Bangkok, and any omission or reduction of the sentences in the original, which is a language verbose, and full of repetitions, would have been imputed by that jealous court to some evil intention, that would have tended to destroy the whole value of the treaty. Some of the Mission had acquired a tolerable knowledge of the Siamese language, and had procured dictionaries and grammars of it from those native Christians who understand Latin.

The Siamese negotiators could not be persuaded to specify, either in the fifth or ninth articles of the treaty, the particular ports which they would not allow British vessels to visit. It was evident, that the Siamese government desire to reserve to itself the power of preventing British vessels from entering those ports which they have not been accustomed to visit, although it was ashamed to avow this desire, after having been assured that Siamese vessels and merchants might proceed to any English country. It appears to be the object and policy of Siam, in the same manner as with many other states, to make the capital an entrepôt for the whole commerce of the country, and to discourage foreign vessels from proceeding to the provincial ports, or direct to the places of growth, for their cargoes.

The sixth article of the treaty provides a more equitable mode than what has hitherto obtained, for the adjustment of "any complaint or suit" that British merchants may have at Bangkok. The Siamese law of debtor and creditor gives the latter a right to go himself and seize the former, and imprison him, or any of his family, until the debt be discharged. If, however, the creditor, when employed in apprehending the debtor, strike him, or any of his family, the debt is immediately cancelled. Hitherto, whenever an English trader complained to the P'hra K'hlang against any person in his debt, he was asked, why he had trusted the party, and told to go himself, and imprison him. The Mission saw an instance of Messrs. Hunter and Mallock detaining the person of a Prince for debt. This system was, of course, liable to many objections, and particularly, as an attempt to seize a debtor, might often be the cause of a serious affray between the foreign trader and the inhabitants of Bangkok, and the rules detailed in the sixth article of the treaty, will less objectionably provide for the merchant's security. The concluding expression, "it will be the merchant's own fault," refers to the circumstance of foreign traders demanding satisfaction from the King, for losses or irrecoverable debts; and as long as the officers of the P'hra K'hlang's department pointed out the persons to whom only the foreign trader could dispose of his goods, he had a right to look to the government for any losses that he might sustain by the insolvency or misconduct of such persons. But the proposed new regulations, as they allow the foreign trader to buy and sell freely, without the intervention of the P'hra K'hlang's department, will, of course, render it incumbent upon himself to take care with whom he may deal. British traders will do well to give no credit, or at least very sparingly and cautiously, as the Siamese are wholly ignorant of that great mercantile virtue—punctuality, and are, besides, always very averse to part with money once come into their possession.

The prohibition against the introduction of opium into the dominions of Siam, is of very ancient date, although, in some reigns, it was not so rigidly maintained as it has been during the last five or six years. Turpin says, in his History of Siam, vol. 2d, page 262, that opium, in Siam, was positively contraband, and that the reigning King, in 1771, had sentenced to death several of his subjects, who had transgressed this law. The penalty of late years, has been forfeiture of the opium, with a fine of eight times the weight in silver, for all opium found with any person, and sometimes, particularly at Queda, and in the southern provinces of Siam, the boat, and the whole of the rest of the cargo or property of a trader, discovered introducing opium, have been seized and confiscated. The clause regarding it, in the tenth article of the treaty, was intended, at the same time that the Siamese ministers prohibited the introduction of opium, to fix the penalty of disobedience, and on as low a scale as possible. Although we learn that opium may be easily introduced and sold at Bangkok, we cannot recommend any British trader to subject himself to the risk and personal inconvenience of conveying such a commodity there.

The Siamese ministers had been in the practice of opening all English letters that came into their possession, and some dispatches of the Envoy, before his arrival at Bangkok, were so treated. Strong representations were made of the disgrace and heinousness of such a practice, and the terms of the eleventh article, are as far as the Siamese ministers could be persuaded to acquiesce in this point. They took care to reserve to themselves the power of still opening the letters of all Asiatic subjects of the British government, on the plea,

that

that the subjects of Ava might endeavour to transmit incendiary letters into Siam, through our territories on the coast of Tenasserim.

The original Siamese in the tenth, as well as in the thirteenth article of the treaty, mentions that "*Khek*" and "*Cheen*," or Chinese only, shall be allowed to travel into the interior of the Siamese territories from our possessions on the coast of Tenasserim and to the eastward. "*Khek*" is, literally, a foreigner, but it is a term generally applied to Malays, and natives of Hindoostan, who are not descendants of Europeans. The Burmese are called "*Phoma*," the Peguers "*Mon*," the Chinese "*Cheen*," or "*Khek*," and Europeans, generally, "*Frang*," distinguishing the English by "*Angkrit*," the Portuguese, "*Portukis*," and the Dutch, "*Holanda*." The Americans are "*Mericam*," and all native Christians are termed "*Portukis*." "*Khek*" and "*Cheen*," of the original, have, therefore, been translated into "Asiatic subjects of the British government, not being Burmese, Peguers, or descendants of Europeans." The Siamese negotiators declared, that the standing laws of Siam, prohibiting Burmese or Peguers being admitted into the Siamese territories, could not, for the present, be altered, and that as a great portion of the Burman country still belongs to Ava, the inhabitants of which might try to gain admission into Siam, with our Burmese subjects, or under pretence of being such, it was necessary that no person should be admitted into the Siamese dominions, from our Burmese conquests, without being furnished with certificates or passports. The Siamese negotiators, also, could not be prevailed upon to admit Europeans, or descendants of Europeans, into the interior of the Siamese dominions. They have an idea, that the object of such persons visiting the interior, would be only to ascertain routes, and make maps for purposes of future hostility, and the Mission found it impossible, at present, to remove this jealousy and suspicion. But after all, the overland trade, between our possessions and the Siamese dominions, will be chiefly conducted, as it has always been, by Chinese, Malays and natives of the Coast of Coromandel, in the hands of which last-mentioned race, the ancient commerce between Mergui and Siam, was so extensive and flourishing. All British subjects, without exception, may, of course, proceed by sea to any Siamese port.

With respect to the first article of the commercial agreement, we may observe, that the Siamese government, like many others, reserves to itself the power of prohibiting the exportation of grain, and importation of fire-arms. By the present laws of Siam, no vessel can export paddy or rice, without a special licence, and the Siamese negotiators, although they expressed their readiness, in seasons of plenty, to permit British, as well as Chinese traders, to export supplies of grain, still desired that the clause in this article should be expressed as it is, in order to prevent British vessels from coming to Siam, for the sole purpose of trading in grain, or from claiming a right to export it.

The data on which the consolidated duty was fixed, have already been shown. A Siamese fathom measures six feet six inches of English measure, and a Siamese tical, as assayed lately at the Calcutta Mint, is worth one sicca rupee, and about three annas and a half. The sicca rupee is not current in Siam, but the Spanish dollar is very readily received by the public officers, who have allowed, sometimes, the commanders of American vessels to discharge their port charges, at the rates of eight *selungs*, or two *ticals*, per dollar, instead of at the usual market rate of six and a half *selungs*. The Siamese officers measure a vessel inside, between decks, at what they consider, often erroneously, to be the broadest part. The space between the lining and outer plank of the vessel is included, and if the measure cannot be introduced there, an allowance is made for it.

The second article of the commercial agreement, details the rules required to be observed upon the first arrival in Siam. Every government has, of course, a right to define the terms upon which it will admit vessels into its ports, and particularly as far as its capital. The Siamese government is extremely anxious to prevent any vessel crossing the bar, until full information be received at the capital of her size, character, and object; and few matters can give so much discontent and dissatisfaction to the Siamese officers, as a vessel crossing the bar at once, and reporting her own arrival at Paknam. The navigation over the bar is not very difficult, and the commander of the American ship, *Liverpool Packet*, found a Chinese fisherman to engage to pilot his vessel over it. This man was, immediately after, seized, and he has not been since heard of. It is therefore particularly recommended to commanders of English vessels, who do not desire to be subjected to inconvenience or difficulty, in their future commercial transactions at Bangkok, to conform as strictly as possible, in the first instance, to the port regulations set down in this commercial agreement, which are no more than what have always been in force.

The third article of the commercial agreement enforces the regulation, by which a vessel is obliged to land her guns at the mouth of the river; a regulation which must have been introduced at the time the French detachments were driven out of Siam. M. Chaumont mentions having been saluted by the guns of English and Dutch vessels lying above Bangkok, and of vessels at anchor off the old city of Yothia, having fired salutes in celebration of the coronation of the Kings of England and Portugal. LaLoubere makes no mention of this regulation. The vessel in which Kœmpfer went to Siam, does not appear to have entered the river. But Captain Hamilton, who visited Siam in 1719, mentions his having been obliged to land and deposit his guns at Bangkok, before his vessel proceeded to the old capital Yothia. This custom is exacted by the  
Siamese,



Siamese, not only as a measure of precaution and safety, but as a security against a commander leaving the port with any of the inhabitants of Siam, or without discharging the whole of his port charges and duties. It was tried, without success, to have the regulation limited to the delivery at Paknam, of all powder on board of British vessels. Any urgent attempts to have the guns left on board would have served only to augment the suspicion and fears of the Siamese.

One of the greatest difficulties experienced at Bangkok, is the tedious and procrastinating manner in which the Siamese conduct business. They have no idea whatever of the value of time, and in no part of the world are the delays of office more vexatious. This point was urgently pressed on the notice of the Siamese ministers, and a part of the fifth article of the commercial agreement will, it is hoped, serve to remind the P'ha K'hlang of the inconvenience of keeping a commander of a British vessel waiting two or three days for his port clearance.

The sixth and last article of the commercial agreement gave the Mission, we are informed, a great deal of trouble. The Siamese ministers, at first, proposed to render all British subjects, without exception, liable to capital punishment and whipping, for the commission of any offences with respect to which the laws of Siam have prescribed such punishments. The Mission pointed out, that British subjects are entirely ignorant of the laws of Siam, and possess no means of acquiring a knowledge of them; that it would be much better to express in this article for what offences they should suffer death; and that it was not our custom to whip the commanders of ships, their officers or merchants, but to punish them by levying a pecuniary fine upon them. The ministers, after some argument, agreed to render this article more precise as to some of the penalties to which British subjects should be liable; but they then declared, that it did not provide for one offence, which, in the eyes of a Siamese, is of much greater magnitude than even murder—speaking disrespectfully of his Majesty the King of Siam, a crime which is invariably punished with death. The Mission observed, that it did not possess the power of engaging, that British subjects should be liable to capital punishment for such an offence, and that it was improper to suppose, for a moment, that any person could speak disrespectfully of so great and enlightened a prince as the present monarch of Siam. After much discussion, this difficulty was overcome, and it was finally settled, that the Right Honorable the Governor General should particularly caution British subjects visiting Siam, not to show disrespect, in any manner, to the officers of Siam. It appears, that British subjects who have hitherto visited Bangkok, have found it extremely difficult to restrain the expression of their opinions, respecting the conduct and character of the officers and people of Siam. Yet moderation and forbearance, on the part of a British trader, desirous of making a profitable adventure to Bangkok, are indispensable; for the Siamese officers are vexed and hurt by contemptuous and intemperate language, in the same proportion as their conduct is ever provoking it. We beg to refer, here, to the account given by Captain Hamilton, of his narrow escape from forfeiture of life, and of the whole of his vessel and property, upon a charge of having only said, that “the King of Siam had been imposed upon;” an expression which was declared to be *high treason*.

No. 34.—From the Government Gazette, June 21, 1827.

*Extracts from a Journal kept at Siam, from July 1826 to March 1827.*—“The Prah-klang was employed from the 26th July to the 30th November, 1826, at Paknam and Pacclaat, repairing the forts, and mounting guns, as they were sent down from Bangkok; where they have been engaged casting them for the last twelve months, and driving piles from the small fort in the middle of the river at Paknam, to the opposite shore, to prevent ships passing outside of it, by which, they would be subject to the whole fire of the great guns from the large fort at Paknam.

The King, attended by about one hundred princes, and men of rank, proceeded to inspect the Prah-klang's operations, and returned the same evening, seemingly highly pleased with them. There are about two hundred guns of various shapes and sizes, in the large fort at Paknam, and nearly as many at Pacclaat. The greater part of these were cast at Bangkok, and from the number already burst in trying them, (one in three) they are fearful the rest will also burst, and are, consequently, extremely anxious to procure a supply of Europe guns. The eighteen small forts round the palace ground at Bangkok, have no guns mounted.

On the 18th September, the brother of the Prah-klang, P'ya Si Phipad, acting in his absence at Paknam, called us to witness, that the two Nacpodalis of the Surat brigs, *Hamoody* and *Naserree*, wished to dispose of their cargoes in the manner they had formerly done, from a fear of giving offence to their employers, as the new treaty, they said, had not been known to them, although, at the same time, they were sure, that a saving of at least four thousand ticals each, would have been made by abiding by it, besides other advantages. P'ya Si Phipad and other government officers, then present, expressed their anxious desire to put the treaty into effect in the present instance, and made particular enquiries of us, whether any deviation, at present, from it, would displease the Bengal government; and so fearful were they of this being



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the case, that they required our signing a paper, specifying the wishes of the Nacqodahs to abide by the old treaty, which we, of course, did, and at the same time explained to them, that as the treaty had not been ratified by the Governor General in Council, there was no necessity for putting it in force until it was. The Prah-khlang was also very desirous, when the bark *Mary Ann Sophia* arrived in December, to carry us away, to get us to follow the new treaty, but as she had very little import cargo, and the duty on the export one had been previously settled, it would not have suited us to have gone by it.

It is a common saying at Bangkok, when the Nacqodah of a Surat vessel arrives, that he will be sure, before he leaves, to bewail the hard treatment which he has experienced : but during the last year they enjoyed greater privileges, and though not quite satisfied in departing, yet sufficiently so not to shed tears. From what was remarked last year, with regard to the trade with the Surat vessels, and indeed experienced in many instances, after the departure of Captain Burney, there is every reason to believe, that a British merchant arriving with a cargo of suitable goods for the Siam market, would be allowed to dispose of them without undergoing those difficulties, to which he would have been so much subject before, in being compelled to sell to, and purchase from the Government ; yet it cannot be expected that all their ancient customs, so long and strictly adhered to, should be relinquished at once. Time and better intercourse may effect a change, and then we may enjoy similar privileges as the Chinese, in being allowed to go up the country to purchase goods. These people carry on a very lucrative trade from many parts of China and Hainan, and as the shop-keepers are, generally, a very honest, well disposed set of people, there is no doubt, when their fears of us begin to abate, for at present they actually consider us little better than pirates, that three or four vessels might be annually employed with valuable cargoes, amounting to two hundred thousand teals, with much advantage, as the taste of the Siamese for European commodities daily increases. There is no place to which a small capital might be ventured with more security than to Siam, and its adjacent ports, touching at Trengano, Calantan, &c. on the way thither.

Since the accession of his present Majesty to the throne, he has abandoned the idea of trading himself, and it is only owing to the Prah-khlang, and his brother Pya Si Phipad's ambitious views, more particularly those of the latter, that merchants have met with obstacles in the freedom of trade. A British merchant finds also the native Christians\* and Chulias very great annoyances. Of the former, there are one thousand, and those have been always known to be the dirtiest, laziest, and most unconscionable villains, uniting chicanery with prevarication, and to deal with whom the British merchant finds all his care and attention extremely requisite. They are so much attached to the government, that they withhold all information which they may, in any way, consider detrimental to it. The greatest hatred of us prevails likewise amongst the other class (Chulias), from motives of religion, and they take great delight in doing us all the mischief they can—the most of them are employed under the government, and as shop-keepers.

The Siamese eat indiscriminately all kind of food used by Europeans. The Prah-khlang's family frequently dined with us, and conducted themselves extremely well.

It is only by great perseverance and patience that a British merchant visiting Siam, can overcome the obstacles in trade, for the Siamese delight in dallying to gain advantages, and put a person off his guard, and, if he is of a hasty and irritable disposition, and makes use of any abusive or insulting language, or offers to strike any of them, they will immediately go away and put a stop to business for several days, but by firmness and forbearance, he will finally succeed.

The result of the Burmese war has made a total revolution in their ideas of the British power, which, from the reports of the junks from Penang and Singapore, they have hitherto considered as very trifling. The conclusion of the treaty has insured their respect for the British government, to please which, appears, at present, to be a very great object with them. After Captain Burney's departure, their fears of the appearance of British troops was so great, that all attempts to quiet them were unsuccessful. Their belief in astrology only adds to their timid fears, as they say, it is decreed and written in their books, that the English will conquer Siam, and they think that it will ultimately be the case. It was reported after the departure of the Mission, that a letter had been suspended to a tree on the frontiers by some Peguers, warning them that the British had resolved on invading the country immediately, and the masters of the Penang and Singapore junks arriving at the same time this communication reached Bangkok, confirmed the report, by stating, that a hostile fleet was ready to sail from Singapore to attack them. This caused the greatest confusion, for they are naturally

\* These people, with the exception of five or six, are all very poor, and support themselves entirely by fishing, and whatever they do not use is sold to purchase rice, which is very plentiful and cheap. The Siamese themselves have no aversion to any one differing from them in religion, and the Court is formed of Chinese, Malays, Chulias, Bengalees, Christians, Cochin Chinese, Laos, &c., and many of them hold very high employments, and are much beloved. I know several Chinese at Bangkok, who have become Siamese, and cut their tails off. The Chinese, immediately after their arrival, adopt the manners of the Siamese, and burn their dead. Upwards of two thousand Chinese annually arrive from Fokien and Hainan, and a very few from Canton.

rally so credulous, that the Chinese take great delight in relating the most ridiculous stories, which gain immediate belief, a circumstance which these crafty people turn to good account, by commanding privileges they would, otherwise, find unattainable, as well as with a view of inculcating a bad spirit in the Siamese against us, of whom they are extremely jealous, and think we encroach too much upon their trade. Any favourable mention of us would not be credited. Their minds have been so long biassed by false reports, that to attempt to contradict them, would be useless. A stranger, on his arrival, is immediately questioned about the English. If his reply is in their favour, he is told, with apparent displeasure by the government officers, that he is a friend to the English.

On asking the Siamese what they would do if attacked, they replied, that they would all run up the country, and such would, probably, be the case, from their cowardly disposition. It is very common to observe one Burman beat off three or four Siamese, both on the river and on shore, and take what fish, rice, &c. he wants, which the Burmese captives are allowed to do to a certain extent. They levy a contribution of a few covies from each person's boat, to which the Siamese, as well as Chinese, are invariably obliged to submit. These poor creatures are kept in heavy irons, and constantly employed in ditching, building, sawing timber, brick-making, &c. and are badly fed, their appearance is, consequently, miserable.

So great an effect has the Burman war produced on the minds of the Siamese, that since the middle of August 1826, three war-boats, commanded by native pilots, were ordered to cruise outside the bar, and report the arrival of all ships before they passed, and the injunctions were so strict, that any negligence only led to the decapitation of the pilots. On our departure from the country, we still left them cruising.

About two months after the departure of the Mission, we found it necessary to make sundry presents to the Prah-klang, his brother Pya Si Phipad, and the second Prah-klang, to regain their good will, which the presence of the Mission had somewhat abated. This induced them to assist us in the disposal of our stock of goods.

The Catin, or great holidays, commence at the new moon in October, and last a few days, during which time the King appears six or seven days, in visiting the pagodas, and the forts at Paknam and Pacclaat. The King, however, intends reducing the number of days devoted to this festival, as he thinks them too great a waste of time, which might be usefully employed in the administration of government, and in active employment.

On the 4th of November, information was brought by several people, of the Siamese having partly filled up the river at the mouth of the Mecklong, leaving but a small space, sufficient to admit vessels only drawing ten feet water, and that they entertained some idea of doing something with the bar at Paknam, to prevent large ships getting over.

On the 11th November, three small junks arrived from Cochin China, with cargoes of sundries, and letters from that government, to assist the person in charge in the disposal of his goods. The principal, attended by the masters of the other two junks, and twelve followers, proceeded to wait upon the Prah-klang, but before they had passed the outer gate of his dwelling house, were stopped and detained there for twenty minutes, until a message from his Excellency told them, that he could not see them that night. They returned, seemingly displeased, but without expressing their disappointment. The circumstance is worthy of notice, as refuting an idle rumour, originating wholly with this trading speculation, that a mission had arrived to claim assistance from the Siamese, to quell a rebellion in Cochin China, intended to raise another king to the throne of that country.

The King has, within the last eight or ten months, erected an extensive shed, covered with tiles, about a mile up the Bezar river, nearly opposite the Prah-klang's house, in which an hundred and thirty-six war-boats, sixty feet long, seven feet broad in the middle, and three and a half feet at the stem and stern, and capable of carrying about thirty men, were lodged. A similar shed has been erected a very little distance in-shore, at Bangkok Nai river, nearly opposite the palace, a quarter of a mile up, with one hundred boats of the above description. Immediately above the palace, and on the same side with it, the government have constructed smaller, but similar sheds to the above, along the banks of the river. Several public buildings were also erecting by the palace, one of which was built a good deal after the English style. The King has issued orders, that all the small buildings, principally occupied by petty shop-keepers, &c. near the palace, should be immediately pulled down, and that no person should in future build there, who could not afford to erect a handsome edifice.

On the 16th March 1827, a large fire broke out near the palace, by which upwards of five hundred houses were destroyed, amongst which was one of the palaces of a brother of his present Majesty. The prince, by this accident, sustained a considerable loss; but, as customary in the country, numerous presents were sent to him from all quarters, and it is thought that he, like many others who have suffered in this way, will be enriched by his misfortunes.

Another very large fire, on the 19th March, occurred at his Majesty's magazines, in the Bezar river, from a man having taken a light with him into the building, which occasioned the accident. It caused an immense

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immense explosion, and it is probable, that not less than one thousand houses, on both sides of the narrow river, must have been burnt down. The King, second king and princes, with an immense crowd, came to the spot, the former to render what assistance they could, but as, in similar cases, more confusion than regularity prevailed, and nothing was done of any consequence. Thia Phipad, second Prah-klang, and one of the best men in the country, had his house completely levelled with the ground, and lost a little boy at the same time, but saved all his money, which was said to be very considerable.

When we left Bangkok we did not hear of any Burmese subjects of the British government, having been brought prisoners to that place, and it is likely that they will not now renew a system so inimical to their own interests, particularly under the dread which they entertain of the British power.

The annual revenue of Siam is estimated at two and a half millions of ticals, which is disbursed in the payment of government servants, and maintaining the princes, said to be altogether about two thousand, leaving but little in the treasury, in which it is said the sum of one lac of ticals has never been exceeded. The expenses incurred in the erection of pagodas, public edifices, &c. are paid by contributions levied on the inhabitants, each according to his circumstances. A present sent by Messrs. Morgans, Hunter and Co. to his Majesty, of a quantity of iron railing, was, in consequence, refused, although highly approved, knowing they would be obliged to make a suitable return. They therefore purchased it by the contributions of the people, each paying, as above, from five to forty peculs of sugar. Every merchant and shop-keeper is obliged to contribute towards the object for which the others are taxed.

One of the principal people possessing twenty thousand, and a shop-keeper ten thousand ticals, would be considered rich. The Prah-klang, and his brother Pya Si Phipad, are amongst the richest in the country.

The interest of money at Siam is equal to thirty-three per cent. per annum.

A report got afloat after Captain Burney's departure, that the Governor of Prince of Wales's Island had seized upon Queda, which created great alarm at Bangkok. This was owing to the report of the master of a Chinese junk, who said that an expedition was preparing to start from Penang when he left.

A merchant visiting Bangkok ought never to inform the government, or any other person, what description of goods he wants, but content himself with gradually purchasing what he really wants, as opportunities offer. This measure will not only prevent the price being raised, but keep the government officers from compelling him to purchase from themselves, even if they wished it, by desiring the shop-keepers, &c. not to sell the description of goods he wants under a certain price.

The Siamese are a most contented and quiet race of people, and seldom ever quarrel or fight, and the climate being extremely fine, they all enjoy most excellent health. They are also very honest, and, during a stay amongst them of nearly three years, few instances occurred of theft. They are, however, greatly given to lying, and their mean low cunning is beyond all description. One trait in their character is, their extreme fondness for their children, to whose education they pay particular attention, and there are but few amongst the coolies, who cannot read and write, while most are even qualified to hold the highest appointments in the country. The lower orders are better and more civil than those of higher rank. All pay the greatest respect to the aged, and do not require so much homage from them.

The Siamese had, for a length of time wished for our departure, as they are utterly averse to the residence of any English amongst them, from the idea that they would report whatever occurred: therefore, when they heard that we were on the point of leaving, they appeared evidently very glad, but as they wished to part with us on good terms, their conduct was extremely kind and civil, and even Pomat, a natural brother of the Prah-klangs, who is one of the most annoying persons about the Court, visited us frequently, and behaved very obligingly to us. Indeed, every one endeavoured to serve us as much as they could, and on our departure we received a short complimentary letter of six lines from the Prah-klang to the house of Messrs. Morgans, Hunter and Co. at Singapore, which occupied him and all his department three days to compose, and was afterwards submitted to his Majesty, and the other Ministers before it was sent to us—This is only noticed here, to give an idea of their alacrity in transacting business. There can be little doubt, though we did all in our power to gain their good feelings during the time we remained in the country, that they will never suffer any British subjects to live entirely amongst them again. Before we left the Prah-klang, he expressed a desire to obtain some Burmese religious books, for which he was going to send to Tavay or Martaban.—The priests were then engaged in a new translation of their sacred books to present to his Majesty.

The Siamese have been casting a brass gun of eighty Peculs, which had occupied, when we left, nearly two thousand men for two months, and it would take up two months more to finish it. The princes, and most of the people of rank were, for some time, busily employed in getting bellows made for the purpose.

We touched at Tringano, on our way from Siam to Singapore, on the 1st of April last, and when we landed, found several of the principal people ready to receive us, which they did with much cordiality, and introduced us to the Sultan, who was also extremely kind. He made many enquiries respecting the conduct



of the Siamese, and the treaty concluded by Captain Burney, expressing great pleasure with that part of it which related to himself and his country, and seemed anxious to know when it was the intention of the British Government to invade the country, saying, that he, as well as the Raja of Calantan, would lend his assistance with troops. We explained to him that it was not the intention of the British Government to attack or molest the Siamese, but to be on good terms with them. A captain of a trading vessel from Calantan informed me, that similar enquiries had been made at that place, and that the Raja appeared equally displeased with the Siamese, and had said he would not in future pay any more tribute to them.

In Tringano there is Tin .....	2000 Peculs.
” ” ” Pepper .....	4000 ”
” ” ” Gold dust .....	”
and at Calantan, Pepper .....	12000 ”

In accordance with a long established custom at Siam, the King ordered the Prah-klang to see that all who owed us debts should pay them before we left—that his own should also be discharged, and that an allowance should be made to us for any detention we might experience on this account.

The Siamese, from the dread of a rebellion, will not keep up a standing army, but raise conscripts in the event of a war.

It is very difficult to ascertain the population of Siam; but it is said to amount to about five millions, under the following distribution:—

Siamese, Laos, &c. ....	3½ millions,
Chinese .....	1½ ”

throughout the whole kingdom. At Bangkok alone, there are 100,000; but the greater part are Chinese.

It were unnecessary to add any thing more respecting a place already so well known as Siam.

## E R R A T A.

*Historical Sketch*—Page 12, tenth line from the top, for “20th Battalion, 20th Regiment, Native Infantry,” read 2d Battalion, &c.

*Documents*—Pages 17\* to 24\* are duplicate folios.

- ” 105 to 107, for “Rangoon,” Marginal Note, read Asam.
- ” 108 to 112, for “Rangoon, 1824” ditto, read Asam, 1825.
- ” 180, “No. 151, (A)” is omitted at the beginning of the heading.
- ” 229, for “No. 147 (C)” read No. 174 (C.)
- ” 237, for “No. 148 (D)” read No. 174 (D).
- ” 240, for “No. 149” read No. 175.

F I N I S.

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(175-100)













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
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